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Sea of Galilee | The lake has been called by different names throughout its history, usually depending on the dominant settlement on its shores. With the changing fate of the towns, the lake's name also changed.
The modern Hebrew name Kineret comes from the Hebrew Bible, where it appears as the "sea of Kineret" in Numbers 34:11 and Joshua 13:27, and spelled כנרות "Kinerot" in Hebrew in Joshua 11:2. This name was also found in the scripts of Ugarit, in the Aqhat Epic. As the name of a city, Kinneret was listed among the "fenced cities" in Joshua 19:35. A persistent, though likely erroneous, popular etymology presumes that the name Kinneret may originate from the Hebrew word kinnor ("harp" or "lyre"), because of the shape of the lake. The scholarly consensus, however, is that the origin of the name is derived from the important Bronze and Iron Age city of Kinneret, excavated at Tell el-'Oreimeh. The city of Kinneret may have been named after the body of water rather than vice versa, and there is no evidence for the origin of the town's name.
All Old and New Testament writers use the term "sea" (Hebrew יָם yam, Greek θάλασσα), with the exception of Luke, who calls it "the Lake of Gennesaret" (Luke 5:1), from the Greek λίμνη Γεννησαρέτ (limnē Gennēsaret), the "Grecized form of Chinnereth." The Babylonian Talmud as well as Flavius Josephus mention the sea by the name "Sea of Ginosar" after the small fertile plain of Ginosar that lies on its western side. Ginosar is yet another name derived from "Kinneret".
The word Galilee comes from the Hebrew Haggalil (הַגָלִיל), which literally means "The District", a compressed form of Gelil Haggoyim "The District of Nations" (Isaiah 8:23). Toward the end of the 1st century CE, the Sea of Galilee became widely known as the Sea of Tiberias after the city of Tiberias founded on its western shore in honour of the second Roman emperor, Tiberius. In the New Testament, the term "sea of Galilee" (Greek: θάλασσαν τῆς Γαλιλαίας, thalassan tēs Galilaias) is used in the Gospel of Matthew 4:18; 15:29, the Gospel of Mark 1:16; 7:31, and in the Gospel of John 6:1 as "the sea of Galilee, which is [the sea] of Tiberias" (θαλάσσης τῆς Γαλιλαίας τῆς Τιβεριάδος, thalassēs tēs Galilaias tēs Tiberiados), the late 1st century CE name. Sea of Tiberias is also the name mentioned in Roman texts and in the Jerusalem Talmud, and it was adopted into Arabic as (بحيرة طبريا), "Lake Tiberias".
From the Umayyad through the Mamluk period, the lake was known in Arabic as Bahr al-Minya, the "Sea of Minya", after the Umayyad qasr complex, whose ruins are still visible at Khirbat al-Minya. This is the name used by the medieval Persian and Arab scholars Al-Baladhuri, Al-Tabari and Ibn Kathir. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_of_Galilee |
COVID-19 pandemic in Jordan | On 22 March, there were 13 additional cases confirmed, one of the cases was for a 19-year-old man who came from Britain, and 5 more cases from Irbid's wedding, and 6 cases for people who were in close contact with a nurse who was infected, including an 83-year-old woman who was in mild to moderate condition, and one of unknown origin, bringing the total of the cases to 112.
On 23 March, 15 additional cases of COVID-19 were reported in Jordan. Four of the cases were already in quarantine at Prince Hamzah Hospital, along with a female administrative staff member at the hospital. To date the 127 confirmed cases (126 active and 1 recovered) are the following nationalities: 103 Jordanians, 7 Iraqis, 6 French, 3 British, 3 Lebanese, 2 Filipinos, 1 Palestinian, 1 Argentinian, 1 Ugandan. Total quarantined 5050 persons, of which 3104 are in Amman, 1923 in the Dead Sea area, 23 in Aqaba, bringing the total number of cases in Jordan to 127.
On 24 March, 26 additional cases were reported, including 12 cases from the Irbid wedding, 5 more cases who were in close contact with one of their family who was infected by a nurse, 3 British individuals, one Spanish individual who was in Romania, 1 American individual, 4 people who were in close contact with an infected person, bringing the total number of the cases to 153, including one recovery.
On 25 March, 19 additional cases have been confirmed, including 1 Iraqi individual, 1 Jordanian individual who came from Switzerland, 8 cases for people who were in close contact with an infected person including 1 Sri Lankan Maid, 4 cases for people who were in close contact with an infected nurse, and 5 more cases from the Irbid wedding, bringing the total of confirmed cases to 172.
On 26 March, another case was declared recovered bringing the total recovered cases to two. The patient had tested negative 4 days ago and was confirmed clear today. Forty additional cases have been confirmed today, including 26 from the Irbid wedding, 2 Jordanian citizens who came from Switzerland, one Jordanian individual who came from the UK, 4 cases for people who were in close contact with infected people, 3 cases for people who were in close contact with a nurse, and one case for someone who was in Saudi Arabia before the Quarantine, 2 Iraqis one of them came from Britain before the Quarantine, and one individual of unknown infection origin, bringing the total number of confirmed cases to 212. As a result, the governorate of Irbid has been completely isolated from the rest of the Kingdom. Today 385 people were arrested for violating the curfew, and 430 vehicles seized.
On 27 March, 16 new recoveries were confirmed, bringing the total of recoveries to 18. Also, 23 additional cases were confirmed, including 2 cases who were in quarantine and came from the United States, 8 cases that were in close contact with people who are infected in a residential building in one of the regions in Amman, 1 individual who came from Pakistan l, 3 cases for people who were in close contact with an infected person who was in Saudi Arabia, 1 Lebanese individual, 1 case who was in close contact with an infected person, 5 more cases from irbid's wedding, 2 cases that have not been confirmed how they were infected yet, bringing the total of confirmed cases to 235, and the total of active cases to 217.
On 28 March, the first death resulting from COVID-19 was confirmed in the kingdom. An 83-year-old woman who was admitted to a private hospital with various illnesses along with blood poisoning was transported from a private hospital to Prince Hamzah Hospital upon discovery that she had contracted the disease. She died early this day. Later in the evening, the total confirmed cases rose to 246 after 11 new cases were confirmed. Of those 11, 5 cases came from Irbid, 1 individual who was in close contact with an infected person, 1 woman who was in close contact with her infected daughter that was visiting from Norway, 3 cases from those already quarantined in hotels (2 of which came from the UK and 1 came from Baghdad), and the final remaining case is of unknown origin/cause, investigations are still ongoing. The health Minister announced that there are 3 cases in serious conditions. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_pandemic_in_Jordan |
Circassians | The traditional female clothing (Adyghe: Бзылъфыгъэ Шъуашэр, Bzıłfıǵe Ȿuaşer [bzəɬfəʁa ʂʷaːʃar]) was very diverse and highly decorated and mainly depends on the region, class of family, occasions, and tribes. The traditional female costume is composed of a dress (Adyghe: Джанэр, Janer [d͡ʒaːnar]), coat (Adyghe: Сае, Saye [saːja]), shirt, pant (Adyghe: ДжэнэкӀакор, Jeneç'akuer [d͡ʒanat͡ʃʼaːkʷar]), vest (Adyghe: КӀэкӀ, Ç'eç' [t͡ʃʼat͡ʃʼ]), lamb leather bra (Adyghe: Шъохътан, Ȿuex́tan [ʂʷaχtaːn]), a variety of hats (Adyghe: ПэӀохэр}, Peꜧuexer [paʔʷaxar]), shoes, and belts (Adyghe: Бгырыпхыхэр, Bğırıpxıxer [bɣərəpxəxar]).
Holiday dresses are made of expensive fabrics such as silk and velvet. The traditional colors of women's clothing rarely includes blue, green or bright-colored tones, instead mostly white, red, black and brown shades are worn. The Circassian dresses were embroidered with gold and silver threads. These embroideries were handmade and took time to complete as they were very intricate.
The traditional male costume (Adyghe: Адыгэ хъулъфыгъэ шъуашэр, Adığe X́uıłfıǵe Ȿuaşer [aːdəɣa χʷəɬfəʁa ʂʷaːʃar]) includes a coat with wide sleeves, shirt, pants, a dagger, sword, and a variety of hats and shoes. Traditionally, young men in the warriors’ times wore coat with short sleeves—in order to feel more comfortable in combat. Different colors of clothing for males were strictly used to distinguish between different social classes, for example white is usually worn by princes, red by nobles, gray, brown, and black by peasants (blue, green and the other colors were rarely worn).
A compulsory item in the traditional male costume is a dagger and a sword. The traditional Adyghean sword is called shashka. It is a special kind of sabre; a very sharp, single-edged, single-handed, and guardless sword. Although the sword is used by most of Russian and Ukrainian Cossacks, the typically Adyghean form of the sabre is longer than the Cossack type, and in fact the word Shashka came from the Adyghe word "Sashkhwa" (Adyghe: Сашьхъуэ, Sas̨x́ue) which means "long knife". On the breast of the costume are long ornamental tubes or sticks, once filled with a single charge of gunpowder (called gaziri cartridges) and used to reload muskets. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circassians |
Geography of Somalia | Physio-graphically, Somalia is a land of limited contrast. In the north, a maritime semidesert plain parallels the Gulf of Aden coast, varying in width from roughly twelve kilometers in the west to as little as two kilometers in the east. Scrub-covered, this plain, known as the Guban (scrub land), is crossed by broad, shallow watercourses that are beds of dry sand except in the rainy seasons. When the rains arrive, the vegetation, which is a combination of low bushes and grass clumps, is quickly renewed, and for a time the guban provides some grazing for nomad livestock. This coastal strip is part of the Ethiopian xeric grasslands and shrublands ecoregion.
Inland from the gulf coast, the plain rises to the precipitous northward-facing cliffs of the dissected highlands. These form the rugged Karkaar mountain ranges that extend from the northwestern border with Ethiopia eastward to the tip of the Horn of Africa, where they end in sheer cliffs at Caseyr. The general elevation along the crest of these mountains averages about 1,800 meters above sea level south of the port town of Berbera, and eastward from that area it continues at 1,800 to 2,100 meters almost to Caseyr. The country's highest point, Shimber Berris, which rises to 2,460 meters, is located near the town of Erigavo.
Southward the mountains descend, often in scarped ledges, to an elevated plateau devoid of perennial rivers. This region of broken mountain terrain, shallow plateau valleys, and usually dry watercourses is known to the Somalis as the Ogo.
In the Ogo's especially arid eastern part, the plateau—broken by several isolated mountain ranges—gradually slopes toward the Somali Sea and in central Somalia constitutes the Mudug Plain. A major feature of this eastern section is the long and broad Nugaal Valley, with its extensive network of intermittent seasonal watercourses. The Nugaal river enters the Somali Sea at Eyl. The eastern area's population consists mainly of pastoral nomads eking a living in a zone of low and erratic rainfall.
The western part of the Ogo plateau region is crossed by numerous shallow valleys and dry watercourses. Annual rainfall is greater than in the east, and there are flat areas of arable land that provide a home for dryland cultivators. Most important, the western area has permanent wells to which the predominantly nomadic population returns during the dry seasons. The western plateau slopes gently southward and merges imperceptibly into an area known as the Haud, a broad, undulating terrain that constitutes some of the best grazing lands for Somali nomads, despite the lack of appreciable rainfall more than half the year. Enhancing the value of the Haud are the natural depressions that during periods of rain become temporary lakes and ponds.
The Haud zone continues for more than sixty kilometers into Ethiopia, and the vast Somali Plateau, which lies between the northern Somali mountains and the highlands of southeast Ethiopia, extends south and eastward through Ethiopia into central and southwest Somalia. The portion of the Haud lying within Ethiopia was the subject of an agreement made during the colonial era. In 1948, under pressure from their World War II allies and to the dismay of the Somalis, the British "returned" the Haud (an important Somali grazing area that was presumably 'protected' by British treaties with the Somalis in 1884 and 1886) and the Ogaden to Ethiopia, based on an 1897 treaty in which the British ceded Somali territory to the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik in exchange for his help against plundering by Somali clans. Britain included the proviso that the Somali nomads would retain their autonomy, but Ethiopia immediately claimed sovereignty over them. This prompted an unsuccessful bid by Britain in 1956 to buy back the Somali lands it had turned over. The stretch of land has since been a considerable source of regional strife.
Southwestern Somalia is dominated by the country's only two permanent rivers, the Jubba and the Shabeelle. With their sources in the Ethiopian highlands, these rivers flow in a generally southerly direction, cutting wide valleys in the Somali Plateau as it descends toward the sea; the plateau's elevation falls off rapidly in this area. The adjacent coastal zone, which includes the lower reaches of the rivers and extends from the Mudug Plain to the Kenyan border, averages 180 meters above sea level.
The Jubba River enters the Somali Sea at Kismaayo. Although the Shabeelle River at one time apparently also reached the sea near Merca, its course is thought to have changed in prehistoric times. The Shabeelle now turns southwestward near Balcad (about thirty kilometers north of Mogadishu) and parallels the coast for more than eighty-five kilometers. The river is perennial only to a point southwest of Mogadishu; thereafter it consists of swampy areas and dry reaches and is finally lost in the sand east of Jilib, not far from the Jubba River. During the flood seasons, the Shabeelle River may fill its bed to a point near Jilib and occasionally may even break through to the Jubba River farther south. Favorable rainfall and soil conditions make the entire riverine region a fertile agricultural area and the center of the country's largest sedentary population.
In most of northern, northeastern, and north-central Somalia, where rainfall is low, the vegetation consists of scattered low trees, including various acacias, and widely scattered patches of grass. This vegetation gives way to a combination of low bushes and grass clumps in the highly arid areas of the northeast and along the Gulf of Aden.
As elevations and rainfall increase in the maritime ranges of the north, the vegetation becomes denser. Aloes are common, and on the higher plateau areas of the Ogo are woodlands. At a few places above 1,500 meters, the remnants of juniper forests (protected by the state) and areas of Euphorbia candelabrum (a chandelier-type spiny plant) occur. In the more arid highlands of the northeast, Boswellia and Commiphora trees are sources, respectively, of the frankincense and myrrh for which Somalia has been known since ancient times.
A broad plateau encompassing the northern city of Hargeysa, which receives comparatively heavy rainfall, is covered naturally by woodland (much of which has been degraded by overgrazing) and in places by extensive grasslands. Parts of this area have been under cultivation since the 1930s, producing sorghum and maize; in the 1990s it constituted the only significant region of sedentary cultivation outside southwestern Somalia.
The Haud south of Hargeysa is covered mostly by a semiarid woodland of scattered trees, mainly acacias, underlain by grasses that include species especially favored by livestock as forage. There vegetation forms spatially periodic patterns reminiscent of a tiger skin when viewed from above and therefore knowns as "tiger bush". As the Haud merges into the Mudug Plain in central Somalia, the aridity increases and the vegetation takes on a subdesert character. Farther southward the terrain gradually changes to semiarid woodlands and grasslands as the annual precipitation increases.
The region encompassing the Shabeelle and Jubba rivers is relatively well watered and constitutes the country's most arable zone. The lowland between the rivers supports rich pasturage. It features arid to subarid savanna, open woodland, and thickets that include frequently abundant underlying grasses. There are areas of grassland, and in the far southwest, near the Kenyan border, some dry evergreen forests are found.
Along the Somali Sea from Hobyo southwestward to near Mogadishu lies a stretch of dry coastal sand dunes, the Hobyo grasslands and shrublands ecoregion. This area is covered with scattered scrub and grass clumps where rainfall is sufficient although unpredictable. Much of this coast is thinly populated but overgrazing, particularly south of Mogadishu, has resulted in the destruction of the protective vegetation cover and the gradual movement of the once-stationary dunes inland. The original flora of this coast contains a number of endemic species and beginning in the early 1970s, efforts were made to stabilize these dunes by replanting. Endemic mammals are the silver dik-dik (Madoqua piacentinii), one of the world's smallest antelopes, and the Somali golden mole (Calcochloris tytonis). Other endemic species include two reptiles, a skink Haackgreerius miopus and a lizard Latastia cherchii and two birds, Ash's lark (Mirafra ashi) and the Obbia lark (Spizocorys obbiensis). The long-term political strife in Somalia has meant the coast is poorly studied and the state of the habitat unknown.
Other vegetation includes plants and grasses found in the swamps into which the Shabeelle River empties most of the year and in other large swamps in the course of the lower Jubba River. Swamps of East African mangroves are found at points along the coast, particularly from Kismaayo to near the Kenyan border. Uncontrolled exploitation appears to have caused some damage to forests in that area. Other mangroves are located near Mogadishu and at a number of places along the northeastern and northern coasts. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Somalia |
Positional notation | The numbers which have a finite representation form the semiring
N
0
b
N
0
:=
{
m
b
−
ν
∣
m
∈
N
0
∧
ν
∈
N
0
}
.
{\displaystyle {\frac {\mathbb {N} _{0}}{b^{\mathbb {N} _{0}}}}:=\left\{mb^{-\nu }\mid m\in \mathbb {N} _{0}\wedge \nu \in \mathbb {N} _{0}\right\}.}
More explicitly, if
p
1
ν
1
⋅
…
⋅
p
n
ν
n
:=
b
{\displaystyle p_{1}^{\nu _{1}}\cdot \ldots \cdot p_{n}^{\nu _{n}}:=b}
is a factorization of
b
{\displaystyle b}
into the primes
p
1
,
…
,
p
n
∈
P
{\displaystyle p_{1},\ldots ,p_{n}\in \mathbb {P} }
with exponents
ν
1
,
…
,
ν
n
∈
N
{\displaystyle \nu _{1},\ldots ,\nu _{n}\in \mathbb {N} }
, then with the non-empty set of denominators
S
:=
{
p
1
,
…
,
p
n
}
{\displaystyle S:=\{p_{1},\ldots ,p_{n}\}}
we have
Z
S
:=
{
x
∈
Q
|
∃
μ
i
∈
Z
:
x
∏
i
=
1
n
p
i
μ
i
∈
Z
}
=
b
Z
Z
=
⟨
S
⟩
−
1
Z
{\displaystyle \mathbb {Z} _{S}:=\left\{x\in \mathbb {Q} \left|\,\exists \mu _{i}\in \mathbb {Z} :x\prod _{i=1}^{n}{p_{i}}^{\mu _{i}}\in \mathbb {Z} \right.\right\}=b^{\mathbb {Z} }\,\mathbb {Z} ={\langle S\rangle }^{-1}\mathbb {Z} }
where
⟨
S
⟩
{\displaystyle \langle S\rangle }
is the group generated by the
p
∈
S
{\displaystyle p\in S}
and
⟨
S
⟩
−
1
Z
{\displaystyle {\langle S\rangle }^{-1}\mathbb {Z} }
is the so-called localization of
Z
{\displaystyle \mathbb {Z} }
with respect to
S
{\displaystyle S}
.
The denominator of an element of
Z
S
{\displaystyle \mathbb {Z} _{S}}
contains if reduced to lowest terms only prime factors out of
S
{\displaystyle S}
.
This ring of all terminating fractions to base
b
{\displaystyle b}
is dense in the field of rational numbers
Q
{\displaystyle \mathbb {Q} }
. Its completion for the usual (Archimedean) metric is the same as for
Q
{\displaystyle \mathbb {Q} }
, namely the real numbers
R
{\displaystyle \mathbb {R} }
. So, if
S
=
{
p
}
{\displaystyle S=\{p\}}
then
Z
{
p
}
{\displaystyle \mathbb {Z} _{\{p\}}}
has not to be confused with
Z
(
p
)
{\displaystyle \mathbb {Z} _{(p)}}
, the discrete valuation ring for the prime
p
{\displaystyle p}
, which is equal to
Z
T
{\displaystyle \mathbb {Z} _{T}}
with
T
=
P
∖
{
p
}
{\displaystyle T=\mathbb {P} \setminus \{p\}}
.
If
b
{\displaystyle b}
divides
c
{\displaystyle c}
, we have
b
Z
Z
⊆
c
Z
Z
.
{\displaystyle b^{\mathbb {Z} }\,\mathbb {Z} \subseteq c^{\mathbb {Z} }\,\mathbb {Z} .} | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Positional_notation |
1947–1948 civil war in Mandatory Palestine | Jerusalem and the great difficulty of accessing the city became even more critical to its Jewish population, who made up one sixth of the total Jewish population in Palestine. The long and difficult route from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, after leaving the Jewish zone at Hulda, went through the foothills of Latrun. The 28-kilometre route between Bab al-Wad and Jerusalem took no less than three hours, and the route passed near the Arab villages of Saris, Qaluniya, Al-Qastal, and Deir Yassin.
Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni arrived in Jerusalem with the intent to surround and besiege its Jewish community. He moved to Surif, a village to the southwest of Jerusalem, with his supporters—around a hundred fighters who were trained in Syria before the war and who served as officers in his army, Jihad al-Muqadas, or Army of the Holy War. He was joined by a hundred or so young villagers and Arab veterans of the British Army. His militia soon had several thousand men, and it moved its training quarters to Bir Zeit, a town near Ramallah.
Abd al-Qadir's zone of influence extended down to the area of Lydda, Ramleh, and the Judean Hills where Hasan Salama commanded 1,000 men. Salama, like Abd al-Qadir, had been affiliated with Mufti Haj Amin al Husseini for years, and had also been a commander in the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine, participated in the Rashid Ali coup of 1941 and the subsequent Anglo-Iraqi War. Salama had re-entered Palestine in 1944 in Operation Atlas, parachuting into the Jordan Valley as a member of a special German—Arab commando unit of the Waffen SS. He coordinated with al-Husayni to execute a plan of disruption and harassment of road traffic in an attempt to isolate and blockade Western (Jewish) Jerusalem.
On 10 December, the first organized attack occurred when ten members of a convoy between Bethlehem and Kfar Etzion were killed.
On 14 January, Abd al-Qadir himself commanded and took part in an attack against Kfar Etzion, in which 1,000 Palestinian Arab combatants were involved. The attack was a failure, and 200 of al-Husayni's men died. Nonetheless, the attack did not come without losses of Jewish lives: a detachment of 35 Palmach men who sought to reinforce the establishment were ambushed and killed.
On 25 January, a Jewish convoy was attacked near the Arab village of al-Qastal. The attack went badly and several villages to the northeast of Jerusalem answered a call for assistance, although others did not, for fear of reprisals. The campaign for control over the roads became increasingly militaristic in nature, and became a focal point of the Arab war effort. After 22 March, supply convoys to Jerusalem stopped, due to a convoy of around thirty vehicles having been destroyed in the gorges of Bab-el-Wad.
On 27 March, an important supply convoy from Kfar Etzion was taken in an ambush in south of Jerusalem. They were forced to surrender all of their arms, ammunition and vehicles to al-Husayni's forces. The Jews of Jerusalem requested the assistance of the United Kingdom after 24 hours of combat. According to a British report, the situation in Jerusalem, where a food rationing system was already in application, risked becoming desperate after 15 May.
The situation in other areas of the country was as critical as the one of Jerusalem. The settlements of Negev were utterly isolated, due to the impossibility of using the Southern coastal road, which passed through zones densely populated by Arabs. On 27 March, a convoy of supplies (the Yehiam convoy) that was intended for the isolated kibbutzim north-west of Galilee was attacked in the vicinity of Nahariya. In the ensuing battle, 42–47 Haganah combatants and around a hundred fighters of the Arab Liberation Army were killed, and all vehicles involved were destroyed. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1947%E2%80%931948_civil_war_in_Mandatory_Palestine |
Almoravid dynasty | Almoravid fortunes began to turn definitively after 1117. While Léon and Castile were in disarray following the death of Alfonso VI, other Christian kingdoms exploited opportunities to expand their territories at the expense of the Almoravids. In 1118, Alfonso I El Batallador ('The Battler'), king of Aragon, launched a successful attack on Zaragoza with the help of the French crusader Gaston de Béarn. The siege of the city began on 22 May and, after no significant reinforcements arrived, it surrendered on 18 December. Ali ibn Yusuf ordered a major expedition to recover the loss, but it suffered a serious defeat at the Battle of Cutanda in 1120.
The crisis is evidence that Almoravid forces were over-extended across their vast territories. When the Almoravid governor of Zaragoza, Abd Allah ibn Mazdali, had died earlier in 1118, no replacement was forthcoming and the Almoravid garrison left in the city prior to the siege seems to have been very small. It is possible that Yusuf ibn Tashfin had understood this problem and had intended to leave Zaragoza as a buffer state between the Almoravids and the Christians, as suggested by an apocryphal story in the Hulul al-Mawshiya, a 14th-century chronicle, which reports that Ibn Tashfin, while on his deathbed, advised his son to follow this policy. Alfonso I's capture of Zaragoza in 1118, along with the union of Aragon with the counties of Catalonia in 1137, also transformed the Kingdom of Aragon into a major Christian power in the region. To the west, Afonso I of Portugal asserted his independent authority and effectively created the Kingdom of Portugal. The growing power of these kingdoms added to the political difficulties Muslims now faced in the Iberian Peninsula.
This major reversal precipitated a decline in popular support for the Almoravids, at least in al-Andalus. The Andalusi society largely cooperated with the Almoravids on the understanding that they could keep the aggressive Christian kingdoms at bay; once this was no longer the case, their authority became increasingly hollow. Their legitimacy was further undermined by the issue of taxation. One of the main appeals of early Almoravid rule had been its mission to eliminate non-canonical taxes (i.e. those not sanctioned by the Qur'an), thus relieving the people of a major fiscal burden. However, it was not feasible to finance Almoravid armies in the fight against multiple enemies across a large empire with the funding from Quranic taxes alone. Ali ibn Yusuf was thus forced to reintroduce non-canonical taxes while the Almoravids were losing ground.
These developments may have been factors in sparking an uprising in Cordoba in 1121. The Almoravid governor was besieged in his palace and the rebellion became so serious that Ali ibn Yusuf crossed over into al-Andalus to deal with it himself. His army besieged Cordoba but, eventually, a peace was negotiated between the Almoravid governor and the population. This was the last time Ali ibn Yusuf visited al-Andalus.
Alfonso I of Aragon inflicted further humiliations upon the Almoravids in the 1120s. In 1125, he marched down the eastern coast, reached Granada (though he refrained from besieging it), and devastated the countryside around Cordoba. In 1129, he raided the region of Valencia and defeated an army sent to stop him. The Almoravid position in al-Andalus was only shored up in the 1130s. In 1129, following Alfonso I's attacks, Ali ibn Yusuf sent his son (and later successor), Tashfin ibn Ali, to re-organize the military structure in al-Andalus. His governorship grew to include Granada, Almeria, and Cordoba, becoming in effect the governor of al-Andalus for many years, where he performed capably. The Banu Ghaniya clan, relatives of the ruling Almoravid dynasty, also became important players during this period. Yahya ibn Ali ibn Ghaniya was governor of Murcia up to 1133, while his brother was governor of the Balearic Islands after 1126. For much of the 1130s, Tashfin and Yahya led the Almoravid forces to a number of victories over Christian forces and reconquered some towns. The most significant was the Battle of Fraga in 1134, where the Almoravids, led by Yahya, defeated an Aragonese army besieging the small Muslim town of Fraga. Notably, Alfonso I El Batallor was wounded and died shortly after.
The greatest challenge to Almoravid authority came from the Maghreb, in the form of the Almohad movement. The movement was founded by Ibn Tumart in the 1120s and then continued after his death (c. 1130) under his successor, Abd al-Mu'min. They established their base at Tinmal, in the High Atlas mountains south of Marrakesh, and from here they progressively rolled back Almoravid territories. The struggle against the Almohads was immensely draining on Almoravid resources and contributed to their shortage of manpower elsewhere, including in al-Andalus. It also required the construction of large fortresses in the Almoravid heartlands in present-day Morocco, such as the fortress of Tasghimut. On Ali ibn Yusuf's orders, defensive walls were built around the capital of Marrakesh for the first time in 1126. In 1138, he recalled his son, Tashfin, to Marrakesh in order to assist in the fight against the Almohads. Removing him from al-Andalus only further weakened the Almoravid position there.
In 1138, the Almoravids suffered a defeat at the hands of Alfonso VII of León and Castile. In the Battle of Ourique (1139), they were defeated by Afonso I of Portugal, who thereby won his crown. During the 1140s, the situation grew steadily worse.
According to some scholars, Ali ibn Yusuf represented a new generation of leadership that had forgotten the desert life for the comforts of the city. After his death in 1143, his son Tashfin ibn Ali lost ground rapidly before the Almohads. In 1146, he was killed in a fall from a precipice while attempting to escape after a defeat near Oran. The Muridun staged a major revolt in southwestern Iberia in 1144 under the leadership of the Sufi mystic Ibn Qasi, who later passed to the Almohads. Lisbon was conquered by the Portuguese in 1147.
Tashfin's two successors were Ibrahim ibn Tashfin and Ishaq ibn Ali, but their reigns were short. The conquest of Marrakesh by the Almohads in 1147 marked the fall of the dynasty, though fragments of the Almoravids continued to struggle throughout the empire. Among these fragments, there was the rebel Yahya Al-Sahrāwiyya, who resisted Almohad rule in the Maghreb for eight years after the fall of Marrakesh before surrendering in 1155. Also in 1155, the remaining Almoravids were forced to retreat to the Balearic Islands and later Ifriqiya under the leadership of the Banu Ghaniya, who were eventually influential in the downfall of their conquerors, the Almohads, in the eastern part of the Maghreb. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Almoravid_dynasty |
Al-Ghazali | During his life, Al-Ghazali wrote over 70 books on science, Islamic reasoning and Sufism. Al-Ghazali played a major role in integrating Sufism with Shariah. He was also the first to present a formal description of Sufism in his works. His works also strengthened the status of Sunni Islam against other schools. The Batinite (Ismailism) had emerged in Persian territories and were gaining more and more power during al-Ghazali's period, as Nizam al-Mulk was assassinated by the members of Ismailis. In his Fada'ih al-Batiniyya (The Infamies of the Esotericists) al-Ghazali declared them unbelievers whose blood may be spilled. Al-Ghazali succeeded in gaining widespread acceptance for Sufism at the expense of philosophy. At the same time, in his refutation of philosophers he made use of their philosophical categories and thus helped to give them wider circulation.
The staple of his religious philosophy was arguing that the creator was the center point of all human life that played a direct role in all world affairs. Al-Ghazali's influence was not limited to Islam, but in fact his works were widely circulated among Christian and Hebrew scholars and philosophers. Some of the more notable philosophers and scholars in the west include David Hume, Dante, and St. Thomas Aquinas. Moses Ben Maimon, a Jewish theologian was deeply interested and vested in the works of al-Ghazali. One of the more notable achievements of Ghazali were his writing and reform of education that laid the path of Islamic Education from the 12th to the 19th centuries. Al-Ghazali's works were heavily relied upon by Islamic mathematicians and astronomers such as At-Tusi.
Al-Ghazali was by every indication of his writings a true mystic in the Persian sense. He believed himself to be more mystical or religious than he was philosophical however, he is more widely regarded by some scholars as a leading figure of Islamic philosophy and thought. He describes his philosophical approach as a seeker of true knowledge, a deeper understanding of the philosophical and scientific, and a better understanding of mysticism and cognition. The period following Ghazali "has tentatively been called the Golden Age of Arabic philosophy" initiated by Ghazali's successful integration of logic into the Islamic seminary Madrasah curriculum.
Imam Al Ghazali mainly chose to keep his legacy in his books so he wrote more than 70 books in his career. It is said about his book "Ihya Ulum Uddin: The Revival of the Religious Sciences" that, if one has no Shaykh Then he has Ihya. Through his writing he still influences islamic scholars and community. Prominent scholars like Shaykh Hamza Yusuf, Shaykh Ibrahim Osi Efa, Dr. Abdul Hakim Murad (Timothy Winter) is greatly influenced by his teaching. People refer to him as the "Proof of Islam". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Ghazali |
Tarout Island | Archaeological finds indicate that the island has been inhabited since 5000 BC; and it was later home to people from the civilization of Dilmun, Akkadians, Assyrians and Persians. Later it was occupied by the Persian Empire, the Islamic Empire; it was colonized by the Portuguese and later made part of the Ottoman Empire.
The most important collections found in the Tarout was pure golden statue representing Ashtaroot goddess. The statue was found placed on the ground in one of the palm groves in the Tarout.
There are many other statues, copper and pottery vessels and traditional weapons found in the Tarout that are displayed in the Riyadh Museum. It also contains a Portuguese fort which is located in Al Deyrah. The Portuguese castle was repaired in the 951H, which had been built on the ruins of former settlements and one of the oldest ones, dating back to over 5,000 years ago.
The site consists of the Fortress of Al-Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab Al Fehani, which was built in 1303H as well as the Fortress of Abu Al-leaf, which is located between the Tarout and Al Qatif, in addition to the three mosques on the old road from Al Qatif.
In 1959 a man cleaning a street discovered rocks with Sabaean inscriptions on them. The most famous artefacts found on Tārūt were unearthed by Danish archaeologists in 1968; they excavated shards of pottery dating back to 4,500 BC, and others from 3000 BC. When the municipality of Qatīf wanted to build a causeway to Tārūt in 1962 they took sand from the hill known as Tell Rafī’ah, and found Stone Age artifacts, including pottery, and a statue. The last discovery was in 1993 on Tell Rafī’ah. Sometimes archaeological ruins are discovered by accident; something that occurred when a car repair workshop was being renovated and tombs dating back to 2000 BC were found.
Many vessels have been found on Tārūt carved from steatite, particularly from Tell Rafī'ah; the designs are very artistic and include representations of cats, nude men, and motifs connected with the sea and fishing. The source of the steatite was actually in South Western Persia, but the carving industry seems to have been a local one.
Among the ancient statues discovered in Tārūt is one of a naked man made out of dark grey stone. It was found in the 1950s by a man ploughing his field. It is 94 cm high, and the man is standing in a reverential posture, with wide eyes. It is almost certainly Sumerian in origin, though it was found about 1000 kilometers from the nearest city of Sumer. It is a very high quality object, but was almost destroyed by the superstitious villagers, who thought it had something to do with spirits (jinn), and so cut it in half and beheaded it. It has been restored and now stands the National Museum of Riyadh.
In 1962 when some of the inhabitants of the village of Rabī'iyah were replacing their former thatched houses with buildings of stone and plaster, a man climbing some of the hills looking for stones, they chanced upon a jar, and then discovered a number of graves, which experts later suggested were likely to be Jewish in origin. They also found many earthenware vessels at the same site. At Khārijīyah in the north of Tārūt many clay figurines have also been found. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarout_Island |
Al-Muqtadir | The stand that had been made during the last four reigns to stay the decline of the Abbasid power at last came to an end. From al-Muqtadir's reign on, the Abbasids would decline. Yet, at the same time, many names that would become famous in the world of literature and science lived during this and the following reigns. Among the best known are: Ishaq ibn Hunayn (d. 911) (son of Hunayn ibn Ishaq), a physician and translator of Greek philosophical works into Arabic; ibn Fadlan, explorer; al Battani (d. 923), astronomer; al-Tabari (d. 923), historian and theologian; al-Razi (d. 930), a philosopher who made fundamental and lasting contributions to the fields of medicine and chemistry; al-Farabi (d. 950), chemist and philosopher; Abu Nasr Mansur (d. 1036), mathematician; Alhazen (d. 1040), mathematician; al-Biruni (d. 1048), mathematician, astronomer, physicist; Omar Khayyám (d. 1123), poet, mathematician, and astronomer; and Mansur al-Hallaj, a mystic, writer and teacher of Sufism most famous for his self-proclaimed attainment of unity with God (which was misunderstood and disputed as divinity), his poetry, and for his execution for heresy by al-Muqtadir.
