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d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10 Solution #10 to SUCI calculation: SUPI Concealment using Hybrid shared Key
| Editor’s Note: Details on KDF inputs are FFS.
Editor's Note: The pros and cons (including security, complexity and efficiency) of combining traditional asymmetric cryptographic algorithms with post-quantum cryptographic algorithms for SUCI calculation is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Why to use an ad-hoc KEM combiner instead o... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10.1 Introduction
| Replacing classical cryptography with PQC algorithms at an early stage carries an inherent risk as a first time widespread deployment and more rigorous testing of PQC algorithms may be needed. So it will be beneficial to have it integrated with classical asymmetric cryptography based security mechanisms via a hybrid ap... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10.2 Solution details
| |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10.2.1 Processing on UE side
| The Hybrid shared key generation scheme is implemented such that for computing a fresh SUCI, the UE uses the provisioned EC based public key of the home network, provisioned PQC-based public key of the home network, freshly generated ECC (elliptic curve cryptography) ephemeral public/private key pair and PQC-based key ... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10.2.2 Processing on home network side
| The Hybrid shared key generation scheme is implemented such that for deconcealing a SUCI, the home network uses the received ECC ephemeral public key of the UE, encrypted PQC shared key, EC based private key of the home network and the PQC-based private key of the home network.
1. Home network (HN) generates a fi... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10.2.3 Sample Profiles for SUCI calculation
| Profile C uses Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) hybrid scheme as defined in RFC 9794 [7] which is a multi-algorithm scheme where at least one component algorithm is a post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a traditional algorithm. The traditional algorithm component uses its own standardized processing for key gener... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10.2.3.1 Profile C (Hybrid 1)
| The ME and SIDF implement this profile. The parameters for this profile are the following:
- Identifier : X25519MLKEM768 (Combining X25519 ECDH with ML-KEM-768)
- EC domain parameters : Curve25519 [35]
- EC Diffie-Hellman primitive : X25519 [35]
- point compression : N/A
- ML-KEM para... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10.2.3.2 Profile D (Hybrid 2)
| The ME and SIDF implement this profile. The parameters for this profile are the following:
- Identifier : SecP256r1MLKEM768 (Combining secp256r1 ECDH with ML-KEM-768)
- EC domain parameters : secp256r1 [10]
- EC Diffie-Hellman primitive : Elliptic Curve Cofactor Diffie-Hellman Primitive [9]
- ... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.10.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.11 Solution #11 to SUCI calculation: SUPI Concealment using hybrid method
| Editor’s Note: Performances due to PQC operations performed after ECIES operations are FFS.
Editor’s Note: The pros and cons (including security, complexity and efficiency) of combining traditional asymmetric cryptographic algorithms with post-quantum cryptographic algorithms for SUCI calculation is FFS.
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.11.1 Introduction
| Replacing classical cryptography with PQC algorithms at an early stage carries an inherent risk as a first time widespread deployment and more rigorous testing of PQC algorithms may be needed. So it will be beneficial to have it integrated with classical asymmetric cryptography based security mechanisms via a hybrid ap... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.11.2 Solution details
| |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.11.2.1 Processing on UE side
| The processing on UE side is done as follows.
Figure 7.2.1.11.2.1-1: SUCI generation using hybrid method at UE
1. UE generates a final output_ECC using ECIES as described in Annex C.3.2 in TS 33.501 [4], where the final output_ECC is Eph. EC public key||ciphertext||MAC tag.
2. UE generates an ephemeral shared key ... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.11.2.2 Processing on home network side
| The processing on home network (HN) side is done as follows.
Figure 7.2.1.11.2-3: Decryption based on hybrid method at home network
1. Home network (HN) decapsulates the encrypted PQC shared key to derive the ephemeral shared key (KPQC).
2. HN generates ephemeral symmetric encryption key and ephemeral MAC key usin... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.11.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.12 Solution #12 to SUCI calculation: Hybrid SUCI calculation
| 7.2.1.12.1 Introduction
This solution addresses the key issue#1.
7.2.1.12.2 Solution details
EN#1: The details of the Combiner Function (3>) is FFS.
SUPI and SUCI type
The SUPI is a globally unique 5G Subscription Permanent Identifier allocated to each subscriber in the 5G System. It is defined in clause 5.9... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.13 Solution #13 to SUCI calculation: Symmetric crypto based SUCI
| Overview: The UDM is creating a collection of relevant SUPI values. The UDM is encrypting by using symmetric crypto each of SUPI values from the list and is sending these to the UE. The UE is appending the selected encrypted SUPI and is hashing the encrypted SUPI together with the concatenated hashed Key KSUPI. The UDM... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.13.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the key issue#1.
