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e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.3.3.1 Subscribe to a M2M Service Provider | When a M2M Service Subscriber subscribes to a M2M Service Provider, the M2M Service Subscriber configures privacy preferences using the PPM. A privacy preference / policy explains what data is intended to be used by ASPs and allowed by consent to be shared with other service subscribers. Figure 11.3.3.1-1 illustrates this process. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 211 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 CSE M2M Portal M2M Service Provider PPM Portal Privacy Preference Privacy Policy Manager M2M Service Subscriber (2) (2) (1) Personal Data Figure 11.3.3.1-1: A M2M Service Subscriber subscribes to a M2M Service Provider 1. A M2M Service Subscriber accesses the M2M portal of a M2M Service Provider: - This process typically uses Web access protocols such as HTTP, HTTPS and so on. - This process is described in clause 11.4.1.2. 2. The M2M Service Subscriber configures a privacy preference and registers it on the PPM portal: - The M2M Service Subscriber accesses the PPM portal, or the M2M portal redirects the M2M Service Provider to the PPM portal. This process uses Web access protocols. - This process is described in clause 11.4.1.2. 3. The M2M Service Provider collects and stores data from AEs. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.3.3.2 Subscription to a service by ASP | The M2M Service Subscriber can subscribe to various kinds of services provided by ASPs through the M2M Service Provider. Service lists are registered on an M2M portal and the M2M Service Subscriber can select services to subscribe to. When the M2M Service Subscriber subscribes to a service, the M2M Service Subscriber needs to accept ASP's privacy policy. In order for the M2M Service Subscriber to easily understand this policy, the PPM shall create the customized privacy policy based on the privacy policy provided by the ASP and the M2M Service Subscriber's privacy preference. Therefore, the M2M Service Subscriber can control personal data and agreement implies understanding of the privacy policy. Figure 11.3.3.2-1 shows the overview of this process. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 212 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 AE CSE M2M Portal M2M Service Provider ASP’s application PPM Portal Privacy Preference Privacy Policy Manager M2M Service Subscriber Personal Data Privacy Policy Customized Privacy Policy (2) (2) (2) (2) (1) (1) (2) Accepted Policy (3) Access Control Policies (3) Figure: 11.3.3.2-1: The M2M Service Subscriber subscribes to an ASP's service 1. The M2M Service Subscriber accesses the M2M portal and selects an ASP's service to subscribe. The M2M portal redirects to the PPM portal to get the M2M Service Subscriber's consent: - This process typically uses Web access protocols such as HTTP, HTTPS and so on. - This process is described in clause 11.4.1.1. 2. The M2M Service Subscriber needs to accept a privacy policy to subscribe to the ASP's service. The PPM shall create the customized privacy policy for each M2M Service Subscriber based on the M2M Service Subscriber's privacy preference and service's privacy policy. It is easy for the M2M Service Subscriber to confirm differences between the privacy preference and the privacy policy and to understand what kind of personal data are collected by the ASP. After the M2M Service Subscriber accepts the privacy policy, the M2M Service Subscriber can subscribe to the ASP's service: - The function of creating a customized privacy policy is described in clause 11.4.1.3. 3. The PPM shall create or update access control policies using the privacy policy that the M2M Service Subscriber accepted: - The function of creating or updating access control policies in the PPM may rely on the authorization mechanisms specified in clauses 7.3 and 7.5. The details of the synchronization process are not specified in the present document. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.3.3.3 Request for personal data to the Hosting CSE | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.3.3.3.1 Implementation options | When the ASP collects personal data to provide the service, it requests the personal data from a Hosting CSE in the M2M Service Provider's domain. Access to the personal data is controlled by the PPM which may work either as PDP, PRP or DAS Server as detailed below: • If the PPM works as PDP, the Hosting CSE acts as PEP and requests <authorizationDecision> from the PPM and controls the data access using them. Figure 11.3.3.3.2-1 illustrates this process. • If the PPM works as PRP, the Hosting CSE acts as PDP and requests <authorizationPolicy> from the PPM and controls the data access using them. Figure 11.3.3.3.3-1 illustrates this process. • If the PPM works as DAS Server (Direct dynamic authorization), the Hosting CSE checks <dynamicAuthorizationConsultation> and requests dynamicACPInfo or <token> from the PPM. Figure 11.3.3.3.4.1-1 illustrates this process. • If the PPM works as DAS Server (Indirect dynamic authorization), the ASP requests <token> or tokenID from the PPM. Figure 11.3.3.3.4.2-1 illustrates this process. (Detail of this request is not specified in oneM2M). ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 213 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.3.3.3.2 Option 1: PPM works as PDP | For this option, the PPM shall be implemented as CSE and shall provide an interface that enables access control for personal data using the PPM as PDP. AE Hosting CSE M2M Service Provider ASP’s application CSE Access Control Policies Privacy Policy Manager PDP PEP Personal Data (1)Request Personal Data (2)Request <authorizationDecision> (3)Response <authorizationDecision> (4)Response (2)Create <authorizationDecision> Details are not specified in oneM2M Figure 11.3.3.3.2-1: Request for personal data to the Hosting CSE (the PPM works as PDP) 1. The ASP requests personal data from the Hosting CSE in M2M Service Provider. 2. PEP in the Hosting CSE requests <authorizationDecision> from the PPM. The PPM shall create <authorizationDecision> using access control policies. The PPM could use <accessControlPolicy> resources as access control policies. In this case, CSE in the PPM stores <accessControlPolicy>. Detail of creating <authorizationDecision> from access control policies is not specified in oneM2M. 3. The PPM shall respond <authorizationDecision> to the Hosting CSE. 4. If accessing personal data is permitted, the Hosting CSE accesses the personal data and sends the personal data to the ASP as a response. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.3.3.3.3 Option 2: PPM works as PRP | For this option, the PPM shall be implemented as CSE and shall provide an interface that enables access control for personal data using the PPM as PRP. AE Hosting CSE M2M Service Provider ASP’s application CSE Access Control Policies Privacy Policy Manager PRP PEP Personal Data (1)Request Personal Data (2)Request <authorizationPolicy> (3)Response <authorizationPolicy> (4)Response (2)Create <authorizationPolicy> PDP (2)Decision requset (3)Decision response Details are not specified in oneM2M Figure 11.3.3.3.3-1: Request for personal data to the Hosting CSE (the PPM works as PRP) ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 214 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 1. The ASP requests personal data from the Hosting CSE in the M2M Service Provider. 2. PEP in the Hosting CSE requests access control decision from PDP in the Hosting CSE. Then, the PDP requests <authorizationPolicy> from the PPM. The PPM shall create <authorizationPolicy> using access control information. The PPM could use <accessControlPolicy> resources as access control policies. In this case, CSE in the PPM stores <accessControlPolicy> 3. The PPM respond <authorizationPolicy> to PDP in the Hosting CSE. Then, the PDP decides to permit or deny access to the personal data using the <authorizationPolicy> and sends a result as "Decision Response" to PEP. 4. If accessing personal data is permitted, the Hosting CSE accesses the personal data and sends the personal data to the ASP as a response. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.3.3.3.4 Option 3: PPM works as DAS Server | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.3.3.3.4.1 Option 3.1: Direct Dynamic Authorization | For this option, the PPM shall be implemented as AE and shall provide an interface that enables access control for personal data using the PPM as DAS Server. AE Hosting CSE ASP’s application IN-AE Access Control Policies Privacy Policy Manager Personal Data (1)Request Personal Data (2)Request <dynamicACPInfo> or <token> (4)Response (3)Create <dynamicACPInfo> or <token> (3)Response <dynamicACPInfo> or <token> <dynamicAC PInfo> or <token> Details are not specified in oneM2M M2M Service Provider Figure 11.3.3.3.4.1-1: Request for personal data to the Hosting CSE (the PPM works as DAS Server and case of direct dynamic authorization) 1. The ASP requests personal data from the Hosting CSE in the M2M Service Provider. 2. The Hosting CSE performs procedure of direct dynamic authorization. The Hosting CSE checks <dynamicAuthorizationConsultation> and requests dynamicACPInfo or <token> from the PPM. 3. The PPM creates dynamicACPInfo or <token> based on access control policies and respond dynamicACPInfo or <token> to the Hosting CSE. The PPM could use <accessControlPolicy> resources as access control policies. 4. The Hosting CSE make access control decision. If accessing personal data is permitted, the Hosting CSE accesses the personal data and sends the personal data to the ASP as a response. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.3.3.3.4.2 Option 3.2: Indirect Dynamic Authorization | For this option, the PPM shall be implemented as AE and shall provide an interface that enables access control for personal data using the PPM as DAS Server. In this clause, some optional procedures of indirect dynamic authorization are omitted and focused on procedures related to the PPM. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 215 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 AE Hosting CSE ASP’s application IN-AE Access Control Policies Privacy Policy Manager Personal Data (3)Request Personal Data, adding <token> or tokenID (2)Response <token> or tokenID (4)Response (4) (If tokenID provided) Request <token> using tokenID (1)Request <token> or tokenID <token> (2)Create <token> Details are not specified in oneM2M M2M Service Provider Figure 11.3.3.3.4.2-1: Request for personal data to the Hosting CSE (the PPM works as DAS Server and case of indirect dynamic authorization) 1. The ASP requests <token> or tokenID from the PPM. 2. The PPM creates <token> and respond <token> or tokenID to the ASP. Details of above two procedures are not specified in oneM2M. 3. The ASP requests personal data from the Hosting CSE with <token> or tokenID. The Hosting CSE make access control decision using <token>. If the Hosting CSE receive tokenID, the Hosting CSE requests <token> from the PPM with tokenID. If accessing personal data is permitted, the Hosting CSE accesses the personal data and sends the personal data to the ASP as a response. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 216 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.4 Privacy Policy Manager Implementation Models | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.4.1 Using Terms and Conditions Mark-up Language | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.4.1.0 Introduction | Provider 2 T&C Provider n T&C Application/Device 1 to n Descriptors Application/Device 1 to n Provider 1 T&C Application/Device 1 to n User #1 Preferences Application/Device 1 to n Legal 1 e.g. City Application/Device 1 to n Legal 2 e.g. State Application/Device 1 to n Legal 3 e.g. country Application/Device 1 to n Other e.g. Legal 4 Region Application/Device 1 to n Presented to user #1 Provider 1 Application/Device 1 to n Presented to user#1 Provider 2 Application/Device 1 to n Order of precedence Key Selected (Yes) Not Selected (No) OK (Allowed) Conflict Mandatory Optional Figure 11.4.1.0-1: Privacy Policy Manager Implementation Model Using Terms and Conditions Mark-up Language, for one end user (#1) and one Application Service Provider (Provider 1) The above model views the components of the Privacy Policy Manager (PPM) for one end user (#1) and one ASP (Provider 1), arranged as a number of selected/not selected filters in a series of stackable Filter Frames. Four mandatory Filter Frames are defined: 1) Descriptor Filter Frame. 2) At least one "Provider Terms and Conditions" Filter Frame. 3) User Preferences Filter Frame. 4) At least one "Presented to user" Filter Frame. Within each Filter Frame, there are grids representing the Privacy Tags in the Mark-up Language, vertically and the applications and/or devices, horizontally. For the Provider Terms and Condition Filter Frame and User Preferences Filter Frame, each attribute represented by the privacy tag configured as being "selected" or "not selected" for a particular application/device is modelled by "dropping in" an appropriate coloured filter disc. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 217 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Discs at the same positions within one or more similarly structured "Presented to user Filter Frames" detect clear paths through the Filter Frame stack: • Where provider terms and conditions and user preferences are in agreement, these discs turn green. • Where the paths are blocked by one or more conflicts, similar detectors turn the discs red. EXAMPLE: If the Application Service Provider expects the user to agree to location information to be collected and shared with a 3rd party, then the ASP selects those two attributes (clear discs) If the end user has set a preference that they do not want location information to be collected and shared, then there will be black discs in the User Preferences Filter Frame and path through the stack will be blocked. Optional additional Filter Frames may be placed in the stack to "select" or "not select" those same features again by "dropping in" an appropriate coloured filter disc. For example, a country Policy Precedence mandate may overrule an application Service Provider or end user selection. The position of these optional Filter Frames determines the precedence, with those at the front overruling those at the back. The assumption with this model is that the vast majority of the provider attributes selected by the application Service Provider will not conflict with user preferences and will show green. However, there will be a very large numbers of devices, applications and frequency of software updates, and additions replacements of devices. While most will not result in a conflict, those that do will be instantly identified by one or more red discs which are only displayed to the end user, thus avoiding the need to constantly read and reread hundreds of pages of detailed T&Cs. There shall be an instance of this stack for each end user who is registered with the PPM and an instance for each Application Service Provider for which they have subscribed. However, the Descriptor Filter Frame and optional city/state/country/region Filter Frames may be shared resources for these instances. While the description software implementation of this model is outside the scope of the present, document sample code for implementation of the logic is shown in annex K (informative). |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.4.1.1 Registration of Application Service Provider Privacy Policy | 1) Optional registration of an applications Privacy Policy shall be part of the process of obtaining a Registered App-ID for each application and version and presenting a security certificate to the oneM2M Registration Authority that is used to authenticate the application and version. 2) The ASP shall download an application Terms and Conditions (T&C) import template from the oneM2M App-ID Registry server, if they do not already have the correct application T&C import template. 3) The application T&C import template shall list in numeric order the tags in normative annex J. NOTE: The format of the T&C import template is left to implementation, as long as it is able to convey the information specified in annex J. 4) For each tag in the list, the ASP shall provide a value for all devices and applications in the scope of the application that the ASP is registering in the format defined in normative annex J. 5) The ASP shall process the application T&C import template using their local systems and procedures with input from devices vendors and third parties who provide components of their application to create one or more provider T&Cs. 6) The oneM2M App-ID Registry shall, at a minimum, also provide the ASP with the "descriptors list" in the language of the oneM2M partner to support the ASP in completing the T&C import templates to form the set of Provider T&C for that ASP. 7) The security certificate that was used during the App-ID registration process shall also be used to ensure integrity and protect the completed application T&C import template in subsequent storage and transmission. 8) The oneM2M App-ID Registry shall check the authenticity and integrity of the ASP T&Cs by verifying the signature with the ASP public key certificate during App-ID Registration. 9) Each ASP or software vendor T&C completed shall be associated to the App-ID in the oneM2M App-ID Registry. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 218 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.4.1.2 Registration of End User Privacy Preferences | 1) When an end user subscribes to a service provided by an application service provider, the end user becomes a data subject, and the data subject downloads or views the end user privacy preferences template from the PPM Portal. 2) The template used by the end user to state their privacy preferences shall align with the template used by the Application Service Provider i.e. the tags as listed in normative annex J shall be displayed in the same order. 3) The end user selects and deselects attributes to state their privacy preferences which are then registered on the PPM using the same portal. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.4.1.3 Creating a customized Privacy Policy for each end user | 1) To make it easy for the data subject to confirm differences between the privacy preference and the privacy policy: a) If the ASP's selection of the feature represented by the tag value matches the privacy preference selected by the user for that Application/Device, then the corresponding "presented to user" indicator shall be set to green. b) If the ASP's non selection of the feature represented by the tag value matches the privacy preference set by the user for that Application/Device, then the corresponding "presented to user" indicator shall be set to green. c) If the ASP's value selected for the feature represented by the tag value matches the privacy preference selected by the user for that Application/Device, then the corresponding "presented to user" indicator shall be set to green. d) If the ASP's selection of the feature represented by the tag value does not match the privacy preference selected by the user for that Application/Device, then the corresponding "presented to user" indicator shall be set to red. e) If the ASP's non selection of the feature represented by the tag value does not match the privacy preference selected by the user for that Application/Device, then the corresponding "presented to user" indicator shall be set to red. f) If the ASP's value set for the feature represented by the tag value does not match the privacy preference set by the user for that Application/Device, then the corresponding "presented to user" indicator shall be set to red. 2) The above rules shall be overridden if one or more optional preference profiles are present. 3) The order of precedence shall be: 1) Legal Region. 2) Legal Country. 3) Legal City. 4) Legal State. 5) Parental Control. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 219 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12. Security-Specific oneM2M Data Type Definitions | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.1 Introduction | Clause 12 contains data type definitions used only within the oneM2M security specifications. Any data types of XML elements defined for use only within oneM2M security specifications shall use the namespace: • https://www.onem2m.org/technical/specifications. The present document, and any XML or XML Schema Documents produced by oneM2M shall use the prefix "sec:" to refer to that namespace. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.2 Simple Security-Specific oneM2M Data Types | Table 12.2-1 describes simple data type definitions specific to security. The types in table 12.2-1 are either: • Atomic data types derived from XML Schema data types by restrictions other than enumeration. • List data types constructed from other XML Schema or oneM2M-defined atomic data types. Table 12.2-1: Security-specific oneM2M simple data types XSD type name Used for Examples Description sec:relKeyID Relative part of symmetric key Identifiers 1he83he, my-key_name, firstname.lastname Any combination of the Roman alphabet, numerals, '.', '_' and '-' characters sec:credentialID Credential Identifier 10-thiskey@mymef.com A sec:credIDTypeID and a xs:anyURI separated by the '-' character. See clause 10.4. The xs:anyURI is the value part of the credential-lD sec:deviceConfig URI deviceConfigURI attribute of the <MEFBase> resource, see ETSI TS 118 132 [58] 1:http://server.dmprovid er.com A sec:devMgmtID value (see clause 12.3.2.2) separated with colon ":" from the URI of a device management server |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.3 Enumerated Security-Specific oneM2M Data Types | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.3.1 Introduction | The enumerated security-specific oneM2M data types are treated identically to the enumerated oneM2M data types defined in clause 6.3.4 of ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. These data types are based on <xs:integer>, with the numeric values interpreted as specified in clause 12.3.2. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.3.2 Enumeration type definitions | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.3.2.1 sec:credIDTypeID | The sec:credIDTypeID enumeration type is used in sec:credentialID to identify the type of the identified credential. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 220 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 12.3.2.1-1: Interpretation of the sec:credIDTypeID enumeration type Value Interpretation Note 10 Symmetric key used to authenticate to a MEF (KpmID) See clause 8.3.2.1 11 Symmetric key used to authenticate to a MAF (KmID) See clause 8.8.3.1 12 Symmetric key used to authenticate in an SAEF (KpsaID or KcID) See clauses 8.2.2.1, 8.2.2.3 13 Symmetric key used to authenticate in ESPrim (pairwiseESPrimKeyID) See clauses 8.4.2 14 Symmetric key used for direct encryption in the ESData Encryption-only or Nested- Sign-then-encrypt security classes (generic symmetric key identifier format) See clause 8.5.2 15 Symmetric key used for symmetric key wrap in the ESData Encryption-only or Nested-Sign-then-encrypt security classes (generic symmetric key identifier format) See clause 8.5.2 16 Symmetric key used for HMAC in the ESData Signature-only security class (generic symmetric key identifier format) See clause 8.5.2 30 Raw Public Key Certificate used in TLS: (Public Key Identifier) See clause 10.1.2 31 Device Certificate used in TLS (globally unique hardware instance identifier) See clause 10.1.1.4 32 CSE-ID Certificate used in TLS (CSE-ID) ETSI TS 118 101 [1] 33 AE-ID Certificate used in TLS (AE-ID) ETSI TS 118 101 [1] 34 Node-ID Certificate used in TLS (Node-ID) See clause 10.1.1.8 41 Raw Public Key Certificate used for RSA or ECDH Key management in the ESData Encryption-only or Nested-Sign-then-encrypt security classes: (Public Key Identifier) See clause 10.1.2 42 Device Certificate used for RSA or ECDH Key management in the ESData Encryption-only or Nested-Sign-then-encrypt security classes (globally unique hardware instance identifier) See clause 10.1.1.4 43 CSE-ID Certificate used for RSA or ECDH Key management in the ESData Encryption-only or Nested-Sign-then-encrypt security classes (CSE-ID) ETSI TS 118 101 [1] 44 AE-ID Certificate used for RSA or ECDH Key management in the ESData Encryption-only or Nested-Sign-then-encrypt security classes (AE-ID) ETSI TS 118 101 [1] 45 Node-ID Certificate used for RSA or ECDH Key management in the ESData Encryption-only or Nested-Sign-then-encrypt security classes (Node-ID) See clause 10.1.1.8 51 Raw Public Key Certificate used for RSA or ECDH Key management in the ESData Signature-only security class: (Public Key Identifier) See clause 10.1.2 52 Device Certificate used for RSA or ECDSA signatures in the ESData Signature- only security class (globally unique hardware instance identifier) See clause 10.1.1.4 53 CSE-ID Certificate used for RSA or ECDH Key management in the ESData Signature-only security class (CSE-ID) ETSI TS 118 101 [1] 54 AE-ID Certificate used for RSA or ECDH Key management in the ESData Signature-only security class (AE-ID) ETSI TS 118 101 [1] 55 Node-ID Certificate used for RSA or ECDH Key management in the ESData Signature-only security class (Node-ID) See clause 10.1.1.8 NOTE: The form of the identifier for the credential type is described in brackets. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.3.2.2 sec:devMgmtID | The sec:devMgmtID enumeration type is used in sec:deviceConfigURI as an identifier of the device management technology used for field device configuration (cf. ETSI TS 118 122 [57]). The sec:devMgmtID enumeration type is also used in the devMgmtID element of the devCfgArgs element of the cmdArgs of the MEF Client Command cmdDescription element (see clause 8.3.9.8) to indicate the DM protocol to be used for Device Configuration (ETSI TS 118 122 [57]). The cmdDescription is an attribute of the <mefClientCmd> resource type in ETSI TS 118 132 [58]). Table 12.3.2.2-1: Interpretation of the sec:devMgmtID enumeration type Value Interpretation Note 1 OMA DMv1.3 See ETSI TS 118 105 [i.29] 2 OMA DMv2.0 See ETSI TS 118 105 [i.29] 3 OMA LwM2M See ETSI TS 118 105 [i.29] 4 BBF TR-069 See ETSI TS 118 106 [i.30] ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 221 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.3.2.3 sec:cmdClassID | The sec:cmdClassID enumeration type is used in the MEF Client Command cmdDescription element (see clause 8.3.9.4) to indicate the cmdClass of the cmdDescription. The cmdDescription is an attribute of the <mefClientCmd> resource type specified in ETSI TS 118 132 [58]). Table 12.3.2.3-1: Interpretation of the sec:cmdClassID enumeration type Value Interpretation Note 0 NO_MORE_COMMANDS The command class is specified in clause 8.3.9.6. 