By the time of al-Muqtadir's reign, there had been war for some years between the Muslims and the Greeks in Asia, with heavy losses for the most part on the side of the Muslims, many of whom were taken prisoner. The Byzantine frontier, however, began to be threatened by Bulgarian hordes. So the Byzantine Empress Zoe Karbonopsina sent two ambassadors to Baghdad with the view of securing an armistice and arranging for the ransom of the Muslim prisoners. The embassy was graciously received and peace restored. A sum of 120,000 golden pieces was paid for the freedom of the captives. All this only added to the disorder of the city. The people, angry at the success of the "Infidels" in Asia Minor and at similar losses in Persia, complained that the Caliph cared for none of these things and, instead of seeking to restore the prestige of Islam, passed his days and nights with slave-girls and musicians. Uttering such reproaches, they threw stones at the Imam, as in the Friday service he named the Caliph in the public prayers.
Some twelve years later, al-Muqtadir was subjected to the indignity of deposition. The leading courtiers having conspired against him, he was forced to abdicate in favour of his brother al-Qahir, but, after scenes of rioting and plunder, and loss of thousands of lives, the conspirators found that they were not supported by the troops. Al-Muqtadir, who had been kept in safety, was again placed upon the throne. The state's finances fell after this event into so wretched a state that nothing was left with which to pay the city guards. Al-Muqtadir was eventually slain outside the city gate in 320 AH (932 AD).
Al-Muqtadir's long reign had brought the Abbasids to their lowest ebb. Northern Africa was lost and Egypt nearly. Mosul had thrown off its dependence and the Greeks could make raids at pleasure along the poorly protected borders. Yet in the East formal recognition of the Caliphate remained in place, even by those who virtually claimed their independence; and nearer home, the terrible Carmathians had been for the time put down. In Baghdad, al-Muqtadir, the mere tool of a venal court, was at the mercy of foreign guards, who, commanded for the most part by Turkish and other officers of foreign descent, were frequently breaking out into rebellion. Because of al-Muqtadir's ineffective rule, the prestige which his immediate predecessors had regained was lost, and the Abbasid throne became again the object of contempt at home and a tempting prize for attack from abroad. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Muqtadir |
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa | According to the treaties, the following organs have decision-making power:
The COMESA Authority, composes of Heads of States or Government and is COMESA's supreme policy-making organ. The Authority is headed by a Chairman elected for an agreed period; the current chairperson from November 2021 is Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The Authority is tasked with the general policy direction and controlling the overall performance of the executive functions of COMESA. The COMESA Authority meets once a year at Summits which are held in different member States. The hosting government and the COMESA Secretariat bear joint responsibility for their organization. Whilst the hosting country assumes the chairmanship of the Authority for the year, an Extraordinary Summit can be held at the request of any member of the Authority; so long as one-third of the members of the Authority support such a request. The Authority meetings are held in closed sessions and usually decisions are taken by consensus. The session leaders have to issue a communiqué, recording any decisions made. These directives and decisions taken by the Authority are binding on all member States and the other organs to which they are addressed.
The COMESA Council of Ministers
The COMESA Court of Justice decisions have precedence over any decisions of national courts. The Court of Justice may receive cases not only from member States, but also from natural and legal persons, against the council to determine the legality of any act towards the directive's, regulation or decision made. The Persons are also permitted under the Treaty to sue a member State in the COMESA Court; the legality under the Treaty of any act, directive regulation, or decision of such member State.
In the event that a member State's court is reviewing the application or interpretation of the Treaty, it may request the Courts' opinion on the matter.
If the national court is a court from which there is no appeal or remedy, then court is required to refer the question to the COMESA court. The national remedies must be exhausted before a person can bring a matter to the COMESA CJ. The COMESA Court has jurisdiction over suits brought by COMESA employees and third parties against COMESA or its institutions. It also may act as an arbitrary tribunal on any matter arising from a contract to which COMESA or any of its institutions is a party. Further the Court can adjudicate any dispute between member States who agree to bring the dispute before it.
Unlike the Statute of the International Court, the treaty does not state the sources of law to be applied by the Court. The Treaty and any COMESA issued legal instruments, will make the initial law to be applied, but municipal law and international law may also be determined applicable by the Court.
While the jurisdiction of the COMESA Court provides multiple avenues for the creation of standard interpretation of the Treaty, there is no specific provision of an avenue for the settlement of disputes between the institutions of the Common Market. The Court is not given the power to interpret the statutes of the other COMESA institutions. Finally, the Treaty does not specify that the Court will have jurisdiction over human rights issues within the context of Community
Due to its varying jurisdictions of the Court, the Eighth Meeting of Ministers of Justice and Attorneys General recommended to the Council of Ministers and the Authority that the Treaty be amended to provide for two divisions in the Court, the Court of First Instance and the Appellate Division. The proposal was adopted and the Court was expanded in June 2005 with the appointment of seven judges in the Court of First Instance and five judges in the Appellate Division. The work of the Court was then suspended until the Appellate Division judges were appointed and the Rules of Court for the Appellate Division were drawn up and adopted. During this reformation of the Court, the previously fully independent Court was made subject to the review of any proposed Rules of Court by the Ministers of Justice and Attorneys-General. The Court was established under the 1994 Treaty, the first set of judges was not appointed until 1998.
Unlike other African regional courts, the COMESA Court continues to receive cases. However, due to lack of funds the Court is unable to hear all its cases at certain times. Funding is only done for one session of the Court per year, these has contributed greatly to piling of cases. The backlog of cases will most certainly increase with the current growth in trade disputes in the region.
The Committee of Governors of Central Banks
The following lower policy organs make recommendations to the above:
The Inter-governmental Committee
The Twelve Technical Committees
The Consultative Committee of the Business Community and other Interest Groups
The COMESA Secretariat
Other COMESA institutions created to promote development are:
The PTA Bank (Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank) in Bujumbura, Burundi
The COMESA Clearing House in Harare, Zimbabwe
The COMESA Association of Commercial Banks in Harare, Zimbabwe
The COMESA Leather Institute in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
The COMESA Re-Insurance Company (ZEP-RE) in Nairobi, Kenya
The Regional Investment Agency in Cairo, Egypt
COMTEL Project, aimed at creating regional telecommunications infrastructure
Regional Association of Energy Regulators for Eastern and Southern Africa (RAERESA) in Harare, Zambia | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Market_for_Eastern_and_Southern_Africa |
Islamic military jurisprudence | Fighting is justified for legitimate self-defense, to aid other Muslims and after a violation in the terms of a treaty, but should be stopped if these circumstances cease to exist. War should be conducted in a disciplined way, to avoid injuring non-combatants, with the minimum necessary force, without anger and with humane treatment towards prisoners of war.
During his life, Muhammad gave various injunctions to his forces and adopted practices toward the conduct of war. The most important of these were summarized by Muhammad's companion and first Caliph, Abu Bakr, in the form of ten rules for the Muslim army:
O people! I charge you with ten rules; learn them well!
Stop, O people, that I may give you ten rules for your guidance in the battlefield. Do not commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You must not mutilate dead bodies. Neither kill a child, nor a woman, nor an aged man. Bring no harm to the trees, nor burn them with fire, especially those which are fruitful. Slay not any of the enemy's flock, save for your food. You are likely to pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic services; leave them alone.
According to Tabari, the ten bits of "advice" that Abu Bakr gave was during the Expedition of Usama bin Zayd. During the Battle of Siffin, the Caliph Ali stated that Islam does not permit Muslims to stop the supply of water to their enemy. In addition to the Rashidun Caliphs, hadiths attributed to Muhammad himself suggest that he stated the following regarding the Muslim conquest of Egypt that eventually took place after his death:
You are going to enter Egypt a land where qirat (money unit) is used. Be extremely good to them as they have with us close ties and marriage relationships. When you enter Egypt after my death, recruit many soldiers from among the Egyptians because they are the best soldiers on earth, as they and their wives are permanently on duty until the Day of Resurrection. Be good to the Copts of Egypt; you shall take them over, but they shall be your instrument and help. Be Righteous to God about the Copts.
These principles were upheld by 'Amr ibn al-'As during his conquest of Egypt. A Christian contemporary in the 7th century, John of Nikiû, stated the following regarding the conquest of Alexandria by 'Amr:
On the twentieth of Maskaram, Theodore and all his troops and officers set out and proceeded to the island of Cyprus, and abandoned the city of Alexandria. And thereupon 'Amr the chief of the Moslem made his entry without effort into the city of Alexandria. And the inhabitants received him with respect; for they were in great tribulation and affliction. And Abba Benjamin, the patriarch of the Egyptians, returned to the city of Alexandria in the thirteenth year after his flight from the Romans, and he went to the Churches, and inspected all of them. And every one said: 'This expulsion (of the Romans) and victory of the Moslem is due to the wickedness of the emperor Heraclius and his persecution of the Orthodox through the patriarch Cyrus. This was the cause of the ruin of the Romans and the subjugation of Egypt by the Moslem. And 'Amr became stronger every day in every field of his activity. And he exacted the taxes which had been determined upon, but he took none of the property of the Churches, and he committed no act of spoliation or plunder, and he preserved them throughout all his days.
The principles established by the early Caliphs were also honoured during the Crusades, as exemplified by Sultans such as Saladin and Al-Kamil. For example, after Al-Kamil defeated the Franks during the Crusades, Oliverus Scholasticus praised the Islamic laws of war, commenting on how Al-Kamil supplied the defeated Frankish army with food:
Who could doubt that such goodness, friendship and charity come from God? Men whose parents, sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, had died in agony at our hands, whose lands we took, whom we drove naked from their homes, revived us with their own food when we were dying of hunger and showered us with kindness even when we were in their power.
The early Islamic treatises on international law from the 9th century onwards covered the application of Islamic ethics, Islamic economic jurisprudence and Islamic military jurisprudence to international law, and were concerned with a number of modern international law topics, including the law of treaties; the treatment of diplomats, hostages, refugees and prisoners of war; the right of asylum; conduct on the battlefield; protection of women, children and non-combatant civilians; contracts across the lines of battle; the use of poisonous weapons; and devastation of enemy territory. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_military_jurisprudence |
Chronology of the ancient Near East | Bietak, M., "Problems of Middle Bronze Age Chronology: New Evidence from Egypt", AJA 88, pp. 471–485, 1984
Bietak, M., "The Middle Bronze Age of the Levant — A New Approach to Relative and Absolute Chronology", in Åström, P. ed. High, Middle or Low, Part 3, Gothenburg, pp. 78–120, 1989
[25] Johannes van der Plicht1 and Hendrik J Bruins, "Radiocarbon Dating in Near-Eastern Contexts: Confusion and Quality Control", Radiocarbon, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 1155–1166, January 2006
[26] Gerard Gertoux, "Mesopotamian chronology over the period 2340–539 BCE through astronomically dated synchronisms and comparison with carbon-14 dating", ASOR 2019 Annual Meeting, Richard Coffman, Nov 2019, San Diego CA, United States, 2023
Grigoriev, Stanislav, "Chronology of the Seima-Turbino bronzes, early Shang Dynasty and Santorini eruption", Praehistorische Zeitschrift, vol. 98, no. 2, pp. 569–588, 2023
[27] Neocleous, A., Azzopardi, G., & Dee, M. W., "Identification of possible δ14C anomalies since 14 ka BP: A computational intelligence approach", Science of the Total Environment, vol. 663, pp. 162–169, 2019 doi:10.1016/j.scitotenv.2019.01.251
Albrecht Goetze, "The Kassites and Near Eastern Chronology," Journal of Cuneiform Studies, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 97–101, 1964
Manning, Sturt W., et al., "Dating the Thera (Santorini) eruption: archaeological and scientific evidence supporting a high chronology". Antiquity 88.342, pp. 1164–1179, 2014
Miller, Jared L., "Amarna Age Chronology and the Identity of Nibḫururiya in the Light of a Newly Reconstructed Hittite Text1", Altorientalische Forschungen, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 252–293, 2007
Otto, Adelheid, "From Pottery to Chronology: The Middle Euphrates Region in Late Bronze Age Syria", Proceedings of the International Workshop in Mainz (Germany), May 5–7, 2012, Gladbeck: PeWe-Verlag 2018
Ramsey, Christopher Bronk, et al., "Radiocarbon-Based Chronology for Dynastic Egypt", Science, vol. 328, no. 5985, pp. 1554–57, 2010
[28] Walther Sallaberger and Ingo Schrakam, "Associated Regional Chronologies for the Ancient Near East and the Eastern Mediterranean: History and Philology (Arcane)", Brepols Publishers (4 March 2015) ISBN 978-2503534947
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[29] Webster, Lyndelle C., et al., "Towards a Radiocarbon-Based Chronology of Urban Northern Mesopotamia in the Early to Mid-Second Millennium BC: Initial Results from Kurd Qaburstan", Radiocarbon, pp. 1–16, 2023
H. Weiss et al., "The Genesis and Collapse of Third Millennium North Mesopotamian Civilization", Science, vol. 261, iss. 5124, pp. 995–1004, 20 August 1993 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chronology_of_the_ancient_Near_East |
Ulama | After the Fall of Constantinople in 1453, the leaders and subjects of the Ottoman Empire became increasingly aware of its role as a great power of its time. This new self-awareness was associated with the idea to legitimise the new political role by linking the religious scholarship to the political system: Ottoman historians of the 15th and 16th century like Ibn Zunbul or Eyyûbî, described the deeds of the Ottoman sultans in terms of idealised Islamic ghazi warriors. According to Burak (2015), the Ottoman literature genres of the "rank order" (Turkish: tabaḳat and the "biografic lexicon" (Turkish: Eş-şakaiku'n) compiled the biographies of scholars in such ways as to create a concise and coherent tradition of the doctrine and structure of the Ottoman imperial scholarship. During the 16th century, scholars like the Shaykh al-Islām Kemālpaşazade (d. 1534), Aḥmād b. Muṣṭafā Taşköprüzāde (1494–1561), Kınalızāde ʿAli Çelebi (d. 1572) and Ali ben Bali (1527–1584) established a seamless chain of tradition from Abu Hanifa to their own time. Explicitly, some authors stated that their work must not only be understood as the historiography of the Hanafi madhhab, but that it should be consulted in case of eventual disagreements within the school of law. This exemplifies their purpose to establish a canon of Hanafi law within the Ottoman imperial scholarship. which modern Ottomanists termed the "Ottoman Islam".
After 1453, Mehmed the Conqueror (1432–1481) had established eight madrasas in former Byzantine church buildings, and later founded the sahn-ı şeman or "Eight courtyards madrasa", adjacent to the Fatih mosque, where he brought together the most distinguished Islamic law scholars of his territory. In his 2015 study on the "second formation of Islamic law", Burak has shown in detail how the Ottoman state gradually imposed upon the traditional ulama a hierarchy of "official imperial scholars", appointed and paid by the central government. From the conquest of the Mamluk Sultanate of Cairo in 1517 onwards, the Ottoman ulama set up their own interpretation of the Sunni Hanafi doctrine which then served as the official religious doctrine of the empire. The formal acknowledgment by decree of the sultan became a prerequisite to issue fatwas. In the 17th century, the annalist al-Hamawi used the expression "sultanic mufti" (al-ifta' al-sultani) to delineate the difference between the officially appointed religious leaders and those who had followed the traditional way of education. Other authors at that time called the Ottoman law scholars "Hanafi of Rūm [i.e., the Ottoman Empire]" (Rūmi ḫānāfi), "Scholars of Rūm" (ʿulamā'-ı rūm) or "Scholars of the Ottoman Empire" (ʿulamā' al-dawla al-ʿUthmaniyyā). The Shaykh al-Islām (Turkish: Şeyhülislam) in Istanbul became the highest-ranking Islamic scholar within, and head of the ulama throughout the empire.
The ulama in the Ottoman Empire had a significant influence over politics due to the belief that secular institutions were all subordinate to Islamic law, the Sharia (Turkish: Şeriat). The ulama were responsible for interpreting the religious law, therefore they claimed that their power superseded that of the government. Within the Ottoman hierarchy of ulama, the Shaykh al-Islām held the highest rank. He exerted his influence by issuing fatwas, his written interpretations of the sharia had authority over the entire Ottoman population. In the 16th century, as the support by the ulama of the sultan and the central government was essential for shaping the still-growing empire, the importance of the office rose, and its power increased. As members of the Ilmiye, the imperial scholars were part of the Ottoman elite class of the Askeri, and were exempt from any taxes.
However, by approving scholars and appointing them to offices, over time the sultan's influence increased over the religious scholars, although, as a Muslim, he still stood under the Islamic law. Even the Shaykh al-Islām was subordinate to the sultan; his position, like the ranks of the muftis, was described as a "service" (Turkish: hizmet) or "rank" (Turkish: rütbe or paye-ı Sahn), to which a candidate was appointed or elevated. Sometimes, the sultans made use of their power: In 1633, Murad IV gave order to execute the Shaykh al-Islām Ahīzāde Ḥüseyin Efendi. In 1656, Shaykh al-Islām Ḥocazāde Mesʿud Efendi was sentenced to death by sultan Mehmed IV.
The use of the Sunni Islam as a legitimisation of the Ottoman dynastic rule is closely linked to Sultan Süleyman I and his kazasker and later Schaykh al-Islām Ebussuud Efendi. Ebussuud compiled an imperial book of law (ḳānūn-nāme), which combined religious law (sharīʿah) with secular dynastic law (ḳānūn) in the person of the sultan. For example, Ebussuud provided a reason why the government could own land, or could levy and increase taxes, as the government was responsible for the protection of the common good of all Muslims. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulama |
Naftali Bennett | From 2010 to 2012, Bennett served as the director of the Yesha Council. In April 2011, together with Ayelet Shaked, he co-founded My Israel, which claims to have 94,000 Israeli members. In April 2012, he founded a movement named Yisraelim ("Israelis"). The movement's main goals include increasing Zionism among centre-right supporters, increasing dialogue between the religious and secular communities, and promoting "The Israel Stability Initiative."
Bennett was elected the leader of The Jewish Home party in 2012. He was reelected as the party's leader in 2015 and 2017.
Following his election to the Knesset, and before he could take his seat, Bennett had to renounce his U.S. citizenship, which he held as the son of American parents. He was appointed Minister of Economy and Minister of Religious Services in March 2013. In April 2013, he was also appointed Minister of Jerusalem and Diaspora Affairs.
After being reelected in the 2015 Knesset election, Bennett was appointed Minister of Education and retained the Diaspora Affairs portfolio in the new government. In May 2015, Netanyahu split the Ministry of Jerusalem and Diaspora Affairs, initially taking back the Jerusalem Affairs portfolio for himself. He later appointed Ze'ev Elkin to the role of Jerusalem Affairs Minister. As Minister of Education, Bennett issued an official order prohibiting school principals from inviting members of Breaking the Silence and other organizations that denounce Israel's military conduct in the West Bank.
In October 2015, Bennett resigned from the Knesset in order to allow Shuli Mualem to take his seat. His resignation took place under the Norwegian Law, which allowed ministers to resign their seats when in the cabinet but return to the Knesset if they leave the government. He returned to the Knesset on 6 December after Avi Wortzman opted to vacate his seat, having temporarily had to resign as a minister in order to do so.
Following Avigdor Lieberman's resignation as Defense Minister in November 2018, Bennett announced that he was seeking the position for himself. On 16 November 2018, a Likud party spokesman announced that Netanyahu had rejected Bennett's request and that Netanyahu himself would take the position instead. It was then announced that Bennett's Jewish Home party would no longer be affiliated with Netanyahu's government. On 19 November, Bennett reneged on his pledge to withdraw from Netanyahu's coalition.
In December 2018, Bennett was among the Jewish Home MKs to leave the party and form the breakaway New Right party. In the April 2019 Knesset election, New Right narrowly failed to cross the electoral threshold; as a result, Bennett did not gain a seat in the 21st Knesset. In June 2019, he left the government after Netanyahu dismissed Bennett from his positions as Education and Diaspora Affairs Minister.
After the Knesset dissolved and a second election in 2019 was called for September, the New Right formed an electoral alliance with the Jewish Home and National Union-Tkuma, named the United Right which was later renamed Yamina, and was led by Ayelet Shaked. The list won seven seats in the election, and Bennett regained his Knesset seat. In November 2019, Bennett rejoined Netanyahu's government as Minister of Defense. After briefly dissolving, the Yamina alliance was reunified in January 2020 ahead of the 2020 Knesset election, with Bennett succeeding Ayelet Shaked as the new leader of the alliance. Yamina won six seats in that election.
In May 2020, with negotiations to form a new government between Netanyahu and Benny Gantz, leader of the centrist Blue and White alliance, Yamina announced that it would go into the opposition, ending Bennett's tenure as Defense Minister. The day before, Rafi Peretz, the leader of The Jewish Home, had split from the alliance, and would be named as the Minister of Jerusalem in the thirty-fifth government of Israel. On 17 May, Bennett met with Gantz, who also succeeded him as Defense Minister, and declared that Yamina was now a "head held high" member of the opposition. Tkuma, which rebranded as the Religious Zionist Party on 7 January 2021, split from Yamina on 20 January. In spite of this, Yamina won seven seats in the 2021 Knesset election in March. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naftali_Bennett |
Al Jazeera Arabic | The closing of the Al Jazeera Media Network was one of the terms of diplomatic reestablishment put forward by Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt during the 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis.
On 23 June 2017, the countries that cut ties to Qatar issued a list of demands to end the crisis, insisting that Qatar shut down the Al Jazeera network, close a Turkish military base and scale down ties with Iran. The call, included in a list of 13 points, read: "Shut down Al Jazeera and its affiliate stations." Agencies, media outlets, journalists and media rights organisations decried the demands to close Al Jazeera as attempts to curb press freedom, including Reporters Without Borders; The Guardian, The New York Times, and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).
Earlier, Saudi Arabia and the UAE blocked Al Jazeera websites; Saudi Arabia closed Al Jazeera's bureau in Riyadh and halted its operating licence, accusing the network of promoting "terrorist groups" in the region; and Jordan also revoked the licence for Al Jazeera. Saudi Arabia also banned hotels from airing Al Jazeera, threatening fines of up to US$26,000 for those violating the ban.
On 6 June 2017, Al Jazeera was the victim of a cyber attack on all of its platforms.
Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, has said Doha will not discuss the status of Al Jazeera in any negotiations. "Doha rejects discussing any matter related to Al Jazeera channel as it considers it an internal affair," Qatar News Agency quoted the foreign minister as saying. "Decisions concerning the Qatari internal affairs are Qatari sovereignty - and no one has to interfere with them."
In June 2017, hacked emails from Yousef Al Otaiba (UAE ambassador to US) were reported as "embarrassing" by HuffPost because they showed links between the UAE and the US-based pro-Israel Foundation for Defense of Democracies. UAE-based Al Arabiya English claimed that the extensive media coverage of the email hack was a provocation and that the hacking was a move orchestrated by Qatar.
On 24 November 2017, Dubai Police deputy chief Lieutenant General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim accused Al Jazeera of provoking the 2017 Sinai attack and called for bombing of Al Jazeera by the Saudi-led coalition, tweeting in Arabic "The alliance must bomb the machine of terrorism ... the channel of ISIL, al-Qaeda and the al-Nusra front, Al Jazeera the terrorists".
In 2018, Al Jazeera reported apparent new details regarding a 1996 Qatari coup d'état attempt in a documentary accusing the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt, of orchestrating it. According to the documentary, a former French army commander, Paul Barril, was contracted and supplied with weapons by the UAE to carry out the coup operation in Qatar. UAE minister of foreign affairs Anwar Gargash responded to the documentary and stated that Paul Barril was "in fact a security agent of the Qatari Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani who visited Abu Dhabi and had no relationship with the UAE" and the documentary was "a falsification" attempt to inculpate the UAE in the coup. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_Jazeera_Arabic |
Bronze Age | In Great Britain, the Bronze Age is considered to have been the period from around 2100 to 750 BC. Migration brought new people to the islands from the continent. Tooth enamel isotope research on bodies found in early Bronze Age graves around Stonehenge indicates that at least some of the migrants came from the area of modern Switzerland. Another example site is Must Farm near Whittlesey, host to the most complete Bronze Age wheel ever to be found. The Beaker culture displayed different behaviours from earlier Neolithic people, and cultural change was significant. Integration is thought to have been peaceful, as many of the early henge sites were seemingly adopted by the newcomers. The rich Wessex culture developed in southern Britain at this time. Additionally, the climate was deteriorating; where once the weather was warm and dry it became much wetter as the Bronze Age continued, forcing the population away from easily defended sites in the hills and into the fertile valleys. Large livestock farms developed in the lowlands and appear to have contributed to economic growth and inspired increasing forest clearances. The Deverel-Rimbury culture began to emerge in the second half of the Middle Bronze Age (c. 1400–1100 BC) to exploit these conditions. Devon and Cornwall were major sources of tin for much of western Europe and copper was extracted from sites such as the Great Orme mine in northern Wales. Social groups appear to have been tribal but with growing complexity and hierarchies becoming apparent.
The burials, which until this period had usually been communal, became more individual. For example, whereas in the Neolithic a large chambered cairn or long barrow housed the dead, Early Bronze Age people buried their dead in individual barrows (commonly known and marked on modern British Ordnance Survey maps as tumuli), or sometimes in cists covered with cairns.
The greatest quantities of bronze objects in England were discovered in East Cambridgeshire, with the most important finds recovered in Isleham (more than 6500 pieces).
Alloying of copper with zinc or tin to make brass or bronze was practised soon after the discovery of copper itself. One copper mine at Great Orme in North Wales, reached a depth of 70 metres. At Alderley Edge in Cheshire, carbon dating has established mining at around 2280 to 1890 BC (95% probability). The earliest identified metalworking site (Sigwells, Somerset) came much later, dated by globular urn-style pottery to approximately the 12th century BC. The identifiable sherds from over 500 mould fragments included a perfect fit of the hilt of a sword in the Wilburton style held in Somerset County Museum. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bronze_Age |
Omar al-Bashir | Omar al-Bashir was elected president (with a five-year term) in the 1996 national election and Hassan al-Turabi was elected to a seat in the National Assembly where he served as speaker of the National Assembly "during the 1990s". In 1998, al-Bashir and the Presidential Committee put into effect a new constitution, allowing limited political associations in opposition to al-Bashir's National Congress Party and his supporters to be formed. On 12 December 1999, al-Bashir sent troops and tanks against parliament and ousted Hassan al-Turabi, the speaker of parliament, in a palace coup.
He was reelected by popular vote for a five-year term during the 2000 Sudanese general election.
From 2005 to 2010, a transitional government was set up under a 2005 peace accord that ended the 21-year long Second Sudanese Civil War and saw the formation of a power-sharing agreement between Salva Kiir's Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and al Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP).
Al-Bashir was reelected president in the 2010 Sudanese general election with 68% of the popular vote; while Salva Kiir was elected President of Southern Sudan. These elections were agreed on earlier in the 2005 peace accord. The election was marked by corruption, intimidation, and inequality. European observers, from the European Union and the Carter Center, criticised the polls as "not meeting international standards". Candidates opposed to the SPLM said they were often detained or stopped from campaigning. Sudan Democracy First, an umbrella organisation in the north, put forward what it called strong evidence of rigging by al-Bashir's NCP. The Sudanese Network for Democracy and Elections (Sunde) spoke of harassment and intimidation in the south, by the security forces of the SPLM.
Al-Bashir had achieved economic growth in Sudan. This was pushed further by the drilling and extraction of oil- However, economic growth was not shared by all. Headline inflation in 2012 approached the threshold of chronic inflation (period average 36%), about 11% up from the budget projection of 2012 reflecting the combined effects of inflationary financing, the depreciation of the exchange rate, and the continued removal of subsidies, as well as high food and energy prices. This economic downturn prompted cost of living riots that erupted into Arab Spring-style anti-government demonstrations, raising discontent within the Sudanese Workers' Trade Union Federation (SWTUF). They threatened to hold nationwide strikes in support of higher wages. The continued deterioration in the value of the Sudanese pound (SDG) posed grave downside risks to already soaring inflation. This, coupled with the economic slowdown, presents serious challenges to the implementation of the approved Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omar_al-Bashir |
Turkmens | Characteristics of traditional Turkmen cuisine are rooted in the largely nomadic nature of day-to-day life prior to the Soviet period coupled with a long local tradition, dating back millennia before the arrival of the Turkmen in the region, of white wheat production. Baked goods, especially flat bread (Turkmen: çörek) typically baked in a tandoor, make up a large proportion of the daily diet, along with cracked wheat porridge (Turkmen: ýarma), wheat puffs (Turkmen: pişme), and dumplings (Turkmen: börek). Since sheep-, goat-, and camel husbandry are traditional mainstays of nomadic Turkmen, mutton, goat meat, and camel meat were most commonly eaten, variously ground and stuffed in dumplings, boiled in soup, or grilled on spits in chunks (Turkmen: şaşlyk) or as fingers of ground, spiced meat (Turkmen: kebap). Rice for plov was reserved for festive occasions. Due to lack of refrigeration in nomad camps, dairy products from sheep-, goat-, and camel milk were fermented to keep them from spoiling quickly. Fish consumption was largely limited to tribes inhabiting the Caspian Sea shoreline. Fruits and vegetables were scarce, and in nomad camps limited mainly to carrots, squash, pumpkin, and onions. Inhabitants of oases enjoyed more varied diets, with access to pomegranate-, fig-, and stone fruit orchards; vineyards; and of course melons. Areas with cotton production could use cottonseed oil and sheep herders used fat from the fat-tailed sheep. The major traditional imported product was tea.
The Royal Geographic Society reported in 1882,The food of the Tekkes [sic] consists of well-prepared pillaus and of game; also of fermented camels' milk, melons, and water-melons. They use their fingers in conveying food to their mouths, but guests are provided with spoons.
In sharp contrast to other Central Asian and Turkic ethnic groups, Turkmen do not eat horse meat, and in fact eating of horse meat is prohibited by law in Turkmenistan.
Conquest by the Russian Empire in the 1880s introduced new foods, including such meats as beef, pork, and chicken, as well as potatoes, tomatoes, cabbage, and cucumbers, though they did not find widespread use in most Turkmen households until the Soviet period. While now consumed widely, they are, strictly speaking, not considered "traditional". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkmens |
United Arab Emirates | The United Arab Emirates is a federal constitutional monarchy made up from a federation of seven hereditary tribal monarchy-styled political units called Sheikhdoms. It is governed by a Federal Supreme Council made up of the ruling Sheikhs of Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Fujairah, Sharjah, Dubai, Ras Al Khaimah and Umm Al Quwain. All responsibilities not granted to the federal government are reserved to the individual emirate. A percentage of revenues from each emirate is allocated to the UAE's central budget.
The UAE uses the title Sheikh instead of Emir to refer to the rulers of individual emirates. The title is used due to the sheikhdom styled governing system in adherence to the culture of tribes of Arabia, where Sheikh means leader, elder, or the tribal chief of the clan who partakes in shared decision making with his followers. The president and vice president are elected by the Federal Supreme Council. Usually, the Head of the Al Nahyan family, who are based in Abu Dhabi, holds the presidency and the Head of the Al Maktoum family, based in Dubai, the prime ministership. All prime ministers but one have served concurrently as vice president.
The federal government is composed of three branches:
Legislative: A unicameral Federal Supreme Council and the advisory Federal National Council (FNC).
Executive: The President, who is also commander-in-chief of the military, the prime minister and the Council of Ministers.
Judicial: The Supreme Court and lower federal courts.
The UAE e-Government is the extension of the UAE federal government in its electronic form. The UAE's Council of Ministers (Arabic: مجلس الوزراء) is the chief executive branch of the government presided over by the prime minister. The prime minister, who is appointed by the Federal Supreme Council, appoints the ministers. The Council of Ministers is made up of 22 members and manages all internal and foreign affairs of the federation under its constitutional and federal law. In December 2019, the UAE became the only Arab country, and one of only five countries in the world, to attain gender parity in a national legislative body, with its lower house 50 per cent women.
The UAE is the only country in the world that has a Ministry of Tolerance, a Ministry of Happiness, and a Ministry of Artificial Intelligence. The UAE also has a virtual ministry called the Ministry of Possibilities, designed to find solutions to challenges and improve quality of life. The UAE also has a National Youth Council, which is represented in the UAE cabinet by the Minister of Youth.
The UAE legislative body is the Federal National Council which convenes nationwide elections every four years. The FNC consists of 40 members drawn from all the emirates. Each emirate is allocated specific seats to ensure full representation. Half are appointed by the rulers of the constituent emirates, and the other half are elected. By law, the council members have to be equally divided between males and females. The FNC is restricted to a largely consultative role.
The United Arab Emirates is an authoritarian federal monarchy. According to the New York Times, the UAE is "an autocracy with the sheen of a progressive, modern state". The UAE has been described as a "tribal autocracy" where the seven constituent monarchies are led by tribal rulers in an autocratic fashion. There are no democratically elected institutions, and there is no formal commitment to free speech. According to human rights organisations, there are systematic human rights violations, including the torture and forced disappearance of government critics. The UAE ranks poorly in freedom indices measuring civil liberties and political rights. The UAE is annually ranked as "Not Free" in Freedom House's annual Freedom in the World report, which measures civil liberties and political rights. The UAE also ranks poorly in the annual Reporters without Borders' Press Freedom Index. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index describes the UAE as a "moderate monarchy". The country was ranked 91 out of 137 states and is far below the average scoring for development towards a democracy. According to the 2023 V-Dem Democracy indices, the United Arab Emirates is the third least electoral democratic country in the Middle East. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Arab_Emirates |
Neo-Assyrian Empire | The ancient Assyrians primarily spoke and wrote the Assyrian language, a Semitic language (i.e. related to modern Hebrew and Arabic) closely related to Babylonian, spoken in southern Mesopotamia. Both Assyrian and Babylonian are generally regarded by modern scholars to be distinct dialects of the Akkadian language. This is a modern convention as contemporary ancient authors considered Assyrian and Babylonian to be two separate languages; only Babylonian was referred to as akkadûm, with Assyrian being referred to as aššurû or aššurāyu. Though both were written with cuneiform script, the signs look quite different and can be distinguished relatively easily. The Neo-Assyrian Empire was the last ever state to sponsor writing traditional Akkadian cuneiform in all levels of its administration. As a result, ancient Mesopotamian textual tradition and writing practices flourished to an unprecedented degree in the Neo-Assyrian period. Texts written in cuneiform were made not just in the traditionally Akkadian-speaking Assyrian heartland and Babylonia, but by officials and scribes all over the empire. At the height of the Neo-Assyrian Empire, cuneiform documents were written in lands today part of countries like Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Iran, which had not produced any cuneiform writings for centuries, and in cases never before.
Three distinct versions, or dialects, of Akkadian were used in the Neo-Assyrian Empire: Standard Babylonian, Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian. Standard Babylonian was a highly codified version of ancient Babylonian, used around 1500 BC, and was used as a language of high culture, for nearly all scholarly documents, literature and poetry. The culture of the Neo-Assyrian elite was strongly influenced by Babylonia in the south; in a vein similar to how Greek civilization was respected in, and influenced, ancient Rome, the Assyrians had much respect for Babylon and its ancient culture. Though the political relationship between Babylonia and the Assyrian central government was variable and volatile, cultural appreciation of the south was constant throughout the Neo-Assyrian period. Many of the documents written in Standard Babylonian were written by scribes who originally came from southern Mesopotamia but were employed in the north. The Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian forms of Akkadian were vernacular languages, i.e. the primary spoken languages of the people of northern and southern Mesopotamia, respectively.