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.13.2 Solution details
| Editor’s Note: The description of a resynchronisation procedure is FFS.
Editor’s Note: It is FFS about the first registration procedure.
Editor’s Note: It is FFS How are new encrypted SUPIs provisioned to UEs.
Editor’s Note: It is FFS How does the UDM regenerate the new symmetric keys for Pseudonyms.
Editor’s Note... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.13.3 Evaluation
| TBD
Editor’s Note: Further evaluation to be added.
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.14 Solution #14 to SUCI Calculation: Symmetric solution on SUCI protection
| |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.14.1 Introduction
| Editor’s Note: Analysis on the probability of desynchronization of eSUCIs is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Resynchronization of desynchronized eSUCIs is FFS.
Editor’s Note: The benefit of this solution is FFS.
The following are principles of the solution:
- UE is able to be provisioned with an enhanced SUCI (eSUCI) by UDM, o... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.14.2 Solution details
| The following figure depicts the initial Registration procedure using eSUCI, which is calculated with quantum resistant symmetric algorithm, symmetric home network key, and SUPI.
Figure 7.2.1.14.2-1: Initial Registration with eSUCI
1. If an enhanced SUCI (eSUCI), which is generated as described in clause 7.2.1.14.1... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.14.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.15 Solution #15 to SUCI calculation: SUCI calculation with symmetric key
| |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.15.1 Introduction
| This solution derives the encryption key EK, ICB and MAC key MK from the root key K. The encryption key length and MAC key length are increased to 256 Bit and AES-256-CTR is used for encrypting the SUPI.
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.15.2 Solution details
| |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.15.2.1 Processing on UE side
| The UE generates a 256 Bit Nonce#1 and similar to MILENAGE, the UE creates two additional Nonces by using a 64 Bit rotate operation. The Nonce#2 is created by rotating/shifting 64 Bits to the left of Nonce#1 and Nonce#3 by rotating/shifting 64 Bits to the left of Nonce#2.
The 256 Bit Encryption key EK is derived usin... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.15.2.2 Processing on home network side
| The home network detects the new SUCI format based on the 6G SUCI indication.
The home network creates based on the received Nonce#1 the two additional nonces Nonce#2 and Nonce#3.
The home network derives the 256 Bit Encryption key EK, 128 Bit ICB and 256 Bit MAC key MK in the same way as in the UE, using the Nonce#... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.15.3 Evaluation
| TBD
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.16 Solution #16 to SUCI calculation: Solution for PQC based SUCI Computation
| |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.16.1 Introduction
| This solution address PQC algorithm based SUCI calculations.
|
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.16.2 Solution details
| Processing on UE side:
Figure 1a: Encryption based on PQC shared key generation at UE
The UE computes a fresh SUCI, using the provisioned PQC-based public key of the home network (HN), and PQC-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) according to the parameters provisioned by home network as follows:
1. UE gene... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.1.16.3 Evaluation
| The solution has the following impacts:
New PQC algorithms and related profiles need to be supported by the UE and Network.
The UE generates ephemeral symmetric encryption key and ephemeral MAC key using a KDF function and ephemeral shared key along with input parameters such as Freshness parameter i.e., timestamp a... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.2 Solutions to MIKEY-SAKKE key exchange
| |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.2.1 Solution #1 to MIKEY-SAKKE key exchange: mitigate
| |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.2.1.1 Introduction
| There are a number of existing mitigations built into the Mission Critical system. Pending development of a post-quantum replacement for MIKEY-SAKKE it is possible these offer sufficient mitigation for threats, in particular harvest-now-decrypt-later. This is not proposed as a long term migration plan. That will requir... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 7.2.2.1.2 Solution Details
| In the on-network case, MIKEY-SAKKE key exchanges are protected by one or more layers of additional cryptographic protections as specified by clauses 5 and 6 in TS 33.180 [3]. Assuming these protocols, e.g. IPsec, are migrated to quantum-safe alternatives, this mitigates the risk of a passive attacker being able to har... |
d20b4aa3005bbe8602412746b3658946 | 33.703 | 8 Conclusions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains agreed conclusions and any normative work is recommended.
Annex A (informative):
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873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 1 Scope
| The present document studies the security when a PLMN hosts an NPN with dedicated NFs deployed in the PNI-NPN operational domain, including:
1.Key issues and potential security requirements for the scenario of PLMN hosting a NPN where the interfaces between PLMN operational domain and PNI-NPN domain include N9. And s... |
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 4 Architecture
| TR 33.757[3] has studied two scenarios of PLMN hosting a NPN, where the interface between PLMN operational domain and PNI-NPN domain is N4 or SBA interface.