1 CERT_PROV The command class is specified in clause 8.3.9.7 Certificate Provisioning is specified in clause 8.3.6 2 DEV_CFG The command class is specified in clause 8.3.9.8 Device Configuration is specified in ETSI TS 118 122 [57] 3 MO_NODE The command class is specified in clause 8.3.9.9 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.3.2.4 sec:cmdStatusCode | The sec:cmdStatusCode enumeration type is used by the cmdStatusCode element to indicate the status of an MEF Client Command. The cmdStatus is an attribute of the <mefClientCmd> resource type specified in ETSI TS 118 132 [58]. Table 12.3.2.4-1: Interpretation of the sec:cmdStatusCode enumeration type Value Interpretation Note 10 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_ISSUED See clause 8.3.9.5.2 11 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_REISSUED See clause 8.3.9.5.3 20 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_OK See clause 8.3.9.5.4 40 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_REPEATED_CMD_ID See clause 8.3.9.5.5 41 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_CLASS_NOT_SUPPORTED See clause 8.3.9.5.6 42 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_BAD_ARGUMENTS See clause 8.3.9.5.7 43 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_UNACCEPTABLE_ARGUMENTS See clause 8.3.9.5.8 100 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_CERT_PROV_SERVER_ERROR See clause 8.3.9.5.9 101 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_CERT_PROV_CLIENT_ERROR See clause 8.3.9.5.10 201 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_DEV_CFG_SERVER_ERROR See clause 8.3.9.5.11 202 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_DEV_CFG_CLIENT_ERROR See clause 8.3.9.5.12 300 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_NOT_FOUND See clause 8.3.9.5.13 301 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_TYPE_CONFLICT See clause 8.3.9.5.14 302 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_BAD_ARGS See clause 8.3.9.5.15 303 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_UNACCEPTABLE_ARGS See clause 8.3.9.5.16 304 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_INCONSISTENT_CONFIG See clause 8.3.9.5.17 305 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_EXECUTION_ERROR See clause 8.3.9.5.18 ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 222 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.3.2.5 sec:certProvProtocolID | The sec:certProvProtocolID enumeration type is used for the certProvProtocolID element of the certProvCmdArgs element of the cmdArgs element of the MEF Client Command cmdDescription element (see clause 8.3.9.7) to indicate the Certificate Provisioning protocol to be used. The cmdDescription is an attribute of the <mefClientCmd> resource type specified in ETSI TS 118 132 [58]). Table 12.3.2.5-1: Interpretation of the sec:certProvProtocolID enumeration type Value Interpretation Note 1 EST See clause 8.3.6.2 2 SCEP See clause 8.3.6.3 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.3.2.6 sec:certSubjectType | The sec:certSubjectType enumeration type is used for the certSubjectType element of the certProvCmdArgs element of the cmdArgs element of the MEF Client Command cmdDescription element (see clause 8.3.9.7) to indicate if the subject of the provisioned certificate will be a Node, CSE or AE. The cmdDescription is an attribute of the <mefClientCmd> resource type specified in ETSI TS 118 132 [58]). Table 12.3.2.6-1: Interpretation of the sec:certSubjectType enumeration type Value Interpretation Note 1 Node-ID See ETSI TS 118 101 [1], clause 7.1.5 2 CSE-ID See ETSI TS 118 101 [1], clause 7.2 3 AE-ID See ETSI TS 118 101 [1], clause 7.2 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.3.2.7 sec:objectTypeID | The sec:objectTypelID enumeration type is used for the objectTypelID element of the MONodeCmdArgs element of the cmdArgs element of the MEF Client Command cmdDescription element (see clause 8.3.9.9) to indicate the type of an MO Node. The cmdDescription is an attribute of the <mefClientCmd> resource type specified in ETSI TS 118 132 [58]). Table 12.3.2.7-1: Interpretation of the sec:objectTypeID enumeration type Value Interpretation Note 1 [authenticationProfile] See ETSI TS 118 122 [57], clause 7.1.4 and 7.2.4. 2 [trustAnchorCred] See ETSI TS 118 122 [57], clause 7.1.6 and 7.2.6. 3 [MAFClientRefCfg] See ETSI TS 118 122 [57], clause 7.1.7 and 7.2.7. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.4 Complex Security-Specific oneM2M Data Types | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.4.1 MAF and MEF client configuration data | Table 12.4.1-1 defines the assignment of data types to the four data containers which are used in MAF and MEF client registration and key registration configuration procedures. Note that these data containers are not defined in the form of resource types since the information is not remotely accessible. The information elements of these containers are managed by means of Device Management procedures (see ETSI TS 118 122 [57]) or by manual provisioning. Table 12.4.1-1: Types used in MAF and MEF Registration Configuration procedures data container name Used in Data Type Notes mefClientRegCfg MEF Client Registration Configuration, see clause 8.3.7.2 sec:clientRegCfg See clause 12.4.2 ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 223 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 data container name Used in Data Type Notes mafClientRegCfg MAF Client Registration Configuration, see clause 8.8.3.2 mefKeyRegCfg MEF Key Registration Configuration, see clause 8.3.7.3 sec:keyRegCfg See clause 12.4.3 mafKeyRegCfg MAF Key Registration Configuration, see clause 8.8.3.3 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.4.2 sec:clientRegCfg | Data type sec:clientRegCfg applies to the mefClientRegCfg and mafClientRegCfg data containers used in MEF Client Registration Configuration and MAF Client Registration Configuration, see clause 8.3.7.2 and clause 8.8.3.2, respectively. Table 12.4.2-1: Type definition of sec:clientRegCfg Element Path Element Type Multiplicity Notes expirationTime m2m:timestamp 0..1 See ETSI TS 118 104 [4] labels m2m:labels 0..1 See ETSI TS 118 104 [4] fqdn xs:anyURI 1 adminFQDN xs:anyURI 1 httpPort xs:unsignedByte 0..1 coapPort xs:unsignedByte 0..1 websocketPort xs:unsignedByte 0..1 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.4.3 sec:keyRegCfg | Data type sec:keyRegCfg applies to the mefKeyRegCfg and mafKeyRegCfg data containers used in MEF Key Registration Configuration and MAF Key Registration Configuration, see clause 8.3.7.3 and clause 8.8.3.3, respectively. Table 12.4.3-1: Type definition of sec:keyRegCfg Element Path Element Type Multiplicity Notes expirationTime m2m:timestamp 0..1 See ETSI TS 118 104 [4] labels m2m:labels 0..1 See ETSI TS 118 104 [4] adminFQDN xs:anyURI 1 SUID m2m:suid 1 See ETSI TS 118 104 [4] targetIDs m2m:listOfM2MID 0..1 See ETSI TS 118 104 [4] |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.4.4 sec:cmdDescription | The sec:cmdDescription complex type is used by the cmdDescription element to describe an MEF Client Command, described in clause 8.3.9.5. The cmdDescription is an attribute of the <mefClientCmd> resource type specified in ETSI TS 118 132 [58]. Table 12.4.4-1: Type definition of sec:cmdDescription Element Path Element Type Multiplicity Notes cmdClassID sec:cmdClassID 1 See clause 12.3.2.3 cmdArgs sec:cmdArgs 1 See clause 12.4.5 targetID m2m:ID 1 ETSI TS 118 104 [4] ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 224 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.4.5 sec:cmdArgs | The sec:cmdArgs complex type is used by the cmdArgs element of datatype sec:cmdDescription. Table 12.4.5-1: Type definition of sec:cmdArgs Element Path Element Type Multiplicity Notes noMoreCmdArgs sec:noMoreCmdArgs 0..1 See clause 12.4.6 certProvCmdArgs sec:certProvCmdArgs 0..1 See clause 12.4.7 devCfgCmdArgs sec:devCfgCmdArgs 0..1 See clause 12.4.8 MONodeCmdArgs sec:MONodeCmdArgs 0..1 See clause 12.4.9 This type is an xs:choice. It shall contain elements from no more than one row listed in table 12.4.5-1. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.4.6 sec:noMoreCmdArgs | The sec:noMoreCmdArgs complex type is used in sec:cmdDescription. Table 12.4.6-1: Type definition of sec: noMoreCmdArgs Element Path Element Type Multiplicity Notes retryDuration xs:duration 1 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.4.7 sec:certProvCmdArgs | The sec:certProvCmdArgs complex type is used in sec:cmdDescription. Table 12.4.7-1: Type definition of sec:certProvCmdArgs Element Path Element Type Multiplicity Notes certProvProtocolID sec:certProvProtocolID 1 See clause 12.3.2.5 URI xs:anyURI 1 certSubjectType sec:certSubjectType 1 See clause 12.3.2.6 certSubjectID xs:union of m2m:nodeID and m2m:ID 1 See ETSI TS 118 104 [4], clause 6.3.3. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.4.8 sec:devCfgCmdArgs | The sec:devCfgCmdArgs complex type is used in sec:cmdDescription. Table 12.4.8-1: Type definition of sec:devCfgCmdArgs Element Path Element Type Multiplicity Notes deviceConfigURI sec:deviceConfigURI 1 See clause 12.2 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 12.4.9 sec:MONodeCmdArgs | The sec:MONodeCmdArgs complex type is used in sec:cmdDescription. Table 12.4.9-1: Type definition of sec:MONodeCmdArgs Element Path Element Type Multiplicity Notes objectPath xs:anyURI 1 objectTypeID sec:objectTypeID 1 See clause 12.3.2.7 objectTypeSpecifcArgs sec:authProfileMONodeArgs 0..1 See clause 12.4.10 ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 225 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 12.4.10 sec:authProfileMONodeArgs The sec:authProfileMONodeArgs complex type is used in sec:MONodeCmdArgs. Table 12.4.10-1: Type definition of sec:authProfileMONodeArgs Element Path Element Type Multiplicity Notes SUID m2m:suid 1 See ETSI TS 118 104 [4], clause 6.3.4.2.39 ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 226 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Annex A (informative): Mapping of 3GPP GBA terminology Table A-1 provides a mapping of terminology and abbreviations used in GBA according to 3GPP specification [13] to corresponding oneM2M terminology and abbreviations as used within the present document. Table A-1 GBA entities, keys and processes oneM2M Security Bootstrap entities, keys & processes UE Enrolee BSF MEF NAF MAF Bootstrapping Procedure Bootstrap Security Handshake + Temporary Enrolment Key Generation Ks Ke B-TID KeID Bootstrapping Usage Procedure Usage in MAF Handshake NAF FQDN MAF-ID Ks_(ext/int)_NAF Km (Master Credential) ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 227 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Annex B (informative): General Mutual Authentication Mechanism B.0 Introduction oneM2M mutual authentication schemes allow oneM2M entities to prove that they know related credentials such as Master Credentials, without having to exchange value of those credentials, and sensitive data such as security identities and security identifiers. To prevent reading and copying of credentials, a secure environment within the Security CSF provides protection against tampering of those credentials and related processed information. A general mutual authentication protocol is applied to both symmetric and asymmetric key based schemes. Precise protocol messages and parameters depend on the chosen scheme and the security parameters selected. Typically it consists of following steps as shown in figure B.0-1. Figure B.0-1: Mutual Authentication 1. An initial step where an entity A is securely identified to an entity B with whom previous or no previous contact has been made. In this step entity A identifies itself to an entity B protected against eavesdropping, i.e. no exchange of key materials (Master Credentials). 2. In the second step entity B sends a challenge to entity A. The Authentication Challenge consists of a challenge, the authentication token (AUTN) of entity B derived from Master Credentials, etc. The authentication challenge, which may be random or not, depends on the chosen authentication scheme and the security parameters selected for symmetric and asymmetric key based schemes. 3. Entity A replies with an Authentication Response that contains an authentication token (AUTN) derived from its known Master Credentials and the received Authentication Challenge. This Authentication Response is sent if entity B has been successfully authenticated by entity A. 4. Entity B then verifies the relation between entity A's identity and the response received in step 3. If the verification is positive, entity B is assured that the response has been created by entity A using a secret associated with entity A's identity provided in step 1. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 228 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 B.1 Group Authentication The oneM2M transactions may naturally involve groups of M2M entities rather than individual ones. A number of entities are classified as a group due to their proximate locations, having the same features, belonging to the same owner, or any other reasons. To get services, all entities in such a group should be authenticated first. The traditional authentication mechanism has two main solutions, the first authentication mechanism is that the service provider authenticates each entity in the group one by one; the second authentication mechanism is that each entity makes mutual authentication with a group agent, then the group agent makes mutual authentication with the service provider. If the first authentication mechanism is used, the resulting authentication overheads of computation and communication may be too high to afford. If the second authentication mechanism is used, it has the following security weaknesses: a) It may exist the man-in-the-middle attack by the group agent: The group agent would be placed in unsecure place or owned by different provider rather than the service provider. If the group agent is compromised or lie to service provider, group agent would act as a middle attacker to make fake authentication to entities and report fake identity to service provider since there is no direct authentication from service provider to each M2M entity. b) Privacy concern: All information from M2M entities is transferred through the group agent, and the group agent knows all information generated by each entity. Based on security consideration, if the group agent is owned by different owner other than the entities' and service providers' owner, the group agent should not get the message. Hence, the M2M entities (e.g. ASN or ADN) with the same feature can utilize group authentication to service provider (e.g. infrastructure node) in order to provide end-to-end secure tunnel as well as reducing the communication overhead. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 229 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Annex C (normative): Security protocols associated to specific SE technologies C.0 Introduction The Secure Environment supporting security functions specified by oneM2M provides a level and a type of protection (e.g. integrity protection, confidentiality, tamper resistance) to the information it contains, independently of the method of protection (e.g. UICC, embedded security element, TEE, etc.). Administration of their content is implementation dependent and relies on existing standards within specific Secure Environment technologies. Some of them are listed below for information. C.1 UICC In case of UICC (SE compliant with ETSI TS 102 671 [23]), OTA mechanisms as specified in [7] and [8], and its extensions [9], [10] for 3GPP underlying networks or [11] and [12] for 3GPP2 underlying networks shall be supported to enable security administration of the sensitive data of the M2M Service Layer. UICC provides the highest protection level 3 against attacks according the Classification of Protection levels table 6.3.1-1 in clause 6.3.1. C.2 Other secure element and embedded secure element with ISO/IEC 7816 interface In case the Secure Environment is implemented as a security element or as an embedded security element supporting an ISO/IEC 7816-4 interface [26], example of remote administration can be according to GlobalPlatform Remote Administration [47]. An embedded secure element provides the highest protection level 3 against attacks according the Classification of Protection levels table 6.3.1-1 in clause 6.3.1. C.3 Trusted Execution Environment In case the secure environment is implemented as a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) according to GlobalPlatform [22], remote administration shall be supported as specified in GlobalPlatform Remote Administration [21]. TEE provides the medium protection level 2 against attacks according the Classification of Protection levels table 6.3.1-1 in clause 6.3.1. C.4 SE to CSE binding In case the SE is implemented as an independent security element supporting ETSI TS 102 221 [24], the platform-to- platform secure channel specified in ETSI TS 102 484 [25] provides logical binding of the SE to a specific CSE or AE. This also protects the information exchanged between the SE and the associated entity on physically exposed interfaces, and is therefore recommended for devices that are physically exposed to attackers. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 230 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Annex D (normative): UICC security framework to support symmetric key based oneM2M Services D.0 Introduction This annex is applicable when UICC (a type of Independent Secure Element compliant with ETSI TS 102 221 [24] and ETSI TS 102 671 [23]) is involved in M2M service layer security using Pre-Shared symmetric Keys, whether it only serves as a mean to pre-provision M2M Service layer material in M2M Devices/Gateways, or it is further used as Secured Environment in an M2M Device/Gateway. In case of M2M deployments using asymmetric credentials (e.g. Public Key cryptography), or in case support of advanced UICC features such as File System support is not desired, annex L of the present document provides an interoperable framework that can be implemented on tamper resistant hardware secure elements without relying on UICC specific features. Specifically, the involvement of UICC in oneM2M security may include any of the following steps: • Pre-provisioning of initial PSK credentials in M2M nodes by any of the following methods: - Simple pre-provisioning and administration of M2M Service material (initial credentials and other pre-provisioned parameters), i.e. UICC-based M2M service provisioning; - Support for infrastructure assisted bootstrapping of the M2M symmetric credentials by derivation from symmetric Access Network credentials stored in the UICC, using GBA. • Derivation of a security association key directly derived from symmetric Access Network Credentials, using GBA. Note that this process can be supported by a Network Access Application on the UICC independently of the presence of the information structure specified in the present annex. The support of UICC provisioning of M2M service subscription information shall be indicated in the M2M Service Table for the corresponding M2M Service Subscription as specified in the present annex. The support of key derivation using GBA that may be used for bootstrapping or security association shall always be indicated in the Service Table of the UICC application of the Access Network Operator supporting the GBA infrastructure. At the most basic level, UICC-based M2M pre-provisioning requires an interoperable framework to store and administrate related information in the UICC. Further involvement requires a framework for discovery of available services offered by the UICC for the hosting M2M field node. The purpose of the present annex is to specify this framework, which enables both initial service provisioning and remote security administration of the subscription information during the subscription lifetime. A common scenario is where an M2M field node holds a UICC application protecting Access Network security credentials, and these credentials are used to derive M2M Service Layer security credentials used for M2M service bootstrapping or security association establishment in the service layer. As these scenarios require a trust agreement between the involved Access Network operator and M2M Service Provider, UICC support for M2M services in such situation shall be handled within the context of the associated Network Access application on the UICC. In particular, the UICC support for M2M credentials derivation using GBA shall be indicated within the UICC application of the Access Network operator. This is specified in clause D.1. Even when the M2M Service Layer credentials are not derived from Access Network Credentials, the UICC may be used as a secure environment that securely protects the symmetric credential used to root security in an M2M field node. In such cases, the M2M subscription information and related methods constitute an independent application that resides on a UICC, in the sense of ETSI TS 102 221 [24]. In particular, ETSI TS 102 221 [24] specifies the application independent properties of the UICC/terminal interface such as the physical characteristics and the logical structure. NOTE: A terminal in the sense of ETSI TS 102 221 [24] is the part of the M2M field node that holds the UICC, e.g. a communication modem or an M2M Node processing environment. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 231 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The specific properties of the M2M Service Provider Identity Module application holding symmetric credentials is specified in clause D.2. The storage of M2M information elements in the UICC and the procedures used for communication between the hosting M2M field node and the UICC shall be as specified in the present annex. The present annex uses abbreviations and coding conventions defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [24]. D.1 Access Network UICC-based oneM2M Service Framework D.1.1 Access Network UICC-based oneM2M Service Framework characteristics An Access Network UICC-based oneM2M Service Framework is always associated with a single M2M Service Subscription and consists of a single DF, DF1M2M, complying with the specifications in clause D.1.3, implemented in the ADF of a Network Access Application on the UICC. This situation addresses the case where a trust relationship has been established between the M2M SP and the AN operator owning the hosting ADF. NOTE 1: This does not necessarily imply that the Access Network credentials of the corresponding ADF are used to derive the M2M Service Layer Credentials: e.g. an Access Network operator may refuse derivation from Access Network credentials to an M2M Service Provider, but may still accept to provide space on its UICC to pre-provision independent credentials or support service infrastructure-assisted bootstrapping. There may be several oneM2M service frameworks (DF1M2M) within the ADF of a single Access Network subscription, in case this Access Network subscription is used by several independent M2M Service subscriptions. The file IDs of the DF1M2M in any ADF shall be listed under the corresponding entry in EFDIR as specified in clause D.1.2. NOTE 2: A single M2M service layer subscription can also use multiple access networks: such subscriptions are best provisioned in a dedicated ADF as specified in clause D.2. The content of any DF1M2M in an Access Network application ADF shall be as specified in clause D.1.3. D.1.2 M2M Service Framework discovery for Access Network UICC When a UICC Network Access application supports one or more M2M Service subscriptions, with a DF1M2M, the EFDIR entry corresponding to this UICC Network Access Application shall contain the following M2M related Data Objects: • oneM2M Service Framework DO: defining the association between the identifier of one M2M Service Subscription provisioned in the ADF and the related DF corresponding to this M2M subscription. Likewise, each M2M Service Subscription is associated to one DF. Each of these DFs is hereafter referred as DF1M2M. There shall be as many oneM2M Service Framework Data Objects as there are M2M Service Subscriptions provisioned in the ADF. Table D.1.2-1: Coding of oneM2M related DOs Bytes Length Description Status 1 1 Discretionary template tag = '73' M 2 1 Length of the discretionary template = X M 3 to (2+X) X Discretionary Template X ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 232 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table D.1.2-2: Coding of oneM2M Discretionary Template related DOs Bytes Length Description Status 1 1 oneM2M service specific data content tag = 'A2' M 2 1 M2M service specific data content length = Y M 3 to (2+Y) Y M2M service specific data content M Table D.1.2-3: Coding of oneM2M Service Specific Data Content related DOs Bytes Length Description Status 1 1 oneM2M supported service provisioning tag = '80' M 2 1 Length of the M2M supported service provisioning tag = A M 3 to 4 2 M2M Dedicated File Identifier for following M2M service subscription M 5 to (A+2) (A-2) M2M Subscription Identifier M Coding: • M2M Dedicated File identifier: - Contain the file identifier of the DF1M2M associated to the provisioning of the M2M Service subscription identified in the DO. • M2M Subscription Identifier: - The identifier of the M2M service subscription provisioned in the DF1M2M indicated in the Data Object, encoded in binary format. D.1.3 Content of files at the DF1M2M level D.1.3.0 Introduction This clause specifies the EFs for the M2M service provisioning specific to a single M2M service provider, defining access conditions, data items and coding. A data item is a part of an EF which represents a complete logical entity. The file structure for DF1M2M is illustrated in figure D.1.3.0-1. ADFhosting AN DF1M2M (FID in EFDIR) EF1M2MST EF1M2MSID EF1M2MSPID EFM2MNID '6F0A' '6F02' '6F03' '6F04' EFCSEID EFM2MAEID EFINCSEIDS EFMAFFQDN '6F05' '6F06' '6F08' '6F09' EFMEFID '6F07' Figure D.1.3.0-1: File identifiers and directory structures of DF1M2M in an hosting Access Network application ADF ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 233 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 D.1.3.1 EF1M2MST (oneM2M Service Table) This EF indicates which optional oneM2M services are available for the corresponding subscription. If a service is not indicated as available in the oneM2M DF, the hosting M2M field node shall not select this service. The presence of this file is mandatory if optional services are provided by the subscription. Identifier: '6F0A' Structure: transparent Mandatory SFI: '0A' File size: X bytes, X ≥ 1 Update activity: low Access Conditions: READ ALW UPDATE ADM DEACTIVATE ADM ACTIVATE ADM Bytes Description M/O Length 1 Services n°1 to n°8 M 1 byte 2 Services n°9 to n°16 O 1 byte 3 Services n°17 to n°24 O 1 byte 4 Services n°25 to n°32 O 1 byte etc. X Services n°(8X-7) to n°(8X) O 1 byte -Services Contents: Service n°1: Local CSE-ID provisioning Service n°2 IN-CSE-ID list provisioning Service n°3 MAF FQDN provisioning Service n°4 Local M2M AE-ID list provisioning Service n°5 Bootstrapping: MEF address provisioning Service n°6 Service n°7 Service n°8 M2M-Node-ID information GBA Secure Provisioning (see note) GBA Secure Connection (see note) NOTE: Services n°7 and 8 can only be available in a oneM2M Service Table located in a DF1M2M hosted in the ADF of the Network Access Application from which the M2M Service Layer credentials are expected to be derived. The EF shall contain at least one byte. Further bytes may be included, but if the EF includes an optional byte, then it is mandatory for the EF to also contain all bytes before that byte. Other services are possible in the future and will be coded on further bytes in the EF. Coding: 1 bit is used to code each service: bit = 1: service available; bit = 0: service not available. - Service available means that the M2M Service Subscription provisioned in the current DF or ADF has the capability to support the service and that the service is available for the user of the M2M Service Subscription. Service not available means that the service shall not be used by the M2M Service Subscription user, even if the M2M Service Subscription has the capability to support the service. First byte: b8 b7 b6 B5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Service n°1 Service n°2 Service n°3 Service n°4 Service n°5 Service n°6 Service n°7 Service n°8 ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 234 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Second byte: b8 b7 b6 B5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Service n°9 Service n°10 Service n°11 Service n°12 Service n°13 Service n°14 Service n°15 Service n°16 etc. D.1.3.2 EF1M2MSID (oneM2M Subscription Identifier) This EF contains the oneM2M Subscription Identifier, M2M-Sub-ID. There shall be only one TLV object within this EF. Identifier: '6F02' Structure: transparent Mandatory SFI: '02' File size: X bytes Update activity: low Access Conditions: READ ALW UPDATE ADM DEACTIVATE ADM ACTIVATE ADM Bytes Description M/O Length 1 M2M Subscription Identifier TLV data object M X bytes The M2M Subscription Identifier value field shall contain the M2M-Sub-ID encoded as specified in ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. The tag value of the oneM2M Subscription Identifier TLV data object shall be '80'. D.1.3.3 EF1M2MSPID (oneM2M Service Provider Identifier) This EF contains the oneM2M Service Provider Identifier, M2M-SP-ID, of the M2M Service Provider related to the subscription in EF1M2MSID. There shall be only one TLV object within this EF. Identifier: '6F03' Structure: transparent Mandatory SFI: '03' File size: X bytes Update activity: low Access Conditions: READ ALW UPDATE ADM DEACTIVATE ADM ACTIVATE ADM Bytes Description M/O Length 1 M2M-SP-ID TLV data object M X bytes The M2M-SP-ID Value field shall contain the M2M-SP-ID encoded as specified in ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. The tag value of the M2M-SP-ID TLV data object shall be '80'. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 235 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 D.1.3.4 EFM2MNID (M2M Node Identifier) This EF contains the M2M-Node-ID supporting the local CSE. It may be used to logically bind a UICC to a specific M2M Node. If service n°6 is "available", this file shall be present. There shall be only one TLV object within this EF. Identifier: '6F04' Structure: transparent Optional SFI: '04' File size: X bytes Update activity: low Access Conditions: READ ALW UPDATE ADM DEACTIVATE ADM ACTIVATE ADM Bytes Description M/O Length 1 to X M2M-Node-ID TLV object M X bytes The M2M-Node-ID Value field shall contain the M2M-Node-ID encoded as specified in ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. D.1.3.5 EFCSEID (local CSE Identifier) This EF contains the local CSE Identifier, CSE-ID, for the M2M field node associated to the subscription in EF1M2MSID. If present, this file is used by the M2M field node to pre-provision the CSE-ID. If service n°1 is "available", this file shall be present. There shall be only one TLV object within this EF. Identifier: '6F05' Structure: transparent Optional SFI: '05' File size: X bytes Update activity: low Access Conditions: READ ALW UPDATE ADM DEACTIVATE ADM ACTIVATE ADM Bytes Description M/O Length 1 CSE-ID TLV data object M X bytes CSE-ID TLV Contents: • The CSE-ID Value field shall contain the local CSE-ID formatted as a URI. Coding: • The URI shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in IETF RFC 3629 [19]. The tag value of the URI TLV data object shall be '80'. D.1.3.6 EFM2MAE-ID (M2M Application Identifiers list) This EF contains the list of M2M Application Identifiers (AE-IDs) for the local M2M applications supported by the subscription in EF1M2MSID. If service n°4 is "available", this file shall be present. Identifier: '6F06' Structure: Linear fixed Optional SFI: '06' Record length: X bytes Update activity: low Access Conditions: READ ALW UPDATE ADM DEACTIVATE ADM ACTIVATE ADM Bytes Description M/O Length 1 to X M2M AE-ID LV data object M X bytes ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 236 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 M2M AE-ID LV Contents: • The Value field shall contain the M2M AE-ID formatted as a URI. Coding: • The URI shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in IETF RFC 3629 [19]. D.1.3.7 EFINCSEIDS (M2M IN-CSE IDs list) This EF contains a list of pre-provisioned IN-CSE-ID used to determine the next point of contact after provisioning or M2M Service Bootstrapping. If service n°2 is "available", this file shall be present. Identifier: '6F08' Structure: Linear fixed Optional Record length: X bytes Update activity: low Access Conditions: READ ALW UPDATE ADM DEACTIVATE ADM ACTIVATE ADM Bytes Description M/O Length 1 to X IN-CSE-ID LV data object M X bytes IN-CSE-ID LV Contents: • The Value field shall contain the IN-CSE-ID formatted as a URI. Coding: • The URI shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in IETF RFC 3629 [19]. D.1.3.8 EFMAFFQDN (MAF-FQDN) This EF is used to pre-provision the FQDN of the MAF to be used for M2M Service Connection after M2M Service Bootstrapping. If service n°3 is "available", this file shall be present. There shall be only one TLV object within this EF. Identifier: '6F09' Structure: Transparent Optional Length: X bytes Update activity: low Access Conditions: READ ALW UPDATE ADM DEACTIVATE ADM ACTIVATE ADM Bytes Description M/O Length 1 MAF FQDN TLV data object M X bytes ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 237 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 MAF FQDN Contents: • The FQDN address of the MAF. Coding: • The MAF-FQDN shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in IETF RFC 3629 [19]. The tag value of the MAF FQDN TLV data object shall be '80'. D.1.3.9 EFMEFID (M2M Enrolment Function Identifier) This EF contains one or more M2M Enrolment Function addresses. The first record in the EF shall be considered to be of the highest priority. The last record in the EF shall be considered to be the lowest priority. If service n°5 is "available", this file shall be present. Identifier: '6F07' Structure: linear fixed Optional Record length: X bytes Update activity: low Access Conditions: READ ALW UPDATE ADM DEACTIVATE ADM ACTIVATE ADM Bytes Description M/O Length 1 to X MEF Address LV data object M X bytes MEF Address LV data object Contents: • Address of MEF, in the format of a FQDN, an IPv4 address, or an IPv6 address. Coding: • The format of the data object is as follows: Field Length (bytes) Length 1 Address Type 1 MEF Address Address Length • Address Type: Type of the MEF address. - This field shall be set to the type of the MEF address according to the following: Value Name 0x00 FQDN 0x01 IPv4 0x02 IPv6 All other values are reserved • MEF Address: Address of the M2M Service Bootstrap Function. - This field shall be set to the address of the M2M Enrolment Function. When the MEF type is set to 0x00, the corresponding MEF Address shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in IETF RFC 3629 [19]. Unused bytes shall be set to 'FF'. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 238 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 D.2 oneM2M Service Module application for symmetric credentials on UICC (1M2MSM) D.2.0 Introduction This clause defines the oneM2M Service Module (1M2MSM), an application used for oneM2M Service Layer security functionalities and subscription provisioning based on symmetric keys. This application resides on the UICC, an IC card specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [24]. In particular, ETSI TS 102 221 [24] specifies the application independent properties of the UICC/terminal interface such as the physical characteristics and the logical structure. There may be several 1M2MSM ADFs on a single UICC, corresponding to independent oneM2M Service Subscriptions. D.2.1 oneM2M Service Module application file structure D.2.1.0 Introduction This clause specifies the EFs for the oneM2M service Layer defining access conditions, data items and coding. A data item is a part of an EF which represents a complete logical entity. D.2.1.1 Content of UICC files at the Master File (MF) level Files at the UICC MF level are application independent as specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [24]. Only the EFDIR and EFICCID files are mandatory on UICC for the purpose of 1M2MSM applications. In any case all files shall be as specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [24]. D.2.1.2 Content of files at the 1M2MSM ADF (Application DF) level The EFs in the 1M2MSM ADF contain oneM2M subscription related information that is required for M2M field nodes operating in an oneM2M environment. This ADF shall be selected using its AID and information in EFDIR. The AID for 1M2MSM applications shall be constructed as specified in ETSI TS 101 220 [27]. NOTE: The ETSI RID can be used for oneM2M pending assignment of a oneM2M dedicated RID in ISO/IEC 7816-5 [i.11]. The File IDs '6F1X' (for EFs), '5F1X' and '5F2X' (for DFs) with X ranging from '0' to 'F' are reserved under the 1M2MSM ADF for administrative use by the card issuer. The DF1M2M substructure used to isolate the provisioning of network access dependent M2M service related information in a Network Access Application ADF is not needed for access network independent provisioning of an M2M service subscription in a 1M2MSM ADF. Therefore, all the EFs specified in clause D.1.3 shall be present at the 1M2MSM ADF level. The file structure of the ADF1M2MSM is illustrated in figure D.2.1.2-1. ADF1M2MSM EF1M2MST EF1M2MSID EF1M2MSPID EFM2MNID '6F0A' '6F02' '6F03' '6F04' EFCSEID EFM2MAEID EFINCSEIDS EFMAFFQDN '6F05' '6F06' '6F08' '6F09' EFMEFID '6F07' Figure D.2.1.2-1: File identifiers and directory structures of ADF1M2MSM ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 239 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 D.2.2 oneM2M Subscription related procedures for M2M Service D.2.2.0 Introduction This clause specifies the procedures that shall be executed by M2M field nodes to interact with a oneM2M Service Subscription on UICC. They are applicable independently of the file structure supporting the oneM2M Service Subscription (1M2MSM ADF or DF1M2M under a Network Access Application ADF), unless otherwise indicated. D.2.2.1 Initialization - 1M2MSM Application selection This procedure only applies to an M2M subscription supported in a 1M2MSM ADF. If the M2M field node wants to engage in M2M operation, then after UICC activation (see ETSI TS 102 221 [24]), the M2M field node shall select a 1M2MSM application, if a 1M2MSM application is listed in the EFDIR file, using the SELECT by DF name as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [24]. After a successful oneM2M application selection, the selected oneM2M AID is stored on the UICC. This application is referred to as the last selected 1M2MSM application. The last selected 1M2MSM application shall be available on the UICC after a deactivation followed by an activation of the UICC. If a oneM2M application is selected using partial DF name, the partial DF name supplied in the command shall uniquely identify a 1M2MSM application. Furthermore if a 1M2M application is selected using a partial DF name as specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [24] indicating in the SELECT command the last occurrence, the UICC shall select the oneM2M application stored as the last oneM2M application. If, in the SELECT command, the options first, next/previous are indicated, they have no meaning if an application has not been previously selected in the same session and shall return an appropriate error code. D.2.2.2 1M2MSM session termination This procedure only applies to a oneM2M subscription supported in a 1M2MSM ADF. The oneM2M UICC session is terminated by the M2M field node as follows: • The M2M field node shall indicate to the oneM2M UICC application that the termination procedure is starting, by sending a particular STATUS command. • Finally, the M2M field node deletes all the M2M subscription related information elements from its memory. • To actually terminate the session, the M2M field node shall then use one of the mechanisms described in ETSI TS 102 221 [24]. D.2.2.3 oneM2M Service discovery procedure This procedure is used to discover the oneM2M related services offered by a oneM2M UICC. The M2M field node shall perform the reading procedure with EF1M2MST. If no oneM2M related service is indicated as available, the M2M field node shall assume that only the provisioning of mandatory parameters is available in this ADF. D.2.2.4 oneM2M Service provisioning procedures These procedures are used by an M2M field node in order to bootstrap an M2M service subscription provisioned on the UICC. The M2M field node shall perform the reading procedure with EF1M2MSID and EF1M2MSPID, and EFCSEID, EFM2MNID, EFINCSEID, EFMAFFQDN according to available services indicated in EF1M2MST. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 240 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 D.2.2.5 oneM2M Application Identifiers provisioning procedure This procedure provisions a list of M2M Application Identifiers that may be enabled on the M2M node in relation with the oneM2M Service Subscription. Condition: Service number 4 shall be available in the oneM2M Service Table. Under this condition, the M2M field node shall perform the reading procedure with EFM2MAEID. D.2.2.6 oneM2M Secure provisioning related procedures These procedures are used by the M2M field node to perform M2M Secure Provisioning with the assistance of the UICC, depending on available services in EF1M2MST and the supported AUTHENTICATE commands contexts (e.g. GBA support by a Network Access Application) indicated for the hosting ADF. Secure Provisioning: MEF address Provisioning: Condition: Service number 5 shall be available in the oneM2M Service Table. Under this condition, the M2M field node shall perform the reading procedure with EFMEFID, if the related service is available. GBA Secure Provisioning: This procedure is dependent on the Authentication Framework supported by the UICC and indicated in the Service Table of the hosting ADF. After identifying the supported authentication framework, the M2M field node shall check availability of Service number 7 in EF1M2MST: If the service is available, the D/G M2M Node shall perform GBA-related procedures with AUTHENTICATE - GBA security context (Bootstrapping Mode and Derivation Mode) with the parameters for GBA secure provisioning. D.2.2.7 oneM2M Security Association related procedures GBA secure connection: This procedure is dependent on the Authentication Framework supported by the UICC and indicated in the Service Table of the hosting ADF. After identifying the supported authentication framework, the M2M field node shall check availability of Service number 12 in EF1M2MST: If the service is available, the M2M field node shall perform a GBA-related procedures with AUTHENTICATE - GBA security context (Bootstrapping Mode and Derivation Mode) with the parameters for GBA Security Association. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 241 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Annex E (informative): Precisions for the UICC framework to support M2M Services E.0 Introduction The present annex provides further practical information related to the UICC framework for oneM2M described in annex D. E.1 Suggested content of the EFs at pre-personalization If EFs have an unassigned value, it may not be clear from the main text what this value should be. This annex suggests values in these cases. Table E.1-1: Pre-personalized EF values File Identification Description Value '6F02' 1M2M Service Subscription Identifier '8000FF…FF' '6F03' 1M2M Service Provider Identifier '8000FF…FF' '6F04' M2M Node Identifier '8000FF…FF' '6F05' Local CSE Identifier '8000FF...FF' '6F06' M2M Application Identifiers list '00FF...FF' for each record '6F07' MEF Identifier '00FF…FF' for each record '6F08' IN-CSE Identifiers list '00FF...FF' for each record '6F09' MAF FQDN '8000FF...FF' '6F0A' 1M2M Service Table Operator/Service Provider dependant E.2 EF changes via Data Download or CAT applications This clause defines if changing the content of an EF by the UICC OTA protocol or by a CAT Application is advisable. Updating of certain EFs "over the air" or "over the Internet" could result in unpredictable behaviour of the UE; these are marked "Caution" in table E.2-1. Certain EFs are marked "No"; under no circumstances should "over the air/over the internet" changes of these EFs be considered. Table E.2-1: EF update behaviour File identification Description Change advised '6F02' 1M2M Service Subscription Identifier No '6F03' 1M2M Service Provider Identifier No '6F04' M2M Node Identifier Caution '6F05' Local CSE Identifier Caution '6F06' M2M Application Identifiers list Caution '6F07' MEF Identifier Caution '6F08' IN-CSE Identifiers list Caution '6F09' MAF FQDN Caution '6F0A' 1M2M Service Table Caution ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 242 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 E.3 List of SFI values at the ADFM2MSM or DFM2M level Table E.3-1: SFI values File Identification SFI Description '6F02' '02' M2M Service Subscription Identifier '6F03' '03' M2M Service Provider Identifier '6F04' '04' M2M Node Identifier '6F05' '05' Local CSE Identifier '6F06' '06' M2M Application Identifiers list '6F0A' '0A' 1M2M Service Table All other SFI values are reserved for future use. E.4 UICC related tags defined in annex J Table E.4-1: UICC tags Tag Name of Data Element Usage '80' MAF FQDN TLV data object EFMAFFQDN '80' M2M-Node-ID TLV Data Object EFM2MNID '80' Local CSE-ID TLV data object EFCSEID '80' M2M-SP-ID TLV data object EF1M2MSPID '80' M2M Subscription Identifier TLV data object EF1M2MSID NOTE: The value 'FF' is an invalid tag value. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 243 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Annex F (normative): Acquisition of Location Information for Location based Access Control F.0 Introduction When a request (resource access) is evaluated by a Hosting CSE and an accessControlLocationRegions parameter is defined in the privileges attribute of the <accessControlPolicy> resources, the Hosting CSE shall check whether the location of the Originator of a request is in the specified regions or not. Therefore, the Hosting CSE shall retain the location of the Originator, or acquire the location or deny the access. This annex indicates how to describe the location regions and obtain the location of the Originator. F.1 Description of Region F.1.1 Circular Description The practical way of describing the region or area is the circular presentation and generally the circle is characterized by the co-ordinates of a centre point of the circle and a radius. Geographically, the centre point and radius is described as longitude and latitude, and meter respectively. For this description, the accessControlLocationRegions parameter shall be represented as a circle. Radius (longitude, latitude) Figure F.1.1-1 F.1.2 Country Description Another simple way of describing the region or area is the country presentation. ISO-3166-1 alpha 2 codes [i.10] are two-letter country codes to represent countries and special regions of geographical interest. For example, KR is a code for Korea, Republic of. F.2 Acquisition of Location Information F.2.0 Introduction As mentioned above, when accessControlLocationRegions parameter is defined, the Hosting CSE shall check the location of the Originator for access control. This clause describes how the Hosting CSE checks or obtains the location. The procedures may vary based on the region description, circle and country. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 244 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 F.2.1 Circular Description If the circular description is used as the location context constraints, the Hosting CSE shall check whether it has the current location of Originator or not. If not, it shall obtain the location of Originator. ETSI TS 118 101 [1] defines a resource type for acquisition of location of a Target Node, <locationPolicy>. Therefore, in order to obtain the location of Originator, the Hosting CSE shall create <locationPolicy> and set the relevant attributes as follows: • locationSource: Reliability of the location information is crucial so the location shall be obtained from trusted network. If the location is obtained by the other sources, the location information can be easily masqueraded (i.e. GPS spoofing). Therefore, the locationSource attribute shall be set to 'network-based'. • locationTargetID: The Target Node shall be the Originator that needs to authorize the sent requests. The locationTargetID attribute shall be set to identifier of the Originator. Note that the other attributes are determined by local policies of Hosting CSE as described in clause 9.6.9 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. In order to obtain the location from the network, the Hosting CSE shall transform the oneM2M specified location request into network specified request. NOTE 1: ETSI TS 118 104 [4] describes how to convert the oneM2M-specified request to 'OMA RESTful NetAPI for Terminal Location' specified request, in annex F. Since the region information (circular description) is defined by the accessControlLocationRegions parameter, the Hosting CSE can utilize the circular region information when it requests the location information from the network. OMA RESTful NetAPI for Terminal Location specification [i.9] specifies resource types as an area (region)-based location notification service, 'CircleNotificationSubscription'. If therefore the Hosting CSE subscribes to the notification service with circular region defined as acccessControlLocationRegions parameter, the Hosting CSE can always determine whether the Originator is in the regions or not. Figure F.2.1-1 demonstrates how to acquire the location of the Originator when the accessControlLocationRegions parameter is defined. Figure F.2.1-1 ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 245 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 1. The Originator sends a request to access a resource. 2. The Hosting CSE shall evaluate the received request against the linked <accessControlPolicy> resource. If one of the rule tuples that is about the request originator contains the accessControlLocationRegions parameter (circular description) and the Hosting CSE does not store the location of the Originator, the Hosting CSE shall either continue to the next step or deny the access. If the Hosting CSE has the location of the Originator, it is used for applying access control policy. The Hosting CSE may deny the access due to the fact that the Originator is not subscriber of the network or any other reasons (e.g. connection lost, server malfunction). 3. The Hosting CSE shall create the <locationPolicy> resource and set relevant attributes as mentioned above. 4. The Hosting CSE shall subscribe to a new area location notification service toward Location Server in the Network. The area information shall be based on the area defined by the accessControlLocationRegions parameters. If multiple regions are defined, multiple subscriptions shall be set. 5. The Location Server immediately obtains the location of the Originator. NOTE 2: After the immediate location acquisition, the Location Server periodically obtains the location of the Originator to check whether the Originator is in the area or not. The frequency and duration can be defined by local policies. 6. The Location Server responds with the immediate location information of the Originator toward Hosting CSE. 7. Based on the received location of the Originator and other access control policies, the request is evaluated and can be either granted or denied. The Hosting CSE responds regarding the request (step 1). 8. When the Originator crosses in (enter) or out of (leave) the area, the Location Server shall notify of the Hosting CSE of the location change. Thus, the Hosting CSE can keep track of the location of the Originator and easily evaluate the access against location context constraint. 9. The Hosting CSE responds to the notification. F.2.2 Country Description Generally, the Originator's country-scale location can be determined by the Originator's IP address. If the Hosting CSE can distinguish the country using the Originator's IP address and it is also matched with the defined acccessControlLocationRegions parameter, the Hosting CSE may grant the request subject to evaluation of the full access control policies. NOTE 1: How to transform the IP address into country is out of scope. However, if Hosting CSE cannot distinguish the country using the Originator's IP address, the Hosting CSE shall obtain the location coordinate (i.e. longitude and latitude) of the Originator from the network and the Hosting CSE can distinguish the country using the location if available. The way of obtaining the location coordinate is defined in annex F of ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. NOTE 2: How to transform the location into country is out of scope. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 246 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Annex G (informative): Access Control Decision Request An Access Control Decision Request as introduced in the Authorization Architecture in clause 6.2.2 is generated by a PEP according to an Originator's access request and extra information provided by the hosting CSE using the format specified by the PDP. The PEP can send the Access Control Decision Request to a PDP for an access control decision. The PDP asks the PRP to retrieve all applicable access control policies according to the Access Control Decision Request, and then uses the Access Control Decision Request to evaluate the retrieved access control policies for an access control decision. An Access Control Decision Request from PEP to PDP can contain the following information: • An Originator: It represents the ID of the Originator that sends an access request to the target resource. • A Resource: It represents the URI of the target resource which the Originator wants to access. • An Operation: It represents the operation which the Originator wants to perform on the target resource. • An AccessTime: It represents the time of access. • A LocationRegion: It represents the location of the Originator. • An IPAddress: It represents the IP Address of the Originator. The URI of the target resource is used to locate the target resource and then find the associated access control policies. The ID of Originator is used to compare with the rule component subjects in order to check if a rule is applicable to the Access Control Decision Request. The operation is used to compare with the rule component operations in order to check if the operation is permitted by the rule. The AccessTime, LocationRegion and/or LocationRegion are used to check the rule component contexts in order to ensure some extra conditions are satisfied to using the rule for making an access control decision. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 247 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Annex H (informative): Implementation Guidance and index of solutions The use of the present document involves a context-specific risk assessment process from which relevant security solutions are identified. Clause 6 provides an overview of oneM2M security procedures. Clause 6.1.1 presents the interactions between layers, clause 6.1.2 introduces the sequence of events, and clause 6.2 provides further background especially for authorization (clause 6.2.2). Clause 7 on Authorization and Access Control applies regardless of the type of credentials used. Clause 7.1 describes the general oneM2M Access Control Policy management framework, which can be further enhanced by supporting frameworks for Role-based Access Control (clause 7.4), Dynamic Authorization (clause 7.3). In addition, clause 11 leverages on the above to provide a Privacy Protection Architecture that facilitates the setting and management of user's privacy profiles. The present annex provides a table to assist implementers in identifying which clauses of the present document are relevant for a given type of credential. Specific clauses that apply for supporting End-to-end security are listed in italic characters. Table H-1: Index of clauses specifying procedures per credential types Procedure/Solution PSK Certificates TEF (GBA, MEF, MAF) Remote security provisioning 8.3.2.1 8.3.2.2, 8.7 8.3.2.3 (GBA) 9.2.1.1 9.2.1.2, 9.2.2.3, 9.2.2.4 (GBA), 9.2.3 Security Association Establishment 8.2.1, 8.4 (ESPrim), 8.5.2.3 (ESData Sign), 8.5.2.4 (ESData Sign+Encrypt) 9.1.1.1, 9.1.2.1 9.1.1.2, 9.1.2.2 (MAF) 8.1.1, 8.2.2.1, 8.5.2.2.2 (ESData Encrypt) 8.1.2, 8.2.2.2, 8.5.2.2.4 (ESData Encrypt) 8.1.3, 8.2.2.3 (MAF), 8.8, 8.5.2.2.3 (ESData Encrypt) Algorithm details 10.2.1, 10.3.6 10.2.2, 10.3 10.1, 10.2.3, 10.3 ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 248 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Annex I: Void ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 249 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Annex J (normative): List of Privacy Attributes Table J-1 Tag ID Tag Name Value Parameter Tag description (short form) full Tag description Notes 1.0 Who Null Null Name of party The trading name of the device or service provider asking for access to the users smart devices/network/data variable Txt company name The name of the company that is requesting access to the user's smart devices and specifying their terms variable Country code Location The country where the device or service provider is located variable Txt Company Registration number Company Registration number which can be used as an aid to check the authenticity of the company. For example you could use the UK company registration number available from the UK Companies House. Other equivalent country registration authorities can be used as an aid to check the authenticity of the company asking to use the data and how much trust to place in it 1.1 ID Options for how applications and devices are uniquely identified Txt Model number These are the mobile number(s) of the device(s) if included in the ASP's service Txt Version These are the version number(s) of the device(s) if included in the ASP's service oneM2M Defined format Registered App ID These are the Registered App ID of the apps if included in the ASP's service Country codes Country codes where approval has been granted if needed Device or app accreditation may only be valid in certain countries 2.0 What Data Classification Type What is the type of data that the device/service will access? With the higher the value the more sensitive the data is Data not collected Yes/No No data collected the device does not gather any data, this could be output device, such as a light switch, that only receives instructions Non personal data Yes/No data not linked to a person The data cannot be linked to a person, this could be applicable if the device was a door sensor that can only report then it was opened or closed ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 250 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Tag ID Tag Name Value Parameter Tag description (short form) full Tag description Notes Anonymized data Yes/No Data is collected about a person but anonymized Data is collected about a person but anonymized to remove or summarize any data that would allow an individual to the identified/profiled Personal data Yes/No Data that can be directly linked to an identify The data gather can be linked to an identifier that is unique to an individual or small group (e.g. family members in the same home) Sensitive personal data Yes/No Data that can be linked to identify, of a more sensitive nature. The EU DPA defines certain types of sensitive person data. Additional types such as banking should also be considered to see if they fall within this area Medical data Yes/No Data related to an individual's health/fitness, etc. Data about illnesses, treatments or general wellbeing 3.0 When Null null When the data is collected How often data is sent Data not collected Yes/No No data collected The device/service does not collect data, e.g. an end device such as a light Event based Yes/No