Neo-Assyrian was used in some surviving tablets containing poetry and also more prominently in surviving letters of royal correspondence. Because of the multilingual nature of the empire, many loan words are attested as entering the Assyrian language during the Neo-Assyrian period. The number of surviving documents written in cuneiform grow considerably fewer in the late reign of Ashurbanipal, which suggests that the language was declining since it is probably attributable to an increased use of Aramaic, often written on perishable materials like leather scrolls or papyrus. The Neo-Assyrian Akkadian language did not disappear completely until around the end of the 6th century BC however, well into the subsequent post-imperial period. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neo-Assyrian_Empire |
Sharia | Westernization of legal institutions and expansion of state control in all areas of law, which began during the colonial era, continued in nation-states of the Muslim world. Sharia courts at first continued to exist alongside state courts as in earlier times, but the doctrine that sultanic courts should implement the ideals of Sharia was gradually replaced by legal norms imported from Europe. Court procedures were also brought in line with European practice. Though the Islamic terms qadi and mahkama (qadi's/Sharia court) were preserved, they generally came to mean judge and court in the Western sense. While in the traditional Sharia court all parties represented themselves, in modern courts they are represented by professional lawyers educated in Western-style law schools, and the verdicts are subject to review in an appeals court. In the 20th century, most countries abolished a parallel system of Sharia courts and brought all cases under a national civil court system.
In most Muslim-majority countries, traditional rules of classical fiqh have been largely preserved only in family law. In some countries religious minorities such as Christians or Shia Muslims have been subject to separate systems of family laws. Many Muslims today believe that contemporary Sharia-based laws are an authentic representation of the pre-modern legal tradition. In reality, they generally represent the result of extensive legal reforms made in the modern era. As traditional Islamic jurists lost their role as authoritative interpreters of the laws applied in courts, these laws were codified by legislators and administered by state systems which employed a number of devices to effect changes, including:
Selection of alternative opinions from traditional legal literature (takhayyur), potentially among multiple madhhabs or denominations, and combining parts of different rulings (talfiq).
Appeal to the classical doctrines of necessity (darura), public interest (maslaha), and the objectives (maqasid) of Sharia, which played a limited role in classical fiqh, but were now given wider utilitarian applications.
Changes in administrative law that grant the courts discretionary powers to restrict certain practices which are not forbidden by substantive law (e.g., polygamy), in some cases imposing penal sanctions as additional deterrence.
Modernist interpretation of Islamic scriptures without adherence to the rules or methodologies of traditional jurisprudence, known as neo-ijtihad.
The most powerful influence on liberal reformist thought came from the work of the Egyptian Islamic scholar Muhammad ʿAbduh (1849–1905). Abduh viewed only Sharia rules pertaining to religious rituals as inflexible, and argued that the other Islamic laws should be adapted based on changing circumstances in consideration of social well-being. Following precedents of earlier Islamic thinkers, he advocated restoring Islam to its original purity by returning to the Quran and the sunna instead of following the medieval schools of jurisprudence. He championed a creative approach to ijtihad that involved direct interpretation of scriptures as well as the methods of takhayyur and talfiq.
One of the most influential figures in modern legal reforms was the Egyptian legal scholar Abd El-Razzak El-Sanhuri (1895–1971), who possessed expertise in both Islamic and Western law. Sanhuri argued that reviving Islamic legal heritage in a way that served the needs of contemporary society required its analysis in light of the modern science of comparative law. He drafted the civil codes of Egypt (1949) and Iraq (1951) based on a variety of sources, including classical fiqh, European laws, existing Arab and Turkish codes, and the history of local court decisions. Sanhuri's Egyptian code incorporated few classical Sharia rules, but he drew on traditional jurisprudence more frequently for the Iraqi code. Sanhuri's codes were subsequently adopted in some form by most Arab countries.
Aside from the radical reforms of Islamic family law carried out in Tunisia (1956) and Iran (1967), governments often preferred to make changes that made a clear break from traditional Sharia rules by imposing administrative hurdles rather than changing the rules themselves, in order to minimize objections from religious conservatives. Various procedural changes have been made in a number of countries to restrict polygamy, give women greater rights in divorce, and eliminate child marriage. Inheritance has been the legal domain least susceptible to reform, as legislators have been generally reluctant to tamper with the highly technical system of Quranic shares. Some reforms have faced strong conservative opposition. For example, the 1979 reform of Egyptian family law, promulgated by Anwar Sadat through presidential decree, provoked an outcry and was annulled in 1985 by the supreme court on procedural grounds, to be later replaced by a compromise version. The 2003 reform of Moroccan family law, which sought to reconcile universal human rights norms and the country's Islamic heritage, was drafted by a commission that included parliamentarians, religious scholars and feminist activists, and the result has been praised by international rights groups as an example of progressive legislation achieved within an Islamic framework. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia |
State of Palestine | The first Intifada broke out in 1987, characterized by widespread protests, strikes, and acts of civil disobedience by Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank against Israeli occupation. In November 1988, the PLO legislature, while in exile, declared the establishment of the "State of Palestine". In the month following, it was quickly recognized by many states, including Egypt and Jordan. In the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, the State of Palestine is described as being established on the "Palestinian territory", without explicitly specifying further. After the 1988 Declaration of Independence, the UN General Assembly officially acknowledged the proclamation and decided to use the designation "Palestine" instead of "Palestine Liberation Organization" in the UN. In spite of this decision, the PLO did not participate at the UN in its capacity of the State of Palestine's government. Violent clashes between Palestinian protesters and Israeli forces intensified throughout 1989, resulting in a significant loss of life and escalating tensions in the occupied territories. 1990 witnessed the imposition of strict measures by the Israeli government, including curfews and closures, in an attempt to suppress the Intifada and maintain control over the occupied territories.
The 1990–1991 Gulf War brought increased attention to conflict, leading to heightened diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful resolution. Saddam Hussein was a supporter of Palestinian cause and won support from Arafat during the war. Following the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam surprised the international community by presenting a peace offer to Israel and withdrawing Iraqi forces from Kuwait, in exchange of withdrawal from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and Golan Heights. Though the peace offer was rejected, Saddam then ordered firing of scud missiles into Israeli territory. This movement was supported by Palestinians. The war also led expulsion of Palestinians from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, as their government supported Iraq.
In 1993, the Oslo Accords were signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), leading to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and a potential path to peace. Yasser Arafat was elected as president of the newly formed Palestinian Authority in 1994, marking a significant step towards self-governance.
Israel acknowledged the PLO negotiating team as "representing the Palestinian people", in return for the PLO recognizing Israel's right to exist in peace, acceptance of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and its rejection of "violence and terrorism". As a result, in 1994 the PLO established the Palestinian National Authority (PNA or PA) territorial administration, that exercises some governmental functions in parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As envisioned in the Oslo Accords, Israel allowed the PLO to establish interim administrative institutions in the Palestinian territories, which came in the form of the PNA. It was given civilian control in Area B and civilian and security control in Area A, and remained without involvement in Area C.
The peace process gained opposition from both Palestinians and Israelis. Islamist militant organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad opposed the attack and responded by conducting attacks on civilians across Israel. In 1994, Baruch Goldstein, an Israeli extremist shot 29 people to death in Hebron, known as the Cave of the Patriarchs massacre. These events led an increase in Palestinian opposition to the peace process. Tragically, in 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by Yigal Amir – an extremist, causing political instability in the region.
The first-ever Palestinian general elections took place in 1996, resulting in Arafat's re-election as president and the formation of a Palestinian Legislative Council. Initiating the implementation of the Oslo Accords, Israel began redeploying its forces from select Palestinian cities in the West Bank in 1997. Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority continued, albeit with slow progress and contentious debates on Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees in 1998. In 1997, Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu and the Palestinian government signed the Hebron Protocol, which outlined the redeployment of Israeli forces from parts of Hebron in the West Bank, granting the government greater control over the city. Israel and the Palestinian government signed the Wye River Memorandum in 1998, aiming to advance the implementation of the Oslo Accords. The agreement included provisions for Israeli withdrawals and security cooperation.
The period of the Oslo Years brought a great prosperity to the government-controlled areas, despite some economic issues. The Palestinian Authority built the country's second airport in Gaza, after the Jerusalem International Airport. Inaugural ceremony of the airport was attended by Bill Clinton and Nelson Mandela. In 1999, Ehud Barak assumed the position of Israeli Prime Minister, renewing efforts to reach a final status agreement with the Palestinians. The Camp David Summit in 2000 aimed to resolve the remaining issues but concluded without a comprehensive agreement, serving as a milestone in the peace process. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_Palestine |
Alodia | It is unclear if the Kingdom of Alodia was destroyed by the Arabs under Abdallah Jammah or by the Funj, an African group from the south led by their king Amara Dunqas. Most modern scholars agree now that it fell due to the Arabs.
Abdallah Jammah ("Abdallah the gatherer"), the eponymous ancestor of the Sudanese Abdallab tribe, was a Rufa'a Arab who, according to Sudanese traditions, settled in the Nile Valley after coming from the east. He consolidated his power and established his capital at Qerri, just north of the confluence of the two Niles. In the late 15th century he gathered the Arab tribes to act against the Alodian "tyranny", as it is called, which has been interpreted as having a religious-economic motive. The Muslim Arabs no longer accepted the rule of, nor taxation by, a Christian ruler. Under Abdallah's leadership Alodia and its capital Soba were destroyed, resulting in rich booty such as a "bejeweled crown" and a "famous necklace of pearls and rubies".
According to another tradition recorded in old documents from Shendi, Soba was destroyed by Abdallah Jammah in 1509 having already been attacked in 1474. The idea of uniting the Arabs against Alodia is said to have already been on the mind of an emir who lived between 1439 and 1459. To this end, he migrated from Bara in Kordofan to a mountain near Ed Dueim on the White Nile. Under his grandson, called Emir Humaydan, the White Nile was crossed. There he met other Arab tribes and attacked Alodia. The king of Alodia was killed, but the "patriarch", probably the archbishop of Soba, managed to flee. He soon returned to Soba. A puppet king was crowned and an army of Nubians, Beja and Abyssinians was assembled to fight "for the sake of religion". Meanwhile, the Arab alliance was about to fracture, but Abdallah Jammah reunited them, while also allying with the Funj king Amara Dunqas. Together they finally defeated and killed the patriarch, razing Soba afterwards and enslaving its population.
The Funj Chronicle, a multi-authored history of the Funj Sultanate compiled in the 19th century, ascribes the destruction of Alodia to King Amara Dunqas; he was also allied with Abdallah Jammah. This attack is dated to the 9th century after the Hijra (c. 1396–1494). Afterwards, Soba is said to have served as the capital of the Funj until the foundation of Sennar in 1504. The Tabaqat Dayfallah, a history of Sufism in Sudan (c. 1700), briefly mentions that the Funj attacked and defeated the "kingdom of the Nuba" in 1504–1505. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alodia |
Uthman | The actual reason for the anti-Uthman movement is disputed among the Shia and Sunni Muslims. Under Uthman, the people became more prosperous and on the political plane they came to enjoy a larger degree of freedom. No institutions were devised to channel political activity, and, in their absence, the pre-Islamic tribal jealousies and rivalries, which had been suppressed under earlier caliphs, erupted once again. The people took advantage of Uthman's leniency, which became a headache for the state, culminating in Uthman's assassination.
According to Wilferd Madelung, during Uthman's reign, "grievances against his arbitrary acts were substantial by standards of his time. Historical sources mention a lengthy account of the wrongdoings he was accused of... It was only his violent death that came to absolve him in Sunni ideology from any ahdath and make him a martyr and the third Rightly Guided Caliph." According to Keaney Heather, Uthman, as a caliph, relied solely on his own volition in picking his cabinet, which led to decisions that bred resistance within the Muslim community. Indeed, his style of governance made Uthman one of the most controversial figures in Islamic history.
The resistance against Uthman arose because he favoured family members when choosing governors, reasoning that, by doing this, he would be able to exact more influence on how the caliphate was run and consequently improve the feudal system he worked to establish. The contrary turned out to be true and his appointees had more control over how he conducted business than he had originally planned. They went so far as to impose authoritarianism over their provinces. Indeed, many anonymous letters were written to the leading companions of Muhammad, complaining about the alleged tyranny of Uthman's appointed governors. Moreover, letters were sent to the leaders of public opinion in different provinces concerning the reported mishandling of power by Uthman's family. This contributed to unrest in the empire and finally Uthman had to investigate the matter in an attempt to ascertain the authenticity of the rumours. Wilferd Madelung discredits the alleged role of Abdullah ibn Saba in the rebellion against Uthman and observes that few if any modern historians would accept Sayf's legend of Ibn Saba.
Bernard Lewis, a 20th-century scholar, says of Uthman:
Uthman, like Mu'awiya, was a member of the leading Meccan family of Ummaya and was indeed the sole representative of the Meccan patricians among the early companions of the Prophet with sufficient prestige to rank as a candidate. His election was at once their victory and their opportunity. That opportunity was not neglected. Uthman soon fell under the influence of the dominant Meccan families and one after another, the high posts of the Empire went to members of those families. The weakness and nepotism of Uthman brought to a head the resentment which had for some time been stirring obscurely among the Arab warriors. The Muslim tradition attribute the breakdown which occurred during his reign to the personal defects of Uthman. But, the causes lie far deeper and the guilt of Uthman lay in his failure to recognize, control or remedy them. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uthman |
Neolithic Revolution | Agriculture in Neolithic China can be separated into two broad regions, Northern China and Southern China.
The agricultural centre in northern China is believed to be the homelands of the early Sino-Tibetan-speakers, associated with the Houli, Peiligang, Cishan, and Xinglongwa cultures, clustered around the Yellow River basin. It was the domestication centre for foxtail millet (Setaria italica) and broomcorn millet (Panicum miliaceum), with early evidence of domestication approximately 8,000 years ago, and widespread cultivation 7,500 years ago. (Soybean was also domesticated in northern China 4,500 years ago. Orange and peach also originated in China, being cultivated c. 2500 BCE.)
The agricultural centres in southern China are clustered around the Yangtze River basin. Rice was domesticated in this region, together with the development of paddy field cultivation, between 13,500 and 8,200 years ago.
There are two possible centres of domestication for rice. The first is in the lower Yangtze River, believed to be the homelands of pre-Austronesians and associated with the Kauhuqiao, Hemudu, Majiabang, and Songze cultures. It is characterized by typical pre-Austronesian features, including stilt houses, jade carving, and boat technologies. Their diet were also supplemented by acorns, water chestnuts, foxnuts, and pig domestication. The second is in the middle Yangtze River, believed to be the homelands of the early Hmong-Mien-speakers and associated with the Pengtoushan and Daxi cultures. Both of these regions were heavily populated and had regular trade contacts with each other, as well as with early Austroasiatic speakers to the west, and early Kra-Dai speakers to the south, facilitating the spread of rice cultivation throughout southern China.
The millet and rice-farming cultures also first came into contact with each other at around 9,000 to 7,000 BP, resulting in a corridor between the millet and rice cultivation centres where both rice and millet were cultivated. At around 5,500 to 4,000 BP, there was increasing migration into Taiwan from the early Austronesian Dapenkeng culture, bringing rice and millet cultivation technology with them. During this period, there is evidence of large settlements and intensive rice cultivation in Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, which may have resulted in overexploitation. Bellwood (2011) proposes that this may have been the impetus of the Austronesian expansion which started with the migration of the Austronesian-speakers from Taiwan to the Philippines at around 5,000 BP.
Austronesians carried rice cultivation technology to Island Southeast Asia along with other domesticated species. The new tropical island environments also had new food plants that they exploited. They carried useful plants and animals during each colonization voyage, resulting in the rapid introduction of domesticated and semi-domesticated species throughout Oceania. They also came into contact with the early agricultural centres of Papuan-speaking populations of New Guinea as well as the Dravidian-speaking regions of South India and Sri Lanka by around 3,500 BP. They acquired further cultivated food plants like bananas and pepper from them, and in turn introduced Austronesian technologies like wetland cultivation and outrigger canoes. During the 1st millennium CE, they also colonized Madagascar and the Comoros, bringing Southeast Asian food plants, including rice, to East Africa. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neolithic_Revolution |
Early Christianity | Edessa, which was held by Rome from 116 to 118 and 212 to 214, but was mostly a client kingdom associated either with Rome or Persia, was an important Christian city. Shortly after 201 or even earlier, its royal house became Christian.
Edessa (now Şanlıurfa) in northwestern Mesopotamia was from apostolic times the principal center of Syriac-speaking Christianity. it was the capital of an independent kingdom from 132 BC to AD 216, when it became tributary to Rome. Celebrated as an important centre of Greco-Syrian culture, Edessa was also noted for its Jewish community, with proselytes in the royal family. Strategically located on the main trade routes of the Fertile Crescent, it was easily accessible from Antioch, where the mission to the Gentiles was inaugurated. When early Christians were scattered abroad because of persecution, some found refuge at Edessa. Thus the Edessan church traced its origin to the Apostolic Age (which may account for its rapid growth), and Christianity even became the state religion for a time.
The Church of the East had its inception at a very early date in the buffer zone between the Parthian and Roman Empires in Upper Mesopotamia, known as the Assyrian Church of the East. The vicissitudes of its later growth were rooted in its minority status in a situation of international tension. The rulers of the Parthian Empire (250 BC – AD 226) were on the whole tolerant in spirit, and with the older faiths of Babylonia and Assyria in a state of decay, the time was ripe for a new and vital faith. The rulers of the Second Persian empire (226–640) also followed a policy of religious toleration to begin with, though later they gave Christians the same status as a subject race. However, these rulers also encouraged the revival of the ancient Persian dualistic faith of Zoroastrianism and established it as the state religion, with the result that the Christians were increasingly subjected to repressive measures. Nevertheless, it was not until Christianity became the state religion in the West (380) that enmity toward Rome was focused on the Eastern Christians. After the Muslim conquest in the 7th century, the caliphate tolerated other faiths but forbade proselytism and subjected Christians to heavy taxation.
The missionary Addai evangelized Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) about the middle of the 2nd century. An ancient legend recorded by Eusebius (AD 260–340) and also found in the Doctrine of Addai (c. AD 400) (from information in the royal archives of Edessa) describes how King Abgar V of Edessa communicated to Jesus, requesting he come and heal him, to which appeal he received a reply. It is said that after the resurrection, Thomas sent Addai (or Thaddaeus), to the king, with the result that the city was won to the Christian faith. In this mission he was accompanied by a disciple, Mari, and the two are regarded as co-founders of the church, according to the Liturgy of Addai and Mari (c. AD 200), which is still the normal liturgy of the Assyrian church. The Doctrine of Addai further states that Thomas was regarded as an apostle of the church in Edessa.
Addai, who became the first bishop of Edessa, was succeeded by Aggai, then by Palut, who was ordained about 200 by Serapion of Antioch. Thence came to us in the 2nd century the famous Peshitta, or Syriac translation of the Old Testament; also Tatian's Diatessaron, which was compiled about 172 and in common use until St. Rabbula, Bishop of Edessa (412–435), forbade its use. This arrangement of the four canonical gospels as a continuous narrative, whose original language may have been Syriac, Greek, or even Latin, circulated widely in Syriac-speaking Churches.
A Christian council was held at Edessa as early as 197. In 201 the city was devastated by a great flood, and the Christian church was destroyed. In 232, the Syriac Acts were written supposedly on the event of the relics of the Apostle Thomas being handed to the church in Edessa. Under Roman domination many martyrs suffered at Edessa: Sts. Scharbîl and Barsamya, under Decius; Sts. Gûrja, Schâmôna, Habib, and others under Diocletian. In the meanwhile Christian priests from Edessa had evangelized Eastern Mesopotamia and Persia, and established the first churches in the kingdom of the Sasanians. Atillâtiâ, Bishop of Edessa, assisted at the First Council of Nicaea (325). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early_Christianity |
Abd Allah al-Mahdi Billah | On 26 August 909, the Kutama army reached Sijilmasa, and demanded the release of their captive imam. After brief clashes with the Midrarid troops, Emir al-Yasa fled his city, which was occupied and plundered. Mounted on horseback and dressed in fine clothes, Sa'id and his son were presented to the army, amidst shouts and tears of religious exaltation. On the next day, 27 August, Sa'id was enthroned and acclaimed by the troops. As the historian Michael Brett explains, the occasion had double meaning: on the one hand, it acknowledged Sa'id's caliphate, but on the other, it recognized the Kutama soldiery as 'faithful' (mu'minin) or 'friends of God' (awliya), an elite distinct from the mass of ordinary Muslims.
On 26 August, outside the walls of Sijilmasa, the Imam emerged. He was riding a bay horse and wearing a turban whose cloth trailed over his neck and shoulders, an Egyptian linen shirt and sandals. ... Just then, a voice rang out over the crowds of the Kutama tribesmen: 'O faithful! This is my lord and yours, and the lord of all mankind!' When the Kutama saw their chief, Abu Abd Allah al-Shi'i, dismount from his horse, they followed suit. Al-Shi'i rushed towards the Imam, falling to his knees to kiss the stirrup of the Imam's horse, tears streaming down his face as he wept with joy. Then, he heard the first of Abd Allah al-Mahdi's words, 'Rejoice in the glad-tidings'.
The army remained at Sijilmasa for several weeks, during which delegations offering submission came from across the western Maghreb. The fugitive emir of Sijilmasa was captured, and the Kutama chieftain Ibrahim ibn Ghalib installed as governor. On 12 October, the army began its return march. On the way it relieved Tahert, which in the meantime had come under attack by the Zenata under Ibn Khazar, attacked the tribe of Sadina in its mountain strongholds, and launched an expedition to capture Ibn Khazar, but the latter managed to flee into the desert. The army then turned northeast, and Sa'id visited Ikjan, the original base of Abu Abdallah's mission among the Kutama. There Sa'id arranged the affairs of the Kutama tribes, and took care to gather the treasures that had for years been hoarded in his name.
After twenty days, the army marched on towards Kairouan, where on 4 January 910 the city notables came forth to greet their new ruler. Asked for a renewal of Abu Abdallah's aman, Sa'id immediately guaranteed their lives, but pointedly did not say anything about their possessions. The new caliph did not enter Kairouan—which he seems never to have visited during his life—and instead rode straight for Raqqada. On the next day, Friday, 5 January 910, in the sermon of the Friday prayer, a manifesto hailing the return of the caliphate to its rightful possessors, the Family of Muhammad, was read, and the name and titles of the new ruler were formally announced: "Abdallah Abu Muhammad, the Imam rightly guided by God, the Commander of the Faithful". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abd_Allah_al-Mahdi_Billah |
2015 Kuwait mosque bombing | Bosnia – The Bosnian-Kuwaiti parliamentary friendship group said the attack targeted not only Kuwaiti worshipers but all Muslims and peace loving people around the world.
Canada – Prime Minister Stephen Harper condemned the "heinous terrorist attacks" that day and offered his deepest condolences. "...We will continue to protect Canadians, support the international coalition to degrade the jihadist threat, and stand shoulder to shoulder with our allies in defiance of this evil," said Harper in a statement posted on the Canadian government website.
India – President of India Pranab Mukherjee sent a letter to the Emir expressing condolences. Prime Minister Narendra Modi condemned the attacks in France, Tunisia, and Kuwait, saying the progress of humanity lies in peace and brotherhood instead of hatred and mindless violence.
Philippines – The Department of Foreign Affairs the attacks in Kuwait along with attacks in Tunisia, and France. The foreign affairs body also urged the international community to continue the global campaign against terrorism saying that "Extremism and terrorism have no place in a civilized society. They also run counter to the desire of people all around the world for peace, harmony and understanding, and to global efforts to promote development and prosperity". Condolences to the families and relatives of the victims of the attack were also extended.
Russia – President Vladimir Putin expressed condolences to Kuwait. "The Russian head of state has strongly denounced terrorism in all of its manifestations and voiced support for the Kuwaiti leadership's and people's efforts to fight this threat," the statement read.
Singapore – The Ministry of Foreign affairs condemned the attacks and reiterated the country's strong opposition of terrorism. "Singapore strongly condemns the acts of violence and the loss of innocent lives in the three terrorist attacks that occurred on 26 June 2015 in Sousse, Tunisia, Kuwait City, Kuwait, and Saint-Quentin-Fallavier, France. We extend our deepest condolences to the families of the victims on their tragic loss. These brutal acts of terror are another reminder that we need to remain vigilant and work closely with our international partners to combat terrorism and counter violent extremism"
Malaysia – Prime Minister Najib Razak condemn the attack and offered his condolences. On his statement in Facebook, he said "In the strongest terms, I condemn the heinous acts of terrorism on innocent civilians in France, Tunisia and Kuwait". "These atrocities, which have caused injuries and claimed the lives of many in this holy month of Ramadan, are against the true teachings of Islam. My deepest condolences and Al-Fatihah".
Pakistan – The Foreign Office strongly condemned the attack. "The people and the Government of Pakistan wish to convey their heartfelt sympathies and deepest condolences to the bereaved families and pray for speedy recovery of the injured. [...] We share the grief of the brotherly people of the State of Kuwait over this cowardly attack against innocent civilians praying at a mosque during the Holy month of Ramadan."
United Kingdom – British Prime Minister David Cameron described the terrorist attacks as "savage" and "a brutal and tragic reminder of the threat faced around the world from these evil terrorists"
Vietnam – President Trương Tấn Sang sent a message of condolence to Kuwait's emir Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah over the great loss of life caused by the terror attack. While Deputy Spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry Pham Thu Hang expressed her deep concern and strongly protests the terrorist attacks in France, Tunisia and Kuwait. In a statement, she said "These are savage and inhumane actions targeting innocent civilians. We share the irreparable losses and heartbreak with the Governments, peoples and families of victims". She also stressed that Vietnam believes those instigators must bear the responsibility for their actions and receive strict punishment. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Kuwait_mosque_bombing |
Sukarno | Filipino actor Mike Emperio portrayed Sukarno in the 1982 movie The Year of Living Dangerously directed by Peter Weir as adapted from a novel of same name written by Christopher Koch.
Indonesian sociologist and writer Umar Kayam portrayed Sukarno in the 1984 movie Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI and the 1988 movie Djakarta 66 directed by Arifin C. Noer.
Indonesian actor Frans Tumbuan portrayed Sukarno in the 1997 movie Blanco, The Colour of Love (compacted from its original TV serial version, Api Cinta Antonio Blanco) about Spanish painter Antonio Blanco who settled and resided in Bali, Indonesia.
Indonesian actor Soultan Saladin portrayed Sukarno in the 2005 movie Gie, directed by Riri Riza, about the life of student activist Soe Hok Gie.
Indonesian actor Tio Pakusadewo is set to portray Sukarno in a planned movie 9 Reasons, telling the stories of nine women in the life of the founding father: Oetari (portrayed by (Acha Septriasa); Inggit Garnasih (Happy Salma); Fatmawati (Revalina Sayuthi Temat); Hartini (Lola Amaria); Haryati (Ajeng Anjani); Kartini Manoppo (Wulan Guritno); Ratna Sari Dewi (Mariana Renata); Yurike Sanger (Isyana Sarasvati); Heldy Djafar (Pevita Pearce); Wisma Susana Siregar (Chelsea Islan); Sakiko Kanase (Haruka Nagakawa) and Amelia De La Rama (Raisa Adriana). Tio Pakusadewo also portrayed Sukarno's erstwhile colleague and eventual successor, Suharto, in another 2012 historical biopic, Habibie dan Ainun.
Indonesian actor Ario Bayu portrayed Sukarno in the 2013 movie Soekarno: Indonesia Merdeka directed by Hanung Bramantyo, about his life from birth until Indonesian independence from Japanese occupation.
Indonesian actor Baim Wong portrayed Sukarno in the 2013 movie Ketika Bung di Ende, focusing on time and life of Sukarno during his exile in Ende, Flores Island.
Indonesian actor and TV personality Dave Mahendra portrayed Sukarno in the 2015 movie Guru Bangsa: Tjokroaminoto, a biopic of Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, an Indonesian nationalist who is often credited as mentor to many prominent figures in the nation's fight to independence, including Sukarno himself.
Ario Bayu reprised his role as Sukarno at the beginning of the 2021 war film Kadet 1947, focusing on the Indonesian War of Independence. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukarno |
Medieval Muslim Algeria | In the closing decades of the 9th century, missionaries of the Ismaili sect of Shia Islam converted the Kutama Berbers of what was later known as the Petite Kabylie region and led them in battle against the Sunni rulers of Ifriqiya. Al Qayrawan fell to them in 909. The Ismaili imam, Abdallah, declared himself caliph and established Mahdia as his capital. Abdallah initiated the Fatimid Dynasty, named after Fatima, daughter of Muhammad and wife of Ali, from whom the caliph claimed descent.
The Fatimids turned westward in 911, destroying the imamate of Tahert and conquering Sijilmasa in Morocco. Ibadi Kharijite refugees from Tahert fled south to the oasis at Ouargla beyond the Atlas Mountains, whence in the 11th century they moved southwest to Oued M'zab. Maintaining their cohesion and beliefs over the centuries, Ibadi religious leaders have dominated public life in the region to this day.
For many years, the Fatimids posed a threat to Morocco, but their deepest ambition was to rule the East, the Mashriq, which included Egypt and Muslim lands beyond. By 969, they had conquered Egypt and in 972, the Fatimid ruler Al Muizz established the new city of Cairo as his capital. The Fatimids left the rule of Ifriqiya and most of Algeria to the Zirids (972–1148). This Berber dynasty, which had founded the towns of Miliana, Médéa, and Algiers and centered significant local power in Algeria for the first time, turned over its domain west of Ifriqiya to the Banu Hammad branch of its family. The Hammadids ruled from 1011 to 1151, during which time Bejaïa became the most important port in North Africa.
This period was marked by constant conflict, political instability, and economic decline. The Hammadids, by rejecting the Ismaili doctrine for Sunni orthodoxy and renouncing submission to the Fatimids, initiated chronic conflict with the Zirids. Two great Berber confederations – the Sanhaja and the Zenata – engaged in an epic struggle. The fiercely brave, camelborne nomads of the western desert and steppe as well as the sedentary farmers of the Kabylie to the east swore allegiance to the Sanhaja. Their traditional enemies, the Zenata, were tough, resourceful horsemen from the cold plateau of the northern interior of Morocco and the western Tell in Algeria.
In addition, raiders from Genoa, Pisa, and Norman Sicily attacked ports and disrupted coastal trade. Trans-Saharan trade shifted to Fatimid Egypt and to routes in the west leading to Spanish markets. The countryside was being overtaxed by growing cities.
Contributing to these political and economic dislocations was a large incursion of Arab beduin from Egypt starting in the first half of the 11th century. Part of this movement was an invasion by the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaym tribes, apparently sent by the Fatimids to weaken the Zirids. These Arab beduin overcame the Zirids and Hammadids and in 1057 sacked Al Qayrawan. They sent farmers fleeing from the fertile plains to the mountains and left cities and towns in ruin.
For the first time, the extensive use of Arabic spread to the countryside. Many sedentary Berbers who sought protection from the Hilalians were gradually Arabized. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medieval_Muslim_Algeria |
COVID-19 pandemic in Jordan | On 1 April, 4 new cases had been confirmed, of which 2 were already in quarantine (having arrived from Spain on 15 March), while the other 2 were in contact with infected people (1 in Jerash and 1 in Irbid).
On 2 April, 21 additional cases have been confirmed, including 7 cases for people of the same family that were in close contact with their son who visited Spain and lives in Ramtha, 5 cases for people of the same family that were in close contact with an infected person, 5 cases for people of the same family who were in close contact with their infected father, 2 cases for people who were in close contact with their infected father, 1 individual that was in a visit to UK that was in the isolated hotels and when he returned to the house after the end of the 2 week isolation he tested positive, 1 individual from irbid's wedding, bringing the total of the cases to 299, 9 recoveries was confirmed on the same day with a total of 45 recovery.
On 3 April, 11 new cases were confirmed, 6 of which were members of the same family who had interacted with their infected father, 1 case that had come in contact with an infected person in Amman (Hashmi Al-Shamali neighbourhood), 1 case for a lady who had contact with her infected nephews/nieces, 1 case that came in contact with an infected person arriving from the UK, 1 case that came in contact with an infected person in Irbid, and 1 case that interacted with an infected person at Prince Hamzah Hospital. On the brighter side 13 persons were declared recovered today (10 at Prince Hamzah Hospital, 3 in Irbid).
On 4 April, 13 additional cases have been confirmed, including 2 cases from irbid, 1 case that is in one of the hotels that was in a visit to the UK, 1 case for a person from the Royal Jordanian that works in cleaning the airplanes, 1 cases for a person who was in close contact with an infected person in ajloun, 5 cases for people of the same family that were in close contact with their infected father, 3 cases for people of the same family that were in close contact with their infected parents, bringing the total of the cases to 323, 16 new recoveries was confirmed on the same day with a total of 74 recovery.
On 5 April, 22 additional cases have been confirmed, including 1 case for a person who was in close contact with an infected person from Lebanon, 2 Iraqis that were in close contact with an infected person, 1 case for a person that was in close contact with his infected father, 1 case for a person that was in close contact with an infected person from Irbid, 1 case for a person that was in close contact with an infected person in a company, 1 case for a mother that was taking care of her son at Prince Hamzah Hospital, 1 case from one of the private hospitals in Amman, 7 cases for people who were in close contact with an infected person in one of the regions of Amman (Hashmi Al-Shamali neighbourhood), 7 cases of the same family that was infected by their father, bringing the total of the cases to 345, 36 recoveries were confirmed on the same day (29 in Irbid, 7 from Prince Hamzah Hospital including 2 French and an Iraqi) the total to 110 recoveries.
On 6 April, 4 additional cases have been confirmed, 1 case for a person who was in close contact with his infected wife who was in a visit to Italy, 1 case for a woman who had a close contact with her infected fiancé who was in close contact with an infected person from Lebanon, 1 case for a female who was in close contact with an infected person, 1 case for a person who was in close contact with an infected person, bringing the total of the cases to 349, 16 new recoveries was confirmed on the same day with a total of 126 recoveries in the whole kingdom. 1 new death was confirmed on the same day for a person who arrived dead to a private hospital in Amman and to confirm the reason of death he was tested for COVID-19 and the test was positive. Five contact tracer teams were dispatched and collected 81 samples from those who have interacted with the deceased including coworkers (at a hotel in Amman).
On 7 April, 4 additional cases have been confirmed, including 2 cases for people who were in close contact with infected people, 2 cases that are still looking for the reason of infection, bringing the total of the cases to 353, 12 new recoveries was confirmed on the same day with a total of 138 recovery in the whole kingdom. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_pandemic_in_Jordan |
Assyrian people | The Assyrians initially experienced periods of religious and cultural freedom interspersed with periods of severe religious and ethnic persecution after the 7th century Muslim conquest of Persia. Assyrians contributed to Islamic civilizations during the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates by translating works of Greek philosophers to Syriac and afterward to Arabic. They also excelled in philosophy, science (Masawaiyh, Eutychius of Alexandria, and Jabril ibn Bukhtishu) and theology (such as Tatian, Bardaisan, Babai the Great, Nestorius, and Thomas of Marga) and the personal physicians of the Abbasid Caliphs were often Assyrians, such as the long-serving Bukhtishu dynasty. Many scholars of the House of Wisdom were of Assyrian Christian background.
Indigenous Assyrians became second-class citizens (dhimmi) in a greater Arab Islamic state. Those who resisted Arabization and conversion to Islam were subject to severe religious, ethnic, and cultural discrimination and had certain restrictions imposed upon them. Assyrians were excluded from specific duties and occupations reserved for Muslims. They did not enjoy the same political rights as Muslims, and their word was not equal to that of a Muslim in legal and civil matters. As Christians, they were subject to payment of a special tax, the jizya.
They were banned from spreading their religion further or building new churches in Muslim-ruled lands, but were expected to adhere to the same laws of property, contract, and obligation as the Muslim Arabs. They could not seek the conversion of a Muslim, a non-Muslim man could not marry a Muslim woman, and the child of such a marriage would be considered a Muslim. They could not own an enslaved Muslim and had to wear different clothing from Muslims to be distinguishable. In addition to the jizya tax, they were required to pay the kharaj tax on their land, which was heavier than the jizya. However, they were protected, given religious freedom, and to govern themselves according to their own laws.