Figure 4-1 N9 interface across PLMN operational domain and PNI-NPN operational domain
In addition to the scenarios in TR 33.757[3], the interfaces between PLM... |
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 5 Security assumptions
| Editor’s Note: This clause includes the security assumptions for the study.
The security assumption in TR 33.757[3] clause 5 apply.
Editor’s Note: Further security assumption is FFS.
|
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 6 Evaluation for SBA interface protection
| Editor’s Note: This clause evaluate if security recommendations given in TS 33.501[2] annex AB apply to the scenario of PLMN hosting a NPN where more CP functions (except AMF, SMF, UDM) are deployed in PNI-NPN domain.
The 5G System architecture consists of the network functions is list in TS 23.501[4] clause 4.2.2, w... |
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 7 Key issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
|
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 7.1 Key Issue #1: TEID issue in N9 interface
| |
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 7.1.1 Key issue details
| A UPF can be deployed in the PNI-NPN operational domain and connects to a UPF deployed in the PLMN operational domain via N9 interface. Attackers in PNI-NPN operational domain (e.g., a misbehaving employee in PNI-NPN or an external attacker gaining unauthorized access to the PNI-NPN networks) can obtain the TEID from t... |
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 7.2.2 Security threats
| When there is no security enabled on the N9 interface between PLMN operation domain and PNI-NPN operation domain, attackers in the PNI-NPN or PLMN operational domain can launch attacks to PLMN or NPN over the intersection.
|
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 7.3.3 Potential security requirements
| TBD.
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873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 7.2 Key Issue #2: Inter domain security on N9 interface
| |
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 7.2.1 Key issue details
|
Figure 7.2-1 Scenario involving N9 interface
Considering the scenario depicted in Figure 7.2-1, attackers in PNI-NPN or PLMN operational domain (e.g., a misbehaving employee in PNI-NPN, PLMN or an external attacker gaining unauthorized access to the PNI-NPN or PLMN networks) can attack the opposing domain through th... |
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 7.2.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall support a mechanism to protect the endpoints of the N9 interface between PLMN operation domain and PNI-NPN operation domain.
7.X Key Issue #X: <Key Issue Name>
7.X.1 Key issue details
7.X.2 Security threats
7.X.3 Potential security requirements
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873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 8 Solutions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
|
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 8.1 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Editor's Note: This clause contains a table mapping between key issues and solutions.
Table 7.1-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#X
KI#Y
KI#Z
8.Y Solution #Y: <Solution Name>
8.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues bein... |
873ee27c242a05b1ac21717ead7f30a2 | 33.758 | 9 Conclusions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions that will form the basis for any normative work.
Annex <X>:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
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SA3#124
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03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 1 Scope
| The present document investigates and identifies the security threats, requirements and potential solution for Integrated Sensing and Communication (ISAC). Based on the architecture and system level enhancements studied in TR 23.700-14 [2], the work in this document focuses on the security and privacy aspects of gNB-ba... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 4 Architecture and security assumptions
| The following architecture and security assumptions are applied to the study:
- The architecture assumptions and principles for Integrated Sensing and Communication as defined in TR 23.700-14 [2] are used as architecture assumptions in this study.
- The security architecture, procedures, and security requirements for... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5 Key issues
| Editor's Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
|
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.1 Key Issue #1: Security of sensing service authorization and sensing result exposure
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03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| In TR 23.700-14 [2], architecture for sensing services is studied to enable the 3GPP network to support sensing service invocation and revocation from the service consumer, and sensing result exposure to the service consumer.
Solutions addressing the KI#2 in TR 23.700-14 [2] of authorization and revocation for particu... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.1.2 Security threats
| Without proper authentication and authorization for sensing service, unauthorized party may be able to access to sensing service.
If the connection between sensing service consumer and NEF/SF is not protected, the attacker can tamper, inject, sniff or replay messages related to sensing service invocation, revocation a... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall be able to support mutual authentication between sensing service consumer and NEF/SF.
The 5G system shall be able to support integrity protection, confidentiality protection and replay protection for the communication between sensing service consumer and NEF/SF.
The 5G system shall be able to auth... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.2 Key Issue #2: Security protection for sensing service operations
| |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.2.1 Key issue details
| According to TR 23.700-14 [2], after the sensing service request from the service consumer is authorized by the network, sensing service operations will be triggered and performed by the relevant network functions, which communicate with each other to obtain the sensing result.
In TR 23.700-14 [2], there are multiple ... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.2.2 Security threats
| As the sensing service operations are performed among sensing function(s) and sensing entities, if the 5GC does not support sensing service operation authorization, the sensing service operation can be abused.
If the connection between sensing entity and sensing function is not securely established, an attacker is abl... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.2.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall be able to support authorization for sensing service operations.