Triggered by an event Device only gathers data when triggered, such as a door sensor triggering a camera Variable Monthly 1 to 12 data Is sent monthly The device/services only gathers the data as a monthly transfer. For example a smart fridge, sending a routine operational status report Weekly Yes/No data is sent weekly The device/service only gathers the data as a weekly transfer. For example a diagnostic status report from your fire detection system, including sensor test results, predicted remaining battery life Daily Yes/No data is sent daily The device/service only gathers the data on a daily transfer. For example a smart fridge sending the items that have run out as a Grocery list to the users preferred retailer so the retailer can short list them for inclusion in the users shopping basket hourly 1 to 24 Data is sent every X hours The device/service only gathers the data on an hourly transfer. For example a house alarm reporting it is armed and all sensors have reported they are active. So user alarm app/alarm monitoring service knows that system is still operational and someone has not been able to disable the alarm ability to send an alert minutes 1 to 60 data is sent every X minutes The device/service only gathers the data every 15th minutes. For example smart meters reporting back their usage figures Real time- triggered Yes/No The data is sent continuously then triggered. The data is sent in real time, when a specific event triggers it. E.g. The house alarm reports an internal door opening while alarm it set, this triggers the streaming of security cameras Real time-full Yes/No The data is sent continuously at all times The data is sent in real time for the duration of the device being active. For example CCTV data being sent to offsite storage 3.1 Time period Null time period of data When data is sent, does it cover a time period ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 251 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Tag ID Tag Name Value Parameter Tag description (short form) full Tag description Notes Data not collected Yes/No No data collected The device/service does not collect data, e.g. an end device such as a light summary/current status Yes/No The device send its current status The Device sends the current status data, with no history e.g. the current status of a door sensor (open/closed) and not the log of when the door was opened and closed Sample Yes/No The data covers a short period of time. The data covers a sample of data from a short period of time, such a periodic sampling of heart rhythm being sampled several times a day full history Yes/No The full data captured by the device is provided The full data captured by the device is provided, either sent in real time (3.0) or history uploaded retrospectively 3.2 Sample rate Null the time period between data sampling How long in seconds between samples been taken Data not collected Yes/No No data collected The device/service does not collect data, e.g. an end device such as a light Variable value is seconds between data capture points How long between readings that the device takes measured in seconds Streamed data Yes/No Data is captured continuously Data is captured continuously, such as a smart security camera able to stream the feed to the user 4.0 Where - stored Null Where the data is stored Were the data created by the device or used by the service is stored Data not collected Yes/No No data collected The device/service does not collect data, e.g. an end device such as a light Local Yes/No The data is only stored locally The data is stored within the network of smart devices (e.g. within the home) variable Country/bloc The country were the data is stored, or if part of a wider framework (such as the EU) 4.1 Where - collected Where the data is collected from. Where the data is collected from -note this may be redundant for consumer, but could be used for external feeds such as weather reports. May also be relevant to services so they can state the tries of devices they will pull data from, as they may not want access to all smart devices in the location Data not collected Yes/No No data collected The device/service does not collect data, e.g. an end device such as a light Device Yes/No Data is collected just the specific device covered by T&C The terms & conditions (also well as users privacy settings) are only be evaluated against the data collected by the specific device Smart device network Yes/No Data is collect from all devices on the users network The data is collected from all the devices* that form the users smart device network ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 252 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Tag ID Tag Name Value Parameter Tag description (short form) full Tag description Notes variable External feed Data comes from an external feed, and is combined with data gather. E.g. Weather forecasts combined with users building utilization patens to predict, then to turn heating up so the building is at the desired temperature when the user arrives This would be descriptive and the user would have two options. Disable or substitute (e.g. they have their own compatible weather station, instead of getting a feed from the meteorological office 4.2 Where - Processed Null Where is the data processed Where (physical location) the data is processed. This may be different from the storage location Data not collected Yes/No No data collected The device/service does not collect data, e.g. an end device such as a light Local Yes/No The data is only processed locally The data in only processed on the device, or with the user's network of smart devices Variable Country/bloc The country were the data is stored, or if part of a wider framework (such as the EU) 4.3 Where - Accessed Null Were the data is accessible from Where the supplier/vendor/Policy Precedence restrictions allow the data stored to be accessed from Data not collected Yes/No No data collected The device/service does not collect data, e.g. an end device such as a light Local Yes/No The data is only processed locally The data in only processed on the device, or with the user's network of smart devices Variable Country/bloc The country were the data is stored, or if part of a wider framework (such as the EU) 5.0 Why Null The prime reason why personal data is being collected and to allow any change of use to be notified to the user Yes/No Yes/No For Direct Delivery of the service The ASP collects information for the direct delivery of the service E.g. using location for paging from a base station that the user is currently registered at Yes/No Yes/No To improve ASP's and their partners products and services The ASP collects information to improve ASP's and their partners products and services Yes/No Yes/No To personalize services The ASP collects information to personalize ASP's and their partners products and services "our customers that selected this also selected these" Yes/No Yes/No A Policy Precedence requirement The ASP collects information to meet a Policy Precedence requirement E.g. Minimum age of intended user used to determine access to resources 6.0 Retention Null How long is data retained How long the data (defined above) is kept in its current level of detail Data not collected Yes/No No data collected The device/service does not collect data, e.g. an end device such as a light Zero retention Yes/No Zero data retention After processing data, its immediately deleted ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 253 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Tag ID Tag Name Value Parameter Tag description (short form) full Tag description Notes Minutes 1 to 60 Data is kept for X minutes Data is kept for 15 minutes before being deleted. E.g. the device only holds the last set of readings and collects new ones every 15 minutes hour 1 to 24 Data is kept for X hour Data is kept for X hours Day 1 to 7 data is kept for X day week 1 to 4 Data is kept for X week Month 1 to 12 Data is kept for X month Year 1 to 10 data is kept for X year forever The data will be kept for ever The data will be stored without a defined retention/deletion policy 6.1 retention - anonymized null how long anonymized data is kept How long any anonymized or other derived data that is not directly linked to a unique identify is kept. E.g. stats on power usage by geo location Zero retention Yes/No Zero data retention After processing data, its immediately deleted Minutes 1 to 60 Data is kept for X minutes Data is kept for 15 minutes before being deleted. E.g. the device only holds the last set of readings and collects new ones every 15 minutes hour 1 to 24 Data is kept for X hour Data is kept for X hours Day 1 to 7 data is kept for X day week 1 to 4 Data is kept for X week Month 1 to 12 Data is kept for X month Year 1 to 10 data is kept for X year forever The data will be kept for ever The data will be stored without a defined retention/deletion policy 6.2 retention - summary Null how long summary data is kept How long summary data is kept, e.g. how much total power was used per month based on meter readings taken every 15 minutes Zero retention Yes/No Zero data retention After processing data, its immediately deleted Minutes 1 to 60 Data is kept for X minutes Data is kept for 15 minutes before being deleted. E.g. the device only holds the last set of readings and collects new ones every 15 minutes hour 1 to 24 Data is kept for X hour Data is kept for X hours Day 1 to 7 data is kept for X day week 1 to 4 Data is kept for X week Month 1 to 12 Data is kept for X month Year 1 to 10 data is kept for X year forever The data will be kept for ever The data will be stored without a defined retention/deletion policy 7.0 Sharing -full Null Who the full data is shared with. Who outside the company has access to the full data by type Data not collected Yes/No Data is not shared outside the company Data is not shared outside the company providing the device/service with not processing contracted out ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 254 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Tag ID Tag Name Value Parameter Tag description (short form) full Tag description Notes Group No/scope and reason Data is only shared with companies in the same group Data is only shared within other companies in the same group Infrastructure provider Yes/No Data is stored on 3rd party infrastructure The data is stored on a separate company's servers e.g. the company providing the device/service uses a cloud provider for storage or processing See note 1. Subcontractor Yes/No Data is shared with subcontractor(s) Data is shared with one or more subcontractors who provide part of the service See note 2. Other contracted parties ancillary functions No/scope and reason Data is shared with other parties under contract Data is shared with other parties under contract that provide additional (non-core) functions to use/operation of device. Such as providing newsletters, marketing offers, etc. Local warranty repair places, etc. Affiliate No/scope and reason Data is shared with other private entities Data is shared with other parties who have no direct or indirect involvement in the device/service. E.g. device suppliers sharing data with channel partners so they can target campaigns Public bodies No/scope, reason, bodies Data is shared with key public bodies Data is shared then certain conditions with certain bodies. E.g. on triggering of an alarm, data for your security devices is shared with police so they can respond in a suitable fashion. Or if a medical alarm goes off the ambulance service/hospital, etc. are sent details so they can respond 7.1 Sharing - anonymized Null Who the data is shared with. Who outside the company has access to anonymized data by type of user Data not collected Yes/No Data is not shared outside the company Data is not shared outside the company providing the device/service with no processing contracted out Group No/scope and reason Data is only shared with companies in the same group Data is only shared within other companies in the same group Infrastructure provider Yes/No Data is stored on 3rd party infrastructure The data is stored on a separate company's servers. E.g. the company providing the device/service uses a cloud provider for storage or processing Subcontractor Yes/No Data is shared with subcontractor(s) Data is shared with one or more subcontractors who provide part of the service Other contracted parties ancillary functions No/scope and reason Data is shared with other parties under contract Data is shared with other parties under contract that provide additional (non-core) functions to use/operation of device. Such as providing newsletters, marketing offers, etc. Local warranty repair places, etc. Affiliate No/scope and reason Data is shared with other private entities Data is shared with other parties who have no direct or indirect involvement in the device/service. E.g. device suppliers sharing data with channel partners so they can target campaigns ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 255 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Tag ID Tag Name Value Parameter Tag description (short form) full Tag description Notes Public bodies No/scope, reason, bodies Data is shared with key public bodies Data is shared then certain conditions with certain bodies. E.g. on triggering of an alarm, data for your security devices is shared with police so they can respond in a suitable fashion. Or if a medical alarm goes off the ambulance service/hospital, etc. are sent details so they can respond 7.2 Sharing - summary Null Who the data is shared with. Who outside the company has access to summary data by type of user Data not collected Yes/No Data is not shared outside the company Data is not shared outside the company providing the device/service with no processing contracted out Group No/scope and reason Data is only shared with companies in the same group Data is only shared within other companies in the same group Infrastructure provider Yes/No Data is stored on 3rd party infrastructure The data is stored on a separate company's servers. E.g. the company providing the device/service uses a cloud provider for storage or processing Subcontractor Yes/No Data is shared with subcontractor(s) Data is shared with one or more subcontractors who provide part of the service Other contracted parties ancillary functions No/scope and reason Data is shared with other parties under contract Data is shared with other parties under contract that provide additional (non-core) functions to use/operation of device. Such as providing newsletters, marketing offers, etc. Local warranty repair places, etc. Affiliate No/scope and reason Data is shared with other private entities Data is shared with other parties who have no direct or indirect involvement in the device/service. E.g. device suppliers sharing data with channel partners so they can target campaigns Public bodies No/scope, reason, bodies Data is shared with key public bodies Data is shared then certain conditions with certain bodies. E.g. local councils gathering average water usage by geo-location 8.0 informing Null Y/N Y/N T&Cs sent to email address registered by the end user The device vendor application providers send their tag values in this table to an email address registered by the end user URL ACME.com/English/de vice type/model/T&C T&Cs by displayed URL The device vendor application providers make their tag values in this table available at a URL Could be automatically processed by the PPM portal URL ACME.com/English/de vice type/model/T&C T&Cs by URL stored in device The device vendor application providers make their tag values in this table available at a URL stored in the device Could be automatically processed by the PPM portal and or device Y/N Y/N T&Cs on local Screen ( if present ) The device vendor application providers make their tag values in this table available on the device screen ( if present) Y/N Y/N On remote screen associated with user The device vendor application providers make their tag values in this table available on remote screen associated with user ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 256 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Tag ID Tag Name Value Parameter Tag description (short form) full Tag description Notes Y/N Y/N By post The device vendor application providers send their tag values in this table to an postal address registered by the end user Y/N Y/N SMS ( txt) The device vendor application providers send their tag values in this table to an SMS number registered by the end user 9.0 Obtaining consent Null Y/N Consent by In app default User has to accept default by a single click in the app Y/N Consent by End user signed document Summary XML signed with end users private key e.g. digital signature Y/N Consent by oneM2M recommended method A oneM2M recommended method {TBA} If this is defined in the future 10.0 Protection Null Five levels to describe how well that the end user privacy and security is protected are defined. Level 1 is the lowest and Level 5 the highest. Each of these levels provides requirements expected for a claim at that level These levels align with those already proposed by oneM2M WG4 Protection level claimed 1 Protection level claimed = 1 Level 1: lowest level with minimal claims that the end user privacy and security is protected. This level is used when minimum risk is associated with a breach of end user security and privacy Protection level claimed 2 Protection level claimed = 2 Level 2: provides some level of confidence that the end user privacy and security is protected. Entities prove, through a secure authentication protocol, that the entity has control of the sensitive data/credentials. Controls are in place to protect against attacks on stored sensitive data/credentials Protection level claimed 3 Protection level claimed = 3 Level 3: provides high confidence that the end user privacy and security is protected. This level is needed when substantial risk is associated with breach of end user security and privacy. Multi-factor authentication is used. Any sensitive data or information exchanged in authentication protocols is cryptographically protected in transit and at rest Protection level claimed 4 Protection level claimed = 4 Level 4: provides very high confidence that the end user privacy and security is protected. This level is used when high risk is associated with a breach of end user security and privacy. This level provides the highest level of end user security and privacy. In addition to Level 3 this level requires the usage of tamper resistant hardware devices for the storage of all sensitive data such as cryptographic keys Protection level claimed 5 Protection level claimed = 5 As level 4 but evidence of external accreditation/assurance available May depend on work of oneM2M on device certification ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 257 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Tag ID Tag Name Value Parameter Tag description (short form) full Tag description Notes 11.0 Age Null When relevant to privacy settings options for how the end users age can be determined e.g. DOB age range, etc. DD/MM/YYY Date Of Birth Claimed Date Of Birth of the end user to determine access to resources Numeric value or range of values Minimum age of intended user Minimum age of intended user used to determine access to resources DD/MM/YYY Maximum age of device ( shelf life) Maximum age of device ( shelf life) used to determine access to resources For devices with embedded batteries that have a shelf life or chemicals in medical devices, etc. NOTE:1: The answers for where reflect the 3rd party as well as the company offering the service/device. NOTE 2: The answers about location, etc. reflect all subcontractors used. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 258 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Annex K (informative): Terms and Conditions Mark-up Language implementation rules Typical implementation rules are shown below and are repeated for each row. Note on conventions: {} identifies the answers to earlier if statement, [] identifies the Filter Frame and () contain comments. The logic has been shown with indents to better show the nesting of the statements. The logic works by checking the same rows on the Filter Frames being checked. To generate the summary value for each row the follow logic is used. If [Current Filter Frame] Value, is not equal to NA (Not applicable= No preference or limit set)? {Yes} Is [Current Filter Frame] value equal to [Previous Filter Frame] summary value (compound value) of? {Yes} [Current Filter Frame] Summary value equals Value set. {No} is [current Filter Frame] Value set ="Yes"? {Yes} [Current Filter Frame] Summary value set as [Previous Filter Frame] Summary value {No} [Current Filter Frame] Summary value set as [Current Filter Frame] Summary value. {No} [Current Filter Frame] summary value set as [Previous Filter Frame] Summary value To generate the T&C acceptable symbol the following logic is used. If [Current Filter Frame] Value equals "Yes"? {Yes] [Current Filter Frame] T&C Acceptable set as "" (the smiley is used so the result displayed to the user is language agnostic as well as only requiring a small amount of screen space). {No} [Current Filter Frame] Value equal [Previous Filter Frame]? {Yes} [Current Filter Frame] T&C acceptable set as "" {No} [Current Filter Frame] T&C Acceptable set as "" ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 259 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Figure K-1 ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 260 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Annex L (normative): Tamper-resistant Secure Element framework supporting asymmetric cryptography services L.0 Introduction L.0.1 Overview Secure elements may be integrated in PKI systems to provide secure identification and authentication of devices, tamper-resistant storage and execution areas for sensitive data (especially secure storage of private keys which may be generated on board in the SE and always used within it) managed by defined stakeholders, and digital signature services with management of digital certificates. Secure Element supporting asymmetric cryptographic services are termed Asymmetric Secure Element (ASE) in the rest of the present annex, which specifies features that should be exposed by the ASE to its hosting device to enable interoperable application deployments: • Providing keys (which may be randomly generated data) to the hosting device for encrypting, integrity protecting and authenticating data sent by the hosting device to receiver of the data. • Negotiation of keys for protecting the communication between hosting device and ASE. • Calculating signatures for data to provide non repudiation. • Generation of random numbers for the TLS command ClientHello. • Key negotiation of the TLS pre-master secrets. • Signature generation and verification for the TLS authentication. • Providing generic cryptographic services to Application Entities. The ASE may be a UICC [24] or eUICC [70], in which case the framework proposed in the present annex may coexist with some features specified in annex D, e.g. by being implemented as a GlobalPlatform applet loaded on a UICC. Other types of ASE may exist (e.g. embedded Secure Element according to GlobalPlatform). The ASE capabilities specified in the present annex may be implemented as a secure element applet as per GlobalPlatform Card Specifications [63], which first needs to be selected in order for the ASE to exhibit the specified behaviour. This implementation provides the possibility to install and provision the asymmetric cryptographic capabilities on secure elements, even after deployment on the field, in a standard manner. It also enables to leverage on the Security Domains structure (SD) of the GlobalPlatform Card specification [63], allowing multiple stakeholders to independently operate and securely manage their own secure environments on a single Secure Element. L.0.2 Naming Conventions To easily identify whether a key is public or private, whether it exists in the ASE or the hosting device or is a CA key, and also the usage of a key, the following notation is used in this annex: KeyType.KeyOwner.KeyUsage To easily identify whether a certificate can be verified in the ASE or not, whether it exists in the ASE or the hosting device or belongs to a CA or root CA, and also its usage, the following notation is used in this annex: CertType.CertOwner.CertUsage ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 261 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The possible values are shown in table L.0.2-1. Table L.0.2-1: Naming convention Parameter Value Meaning Key or certificate Type PuK Public Key PrK Private key Owner ICC ASE IFD Hosting device (i.e. interface with M2M application) CA Certification Authority CAICC Certification authority that generated the certificate for the ICC public key RCA Root Certification Authority Usage AUT Authentication key DS Digital signature key KA Key Agreement CS-AUT Certificate Signature Authentication L.1 Physical interface and transport protocol The intention of the present annex is to specify a set of generic security services that shall be supported in oneM2M ASE and should be exposed to oneM2M applications through the Secure Environment Abstraction Layer of ETSI TS 118 116 [67]. The ASE services are described at a high level in order to support implementations that comply with specific regulations, e.g. regional standards such as BS EN 419 212-1 [64] in the European Union or FIPS 201-2 [69] in the USA, or vertical such as BSI TR 03109 [i.32] in the German energy sector. The ASE security services described in this annex are commonly supported in secure elements used for certificate-based security deployments, such as governmental or corporate identification cards supporting digital signature as per BS EN 419 212-1 [64] or FIPS 201-2 [69]. The functionalities described in the present annex imply the presence of a random number generation capability in the ASE. This functionality may be made available to the hosting device. They also imply that the ASE supports asymmetric cryptography based on the RSA or ECC algorithms, and the AES symmetric algorithm. The Secure Element may interface with the hosting M2M device through various physical communication means. The difference between the multiple communication links (wired or contactless) that may be used does not otherwise impact the way applications would interact with the Secure Element. L.2 Lifecycle phases The ASE lifecycle comprises the following phases: • Personalization, where the ASE maintains the state initialized upon creation to enable its initial provisioning. This phase is supposed to take place in a trusted facility under control of the stakeholder responsible for the ASE (e.g. ASE issuer facility, device assembly line or Point of sale). It ends when the ASE receives a trigger to transition into its operational state. • Operational phase, where the ASE maintains a state suitable for secure operation in the field, into which a transition is triggered upon completion of the personalization phase. A secure channel shall first be established to secure data exchange with a host, as described in clause L.3. Depending on the operating environment, the secure channel may only ensure mutual authentication between both entities, or add MIC protection, or add both MIC and confidentiality protections. Operation of the ASE (or ASE applet) during its personalization phase can be subject to specific constraints and can include special commands that are not available in the operational state. For example, the GlobalPlatform Card Specification [63] specifies low level personalization commands and procedures that may be implemented by ASE supporting ISO/IEC 7816-4 APDUs [26] in deployments requiring interoperability in the personalization state. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 262 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 At the end of initial provisioning/personalization, the ASE (or ASE applet) enters an operational state, in which the functions specified in clause L.4 shall be available. During operation, the secure element or specific information within it (e.g. keys) may move to a "blocked" state designed as a protection mechanism once it encounters any integrity problem or e.g. if a maximum allowed number of authentication attempts has been reached. L.3 Device Application / ASE Authentication and Secure Channel Establishment To prevent execution of commands and access to information by unauthorized entities, communication between the hosting device application and ASE shall be protected through the establishment of a secure channel (e.g. based on access control mechanism or mutual authentication of the communicating entities) both in the personalization and the operational state. This enables the protection of the information exchanged over the Mcs and Mca reference points. This mechanism ensures that: • On one side, any entity (such as a clerk) which wants to access the protected data on the ASE, shall authenticate themselves to the ASE. Behind the entity are the system and the hosting device (called IFD). The ASE checks that the entity who is requiring access to the data is allowed to do so. • On the other side, the ASE authenticates itself to the clerk's systems via the IFD, to ensure that it is genuine. After mutual authentication between an entity and the ASE, the ASE grants the specific access rights related to the entity. The secure channel authentication required for the ASE and external entity to exchange sensitive information may be based on either symmetric or asymmetric credentials: • Asymmetric key mutual authentication based on the ASE and IFD verifying the existence of a certified key pair in the other entity. This process can be based on either RSA device authentication, or ECC device authentication. Where needed, common symmetric session keys can then be derived using the Diffie–Hellman key exchange mechanism to ensure integrity and/or confidentiality of the information exchange. • Symmetric key mutual authentication based on the ASE and IFD verifying the existence of two AES symmetric secret keys, KENC and KMIC, in the other entity. A successful symmetric mutual authentication opens the secure channel. Establishment of a secure channel, i.e. a secure messaging session, requires a successful mutual authentication between the ASE and hosting device. The following scenarios shall terminate a secure channel: • Power off or reset of the ASE. • Reselection of the ASE applet. • A command with an incorrect MIC is received by the ASE. • A command with an incorrect encryption is received by the ASE. The present annex does not mandate any specific secure channel mechanism to allow alignment with contextual requirements. Example of relevant secure channel mechanisms include the following: • Secure Channel Protocols (SCP) specified in the GlobalPlatform Card Specification [63], such as SCP 11 or SCP 03. • Secure channel mechanisms specified in the GSMA eUICC technical specifications SGP.02 and SGP.22 [70]. • Secure Channel mechanisms specified in BS EN 419 212-1 [64] or FIPS 201-2 [69]. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 263 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 L.4 ASE Supported Functions L.4.1 ASE Verifiable Certificates These are certificates stored in the ASE and used in asymmetric key mutual authentication. The ASE Verifiable Certificate is issued and signed by a trusted certificate authority (CA) and stored in the hosting device to show that it (and so the entity behind it) can be trusted. This certificate is referred as C_CV.IFD.AUT. The ASE can check that the ASE Verifiable Certificate in the hosting device can be trusted by using the CA's public key. Similarly, the ASE may contain a certificate issued and signed by the CA, called the C.ICC.AUT. The hosting device can check that this certificate was genuinely issued and signed by the CA by using the CA's public key. In BS EN 419 212-1 [64], ASE Verifiable Certificates used in RSA-based device authentication are non self-descriptive (i.e. the tags and lengths of the signature elements are not included in the format), while ASE Verifiable Certificates used in Elliptic Curve Device Authentication are self-descriptive. Such ASE Verifiable Certificates include a Certificate Holder Authorization (CHA) that may be used as a security condition to access relevant sensitive data. L.4.2 ASE Secure Storage L.4.2.1 Overview An ASE shall support a way to store information in its protected non-volatile memory. For example an ISO 7816 file system, or GlobalPlatform functionalities to store data inside a Secure Element without a file system. This can be used for information meant to be exchanged with external entities: This includes permanent storage of stakeholder information, storage of service credentials, and storage of data for service processing. This can be updated dynamically during operation provided that access control conditions are satisfied. Data objects are meant to store information used during internal processes such as secret keys. The structures for Data objects may need to be reserved during the personalization phase but their content can be updatable, if desirable, during the operational phase. L.4.2.2 PIN PINs may be used to identify a user and to protect data. See clause L.4.6 for further details. L.4.2.3 Symmetric secret keys Symmetric secret keys are 16-byte, 24-byte or 32-byte AES keys used for symmetric key mutual authentication. Two secret keys, KENC and KMIC, are shared by the secure element and its host, and can be diversified, for example by using the secure element serial number. Mutual authentication consists of each entity proving that it possesses the two keys to the other entity. A symmetric key can optionally be protected by a ratification counter. There may be multiple key pairs (KENC, KMIC) in an ASE. They shall be created together and initialized during the personalization phase. L.4.2.4 Public keys RSA and ECC public keys are associated with private keys in a key pair sharing a common one byte identifier, KID. These could be used for mutual authentication or to verify a signature or certificate. RSA Public Keys can also be used to encrypt sensitive data, while ECC Public Keys can be used to derive a symmetric shared key (ZZ) to be used to encrypt data. The typical process to create a key pair in an ASE requires reservation of space for an Asymmetric Key Header during the personalization phase. This initializes a key container with at least a public portion and optionally a private portion. The following public keys are generally stored in the ASE: • CA public keys used in asymmetric key mutual authentication ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 264 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • RSA and ECC public keys used by the application More than one CA may store its public key PuK.CA.AUT on an ASE. RSA public keys always contain a modulus, N, and a public exponent, e.g. the keys may be automatically updated by ASE internal process, or the keys may be generated outside the secure element. L.4.2.5 Private keys Private keys are used for public key cryptographic operations of M2M applications, such as generation of digital signatures, sensitive data decryption, and asymmetric scheme mutual authentication. Private keys are always stored in the ASE to be adequately protected. They may be initialized either during the personalization phase or during the operational phase. L.4.2.6 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange parameters The Diffie–Hellman key exchange parameters used in asymmetric key mutual authentication may also be stored in the ASE. L.4.2.7 Arbitrary Application Data This provides a service to create, store, update and delete application data in the SE. L.4.2.8 ProfileData This provides a service to store and protect profile data. A profile is the representation of parameters and data for its application, keys, and load files. L.4.3 On-Board Key Generation (OBKG) The On-Board Key Generation functionality enables creation of a public / private key pair within an ASE, so that the private key never leaves the ASE which protects it during storage and usage (e.g. to sign a certificate). OBKG is initiated when a command is sent to the ASE to initialize or update the value of a key pair when the ASE is in Operational state. This command only generates new values for private key and public key and returns the public key value in its response. On-Board Key Generation has several advantages: • The ASE performs the computation of the key values. The key value is not precomputed or imposed by an external entity. • As the key update takes place within the ASE, the secure element handles the security of the operation instead of the hosting application. • The command may need to satisfy access conditions to the private key data object in order to update the value of the private key data object. • The new private key value never leaves the secure element. • The life span of the key pair can be easily managed within the application, e.g. by regular renewals in order to adapt to the specific risks to which the key pair may be exposed. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 265 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 L.4.4 Digital Signature L.4.4.1 Overview The ASE may be used to generate Digital Signatures, by which a message is authenticated by the receiver to ensure that it is sent by the intended sender and that the message was not altered since it was sent. The signatures are generated using the Digital Signature keys stored in the ASE. L.4.4.2 Digital Signature Generation The digital signature generation process is the computation of the message signature using the digital signature private key on a pre-computed message hash digest. As the signature is generated using the sender's private key which is securely stored in the ASE, the message can only be sent by authorized sender and not by anybody else. The digital signature creation process is as follows: 1) Message Hashing. The sender (Host Application) computes the hash of the original message using a hash algorithm. The host application calls a command to perform the hashing. 2) Formatting Hash to Digital Signature Input (DSI). The ASE pads the hash to the length and format indicated by the hashing command. 3) Signature Creation. The hash is ciphered with the sender's private key. The result is known as the signature. 4) Digitally Signed Message Sending. The signature is appended to the original message and sent. L.4.4.3 Message Hashing The generation of the hash may be performed in three ways: 1) performed entirely by the ASE using a dedicated command; 2) performed externally; 3) partially performed by the ASE and partially performed externally (in this case, the data is split). For RSA Signatures, the ASE may use any of the following secure hash algorithms: • SHA-256 • SHA-384 • SHA-512 For ECC signatures, the ASE may also use any of these SHA algorithms. L.4.4.4 Formatting Hash to Digital Signature Input (DSI) The generated hash is typically shorter than the required length of the Digital Signature Input and needs to be padded accordingly. The DSI needs to conform to a particular format, so the hash cannot be simply padded by adding a padding character. For this reason, the ASE is able to perform the necessary padding. L.4.4.5 Signature Creation The ASE uses the DSI to compute the digital signature upon instruction from its host. The following algorithms are supported: • ALG_ECDSA_SHA_256: Signature algorithm ALG_ECDSA_SHA_256 generates a 32-byte SHA-256 digest and signs/verifies the digest using ECDSA with the curve defined in the ECKey parameters - such as the P-256 curve specified in the Digital Signature Standards specification [71], FRP256V1 or brainpoolP256r1 curves all recommended in [74]. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 266 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • ALG_ECDSA_SHA_384: Signature algorithm ALG_ECDSA_SHA_384 generates a 48-byte SHA-384 digest and signs/verifies the digest using ECDSA with the curve defined in the ECKey parameters - such as the P-384 curve specified in the Digital Signature Standards specification [71]. • ALG_ECDSA_SHA_512: Signature algorithm ALG_ECDSA_SHA_512 generates a 64-byte SHA-512 digest and signs/verifies the digest using ECDSA with the curve defined in the ECKey parameters - such as the P-521 curve specified in the Digital Signature Standards specification [71]. L.4.4.6 Integrity of the Data to be Signed The ASE may check integrity of the data to be signed, as required by some signature certification schemes. L.4.4.7 Digital Signature Verification The digital signature verification typically involves decrypting the signature using the sender's public key and hashing the original message using the hashing algorithm. If the hashes are equal, the signature is valid. As the signature is created using the sender's private key, it can only be verified by the sender's public key. By verifying the signature, the recipient has proof that the sender's private key was used to encrypt the message hash and that the message has not been altered. Since this does not require a high level of security, this process is typically performed externally and the ASE is not involved in this operation. The principle of digital signature verification is shown for informational purposes only: 1) The receiver uses the sender's public key to decrypt the signature and retrieve the message hash. 2) The receiver hashes the original message and compares it with the result obtained in step 1. If the two hashes match, then the sender is authentic. L.4.5 Encryption and Decryption L.4.5.1 Overview Public key pairs may be used for encryption and decryption of sensitive data, typically symmetric session keys. In the case of RSA, the public key of the receiver's RSA key pair is used to encrypt messages and the private key of the key pair stored in the ASE is used to decrypt the message. The external entity uses the ASE's public key to encrypt the message, which is not a sensitive operation, while the ASE uses the corresponding private key to decrypt the message internally using the PSO- Decipher (RSA use) decryption function. This process ensures that only the intended recipients can decrypt and read the message. Upon successful completion of the command, the ASE returns the deciphered message in the response. In the case of ECC, the public key of the receiver (the ASE) is used to derive a shared key ZZ, which is used to encrypt and decrypt data. The key is generated by the ASE. For security reason, it is strongly recommended to never use the same private key for deciphering and signing. The following clauses provide an example of a message encryption and decryption process wherein the encrypted data is a one-time session key that has been used to encrypt another message. L.4.5.2 RSA Message Encryption and Decryption The message encryption process is performed by the message sender (external entity). The process includes the following steps: 1) Message Encryption. The message sender encrypts the document with a one-time session key. Typically, this is an AES session key. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 267 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 2) Symmetric Key Encryption. The message sender encrypts the symmetric session key with the host application RSA public key with a specified padding, e.g. PKCS #1. 3) Message Sending. The message sender sends the encrypted session key and the encrypted message to the host application. The message decryption occurs in the host application. The process includes the following steps: 1) Symmetric Key Decryption. Upon receiving the message, the host application instructs the ASE to decrypt the symmetric key. The ASE returns the decrypted symmetric key in the response. 2) Message Decryption. The host application decrypts the message using the symmetric key retrieved in step 1. This step is performed by the host application. For security reasons, it is strongly recommended not to use the same private key for decryption and signing. The messages to be decrypted may be protected by e.g. RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 algorithm or RSAES OAEP algorithms. L.4.5.3 ECC Message Encryption and Decryption Encrypting a Message (ECC): The steps are as follows: 1) The sender derives a shared key, ZZ, from the ASE certified public key (yb) and the hosting device ephemeral private key (ra). This process involves generation of a random challenge. 2) The sender encrypts a message using ZZ. Decrypting a Message (ECC): 1) The sender sends both the encrypted message and his/her public key (ya) to the ASE acting as the receiver. 2) The receiver uses ZZ to decrypt the message. L.4.5.4 AES Message Encryption and Decryption The following methods may be supported according to ETSI TS 118 116 [67]: • ALG_AEAD_AES_128_GCM: The AEAD_AES_128_GCM authenticated encryption algorithm works as specified in IETF RFC 5116 [72], using AES-128 as the block cipher, by providing the key, nonce, and plaintext, and associated data to that mode of operation. • ALG_AEAD_AES_256_GCM: This algorithm is identical to AEAD_AES_128_GCM, but with the following differences: K_LEN is 32 octets, instead of 16 octets, and AES-256 GCM is used instead of AES-128 GCM. • ALG_AEAD_AES_128_CCM: The AEAD_AES_128_CCM authenticated encryption algorithm works as specified in IETF RFC 5116 [72], using AES-128 as the block cipher, by providing the key, nonce, associated data, and plaintext to that mode of operation. • ALG_AEAD_AES_256_CCM: This algorithm is identical to AEAD_AES_128_CCM, but with the following differences: K_LEN is 32 octets, instead of 16, and AES-256 CCM is used instead of AES-128 CCM. • ALG_AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8: The AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 authenticated encryption algorithm is identical to the AEAD_AES_128_CCM algorithm (see Section 5.3 of IETF RFC 5116 [72]), except that it uses 8 octets for authentication, instead of the full 16 octets used by AEAD_AES_128_CCM (see Section 6.1 of IETF RFC 6655 [31]). • ALG_AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8: The AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8 authenticated encryption algorithm is identical to the AEAD_AES_256_CCM algorithm (see Section 5.4 of IETF RFC 5116 [72]), except that it uses 8 octets for authentication, instead of the full 16 octets used by AEAD_AES_256_CCM (see Section 6.2 of IETF RFC 6655 [31]). ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 268 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD: Cipher algorithm ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD provides a cipher using AES with block size 128 in CBC mode and does not pad input data. • ALG_AES_CBC_ISO9797_M1: Cipher algorithm ALG_AES_CBC_ISO9797_M1 provides a cipher using AES with block size 128 in CBC mode, and pads input data according to the ISO 9797 [73] method 1 scheme. • ALG_AES_CBC_ISO9797_M2: Cipher algorithm ALG_AES_CBC_ISO9797_M2 provides a cipher using AES with block size 128 in CBC mode, and pads input data according to the ISO 9797 [73] method 2 (ISO 7816-4 [26], EMV'96) scheme. • ALG_AES_CBC_PKCS5: Cipher algorithm ALG_AES_CBC_PKCS5 provides a cipher using AES with block size 128 in CBC mode, and pads input data according to the PKCS#5 scheme. L.4.6 User Authentication through PIN PINs are used to identify the owner of an ASE and to protect its data. A data object in the ASE may be protected by a PIN. In this case, access to the object shall only be allowed upon successful verification of the PIN. An ASE may also support an Activation PIN verification mechanism to prevent unauthorized use of the ASE before verification that the ASE is provided to the authorized owner. The Activation PIN needs to be presented once only during the Operational Phase. The ASE may also support a "Force PIN Change Before Signature" mechanism. If the feature is activated after personalization and if the Digital Signature key is protected by a PIN, the PIN shall be changed at least once after personalization to make the signature functionality available. L.4.7 TLS-Handshake The ASE may provide services for the establishment of TLS channels (Handshake), including: • Generation of random numbers for the TLS command ClientHello • Key negotiation of the TLS pre-master secrets • Signature generation and verification for the TLS authentication • Securing the data sent via the negotiated TLS channel The applicable cipher suites are listed in clause 10.2. L.4.8 getSEFunctions This service provides a list of available sensitive functions provided by the secure element. L.4.9 Random numbers This service provides random numbers to the hosting device. L.4.10 Calculating MICs This service calculates MICs. The following algorithm may be supported: • ALG_AES_CMAC_128: Signature algorithm ALG_AES_CMAC_128 generates a 16-byte Cipher-based MAC (CMAC) using AES with blocksize 128 in CBC mode with ISO 9797 [73] M2 padding scheme. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 269 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • ALG_AES_MAC_128_NOPAD: Signature algorithm ALG_AES_MAC_128_NOPAD generates a 16-byte MAC using AES with blocksize 128 in CBC mode and does not pad input data. • ALG_HMAC_SHA_256: HMAC message authentication algorithm ALG_HMAC_SHA_256. This algorithm generates an HMAC following the steps found in IETF RFC 2104 [33] using SHA-256 as the hashing algorithm. • ALG_HMAC_SHA_384: HMAC message authentication algorithm ALG_HMAC_SHA_384. This algorithm generates an HMAC following the steps found in IETF RFC 2104 [33] using SHA-384 as the hashing algorithm. • ALG_HMAC_SHA_512: HMAC message authentication algorithm ALG_HMAC_SHA_512. This algorithm generates an HMAC following the steps found in IETF RFC 2104 [33] using SHA-512 as the hashing algorithm. L.4.11 Device Authentication This service provides authentication of the hosting device, verifying the authenticity of remote entities and negotiating session keys for protecting the communication between the mutual authenticated entities. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 270 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Annex M (informative): Example SCEP implementation M.1 Introduction This annex provides a description of an implementation of the Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol (SCEP). M.2 Certificate Provisioning procedures using SCEP Figure M.1 shows a high level outline of the SCEP procedures. The figure identifies the following building blocks of a certificate automation service using SCEP specified in IETF RFC 8894 [66]. • Profile Provisioning is the primary and authoritative actor in any automation system. Provisioning informs the device's automation client, and the PKI service – the credential issuer, though the establishment of pre- authorized device credentials, that a number of unique devices will be calling home to request dedicated unique client certificate(s). • The provisioning capability informs both the remote device and the PKI service over an authenticated and confidential channel of their unique Provisioning Profiles. The Provisioning Profiles can be revised at any time, allowing existing credentials to be forced changed if necessary. Typical provisioning protocols include BBF TR-069, OMA-DM, etc., see [i.29] and [i.30]. • The device automation client, or certificate application intelligence provides a state machine that uses the provisioning data, a.k.a Provisioning Profiles, to generate keys and request and replace certificates at pre- determined periods in time by making requests of a native SCEP client. Typically the intelligence is time driven, ensuring timely renewal of existing keys and certificates; however it can also be event driven by the receipt of revised Provisioning Profiles from the provisioning system. The SCEP client is a native application installed on systems, servers or devices, it communicates with a SCEP responders using a protocol defined in IETF RFC 8894 [66]. The particular SCEP responder(s) are identified within the various Provisioning Profiles. • The figure identifies a number of example SCEP message request response messages – these are documented within the IETF RFC 8894 [66]. The SCEP responder on receipt of a chain certificate request, responds by supplying the requested certificate. On receipt of a client certificate request the SCEP responder first validates the requestor's identity and proof of possession of a unique credential, before requesting the Issuing CA to issue a new certificate, forwarding the new certificate back to the SCEP client. • The SCEP Responder can also reject the certificate request, or indicate issuance is pending based on an Issuing CA action. On receipt of a replacement certificate chain the device automation client validates the certificate chain received including testing against either CRL or OCSP responses. Only if the new certificate chain is known to be good will the certificate chain be written to the application certificate store, overwriting the previous certificate. On renewal, a peer's trust anchor(s) can also be renewed. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 271 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 TR-069 Provisioning(SCEP Client) Root CA GetCACaps Response( ) GetCACaps ( ) Issuing CA ICA check, checked Against both the Root and ARL Root CA, Checked against Fingerprint End Entity Cert End Entity check in CRL SCEP Client SCEP Responder Validated Against Root CA Validated Against ICA GetCACert (SCEP Message) GetCACert Response ( ) Trust Anchor Block GetCACaps Response( ) GetCACaps ( ) Enrolment Block GetCACerts ( ) GetCACerts Response ( ) PKCSReq (Encrypted CSR) CertRep (Pending) GetCertInitial ( ) CertRep(Success + cert ) TR-069 (Data Master). TR-069 Provisioning(FQDN + Challenge Phrase) App Stack Private Certs CA Certs App(s). Provisioning Client. Provisioning Profile 1 – Request Trust anchor(s) Provisioning Profile 2 – Request Issuing CA and End Entity Cert. Automated Renewal Provisioning Block Capabilities Block Capabilities Block Figure M.2-1: SCEP certificate provisioning procedure The SCEP certificate automation solution consists of the following five functions: 1) Initial configuration of the SCEP client with Provisioning Profiles Initial configuration of the SCEP client addresses the need to establish sets of context specific Provisioning Profiles within an end point device. The two obvious options for providing Provisioning Profiles are: 1) Manual configuration of each device; and 2) Automated provisioning from a device manager or element manager service. For example by the procedures in ETSI TS 118 122 [57]. The number of sets of Provisioning Profiles matches the number of Application Security Stacks required. This function downloads a set of Provisioning Profiles from the device manager or element manager service to enable the following actions: • A unique x509v3 cryptographic credential chaining to a trusted Root CA is established. allowing the end point device to subsequently bootstrap its setup. • A locally significant unique key pair is established. • An associated certificate signing request is generated. • A trust anchor is validated out of band by verification of a finger print within the Provisioning Profile. • Each subordinate CA retrieved is validated in turn against its superior. • The request of a client certificate from a pre-authorized issuer (the SCEP responder) is authenticated and secured using a username and password. • The trust anchor of a trusted peer can also be downloaded and validated. These peer trust anchors can be updated based on a revised Provisioning Profile. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 272 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 2) Device Intelligence & State Machine The device intelligence and state machine is the heart of any SCEP, Certificate Management Protocol version 2 (CMPv2) or EST solution. Logically a good state machine can drive any message responder where SCEP is considered here. The state machine is triggered by a complete and valid set of Provisioning Profiles. This function, while intended to operate autonomously in the context of unattended IoT devices without a web browser user interface, has been written to reflect a browser based user journey. The intention is to maintain compatibility with any manual test and diagnostic processes required for IoT devices and with elements of the service that do have a traditional user interface, for example, use of a smart phone in the oneM2M Home Domain. The key steps are: 1) The device requests its own Trust Anchor (Root CA). 2) The device's own Trust Anchor (Root CA) is validated against a fingerprint provided by a Provisioning Profile. 3) The device requests its own intermediate certificates one by one. 4) The device intermediate certificates are validated against the superior issuer to protect against MITMA. 5) The device requests a first client certificate. This assumes a device has no client certificate, but is in possession of a valid set of Provisioning Profiles. This step always requests the issuing CA to provide confidentiality for certificate requests. The SCEP client recovers the public key for the ICA. The certificate request is encrypted with the public key so that only the CA or RA private key can decrypt the request. 6) If directed by provisioning authority, the device requests a new certificate, or requests the renewal of an existing certificate immediately. A request for a new certificate might be against a different PKI. 7) Automated renewal of an existing certificate, based for example on a configured percentage of the current certificates lifetime has elapsed, is also supported. 8) All certificates are parsed to request associated CRLs or OCSP response. 9) The client requests the peers Trust Anchor, if it is different from its own Trust Anchor. 10) The intermediate and issuing CA of a peer are requested to allow mutual authentication if required. Once a new, or replacement, certificate chain has been established, the certificate chain is validated, as it will likely be used to replace the existing good certificate chain. 