As non-Islamic proselytising was punishable by death under Sharia, the Assyrians were forced into preaching in Transoxiana, Central Asia, India, Mongolia and China where they established numerous churches. The Church of the East was considered to be one of the major Christian powerhouses in the world, alongside Latin Christianity in Europe and the Byzantine Empire (Greek Orthodoxy).
From the 7th century AD onwards, Mesopotamia saw a steady influx of Arabs, Kurds and other Iranian peoples, and later Turkic peoples. Assyrians were increasingly marginalized, persecuted and gradually became a minority in their homeland. Conversion to Islam was a result of heavy taxation, which also resulted in decreased revenue from their rulers. As a result, the new converts migrated to Muslim garrison towns nearby.
Assyrians remained dominant in Upper Mesopotamia as late as the 14th century, and the city of Assur was still occupied by Assyrians during the Islamic period until the mid-14th century when the Muslim Turco-Mongol ruler Timur conducted a religiously motivated massacre against Assyrians. After, no records of Assyrians remained in Assur according to the archaeological and numismatic record. From this point, the Assyrian population was dramatically reduced in their homeland.
From the 19th century, after the rise of nationalism in the Balkans, the Ottomans started viewing Assyrians and other Christians on their eastern front as a potential threat. The Kurdish Emirs sought to consolidate their power by attacking Assyrian communities, which were already well-established there. Scholars estimate that tens of thousands of Assyrians in the Hakkari region were massacred in 1843 when Bedr Khan Beg, the emir of Bohtan, invaded their region. After a later massacre in 1846, western powers forced the Ottomans into intervening in the region, and the ensuing conflict destroyed the Kurdish emirates and reasserted the Ottoman power in the area. The Assyrians were subject to the massacres of Diyarbakır soon after.
Being culturally, ethnically, and linguistically distinct from their Muslim neighbors in the Middle East—the Arabs, Persians, Kurds, Turks—the Assyrians have endured much hardship throughout their recent history as a result of religious and ethnic persecution by these groups. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assyrian_people |
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Lebanese Civil War | Throughout the spring of 1975, minor clashes in Lebanon had been building up towards all-out conflict, with the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) pitted against the Phalange, and the ever-weaker national government wavering between the need to maintain order and cater to its constituency. On the morning of 13 April 1975, unidentified gunmen in a speeding car fired on a church in the Christian East Beirut suburb of Ain el-Rummaneh, killing four people, including two Maronite Phalangists. Hours later, Phalangists led by the Gemayels killed 30 Palestinians traveling in Ain el-Rummaneh. Citywide clashes erupted in response to this "Bus Massacre". The Battle of the Hotels began in October 1975, and lasted until March in 1976.
On 6 December 1975, a day later known as Black Saturday, the killings of four Phalange members led Phalange to quickly and temporarily set up roadblocks throughout Beirut at which identification cards were inspected for religious affiliation. Many Palestinians or Lebanese Muslims passing through the roadblocks were killed immediately. Additionally, Phalange members took hostages and attacked Muslims in East Beirut. Muslim and Palestinian militias retaliated with force, increasing the total death count to between 200 and 600 civilians and militiamen. After this point, all-out fighting began between the militias.
On 18 January 1976 an estimated 1,000–1,500 people were killed by Maronite forces in the Karantina Massacre, followed two days later by a retaliatory strike on Damour by Palestinian militias. These two massacres prompted a mass exodus of Muslims and Christians, as people fearing retribution fled to areas under the control of their own sect. The ethnic and religious layout of the residential areas of the capital encouraged this process, and East and West Beirut were increasingly transformed into what was in effect Christian and Muslim Beirut. Also, the number of Maronite leftists who had allied with the LNM, and Muslim conservatives with the government, dropped sharply, as the war revealed itself as an utterly sectarian conflict. Another effect of the massacres was to bring in Yassir Arafat's well-armed Fatah and thereby the Palestine Liberation Organisation on the side of the LNM, as Palestinian sentiment was by now completely hostile to the Maronite forces. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanese_Civil_War |
Arabs | The earliest documented use of the word Arab in reference to a people appears in the Kurkh Monoliths, an Akkadian-language record of the Assyrian conquest of Aram (9th century BCE). The Monoliths used the term to refer to Bedouins of the Arabian Peninsula under King Gindibu, who fought as part of a coalition opposed to Assyria. Listed among the booty captured by the army of the Assyrian king Shalmaneser III in the Battle of Qarqar (853 BCE) are 1000 camels of "Gîndibuʾ the Arbâya" or "[the man] Gindibu belonging to the Arabs" (ar-ba-a-a being an adjectival nisba of the noun ʿArab).
The related word ʾaʿrāb is used to refer to Bedouins today, in contrast to ʿArab which refers to Arabs in general. Both terms are mentioned around 40 times in pre-Islamic Sabaean inscriptions. The term ʿarab ('Arab') occurs also in the titles of the Himyarite kings from the time of 'Abu Karab Asad until MadiKarib Ya'fur. According to Sabaean grammar, the term ʾaʿrāb is derived from the term ʿarab. The term is also mentioned in Quranic verses, referring to people who were living in Madina and it might be a south Arabian loanword into Quranic language.
The oldest surviving indication of an Arab national identity is an inscription made in an archaic form of Arabic in 328 CE using the Nabataean alphabet, which refers to Imru' al-Qays ibn 'Amr as 'King of all the Arabs'. Herodotus refers to the Arabs in the Sinai, southern Palestine, and the frankincense region (Southern Arabia). Other Ancient-Greek historians like Agatharchides, Diodorus Siculus and Strabo mention Arabs living in Mesopotamia (along the Euphrates), in Egypt (the Sinai and the Red Sea), southern Jordan (the Nabataeans), the Syrian steppe and in eastern Arabia (the people of Gerrha). Inscriptions dating to the 6th century BCE in Yemen include the term 'Arab'.
The most popular Arab account holds that the word Arab came from an eponymous father named Ya'rub, who was supposedly the first to speak Arabic. Abu Muhammad al-Hasan al-Hamdani had another view; he states that Arabs were called gharab ('westerners') by Mesopotamians because Bedouins originally resided to the west of Mesopotamia; the term was then corrupted into Arab.
Yet another view is held by al-Masudi that the word Arab was initially applied to the Ishmaelites of the Arabah valley. In Biblical etymology, Arab (Hebrew: arvi) comes from the desert origin of the Bedouins it originally described (arava means 'wilderness').
The root ʿ-r-b has several additional meanings in Semitic languages—including 'west, sunset', 'desert', 'mingle', 'mixed', 'merchant' and 'raven'—and are "comprehensible" with all of these having varying degrees of relevance to the emergence of the name. It is also possible that some forms were metathetical from ʿ-B-R, 'moving around' (Arabic: ʿ-B-R, 'traverse') and hence, it is alleged, 'nomadic'. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arabs |
Somali Civil War | UN Security Council Resolution 733 and UN Security Council Resolution 746 led to the creation of the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), to provide humanitarian relief and help restore order in Somalia after the dissolution of its central government.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 was unanimously passed on December 3, 1992, which approved a coalition of United Nations peacekeepers led by the United States. Forming the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the alliance was tasked with assuring security until humanitarian efforts aimed at stabilizing the situation were transferred to the UN. Landing in 1993, the UN peacekeeping coalition started the two-year United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) primarily in the south. UNITAF's original mandate was to use "all necessary means" to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid in accordance to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
During negotiations from 1993 to 1995, Somali principals had some success in reconciliation and establishment of public authorities. Among these initiatives was the Mudug peace agreement of June 1993 between Aidid's forces and the SSDF, which established a ceasefire between the Haber Gedir and the Majeerteen clans, opened the trade routes, and formalized the withdrawal of militants from Galkayo; the UNOSOM-mediated Hirab reconciliation of January 1994 in Mogadishu between elders of the rival Abgal and Haber Gedir clans, which was backed by politicians from these constituencies and concluded with a pact to end hostilities, dismantle the green line partitioning the city, and remove road blocks; the UNOSOM-mediated Kismayo initiative of 1994 between the SNA, SPM, SSDF, and representatives of nineteen clans from the southern Lower Juba and Middle Juba regions; the 1994 Bardhere conference between the Marehan and Rahanweyn (Digil and Mirifle), which resolved conflicts over local resources; and the short-lived Digil-Mirifle Governing Council for the southern Bay and Bakool regions, which was established in March 1995.
Some of the militias that were then competing for power saw UNOSOM's presence as a threat to their hegemony. Consequently, gun battles took place in Mogadishu between local gunmen and peacekeepers. Among these was the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993, part of an unsuccessful operation by U.S. troops to apprehend Somali National Alliance faction leader Mohamed Farah Aidid. UN soldiers eventually withdrew altogether from the country on March 3, 1995, having incurred more significant casualties. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somali_Civil_War |
Andalusi classical music | Al-Andalus was probably the main route of transmission of a number of Near Eastern musical instruments used in European music: the lute from the oud, rebec from the Maghreb rebab, the guitar from qitara and Greek kithara, and the naker from the naqareh. Further terms fell into disuse in Europe: adufe from al-duff, alboka from al-buq, añafil from an-nafir, exabeba from al-shabbaba (flute), atabal (bass drum) from al-tabl, atambal from al-tinbal, the balaban, sonajas de azófar from sunuj al-sufr, the conical bore wind instruments, and the xelami from the sulami or fistula (flute or musical pipe).
Most scholars believe that Guido of Arezzo's Solfège musical notation system had its origins in a Latin hymn, but others suggest that it may have had Andalusi origins instead. According to Meninski in his Thesaurus Linguarum Orientalum (1680), Solfège syllables may have been derived from the syllables of an Arabic (Moorish) solmization system Durar Mufaṣṣalāt ("Separated Pearls"). However, there is no documentary evidence for this theory, and no Arabian musical manuscripts employing sequences from the Arabic alphabet are known to exist. Henry George Farmer believes that there is no firm evidence on the origins of the notation, and therefore the Arabian origin theory and the hymnal origin theories are equally credible. Although the philosopher al-Kindī (d. 259/874) and the author Abū l-Faraj al-Iṣfahānī (d. 355/967) both mention music writing systems, they were descriptive and based on lute fingerings, and thus complicated to use. No practical, indigenous system of music writing existed in the Islamic world before the colonial era.
Some scholars have speculated that the troubadour tradition was brought to France from al-Andalus by the first recorded troubadour, William IX of Aquitaine (d. 1126), whose father had fought in the siege and sack of Barbastro in 1064 and brought back at least one female slave singer. It is likely that young William's taste in music and poetry was thus influenced by al-Andalus. George T. Beech observes that while the sources of William's inspirations are uncertain, he did have Spanish individuals within his extended family, and he may have been friendly with some Europeans who could speak Arabic. Regardless of William's involvement in the tradition's creation, Magda Bogin states that Andalusi poetry was likely one of several influences on European "courtly love poetry". J. B. Trend has also asserted that the poetry of troubadours was connected to Andalusi poetry. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andalusi_classical_music |
Gaza War (2008–2009) | The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that the Gaza humanitarian crisis is significant and should not be understated. It also states that the situation is a "human dignity crisis" in the Gaza strip, entailing "a massive destruction of livelihoods and a significant deterioration of infrastructure and basic services". Fear and panic are widespread; 80% of the population could not support themselves and were dependent on humanitarian assistance. The International Red Cross said the situation was "intolerable" and a "full blown humanitarian crisis". The importation of necessary food and supplies continues to be blocked even after the respective ceasefires. According to the World Food Programme, the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization and Palestinian officials, between 35% and 60% of the agriculture industry was wrecked. With extensive damage occurring to water sources, greenhouses, and farmland. It is estimated that 60% of the agricultural land in the north of the Strip may no longer be arable. More than 50,800 Gazans were left homeless. Extensive destruction was caused to commercial enterprises and to public infrastructure. According to Palestinian industrialists, 219 factories were destroyed or severely damaged during the Israeli military operation. They accounted as part of the 3% of industrial capacity that was operating after the Israeli blockade was imposed, which was mostly destroyed during the operation.
On 3 January before the IDF ground operation, Israel's foreign minister Tzipi Livni said that Israel had taken care to protect the civilian population of Gaza, and that it had kept the humanitarian situation "completely as it should be", maintaining Israel's earlier stance. The Secretary-general of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, criticized Livni's statement and further criticized the Security Council for not responding faster to the crisis. On subsequent reports, the UN stated that "only an immediate cease-fire will be able to address the large-scale humanitarian and protection crisis that faces the people of Gaza."
The Emergency Relief Coordinator of the United Nations has stated that after the end of the Israeli operation, at best, only 120 truckloads get into Gaza, instead of the normal daily requirement, including commercial traffic, of 500 trucks at minimum. It is also reported in his statement and other UN humanitarian office reports that essential items such as construction materials, water pipes, electrical wires, and transformers continue to be effectively banned, or only allowed infrequently. He also stated that commercial goods must be allowed in and out, since Gaza Palestinians "do not want or deserve to be dependent on humanitarian aid" and that the "limited trickle" of items into Gaza continue the effective collective punishment of the civilian population and force the counter-productive reliance on tunnels for daily essentials.
As a result of the conflict, the European Union, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and over 50 nations donated humanitarian aid to Gaza, including the United States, which donated over $20 million. On 7 January a UN Relief Works Agency spokesman acknowledged that he was "aware of instances where deliveries of humanitarian aid into Gaza" were diverted by the Hamas government, though never from his agency. Additionally, on 3 February, blankets and food parcels were confiscated by Hamas police personnel from an UNRWA distribution center, and on 4 February, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator demanded that the aid be returned immediately. The Hamas government issued a statement stating that the incident was a misunderstanding between the drivers of the trucks and has been resolved through direct contact with the UNRWA. On 9 February, UNRWA lifted the suspension on the movement of its humanitarian supplies into Gaza, after the Hamas authorities returned all the aid supplies confiscated. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has described the Israeli procedures for humanitarian organizations entrance to Gaza as inconsistent and unpredictable ones that impedes the ability of organizations to effectively plan their humanitarian response and obstructs efforts to address the humanitarian crisis brought by the 18 months blockade and Israel's military operation. The UN also reported that international organizations faced "unprecedented denial" of access to Gaza by Israel since 5 November and that humanitarian access remained unreliable and needed to be granted on an unrestricted daily basis.
In a damage assessment by the World Health Organization, 48% of the 122 health facilities assessed were found to be damaged or destroyed, 15 of Gaza's 27 hospitals and 41 primary health care centers suffered damage, and 29 ambulances were partially damaged or destroyed. Injured patients needing referral outside Gaza for specialized care were evacuated exclusively through the Egyptian Rafah border crossing. In the early stages of the conflict, Hamas sealed the border, and prevented wounded Palestinians from seeking medical attention in Egypt. On 30 December, the organization allowed a trickle of medical evacuations from Gaza, but restricted their number. Gaza Ministry of Health reported that between 29 December and 22 January 608 injured were evacuated through Rafah. The Israeli Erez crossing was closed much of the period and only 30 patients were able to exit during the crisis. An initial survey conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that 14,000 homes, 68 government buildings, and 31 non-governmental organization offices (NGOs) were either totally or partially damaged, creating about 600,000 tonnes of concrete rubble needing to be removed. Since 2007, Israel has not permitted the entry of construction material into Gaza, adversely affecting UN projects, in particular UNRWA and UNDP, who suspended more than $100 million in construction projects due to lack of materials.
The Israeli Health Ministry and Magen David Adom established an emergency clinic for wounded Gazans at the Erez crossing on 17 June. The clinic received only patients, none of them with war-related injuries, and it was suspected that Hamas had instructed civilians not to seek treatment there. The clinic closed after ten days. Subsequently, the Jordanian Army established a field hospital in the Gaza Strip, which is still operating. The hospital's equipment, staff, and military guards are transferred from Jordan through Israel via the Allenby Bridge, and outgoing personnel return the same way.
One year after the ceasefire approximately 20,000 people remained displaced. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_War_(2008%E2%80%932009) |
War in Darfur | Authors Julie Flint and Alex de Waal date the beginning of the rebellion to 21 July 2001, when a group of Zaghawa and Fur met in Abu Gamra and swore oaths on the Quran (Nearly all of Darfur's residents are Muslim, including the Janjaweed, as well as the government leaders in Khartoum.) to work together to defend against government-sponsored attacks on their villages. The rebels' first military action was a successful attack on an army garrison on 25 February 2002. The government had been aware of a unified rebel movement since an attack on the Golo police station in June, 2002. Flint and de Waal place the start of the Darfur Genocide on 26 February 2003, when a group calling itself the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) publicly claimed responsibility for an attack on Golo, the headquarters of Jebel Marra District. By this point several rebel attacks had been carried out against police stations, army outposts and military convoys and the government engaged in a massive air and land assault on the rebel stronghold in the Marrah Mountains.
On 25 March 2003, the rebels seized the garrison town of Tine along the Chadian border, seizing large quantities of supplies and arms. Despite a threat by President Omar al-Bashir to "unleash" the army, the military had little in reserve. The army was already deployed in both the south, where the Second Sudanese Civil War was drawing to an end, and the east, where rebels sponsored by Eritrea were threatening a newly constructed pipeline from the central oilfields to Port Sudan. The rebel guerilla tactic of hit-and-run raids proved almost impossible for the army – untrained in desert operations – to counter. However, its aerial bombardment of rebel positions on the mountain was devastating.
At 5:30 am on 25 April 2003, the Darfur genocide arose when the Sudan Liberation Movement and the JEM, which is the largest rebel group in Darfur, entered Al-Fashir, the capital city of North Darfur and attacked the sleeping garrison. In the next four hours, four Antonov bombers and helicopter gunships (according to the government; seven according to the rebels) were destroyed on the ground, 75 soldiers, pilots and technicians were killed and 32 were captured, including the commander of the air base, a Major General. The success of the raid was unprecedented in Sudan; in the twenty years of the war in the south, the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) had never before carried out such an operation.
The Al-Fashir raid was a turning point, both militarily and psychologically. The armed forces had been humiliated by the raid, placing the government in a difficult strategic situation. The incompetent armed forces needed to be retrained and redeployed amid concerns about the loyalty of the many Darfurian non-commissioned officers and soldiers. Responsibility for prosecuting the war was given to Sudanese military intelligence. Nevertheless, in the middle months of 2003, rebels won 34 of 38 engagements. In May, the SLA destroyed a battalion at Kutum, killing 500 and taking 300 prisoners; in mid-July, 250 were killed in a second attack on Tine. The SLA began to infiltrate farther east, threatening to extend the war into Kordofan.
Given that the army was consistently losing, the war effort switched to emphasize three elements: military intelligence, the air force and the Janjaweed. The latter were armed Baggara herders whom the government had used to suppress a Masalit uprising from 1986 to 1999. The Janjaweed became the center of the new counter-insurgency strategy. Though the government consistently denied supporting them, military resources were poured into Darfur and the Janjaweed were outfitted as a paramilitary force, complete with communication equipment and some artillery. The military planners were aware of the probable consequences of such a strategy: similar methods undertaken in the Nuba Mountains and around the southern oil fields during the 1990s had resulted in massive human rights violations and forced displacements. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Darfur |
Isaaq genocide | In addition to using both air and ground military capabilities against the Isaaq, the Somali government also hired South African and Rhodesian mercenaries to fly and maintain its fleet of British Hawker Hunter aircraft and carry out bombing missions over Isaaq cities.
In addition to the "systematic destruction of Isaaq dwellings, settlements and water points", bombing raids were conducted on major cities in the northwest regions inhabited mainly by Isaaq on orders of President Barre.
The Guardian reported the brutal campaign by the Somali government against the Isaaq: Hundred of Thousands of people have been killed, dispersed or bombed out of their homes in northern Somalia after government military operations which Western aid workers say are little short of genocide.The action has been concentrated on the three northern towns of Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao where some 20,000 people are believed to have died in recent bombing raids by the government ... Many thousands of others are being systematically denied food because Somali forces are deliberately holding up essential supplies. Aid officials said that up to 800,000 people – almost all of them Issaq nomads – have been displaced as a result of the civil war. A quarter of these, and possibly as many as 300,000, were now struggling to survive in wretched conditions in refugee camps in Ethiopia while a similar number had been forced to leave Africa. The fate of those who can no longer be traced remains largely unknown.... Until about eight months ago, the urbanised population of Issaqi were concentrated in Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao. Although few journalists have been authorised to visit the area, tens of thousands of people are understood to have died during a series of bombing raids on the towns last August conducted mainly by mercenaries recruited in Zimbabwe.... "they just bombed and bombed and bombed," an [aid] agency man, recently returned from Somalia said. Hargeisa which originally had a population of 350,000, was 70 percent destroyed, Burao was "devastated" in the same raids.Issaqis who survived the bombings are said to have been rounded up in the streets by Somali troops and summarily shot. Mass graves have since been found as well as corpses which were left to rot in the streets where they fell.The people now living in the three towns are believed to be totally non-Issaqi or military personnel who have been deputed to guard what has been retaken from the SNM. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isaaq_genocide |
Ancient Egypt in the Western imagination | The rationale for "Egyptomania" rests on a similar concept: Westerners looked to ancient Egyptian motifs because ancient Egypt itself was intrinsically so alluring. The Egyptians used to consider their religion and their government somewhat eternal; they were supported in this thought by the enduring aspect of great public monuments which lasted forever and which appeared to resist the effects of time. Their legislators had judged that this moral impression would contribute to the stability of their empire.
The culture of Romanticism embraced every exotic locale, and its rise in the popular imagination coincided with Napoleon's failed Egyptian campaign and the start of modern Egyptology, beginning very much as a competitive enterprise between Britain and France. A modern "Battle of the Nile" could hardly fail to stir renewed curiosity about Egypt beyond the figure of Cleopatra. At about the same moment, the tarot was brought to Europe's attention by the Frenchman Antoine Court de Gebelin as a purported key to the occult knowledge of Egypt. All this gave rise to "Egyptomania" and occult tarot.
This legendary Egypt has been difficult, but not impossible to concile with the 1824 decryption of hieroglyphs by Jean-François Champollion. Inscriptions that a century earlier had been thought to hold occult wisdom, proved to be nothing more than royal names and titles, funerary formulae, boastful accounts of military campaigns, even though there remains an obscure part that might agree with the mystic vision. The explosion of new knowledge about actual Egyptian religion, wisdom and philosophy has been widely interpreted as exposing the mythical image of Egypt as an illusion that had been created by the Greek and Western imaginations.
In art, the development of Orientalism and the increased possibility of travel produced a large number of depictions, of varying degrees of accuracy. By the late 19th-century, exotic and carefully studied or researched decor was often dominant in depictions of both landscape and human figures, whether ancient or modern.
On the most popular 19th-century level, all of ancient Egypt was reduced in the European imagination to the Nile, the Pyramids and the Great Sphinx in a setting of sand, characterized on a more literary level in the English poet Shelley's "Ozymandias" (1818):
Egyptian Revival architecture extended the repertory of classical design explored by the Neoclassical movement and widened the decorative vocabulary that could be drawn upon.
The well-known Egyptian cult of the dead inspired the Egyptian Revival themes first employed in Highgate Cemetery, near London, which was opened in 1839 by a company founded by the designer-entrepreneur Stephen Geary (1797–1854); its architectural features, which included a 'Gothic Catacomb' as well as an 'Egyptian Avenue', were brought to public attention once more by James Stevens Curl.
Ancient Egypt provided the setting for the Italian composer Verdi's stately 1871 opera Aida, commissioned by the Europeanized Khedive for premiere in Cairo.
In 1895, the Polish writer Bolesław Prus completed his only historical novel, Pharaoh, a study of mechanisms of political power, described against the backdrop of the fall of the Twentieth Dynasty and the New Kingdom. It is, at the same time, one of the most compelling literary reconstructions of life at every level of ancient Egyptian society. In 1966, the novel was adapted as a Polish feature film. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ancient_Egypt_in_the_Western_imagination |
Potiphar | In art, the subject is most commonly shown in the Power of Women topos.
There is a Persian poem called Yusuf and Zulaikha in Jami's Haft Awrang ("Seven thrones")
In The Divine Comedy, Dante sees the shade of Potiphar's wife in the eighth circle of Hell. She does not speak, but Dante is told by another spirit that, along with other perjurers, she is condemned to suffer a burning fever for all eternity.
In the John Sayles film Matewan, Will Oldham plays a young minister boy who preaches the story of Potiphar to his small town.
In Andrew Lloyd Webber and Tim Rice's musical Joseph and the Amazing Technicolor Dreamcoat, Potiphar is a tycoon of ancient Egypt who made his wealth through buying shares in pyramids ("Potiphar had made a huge pile, owned a large percentage of the Nile"). His wife is a seductive man-eater. Both feature in the song "Potiphar".
In John Keats' poem, "On Fame", Keats calls Fame "Sister-in-law to jealous Potiphar".
In the animated film Joseph: King of Dreams, before having him jailed for allegedly assaulting his wife, Potiphar takes notice of Joseph's intelligence and makes him a chief slave in his household. He orders Joseph to be executed for the attempted rape of his wife; when she asks him to stop, Potiphar realizes Joseph was telling the truth of his innocence and instead has him jailed to save face, though he shows significant disgust at his wife. Potiphar later brings Joseph to Pharaoh, who is plagued by inexplicable dreams, and expresses deep regret for having Joseph put in prison, but Joseph understands and forgives Potiphar. After Joseph interprets Pharaoh's dreams, Pharaoh asks Potiphar if he trusts Joseph, to which he responds that he trusts Joseph "with [his] life." Potiphar is also present when Joseph reunites with his brothers.
In Joseph and his Brothers, Thomas Mann suggests that Potiphar's wife is sexually frustrated partly because Potiphar is a eunuch.
In Margaret Atwood's The Testaments, the sequel to The Handmaid's Tale, Potiphar's wife is referred to in Chapter 46 of the Ardua Hall Holograph storyline as narrated by Aunt Lydia. She mentions that Dr. Grove defended himself against attempted rape charges through the Potiphar vignette.
Czechoslovak author Valdemar Vinař wrote La skandalo pro Jozefo, an original work of fiction in Esperanto, relating the story from the viewpoints of five different witnesses. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potiphar |
Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate | The Lebanese have been dealing with the Ottoman currency since the beginning of the Mutasarrifate era, and they called it the "El-lirah el-osmeliyyeh" or "Osmeliyyeh" for short, and the Ottoman lira was minted from gold and silver and divided into one hundred and sixty-two piasters. The population also dealt with the Egyptian currency, from which the money acquired the words "Maṣāri" and "Miṣriyyāt" (from the Arabic name for Egypt, "Miṣr") which are still used in the Levant meaning "currency". The Turkish currency was also divided into a matleek (smallest Ottoman coin) and a bashlik, a matleek is minted from iron, copper or bronze, and a bashlik is a copper-bronze coin, which is equal to 10 matleeks or 3 piasters.
During World War I, the federal government issued paper money and forced the people to circulate it. This is because the Ottoman Empire spent huge sums on the war, which led to it being forced to issue banknotes for the first time in the country's history, and to increase the quantities that it brought to the market, so the value of this paper currency in relation to gold and silver money fell significantly, but the government was insisting on considering the paper lira as equal to the gold lira, and it used to force people to take it and deal with it. The country's catastrophe with this cash was double, as it lost part of the wealth of the Lebanese, and caused a stagnation in the movement of buying and selling, because people were evading its grip and preferred to keep what they had of goods and grain instead of selling them with papers issued by a state burdened with exorbitant war expenses. The financial crisis was made worse by the loss of small coins from people's hands, making it impossible for citizens to pay the values of business and small things, such as a porter's fare, or the price of a postage stamp, or an electric locomotive ticket, or anything else. Dr. George Hanna states:
"I had spent an entire night on the train with nothing to feed. When I got off at Daraa station, I met a seller of sesame Ka'aks, and I bought a Ka'ak from him for ten piasters. When I gave him the price of a banknote, he looked at me with the most contempt and threw the paper in my face, saying: “We do not take strips of papers… We do not issue letters with the post.” By this he means that the currency is only suitable for buying postage stamps. And since I did not have the coins, I was about to return the Ka'ak to the seller... However, the simple and generous seller refused to return it when he knew from my words that I am an Arab from Lebanon. He gave me the Ka'ak...He started insulting the Turks and the enemies of the Arabs, and praying to God to undermine the Ottoman Empire so that the Arabs could rid themselves of its rule, oppression, and colonization." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mount_Lebanon_Mutasarrifate |
Al-Aziz Billah | After securing Fatimid rule in central and southern Syria, Caliph al-Aziz aimed to capture Aleppo as well, but was restrained by Ibn Killis while he lived. The question of Aleppo was complicated, as it risked provoking a direct confrontation with Byzantium. Since 969, the Hamdanid emirate had been tributary to the Byzantines. Its ruler, Sa'd al-Dawla (r. 967–991), resented this dependence, but was forced to abide with it in order to prevent an outright Fatimid conquest. As a result, his policy vacillated between the two powers. Nevertheless, the Fatimids benefited from the weakness of the Hamdanids, as many Hamdanid supporters began entering Fatimid service. For example, Raja al-Siqlabi defected with 300 of his men, and was appointed governor of Acre and Caesarea.
The most important such defection was that of the Hamdanid governor of Homs, Bakjur, in 983. Bakjur contacted al-Aziz directly and offered to enter Fatimid service against Aleppo in exchange for the governorship of Damascus. Attracted by the possibility of taking over not only Homs but possibly Aleppo as well, al-Aziz agreed to Bakjur's offer over the vehement opposition of Ibn Killis, who was briefly deposed and imprisoned in conjunction with a harvest failure that led to famine in the capital. The Caliph provided Bakjur with an army, with which he attacked Aleppo in September. Sa'd al-Dawla was forced to appeal to the Byzantine emperor Basil II (r. 976–1025) for help, who sent his general Bardas Phokas the Younger to assist Aleppo. Forewarned of the Byzantines' approach by the exiled Ibn al-Jarrah, Bakjur raised the siege and fled to Fatimid territory. The Byzantines proceeded to sack Homs in October, and returned the city to Hamdanid control. In 987/88, a seven-year truce was concluded with the Byzantines. It stipulated an exchange of prisoners, the recognition of the Byzantine emperor as protector of Christians under Fatimid rule and of the Fatimid caliph as protector of Muslims under Byzantine control, and the replacement of the name of the Abbasid caliph with that of the Fatimid caliph in the Friday prayer in the mosque at Constantinople.
Despite his failure, Bakjur was named governor of Damascus by al-Aziz, and was joined by Ibn al-Jarrah. Ibn Killis, who was released and restored to his office after barely two months, immediately began working against the two. Bakjur gradually made himself unpopular to the Damascenes due to his cruelty, and after several failed efforts, in 989 Ibn Killis finally persuaded al-Aziz to replace Bakjur with one of the vizier's personal ghilmān, Ya'qub al-Siqlabi. Bakjur fled to Raqqa, from where he continued his unsuccessful attacks on Aleppo. At the same time, Baltakin was sent to pacify the Bedouin tribes who were raiding the Hajj caravans, leading to the establishment of a Fatimid garrison at Wadi al-Qura, north of Medina.
Ibn Killis' death in 991 freed al-Aziz to pursue a more aggressive stance in the Aleppo question. Immediately he dismissed Ibn Killis' protégé and appointed the Turk Manjutakin as governor of Damascus. Manjutakin's use of Damascus as his base during the subsequent campaigns shows the consolidation of Fatimid control in the area, but also, as Hugh Kennedy remarks, the changes it brought to the "political and economic geography of Syria": given the continued insecurity of the overland routes due to the depredations of the Bedouin, the Fatimids supplied their forces in Syria by sea—notably via Tripoli—and as a result the chief coastal towns rose in importance, as centres of Fatimid control and administration as well as commerce, experiencing a revival which continued into the 12th century.
Manjutakin invaded the Hamdanid emirate, defeated a Byzantine force under the doux of Antioch, Michael Bourtzes, in June 992, and laid siege to Aleppo. However, he failed to pursue the siege with vigour and the city was easily able to resist until, in the spring of 993, after thirteen months of campaigning, Manjutakin was forced to return to Damascus due to lack of supplies. In spring 994, Manjutakin launched another invasion, again defeated Bourtzes at the Battle of the Orontes in September and again besieged Aleppo. The blockade was far more effective this time and soon caused a severe lack of food, but the city's defenders held out until the sudden arrival of the Byzantine emperor, Basil II, in person in April 995. Basil crossed Asia Minor in only sixteen days at the head of an army; his sudden arrival, and the exaggerated numbers circulating for his army, caused panic in the Fatimid army. Manjutakin burned his camp and retreated to Damascus without giving battle.
The Byzantines besieged Tripoli but failed to capture it; nevertheless, the Fatimids lost control of the city, which became independent under its qadi. The Byzantine emperor then occupied and fortified Tartus. Al-Aziz himself now prepared to take the field against the Byzantines himself, beginning large-scale preparations at Cairo. Byzantine and Hamdanid embassies carrying proposals for a truce were received in September 995, but rejected. Al-Aziz's preparations were set back when the fleet being prepared at Cairo was destroyed by a fire, which set off an anti-Christian pogrom in the city. Manjutakin was ordered to recapture Tartus, but its Armenian garrison was able to fend off his attacks; and a Fatimid fleet sent to assist the siege was lost in a storm off the coast. Al-Aziz died on 14 October 996, before setting out on his campaign. The Byzantine–Fatimid conflict continued under his successor until the conclusion of a ten-year truce in 1000. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Aziz_Billah |
Samaw'al ibn 'Adiya | More than for his poetic talents al-Samaw'al is famous for his connection with the warrior-poet and prince Imru' al-Qais, which won for him the epithet "faithful," and gave rise to the Arabic saying "more faithful than al-Samaw'al." This came about in the following manner: Amru al-Qais, being abandoned by his followers in his fight with the Banu Asad to avenge the death of his father, and being pursued by Al-Nu'man Ibn al-Mundhir Ibn Ma' al-Sama', wandered about from tribe to tribe seeking protection as well as support in his endeavor to regain his inheritance. When he came to the Banu Fazara their chief advised him to seek out Samaw'al ibn 'Adiya' in his castle al-Ablaq, saying that although he had seen the Emperor of the Greeks and visited the Lakhmid kingdom of al-Hirah, he had never found a place better fitted for assuring safety to those in need, nor known a more faithful protector than its owner. Amru al-Qais, who was accompanied by his daughter Hind, and his cousin, and had with him five suits of chainmail besides other weapons, immediately set out for the castle, and on the way he and his guide composed a poem in praise of their prospective host. Samaw'al received the poet hospitably, erected a tent of skins for Hind, and received the men into his own hall. After they had been there "as long as God willed," Amru al-Qais, wishing to secure the assistance of the emperor Justinian I, asked Samaw'al to give him a letter to the Ghassanid prince Harith ibn Abi Shamir, who might further him on his way. The poet then departed, leaving Hind, his cousin, and his armor in Samaw'al's keeping, and he never came to reclaim them. According to Arabian tradition, while on his homeward journey from Constantinople, he was poisoned by order of Justinian, who had listened to treacherous accusations against him.
After Amru al-Qais had left Al-Ablaq, Prince al-Munthir—it is not known whether before or after Amru's death—sent Harith to Samaw'al ordering him to deliver up the articles deposited with him. Samaw'al refusing to do so, Harith laid siege to the castle. The besiegers met with no success until one day Harith captured Samaw'al's son, who, according to the story in the Kitab al-Aghani, was returning from the chase. Harith then called upon the father to choose between giving up the property and witnessing his son's death. Samaw'al answered that his son had brothers, but that his honor once lost could not be recovered. Harith at once struck off the boy's head before the unhappy father's eyes and then withdrew, perceiving that he could accomplish nothing in the face of such steadfastness. There are a few verses handed down by different Arabian writers in which Samaw'al ibn 'Adiya refers to this deed.