The 5G system shall be able to support integrity protection, confidentiality protection and replay protection for the connection between sensing entity and SF.
Editor’s Note: More security requirements will be added depends on SA2 pr... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.3 Key issue #3 on privacy for sensing
| |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.3.1 Key issue details
| This key issue focuses on the privacy aspect of sensing.
The introduction of sensing capabilities enables the network to collect and process sensing data about objects in the public or even private environment and expose derived sensing results, all without the direct participation or awareness of the sensed object. C... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.3.2 Security threats
| If any privacy related information is contained in the sensing data and is leaked to an unauthorized party, it could lead to privacy violation.
|
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.3.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall provide a mechanism to mitigate privacy threats in the sensing system.
Editor's Note: further refinement of the above requirement is FFS.
Editor’s Note: whether this key issue needs 3GPP solution(s) is FFS, as there may be mechanism out-of-3GPP.
|
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.4 Key issue #4 on active attacks in sensing
| |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.4.1 Key issue details
| One of the use cases for sensing technology is detection of aerial objects. In order to be useful, the result has to be reliable, ie. report an aerial object when there is one, and report empty airspace only when the airspace is in fact empty.
During the sensing operation, an attacker could generate a radio signal tha... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.4.2 Security threats
| Editor's note: threat description is FFS
|
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.4.3 Potential security requirements
| Editor's note: Requirements are FFS
Editor's note: Whether or not to coordinate with RAN1 is FFS
|
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.5 Key issue #5 on unauthorized passive sensing
| |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.5.1 Key issue details
| The sensing mode considered in the present document is a collocated sensing transmitter and receiver. However, the sensing signal sent by the sensing transmitter is not only reflected to the collocated sensing receiver, but also attenuated and scattered in all directions. Therefore, it can be possible for an attacker t... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.5.2 Security threats
| Editor's note: threat description is FFS
|
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 5.5.3 Potential security requirements
| Editor's note: requirements are FFS.
Editor's note: Whether or not to coordinate with RAN1 is FFS.
|
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6 Solutions
| Editor's Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
|
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.0 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Editor's Note: This clause contains a table mapping between key issues and solutions.
Table 6.1-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#1
KI#2
KI#3
KI#4
KI#5
#1.1
X
#1.2
X
#1.3
X
#1.4
X
#1.5
X
#1.6
X
#1.7
X
#2.1
X
#2.2
... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1 Solutions to KI#1
| |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.1 Solution #1.1: Authorization for sensing service request from AF
| |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.1.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1: Security of authorization for sensing service invocation and revocation.
In this solution, the sensing service consumer is assumed to be an external AF. The NEF performs the access authorization by verifying the AF's identity, and the SF performs the service authorization by valid... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.1.2 Solution details
| This solution proposes mutual certificate-based authentication between the NEF and the external AF/sensing service consumer using TLS. Certificate based authentication follows the profiles given in 3GPP TS 33.310 [6], clause 6.1.3a. The identities in the end entity certificates is used for authentication and policy che... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.1.3 Evaluation
| This solution is based on the assumption that the sensing service consumer is an external AF. This solution does not address authorization for internal AF.
This solution proposes to reuse the existing mechanism to perform mutual authentication and secure communication between sensing service consumer and NEF. Details ... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.2 Solution #1.2: Authorization for Sensing Service
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03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.2.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses requirements of key issue #1.
In this solution, existing SBA security framework is reused so that authentication and communication protection among sensing service consumer and NEF/SF can be protected using existing SBA mechanism, for authorization, NRF is deemed as authorization check point, ... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.2.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.1.2.2 - Authorization for Sensing Service
1. AF sends sensing service request to the NEF. The message includes the AF ID, the requested sensing services and optionally the requested sensing location for the sensing service.
2. The NEF performs SF discovery procedure via NRF.
3. The NEF sends t... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.2.3 Evaluation
| The solution address authorization requirements of key issue #1.
The solution reuses existing SBA framework for token-based authorization.
According to conclusion made for static authorization in table 7.1.2-1 of TS 23.700-14 [2], AF ID, sensing area for sensing, sensing service type are criteria for authorization f... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.3 Solution #1.3: Solution on authorization for sensing service request
| 6.1.3.1 Introduction
This solution addresses Key Issue#1 on Security of authorization for sensing service invocation and revocation. Specifically, it addresses the third requirement in KI#1: “The 5G system shall be able to authorize sensing service request from a sensing service consumer”.
According to TR 23.700-1... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.4.1 Introduction
| This solution aims to address the security requirements in Key Issue #1. In TR 23.700-14 [2], architecture for sensing services is studied to enable the 3GPP network to support sensing service invocation and revocation from the service consumer.
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