11) The key material is moved to the appropriate secure application stores. 12) The provisioning authority of current certificate is notified with information as required. 13) Expired certificate artefacts are deleted. Note that the above list is not meant to imply a state machine order, or indicate a solution. However, it is assumed sophisticated solutions will exceed the states identified, and simpler solutions can choose to omit states not required by the device solution. 3) SCEP Client A SCEP client is typically an open source piece of software developed to perform certificate request actions against the SCEP responder. The SCEP Client is directed by the state machine described above using the data provisioned in the initial configuration procedure. The SCEP client is compliant with [66] and can be sourced from the open source communities, if a native client does not exist today. For example see [i.26] - based on original work by Martin Bartosch. This SCEP Client was selected because the authors have modified their SCEP client behaviour to support long chain PKI (see [i.28]). An alternative is the Java-based SCEP client at [i.27] by Dave Grant and team. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 273 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 NOTE: This has also been modified to support long chained PKI and recently forked to specifically address Android requirements by Wes Bunton. 4) SCEP Responder A SCEP responder is an additional component of both Enterprise and Managed PKI services. Essentially a SCEP responder can be considered as an additional RA (Registration Authority) service. On request the SCEP responder(s) will provide Trust Anchors, Intermediate CAs, issuing CAs and Locally Significant certificates. A private/public key pair needs to be generated on the device. Requests for certificate issuance would be against a unique username and password held securely within the request Subject Alternative Name and challenge phrase fields of the certificate CSR (see IETF RFC 8894 [66]). Typically these one-time passwords expire on certificate issuance, needing to be re-set in the future when certificate renewal services are required. The provisioning solution identified would be authoritative - tracking devices and elements under management, and would pre-provision the SCEP responder with valid username and password pairs, prior to the SCEP client using them. Unsuccessful authentications are rejected, and successfully authenticated CSR are passed to the PKI for fulfilment. Upon successful authentication, an End Entity Certificate is returned. The provisioning solution can even request revocation of device certificates that can no longer be trusted. 5) Locally Significant PKI & Certificates A PKI service provides the pre-requisite knowledge, skill and Compliance Framework to support SCEP certificate issuance. The building blocks of a SCEP solution include: PKI&CA, SCEP Responder (RA), Request Authenticator, and Request Authorizer. It is typical in the CPE or IoT space that a PKI is designed based on a good understanding of the certificate volumes, and an understanding of the required cryptographic operational separation to be enforced. Certificate Authority A SCEP Certification Authority (CA) signs client certificates. The CAs name is stored in the issuer field of resulting certificates. Before any PKI operations are invoked, the SCEP responder shares an issuer 'CA' certificate that is compliant with the profile in IETF RFC 5280 [34] with SCEP Client and optionally dedicated RA certificates. This can be a CA certificate that was issued by a higher level CA. The client builds an entire certificate chain from the trust anchor, validating each certificate in turn. Registration Authority A SCEP Registration Authority (RA) as a SCEP Responder performs validation and authorization checks of the SCEP requester and forward the certification requests to the CA. The SCEP Responder receives a certificate from the CA and forwards this to the SCEP Client. The RAs name does not appear in the issuer field of resulting certificates. Requester Authentication As with every protocol that uses public-key cryptography, the association between the public keys used in the protocol and the identities with which they are associated are authenticated in a cryptographically secure manner. This requirement is needed to prevent a "man-in-the-middle" attack, in which an adversary can manipulate the data as it travels between the protocol participants and subvert the security of the protocol. The communication between the requester and the certification authority is secured using SCEP Secure Message Objects which specifies how PKCS#7 is used to encrypt and sign the data of the CSR. Request Authorization The following SCEP authentication methods for certificate authorization can be supported: - use of unique usernames and passwords; - use of unique end entity certificate and a demonstration of proof of possession of the private key. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 274 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Annex N (informative): Considerations on Long Term Key Storage Long term Provisioned Secure Connection Keys can pose a security risk if not adequately secured, and for this reason Long Term Provisioned Secure Connection Keys are recommended to be stored in Secure Environments. Long term Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Keys can pose a security risk if not adequately secured, and for this reason it is recommended that Long term Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Keys are stored in Secure Environments. Since by definition, there will be a very wide range of non-3GPP based devices with many different implementations. As these are not likely to be standardized, this is not in the scope of oneM2M or 3GPP. However, security best practice guides are available from: • ETSI TS 103 645 - Cyber Security For Consumer Internet Of Things [i.33]; • IoTSF - Secure Design: Best Practice Guide. Release 2, November 2019 [i.34]; and • GSMA - IoT Security Guidelines and Assessment [i.35]. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 275 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Annex O (informative): Bibliography • Open Mobile API specification V3.2. • GlobalPlatform Device Technology TEE Client API Specification, Version 1.0. • 3GPP TS 33.222: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA), Access to network application functions using Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security (HTTPS) (Release 12)". • 3GPP TS 24.109: "Bootstrapping interface (Ub) and network application function interface (Ua); Protocol details (Release 12)". • 3GPP TS 29.109: "Protocols details Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Zh and Zn Interfaces based on Diameter protocol; Stage 3 (Release 12)". • ISO/IEC 7816-6: "Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 6: Interindustry data elements". • ISO/IEC 7816-8: "Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 8: Security related interindustry commands". • ISO/IEC 7816-9: "Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 9: Additional interindustry commands and security attributes". • GlobalPlatform Device Technology, Generic API to access Secure Elements, Open Mobila API Specifications, Version 3.2. • ETSI TS 102 600: "Smart Cards; UICC - Terminal Interface; Characteristics of the USB Interface". • ETSI TS 102 622: "Smart Cards; UICC - Contactless Front-End (CLF) Interface; Host Controller Interface". • IEEE P1363™: "Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography". ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 276 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 History Version Date Status V4.7.1 March 2026 Publication |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 1 Scope | The reporting of Global KPIs in accordance with ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2] requires the collection of data to enable the calculation of the following aspects: • Objective KPI relating to task efficiency (KPITE) based on data_volume and total energy consumption (KPIEC). • Objective KPI relating to the use of renewable energy (KPIREN). The present document supports the requirements of ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2] providing a framework for, and detailing, the implementation procedures including any necessary techniques for estimation of energy consumption together with clarification and treatment of different types of data volume. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 2 References | |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at https://docbox.etsi.org/Reference/. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI EN 305 200 series: "Access, Terminals, Transmission and Multiplexing (ATTM); Energy management; Operational infrastructures; Global KPIs". [2] ETSI EN 305 200-2-2: "Access, Terminals, Transmission and Multiplexing (ATTM); Energy management; Operational infrastructures; Global KPIs; Part 2: Specific requirements; Sub-part 2: Fixed broadband access networks". |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. Not applicable. ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 10 |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2] and the following apply: Access Gateway (AG): gateway that interworks a significant number of analogue lines to a packet network downstream: relative location in the fixed access network in the direction of Network Termination Point fixed access network: access network provided by telecommunications operators providing direct connection (e.g. by metallic, optical fibre or fixed wireless or community WiFi) to customer premises where the User Equipment (UE) or the Access Gateway (AG) is connected directly by a fixed link NOTE: This modifies and updates the definition of ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2]. Fixed Wireless Access (FWA): means of providing internet connectivity that uses wireless network technology rather than fixed lines Management Information Base (MIB): database allowing management of ICT devices using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC): network architecture that supports increases in data processing and storage at the edge of a fixed access network (closer to end-user) to reduce latency Other Licensed Operator (OLO): provider of wireless communications services that owns or controls all the elements necessary to sell and deliver services to an end user including wireline network infrastructure, backhaul infrastructure, billing, customer care, provisioning computer systems and marketing and repair organizations upstream: relative location in the fixed access network in the direction of an operator site |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 3.2 Symbols | For the purposes of the present document, the symbols given in ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2] apply. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2] and the following apply: AG Access Gateway ATM Automated Teller Machine FTTdp Fiber To The distribution point FWA Fixed Wireless Access FXS Foreign eXchange Station LL Leased Line MEC Multi-access Edge Computing MIB Management Information Base OLO Other Licensed Operator ONT Optical Network Termination PoS Point of Sale PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 11 |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 4 Global KPIs of ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 | |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 4.1 Fixed broadband access networks | The network schematic used in the present document is shown in Figure 1 (taken from of ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2]). Figure 1: Fixed access network implementations Within the Fixed Access Network (FAN), the term Network Distribution Node (NDN) is employed to describe a variety of aggregations of Network Telecommunications Equipment (NTE) at locations between the Operator Site (OS) and the Terminal Equipment (TE) in the Customer Premises (CP). The Last Operator Connection point (LOC) is shown as a specific example of an NDN and is the closest NDN containing NTE to a CP. Figure 1 shows certain NDNs within dashed boxes to indicate that they are: • optional; • not restricted in number to the configurations shown. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 4.2 KPIs for energy management | |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 4.2.1 Global KPI (KPIEM) for fixed access networks | From ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2], KPIEM is a combination of two separate KPIs, in a common assessment period, as follows: 1) the Objective KPI for task effectiveness expressed as KPITE (see clause 4.2.2.2); 2) the Objective KPI for renewable energy contribution expressed as KPIREN (see clause 4.2.2.3); and both of these Objective KPIs incorporate a third Objective KPIs for energy consumption expressed as KPIEC (see clause 4.2.2.1). Customer network Access network (external) Transport Distribution FTTC FTTB NTP Multi-tenant premises FTTH LOC OS NTP Remote ICT site NTP Copper local loop Access network (internal) Single tenant premises ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 12 From ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2], KPIEM is defined as: _ data volume KPITE KPI EC = in conjunction with KPIREN The Global KPI, KPIEM, and the underpinning Objective KPIs are primarily intended for trend analysis - not to enable comparison between fixed access networks. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 4.2.2 Objective KPIs | |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 4.2.2.1 Energy consumption (KPIEC) | |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 4.2.2.1.1 General | The present document supports the evaluation of the energy consumption required to provide a given level of service as a primary objective. From ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2], KPIEC, for a given assessment period, is defined mathematically as: = ∑ + ∑ where, for the assessment period: i = index of OS j = index of NDN sites N = total number of OS M = total number of NDN sites i OS C = energy consumption of all the fixed access network NTE at OSi NOTE 1: COS includes the energy consumption of the supporting infrastructure at OSs where all the NTE is under common governance. j NDN C = energy consumption of all the fixed access network NTE at NDNj supplied from the utility, from upstream sources or generated on-site NOTE 2: CNDN includes the energy consumption of the supporting infrastructure at NDNs where all the NTE is under common governance. The note text in the explanations of the parameters are taken from ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2]. However, it should be noted that network and location sharing (see clause 5.2.1.5) implies that not all NTE at OS and NDN sites is under common governance and the present document refines the approach taken in such situations. The above formula and terms do not take account of equipment that is powered by third parties including Access Gateways (AG), Fiber To The distribution point (FTTdP) equipment (G-FAST) and Optical Network Termination (ONT) equipment powered by the end-user. This is not addressed in ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2] and the inclusion of such equipment requires a modification to the above formula (see clause 4.2.2.1.2). It has to be considered that a fixed access network is complex and consists of a large number of distributed sites accommodating ultra-broadband equipment. A typical Operator has many thousand sites, up to tens of thousands. The number of sites is predicted to increase further with the development of higher speed networks such as G-FAST and of Fixed Wireless Access (FWA). KPIEC can be either measured or estimated: • KPIEC-measured is the energy consumption obtained through direct measurement by the MNO or electricity supplier, or provided by another MNO if equipment is co-located in the OS or the NDN; ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 13 • KPIEC-estimated is the energy consumption obtained through direct measurement by the MNO or electricity supplier, or provided by another MNO if equipment is co-located in the OS or the NDN. NOTE 3: This is applied in mixed, "access/core", network sites where equipment of other network segments is present (core, fixed access, etc.) and the energy split is not made through continuous measurement. Estimation is also needed for the energy consumed by network equipment in small cells, powered from CP as described in clause 4.2.2.1.2. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 4.2.2.1.2 CP-powered equipment within the calculation of KPIEC | 4.2.2.1.2.1 General The presence of CP-powered equipment within the fixed access network requires an amendment of the formula for KPIEC of clause 4.2.2.2.1 as follows: = ∑ + ∑ + with: = ∑ where, for the assessment period: k = index of AG, FTTdp and ONT equipment P = total number of AG, FTTdp, ONT equipment under consideration = energy portion of the consumption of CP-powered AG, FTTdp, FTTH ONT or FWA equipment k (see clauses 4.2.2.1.2.2, 4.2.2.1.2.3, 4.2.2.1.2.4, 4.2.2.1.2.5 and 4.2.2.1.2.6 respectively) 4.2.2.1.2.2 AG FXS VoIP The progressive trend towards the dismission of legacy narrowband platforms (the digital switches) should be considered. The digital switches represent the majority of the energy consumption of many operators. They are coming of age as they were installed in the early "nineties". Furthermore, the progressive use of broadband services, of Voice over IP (VoIP) and of mobile telephony for voice calls has drastically reduced the number of customers to these legacy services. Switching off the digital switches can produce huge reduction in energy use of fixed access networks. Although drastically reduced, Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) is still widely used (elderly people, Point of Sale (PoS) equipment, alarms, etc.). It is then normal to replace the original service from the digital switch with VoIP delivery via the Foreign eXchange Service (FXS) port of an AG. Such provision of the PSTN service needs the following considerations: • the AG needs to be always on. It cannot be switched off when broadband service is not in use; • the energy to support such service is provided by the customer (legacy equipment was powered by the operator); • "lifeline" service can be a problem. Need to install an opportune power backup (e.g. UPS) at the AG in case lifeline service needs to be guaranteed. The consumption of such equipment even if it is not directly accounted for by the operator, has an integral role in providing the fixed access network services and should be part of the KPIEC. The AG module dedicated to the delivery of VoIP via FXS needs to remain active at all times and its consumption can be estimated as 25 % of the maximum AG energy consumption (as specified in the equipment's technical specification). ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 14 4.2.2.1.2.3 Access Gateway support of WiFi community service Among the services fixed (or converged fixed-mobile) network operators are giving to their customers is the WiFi community service. It allows subscribing customers to connect to other hotspots of the same community when they are outside their home, or even abroad. Typically, a subscribing customer accepts to share a part of the bandwidth of their fixed broadband access with the other members of the same community, on a second Wi-Fi signal (WiFi community SSID), in exchange for the right to use other members' hotspots. The AG module dedicated to WiFi community support need to remain active at all times and its consumption can be estimated as 25 % of the maximum AG energy consumption (as specified in the equipment's technical specification). 4.2.2.1.2.4 CP-powered distribution points In order to deliver very high speeds, in excess of 250 Mb/s, without incurring is the costs and network development issues of the FTTH, modern transmission technologies are being introduced with Fiber To The distribution points (FTTdp), acting as LOCs, to accommodate G-FAST DSLAMs and, typically, serving only a very limited number of users based on very short loop lengths. Given their very high number, powering such equipment is problematic and would imply excessive infrastructural costs. So, the trend is to feed them through "reverse powering" from the CP providing power to the G-FAST DSLAMs in the distribution point using the same copper pair(s) used to convey the broadband signal to the CP. The FTTdp equipment can be deployed in different places such as: • hanging on poles; • underground in maintenance chambers; • in basements of multi-dwelling units. The consumption of the G-FAST DSLAMs, when all ports are in active condition, has to be considered within the calculation of KPIEC. The estimation of this consumption of FTTdp powered by the CP can be made by multiplying the quantity of such equipment by its maximum energy consumption. 4.2.2.1.2.5 FTTH ONT FTTH service is increasingly used as it allows virtually unlimited bit rate capabilities. FTTH normally requires the installation of an Optical Network Termination (ONT) at the customer premises to terminate the optical access network operation and maintenance functions. The consumption of the ONT, when in active condition, has to be considered within the calculation of KPIEC. 4.2.2.1.2.6 Fixed Wireless Access Among the services of operators, FWA is typically used to deliver high-speed broadband in a cost-effective way where deployment of telecommunications cabling (optical or copper) would be impractical. The consumption of the TE of FWA services (that can be integrated in the antenna) needs to be accounted for. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 4.2.2.1.3 Measurement (and estimation) of total energy consumption | As indicated above KPIEC (as either KPIEC-measured or KPIEC-estimated) is the arithmetic sum of the consumption of all the NTE of the fixed access network, together with the energy consumed by their supporting infrastructure where all the NTE is under common governance. The supporting infrastructure considers powering; cooling; lighting and any further ancillary equipment in the fixed access network sites. As described in detail in clause 5.2.1, the consumption information sources can be: • the utility meter, through the fiscal energy billing; • a sensor and metering network installed by the fixed operator; • energy consumption estimation; ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 15 • consumption of CP-powered equipment (see clause 4.2.2.1.2). Although the primary objective of present document is the evaluation of KPIs of a fixed access network only, in some cases it could prove difficult to apportion the consumption of mixed-use sites, that are hosting both access and core network equipment and even offices for the operator's employees. This could lead to extensive need to split by estimation of the shares due to the various network segments (see clause 5.2.1.5). This complexity is going to increase as the Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC) equipment is going to spread across the access network sites. In such a case, in addition to NTE, other infrastructures composed of ITE will be present in the ICT site. In order to simplify the task for the operator and to improve dependability of the data, it could then be acceptable that the consumption of the MEC ITE equipment, up to that of the whole fixed network is used as KPIEC. The approach chosen on the network boundaries considered will have to be declared in the reporting template. KPIEC is expressed in kWh; the unit for consumption of electricity which is the main source of energy in fixed access networks. Nevertheless, other energy vectors can be part of the total energy consumption such as: diesel oil used in gen- sets that power off-grid, remote sites, natural gas used in high efficiency CHP co/tri-generators. The additional use of energy from different sources than electricity has to be converted from the original form into kWh. Requirements or recommendations in relation to the improvement of the energy consumption of the NTE and support infrastructures are not within the scope of the present document. It is desirable that the actual energy consumption of all relevant NTE and supporting infrastructure equipment is measured and used to calculate the KPI. However, in situations where direct measurement of the consumption is not possible, the maximum consumption of the equipment contained within the vendors technical specifications may be used. This latter approach will result in a generally higher value of KPIEC. This will encourage the implementation of methodologies to enable the direct measurements to be made. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 4.2.2.2 Task effectiveness (KPITE) | |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 4.2.2.2.1 General | The present document supports the evaluation of the task effectiveness as a primary objective. KPITE is a measure of the data volume transported across the fixed access network per unit of energy consumed by the entire network. An improvement of KPITE reflects a reduction of the overall energy consumption required to deliver a given data volume (which is noted by a reduction in KPIEC) and/or an increase in the data volume provided for a given level of energy consumption. From ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2], KPITE, for a given assessment period, is defined mathematically as: _ 1 N data volumei i KPIEC KPITE = = where, for the assessment period: KPIEC = total of KPIEC-measured and KPIEC-estimated i = index of the site N = total number of sites _ data volumei = total data volume at the site i (which can be measured at the highest hierarchical level which provides clear and unambiguous data) In order to obtain the total data volume, it is not necessary to measure the data traffic at each site as an aggregated view of data volume can be obtained by measurement at the core level or other location in the network where data are aggregated. This represents a wider interpretation to that given in ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2]. ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 16 |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 4.2.2.2.2 Measurement of data volumes | The measurement of the total data volume transported across the fixed network could be made at different probing points, from each NDN, up to the core network. Nevertheless, measuring at each NDN is quite complex both due to the quantity of equipment involved and the lack of such probing points in legacy equipment. Practical reasons favour the measurement at high level network points (towards the boundaries between access and core network) as they are significantly less numerous and, anyway, in today's network architecture all the data traffic is crossing them. The introduction of MEC will introduce new paths for the data flow as a relevant part of the data served to customers will not cross the core network anymore, but will be limited to the extreme downstream part of the access network. In order to ensure that the data traffic of these future fixed services is accounted for, each MEC installation shall be provided with data flow measurement features. Some legacy technologies are expressing the traffic in other terms than bit rate. PSTN and ISDN voice traffic, as an example, is expressed in minutes of call. To determine the data traffic contribution of such technologies it is then needed to convert the minutes of calls using the following formulas: TrafficvoicePSTN = 72 [kbits/s] × 60 [s/minutes] × CALLmillion minutes × 2 (bi-directional data flow) where: Trafficvoice = data volume equivalent (Gbit) of total call time of the FAN CALLmillion minutes = total call time (in millions of minutes) over the FAN NOTE: The "72 [kbit/s]" values comprises the bit rate for the call itself + an additional bit rate for the signalling and framing overhead. Among the services of the operator there are LL. Their data traffic has to be counted but the actual amount of traffic of the LL is not known as the operator knows only its nominal bit rate which is the maximum data rate such interface could transport. It is not reasonable to count the maximum theoretical as no data interface is used at 100 % of its capabilities. To the objectives of the present document, a utilization factor of 5 % is considered. A broad number of types of LL has been created along the time and it would be impractical to perform a detailed and exhaustive calculation so, to simplify the evaluation by operators, a grouping of families of LL is applied: 1) analogic or digital (less than 64 kbit/s) - in this case, an average value of 32 kbit/s is considered for the calculation); 2) N × 64 kbit/s - in this case, the average value assigned to N is 2: this category includes the connections towards the Automated Teller Machines (ATM); 3) 2 Mbit/s (these connections, together with the N × 64 kbit/s, are the most numerous); 4) 34 Mbit/s; 5) 155 Mbit/s; 6) 1 Gbit/s (this class contains optical fibre LL). Considering K as a class for a given rated speed of a LL, the annual traffic of a group of such LLs is given by the following formula: = × 0,05 × 31 536 × where: LLTrafficK = annual traffic expressed in Gbps for class K Rated speedK = rated speed for class K LLK = no. of leased lines of class K ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 17 |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 4.2.2.3 Renewable energy (KPIREN) | |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 4.2.2.3.1 General | From ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2], KPIREN , for a given assessment period, is defined mathematically as: 1 1 N M C R C R OS OS NDN NDN i i j j i j KPIEC KPIREN × + × = = = where, for the assessment period: i = index of OS j = index of NDN sites N = total number of OS M = total number of NDN sites i OS C = energy consumption of all the fixed access network NTE at OSi j NDN C = energy consumption of all the fixed access network NTE at NDNj supplied from the utility, from upstream sources or generated on-site i OS R = ratio of renewable energy generated on-site at OSi j NDN R = ratio of renewable energy generated on-site at NDNj KPIREN is the ratio of energy consumption from renewable sources to the total energy consumption of clause 4.2.2.1. It is a dimensionless number. Equipment powered by the CP (as described in clause 4.2.2.1.2) are not considered within calculations of KPIREN unless the energy source is under the control of the operator. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 4.2.2.3.2 Measurement of renewable energy consumption | ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2] and the present document support the use of renewable energy as a primary objective. KPIREN is the ratio of energy consumption from renewable sources to the total energy consumption of clause 4.2.2.1. It is a dimensionless number. Only the sources contributing to KPIEC will be taken into account, whether dedicated or shared. KPIREN takes account of renewable energy that is produced by: a) sources dedicated to and directly serving an NDN; b) sources under common governance with the NDNs they serve and from which it is conveyed by the utility (grid) serving an NDNs in the group defined for the application of the KPIEM. In the case of b): • the renewable energy shall not be included within KPIREN of the recipient site if it is already included in the proportion of "green" energy within the energy mix of the utility (grid) supplied to the NDN as defined in European standards or other international schemes; NOTE: Any proportion in the mix of utility electricity supplies certified as "renewable" (e.g. based on the carbon footprint of the energy source) by electricity suppliers or in accordance with nationally recognized schemes is not recognized by the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 18 • the portion of such energy allocated to the recipient NDN added to other NDN consumptions shall not exceed the overall energy consumption by the NDN. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 5 Collection of data | |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 5.1 General | The data collection provides the input for KPI calculation. Data are obtained from different sources at the sites or equipment comprising the fixed access network as described in clause 4. This clause describes the origin of the data and the way they could be collected. It is not within the scope of the present document to provide a detailed view of FAN equipment. However, some basic information is required to allow the calculation of the Objective KPIs. Information related to energy consumption can be collected from different sources as described in clause 5.2.1.1. Once the data are collected by the operator, they will have to be stored in a database to be analysed and sorted for providing the KPIs and help stakeholders in the management and improvement of their energy usage. A certain level of basic information is required to calculate the different indicators (see clause 4.2.2). Partial information, or a too high level of extrapolation will not give a realistic view of the energy consumption, KPIEC, task efficiency, KPITE, and renewable energy usage, KPIREN. This will also falsify the results of the global indicator KPIEM. Figure 2 is a schematic view of data collection and storage which excludes any contribution of energy provided from CPs. Figure 2: Data collection architecture Customer network Access network (external) Transport Distribution FTTC FTTB NTP Multi-tenant premises FTTH LOC OS NTP Remote ICT site NTP Copper local loop Access network (internal) Single tenant premises Database Data analysis Reports = measurement point ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 19 Figure 3 is a schematic view of the several steps to produce reporting for the KPIs. Figure 3: Data processing and reporting architecture Clause 7 describes a reporting template for the fixed access network KPIs. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 5.2 Estimation of energy consumption and renewable content | |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 5.2.1 Energy consumption | |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 5.2.1.1 Overview | The estimation of the energy consumption is given by the KPIEC indicator. For a fixed access network, composed of thousands of remote sites, the KPIEC for global access network will be the arithmetic sum of all KPIEC, estimated or measured, for each site (OS or NDN). This is the same for the objective KPIREN. For example, KPIREN will be the quantity of renewable energy which is locally generated at all the sites which are fully or for a part-powered with renewable energy (solar, wind or other). NOTE 1: Any proportion in the mix of utility electricity supplies certified as "renewable" (e.g. based on the carbon footprint of the energy source) by electricity suppliers or in accordance with nationally recognized schemes is not recognized by the present document. Figure 4 is a schematic from ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2] which has been modified to include the concept of powering of sites from CPs. Figure 4: Schematic of fixed access network energy consumption For an Operator, the large number of sites make it difficult to collect the data to estimate their individual site consumption and efficiency since the deployment of a smart metering solution on each site is very costly. Measure on-site Collect information Store data Data processing Report Meters, bills, other methods Data collected, centralized and transferred to a central management system Data stored in database Data sorted and analyzed to produce the KPI NTE Other NTE TE NTE OS Other* Other* * This allows for the inclusion of supporting infrastructures if all the NTE at the remote site is under common governance Access network boundary Remote provision NDN Energy Renewable Non-renewable Renewable Non-renewable Energy Renewable Non-renewable Remote provision Renewable Non-renewable LOC Remote provision Renewable Non-renewable CP Reverse powering ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 20 This clause describes the origin of the data giving some elements in order to evaluate the energy consumption. For the energy use, data can be collected from different sources such as: • energy bills from the electricity/gas/fuel supplier (see clause 5.2.1.2); • proprietary meters installed on sites at different levels in the access network (see clause 5.2.1.3); NOTE 2: This solution ideally enables full coverage of all sites but the complexity and costs of monitoring the many thousands of sites in a typical fixed access network often force the Operator to only cover a sample of the sites. • the equipment itself, if it is equipped with the appropriate mechanism to record data on energy consumption (see clause 5.2.1.4). All equipment at the site, including that for the ancillary services, has to be equipped with such features. The Operator has to provide the consumptions related to the different points of measurement, for all sites or equipment connected to the grid, and for the renewable part, the global amount of energy generated by the production source. The information detailed above is meaningful only for dedicated ICT sites since supporting infrastructure consumption is included for KPIEC in such locations. Clause 5.2.1.5 addresses network and location sharing. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 5.2.1.2 Energy bills | Most sites connected to the grid are equipped with a meter provided by the electricity supplier. This meter allows the supplier to collect (manually or automatically) the energy consumed during a certain period (typically monthly). The collected information on the consumption are used by the supplier to invoice the customer. The collection, storage and analysis of information given by the bill is generally made by Operator and provides a clear and dependable view of the entire energy consumption of all sites which are connected to the grid. Similarly, if the site produces energy based on renewable sources and feeds energy to the electricity supplier, this will be separately recorded by the meter used for the Feed-in Tariff. Clause 4.2.2.3.2 specifies how such renewable energy may be included in KPIREN at other sites under common ownership. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 5.2.1.3 Meters installed by the operator (smart metering) | Some operators, for various reasons, have deployed their own meters on some, or all, of their sites, together with a software platform to analyse data and produce detailed reporting. This solution, even if it is the best to know clearly where energy is consumed, is very costly because it needs to deploy, instead of primary meters at the site entrance, some sub-meters in all parts of the sites, for cooling, racks, equipment, etc. To cover the whole fixed access network, this implies the deployment of thousands of meters and probes. Generally, the Operator limits these solutions to their main ICT sites and a sample of other typical access network sites. They then extrapolate to the entire range of access network sites. For such reasons it is normally considered not a practical solution to obtain a dependable information on the exact overall energy consumption of the network. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 5.2.1.4 Energy consumption provided by the equipment | Certain equipment such as servers and even NTEs, is now able to collect internally information on its own energy consumption and store this information in a Management Information Base (MIB). NOTE: Older equipment does not implement such features and this option is of limited value for legacy installations. The MIB can be collected through the network and be managed by a software platform to provide any KPI as defined by the Operator. This method can be valid to keep track of the consumption of more modern equipment, but is not available for older NDNs and not, normally, for the consumption of the ancillary equipment. ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 21 |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 5.2.1.5 Network and location sharing | Fixed infrastructure sharing means the process by which operators share their infrastructure to deliver a fixed service to end users. In the case of the fixed access network, a challenge will be to be to split the consumption between several stakeholders, knowing that part of the network and the sites could be shared with one or more Other Licenced Operator (OLO). Usually, the energy meter provided by the electricity company gives a global consumption for the whole site. Sharing the fixed access network is a widespread policy, in particular as, since the "nineties", the incumbent operators got obligation to set in their sites (the central offices), rooms and technical capabilities (e.g. powering and cooling) to host access equipment of other OLOs. The way the energy consumption is apportioned among those present by the site owner and the way the energy cost is subdivided is normally defined in the contract between the site owner and the OLO. The higher levels of sharing (core network elements and service platforms) are not considered in the present document. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 5.2.2 Renewable energy | Two different methods are possible to collect data for renewable energy: • measure the total of energy generated from renewable sources in a site; • measure the renewable energy consumption of the site (which may differ form that produced at the site). 5.3 Data related to traffic For KPITE, (related to measure the data volume transported across the fixed access network per unit of energy consumed by the entire network), the energy consumption depends on two parts. The first is related to the infrastructure and it is the "fixed" part, typically responsible for major part (70 % to 80 %) of the energy consumption, the other part is linked to the load of the network activity. This amount of energy consumption depends on the traffic and data-volumes generated at the different levels of the network and linked to the type of communication and service offered. Data volumes are obtained via monitoring probes that can be placed over suitable interfaces within the fixed network. Depending on their position, these probes allow to data volumes to be captured with various levels of granularity. Probes may take measurements at different levels of the network such as: • core network (charging and policy servers, gateways); • core and metro network routers; • ICT site (Central Office, NDN, etc.). The present document focusses on the measurement of the total aggregated information and there is no requirement for the collection of data from each OS or NDN. However, the introduction of MEC will require each MEC site to be provided with the capability to measure their individual data flow in order to ensure the correct data volume is accounted for. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 5.4 Clarification of data | There are two different types of data which are basic to KPITE calculation: • energy consumption: all data containing information on the energy consumed or any energy generated by renewable sources; • data-traffic: all data containing information on the volumes of information (uplink and downlink) exchanged on the network between the customer and the access network. ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 22 |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 5.5 Treatment of data types | Each type of data refers to one or more objectives indicators (KPIEC, KPITE, KPIREN). The data will have to be identified to provide the appropriate information for the calculation method of the KPIs: • data related to energy consumption as input for KPIEC; • data related to renewable energy generated as input for KPIREN; • data related to traffic volumes as input for KPITE. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 6 Trend analysis | |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 6.1 Overview | Fixed access networks have developed significantly over recent years and offer data-oriented services that include, in addition to voice communications, multimedia communication, online gaming, high-quality video streaming, and many other future services needing increasing bandwidth and generating substantial growth of traffic on the fixed access network. Although the net number of subscriptions to fixed telecommunications has decreased in the last decades, following the shift of voice calls to VoIP and to mobile, the demand for ever higher data rates of fixed subscribers has drastically increased forcing Operators to deploy newer transmission technologies to serve the demand. Each new generation of network requires a new infrastructure to be deployed. The number of network components to be exchanged in such a programme together with the new features provided by equipment increases the energy consumption of the network, unless legacy platforms such as PSTN and ISDN are passed through a port compacting (to get rid of unused ports), or are discontinued at all (switched-off). NOTE: For a period of time, the existing and new networks co-exist to maintain legacy service provision which can further increase energy consumption. However, this increase is balanced by the effectiveness of the new equipment in terms of ratio of kbps/W which has been multiplied by more than 1 000 000 over the last thirty years (see figure 5). ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 23 Figure 5: Growth of traffic data rate per W Considering that each new fixed generation is associated with an increase of the total energy needs to guarantee the service. Each new generation of fixed access network exhibits an improved efficiency and can affect positively the KPITE by offering a higher ratio of kbps/W. The energy consumption of the fixed access networks can be reduced by one of more of the following: 1) the use of more energy efficient hardware - reducing KPIEC and increasing KPITE of NTE equipment; 2) the increased adoption of renewable energy systems as main power sources for NTEs, where relevant - increasing KPIREN; 3) the intelligent management of the network elements in operation, management and deployment, based on traffic load variations and geographical considerations; 4) compacting the user lines of legacy technologies where the number of clients is diminishing (e.g. PSTN, ISDN) to a limited set of modules, allowing removing the unused ones. 1.2 32 128 768 2048 7000 24000 100000 2500000 10000000 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 1000000 10000000 1980 PSTN 1990 PSTN 1992 ISDN 1995 HDSL 1998 SHDSL 2000 ADSL 2006 ADSL+ 2010 VDSL2 2013 GPON 2019 XG-PON kbps Evolution of data rates in wireline communications 0.5 13 32 154 410 1000 16000 50000 312500 833333 0.1 1.0 10.0 100.0 1000.0 10000.0 100000.0 1000000.0 10000000.0 1980 PSTN 1990 PSTN 1992 ISDN 1995 HDSL 1998 SHDSL 2000 ADSL 2006 ADSL+ 2010 VDSL2 2013 GPON 2019 XG-PON kbps/W Evolution of data rates in wireline communications ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 24 |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 6.2 Renewable energy sources | Fixed access network sites could be supplied in part or in full using the renewable energy. Different ways to generate renewable energy are presented in Annex A. Currently, the most important part of renewable energy in fixed access network is the use of solar photovoltaic panels for energy generation. This has the advantage of being easy to deploy in many different countries and regions. Some electricity suppliers propose to acquire via the grid energy with a guarantee of "green" renewable sources. Both ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2] and the present document do not consider this aspect. Renewable energy power is a relevant solution for the fixed access network in the following conditions: • "off-the-grid" areas; • regions that suffer from frequent power cuts; • optimal climatic conditions for solar and wind energy generation; • proximity of a river, torrent, sea current, tides for hydraulic energy generation; NOTE 1: This solution is generally at an experimental state but will certainly become more deployed in the future due to their potential yield. • possibility to obtain vegetal or animal wastes, generally in rural areas for energy generation from biomass. NOTE 2: This solution is generally at an experimental state but will certainly become more deployed in the future due to their potential yield. Renewable energy sources can only produce electricity when some conditions are respected. To avoid power cuts, it is usually coupled with a backup source (grid or generator) or in most cases, batteries which can assume the service continuity during non-production hours or days. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 6.3 Intelligent management | The fixed access network should operate in an "energy aware" way, so to minimize its energy consumption while delivering the service requested by the customer. During the periods of lower customer traffic it should apply, as far as possible, applicable standby and sleep modes so to aim at an energy consumption behaviour that is linearly related with the volume of service delivered. ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 25 |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 6.4 Summary of possible actions to improve KPIEM | Table 1 summarizes the different techniques to improve KPIEM by the reduction of energy consumption. Table 1: Techniques for improvement of KPIEM Approach Energy savings Advantages Considerations Use of ICT equipment having wide temperature and humidity operating range Up to 30 %. Significant savings when fresh air cooling can be used for most of (or all) the year. High capital expenditure to replace legacy equipment. Replacing older equipment with more modern equivalent and compacting legacy ones Up to 50 %. Easy to implement. East to test. Replacing older PSTN/xDSL with more efficient ones will save further space in the site. Switching off legacy narrowband services and VoIP delivery through the FXS port of an Access Gateway Up to 80 %. Low implementation costs. Big savings. Real estate advantages. Dismission of old cooling and powering equipment. The Access Gateways need to be always on. The energy to provide such service is provided by the customer. Lifeline service can be a problem. Renewable energy Dependent on location and climatic conditions. Green energy. Decreased carbon footprint. All energy produced reduces Opex. Capital expenditure. Location of sites. Meteorological conditions. KPIEM can also be improved by the use of renewable energy which also reduces carbon footprint and operating expenditure. The opportunity for this depends upon climatic/meteorological conditions at the location of the ICT site and the type of renewable energy source but can involve high capital expenditure. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 6.5 Reporting of trend data | KPIEM represented by the combination of KPITE or KPIREN is a measure of the energy management across an entire fixed access network. Operators can demonstrate their commitment to improving the energy management by highlighting trends in the measured values of KPITE or KPIREN. However, certain operational decisions can mask the true energy performance of the network by effectively "outsourcing" energy consumption to third party. An example of this would be a move towards the use of shared infrastructures at ICT sites and NDNs. This could produce a significant improvement in KPITE which could overwhelm both smaller improvements, or even reductions, in energy performance elsewhere. See clause 7 for reporting requirements. |
b9795efe25281bc46e92bb406f342429 | 105 200-2-2 | 7 Reporting templates | As specified in the ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 [2] the following values shall be reported for the sites within the fixed access network for which the KPIEM has been determined using the template of Table 2: • TKPI: the period of time over which Objective KPIs are assessed; • TREPEAT; the time between which the Objective and Global KPIs are assessed to determine relevant trend information; • Δt: the maximum time variation between measurement points of the different Objective KPIs within a given Global KPI. ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 26 Table 2: Template for fixed network report Fixed network Name, designation, etc. Assessment date End date of assessment Foundations Value Δt To be determined by the operator TREPEAT To be determined by the operator TKPI To be determined by the operator N (total number of OS) To be determined by the operator M (total number of NDN) To be determined by the operator P (total number of CP powered equipment) To be determined by the operator Baseline data Value KPIEC as either KPIEC-measured or KPIEC-estimated or KPIEC-power Calculated COS (energy consumption of the NTE at all the OSs) Calculated CNDN (energy consumption of the NTE at all the NDNs supplied from the utility, from upstream) Calculated CCP (total energy consumption of all the equipment supplied from downstream CPs) Calculated Total data volume Calculated KPI results Value KPIREN Calculated KPITE Calculated In view of the two options for the assessment of energy consumption the KPIEC shall be reported as either: • KPIEC-power: Objective KPI of energy consumption if any OS or NDN measurements are based on power rather than energy; or • KPIEC: Objective KPI for energy consumption (indicated as either KPIEC-measured or KPIEC-estimated). In addition, the existence of equipment being powered by CP requires the separate reporting of the total energy consumption CCP (see clause 4.2.2.1.2) in addition to its inclusion in KPIEC-power. The report shall also include any relevant business information which serves to explain any trends in the Global KPI (as either KPITE or KPIREN) which the report highlights. Such information includes, for example, a significant move towards shared infrastructure which improves KPITE as described in clause 6.5. ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 27 Annex A (informative): Fixed Access Networks and Energy A.1 Network energy consumption and supply The fixed access network delivers communications between the NTEs and the CP and includes the following equipment: • OSs; • NDNs; • NTEs over metallic, optical or fixed wireless access; • backhaul links; • other active equipment such as repeaters, etc. As shown schematically in Figure 1, the legacy generations of fixed access networks (PSTN, ISDN), were usually located on the same centralized sites, both in outdoor and indoor sites, same as for first generations of broadband equipment (ADSL, HDSL, SHDSL). Higher speed technologies still operating over metallic loops (VDSL and G-FAST) need much shorter loop lengths and imply a great number of remote sites spread in the vicinity to the customer. On the contrary, the development of fully optical broadband, thanks to the longer reach of such interfaces, enables shrinking the network equipment to a reduced set of sites, centralized into a reduced number of OSs. The energy consumed by the great majority of urban and rural sites is provided by the grid. Operators or third-party stakeholders providing facilities and accommodation for sites are searching to introduce renewable energy solutions in order to decrease operating expenditure by generating a part of the energy needed. Table A.1 presents some existing solutions of renewable energy sources that are or could be used to supply energy for the access network. Some of them are already deployed by operators in part of their networks, some others are currently experimental solutions, but could be relevant solutions for the future. Table A.1: Renewable energy source solutions Renewable energy sources Yield Location Types of ICT sites or equipment Type of supply Solar (photovoltaic) panels Dependent on solar conditions Urban or rural areas NDN, sensors Primary, backup Windmills Dependent on wind conditions Urban or rural areas OS, NDN Primary, backup Fuel cells 24h/24 Urban or rural areas OS, NDN Primary, backup Hydraulic turbines Possibly 24h/24 dependent on location Rural areas NDN Primary Gas turbines (methane) Possibly 24h/24 dependent on location Rural areas OS Primary Primary batteries (non-rechargeable) 24h/24 Urban or rural areas Sensors Primary A.2 Energy consumption trends The data collected by means of the annual reports and other information obtained during the processing of that data will generate the set of KPIs defined in present document. In addition to presenting the information in tabular form, it can be useful to represent them in graphical form so to enable visual trend analysis. Examples for such representations are given in Figure A.1 to Figure A.6. These Figures are provided as pure guidance only and should not be considered as having any implication for the FAN operators that will apply the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 28 The historical data in Figures A.1 to A.6 come from trend information FAN operators such as sustainability reports and conference papers. The data for the 2020-2030 periods are based public internet traffic forecasts and network development trends. They are included for guidance for possible evolution due to the appearance of new technologies (e.g. 5G) or to the removal of legacy ones (e.g. PSTN and ISDN). Discontinuing the support of PSTN will lead to extensive use of POTS port replication within AGs. The impact on the consumption at the CPs has been taken into account, together with the other FAN-related loads defined in clause 4.2.2.1.2. Figure A.1 shows the exponential growth of data volumes. The share due to PSTN/ISDN voice calls has drastically decreased both due to the progressive transition of calls to the mobile platforms and also to the reduction of PSTN/ISDN lines. Public switched traffic is due to disappear as the PSTN and ISDN platforms have come of age and are will be removed in the next decade. The remaining voice traffic of FANs will be originated at the AG and will be conveyed through the broadband network as VoIP. Figure A.1: Trends in data volume Figure A.2 shows the historical, non-regular, behaviour of the yearly increase of the data volume. Such irregularity is due to the various phases of development of broadband networks (ADSL, VDSL2, etc.) and to the advent of more data-hungry services, such as video streaming. Figure A.2: Trends in data volume increase (annual) 0% 1% 10% 100% 1000% 10000% 100000% 1000000% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Fixed access network – Total data traffic Base data 2004 = 100% Data Voice PSTN/ISDN switch-off 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Fixed access network – Data traffic increase (annual) Initial data point 2004 Online video demand Initial deployment of ADSL Ramp-up of VDSL ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 29 The energy consumption of FANs has always been dominated by the load due to the legacy switched network platforms (PSTN/ISDN) and their stricter requirements on cooling that keep the need for energy-hungry active cooling. ADSL broadband networks deployment represented an additional load, but the operators continuously ran efficiency programmes on the legacy platforms and successfully achieved a net reduction of overall amount of energy used. In recent years, the boost in the deployment of VDSL2 has driven a growth of the consumption. This trend is likely to be inverted due to development of less per-capita energy-hungry technologies such as FTTH and, more importantly, to the switch-off of the switched network platforms, of the ADSL and the abandonment of most central offices as no more long-distance services over metallic cabling are expected to be used. As shown in Figure A.3, while the direct energy demand of the FAN NTE equipment is expected to fall, the TE at (or NTE near) the customer premises is going to grow significantly. Figure A.3: Trends in energy consumption and sourcing As shown in Figure A.4, in the past, only a small fraction of the energy consumption of the FAN was estimated as nearly all the connections to the electrical grid were metered. Things are expected to change in the future as the load of network terminations at (or near) the customer premises is going to grow significantly which cannot be metered. Figure A.4: Trends in energy consumption and sourcing 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Fixed access network – Energy consumption CP supplied Operator supplied PSTN/ISDN efficiency actions VDSL deployment PSTN/ISDN switch-off ADSL switch-off and abandonment of ”central offices” VoIP and CP feeding NTE 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Fixed access network – Measured vs estimated energy consumption Base data 2004 = 100% Estimated Measured PSTN/ISDN switch-off ADSL switch-off and abandonment of ”central offices” ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 30 As shown in Figure A.5, the dramatic increase in the amount of data delivered, while the energy consumption has remained nearly constant, has produced an enormous growth of KPITE. Such trend is expected to be maintained in the next decade also. Figure A.5: Trends in KPITE As shown in Figure A.6, the yearly progress of KPITE. is expected to generally follow the incremental rate of the data traffic. Figure A.6: Trends in KPITE increase (annual) 100% 1000% 10000% 100000% 1000000% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Fixed access network – KPITE Base data 2004 = 100% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Fixed access network – KPITE increase (annual) ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 31 Annex B (informative): Change History Date Version Information about changes 06-2019 0.0.1 First formal WD for circulation and comment 07-2019 0.0.2 Second formal WD for circulation and comment 29/07/2019 0.0.3 Stable draft ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-2-2 V1.3.1 (2019-12) 32 History Document history V1.1.1 May 2018 Publication as ETSI ES 205 200-2-2 V1.2.1 August 2018 Publication as ETSI EN 305 200-2-2 V1.3.1 December 2019 Publication |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 1 Scope | The present document describes the end-to-end oneM2M functional architecture, including the description of the functional entities and associated reference points. oneM2M functional architecture focuses on the Service Layer aspects and takes Underlying Network-independent view of the end-to-end services. The Underlying Network is used for the transport of data and potentially for other services. |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 2 References | |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at https://docbox.etsi.org/Reference/. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 118 111: "oneM2M; Common Terminology (oneM2M TS-0011)". [2] ETSI TS 118 103: "oneM2M; Security solutions (oneM2M TS-0003)". [3] ETSI TS 118 104: "oneM2M; Service Layer Core Protocol Specification (oneM2M TS-0004)". [4] W3C® Recommendation: "RDF 1.1 Concepts and Abstract Syntax". [5] W3C® Recommendation: "SPARQL 1.1 Query Language". [6] ETSI TS 118 112: "oneM2M; Base Ontology (oneM2M TS-0012)". [7] ETSI TS 118 121: "oneM2M; oneM2M and AllJoyn® Interworking (oneM2M TS-0021)". [8] ETSI TS 118 123: "oneM2M; Home Appliances Information Model and Mapping (oneM2M TS-0023)". [9] ETSI TS 118 116: " oneM2M; Secure Environment Abstraction (oneM2M TS-0016)". [10] ETSI TS 118 122: "oneM2M; Field Device Configuration (oneM2M TS-0022)". [11] IETF RFC 5771: "IANA Guidelines for IPv4 Multicast Address Assignments". [12] IETF RFC 2375: "IPv6 Multicast Address Assignments". [13] ETSI TS 118 132: "MAF and MEF Interface Specification (oneM2M TS-0032)". [14] oneM2M TS-0034: "Semantics Support". [15] ETSI TS 118 126: "3GPP Interworking (oneM2M TS-0026)". [16] IETF RFC 7946: "The GeoJSON Format". NOTE: Available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7946. [17] IETF RFC 4566: "SDP: Session Description Protocol". [18] IETF RFC 3986: "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax". ETSI ETSI TS 118 101 V4.15.0 (2022-09) 18 (oneM2M TS-0001 version 4.15.0 Release 4) [19] IETF RFC 8141: "Uniform Resource Names (URNs)". |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. [i.1] ETSI TS 118 102: "oneM2M Requirements (oneM2M TS-0002)". [i.2] Broadband Forum TR-069: "CPE WAN Management Protocol Issue": 1 Amendment 5, November 2013. [i.3] OMA-DM: "OMA Device Management Protocol", Version 1.3, Open Mobile Alliance. [i.4] LWM2M: "OMA LightweightM2M", Version 1.0, Open Mobile Alliance. [i.5] OMA-TS-MLP-V3-4-20130226-C: "Mobile Location Protocol", Version 3.4. [i.6] OMA-TS-REST-NetAPI-TerminalLocation-V1-0-20130924-A: "RESTful Network API for Terminal Location", Version 1.0. [i.7] IETF RFC 1035: "Domain names - Implementation and specification". [i.8] IETF RFC 3588: "Diameter Base Protocol". [i.9] IETF RFC 3596: "DNS Extensions to Support IP Version 6". [i.10] Void. [i.11] IETF RFC 4006: "Diameter Credit-Control Application". [i.12] IETF RFC 6895: "Domain Name System (DNS) IANA Considerations". [i.13] GSMA-IR.67: "DNS/ENU Guidelines for Service Providers & GRX/IPX Providers". [i.14] ETSI TS 123 682: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Architecture enhancements to facilitate communications with packet data networks and applications (3GPP TS 23.682)". [i.15] ETSI TS 132 240: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Telecommunication management; Charging management; Charging architecture and principles (3GPP TS 32.240)". [i.16] ETSI TS 132 299: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Telecommunication management; Charging management; Diameter charging applications (3GPP TS 32.299)". [i.17] 3GPP2X.P0068: "Network Enhancements for Machine to Machine (M2M)". [i.18] JNI 6.0 API Specification: "Java Native Interface 6.0 Specification". [i.19] Void. [i.20] Void. [i.21] Void. [i.22] Void. ETSI ETSI TS 118 101 V4.15.0 (2022-09) 19 (oneM2M TS-0001 version 4.15.0 Release 4) [i.23] ETSI TS 123 003: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM) ;Universal Mobile Telecommunications System(UMTS) ;LTE ;5G ; Numbering, addressing and identification (3GPP TS 23.003)". [i.24] Recommendation ITU-T X.660 | ISO/IEC 9834-1: "Information technology - Procedures for the operation of object identifier registration authorities: General procedures and top arcs of the international object identifier tree". [i.25] oneM2M TR-0008: "Analysis of Security Solutions for oneM2M System". [i.26] IETF RFC 4122: "A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace". [i.27] oneM2M Drafting Rules. NOTE: Available at https://www.onem2m.org/images/files/oneM2M-Drafting-Rules.pdf. [i.28] oneM2M TR-0007: "Study of Abstraction and Semantics Enablement". [i.29] Void. [i.30] Void. [i.31] OMA-TS-REST-NetAPI-CommunicationPatterns-V1-0: "RESTful Network API for Communication Patterns", Version 1.0, Open Mobile Alliance. [i.32] ETSI TS 123 246: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS); Architecture and functional description (3GPP TS 23.246)". [i.33] ETSI TS 123 468: "LTE; Group Communication System Enablers for LTE (GCSE_LTE); Stage 2 (3GPP TS 23.468)". [i.34] IETF RFC 3171 (2001): "IANA Guidelines for IPv4 Multicast Address Assignments". [i.35] IETF RFC 4291 (2006): "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture". [i.36] IETF RFC 6838 (2013): "Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures". [i.37] IETF RFC 3987: "Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs)". NOTE: Available at https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3987.txt. [i.38] oneM2M TR-0052: "Study on Edge and Fog Computing in oneM2M systems". |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TS 118 111 [1] and the following apply: NOTE: A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in ETSI TS 118 111 [1]. access control attributes: set of parameters of the Originator, target resource, and environment against which there could be rules evaluated to control access NOTE: An example of Access Control Attributes of Originator is a role. Examples of Access Control Attributes of Environment are time, day and IP address. An example of Access Control Attributes of targeted resource is creation time. access decision: authorization reached when an entity's Privileges, as well as other Access Control Attributes, are evaluated ETSI ETSI TS 118 101 V4.15.0 (2022-09) 20 (oneM2M TS-0001 version 4.15.0 Release 4) application layer: comprises oneM2M Applications and related business and operational logic attribute: stores information pertaining to the resource NOTE: An attribute has a name and a value. Only one attribute with a given name can belong to a given resource. For an attribute defined as having "multiplicity" greater than 1, the value of that attribute is a composite value, i.e. a list of different values. child resource: sub-resource of another resource that is its parent resource NOTE: The parent resource contains references to the child resources. common services layer: oneM2M service functions that enable oneM2M Applications (e.g. management, discovery and policy enforcement) Common Services Function (CSF): informative architectural construct which conceptually groups together a number of sub-functions NOTE: Those sub-functions are implemented as normative resources and procedures. A set of CSFs is contained in the CSE. content based discovery: discovery operation for <contentInstance> resources which is matched with the given condition regarding content attribute of <contentInstance> resource under specific <container> NOTE: Content based discovery is based on knowledge about data structure of M2M data stored at <container>. execution environment: logical entity that represents an environment capable of running software modules hosting CSE: CSE where the addressed resource is hosted M2M service provider domain: part of the M2M System that is associated with a specific M2M Service Provider managed entity: either an M2M Device, M2M Gateway, or a device in the M2M Area Network or the M2M Application Layer or M2M Service Layer software components management proxy: entity within the Device Management Architecture, in conjunction with the Management Client, that acts as an intermediary between the Management Server and the Proxy Management Client network services layer: layer providing transport, connectivity and service functions node: logical entity that is identifiable in the M2M System non-oneM2M node: node that does not contain oneM2M Entities notifier: hosting CSE that initiates notifications to Notification Targets in the subscription/notification framework or in the non-blocking asynchronous scheme notification target: AE or CSE that receives notifications from the Notifier NULL: null value NOTE: Refer to ETSI TS 118 104 [3] for the definition of null. originator: in case of a request traversing a single reference point, the Originator is the AE/CSE that sends the request NOTE: In case of a request that traverses multiple reference points, the Originator is the AE/CSE that sends the first request in the sequence. proxy management client: entity within the Device Management Architecture that provides local management capabilities to a device in an M2M Area Network receiver: entity that receives the Request NOTE: A Receiver can a CSE or can be and AE when notification is requested. receiver CSE: any CSE that receives a request registree: AE or CSE that registers with another CSE ETSI ETSI TS 118 101 V4.15.0 (2022-09) 21 (oneM2M TS-0001 version 4.15.0 Release 4) registrar CSE: CSE is the CSE where an Application or another CSE has registered resource: uniquely addressable entity in oneM2M architecture NOTE: A resource is transferred and manipulated using CRUD operations. A resource can contain child resource(s) and attribute(s), which are also uniquely addressable. role: collection of permissions that can be statically or dynamically granted to an entity service charging and accounting: set of functionalities within the M2M Service Layer that enable configuration of information collection and charging policies, collection of Charging Records based on the policies, and correlation of Charging Records to users of M2M common services service charging record: formatted collection of information about a chargeable operation service layer offline charging: mechanism where charging information does not affect, in real-time, the service rendered service layer online charging: mechanism where charging information can affect, in real-time, the service rendered, including real time credit control software package: entity that can be deployed on the Execution Environment NOTE: It can consist of entities such as software modules, configuration files, or other entities. structured data: data that either has a structure according to a specified Information Model or is otherwise organized in a defined manner transit CSE: any receiver CSE that is not a Hosting CSE |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 3.2 Symbols | For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: Mca Reference Point for M2M Communication with AE Mcc Reference Point for M2M Communication with CSE Mcc' Reference Point for M2M Communication with CSE of different M2M Service Provider Mch Reference Point for M2M Communication with external charging server Mcn Reference Point for M2M Communication with NSE Mcs Reference Point to access functions and data protected within local secure environments Tsms Interface between Short Message Entity (SME) and Short Message Service Center (SMS SC) Tsp Interface between Service Capability Server (SCS) and Machine Type Communication (MTC) InterWorking Function |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 2G Second Generation 3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project 3GPP2 3rd Generation Partnership Project 2 A/AAAA IPv4/IPv6 DNS records that are used to map hostnames to an IP address AAA Authentication, Authorization, Accounting AAAA Authentication, Authorization, Accounting and Auditing ABT Additional Back-off Time ACA Accounting Answer ACK Acknowledged ACP Access Control Policy ACR Accounting Request ADN Application Dedicated Node ADN-AE AE which resides in the Application Dedicated Node AE Application Entity AE/CSE Application Entity/Common Services Entity ETSI ETSI TS 118 101 V4.15.0 (2022-09) 22 (oneM2M TS-0001 version 4.15.0 Release 4) AE-ID Application Entity Identifier AID Addressing and Identification Annc Announced API Application Program Interface App-ID Application Identifier AS Application Server ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange ASM Application and Service Layer Management ASM CSF Application and Service Layer Management CSF ASN Application Service Node ASN-AE Application Entity that is registered with the CSE at Application Service Node ASN-CSE CSE which resides in the Application Service Node ASN/MN Application Service Node/Middle Node BBF BroadBand Forum CBOR Concise Binary Object Representation CDR Charging Data Record CF Configuration Function CHF Charging Function CM Conditional Mandatory CMDH Communication Management and Delivery Handling COSEM Companion Specification for Energy Metering CRUD Create Retrieve Update Delete CRUDN Create Retrieve Update Delete Notify CSE Common Services Entity CSE-ID Common Service Entity Identifier CSE-PoA CSE Point of Access CSF Common Services Function CUD Create, Update and Delete DAS Dynamic Authorization System DCF Device Configuration Function DDMF Device Diagnostics and Monitoring Function DFMF Device Firmware Management Function DIS Discovery DIS CSF Discovery CSF DM Device Management DMG Device Management DMG CSF Device Management CSF DMR Data Management and Repository DNS Domain Name Server DRX Discontinuous Reception DTMF Device Topology Management Function DWAPI Device Web API E2E End-to-End EQ Equals ESN Electronic Serial Number FIFO First-In First-Out FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name FS/RS FactSet/RuleSet GE Greater or Equals GMG Group Management GMG CSF Group Management CSF GMLC Gateway Mobile Location Center GPRS General Packet Radio Service GPS Global Positioning System GSMA Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSM Association) GT Greater Than HA/LMA Home Agent/Local Mobility Agent HAAA Home AAA HAIM Home Appliance Information Model HLR Home Location Register HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority ETSI ETSI TS 118 101 V4.15.0 (2022-09) 23 (oneM2M TS-0001 version 4.15.0 Release 4) IBT Initial Back-off Time ID Identifier IETF Internet Engineering Task Force IGMP Internet Group Management Protocol IMEI International Mobile Equipment Identity IMS IP Multimedia System IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity IN Infrastructure Node IN-AE Application Entity that is registered with the CSE in the Infrastructure Node IN-CSE CSE which resides in the Infrastructure Node IN-DMG Infrastructure Node Device ManaGement IN-DMG-MA Infrastructure Node Device ManaGement Management Adapter IP Internet Protocol IPE Interworking Proxy application Entity IRI Internationalized Resource Identifier ISO International Organization for Standardization ITU-T International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication IWF InterWorking Function JNI Java Native Interface JSON JavaScript Object Notation LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LE Less or Equals LOC Location LOC CSF Location Common Services Function LT Less Than LWM2M Lightweight M2M M2M Machine to Machine M2M-EXT-ID Machine to Machine External IDentifier M2M-IWF M2M InterWorking Function M2M-SS-ID M2M Service Subscriber Identifier M2M-Sub-ID M2M Service Subscription Identifier M2M-User-ID M2M Service User Identifier MA Mandatory Announced MAF M2M Authentication Function MB Mega Bytes MBMS Multimedia Broadcast Multicast Service MBT Maximum Back-off Time MEF M2M Enrolment Function MEID Mobile Equipment Identifier MIC Message Integrity Code MIP Mobile IP MLD Multicast Listener Discovery MN Middle Node MN-AE Application Entity that is registered with the CSE in Middle Node MN-CSE CSE which resides in the Middle Node MNO Mobile Network Operator MQTT Message Queuing Telemetry Transport MSISDN Mobile Subscriber International Subscriber Directory Number MTC Machine Type Communications MTE M2M Trust Enabler NA Not Announced NAT Network Address Translation NoDN Non-oneM2M Node NE Not Equals NP Not Present NSE Network Service Entity NSSE Network Service Exposure, Service Execution and Triggering NSSE CSF Network Service Exposure, Service Execution and Triggering CSF NTP Network Termination Point NWA NetWork Action OA Optional Announced OID Object Identifier ETSI ETSI TS 118 101 V4.15.0 (2022-09) 24 (oneM2M TS-0001 version 4.15.0 Release 4) OMA Open Mobile Alliance OMA-DM Open Mobile Alliance - Device Management OS Operating System OUI Organizationally Unique Identifier OWL Web Ontology Language PDP Packet Data Protocol PDSN Packet Data Serving Node PEP Policy Enforcement Point PIP Policy Information Point PMG Process Management PMG CSF Process Management CSF PMIP Proxy Mobile IP PoA Point of Access PPM Privacy Policy Manager PPP Point to Point Protocol PRP Policy Retrieval Point PSM Power Saving Mode PTP Point-To-Point QoS Qualify of Service RAM Random Access Memory RBAC Role Based Access Control RBT Random Back-off Time RDF Resource Description Framework REG Registration REG CSF Registration CSF RFC Request for Comments RIF Rule Interchange Format RO Read Only RPC Remote Procedure Calls RTP Real-Time Transport Protocol RW Read Write SCA Service Charging and Accounting SCA CSF Service Charging and Accounting CSF SCEF Service Capability Exposure Function SDO Standards Developing Organization SDP Session Description Protocol SE Secure Environment SEA Security Association Endpoint SEC Security SEC CSF Security CSF SEM Semantics SEM CSF Semantics Common Services Function SLA Service Level Agreement SMF Software Monitoring Function SMG Session Managemen SMG CSF Session Management CSF SMI Semantic Mashup Instance SMJP Semantic Mashup Job Profile SMS Short Messaging Service SP Service Provider SPARQL SPARQL Protocol and RDF Query Language SP-ID Service Provider Identifier SS-ID Service Subscriber Identifier SSM Service Session Management SUB Subscription and Notification SUB CSF Subscription and Notification CSF SWT Spreading Wait Time TIMG Time Management TIMG CSF Time Management CSF TLS Transport Layer Security TMG Transaction Management TMG CSF Transaction Management CSF ETSI ETSI TS 118 101 V4.15.0 (2022-09) 25 (oneM2M TS-0001 version 4.15.0 Release 4) TMGI Temporary Mobile Group Identity TP Traffic Patterns TR Technical Report TS Technical Specification UE User Equipment UL UpLink URI Uniform Resource Identifier URL Uniform Resource Locator URN Uniform Resource Name UUID Universally Unique Identifier WLAN Wireless Local Area Network WO Write Once XML eXtensible Markup Language XOR Exclusive OR XSD XML Schema Definition |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 4 Conventions | The keywords "Shall", "Shall not", "May", "Need not", "Should", "Should not" in the present document are to be interpreted as described in the oneM2M Drafting Rules [i.27]. To improve readability: • The information elements of oneM2M Request/Response messages will be referred to as parameters. Parameter abbreviations will be written in bold italic. • The information elements of resources will be referred to as attributes and child resources. Attributes will be written in italics. |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 5 Architecture Model | |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 5.1 General Concepts | Figure 5.1-1 depicts the oneM2M Layered Model for supporting End-to-End (E2E) M2M Services. This layered model comprises three layers: Application Layer, Common Services Layer and the underlying Network Services Layer. Application Layer Common Services Layer Network Services Layer Figure 5.1-1: oneM2M Layered Model ETSI ETSI TS 118 101 V4.15.0 (2022-09) 26 (oneM2M TS-0001 version 4.15.0 Release 4) |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 5.2 Architecture Reference Model | |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 5.2.1 Functional Architecture | Figure 5.2.1-1 illustrates the oneM2M functional architecture. Figure 5.2.1-1: oneM2M Functional Architecture NOTE 1: Other reference points are specified in other clauses of the present document. See clauses 6.2.4 and 12.2.1. NOTE 2: The above architecture diagram is a functional diagram. For examples of physical mappings, see clause 6. The oneM2M functional architecture in figure 5.2.1-1 comprises the following functions: 1) Application Entity (AE): Application Entity is an entity in the application layer that implements an M2M application service logic. Each application service logic can be resident in a number of M2M nodes and/or more than once on a single M2M node. Each execution instance of an application service logic is termed an "Application Entity" (AE) and is identified with a unique AE-ID (see clause 7.1.2). Examples of the AEs include an instance of a fleet tracking application, a remote blood sugar monitoring application, a power metering application, or a controlling application. 2) Common Services Entity (CSE): A Common Services Entity represents an instantiation of a set of "common service functions" of the M2M environments. Such service functions are exposed to other entities through the Mca and Mcc reference points. Reference point Mcn is used for accessing underlying Network Service Entities. Each Common Service Entity is identified with a unique CSE-ID (see clause 7.1.4). Examples of service functions offered by CSE include: Data Management, Device Management, M2M Service Subscription Management, and Location Services. Such "sub-functions" offered by a CSE may be logically and informatively conceptualized as Common Services Functions (CSFs). The normative Resources which implement the service functions in a CSE can be mandatory or optional. 3) Underlying Network Services Entity (NSE): A Network Services Entity provides services from the underlying network to the CSEs. Examples of such services include device management, location services and device triggering. No particular organization of the NSEs is assumed. NOTE 3: Underlying networks provide data transport services between entities in the oneM2M System. Such data transport services are not included in the NSE. ETSI ETSI TS 118 101 V4.15.0 (2022-09) 27 (oneM2M TS-0001 version 4.15.0 Release 4) |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 5.2.2 Reference Points | |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 5.2.2.0 Overview | A reference point consists of one or more interfaces of any kind. The following reference points are supported by the Common Services Entity (CSE). The "Mc(-)" nomenclature is based on the mnemonic "M2M communications". NOTE: Information exchange between two M2M Entities assumes the usage of the transport and connectivity services of the Underlying Network, therefore, they are not explicitly defined as services provided by the underlying Network Service Entity(s) in the scope of the present document. |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 5.2.2.1 Mca Reference Point | Communication flows between an Application Entity (AE) and a Common Services Entity (CSE) cross the Mca reference point. These flows enable the AE to use the services supported by the CSE, and for the CSE to communicate with the AE. NOTE: The AE and the CSE may or may not be co-located within the same physical entity. |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 5.2.2.2 Mcc Reference Point | Communication flows between two Common Services Entities (CSEs) cross the Mcc reference point. These flows enable a CSE to use the services supported by another CSE. |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 5.2.2.3 Mcn Reference Point | Communication flows between a Common Services Entity (CSE) and the Network Services Entity (NSE) cross the Mcn reference point. These flows enable a CSE to use the supported services (other than transport and connectivity services) provided by the NSE. |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 5.2.2.4 Mcc' Reference Point | Communication flows between two Common Services Entities (CSEs) in Infrastructure Nodes (IN) that are oneM2M compliant and that resides in different M2M SP domains cross the Mcc' reference point. These flows enable a CSE of an IN residing in the Infrastructure Domain of an M2M Service Provider to communicate with a CSE of another IN residing in the Infrastructure Domain of another M2M Service Provider to use its supported services, and vice versa. Mcc' extends the reachability of services offered over the Mcc reference point, or a subset thereof. The trigger for these communication flows may be initiated elsewhere in the oneM2M network. |
2bd691fcce98b96819b9b3b005c72741 | 118 101 | 5.2.2.5 Other Reference Points and Interfaces | • See clause 12.2.1 for Mch reference point. • See clause 6.2.4 for Mc, Mp, Ms and La device management interfaces. • See clause 6.2.10 for Mcs reference point. • See clause 11.0 for Mmaf and Mmef reference points. ETSI ETSI TS 118 101 V4.15.0 (2022-09) 28 (oneM2M TS-0001 version 4.15.0 Release 4) |
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