A description of the castle al-Ablaq is given by the poet A'sha (Yaqut, i.96), who confuses it with Solomon's Temple. It is related of this poet that, being captured together with other Arabs, he was taken as a prisoner to the castle at Taima, at that time belonging to Samaw'al's son Shuraih ibn Samaw'al, without his captor's knowing that he was in the company. Waiting until Shuraih was within hearing, A'sha began to recite a poem extolling the deed of his father, and calling on the son to emulate his example by rescuing him (A'sha). Shuraih procured the poet's release, and allowed him to depart, first presenting him with a swift camel. Shuraih himself, his brother Jarid, and Samaw'al's grandson Sa'ba were all poets. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samaw%27al_ibn_%27Adiya |
Gulf War | Throughout the Cold War, Iraq had been an ally of the Soviet Union, and there was a history of friction between Iraq and the United States. The US was concerned with Iraq's position on Israeli–Palestinian politics. The US also disliked Iraqi support for Palestinian militant groups, which led to Iraq's inclusion on the developing US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in December 1979.
The US remained officially neutral after Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980, which became the Iran–Iraq War, although it provided resources, political support, and some "non-military" aircraft to Iraq. In March 1982, Iran began a successful counteroffensive (Operation Undeniable Victory), and the US increased its support for Iraq to prevent Iran from forcing a surrender. In a US bid to open full diplomatic relations with Iraq, the country was removed from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Ostensibly, this was because of improvement in the regime's record, although former US Assistant Defense Secretary Noel Koch later stated: "No one had any doubts about [the Iraqis'] continued involvement in terrorism ... The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran."
With Iraq's newfound success in the war, and the Iranian rebuff of a peace offer in July, arms sales to Iraq reached a record spike in 1982. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein expelled Abu Nidal to Syria at the US's request in November 1983, the Reagan administration sent Donald Rumsfeld to meet Saddam as a special envoy and to cultivate ties. By the time the ceasefire with Iran was signed in August 1988, Iraq was heavily debt-ridden and tensions within society were rising. Most of its debt was owed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Iraq's debts to Kuwait amounted to $14 billion. Iraq pressured both nations to forgive the debts, but they refused.
The Iraq–Kuwait border dispute involved Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territory. Kuwait had been a part of the Ottoman Empire's province of Basra, something that Iraq claimed made Kuwait rightful Iraqi territory. Kuwait's ruling dynasty, the al-Sabah family, had concluded a protectorate agreement in 1899 that assigned responsibility for Kuwait's foreign affairs to the United Kingdom. The UK drew the border between Kuwait and Iraq in 1922, making Iraq almost entirely landlocked. Kuwait rejected Iraqi attempts to secure further provisions in the region.
Iraq also accused Kuwait of exceeding its OPEC quotas for oil production. In order for the cartel to maintain its desired price of $18 per barrel, discipline was required. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait were consistently overproducing; the latter at least in part to repair losses caused by Iranian attacks in the Iran–Iraq War and to pay for the losses of an economic scandal. The result was a slump in the oil price – as low as $10 per barrel ($63/m3) – with a resulting loss of $7 billion a year to Iraq, equal to its 1989 balance of payments deficit. Resulting revenues struggled to support the government's basic costs, let alone repair Iraq's damaged infrastructure. Jordan and Iraq both looked for more discipline, with little success. The Iraqi government described it as a form of economic warfare, which it claimed was aggravated by Kuwait slant-drilling across the border into Iraq's Rumaila oil field. According to oil workers in the area, Iraq's slant drilling claim was fabricated, as "oil flows easily from the Rumaila field without any need for these techniques." At the same time, Saddam looked for closer ties with those Arab states that had supported Iraq in the war. This move was supported by the US, who believed that Iraqi ties with pro-Western Gulf states would help bring and maintain Iraq inside the US' sphere of influence.
In 1989, it appeared that Saudi–Iraqi relations, strong during the war, would be maintained. A pact of non-interference and non-aggression was signed between the countries, followed by a Kuwaiti-Iraqi deal for Iraq to supply Kuwait with water for drinking and irrigation, although a request for Kuwait to lease Iraq Umm Qasr was rejected. Saudi-backed development projects were hampered by Iraq's large debts, even with the demobilization of 200,000 soldiers. Iraq also looked to increase arms production so as to become an exporter, although the success of these projects was also restrained by Iraq's obligations; in Iraq, resentment to OPEC's controls mounted.
Iraq's relations with its Arab neighbors, particularly Egypt, were degraded by mounting violence in Iraq against expatriate groups, who were well-employed during the war, by unemployed Iraqis, among them demobilized soldiers. These events drew little notice outside the Arab world because of fast-moving events directly related to the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. However, the US did begin to condemn Iraq's human rights record, including the well-known use of torture. The UK also condemned the execution of Farzad Bazoft, a journalist working for the British newspaper The Observer. Following Saddam's declaration that "binary chemical weapons" would be used on Israel if it used military force against Iraq, Washington halted part of its funding. A UN mission to the Israeli-occupied territories, where riots had resulted in Palestinian deaths, was vetoed by the US, making Iraq deeply skeptical of US foreign policy aims in the region, combined with the reliance of the US on Middle Eastern energy reserves.
In early July 1990, Iraq complained about Kuwait's behavior, such as not respecting their quota, and openly threatened to take military action. On the 23rd, the CIA reported that Iraq had moved 30,000 troops to the Iraq-Kuwait border, and the US naval fleet in the Persian Gulf was placed on alert. Saddam believed an anti-Iraq conspiracy was developing – Kuwait had begun talks with Iran, and Iraq's rival Syria had arranged a visit to Egypt. On 15 July 1990, Saddam's government laid out its combined objections to the Arab League, including that policy moves were costing Iraq $1 billion a year, that Kuwait was still using the Rumaila oil field, and that loans made by the UAE and Kuwait could not be considered debts to its "Arab brothers". He threatened force against Kuwait and the UAE, saying: "The policies of some Arab rulers are American ... They are inspired by America to undermine Arab interests and security." The US sent aerial refuelling planes and combat ships to the Persian Gulf in response to these threats. Discussions in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, mediated on the Arab League's behalf by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, were held on 31 July and led Mubarak to believe that a peaceful course could be established.
It was revealed during Saddam Hussein's 2003–2004 interrogation following his capture that in addition to economic disputes, an insulting exchange between the Kuwaiti emir Al Sabah and the Iraqi foreign minister – during which Saddam claimed that the emir stated his intention to turn "every Iraqi woman into a $10 prostitute" by bankrupting the country – was a decisive factor in triggering the Iraqi invasion.
On the 25th, Saddam met with April Glaspie, the US Ambassador to Iraq, in Baghdad. The Iraqi leader attacked American policy with regards to Kuwait and the UAE:
So what can it mean when America says it will now protect its friends? It can only mean prejudice against Iraq. This stance plus maneuvers and statements which have been made has encouraged the UAE and Kuwait to disregard Iraqi rights ... If you use pressure, we will deploy pressure and force. We know that you can harm us although we do not threaten you. But we too can harm you. Everyone can cause harm according to their ability and their size. We cannot come all the way to you in the United States, but individual Arabs may reach you ... We do not place America among the enemies. We place it where we want our friends to be and we try to be friends. But repeated American statements last year made it apparent that America did not regard us as friends.
Glaspie replied:
I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait ... Frankly, we can only see that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would not be any of our business. But when this happens in the context of what you said on your national day, then when we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister, then when we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the UAE and Kuwait is, in the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against Iraq, then it would be reasonable for me to be concerned.
Saddam stated that he would attempt last-ditch negotiations with the Kuwaitis but Iraq "would not accept death."
According to Glaspie's own account, she stated in reference to the precise border between Kuwait and Iraq, "... that she had served in Kuwait 20 years before; 'then, as now, we took no position on these Arab affairs'." Glaspie similarly believed that war was not imminent.
On 26 July 1990, only a few days before the Iraqi invasion, OPEC officials said that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had agreed to a proposal to limit their oil output to 1.5 million barrels (240,000 m3) per day, "down from the nearly 2 million barrels a day they had each been pumping," thus potentially settling differences over oil policy between Kuwait and Iraq. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War |
King David Hotel bombing | The bombing inflamed public opinion in Britain. After the bombing, editorials in British newspapers argued that the bombing deflated statements by the government that it had been winning against the Jewish paramilitaries. The Manchester Guardian argued that "British firmness" inside Palestine had brought about more terrorism and worsened the situation in the country, the opposite effect that the government had intended.
Speaker after speaker in the House of Commons expressed outrage. Ex-Prime Minister Winston Churchill, a prominent and enthusiastic supporter of Zionism, criticized the attack. He also related the bombing to the problems within the Mandate system, and he advocated allowing further Jewish immigration into Palestine. Chief Secretary for the Government of Palestine, Sir John Shaw, noted that the majority of the dead had been members of his own personal staff. He said, "British, Arabs, Jews, Greeks, Armenians; senior officers, police, my orderly, my chauffeur, messengers, guards, men and women—young and old—they were my friends."
British Prime Minister Clement Attlee commented in the House of Commons:
Hon. Members will have learned with horror of the brutal and murderous crime committed yesterday in Jerusalem. Of all the outrages which have occurred in Palestine, and they have been many and horrible in the last few months, this is the worst. By this insane act of terrorism 93 innocent people have been killed or are missing in the ruins. The latest figures of casualties are 41 dead, 52 missing and 53 injured. I have no further information at present beyond what is contained in the following official report received from Jerusalem:
It appears that after exploding a small bomb in the street, presumably as a diversionary measure—this did virtually no damage—a lorry drove up to the tradesmen's entrance of the King David Hotel and the occupants, after holding up the staff at pistol point, entered the kitchen premises carrying a number of milk cans. At some stage of the proceedings, they shot and seriously wounded a British soldier who attempted to interfere with them. All available information so far is to the effect that they were Jews. Somewhere in the basement of the hotel they planted bombs which went off shortly afterwards. They appear to have made good their escape.
Every effort is being made to identify and arrest the perpetrators of this outrage. The work of rescue in the debris, which was immediately organised, still continues. The next-of-kin of casualties are being notified by telegram as soon as accurate information is available. The House will wish to express their profound sympathy with the relatives of the killed and with those injured in this dastardly outrage.
In a visit made sometime before the attack, Field Marshal Lord Montgomery, soon to become Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), the professional head of the British Army, had told Lieutenant General Sir Evelyn Barker, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the British Forces in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, to emphasise to the British servicemen that they were facing a cruel, fanatical and cunning enemy, and there was no way of knowing who was friend and who foe. Since there were female terrorists as well, according to Montgomery, all fraternising with the local population would have to cease. Within a few minutes of the bombing, Barker translated this instruction into an order that "all Jewish places of entertainment, cafes, restaurants, shops and private dwellings" be out of bounds to all ranks. He concluded, "I appreciate that these measures will inflict some hardship on the troops, but I am certain that if my reasons are fully explained to them, they will understand their propriety and they will be punishing the Jews in a way the race dislikes as much as any, by striking at their pockets and showing our contempt of them." The future Israeli diplomat Abba Eban, then an officer in the British Army, leaked the order to the press. Barker's wording was interpreted as antisemitic and caused much outrage and bad publicity for the British. Barker was nearly dismissed from his position over the scandal, and only Montgomery's threat to resign if Barker was sacked saved him his job.
The attack did not change Britain's stance toward an Anglo-American agreement on Palestine, which was then in its concluding phase. In a letter dated July 25, 1946, Prime Minister Attlee wrote to American President Harry S. Truman: "I am sure you will agree that the inhuman crime committed in Jerusalem on 22 July calls for the strongest action against terrorism but having regard to the sufferings of the innocent Jewish victims of Nazism this should not deter us from introducing a policy designed to bring peace to Palestine with the least possible delay." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/King_David_Hotel_bombing |
Polygyny in Islam | Islamic communities in Asia, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, have also experienced feminist movements which work to restrict polygynous practices. Indonesian feminists have challenged these practices through the study and reinterpretation of religious texts. Fatayat NU, a voluntary Muslim women's organization, was created in 1950 for middle-aged women who were a part of Nahdlatul Ulama, a Sunni Islam group, and wanted to have a voice. Initially experiencing membership issues due to large percentage of women who were married or uneducated, Fatayat NU began to gain power as institutions outside of Indonesia took notice of it and supported the organizations work. The women in Fatayat NU use Islam and the religious texts to justify their actions and guide their decisions, so women who have extensively studied the religion are crucial. Out of the many controversial issues that Fatayat NU takes a stand on, polygyny is one that has recently come into contention. Although polygyny in Indonesia was never very popular, some Muslim women are worried that it is starting to gain more support. Nahdlatul Ulama is one of the organizations that approves of polygyny as an Islamic practice, but Fatayat NU is taking a contradicting stance; the members believe that polygyny can only be possible if men and women are unequal, which goes against their interpretation of the Qur'an's message on gender status.
In Malaysia, polygyny has been considered a topic that is not fit to be brought up in public, but recently it has begun to enter public discourse. This change came about through the passage of a new Islamic family law, which supports polygynous practices by making them easier for men to take part in. This has created a "debate between Islamic fundamentalists who dominate the burgeoning Islamic Affairs Department that administers Shariah law and mostly Western-educated Muslim feminists who say the department, in its overzealous interpretation of the Qur’an, has gone overboard in making new laws that discriminate against women and children." The campaign against this law was very popular, but the law was still passed. Muslim women's organizations in Malaysia plan to continue protesting it until it is revoked. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polygyny_in_Islam |
Mauritania–Senegal Border War | On 8 April 1989, there was a clash between Senegalese Soninke farmers and Mauritanian Fulani herdsmen in Mauritania over grazing rights in Diawara, a town in the Bakel Department of eastern Senegal. This event marked the beginning of the conflict. The clash took place because the Senegalese herdsmen confiscated a herd of cattle belonging to the Mauritanian farmers after the cattle migrated into Senegalese territory. The confiscation of the cattle was in accordance with an earlier agreement made between Senegal and Mauritania over grazing rights and territorial control. Despite this, Mauritanian border guards intervened after spotting a group of Senegalese farmers who had crossed into Mauritanian controlled territory. The border guards fired at the group, killing at least two Senegalese peasants, as well as seriously injuring several more, and taking between 12 and 15 Senegalese farmers hostage. Official reports of the incident from Senegal and Mauritania provide conflicting details, as the Senegalese government claims the attackers were border guards, and the Mauritanian government claims the attackers were Mauritanian farmers.
The Mauritanian Interior Minister, Djibril Ould Abdoullahi, traveled to Dakar, Senegal a few days after the attack to speak on Senegalese television. Abdoullahi made comments about the importance of the event, which many Senegalese citizens interpreted as discounting the severity of the event and making light of those who died.
As a result of the 8 April attack and the subsequent comments by Abdoullahi, Senegalese citizens on the southern bank rioted, escalating the conflict. Between 21–24 April 1989, Senegalese mobs looted and burned shops owned by Mauritanian traders in Dakar, killing 61 Mauritanians. On 25 April, Mauritanian soldiers and border guards in Southern Mauritania retaliated by beating to death at least 200 Senegalese citizens in an event now referred to as 'Black Tuesday'. The violence between 21–25 April, led to a mass exodus of refugees from both sides.
Between 27–29 April, Senegalese citizens orchestrated attacks against individual Mauritanians living in Dakar, leading to the deaths of at least 50 Mauritanians. Simultaneously in Mauritania, Arab Moors attacked and killed individual Senegalese nationals and even some black Mauritanians. Both countries deployed their armies internally to control the violence and both governments implemented curfews.
On 21 August 1989, the border was closed, and diplomatic relations between Mauritania and Senegal came to an end. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mauritania%E2%80%93Senegal_Border_War |
Al-Aqsa | Since 1948, the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound has been under the custodianship of the Hashemite rulers of Jordan, administered through the Jerusalem Waqf, the current version of which was instituted by Jordan after its conquest and occupation of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, during the 1948 war. The Jerusalem Waqf remained under Jordanian control after Israel occupied the Old City of Jerusalem during the Six-Day War of June 1967, though control over access to the site passed to Israel.
Jordan undertook two renovations of the Dome of the Rock, replacing the leaking, wooden inner dome with an aluminum dome in 1952, and, when the new dome leaked, carrying out a second restoration between 1959 and 1964.
On 21 August 1969, a fire was started by a visitor from Australia named Denis Michael Rohan, an evangelical Christian who hoped that by burning down al-Aqsa Mosque he would hasten the Second Coming of Jesus. In response to the incident, a summit of Islamic countries was held in Rabat that same year, hosted by Faisal of Saudi Arabia, the then king of Saudi Arabia. The al-Aqsa fire is regarded as one of the catalysts for the formation of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC, now the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) in 1972.
Following the fire, the dome was reconstructed in concrete and covered with anodized aluminium, instead of the original ribbed lead enamel work sheeting. In 1983, the aluminium outer covering was replaced with lead to match the original design by az-Zahir.
In the 1980s, Ben Shoshan and Yehuda Etzion, both members of the Israeli radical Gush Emunim Underground group, plotted to blow up the Al-Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock. Etzion believed that blowing up the two mosques would cause a spiritual awakening in Israel, and would solve all the problems of the Jewish people. They also hoped the Third Temple would be built on the location of the mosque.
In 1990, the Waqf began construction of a series of outdoor minbar (pulpits) to create open-air prayer areas for use on popular holy days. A monument to the victims of the Sabra and Shatila massacre was also erected. In 1996, the Waqf began underground construction of the new el-Marwani Mosque in the southeastern corner of the Temple Mount. The area was claimed by the Waqf as a space that served in earlier Islamic periods as a place of prayer, but some saw the move as a part of a "political agenda" and a "pretext" for the Islamization of the underground space, and believed it had been instigated to prevent the site being used a synagogue for Jewish prayers. A spate over the use of the Golden Gate (Bab adh-Dhahabi) gatehouse as a mosque has followed in 2019.
On 28 September 2000, then-opposition leader of Israel Ariel Sharon visited the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound along with 1,000 armed guards. The visit was provocative and helped spark the five-year uprising by the Palestinians commonly known as the Second Intifada, but also referred to as the al-Aqsa Intifada after the incident.
On 5 November 2014, Israeli police entered the main prayer hall itself for the first time since capturing Jerusalem in 1967, according to Sheikh Azzam Al-Khatib, director of the Islamic Waqf. Previous media reports of 'storming Al-Aqsa' referred to the whole compound rather than the Qibli Mosque prayer hall itself. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Aqsa |
Báb | The writings of the Báb have been described in terms of different typologies, including chronologically and thematically. The Báb himself divides his writings into two stages: the first stage, where for purposes of preparation and prudence, the subtleties of his claims and teachings were veiled and consequently not appreciated by the hearts and minds of the people around him; and a later stage, where he openly declared that he was not only the promised Twelfth Imam of Shiah Islam, but a Prophet who has brought a new world religion, prophesied by Torah, Gospel and the Quran. This new revelation, he claimed, would release the creative energies and capacities necessary for the establishment of global unity and peace.
The Báb's teachings can be further understood as having three broad stages, each with a dominant thematic focus. His earliest teachings are primarily defined by his interpretation of the Quran and hadith, which recast common understandings of theological belief in light of a new hermenutics emphasizing the unity of God and his prophets and of all people. Rather than revealing new religious laws, early Bábí doctrine "focuses on the inner and mystical meanings of religious law" and "turning ritual action into a spiritual journey" These themes continue in later years, but a shift takes place where his emphasis moves to philosophical elucidation, and finally to legislative pronouncements.
In the second philosophical stage, the Báb gives an explanation of the metaphysics of being and creation, and in the third legislative stage his mystical and historical principles unite as the Báb's writings gain a historical consciousness. and clearly establish the principle of Progressive Revelation.
The Báb discusses many fundamental issues in religion in this second stage including how to recognize spiritual truth, the nature of the human being, the meaning of faith, the nature of good deeds, the preconditions of spiritual journey and the question of the eternality or origination of the world. The realization of "true justice" in the world, and the central role of religion in attaining such justice, is another major focus of this stage. He even, in his Treatise on Singing, explores the philosophy of music, "where like every other human action, singing becomes moral or immoral depending on the intention of the actor and the function of the act."
In 1848 the Báb's teachings changed with a clear abrogation of Islamic law and the introduction of his own set of doctrines and practices. A radical thesis was offered: religion is not to be understood as the unending imposition of the Will of God on humans, but rather the "product of the interaction of the will of God with the historical stage of the development of humanity." As human understanding and action undergoes change, so too is religion an unfolding and progressive phenomenon. The Persian Bayan, the principal scriptural work of the Báb during this period, openly proclaims the inception of a new religion. The Báb's legal system included details for marriage, burial, pilgrimage, prayer, and other practices that appear designed for a future Bábí state or to be implemented by He whom God shall make manifest, the promised universal messenger of God who is mentioned throughout the Báb's writings. All these laws were contingent on the approval of "Him Whom God shall make manifest" and thus their importance lied in the spiritual meaning which they symbolized: the recognition of Him Whom God shall make manifest in the next divine revelation. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B%C3%A1b |
1860 civil conflict in Mount Lebanon and Damascus | In the days after the Druze victory at Hasbaya, violence raged in the southern Beqaa Valley. The hostilities were set off after two Druze men from Kfar Qouq were arrested by the authorities for their suspected role in the deaths of two Christians from Dahr al-Ahmar who were shot down as they were transporting clay pots on their way to Damascus. The Druze men were quickly released by the Ottomans after protests by the local Druze community. The local Druze were angry at the Christians for complaining to the authorities, which led to the arrests, and launched an attack on Dahr al-Ahmar. On 8 June Christians from Dahr al-Ahmar and the vicinity fled to Rashaya, which had an Ottoman garrison, for protection.
As the Christians fled to Rashaya, Druzes began burning down the homes they left behind and assaulted the Christian villages of Kfar Mishki, Beit Lahia and Hawush. The Christians received assurances of safety from Emir Ali Shihab, governor of Rashaya, and the Druze al-Aryan family, which held significant influence in the town. About 150 took refuge in the government house and set up barricades on the streets leading to the building as additional security measures. That same day, a Druze force attacked the town and burnt down Christian homes, forcing many other local Christians to seek shelter in the government house. Several Christians were murdered before the Druze force withdrew after a meeting with the Ottoman authorities at Ziltatiat. The Christians remained in the government house upon the counsel of the local Ottoman garrison's commander.
By 11 June, a 5,000-strong Druze force assembled outside Rashaya consisting of local Druze militiamen, the Druze force from the previous Hasbaya battle and Druze troops under the command of Isma'il al-Atrash. Al-Atrash's men had attacked several Christian villages in the Anti-Lebanon Mountains on their way to Rashaya. That day, the Druze force split into two main contingents, with one attacking the Christian village of Aya and the other storming Rashaya. The Shihab emirs of Rashaya, with the exception of two, were slain. The Druze assaulted the government house and murdered the men inside, including priests. The combined Christian fatalities from the massacre at Hasbaya and the assault on Rashaya and its neighboring villages were roughly 1,800. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1860_civil_conflict_in_Mount_Lebanon_and_Damascus |
1994 FIFA World Cup | The FIFA Organizing Committee upheld the tradition to seed the host (United States) and defending champion (Germany), along with the other four teams ranked in the top five based on their results obtained in the last three FIFA World Cups. The newly introduced FIFA World Ranking was not used as part of the calculated ranking for the seeding in this World Cup, as FIFA considered it to be too new. Despite that it was not used in any way, for comparison purposes the teams' pre-tournament FIFA World ranking position from June 1994 are shown in parentheses, followed by the official and used ranking (OR) position determined by the results obtained in the last three world cups.
The six top-seeded teams, were allocated in pot 1 and would be drawn into the first position of the six groups playing in the group stage. The remaining 18 teams were allocated into three pots based on geographical sections, with the: six qualified teams from Africa and Americas in pot 2, the top-6 ranked European teams in pot 3, while pot 4 comprised the 7th-10th best qualified European teams along with the two qualified Asian teams.
The principle of the draw was that each of the six drawn groups would have one team drawn respectively from pot 1, 2, 3 and 4; while respecting the following geographical limitations:
At least two European teams from UEFA in all groups, with one group having three European teams.
United States and Mexico could not be drawn in the same group, because only one CONCACAF team per group.
Brazil and Argentina could not be drawn with another South American team, because only one CONMEBOL team per group.
As all qualified Asian teams from AFC were in pot 4, and all qualified African teams from CAF in pot 2, this automatically ensured only allowing maximum one Asian team and maximum one African team per group, as part of the normal draw procedure - without needing to observe special restricting sub-rules for them.
The draw took place at the Las Vegas Convention Center and was televised live on December 19, 1993, on ESPN in the United States & Eurosport in all Europe with English language commentary on the latter channel by Scottish sportscaster Archie Macpherson. The draw presenters were Dick Clark and Faye Dunaway.
Ahead of the draw, the FIFA Organizing Committee had decided to allocate the top-seeded first group position A1 for the United States as the host, C1 for defending champion Germany, and E1 for the Italian team, which had requested to play most of its group matches at Giants Stadium in New York. The three other top-seeded teams would be located at the first position of either group B/D/F, with the decision largely depending on the identity of the other drawn group members for the seeded teams. Therefore, this last decision would only be made by a secret vote made by the FIFA Organizing Committee a few minutes after all teams had been drawn for all groups, and the decision would only be announced as the last step of the televised draw event. To make this procedure possible, the six drawn groups would during the draw be given the colors green, orange, white, black, pink and blue; and the closing remarks at the event would then reveal the group letters represented by the colors. The six groups from A to F would play their group matches in the following nine cities:
Group A and B played in Detroit, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.
Group C and D played in Chicago, Dallas, and Boston.
Group E and F played in New York, Washington DC, and Orlando.
Procedure for the draw:
Pot 1 was used to draw the six top-seeded teams into the first position of the six groups designated by the colors green, orange, white, black, pink and blue. Group letters behind each color would only be decided by a following secret FIFA Organizing Committee vote, and only be revealed after the draw had been completed. Although the committee had already predetermined ahead of the draw that: the United States should play in group A, Germany should play in group C, and Italy should play in group E.
Pot 2 was used to draw one team to each of the six colored groups, with the draw conducted in the color order from left to right (green, orange, white, black, pink, blue); while this order however at the same time had to respect the following restricted geographical rules:
Rule 1: First two drawn non South American teams shall irrespectively of the color order, first be drawn into the two groups led by a South American team, in order to avoid the possibility for these groups later to be drawn by a second South American team.
Rule 2: First drawn South American team or one of the last two African teams shall irrespectively of the color order, first be drawn into the group led by the CONCACAF team, the United States, in order to avoid the possibility for this group later to be drawn by the second CONCACAF team Mexico.
Rule 3: One of the two South American teams or one of the last two African teams shall irrespectively of the color order, first be drawn into the first available open group being led by a European team, in order to avoid the meeting of two South American teams in the same group.
Rule 4: Mexico can not be drawn together with the United States as they are both CONCACAF teams, so Mexico will be grouped with the first still open available group being led by a European or South American team, as per the color order.
Pot 3 was used to draw one European team to each of the six colored groups, with the draw conducted in the color order from left to right (green, orange, white, black, pink, blue).
Pot 4 was used to draw one European/Asian team to each of six colored groups, with the draw conducted in the color order from left to right (green, orange, white, black, pink, blue). However, in order to respect the geographical rule that five of the groups shall have two European teams - and the rule that three European teams is only allowed in one group, the color order will be skipped subject to these allocation rules:
Rule 1: All drawn Asian (AFC) teams would not be drawn into any of the three groups led by a top-seeded CONCACAF/CONMEBOL team (United States/Brazil/Argentina), but would instead only be allowed to join a group being led by a top-seeded European team.
Rule 2: All drawn European (UEFA) teams, shall first be drawn into the three groups led by a top-seeded CONCACAF/CONMEBOL team (United States/Brazil/Argentina), until the point of time when only European team(s) remain to be drawn from the last pot 4.
The exact group position number for the teams (2, 3 or 4) in each colored group, were also drawn immediately from six special group bowls, after each respective team had been drawn from pot 2, 3 and 4.
Group letters behind each color (green, orange, white, black, pink and blue) would finally be decided by a final secret FIFA Organizing Committee vote, being announced as the last part of the televised event.
The draw was officiated by FIFA general-secretary Sepp Blatter. Teams were drawn by German legend Franz Beckenbauer, heavyweight boxing champion Evander Holyfield and comedian and actor Robin Williams. Numbers for placement in the group were drawn by actor Beau Bridges, Women's World Cup champion Michelle Akers, model Carol Alt, artist Peter Max, racecar driver Mario Andretti and Olympic gold medalist in gymnastics Mary Lou Retton. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1994_FIFA_World_Cup |
Qatari folklore | Some of the common hero archetypes found in Qatari tales include:
The tolerant husband: The archetype of the tolerant and understanding husband in Qatari folktales portrays a man who comprehends and accepts his wife's circumstances and motivations. This character is often depicted in stories where, despite being deceived by his wife, he forgives her and raises a child as his own, even if the child is not biologically his. He embraces the child as a true member of the family, exemplifying the chivalric values historically valued in Arab culture. An example of this can be found a traditional tale where a father observes his children playing and notices two of them building houses of sand and clay, while the eldest farms and digs. He confronts his wife, demanding the truth about the eldest child's parentage. She confesses that the child is not his, but he forgives her, and they continue to live happily. In another story, The Two Sisters, the father forgives his wife for her deceit and ensures that the child she attributed to him receives his rightful financial share. In the broader Arab heritage, this archetype contrasts sharply with the tyrannical kings who disown children born to slave girls, as often depicted in folktales. The tolerant husband is portrayed as more honorable than these kings, demonstrating compassion and understanding.
The blessed man: In Qatari folktales, the archetype of the blessed man is depicted as an individual who enjoys success and divine favor. He is portrayed as being under God's mercy and care, benefiting from divine blessings that positively impact those around him. In one such tale, Girb Yathar, the protagonist Qarab bin Abdullah Al-Ahsa'i describes how, during childbirth, a compassionate hand—believed to be that of angels sent by God—provided care and tenderness in place of the absent mother's affection. Another narrative, The Sheep Fish, illustrates the blessed man's miraculous powers. He touches fish that have been bewitched, and they revert to their natural state. The fish, grateful for their liberation, reveal they had been enchanted for two years and were originally wealthy. The blessed man's touch restores them, and he returns home with a herd of bulls, astonishing his fellow villagers. These stories of the blessed man resonate with the broader folklore of many cultures, where figures known as righteous saints are revered. From an Islamic viewpoint, the blessed man embodies the divine love and favor of God towards a devout servant. This archetype reflects the influence of Islamic spirituality on popular folk culture.
The intelligent and cunning man: This character in Qatari folktales is portrayed as possessing natural intelligence, sharp insight, and sound judgment. Sometimes depicted as an orphan, his keen mind and prudent behavior allow him to navigate and resolve various challenges. Despite life's adversities, this man exemplifies patience and determination, ultimately overcoming obstacles through his resourcefulness and practical wisdom. In one tale, Ibn al-Ajafa, also known colloquially as Ibn al-Mashatah, a poor man achieves success, amasses wealth, and marries the daughters of the Sultan, the minister, and the judge. Through these accomplishments, he restores his and his mother's honor and exacts revenge on the corrupt authorities. This archetype recalls historical narratives of oppressed individuals rising against tyrannical rulers. Physiognomy, a popular practice among Bedouins, is commonly used by this archetype. In one narrative, three Omani men demonstrate their eloquence and shrewdness by identifying a thief who stole their money while they slept in the desert. Another tale involves the three Omanis using their observational skills to describe a lost camel they had never seen.
The brave man: The archetype of the brave man in Qatari folktales is characterized by his courage, self-sacrifice, and desire for the welfare of others. This man's valor allows him to challenge societal prejudices, whether based on social standing or physical attributes. Bravery is seen as one of the greatest virtues in Bedouin culture. One illustrative story is Al Furousiya, where the youngest brother, born to a slave woman, embarks on a quest to find his brothers in India. Despite facing numerous trials, including an encounter with an Indian princess, he successfully brings his brothers back and earns recognition from his father, the Sultan, who had doubted his abilities. The Sultan ultimately appoints him as his successor, acknowledging his bravery and leadership. Another tale, Nassif, presents a different portrayal of bravery through a disabled hero. Nassif, despite his physical challenges, demonstrates greater courage than many able-bodied men by defeating a ghoul and rescuing the ruler's daughter. The ruler, who had previously underestimated Nassif, is forced to recognize his bravery and capability. The use of exaggeration and symbolism is prevalent in Qatari folktales to highlight the extraordinary bravery of heroes. In the story The Milk of Seven, the repetitive use of the word "seven" signifies the immense challenges the hero faces. Despite the seemingly impossible task of obtaining Saba's milk, the hero perseveres, demonstrating exceptional courage. This tale also reflects the frequent conspiracies and difficult circumstances that brave men must navigate. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qatari_folklore |
Jama Masjid, Delhi | The British took over Shahjahanabad in 1803. The Mughal Emperor remained the ritual imperial head of the mosque, but Mughal power and patronage had significantly waned. The initial policy of the British in the city was favourable towards its residents; the British undertook repairs and even renovations of the Jama Masjid. The Masjid continued to serve as a site of social and political discourse, in keeping with other mosques of Delhi at the time; for example, theological and philosophical debates were held between Muslims and Christians.
The Revolt of 1857 was a major turning point in this situation. This event resulted in the deaths of many British people in the city, and weakened colonial authority, deeply affronting the British. It also ended the Mughal empire. The British perceived the revolt as instigated by Muslims, cultivated within Delhi's mosques. After the British reclaimed the city in the same year, they razed many mosques and banned the congregation of Muslims in any remaining mosques. The Jama Masjid fell into British confiscation during this time, and was barred from any religious use. It was repeatedly considered for destruction, but the British eventually began using it as barracks for its Sikh and European soldiers. This was a desecration of the space; Aziz characterises the decision as deliberate, in order to insult the sentiments of the city's Muslim inhabitants.
The Masjid was eventually returned to the Muslim population in 1862, due to their increasing resentment of British actions. Multiple conditions were imposed, including the usage of Jama Masjid as strictly a religious site, as well as mandatory policing by the British. The Jama Masjid Managing Committee (JMMC), consisting of respected Muslims of Delhi, was established as a formal body to represent the mosque and enforce these conditions.
Upon its return, the Jama Masjid was reestablished as a mosque. Though the Mughal state had been dissolved, the mosque received patronage from various regional Islamic rulers and nobles. In 1886, the Nawab of Rampur donated a large sum of 1,55,000 rupees to facilitate repairs. In 1926, a donation from the Nizam of Hyderabad of 1,00,000 rupees was used for similar purposes.
Growing unrest against British rule manifested in Delhi's mosques from 1911. The Jama Masjid was frequently used for non-religious, political purposes, against the rules instituted. While the British could police and clamp down on political activities in public spaces, the Jama Masjid was a religious space and was hence protected from such action, by both law (Religious Endowment Act, 1863) and the sentiments of Delhi. Hindus often gathered with Muslims in the mosque to express anti-colonial solidarity, in spite of simmering tension between the communities in the colonial period. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jama_Masjid,_Delhi |
French protectorate of Tunisia | Italy had a strong interest in Tunisia since at least the early 19th century, and had briefly entertained the idea of invading the country in the 1860s. Italian was the lingua franca of Tunisian diplomacy well into the 19th century, and of the various expatriate communities in Tunis that did not speak Arabic.
For this reason, the first foreign policy objective of Benedetto Cairoli's government was the colonisation of Tunisia, to which both France and Italy aspired. Cairoli, like Agostino Depretis before him, never considered to proceed to occupation, being generally hostile towards a militarist policy. However, they relied on a possible British opposition to an enlargement of the French sphere of influence in North Africa (while, if anything, London was hostile about a single country controlling the whole Strait of Sicily).
In the beginning of 1881 France decided to militarily intervene in Tunisia. The motivations of this action were provided by Jules Ferry, who sustained that the Italians wouldn't have opposed it because some weeks before France had consented to a renewal of the Italo-French trade treaty, Italy was still paying debts contracted with France and primarily it was Italy that was politically isolated despite its tentatives towards the German Empire and Austria-Hungary (Ferry confirmed that it was Otto von Bismarck to invite Paris to act in Tunisia precising that, in case of action, Germany wouldn't have raised objections. While in Italy there was a debate about the reliability of the news about a possible French action in Tunisia, a twenty-thousand-men expeditionary corps was preparing in the Toulon arsenal. On 3 May a French contingent of two thousand men landed in Bizerte, followed on 11 May by the rest of the forces. The episode gave an ulterior confirm of the Italian political isolation, and rekindled the polemics that had followed the Congress of Berlin three years before. The events, in effect, demonstrated the irrealisability of the foreign policy of Cairoli and of Depretis, the impossibility of an alliance with France and the necessity of a rapprochement with Berlin and with Vienna, even if obtorto collo.
However, such an inversion of the foreign policy of the last decade couldn't be led by the same men, and Benedetto Cairoli resigned from office on 29 May 1881, thus avoiding that the Camera would openly distrust him; since then he de facto disappeared from the political scene. The Italians called these events The Schiaffo di Tunisi (literally Slap of Tunis).
After the establishment of French protectorate, Italian immigrants in Tunisia would have protested and caused serious difficulties to France. However, little at a time, the problem was solved and the immigrants could later opt for French nationality and benefit from the same vantages as French colonists. Italo-French relation dangerously fractured. Among the hypotheses weighed by the Italian military staff a possible invasion of the Italian Peninsula by French troops was not excluded. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_protectorate_of_Tunisia |
Music of Mesopotamia | Although musicians and musical instruments were depicted in Mesopotamian art in various forms over a 3,000 year period, very few of the instruments themselves have survived. Only eleven stringed instruments have been recovered, nine lyres and two harps, all from the Royal Cemetery of Ur. These Lyres of Ur include the "Gold Lyre" (Iraq Museum) and the "Bull Headed Lyre" (Penn Museum).
The Gold Lyre of Ur now held in the Iraq Museum is a partial reconstruction; the original was destroyed in the looting that followed the US invasion of Baghdad during the second Iraq War. Musicologist Samuel Dorf details the event:
In early April of 2003, the museum was looted. The lyre went missing, only to be found in pieces. The irreparably damaged gold and mother-of-pearl bull's head was subsequently discovered in the flooded basement vaults of Iraq's Central Bank. Looters stripped parts of the body of much of its gold and left the remains in a parking lot.
The destruction of these antiquities during the war sparked widespread international condemnation. In a 2016 event held in London's Trafalgar Square meant to condemn ISIS and the looting, singer/composer Stef Conner and harpist Mark Hamer performed with a replica of the lyre, recreated by harpist Andy Lowings. The lyre was built of authentic wood, and adorned with lapis lazuli, other precious stones, and $13,000 worth of 24k gold. They played a musical interpretation of The Epic of Gilgamesh from their 2014 album The Flood.
At Ur, an especially ornate harp was found in the grave of Queen Puabi. Whereas the largest of the lyres had a register similar to a modern bass viol, and the smaller silver lyre had a register like a cello, Puabi's harp fell in the register of a small guitar. UC Berkeley professor Robert R. Brown made three playable replicas of Puabi's harp, one of which is held in the British Museum. Musicologist Claire Polin describes the richly adorned instrument:
a graceful boat-shaped instrument with gold knobs upon the eleven-stringed posts. The body terminated in a golden calf's head with lapis lazuli hair and beard, shell and lapis eyes, a mosaic-studded collar, a spacious wooden soundbox with inlaid edges of mosaic, red limestone, shell, and lapis.
Other instruments discovered at the cemetery include a pair of silver pipes, as well as drums, sistra, and cymbals. In earlier findings dating to the 5th millennium BCE, two bone wind instruments have been recovered, one complete and the other in fragments. Also recovered is a fragment of a clay whistle from Uruk dating to c. 3200 BCE. Two pairs of copper clappers from Kish are in the Oriental Institute, and there are two scraper instruments dating to 1500 BCE in the Teheran Archaeological Museum. There is a large, elaborately decorated Assyrian bell in the Berlin Museum. At one time there was a bone whistle recovered from Nimrud, which produced three distinct pitches, but it was subsequently lost. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Music_of_Mesopotamia |
Somali Bantus | Somali Bantus simply refer to themselves as Bantu. Those who can trace their origins to Bantu groups in southeast Africa refer to themselves collectively as Shanbara, Shangama or Wagosha. Those who trace their origins to Bantu tribes inhabiting areas further south call themselves Zigula, Makua, Yao, Nyassa, Ngindo, Nyamwezi, Mwera and other names, although the Somalis from Mogadishu called them with a discriminatory word all together Mushunguli.
Unlike Somalis, most of whom are traditionally nomadicherders, Somali Bantus are mainly sedentary subsistence farmers. The Somali Bantus' predominant "Negroid" physical traits also serve to further distinguish them from Somalis. Among these phenotypic characteristics of the Bantu are kinky (jareer) hair, while Somalis are soft-haired (jilec).
The majority of Somali Bantus have converted to Islam, which they first began embracing. Starting in the colonial period, some also began converting to Christianity. However, whether Muslim or Christian, many Bantu have retained their ancestral animist traditions, including the practice of possession dances and the use of magic . Many of these religious traditions closely resemble those practised in Tanzania, similarities which also extend to hunting, harvesting and music, among other things.
Many Somali Bantus have also retained their ancestral social structures, with their Bantu tribe of origin in southeastern Africa serving as the principal form of social stratification. Smaller units of societal organization are divided according to matrilineal kinship groups, the latter of which are often interchangeable with ceremonial dance groupings. Meanwhile, they do maintain some traditions of their own, such as the common act of basket weaving. Another important cultural aspect of the Bantu people consists art using bright colors and fabrics.
Primarily for security reasons, some Somali Bantus have attempted to attach themselves to groups within the Somalis' indigenous patrilineal clan system of social stratification. These Bantus are referred to by the Somalis as sheegato or sheegad (literally "pretenders"), meaning they are not ethnically Somali and are attached to a Somali group on an adoptive, client basis. Somali Bantus that have retained their ancestral southeast African traditions have likewise been known to level sarcasm at other Bantus who have tried to associate themselves with their Somali patrons, albeit without any real animosity (the civil war has actually served to strengthen relationships between the various Bantu sub-groups).
Most Gosha gradually accepted Islam in the early decades of the 20th Century.
Most Somali Bantus now consider themselves members of Somali Digil or Rahanweyn clans. However, marriage patterns still tend to follow the original ethnic lines of the various original Bantu groups. This has perpetuated the non-Somali physical characteristics of the Jubba Valley farmers. Because of this the Somalis consider them different. One of the Bantu customs still observed by Gosha people is the Gulu Nkulu ("Great Dance") of the Yao in Mozambique and Malawi.
All told, there has been very little co-mingling between Somali Bantus and Somalis. Formal intermarriage is extremely rare, and typically results in ostracism the few times it does occur. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somali_Bantus |
Shukri al-Quwatli | Quwatli opposed the proposed partition of the British Mandate of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, arguing that the plan, which would allocate 56% of Palestine to the Jewish state, violated the rights of the Palestinian Arab majority. The proposal passed the UN vote and Syria made war preparations soon afterward, including co-founding the Arab Liberation Army (ALA). Quwatli had proposed the creation of the ALA as a volunteer force to attract fighters from throughout the Arab world and to take the place of Arab regular armies. The ALA's establishment was sponsored by the Arab League following the UN partition vote and Fawzi al-Qawuqji, a Syrian commander who played leading roles in the Great Syrian Revolt and the 1936 revolt in Palestine, was appointed its commander. Quwatli did not believe the armies of Syria and the Arab world were ready to successfully confront Jewish forces and as war drew near in early 1948, he petitioned Abdel Rahman Azzam, head of the Arab League, to not enter Arab armies into Palestine. Instead, Quwatli offered to provide local Palestinian Arab fighters arms and funding. Azzam was not swayed and continued his effort of rallying Arab governments to dispatch their armies. On 15 May, after the establishment of Israel was announced, Quwatli ordered the Syrian Army to enter Palestine immediately.
The Syrian Army, which consisted of 4,500 soldiers, had been mostly repelled in their offensive during the first few days of the war, gaining control over a small area along the Syrian border. As a result of the army's poor showing, Quwatli pressed defense minister Ahmad al-Sharabati to resign his post, which Sharabati did on 24 May. He then replaced chief of staff Abdullah Atfeh with Husni al-Zaim during that same period of the war. Following the war, Quwatli accused Zaim of military incompetence and his officers of profiteering. In turn, Zaim accused Quwatli of mismanagement during the conflict. The Syrian public did not spare Quwatli blame for the army's poor performance, causing his popularity, built on his nationalist reputation, to erode further. The Syrian press was also sharply critical of Quwatli and Prime Minister Mardam Bey, urging them to leave their positions. Mardam Bey resigned on 22 August 1948 and was replaced by Khalid al-Azm.
Mass demonstrations took place in Syria condemning US President Harry Truman for recognizing Israel. Synagogues were attacked in Damascus as were the offices of General Motors. US officials were frustrated at Quwatli for not attempting to stop the demonstrations. When Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon signed armistice agreements with Israel between February and April 1949, Syria under Quwatli did not do so and refused to send a delegation to attend truce negotiations in Rhodes in March. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shukri_al-Quwatli |
Shia Islam in the Indian subcontinent | Shi'ism was introduced to Bengal during the governorship of Shah Shuja (1641–1661 AD), son of Shah Jahan. However, from 1707 AD to 1880 AD, the Nawabs of Bengal were Shias. They built huge Imambargahs, including the biggest of the Subcontinent built by Nawab Siraj-ud Daula, the Nizammat Imambara. The nawabs of Bengal and Iranian merchants in Bengal patronised azadari and the political capital Murshidabad and the trading hub Hoogly attracted Shia scholars from within and outside India.
The first Nawab, Murshid Quli Khan, was adopted by a Shia merchant Haji Shafi Isfahani and was brought up as a Shia. The fifth nawab, Ali Vardi Khan (1740 – 1756 AD) is among the best rulers India has produced. He was a hard working and far-sighted man. Bengal at that time was richest state of India, as the center of trade it attracted investments from Asian and European companies, and that was why it was attacked by the Marathas, the Afghan Rohillas and finally the East India Company (EIC) managed to conquer it after his demise. During the Anglo-French and Anglo-Indian wars in Madras region and beyond, and their gradually increasing invisible control over these regions, Ali Vardi Khan studied the developments with the help of his spies. While he encouraged trade with Europeans, he did not let them build military-purpose fortress in Bengal. If they tried doing it, he would demolish it and say to them:
"You are merchants, what need have you of a fortress? Being under my protection, you have no enemies to fear".
He was a practising Shia, he offered prayers and recited Quran everyday and held meetings with learned men for discussions. At the times of war and crisis, he used to pray whole night on a piece of earth from the grave of Imam Hussain at Karbala. During his reign, many Shia scholars came to Bengal and started teaching in 'maktabs', mosques and imambaras. He did not discriminate against Hindus or others on the basis of religion, and this was one of his points of strength. However, the EIC managed to exploit tensions based on religion and when his naive and young grandson Nawab Siraj-ud Daula came to power, many members of Hindu elite, especially Jagat Seth and Amir Chand, supported the great conspiracy of 1757 AD, and the EIC annexed Bengal. Keeping the puppet nawabs on their thrones, now the East India Company were indirectly ruling parts of Southern and Eastern India without exposing themselves to the volatile power struggle between the Afghans, the Marathas and the Shias. This strategy of camouflage was adopted to gain maximum economic advantage of the situation. A decade of exploitation followed. Bengal, the once richest province of India, suffered from famine in 1770 AD, and one third of its peasants died and others driven to cannibalism. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia_Islam_in_the_Indian_subcontinent |
Television in Lebanon | After the war, Lebanon emerged as the country with the most liberal media in the region. In the early nineties, there were 54 television stations operating in the country. In 1994, Lebanon once again legalized private ownerships of radio and television stations, making it the only country in the Arab world to do so at the time. The Audiovisual Media Law of 1994 not only regulated the airwaves, but also ended the state's monopoly over broadcast television that had been in effect since 1977. Two years later, the government passed a similar law addressing satellite television stations. In 1996, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBCI) became the first Arab satellite station to broadcast from the Arab world. MBC was then broadcasting from London and ART from Italy.
Soon after, privately owned Future Television also began broadcasting from Beirut to the Arab world and along with LBC changed viewing patterns across Arab countries, and especially in Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Lebanon offered Gulf viewers a view into a much more open-minded and liberal, Arabic-speaking society—with different dress-codes and values—that was distant enough geographically not to be threatening to their own values. With Lebanon's private satellite television stations broadcasting unique and innovative programming out of Lebanon, the country gained regional influence disproportionate to its small population and geographic size. The Pan-Arab reach that Lebanese television quickly achieved challenged the dominance of Egyptian television and Saudi-owned satellite stations, such as MBC and ART. While attractive female presenters and entertaining games shows helped garner viewership for Lebanese television across the Arab world, the influence was much greater as Arab terrestrial and satellite stations, including Al Jazeera, "unmistakably adopted the styles and methods of the Lebanese School of Journalism, in language, content presentation and delivery of news and current affairs programs as well as entertainment shows". LBC's programming were innovative and pushed the envelope on several social and cultural fronts, and this made the channel very popular across the Arab world. For example, LBC was as popular in Saudi Arabia in 1997 as was Saudi-owned MBC.
In the early 1990s, audiences across the Arab world were exposed to dubbed, Latin American television productions for the first time. Nicolas Abu Samah's Filmali dubbed Mexican and Brazilian telenovelas into Arabic to air on Lebanese stations, especially LBC. These dubbed telenovelas were also sold to other Arab television stations.
In 1996, Scorpions became the first, international rock band to perform in Lebanon after the war, and during their stay in Beirut, they filmed their music video for the song, “When You Came into my Life” in the hotel district of Beirut Central District, which was yet to be redeveloped. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Television_in_Lebanon |
H3 (Kuwait) | Based on the pottery, H3 has been dated to the Ubaid 2-3 period, or second half of the sixth millennium BC. A single radiocarbon date from the oldest part of the site provided a date of 5511-5324 cal BC. The oldest part of the site is thought to be a fire pit that was exposed in the western part of the site. The excavators interpret it as an installation where fish was processed. The main occupation at H3 consists of several separate stone-built structures, of which two were excavated and several more are visible on the surface. One was an open-air enclosure with a storage room. This area was probably used for the production of stone and flint tools.The second structure consisted of four rooms with corbelled walls, possibly to support a roof. The function of the rooms could not be determined with certainty, but based on the presence of certain artefacts and fish and mammal bones, one of the larger rooms was probably used as living area. Based on these substantial architectural remains, it has been suggested that the inhabitants may have lived for extended periods at the site - if not permanently.
The majority of the pottery at H3 consisted of plain and painted Ubaid ware. This pottery has been dated to Ubaid 2-3, with parallels found at sites like Choga Mami in Mesopotamia and Dosariyah along the Gulf coast. Based on the abundant presence of fish bones and fishing equipments, fishing must have been of considerable importance at the site. Fishing was practiced in shallow water, but there is evidence for deep-water fishing as well. Some of the species identified at H3, such as tuna, are no longer present in Kuway Bay today. Gazelle and sheep/goat bones were also present, indicating that the occupants of H3 also practiced hunting as well as pastoralism. Date stones found at the site are among the earliest evidence in the world for date consumption, together with stones from Dalma Island (UAE). The inhabitants of H3 also manufactured shell jewelry, possibly to be traded with other communities.
According to Robert Carter, H3 has been interpreted as a cultural borderland between Mesopotamian and Arabian Neolithic. The settlement has been interpreted as belonging to a local Arabian Neolithic tradition that practiced extensive contacts with the Ubaid settlements of Mesopotamia. It is likely that people of Mesopotamian origin lived in H3 and practiced Mesopotamian agriculture and cereal farming techniques. These contacts also likely involved trade, where Ubaid pottery, shells and pearls were commodities. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H3_(Kuwait) |
Qom | The present town of Qom in Central Iran dates back to ancient times. Its pre-Islamic history can be partially documented, although the earlier epochs remain unclear. Excavations at Tepe Sialk indicate that the region had been settled since ancient times (Ghirshman and Vanden Berghe), and more recent surveys have revealed traces of large, inhabited places south of Qom, dating from the 4th and 1st millennium BC. While nothing is known about the area from Elamite, Medes, and Achaemenid times, there are significant archeological remains from the Seleucid and Parthian epochs, of which the ruins of Khurha (about 70 kilometres or 43 miles southwest of Qom) are the most famous and important remnants. Their dating and function have instigated long and controversial debates and interpretations, for they have been interpreted and explained variously as the remains of a Sasanian temple, or of a Seleucid Dionysian temple, or of a Parthian complex. Its true function is still a matter of dispute, but the contributions by Wolfram Kleiss point to a Parthian palace that served as a station on the nearby highway and was used until Sasanian times.
The recently published results of the excavations carried out in 1955 by Iranian archeologists have, however, revived the old thesis of a Seleucid religious building. Besides Khurha, which is already mentioned as Khor Abad at Qomi in the 9th century, the region has turned up a few other remnants from this epoch, including the four Parthian heads found near Qom, now kept in the National Museum of Iran in Tehran. Qomi names Parthian personalities as founders of villages in the Qom area. The possible mention of Qom in the form of Greek names in two ancient geographical works (the Tabula Peutingera and Ptolemy's geographical tables) remains doubtful.
The Sasanian epoch offers many archeological findings and remnants, besides the fact that various sources mention Qom. The most interesting building from an archeological point of view is the Qalʿa-ye Doḵtar in Qom itself, which was long thought to have served religious purposes, while more recent research points to an administrative use. The wider surroundings of Qom also contain numerous traces from palaces, religious, military and administrative buildings. Some of these are mentioned by Qomi, who also names many more fire temples in the urban area of present Qom and its region, of which no archeological traces are left although the location of one fire temple can probably be equated with today's Masjed-e Emām in the city. According to Qomi, the most important fire temple of the area stood in the nearby village of Dizijan.
Tāriḵ-e Qom and some other sources also speak of genuine historical figures of the Sasanian epoch in connection with Qom and its region. They shed new light on the time of the seizure of power by the first Sasanian king Ardashir I, who fought his decisive battles near Qom, and the collapse of the Sasanian empire, which is extensively reported by Ebn Aʿṯam Kufi and the Nehāyat al-Erab and names a certain Šērzād as the satrap of the region. The existence of an urban settlement in the Sasanian epoch is furthermore verified by Middle Persian sources (literary sources, inscriptions, and seals) that mention in the time of Shapur I and Kawād I the names Godmān/Gomān and Ērān Win(n)ārd Kawād, both of which could be identified as Qom. Altogether one can assume that Qom functioned as a small administrative unit throughout the whole Sasanian era. Probably the urban structure of the Sasanian settlement of Qom can be compared with the type of city of Ctesiphon (Or. Madāʾen) and consisted of several villages and little towns with Abaraštejān, Mamajjān and Jamkarān as the bigger settlements that were loosely connected by defense installations.
It is difficult to decipher the actual process of the Arab conquest of Qom from the extant Arabic sources. According to Balāḏori, the first tentative conquest of Qom took place in 23/644 by Abu Musa Ashaari after a few days of fighting (although Abu Musa's route through Western Persia, as narrated by Balāḏori, appears somewhat confusing). It remains unclear who the defenders of Qom were; probably fleeing Sasanian nobles and local soldiers returning from the great battles against the Arabs formed the core of the resistance. The area remained largely untouched for 60 years after the initial conquest and was probably administered from Isfahan.
The first permanent settlement of Arab settlers in Qom took place during the revolts of Mukhtar al-Thaqafi and Moṭarref b. Moḡira b. Šaʿba in 66–77/685–96, when small groups of refugees moved there and Qom itself was affected by the fighting between the Umayyad state power and the rebels
The decisive step for the later urban development of Qom occurred when a group of Ashaari Arabs came to the area. These Ashaaries originated in Yemen and the first important figure among them was the first conqueror of the area of Qom, the above-mentioned Abu Musa Ashaari. ʿAbd-Allāh b. Saʿd and Aḥwaṣ b. Saʿd were grandsons of Abi Musa's nephew and led the group of Ashaaries that emigrated from Kufa to the region of Qom. It is not exactly clear why they migrated, but it might have also been a general opposition to the Umayyad dynasty. A central element was the early contact with the leading local Zoroastrian Persian noble Yazdanfadar.
As the Arabs required a great deal of pasture for their large herds of cattle and were much wealthier than the local Persians, they slowly started to buy land and take over more villages. The decisive step for controlling the area was the elimination of the local Persian noble class that took place after the death of Yazdanfadar in 733.
Although a few names of governors and their tax assessments are known from the time after the administrative independence, the death of Fātimah bint Mūsā, the sister of the eighth Imam of Shias Ali al-Ridha in the city in 201/816–17 proved to be of great importance for the later history of Qom. Fātimah bint Mūsā died while following her brother to Khorasan, a region in northern Iran. The place of her entombment developed from 869–70 into a building that was transformed over time into today's magnificent and economically important sanctuary.
In 825–26, a major rebellion against the tax regulations of the caliphate broke out in Qom. It was caused by the refusal of the caliph Al-Ma'mun to lower the yearly tax assessment as he had done in Ray. The revolt was led by an Ashaari named Yahya ibn Emran, maintaining that taxes should not be paid to an unlawful ruler. Yahya was killed by troops sent by the caliph and the citizens were severely punished; the taxes were raised from 2 million to 7 million dirhams. Two years later the taxes were again raised by 700,000 dirham by the Ashaari governor Ali ibn Isa, who was subsequently deposed because he was strongly rejected by the inhabitants of Qom. But in 833 Ali returned to the post of governor (wali) and forcefully collected tax debts that were laid upon him by the caliph. He destroyed parts of Qom and handed over a wanted rebel to caliphal authorities under Al-Moʿtasem. Between 839–42 two contradicting tax assessments were carried out under turbulent circumstances which amounted to a sum of 5 million dirhams. The names of those involved have survived.
The move of a Hadith transmitter from Kufa to Qom, which took place probably in the middle of the 9th century, indicates the increased importance of Qom as a center of Shia learning. At about the same time another military attack on the city occurred in 254/868, when Mofleḥ, the Turkish officer of the caliph Al-Mostaʿin, executed some of its inhabitants because of the city's refusal to pay taxes. Mofleḥ became governor of Qom and lasted in that position for at least five years. During his governorship important Alids moved to Qom and there are references to close contacts between the representative of the 11th Shia's Imam, Hassan al-Askari, in Qom and other Qomis. The representative Aḥmad b. Esḥāq was at the same time administrator of the Fāṭema sanctuary and the agent (wakil) responsible for the pensions of the Alids.
The first Friday mosque in Qom was built in 878–79 on the site of a fire temple, although there are also confusing reports concerning a possible earlier Friday mosque. In 881–82 Qom was occupied by the Turkish military leader Edgu Tegin (Arabic: Yadkutakin b. Asātakin or Aḏkutakin), who tried to collect the tax arrears for seven years which partially ruined the guarantors (some of whom are known) of these taxes. At about the same time the early orthodox Shias achieved their victory in the town. In 893–94, at the latest, all extremists (ḡolāt) were driven out of town by the leading Shia shaikh of Qom, Aḥmad b. Moḥammed b. Isa Ashaari. Probably one year later, in 1895, the famous Islamic mystic Ḥosayn b. Manṣur Ḥallaj stayed in Qom, where he was arrested.
From 895–96 onwards the history of Qom was connected with a family of Turkish military leaders from the army of the caliph Al-Mu'tadid, including the governor Berun (Birun). In the same year, Berun destroyed a big and probably still active fire temple located on the territory of the evolving city and probably opposite today's sanctuary of Fātimah bint Mūsā. In these unstable political times, Qom was visited by the vizier of Al-Moʿtazed, Obayd-Allah ibn Solayman, and two tax assessments were organized. An administrative peculiarity of Qom was put to an end at about the same time, to wit the independent appointment of judges through the Arab inhabitants of Qom until the time of al-Moktafi, which, together with the dispatch of a joint Arab-Persian delegation to the vizier Ḥamid ibn Abbas indicate the end of the elevated position of the Arabs in Qom. The period of the governor Abbas ibn Amr Ganawi (292–96/904–09) is remarkable for the presence of non-Twelver Shias in Qom and the establishment of the office of the jahbaḏ (financial officer) as the tax broker for the city, which fostered local self-determination.
In 909 Hosayn ibn Hamdan ibn Hamdun was appointed governor of Qom and Kāšān by the caliph Al-Moqtader and had to assist the caliph's army against the Saffarids in Fars. Altogether he stayed in power only for two years before he had to return to Baghdad. In the years 301/913–14 to 315/927, the people of Qom had, besides another tax assessment (meanwhile the eighth), a caliphal intervention that resulted in the appointment of a governor to stabilize the administrative grip over the region. This move caused more unrest and affected the balance of power in an area that was disputed between the powers of the time (Daylamites, Samanids). Beginning in 316/928 Qom fell into the sphere of interest of Daylami warlords and was relieved from the direct authority of the caliph, although it changed hands several times between 928 and 943. The Daylamites brutally exploited the city through harsh taxes. With the firm establishment of Buyids control from 340/951–52 on, the political circumstances were less troubled than before, although the economic situation deteriorated.
No outstanding events are reported for the relatively stable political period until 988–89, but Qom seems to have been isolated inside Persia because of its Shia creed. At the same time, the Fatima sanctuary was enlarged and the number of sayyeds residing in Qom reached a considerable number. In 373/984, Qom and its environs were impacted by the revolt of the Kurdish Moḥammad Barzikāni against the Buyid Fakr-Al-Dawla.
The population amounted to 50,000 inhabitants at the most and consisted of Persians and Arabs who had adopted the Persian of the time as their language and many social customs from the Persians, whose proportion was probably smaller than the Arabs. The Kurds lived in the countryside to the west. The Twelver Shia constituted the great majority of the population and many important Shia scholars of the time came from Qom or lived there. As many as 331 male Alids lived in Qom in 988–89, and they produced a good number of community leaders and there is also mention of one prominent female ʿAlid besides Fātimah bint Mūsā. These Alids descended from the Imams and were supported by pensions.
Apart from the Shia mainstream, other Shia sects existed in the city and one can also assume the presence of Sunnies. Ḏemmis, or followers of other revealed religions (Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians) must have lived in the city, too, as the payment of poll tax (jezya) indicates, although their number can only be very roughly estimated at a few thousand at the end of the 9th century and must have shrunk drastically in the 10th century. The majority of these non-Muslims were Zoroastrians, who made their living mostly as farmers. Jews must have lived in Qom as well, but information on them is scant. It is striking that the formerly dominant Ashaaries had lost their leading positions by the end of the 10th century. This points at a new social situation that allowed assimilated Persians to join the local establishment.
The city's topography in the 10th century still reflected the evolutionary merging of the original six villages; these were still separated by fields. The town center was located in the village of Mamajjān, which was connected to other parts of the city on the other side of the river by four bridges. There were about eight squares whose function is not clear and three mosques within the city. There is almost no information about madrasas. The sanctuary must have still been quite small as only two cupolas are mentioned. A bazaar and bathhouses must have existed, too, as well as certain administrative buildings (prison, mint). Five bigger and eight smaller roads indicate good traffic connections, which were supported by at least three or maybe even nine city gates.
Qom was then in a difficult economic and social position. Many houses inside the city as well as bridges and mills were ruined, and the roads and agriculture were suffering from an insecure situation. This has to be attributed to difficult social circumstances and excessive taxation. The water supply seems to have been satisfactory and the Ashaaries seem to have undertaken continuous renovation works on the irrigation channels between 733 and 900. The Ašʿaris were also the proprietors of the water rights, which were safeguarded in the water authority (divān-e āb) that regulated the water shares. The system made the Ašʿaris the wealthiest inhabitants of Qom and stayed in place until 347/958–59 when they were expropriated by the Buyids, which consequently brought about a decline in the whole system of irrigation. Although there were attempts at restoration in 371/981–82, only three of originally twenty-one channels had flowing water which meant enough drinking water was supplied for the population, but the available amount could not have been adequate for agricultural purposes.
Altogether the state of cultivation in Qom seems to have resembled that of the other regions of Persia, although the thirty different crops and plants are only indirectly mentioned in connection with the tax assessments. The soil is reported to have good quality and produced big quantities of food. Little is known about animal husbandry in the region, but the considerable number of fifty-one mills existed, of which a fifth was in decay. Legends speak of mineral deposits and mines of silver, iron, gold and lead, while Kurds seem to have produced salt from a lake nearby (see Qom Lake). The production of chairs, textiles, and saddle equipment indicates craftsmanship.
The city's taxation has to be distinguished between the more proper rule of the Abbasid tax bureaucracy and the time of the Deylamid warlords where rules were bent arbitrarily. A stunning diversity of taxes is known (often meant to serve the Abbasid bureaucracy and the Deylamid and Buyid war machinery) but the Karaj (land tax), which was composed of many different separate sums, was the most important single tax existing in Qom at least since post-Sasanian times. Within the known 18 tax figures ranging over 160 years there are great differences and the tax figures vary from 8 million to 2 million dirhams with a mean value at around 3 million. In taxation Qom always followed the solar calendar with its own local variation, starting from the death of the Sasanian Yazdegerd III. A highly differentiated tax administration existed and is known in great detail; 24 tax collectors (ʿommāl) are listed from 189/804–05 to 371/981–82 plus two jahabaḏa who acted as mediators after the attempt to enforce collective responsibility by the taxpayers had failed. The information in the Tāriḵ-e Qom on taxation also mention by name 21 tax districts (rasātiq) in the region with 900 villages.
Little is known about the time until the period of Seljuki dominance. In 387/997, Qom became involved in internal Buyid quarrels and was subsequently unsuccessfully besieged. In 418/1027–28, Qom fell under the rule of Šahryuš from the Kakuyid dynasty and a few years later (1030–40) it became part of the Ghaznavid domain. The Seljuki did not occupy Qom at once but left the town and Jebāl in Kakuyid hands for ten years. From 442/1050–51 on, the city was under Seljuk rule and nothing is known about its fate until 487/1094. Afterwards the growing instability of the Seljuk empire involved Qom in the power struggles between the competing Seljuk factions in Jebāl and the city changed hands many times. The most stable period seems to have been the 14 years (513–27/1119–33) when Qom lay in Sanjar's sphere of power and witnessed the construction of a second Friday mosque.
Qom enjoyed relative prosperity in its economy in the Seljuk period. The rigidly Sunni Seljuks seem to have practiced a pragmatic policy and one of the main sources of this time (ʿAbd-al-Jalil Qazvini) speaks of good relations between the famous vizier Nizam al-Mulk and Seljuk sultans on the one hand, and members of the local nobility on the other. Sultans reportedly visited the sanctuary (although no specific sultan is mentioned by name) and in general no religiously motivated punitive action against Qom is known to have taken place. Under Seljuk rule a considerable number of religious buildings were erected. At least ten madrasas are known by name. Two Friday mosques seem to have existed in Seljuk times: the old one was renovated and a new one, located outside of the town area, was built in 528/1133–34 by the order of Sultan Togrel II (Persian: سلطان طغرل دوم). Qom must have expanded during this period, but precise reasons for its prosperity are not known. A family of Ḥosaynid Alids was influential and provided a number of community leaders. Another important Shia family was that of the Daʿwidār (Persian: دعویدار), whose members were judges (Arabic: قاضی) in town, which indicates the transformation of Qom from a town governed by the Sunnis to a completely Shai domain.
The following epochs of the Eldiguzids and Khawrazmshahs lasted for almost 30 years and brought different systems of rule in quick succession. The two noteworthy events of this period are the execution of ʿEzz-al-Din Yaḥyā, the naqib of the Shias, by the Tekesh in 592/1196 and the work on the tiles of the sanctuary (probably in 605–13/1208–17), which indicate a certain economic prosperity at a time of unstable political conditions. From 614/1217–18 until the Mongol attack, Qom remained under Muhammad II of Khwarezm.
The Mongol invasion led to the total destruction of Qom by the armies of the Mongol generals, Jebe and Sübedei, in 621/1224 and left the city in ruins for at least twenty years, when the sources (Jovayni) tell of the levying of taxes. Twenty years later, reconstruction and repair works, probably sponsored by some wealthy inhabitants, were being done on the mausoleums of Shia saints in the city, which contradict those sources, such as Ḥamd-Allāh Mostawfi, that describe Qom as a ruined and depopulated city throughout the Ilkhanid period. Besides, the fact that the Ilkhanid vizier Šams-al-Din Jovayni took refuge in the Fātimah bint Mūsā sanctuary in 683/1284, indicates that the city must have experienced at least a modest comeback. The city walls were probably rebuilt and, moreover, four graves of saints are known to have been constructed between 720/1301 and 1365. Additionally, some fine tiles are known from this period. Nothing is known about the irrigation systems of the town, but nearby a dam was built in the Ilkhanid period and the local administration must have functioned again, as the name of a judge shows. The agricultural situation is described as flourishing with a variety of cultivated plants and a good supply of water, and legends indicate the use of deposits of mineral resources. Information exists concerning taxes for the post-Mongolian period. Qom paid 40,000 dinars, but more remarkable is the fact that some of the surrounding rural districts paid as much as Qom or even more, which suggests that the whole administrative structure of districts had also changed.
In the late 14th century, the city was plundered by Tamerlane and the inhabitants were massacred. Qom gained special attention and gradually developed due to its religious shrine during the Saffavid dynasty. By 1503, Qom became one of the important centers of theology in relation to Shia Islam and became a significant religious pilgrimage site and pivot.
The city suffered heavy damage again during the Afghan invasions, resulting in consequent severe economic hardships. Qom further sustained damage during the reign of Nader Shah and the conflicts between the two households of Zandieh and Qajariyeh in order to gain power over Iran. Finally in 1793 Qom came under the control of Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar. On being victorious over his enemies, the Qajar Sultan Fath Ali Shah was responsible for the repairs done on the sepulchre and Holy Shrine of Hæzræt Mæ'sume, as he had made such a vow.
The city of Qom began another era of prosperity in the Qajar era. After Russian forces entered Karaj in 1915, many of the inhabitants of Tehran moved to Qom due to reasons of proximity, and the transfer of the capital from Tehran to Qom was even discussed. But the British and Russians defeated prospects of the plan by putting Ahmad Shah Qajar under political pressure.
As a center of religious learning Qom fell into decline for about a century from 1820 to 1920 but had a resurgence when Shaykh Abdul Karim Haeri Yazdi accepted an invitation to move from Sultanabad (now called Arak, Iran), where he had been teaching, to Qom.
In 1964–65, before his exile from Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini led his opposition to the Pahlavi dynasty from Qom. On 19 February 2020, the Iranian Students News Agency reported that the first two cases of the COVID-19 pandemic in Iran were detected in Qom. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qom |
Gao | On 31 March 2012, one day after the capture of Kidal, Malian military forces retreated from Gao's military bases, allowing it to be occupied by Tuareg rebellion member groups MNLA and Ancar Dine. Timbuktu was captured the following day. On 6 April, the MNLA declared the region independent of Mali as the nation of Azawad. After the Battle of Gao on 26 and 27 June 2012, the MNLA lost control to Islamist militias.
After the 2012 rebellion forced the Malian Army out of Gao and the state of Azawad was proclaimed, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad took control of the governor's building, flying the flag of Azawad over it and rechristening it the Palace of Azawad.
On 26 June 2012, the tension came to all-out combat in Gao between the MNLA and MOJWA, with both sides firing heavy weapons. MNLA Secretary General Bilal ag Acherif was wounded in the battle. The MNLA were soon driven from the city, and from Kidal and Timbuktu shortly after. However, the MNLA stated that it continued to maintain forces and control some rural areas in the region. The following day, Ansar Dine announced that it was in control of all the cities of northern Mali.
On 19 January 2013, it was reported that Gao journalist Kader Toure was killed after being suspected of working for foreign news services. In retaliation, the local youth are reported to have lynched Islamic police commissioner Aliou Toure who was recruited by MUWA, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, who took control of the town in June 2012.
In January 2013 French warplanes bombed parts of Gao, including the airport, in an attempt to drive out fighters from the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa.
Gao was captured by French and Malian forces on 26 January 2013, as the Islamists were driven out from the city.
On 17 March 2015, a United Nations AH-64 helicopter crashed during an exercise near the town, killing both pilots. The AH-64 came from the Dutch Air Force's Defense Helicopter Command.
On 18 January 2017, a suicide bomber from Al-Mourabitoun drove a vehicle filled with explosives into a military camp near Gao, killing 77 people and injuring at least 115 (see 2017 Gao bombing). The incident was the deadliest terrorist attack in Malian history. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gao |
Gülen movement | Questions have arisen about the Gülen movement's possible involvement in the ongoing Ergenekon investigation, which critics have characterized as "a pretext" by the government "to neutralize dissidents" in Turkey.
According to investigative journalist Nedim Şener, the Gülen movement used the assassination of Hrant Dink, the assassination of priest Andrea Santoro, the Zirve Publishing House murders as well as other events, to create an atmosphere and illusion of a clandestine Kemalist ultra-nationalist organization holding responsible for these misdeeds. With the start of the Ergenekon trials, this alleged organization was called "Ergenekon terrorist organization". The Gülenist media, in particular Taraf, Zaman and Samanyolu Haber TV, were instrumental in shaping the public opinion during these operations. In these court cases, military officials, parliamentarians and journalists were accused of plotting a violent coup to oust the government. It later turned out that these cases were based on fabricated evidence, and that most such fabrications were produced by the Gülenists in the police. In 2011, Nedim Şener was included to the Ergenekon trials for being member of Ergenekon and subsequently was arrested and held in pre-trial detention.
According to Gareth H. Jenkins, a Senior Fellow of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center at Johns Hopkins University:
From the outset, the pro-AKP media, particularly the newspapers and television channels run by the Gülen Movement such as Zaman, Today's Zaman and Samanyolu TV, have vigorously supported the Ergenekon investigation. This has included the illegal publication of "evidence" collected by the investigators before it has been presented in court, misrepresentations and distortions of the content of the indictments and smear campaigns against both the accused and anyone who questions the conduct of the investigations.
There have long been allegations that not only the media coverage but also the Ergenekon investigation itself is being run by Gülen's supporters. In August 2010, Hanefi Avcı, a right-wing police chief who had once been sympathetic to the Gülen Movement, published a book in which he alleged that a network of Gülen's supporters in the police were manipulating judicial processes and fixing internal appointments and promotions. On September 28, 2010, two days before he was due to give a press conference to present documentary evidence to support his allegations, Avcı was arrested and charged with membership of an extremist leftist organization. On March 14, 2011, Avcı was also formally charged with being a member of the alleged Ergenekon gang.
The Gülen movement has also been implicated in what the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) – and after 2013 also President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – have said were illegal court decisions against members of the Turkish military, including many during the Ergenekon investigation. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%BClen_movement |
Modern Standard Arabic | Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) is the literary standard across the Middle East, North Africa and Horn of Africa, and is one of the six official languages of the United Nations. Most printed material in the Arab League—including most books, newspapers, magazines, official documents, and reading primers for small children—is written in MSA. "Colloquial" Arabic refers to the many regional dialects derived from Classical Arabic spoken daily across the region and learned as a first language, and as second language if people speak other languages native to their particular country. They are not normally written, although a certain amount of literature (particularly plays and poetry, including songs) exists in many of them.
Literary Arabic (MSA) is the official language of all Arab League countries and is the only form of Arabic taught in schools at all stages. Additionally, some members of religious minorities recite prayers in it, as it is considered the literary language. Translated versions of the Bible which are used in Arabic-speaking countries are mostly written in MSA, aside from Classical Arabic. Muslims recite prayers in it; revised editions of numerous literary texts from Umayyad and Abbasid times are also written in MSA.
The sociolinguistic situation of Arabic in modern times provides a prime example of the linguistic phenomenon of diglossia – the use of two distinct varieties of the same language, usually in different social contexts. This diglossic situation facilitates code-switching in which a speaker switches back and forth between the two dialects of the language, sometimes even within the same sentence. People speak MSA as a third language if they speak other languages native to a country as their first language and colloquial Arabic dialects as their second language. Modern Standard Arabic is also spoken by people of Arab descent outside the Arab world when people of Arab descent speaking different dialects communicate to each other. As there is a prestige or standard dialect of vernacular Arabic, speakers of standard colloquial dialects code-switch between these particular dialects and MSA.
Classical Arabic is considered normative; a few contemporary authors attempt (with varying degrees of success) to follow the syntactic and grammatical norms laid down by classical grammarians (such as Sibawayh) and to use the vocabulary defined in classical dictionaries (such as the Lisan al-Arab, Arabic: لِسَان الْعَرَب).
However, the exigencies of modernity have led to the adoption of numerous terms which would have been mysterious to a classical author, whether taken from other languages (e. g. فيلم film) or coined from existing lexical resources (e. g. هاتف hātif "caller" > "telephone"). Structural influence from foreign languages or from the vernaculars has also affected Modern Standard Arabic: for example, MSA texts sometimes use the format "A, B, C and D" when listing things, whereas Classical Arabic prefers "A and B and C and D", and subject-initial sentences may be more common in MSA than in Classical Arabic. For these reasons, Modern Standard Arabic is generally treated separately in non-Arab sources. Speakers of Modern Standard Arabic do not always observe the intricate rules of Classical Arabic grammar. Modern Standard Arabic principally differs from Classical Arabic in three areas: lexicon, stylistics, and certain innovations on the periphery that are not strictly regulated by the classical authorities. On the whole, Modern Standard Arabic is not homogeneous; there are authors who write in a style very close to the classical models and others who try to create new stylistic patterns. Add to this regional differences in vocabulary depending upon the influence of the local Arabic varieties and the influences of foreign languages, such as French in Africa and Lebanon or English in Egypt, Jordan, and other countries.
As MSA is a revised and simplified form of Classical Arabic, MSA in terms of lexicon omitted the obsolete words used in Classical Arabic. As diglossia is involved, various Arabic dialects freely borrow words from MSA. This situation is similar to Romance languages, wherein scores of words were borrowed directly from formal Latin (most literate Romance speakers were also literate in Latin); educated speakers of standard colloquial dialects speak in this kind of communication.
Reading out loud in MSA for various reasons is becoming increasingly simpler, using less strict rules compared to CA, notably the inflection is omitted, making it closer to spoken varieties of Arabic. It depends on the speaker's knowledge and attitude to the grammar of Classical Arabic, as well as the region and the intended audience.
Pronunciation of native words, loanwords, and foreign names in MSA is loose. Names can be pronounced or even spelled differently in different regions and by different speakers. Pronunciation also depends on the person's education, linguistic knowledge, and abilities. There may be sounds used which are missing in Classical Arabic but exist in colloquial varieties. For example, the consonants /v/, /p/, /t͡ʃ/ (often realized as [t]+[ʃ]) (which may or may not be written with special letters) and the vowels [o], [e] (both short and long). There are no special letters in Arabic to distinguish between [e~i] and [o~u] pairs but the sounds o and e (short and long) exist in the colloquial varieties of Arabic and some foreign words in MSA. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modern_Standard_Arabic |
Fethullah Gülen | Despite Gülen's and his followers' statements that the organization is non-political in nature, analysts believed that a number of corruption-related arrests made against allies of Erdoğan reflect a growing political power struggle between Gülen and Erdoğan. These arrests led to the 2013 corruption scandal in Turkey, which the ruling AKP's supporters (along with Erdoğan himself) and the opposition parties alike have said were choreographed by Gülen after Erdoğan's government came to the decision early in December 2013 to shut down many of his movement's private pre-university schools in Turkey.
The Erdoğan government has said that the corruption investigation and comments by Gülen are the long term political agenda of Gülen's movement to infiltrate security, intelligence, and justice institutions of the Turkish state, a charge almost identical to the charges against Gülen by the Chief Prosecutor of Turkey in his trial in 2000 before Erdoğan's party had come into power. Gülen had previously been tried in absentia in 2000, and acquitted of these charges in 2008 under Erdoğan's AKP government.
In emailed comments to the Wall Street Journal in January 2014, Gülen said that "Turkish people ... are upset that in the last two years democratic progress is now being reversed", but he denied being part of a plot to unseat the government. Later, in January 2014 in an interview with BBC World, Gülen said "If I were to say anything to people I may say people should vote for those who are respectful to democracy, rule of law, who get on well with people. Telling or encouraging people to vote for a party would be an insult to peoples' intellect. Everybody very clearly sees what is going on."
On 28 October 2015, Ministry of Interior placed Gülen in the red category of the "most wanted terrorists list". The Ministry announced that a monetary reward of up to 10 million Turkish liras will be given to Gülen in this category.
According to some commentators, Gülen is to Erdoğan what Trotsky was to Stalin. Ben Cohen of the Jewish News Syndicate wrote: "Rather like Leon Trotsky, the founder of the Soviet Red Army who was hounded and chased out of the USSR by Joseph Stalin, Gülen has become an all-encompassing explanation for the existential threats, as Erdogan perceives them, that are currently plaguing Turkey. Stalin saw the influence of 'Trotskyite counter-revolutionaries' everywhere, and brutally purged every element of the Soviet apparatus. Erdogan is now doing much the same with the 'Gülenist terrorists.'" | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fethullah_G%C3%BClen |
Operation Infinite Reach | National Security Advisor Sandy Berger called President Bill Clinton at 5:35 AM on August 7 to notify him of the bombings. That day, Clinton started meeting with his "Small Group" of national security advisers, which included Berger, CIA director George Tenet, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Attorney General Janet Reno, Defense Secretary William Cohen, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hugh Shelton. The group's objective was to plan a military response to the East Africa embassy bombings. Initially the U.S. suspected either Hamas or Hezbollah for the bombings, but FBI Agents John P. O'Neill and Ali Soufan demonstrated that al-Qaeda was responsible. Based on electronic and phone intercepts, physical evidence from Nairobi, and interrogations, officials soon demonstrated bin Laden as the perpetrator of the attacks. On August 8, the White House asked the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a targets list; the initial list included twenty targets in Sudan, Afghanistan, and an unknown third country, although it was narrowed down on August 12.
In an August 10 Small Group meeting, the principals agreed to use Tomahawk cruise missiles, rather than troops or aircraft, in the retaliatory strikes. Cruise missiles had been previously used against Libya and Iraq as reprisals for the 1986 Berlin discotheque bombing and the 1993 attempted assassination of then-President George H. W. Bush. Using cruise missiles also helped to preserve secrecy; airstrikes would have required more preparation that might have leaked to the media and alerted bin Laden. The option of using commandos was discarded, as it required too much time to prepare forces, logistics, and combat search and rescue. Using helicopters or bombers would have been difficult due to the lack of a suitable base or Pakistani permission to cross its airspace, and the administration also feared a recurrence of the disastrous 1980 Operation Eagle Claw in Iran. While military officials suggested bombing Kandahar, which bin Laden and his associates often visited, the administration was concerned about killing civilians and hurting the U.S.' image.
On August 11, General Anthony Zinni of Central Command was instructed to plan attacks on bin Laden's Khost camps, where CIA intelligence indicated bin Laden and other militants would be meeting on August 20, purportedly to plan further attacks against the U.S. Clinton was informed of the plan on August 12 and 14. Participants in the meeting later disagreed whether or not the intelligence indicated bin Laden would attend the meeting; however, an objective of the attack remained to kill the al-Qaeda leader, and the NSC encouraged the strike regardless of whether bin Laden and his companions were known to be present at Khost. The administration aimed to prevent future al-Qaeda attacks discussed in intercepted communications. As Berger later testified, the operation also sought to damage bin Laden's infrastructure and show the administration's commitment to combating bin Laden. The Khost complex, which was 90 miles (140 km) southeast of Kabul, also had ideological significance: Bin Laden had fought nearby during the Soviet–Afghan War, and he had given interviews and even held a press conference at the site. Felix Sater, then a CIA source, provided additional intelligence on the camps' locations.
On August 14, Tenet told the Small Group that bin Laden and al-Qaeda were doubtless responsible for the attack; Tenet called the intelligence a "slam dunk", according to counterterrorism official Richard Clarke, and Clinton approved the attacks the same day. As the 9/11 Commission Report relates, the group debated "whether to strike targets outside of Afghanistan". Tenet briefed the small group again on August 17 regarding possible targets in Afghanistan and Sudan; on August 19, the al-Shifa pharmaceutical facility in Khartoum, Sudan, al-Qaeda's Afghan camps, and a Sudanese tannery were designated as targets. The aim of striking the tannery, which had allegedly been given to bin Laden by the Sudanese for his road-building work, was to disrupt bin Laden's finances, but it was removed as a target due to fears of inflicting civilian casualties without any loss for bin Laden. Clinton gave the final approval for the attacks at 3:00 AM on August 20; the same day, he also signed Executive Order 13099, authorizing sanctions on bin Laden and al-Qaeda. The Clinton administration justified Operation Infinite Reach under Article 51 of the UN Charter and Title 22, Section 2377 of the U.S. Code; the former guarantees a UN member state's right to self-defense, while the latter authorizes presidential action by "all necessary means" to target international terrorist infrastructure. Government lawyers asserted that since the missile strikes were an act of self-defense and not directed at an individual, they were not forbidden as an assassination. A review by administration lawyers concluded that the attack would be legal, since the president has the authority to attack the infrastructure of anti-American terrorist groups, and al-Qaeda's infrastructure was largely human. Officials also interpreted "infrastructure" to include al-Qaeda's leadership.
The missiles would pass into Pakistani airspace, overflying "a suspected Pakistani nuclear weapons site," according to Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Ralston; U.S. officials feared Pakistan would mistake them for an Indian nuclear attack. Clarke was concerned the Pakistanis would shoot down the cruise missiles or airplanes if they were not notified, but also feared the ISI would warn the Taliban or al-Qaeda if they were alerted. In Islamabad on the evening of August 20, Ralston informed Pakistan Army Chief of Staff Jehangir Karamat of the incoming American strikes ten minutes before the missiles entered Pakistani airspace. Clarke also worried the Pakistanis would notice the U.S. Navy ships, but was told that submerged submarines would launch the missiles. However, the Pakistan Navy detected the destroyers and informed the government. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Infinite_Reach |
Anglo-Iraqi War | Before the war, the United Kingdom provided support to the Royal Iraqi Army, to the Royal Iraqi Navy, and to the Royal Iraqi Air Force through a small military mission based in Baghdad, commanded from 1938 by Major-General G. G. Waterhouse. The Iraqi Army was composed of approximately 60,000 men, most in four infantry divisions and one mechanised brigade. The 1st and 3rd Divisions were stationed near Baghdad. Also based within Baghdad was the Independent Mechanised Brigade, composed of a light-tank company made up of L3/35 tankettes, an armoured-car company composed of Crossley armoured cars, two battalions of motorised infantry, machine-gunners and an artillery brigade. Unlike the contemporary use of the term "mechanised", it meant "motorised" in 1941 (moving in lorries, fighting on foot). The Iraqi 2nd Division was stationed in Kirkuk and the 4th Division in Al Diwaniyah, on the main rail line from Baghdad to Basra. The Iraqis fielded police units and about 500 irregulars under Arab guerrilla leader Fawzi al-Qawuqji, a ruthless fighter who did not hesitate to murder or mutilate prisoners. For the most part, Fawzi operated in the area between Rutbah and Ramadi, before being chased back into Syria.
The air force had 116 aircraft in seven squadrons, of which 50 to 60 were serviceable, and a training school. Most Iraqi fighter and bomber aircraft were at "Rashid Airfield" in Baghdad (formerly RAF Hinaidi) or in Mosul. Four squadrons and the Flying Training School were based in Baghdad. Two squadrons with close co-operation and general-purpose aircraft were based in Mosul. The Iraqis flew an assortment of aircraft types including Gloster Gladiator biplane fighters, Breda 65 fighter bombers, Savoia SM 79 medium bombers, Northrop/Douglas 8A fighter bombers, Hawker Hart (Hawker Nisr) biplane close co-operation aircraft, Vickers Vincent biplane light bombers, de Havilland Dragon biplane general purpose aircraft, de Havilland Dragonfly biplane general purpose aircraft and Tiger Moth biplane trainers. The air force had another nine aircraft not allocated to squadrons and 19 aircraft in reserve.
The Royal Iraqi Navy had four 100 long tons (100 t) Thornycroft gunboats, a pilot vessel and a minesweeper. All were armed and were based in the Shatt al-Arab waterways. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iraqi_War |
Theatre | Theatre took on many alternative forms in the West between the 15th and 19th centuries, including commedia dell'arte from Italian theatre, and melodrama. The general trend was away from the poetic drama of the Greeks and the Renaissance and toward a more naturalistic prose style of dialogue, especially following the Industrial Revolution.
Theatre took a big pause during 1642 and 1660 in England because of the Puritan Interregnum. The rising anti-theatrical sentiment among Puritans saw William Prynne write Histriomastix (1633), the most notorious attack on theatre prior to the ban. Viewing theatre as sinful, the Puritans ordered the closure of London theatres in 1642. On 24 January 1643, the actors protested against the ban by writing a pamphlet titled The Actors remonstrance or complaint for the silencing of their profession, and banishment from their severall play-houses. This stagnant period ended once Charles II came back to the throne in 1660 in the Restoration. Theatre (among other arts) exploded, with influence from French culture, since Charles had been exiled in France in the years previous to his reign.
In 1660, two companies were licensed to perform, the Duke's Company and the King's Company. Performances were held in converted buildings, such as Lisle's Tennis Court. The first West End theatre, known as Theatre Royal in Covent Garden, London, was designed by Thomas Killigrew and built on the site of the present Theatre Royal, Drury Lane.
One of the big changes was the new theatre house. Instead of the type of the Elizabethan era, such as the Globe Theatre, round with no place for the actors to prepare for the next act and with no "theatre manners", the theatre house became transformed into a place of refinement, with a stage in front and stadium seating facing it. Since seating was no longer all the way around the stage, it became prioritized—some seats were obviously better than others. The king would have the best seat in the house: the very middle of the theatre, which got the widest view of the stage as well as the best way to see the point of view and vanishing point that the stage was constructed around. Philippe Jacques de Loutherbourg was one of the most influential set designers of the time because of his use of floor space and scenery.
Because of the turmoil before this time, there was still some controversy about what should and should not be put on the stage. Jeremy Collier, a preacher, was one of the heads in this movement through his piece A Short View of the Immorality and Profaneness of the English Stage. The beliefs in this paper were mainly held by non-theatre goers and the remainder of the Puritans and very religious of the time. The main question was if seeing something immoral on stage affects behaviour in the lives of those who watch it, a controversy that is still playing out today.
The seventeenth century had also introduced women to the stage, which was considered inappropriate earlier. These women were regarded as celebrities (also a newer concept, thanks to ideas on individualism that arose in the wake of Renaissance Humanism), but on the other hand, it was still very new and revolutionary that they were on the stage, and some said they were unladylike, and looked down on them. Charles II did not like young men playing the parts of young women, so he asked that women play their own parts. Because women were allowed on the stage, playwrights had more leeway with plot twists, like women dressing as men, and having narrow escapes from morally sticky situations as forms of comedy.
Comedies were full of the young and very much in vogue, with the storyline following their love lives: commonly a young roguish hero professing his love to the chaste and free minded heroine near the end of the play, much like Sheridan's The School for Scandal. Many of the comedies were fashioned after the French tradition, mainly Molière, again hailing back to the French influence brought back by the King and the Royals after their exile. Molière was one of the top comedic playwrights of the time, revolutionizing the way comedy was written and performed by combining Italian commedia dell'arte and neoclassical French comedy to create some of the longest lasting and most influential satiric comedies. Tragedies were similarly victorious in their sense of righting political power, especially poignant because of the recent Restoration of the Crown. They were also imitations of French tragedy, although the French had a larger distinction between comedy and tragedy, whereas the English fudged the lines occasionally and put some comedic parts in their tragedies. Common forms of non-comedic plays were sentimental comedies as well as something that would later be called tragédie bourgeoise, or domestic tragedy—that is, the tragedy of common life—were more popular in England because they appealed more to English sensibilities.
While theatre troupes were formerly often travelling, the idea of the national theatre gained support in the 18th century, inspired by Ludvig Holberg. The major promoter of the idea of the national theatre in Germany, and also of the Sturm und Drang poets, was Abel Seyler, the owner of the Hamburgische Entreprise and the Seyler Theatre Company.
Through the 19th century, the popular theatrical forms of Romanticism, melodrama, Victorian burlesque and the well-made plays of Scribe and Sardou gave way to the problem plays of Naturalism and Realism; the farces of Feydeau; Wagner's operatic Gesamtkunstwerk; musical theatre (including Gilbert and Sullivan's operas); F. C. Burnand's, W. S. Gilbert's and Oscar Wilde's drawing-room comedies; Symbolism; proto-Expressionism in the late works of August Strindberg and Henrik Ibsen; and Edwardian musical comedy.
These trends continued through the 20th century in the realism of Stanislavski and Lee Strasberg, the political theatre of Erwin Piscator and Bertolt Brecht, the so-called Theatre of the Absurd of Samuel Beckett and Eugène Ionesco, American and British musicals, the collective creations of companies of actors and directors such as Joan Littlewood's Theatre Workshop, experimental and postmodern theatre of Robert Wilson and Robert Lepage, the postcolonial theatre of August Wilson or Tomson Highway, and Augusto Boal's Theatre of the Oppressed. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theatre |
Munkar and Nakir | Munkar and Nakir bear some similarity to Zoroastrian divinities. Some of these, such as Mithra, Sraosha and Rashnu have a role in the judgement of souls. Rashnu is described as a figure who holds a set of scales, like some angels of the grave. E.G. Brown has suggested that a continuity exists between Rashnu and Munkar and Nakir. Sebastian Günther also points out it. He writes that "the image and function of Munkar and Nakīr carries certain echoes of the Zoroastrian concept of the angels Srōsh (“Obedience”) and Ātar (“Fire”)". A mythical figure in Mandaean religion, Abathur Muzania is similar to Rashnu. He has the same position in the world of the dead and he holds a set of scales. Muzania means scales (mizan) in Aramaic.
According to a recent research, it is hypothesized that Munkar and Nakir were derived from astrological figures that originally associated with the Mesopotamian astral god Nergal.This is based on idea that the Mesopotamian god Nergal has almost the same characteristics as Munkar and Nakir. First of all, Assyrian nakru which means 'enemy', was an epithet of Nergal. The Assyrian nakru, like the names Munkar and Nakir, comes from the same root, that is, it comes from the proto-Semitic NKR which derived some negative terms. Some scholars use a different spelling; nakuru. which is almost the same as Nakir. Moreover, Nergal is a lord of the Underworld and the grave (Assyrian qabru: grave). Like Munkar and Nakir, he has a terrifying voice that can cause panic among men and gods. He holds a shining mace and his breath can burn his enemies. Because he is related to fire most scholars suggest that he was originally a sun god. Furthermore, he is identified with the celestial twins (Gemini) in the Babylonian astral mythology which forms a direct link to Munkar and Nakir.
The Mesopotamians still believed in the sun god Shamash, as well as Nergal and several other Babylonian gods at the time Islam was introduced.Thus, Nergal the god of the Underworld who is symbolized by the planet Mars, is a possible prototype for Munkar and Nakir. Astrologically, Munkar and Nakir share more clues in their Martian characteristics which connect them to Nergal.
In stark contrast, scholar A. J. Wensinck found the association of Munkar and Nakir to the root NKR to be unlikely. Similarly, scholar John MacDonald believes the names of the two angels have not been satisfactorily explained, although given that they are in the passive form, they may be understood as "unknown" or "disguised", much in the same way how angels visit graves in disguise in Judaism. Rabbinic literature offers many traditions about punishing angels, chastising the dead. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munkar_and_Nakir |
Arithmetic | Multiplication is an arithmetic operation in which two numbers, called the multiplier and the multiplicand, are combined into a single number called the product. The symbols of multiplication are
×
{\displaystyle \times }
,
⋅
{\displaystyle \cdot }
, and *. Examples are
2
×
3
=
6
{\displaystyle 2\times 3=6}
and
0.3
⋅
5
=
1.5
{\displaystyle 0.3\cdot 5=1.5}
. If the multiplicand is a natural number then multiplication is the same as repeated addition, as in
2
×
3
=
2
+
2
+
2
{\displaystyle 2\times 3=2+2+2}
.
Division is the inverse of multiplication. In it, one number, known as the dividend, is split into several equal parts by another number, known as the divisor. The result of this operation is called the quotient. The symbols of division are
÷
{\displaystyle \div }
and
/
{\displaystyle /}
. Examples are
48
÷
8
=
6
{\displaystyle 48\div 8=6}
and
29.4
/
1.4
=
21
{\displaystyle 29.4/1.4=21}
. Division is often treated as a special case of multiplication: instead of dividing by a number, it is also possible to multiply by its reciprocal. The reciprocal of a number is 1 divided by that number. For instance,
48
÷
8
=
48
×
1
8
{\displaystyle 48\div 8=48\times {\tfrac {1}{8}}}
.
The multiplicative identity element is 1 and the multiplicative inverse of a number is the reciprocal of that number. For example,
13
×
1
=
13
{\displaystyle 13\times 1=13}
and
13
×
1
13
=
1
{\displaystyle 13\times {\tfrac {1}{13}}=1}
. Multiplication is both commutative and associative. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arithmetic |
Himyarite Kingdom | Himyar: The most famous of whose septs were Zaid Al-Jamhur, Banu Quda'a and Sakasik.
Kahlan: The most famous of whose septs were Hamdan, Azd, Anmar, Ṭayy (today their descendants are known as Shammar), Midhhij, Kinda, Lakhm, Judham
Kahlan septs emigrated from Yemen to dwell in the different parts of the Arabian Peninsula prior to the Great Flood (Sail Al-‘Arim of Marib Dam), due to the failure of trade under the Roman pressure and domain on both sea and land trade routes following Roman occupation of Egypt and Syria.
Naturally enough, the competition between Kahlan and Ḥimyar led to the evacuation of the first and the settlement of the second in Yemen.
The emigrating septs of Kahlan can be divided into four groups:
Azd: Who, under the leadership of ‘Imrān bin ‘Amr Muzaiqbā’, wandered in Yemen, sent pioneers and finally headed northwards. Details of their emigration can be summed up as follows:
Tha‘labah bin ‘Amr left his tribe Al-Azd for Ḥijāz and dwelt between Tha‘labiyah and Dhī Qār. When he gained strength, he headed for Madīnah where he stayed. Of his seed are Aws and Khazraj, sons of Haritha bin Tha‘labah.
Haritha bin ‘Amr, known as Khuzā‘ah, wandered with his people in Hijaz until they came to Mar Az-Zahran. They conquered the Ḥaram, and settled in Makkah after having driven away its people, the tribe of Jurhum.
‘Imrān bin ‘Amr and his folks went to ‘Oman where they established the tribe of Azd whose children inhabited Tihama and were known as Azd-of-Shanu’a.
Jafna bin ‘Amr and his family, headed for Syria where he settled and initiated the kingdom of Ghassan who was so named after a spring of water, in Ḥijāz, where they stopped on their way to Syria.
Lakhm and Judham: Of whom was Nasr bin Rabi‘a, father of Manadhira, Kings of al-Hirah.
Banū Ṭayy: Who also emigrated northwards to settle by the so- called Aja and Salma Mountains which were consequently named as Tai’ Mountains. The tribe later became the tribe of Shammar.
Kinda: Who dwelt in Bahrain but were expelled to Hadramout and Najd where they instituted a powerful government but not for long, for the whole tribe soon faded away.
Another tribe of Himyar, known as Banū Quḑā'ah, also left Yemen and dwelt in Samāwah on the borders of Iraq.
However, it is estimated that the majority of the Ḥimyar Christian royalty migrated into Jordan, Al-Karak, where initially they were known as Banū Ḥimyar (Sons of Ḥimyar). Many later on moved to central Jordan to settle in Madaba under the family name of Al-Hamarneh (pop 12,000, est. 2010) | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Himyarite_Kingdom |
Green building | Buildings represent a large part of energy, electricity, water and materials consumption. As of 2020, they account for 37% of global energy use and energy-related CO2 emissions, which the United Nations estimate contributed to 33% of overall worldwide emissions. Including the manufacturing of building materials, the global CO2 emissions were 39%. If new technologies in construction are not adopted during this time of rapid growth, emissions could double by 2050, according to the United Nations Environment Program.
Glass buildings, especially all-glass skyscrapers, contribute significantly to climate change due to their energy inefficiency. While these structures are visually appealing and allow abundant natural light, they also trap heat, necessitating increased use of air conditioning systems, which contribute to higher carbon emissions. Experts advocate for design modifications and potential restrictions on all-glass edifices to mitigate their detrimental environmental impact.
Buildings account for a large amount of land. According to the National Resources Inventory, approximately 107 million acres (430,000 km2) of land in the United States are developed. The International Energy Agency released a publication that estimated that existing buildings are responsible for more than 40% of the world's total primary energy consumption and for 24% of global carbon dioxide emissions.
According to Global status report from the year 2016, buildings consume more than 30% of all produced energy. The report states that "Under a below 2°C trajectory, effective action to improve building energy efficiency could limit building final energy demand to just above current levels, meaning that the average energy intensity of the global building stock would decrease by more than 80% by 2050".Green building practices aim to reduce the environmental impact of building as the building sector has the greatest potential to deliver significant cuts in emissions at little or no cost. General guidelines can be summarized as follows: Every building should be as small as possible. Avoid contributing to sprawl, even if the most energy-efficient, environmentally sound methods are used in design and construction. Bioclimatic design principles are able to reduce energy expenditure and by extension, carbon emissions. Bioclimatic design is a method of building design that takes local climate into account to create comfortable conditions within the structure. This could be as simple as constructing a different shape for the building envelope or facing the building towards the south to maximize solar exposure for energy or lighting purposes. Given the limitations of city planned construction, bioclimatic principles may be employed on a lesser scale, however it is still an effective passive method to reduce environmental impact. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_building |
Crusader states | The Fatimids' feud with the Seljuks hindered Muslim actions for more than a decade. Outnumbered by their enemies, the Franks remained in a vulnerable position, but they could forge temporary alliances with their Armenian, Arab, and Turkic neighbours. Each crusader state had its own strategic purpose during the first years of its existence. Jerusalem needed undisturbed access to the Mediterranean; Antioch wanted to seize Cilicia and the territory along the upper course of the Orontes River; and Edessa aspired to control the Upper Euphrates valley. The most powerful Syrian Muslim ruler, Toghtekin of Damascus, took a practical approach to dealing with the Franks. His treaties establishing Damascene–Jerusalemite condominiums (shared rule) in debated territories created precedents for other Muslim leaders.
In August 1099, Godfrey defeated the Fatimid vizier, Al-Afdal Shahanshah at Ascalon. When Daimbert of Pisa, the papal legate, arrived in the Levant with 120 Pisan ships, Godfrey gained much-needed naval support by backing him for the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, as well as granting him parts of Jerusalem and the Pisans a section of the port of Jaffa. Daimbert revived the idea of creating an ecclesiastic principality and extracted oaths of fealty from Godfrey and Bohemond.
When Godfrey died in 1100, his retainers occupied the Tower of David to secure his inheritance for his brother Baldwin. Daimbert and Tancred sought Bohemond's help against the Lotharingians, but the Danishmends captured Bohemond under Gazi Gümüshtigin while securing Antioch's northern marches. Before departing for Jerusalem, Baldwin ceded Edessa to his cousin, Baldwin of Bourcq. His arrival thwarted Daimbert, who crowned Baldwin as Jerusalem's first Latin king on Christmas Day 1100. By performing the ceremony, the Patriarch abandoned his claim to rule the Holy Land.
Tancred remained defiant to Baldwin until an Antiochene delegation offered him the regency in March 1101. He ceded his Principality of Galilee to the king, but reserved the right to reclaim it as a fief if he returned from Antioch within fifteen months. For the next two years, Tancred ruled Antioch. He conquered Byzantine Cilicia and parts of Syria. The Fatimid Caliphate attacked Jerusalem in 1101, 1102 and 1105, on the last occasion in alliance with Toghtekin. Baldwin I repulsed these attacks and with Genoese, Venetian, and Norwegian fleets conquered all the towns on the Palestinian coast except Tyre and Ascalon.
Raymond laid the foundations of the fourth crusader state, the County of Tripoli. He captured Tartus and Gibelet and besieged Tripoli. His cousin William II Jordan continued the siege after Raymond's death in 1105. It was completed in 1109 when Raymond's son Bertrand arrived. Baldwin brokered a deal, sharing the territory between them, until William Jordan's death united the county. Bertrand acknowledged Baldwin's suzerainty, although William Jordan had been Tancred's vassal.
When Bohemond was released for a ransom in 1103, he compensated Tancred with lands and gifts. Baldwin of Bourcq and his cousin and vassal, Joscelin of Courtenay, were captured while attacking Ridwan of Aleppo at Harran with Bohemond. Tancred assumed the regency of Edessa. The Byzantines took the opportunity to reconquer Cilicia. They took the port but not the citadel of Laodikeia.
Bohemond returned to Italy to recruit allies and gather supplies. Tancred assumed leadership in Antioch, and his cousin Richard of Salerno did the same in Edessa. In 1107, Bohemond crossed the Adriatic Sea and failed in besieging Dyrrachion in the Balkan Peninsula. The resulting Treaty of Devol forced Bohemond to restore Laodikeia and Cilicia to Alexios, become his vassal and reinstate the Greek patriarch of Antioch. Bohemond never returned. He died, leaving an underage son Bohemond II. Tancred continued as regent of Antioch and ignored the treaty. Richard's son, Roger of Salerno, succeeded as regent on Tancred's death in 1112.
The fall of Tripoli prompted Sultan Muhammad Tapar to appoint the atabeg of Mosul, Mawdud, to wage jihad against the Franks. Between 1110 and 1113, Mawdud mounted four campaigns in Mesopotamia and Syria, but rivalry among his heterogeneous armies' commanders forced him to abandon the offensive on each occasion. As Edessa was Mosul's chief rival, Mawdud directed two campaigns against the city. They caused havoc, and the county's eastern region could never recover. The Syrian Muslim rulers saw the Sultan's intervention as a threat to their autonomy and collaborated with the Franks. After an assassin, likely a Nizari, murdered Mawdud, Muhammad Tapar dispatched two armies to Syria, but both campaigns failed.
As Aleppo remained vulnerable to Frankish attacks, the city leaders sought external protection. They allied with the adventurous Artuqid princes, Ilghazi and Balak, who inflicted crucial defeats on the Franks between 1119 and 1124, but could rarely prevent Frankish counter-invasions.
In 1118 Baldwin of Bourcq succeeded Baldwin I as King of Jerusalem, naming Joscelin his successor in Edessa. After Roger was killed at Ager Sanguinis ('Field of Blood'), Baldwin II assumed the regency of Antioch for the absent Bohemond II. Public opinion attributed a series of disasters affecting the Outremer—defeats by enemy forces and plagues of locusts—as punishments for the Franks' sins. To improve moral standards, the Jerusalemite ecclesiastic and secular leaders assembled a council at Nablus and issued decrees against adultery, sodomy, bigamy, and sexual relations between Catholics and Muslims.
A proposal by a group of pious knights about a monastic order for deeply religious warriors was likely first discussed at the council of Nablus. Church leaders quickly espoused the idea of armed monks, and within a decade, two military orders, the Knights Templar and Hospitaller, were formed. As the Fatimid Caliphate no longer posed a major threat to Jerusalem, but Antioch and Edessa were vulnerable to invasion, the defence of the northern crusader states took much of Baldwin II's time. His absence, its impact on government, and his placement of relatives and their vassals in positions of power created opposition in Jerusalem. Baldwin's sixteen-month captivity led to a failed deposition attempt by some of the nobility, with the Flemish count, Charles the Good, considered as a possible replacement. Charles declined the offer.
Baldwin had four daughters. In 1126, Bohemond reached the age of majority and married the second-oldest, Alice, in Antioch. Aleppo had plunged into anarchy, but Bohemond II could not exploit this because of a conflict with Joscelin. The new atabeg of Mosul Imad al-Din Zengi seized Aleppo in 1128. The two major Muslim centres' union was especially dangerous for the neighbouring Edessa, but it also worried Damascus's new ruler, Taj al-Muluk Buri. Baldwin's eldest daughter Melisende was his heir. He married her to Fulk of Anjou, who had widespread western connections useful to the kingdom. After Fulk's arrival, Baldwin raised a large force for an attack on Damascus. This force included the leaders of the other crusader states, and a significant Angevin contingent provided by Fulk. The campaign was abandoned when the Franks' foraging parties were destroyed, and bad weather made the roads impassable. In 1130 Bohemond II was killed raiding in Cilicia, leaving Alice with their infant daughter, Constance. Baldwin II denied Alice control, instead resuming the regency until his death in 1131. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crusader_states |
Sandgrouse | Sandgrouse are principally seed eaters. Other food items eaten include green shoots and leaves, bulbs, and berries. Insect food such as ants and termites may also be eaten, especially during the breeding season. The diet of many sandgrouse is highly specialised, with the seeds of a small number of plant species being dominant. This may depend on local availability but in other cases it reflects actual selection of favoured seeds over others by the sandgrouse. Seeds of leguminous plants are usually an important part of the diet. In agricultural areas oats and other grain are readily taken. Seeds are either collected from the ground or directly from the plants.
Foraging techniques vary between species that coexist, which reduces competition; in Namibia, double-banded sandgrouse feed slowly and methodically whilst Namaqua sandgrouse feed rapidly, exploring loose soil with their beaks and flicking it away sideways. Grit is also swallowed to help grind up food in the gizzard.
Sandgrouse are gregarious, feeding in flocks of up to 100 birds. As a consequence of their dry diet, they need to visit water sources regularly. Drinking times vary among the species. Ten species drink at dawn, four at dusk, and two at indeterminate times. When drinking, water is sucked into the beak, which is then raised to let the water flow down into the crop. By repeating this procedure rapidly, enough water to last twenty four hours can be swallowed in a few seconds. As they travel to water holes, they call to members of their own species and many hundreds or thousands synchronise their arrival at the drinking site despite converging from many different locations scattered over hundreds of square miles (kilometres) of territory.
They are vulnerable to attack while watering but with a large number of birds milling about, predators find it difficult to select a target bird and are likely to have been spotted before they can get close to the flock. The choice of a watering site is influenced by the topography of the nearby ground. The sandgrouse tend to avoid sites with cover for mammalian predators and their greatest risk is usually from predatory birds.
Sandgrouse travel tens of miles to their traditional water holes and tend to disregard temporary water sources which may appear periodically. This clearly has a survival value, because a dried up water source in an arid region could result in dehydration and death. The Burchell's sandgrouse in the Kalahari Desert sometimes travels over 100 miles (160 km) daily to reach a water source. Not all species need to drink every day, and the Tibetan sandgrouse does not need to travel to drink, because of the abundance of water from melting snowfields in its habitat. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandgrouse |
Kabbalah | Among problems considered in the Hebrew Kabbalah is the theological issue of the nature and origin of evil. In the views of some Kabbalists this conceives "evil" as a "quality of God", asserting that negativity enters into the essence of the Absolute. In this view it is conceived that the Absolute needs evil to "be what it is", i.e., to exist. Foundational texts of Medieval Kabbalism conceived evil as a demonic parallel to the holy, called the Sitra Achra (the "Other Side"), and the qlippoth (the "shells/husks") that cover and conceal the holy, are nurtured from it, and yet also protect it by limiting its revelation. Scholem termed this element of the Spanish Kabbalah a "Jewish gnostic" motif, in the sense of dual powers in the divine realm of manifestation. In a radical notion, the root of evil is found within the 10 holy Sephirot, through an imbalance of Gevurah, the power of "Strength/Judgement/Severity".
Gevurah is necessary for Creation to exist as it counterposes Chesed ("loving-kindness"), restricting the unlimited divine bounty within suitable vessels, so forming the Worlds. However, if man sins (actualising impure judgement within his soul), the supernal Judgement is reciprocally empowered over the Kindness, introducing disharmony among the Sephirot in the divine realm and exile from God throughout Creation. The demonic realm, though illusory in its holy origin, becomes the real apparent realm of impurity in lower Creation. In the Zohar, the sin of Adam and Eve (who embodied Adam Kadmon below) took place in the spiritual realms. Their sin was that they separated the Tree of knowledge (10 sefirot within Malkuth, representing Divine immanence), from the Tree of life within it (10 sefirot within Tiferet, representing Divine transcendence). This introduced the false perception of duality into lower creation, an external Tree of Death nurtured from holiness, and an Adam Belial of impurity. In Lurianic Kabbalah, evil originates from a primordial shattering of the sephirot of God's Persona before creation of the stable spiritual worlds, mystically represented by the 8 Kings of Edom (the derivative of Gevurah) "who died" before any king reigned in Israel from Genesis 36. In the divine view from above within Kabbalah, emphasised in Hasidic Panentheism, the appearance of duality and pluralism below dissolves into the absolute Monism of God, psychologising evil. Though impure below, what appears as evil derives from a divine blessing too high to be contained openly. The mystical task of the righteous in the Zohar is to reveal this concealed Divine Oneness and absolute good, to "convert bitterness into sweetness, darkness into light". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kabbalah |
Shebaa Farms | The United Nations certified Israel's pullout under Resolution 425 as conforming to the "withdrawal line" it had laid down in accordance with the maps at its disposal "for the practical purpose of confirming the Israeli withdrawal". At the same time the UN noted that its decision was "without prejudice to future border agreements between the Member States concerned," referring to Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. The UN stated:
"On May 15, 2000, the United Nations received a map, dated 1966, from the Government of Lebanon which reflected the Government's position that these farmlands were located in Lebanon. The United Nations is in possession of ten other maps issued after 1966 by various Lebanese government institutions, including the Ministry of Defense and the army, all of which place the farmlands inside the Syrian Arab Republic. The United Nations has also examined six maps issued by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, including three maps since 1966, which place the farmlands inside the Syrian Arab Republic."
In April 2002, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, said:
"With reference to the disturbances along the Blue Line emanating from Lebanese territory, I call on the Government of Lebanon and all relevant parties to condemn and prevent such violations. The Security Council itself confirmed in June 2000 that Israel had withdrawn from southern Lebanon in compliance with UN Security Council resolutions 425 and 426. Attacks at any point along the Blue Line, including in the Shebaa Farms area in the occupied Golan Heights, are violations of Security Council resolutions. Respect for decisions of the Security Council is the most basic requirement of international legitimacy."
On 20 January 2005, UN Secretary-General's report on Lebanon stated:
"The continually asserted position of the Government of Lebanon that the Blue Line is not valid in the Shab'a farms area is not compatible with Security Council resolutions. The Council has recognized the Blue Line as valid for purposes of confirming Israel’s withdrawal pursuant to resolution 425 (1978). The Government of Lebanon should heed the Council’s repeated calls for the parties to respect the Blue Line in its entirety."
The BBC quoted Timur Goksel, then spokesman for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as saying that "no-one disputed that the village of Shebaa itself was in Lebanon, but most of the farms fell into an undefined area that may be either in Lebanon or Syria" and although the UN was not a "boundary marking authority [...] on all maps the UN has been able to find, the farms are seen on the Syrian side [of the border]."
In 2006, Terje Rød-Larsen, the UN special envoy on implementation of Resolution 1559, declared that "the Shaba Farms area is not part of Lebanon. Therefore, any Lebanese 'resistance' to 'liberate' the area from continued Israeli occupation cannot be considered legitimate."
Following the Israeli war against Hezbollah in 2006, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 called for the "Delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including in the Shebaa Farms area." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shebaa_Farms |
Elias Khoury | Khoury published his first novel in 1975, On the Relations of the Circle (Arabic: عن علاقات الدائرة). It was followed in 1977 by The Little Mountain (Arabic: الجبل الصغير), set during the Lebanese Civil War, a conflict that Khoury initially thought would be a catalyst for progressive change. Other works by him include The Journey of Little Gandhi, about a rural immigrant to Beirut who lives through the events of the civil war; and Gate of the Sun (2000), an epic re-telling of the life of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon since the 1948 Palestinian expulsion and flight. The book, which addresses the ideas of memory, truth, and storytelling, was adapted as a film of the same name by Egyptian director Yousry Nasrallah (2002).
In an interview by the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot, after the publication of the Hebrew translation of Gate of the Sun, Khoury remarked:"When I was working on this book, I discovered that the "other" is the mirror of the I. And given that I am writing about half a century of Palestinian experience, it is impossible to read this experience otherwise than in the mirror of the Israeli "other." Therefore, when I was writing this novel, I put a lot of effort into trying to take apart not only the Palestinian stereotype but also the Israeli stereotype as it appears in Arab literature and especially in the Palestinian literature of Ghassan Kanafani, for example, or even of Emil Habibi. The Israeli is not only the policeman or the occupier, he is the "other," who also has a human experience, and we need to read this experience. Our reading of their experience is a mirror to our reading of the Palestinian experience."[1]
Khoury's novel Yalo (2002, translated into English in 2008 by American Peter Theroux) depicted a former militiaman accused of crimes during Lebanon's civil war. He described the use of torture in the Lebanese judicial system. The title refers to the name of a Palestinian Arab village that was annexed by Israel during the 1967 and later destroyed. All the inhabitants were expelled and most went to Jordan. Kirkus Reviews described the book as a "deceptively intricate" story and an "unsparing portrayal of a man without a country, a history or even an identity."
Khoury's novels are notable for their complex approach to political themes and fundamental questions of human behavior. His narrative technique often involves an interior monologue, at times approaching a stream of consciousness. In recent works he has tended to use a considerable element of colloquial Arabic, although the language of his novels remains primarily Modern Standard Arabic. While use of dialect in dialogue is relatively common in modern Arabic literature (for example, in the work of Yusuf Idris), Khoury also uses it in the main narrative, which is unusual in contemporary literature. Khoury has explained this choice by saying, "As long as the official, written language is not opened to the spoken language it is a total repression because it means that the spoken, social experience is marginalised."
In addition to his novels, Khoury has also served in several editorial positions, starting in 1972 when he joined the editorial board of the journal Mawaqif. He served as the editor of the Palestine Liberation Organization's magazine Shu'un Filastiniyya (Palestinian Affairs Magazine) from 1975 to 1979 in collaboration with Mahmoud Darwish. Between 1980 and 1985, Khoury worked as an editor of the series Thakirat Al-Shu'ub, published by the Arab Research Foundation in Beirut. In the 1980s, he was the editorial director first of Al Karmel magazine, and then of the cultural section of Al-Safir. Khoury also worked as the technical director of Beirut Theater from 1992 to 1998, and was a co-director of the Ayloul Festival of Modern Arts.
In 1993, Khoury became the editor of Al-Mulhaq, the cultural supplement of the Lebanese daily newspaper Al-Nahar. Under his leadership, the magazine criticized controversial aspects of Lebanon's post-Civil War reconstruction, which was led by former Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri. In a 2019 article, Khaled Saghieh wrote that Al-Mulhaq was "foundational in launching the debate over memory that would occupy a wide portion of the Lebanese cultural scene in the 1990s."
Khoury's works have been translated and published in Catalan, Dutch, English, French, German, Hebrew, Italian, Portuguese, Romanian, Norwegian, Spanish, and Swedish. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elias_Khoury |
Agriculture in Syria | Syria has produced cotton since ancient times, and its cultivation increased in importance in the 1950s and 1960s. Until superseded by petroleum in 1974, cotton was Syria's most important industrial and cash crop, and the country's most important foreign exchange earner, accounting for about one-third of Syria's export earnings. In 1976, the country was the tenth largest cotton producer in the world and the fourth largest exporter. Almost all the cotton was grown on irrigated land, largely in the area northeast of Aleppo. Syrian cotton was medium staple, similar to cotton produced in other developing countries but of lower quality than the extra-long staple variety produced in Egypt. The cotton was handpicked, although mechanical pickers were tried in the 1970s in an attempt to hold down rising labor costs.
Cotton production (cotton lint) rose from 13,000 tons in 1949 to 180,000 tons in 1965. However, land reform and nationalization of the cotton gins precipitated a sharp decline in output in the next few years. Beginning in 1968 and during the 1970s annual lint production hovered around 150,000 tons. However, in 1983 and 1984, Syria enjoyed a record cotton crop of 523,418 tons, and the third highest yield in the world, estimated at 3 tons per hectare. To a large measure, this increase was attributable to the government's raising cotton procurement prices by 44 percent in 1981–82, and by another 20 percent in 1982–83.
Although the area under cotton cultivation has declined since the early 1960s, yields have increased as a result of improved varieties of seed and increasing amounts of fertilizer. The area planted dropped from over 250,000 hectares in the early 1960s to 140,000 hectares in 1980. In response to the jump in procurement prices by 1984, it increased to 178,000 hectares. As domestic consumption of cotton increased in the 1960s and 1970s, the government built several textile mills to gain the value added from exports of fabrics and clothes compared with exports of raw cotton. In the 1980s, cotton exports averaged 120,000 tons, ranging from a low of 72,800 tons to a record of 151,000 tons in 1983. Syria's seed cotton harvest was 462,000 tons in 1985, about 3 percent higher than in 1984. Approximately 110,000 tons of the 1985 harvest were destined for export markets. Major foreign customers in 1985 included the Soviet Union (18,000 tons), Algeria (14,672 tons), Italy (13,813 tons), and Spain (10,655 tons).
The government's goal of expanding and diversifying food production created intense competition for irrigated land and encouraged the practice of double cropping. Because cotton did not lend itself to double cropping, the cultivated cotton area was declining in real terms. However, the area under cultivation and significance of other industrial crops substantially increased during the 1980s. For example, the government initiated policies designed to stimulate sugar beet cultivation to supply the sugar factories built in the 1970s and 1980s. The area under cultivation for sugar beets rose from 22,000 hectares in 1980 to 35,700 hectares in 1984, with sugar beet harvests totaling over 1 million tons in 1984. Syria, however, still imported LS 287 million worth of sugar in 1984. USDA estimated that Syria would achieve tobacco self-sufficiency in 1985, with harvests of 12.3 million tons (dry weight) compared with 12.2 million tons in 1984. Although yields per hectare fell slightly in 1985, USDA expected imports to match exports. In 1984, Syria imported 559 tons of tobacco and exported 225 tons. Other important commercial crops included olives and tomatoes. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agriculture_in_Syria |
Sennacherib | Despite the defeat of Nergal-ushezib and the flight of the Elamites, Babylonia did not surrender to Sennacherib. The rebel Shuzubu, hunted by Sennacherib in his 700 BC invasion of the south, had resurfaced under the name Mushezib-Marduk and, seemingly without foreign support, acceded to the throne of Babylon. As he was king by 692 BC, but not described in Assyrian sources as "revolting" until 691 BC, it is possible that his rule was initially accepted by Sennacherib. There was also a change in rulership in Elam, where Kutur-Nahhunte was deposed in favor of Humban-menanu, who began assembling the anti-Assyrian coalition once more. Mushezib-Marduk ensured Humban-menanu's support by bribing him. The Assyrian records considered Humban-menanu's decision to support Babylonia to be unintelligent, describing him as a "man without any sense or judgement".
Sennacherib met his enemies in battle near the city of Halule. Humban-menanu and his commander, Humban-undasha, led the Babylonian and Elamite forces. The outcome of the Battle of Halule is unclear since the records of both sides claim a great victory. Sennacherib claims in his annals that Humban-undasha was killed and that the enemy kings fled for their lives whereas the Babylonian chronicles claim that it was the Assyrians who retreated. If the battle was a southern victory, the setback faced by the Assyrians would have to have been minor as Babylon was under siege in the late summer of 690 BC (and had apparently been under siege for some time at that point). The Assyrians had not marched on Babylon immediately, however, as military actions are recorded elsewhere. In 1973, the Assyriologist John A. Brinkman wrote that it was likely that the southerners won the battle, though probably suffering many casualties, since both of Sennacherib's enemies still remained on their respective thrones after the fighting. In 1982, Assyriologist Louis D. Levine wrote that the battle was probably an Assyrian victory, though not a decisive one and that though the southerners had been defeated and fled, the Assyrian advance on Babylon itself was temporarily halted. The Assyrian army's diversion from its course could then be interpreted by the Babylonian chroniclers as an Assyrian retreat.
In 690 BC, Humban-menanu suffered a stroke and his jaw became locked in a way that prevented him from speaking. Taking advantage of the situation, Sennacherib embarked on his final campaign against Babylon. Although the Babylonians were successful initially, that was short-lived, and in the same year, the siege of Babylon was already well underway. It is likely Babylon would have been in a poor position once it fell to Sennacherib in 689 BC, having been besieged for over fifteen months. Although Sennacherib had once anxiously considered the implications of Sargon's seizure of Babylon and the role that the city's offended gods may have played in his father's downfall, his attitude towards the city had shifted by 689 BC. Ultimately, Sennacherib decided to destroy Babylon. Brinkman believed that Sennacherib's change in attitude came from a will to avenge his son and tiring of a city well within the borders of his empire repeatedly rebelling against his rule. According to Brinkman, Sennacherib might have lost the affection he once had for Babylon's gods because they had inspired their people to attack him. Sennacherib's own account of the destruction reads:
Into my land I carried off alive Mušēzib-Marduk, king of Babylonia, together with his family and officials. I counted out the wealth of that city—silver, gold, precious stones, property and goods—into the hands of my people; and they took it as their own. The hands of my people laid hold of the gods dwelling there and smashed them; they took their property and goods.I destroyed the city and its houses, from foundation to parapet; I devastated and burned them. I razed the brick and earthenwork of the outer and inner wall of the city, of the temples, and of the ziggurat; and I dumped these into the Araḫtu canal. I dug canals through the midst of that city, I overwhelmed it with water, I made its very foundations disappear, and I destroyed it more completely than a devastating flood. So that it might be impossible in future days to recognize the site of that city and its temples, I utterly dissolved it with water and made it like inundated land.
Although Sennacherib destroyed the city, he appears to have still been somewhat fearful of Babylon's ancient gods. Earlier in his account of the campaign, he specifically mentions the sanctuaries of the Babylonian deities had provided financial support to his enemies. The passage describing the seizure of the property of the gods and the destruction of some of their statues is one of the few where Sennacherib uses "my people" rather than "I". Brinkman interpreted this in 1973 as leaving the blame of the fate of the temples not personally on Sennacherib himself, but on the decisions made by the temple personnel and the actions of the Assyrian people.
During the destruction of the city, Sennacherib destroyed the temples and the images of the gods, except for that of Marduk, which he took to Assyria. This caused consternation in Assyria itself, where Babylon and its gods were held in high esteem. Sennacherib attempted justifying his actions to his own countrymen through a campaign of religious propaganda. Among the elements of this campaign, he commissioned a myth in which Marduk was put on trial before Ashur, the god of Assyria. This text is fragmentary, but it seems Marduk is found guilty of some grave offense. Sennacherib described his defeat of the Babylonian rebels in the language of the Babylonian creation myth, identifying Babylon with the evil demon-goddess Tiamat and himself with Marduk. Ashur replaced Marduk in the New Year's festival, and in the temple of the festival he placed a symbolic pile of rubble from Babylon. In Babylonia, Sennacherib's policy spawned a deep-seated hatred amongst much of the populace.
Sennacherib's goal was the complete eradication of Babylonia as a political entity. Though some northern Babylonian territories became Assyrian provinces, the Assyrians made no effort to rebuild Babylon itself, and southern chronicles from the time refer to the era as the "kingless" period when there was no king in the land. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sennacherib |
Free Syrian Army | On 6 January 2012, General Mustafa al-Sheikh of the Syrian Army defected from the government forces to join the FSA. General Mustafa al-Sheikh told Reuters that up to 20,000 soldiers in total had deserted the army since the beginning of the conflict, and that the FSA had taken control of large swathes of land. He said in an interview on 12 January 2012: "If we get 25,000 to 30,000 deserters mounting guerrilla warfare in small groups of six or seven it is enough to exhaust the army in a year to a year-and-a-half, even if they are armed only with rocket-propelled grenades and light weapons".
On 7 January 2012, Colonel Afeef Mahmoud Suleima of the Syrian Air Force logistics division defected from Bashar Al Assad's regime along with at least fifty of his men. He announced his group's defection on live television and ordered his men to protect protesters in the city of Hama. Colonel Suleiman declared: "We are from the army and we have defected because the government is killing civilian protesters. The Syrian army attacked Hama with heavy weapons, air raids and heavy fire from tanks. … We ask the Arab League observers to come visit areas affected by air raids and attacks so you can see the damage with your own eyes, and we ask you to send someone to uncover the three cemeteries in Hama filled with more than 460 corpses."
Syrian forces clashed with army deserters in an area near the capital Damascus, opposition activists said. The town of Reef Damascus saw fighting on 1 January as the government forces were hunting for suspected defectors, according to the activists. There were no immediate reports of casualties. According to the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human rights, despite a self-declared ceasefire, Free Syrian Army soldiers in Idlib, on 2 January, overran two checkpoints belonging to security forces and captured dozens of loyalist troops, and launched an attack on a third checkpoint killing and wounding several loyalists. More than a dozen people, including 11 soldiers, were killed in clashes between defectors and loyalists in Basr al-Harir, a town in southern Daraa Governorate, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Shelling and gunfire were also reported in Deir ez-Zor by the LCC. On 14 January, the Syrian Observatory For Human Rights said there was fighting between deserters and loyalist troops in Hula, Homs province, after the defectors destroyed a barricade and a number of security forces were killed or wounded.
In mid-January, the FSA managed to take control over the border town of Zabadani, just 14 miles away from the capital, Damascus. Regular army forces tried to assault the town several times but as of 16 January all attacks were repelled.
On 16 January General Mouaffac Hamzeh in the city of Qusayr in Homs province was announced to have defected to the opposition.
By 26 January, the Damascus suburb of Douma had fallen under control of the Free Syrian Army, with occasional raids by security forces failing to dislodge the rebels, mainly made of armed civilians, and some army defectors, mostly armed with assault rifles and hand grenades. Because of the growing number of defectors, some defectors managed to take their tanks with them. A spokesman for the Free Syrian Army said that more than 100 soldiers defected on 28 January 2012, bringing three tanks along with them. By the end of January and the beginning of February, videos surfaced showing BMP-2 armoured personnel carriers in Homs carrying the Syrian independence flag firing at government forces, supported by FSA soldiers.
On 29 January, there were reports of a new round of high-ranking defections after the Syrian Army was deployed to fight in the Damascus suburbs, some of them joining FSA. At least two generals and hundreds of soldiers with their weapons defected at this time.
Between 29 and 30 January, government forces massed over 2,000 troops and at least 50 tanks and launched a major offensive to reclaim the northern suburbs – held by the FSA – and drive them from the city. By the end of 30 January, it appeared that the operation had been mostly successful, and the FSA had made a tactical withdrawal. 10 FSA fighters and eight government soldiers were killed during the day in the whole country. Two of the defectors died in the Damascus suburb of Rankus, which had been retaken by the military. Another report put the day's death toll in the suburbs at 19 civilians and 6 FSA fighters, while the overall number of those killed in the previous three days, since the fighting in the area started, was 100. The same day, it was reported by opposition activists that one of the original founders of the FSA, Colonel Hussein Harmush, who was captured in late August by Syrian special forces, was executed several weeks earlier.
On 31 January, the Syrian army continued to advance to remove the last FSA pockets. The army fired into the air, as they advanced with tanks even beyond the positions from where the FSA withdrew. Activists told that the suburbs were on unannounced curfew while others were allowed to flee. The army was conducting arrests on suspected people in the district of Arbin. In some instances, curfews were defied by some citizens, who put up a large opposition flag in the centre of Damascus.
On 1 February, the Syrian army extended their operations around Damascus, with more troops moving into the mountainous area of Qaramoun, north of Damascus. Further north, the troops which took the control of Rankous, started to extend their control into farmland surrounding the city. In the eastern suburbs of Mesraba, activist reported that army snipers were positioned and that tanks were in the streets. Initially, 12 people, including six FSA rebels, were killed in fighting in Wadi Barada, located north-west of Damascus in the Rif Damashk governorate, according to the Local Committee of Coordination. Later, the death toll of FSA fighters in the area was raised to 14. The town of Deir Kanoun and Ein al Fija were also under army assaults according to the London-based SOHR. At the same time, SANA reported that, further south in the suburbs Daraa, security forces killed 11 armed fighters and wounded two when they attacked a military bus killing one army sergeant and wounding two others. Also, the Al-Watan newspaper reported that 37 rebel fighters were killed in fighting in Homs and 15 in Rastan, while four soldiers died in Bab Dreib and two in Rastan.
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, troops and army defectors clashed in the northwestern province of Idlib and the southern province of Daraa on 5 February. They report two civilians and nine soldiers killed in Idlib. Five government troops were shot in clashes with rebel fighters in Qalaat al-Madyaq town in restive Hama area, on 14 February.
On the night of 3 February and in the early hours of 4 February, government forces launched a major offensive against Homs, leading to over 200 deaths and 800 injuries. FSA forces engaged loyalist forces and threatened reprisals particularly in Damascus. On 10 February, Sky News reported that the FSA had taken full control of the northern city of Idlib. However, Syrian tanks were surrounding Idlib, and citizens and defected soldiers feared a new offensive. Renewed fighting in the Idlib province was reported on 11 February.
On 6 February 2012, Riad al-Asaad voiced his concern about the SNC's lack of political and material support for the FSA, and stated that if differences could not be resolved the FSA would break off its relations with the SNC.
Heavy fighting had taken place in the town of Al-Qusayr in Homs since 13 February, when the FSA captured the headquarters of the secret service in Homs, killing five agents in the process. Remaining government troops retreated to the town hall and hospital in the city. Four tanks came to reinforce them. However, 1 of the 4 tanks as well as 30 soldiers defected to the opposition, where the tank, aided by tractors and trucks, took out remaining government positions and the other 3 tanks. During the Battle of Al-Qusayr, FSA fighters were able to establish full control of the city. They said 20 government soldiers had been killed and 80 had fled. FSA fighters said 1 of their men had been killed and another 6 wounded during the battle.
Around 18 February 2012, General Fayez Amro of the Syrian Air Force, who was from the Bab Amr district in Homs and of Turkmen origin, defected to Turkey.
Another intelligence general from the Syrian army also defected at this time to Turkey. His name was not disclosed due to security reasons, opposition forces said.
22 February, a brigadier general defected in Idlib with 200 of his soldiers. In March, General Adnan Farzat from the city of Rastan and two other generals defected. Turkish government sources reported that same month a surge in desertions with 20,000 desertions in the past month alone bringing the total number of deserters from the Syrian army to over 60,000 soldiers.
In February 2012, Fahad Al Masri was one of the founders of the first joint command of the Free Syrian Army Interior, along with Colonel Qassem Saad Eddin and other officers, and helped strengthen the formation of military councils, at the governorate level, and the establishment of press offices. Al Masri was accredited as the movement's spokesman.
In late February 2012, the Syrian National Council established a military bureau to oversee military operations. This initiative was met with criticism by Free Syrian Army leaders who said that they had not been informed. Defected General Mustafa al-Sheikh created a similar discord in the army when he established a rival group called the Higher Military Revolutionary Council which was rejected by the FSA leadership and field units.
Earlier the Muslim Brotherhood had also tried to coopt the FSA but the leadership rejected their attempt. Colonel Al Kurdi, the deputy leader of the FSA, dismissed the internal disputes and said that despite disagreements, the opposition remained united against the government and in their call for arms.
In late 2011, the FSA established control over a number of towns and villages across Idlib province.
Later in January 2012, the Free Syrian Army succeeded in taking control of the town of Zabadani in Damascus province, following intense clashes with the regular troops.
On 21 January, the FSA temporarily captured the town of Douma, near Damascus.
The Free Syrian Army also for three months controlled around two-thirds of Homs, Syria's third largest city, according to Syrian military officers inside the city.
In January, some Damascus suburbs fell under partial opposition control. For example, the town of Saqba, an eastern suburb of Damascus fell under opposition control for a week until the FSA was forced to tactically retreat into the local population after sustaining heavy bombardment by the Syrian Army. In late February, the city of Idlib was under opposition control, with opposition flags flying in the city centre. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_Syrian_Army |
Antioch | In 637, during the reign of the Byzantine emperor Heraclius, Antioch was conquered by Abu Ubayda ibn al-Jarrah of the Rashidun Caliphate during the Battle of the Iron Bridge, marking the beginning of Islamic influence in the region. The city became known in Arabic as أنطاكية Anṭākiyah. Under the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 AD), Antioch served as a significant military and administrative center. The Umayyads fortified the city, utilizing it as a base for operations in the region. The city remained an important urban center, with its multicultural population including Christians, Muslims, and Jews living together, although there were periods of tension and conflict. However, since the Umayyad dynasty was unable to penetrate the Anatolian Plateau, Antioch found itself on the frontline of the conflicts between two hostile empires during the next 350 years, so that the city went into a precipitous decline. During the Abbasid period (750–969 AD), Antioch continued to thrive as a hub of commerce and culture. Under the Abbasids, closer relations were developed with Byzantium, but it was not until the Fatimids opened up the Mediterranean for shipping from the end of the fourth/tenth century that the affairs of western Europe and the Near East began to interact once again. The Abbasids placed a strong emphasis on trade, which facilitated economic prosperity in Antioch. The city became known for its diverse markets, contributing to the flow of goods and ideas between the Islamic world and the Byzantine Empire.
The decline of Arab rule in Antioch began in the late 9th century with increasing pressure from the Byzantine forces. The city changed hands several times during the Byzantine-Arab wars, Before finally, in 969 AD, under the Byzantine Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas, the city was captured after the siege of Antioch (968–969) by the Byzantine general Michael Bourtzes and the stratopedarches Peter. It soon became the seat of a doux, the civil governor of the homonymous theme, but also the seat of the somewhat more important Domestic of the Schools of the Orient, the supreme military commander of the imperial forces on the eastern frontier. Sometimes both offices were held by the same person, usually military officers such as Nikephoros Ouranos, or Philaretos Brachamios, who managed to retain the integrity of the eastern borderline after the Seljuk conquest of Anatolia. The size of the Melkite community increased during that time due to immigration from Christians from Fatimid Egypt but also other parts of the Near East and Christians remained the dominant population up to the Crusades.
As the empire disintegrated rapidly before the Komnenian restoration, Dux of Antioch & Domestic of the Schools of the East Philaretos Brachamios held the city until Suleiman ibn Qutalmish, the emir of Rum, captured it from him in 1084. Two years later, Suleiman was killed fighting against Tutush, the brother of the Seljuk Sultan, who annexed the city into the Seljuk Empire. Yagisiyan was appointed governor. He became increasingly independent within the tumultuous years following Malik-Shah's death in 1092. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antioch |
Haider al-Abadi | On 24 July 2014, Fuad Masum became the new president of Iraq. He, in turn, nominated al-Abadi for prime minister on 11 August. For the appointment to take effect, al-Abadi was required to form a government to be confirmed by Parliament within 30 days. Al-Maliki, however, refused to give up his post and referred the matter to the federal court claiming the president's nomination was a "constitutional violation". He said, "The insistence on this until the end is to protect the state." On 14 August 2014, in the face of growing calls from world leaders and members of his own party, the embattled prime minister announced he was stepping down to make way for al-Abadi. The announcement of the leadership transition from al-Maliki to al-Abadi triggered a major realignment of Sunni Arab public opinion away from armed opposition groups and to the Iraqi government, since many Iraqi Sunni Arabs were optimistic that the new government would address their grievances and deliver public goods and services to them.
The Iraqi Parliament approved al-Abadi's new government and his presidential program on 8 September 2014. In the months after assuming office in September 2014, Abadi made determined efforts to increase Sunni participation in the Iraqi government. Abadi appointed Khaled al-Obaidi, a prominent Sunni politician from Mosul, as his Defense Minister, and the appointment was ratified by the Iraqi parliament after two months. In mid-December 2014, Abadi forged a new revenue-sharing agreement with the Kurds, under which Baghdad agreed to pay the Kurdish Regional Government one half of all income from Kurdish-controlled oil fields. To counter the widespread corruption in the army stemming from the Maliki years, Abadi announced that 50,000 "ghost soldiers" had been identified and would be removed from army payrolls. "Ghost soldiers" were men on army payrolls who never showed up for duty, but paid their officers part of their salaries, thus institutionalizing corruption and hollowing out the armed forces.
Iraqi President Fuad Masum paid a goodwill visit to Saudi Arabia in November 2014. In response, Saudi Arabia prepared to reopen its embassy in Baghdad, which had remained closed since the start of the Gulf War in 1990. Abadi has also visited Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey to discuss regional strategies to combat militant Islamist forces. Foreign Affairs magazine has written that after four months in power, Abadi's attempts to resolve Iraq's sectarian strife make his premiership "a welcome change from the schismatic style of his predecessor". As a result of Abadi's reforms, the United States pledged $1.5 billion to train Iraqi forces and announced the sale of F-16 fighter jets, suspended after the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Combating political corruption was an early priority of the al-Abadi administration. In August 2015, al-Abadi unveiled a plan to strengthen the government by, among other things, eliminating security details for senior officials and cutting benefits to specific high-level officials.
Al-Abadi was forced to contend with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant as prime minister; he was sometimes critical of Barack Obama and the United States military response to the threat of ISIL. Furthermore, al-Abadi pivoted closer towards Russia and Iran in order to combat the threat of ISIL and encouraged cooperation between these nations on military operations in the region.
In April, 2016, al-Abadi's difficulties in implementing political reforms led to the storming of the Iraqi parliament by supporters of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The protesters breaching the Green Zone and disrupting the parliament have been described as evidence of Iraq's increasingly dysfunctional political system and al-Abadi's problems in getting corruption under control.
On 9 December 2017, Prime Minister Al-Abadi announced victory over ISIL and the end of the Iraqi Civil War (2014-2017).
Abadi was succeeded by Adil Abdul-Mahdi on 25 October 2018. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haider_al-Abadi |
Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate | Following the events of 1860, a large number of the Druze migrated to Hauran and Jabal al-Arab and settled there. In 1869, the Suez Canal was opened, shortening the road between Europe and the countries of the Ottoman Arab East. When Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, security prevailed and trade flourished greatly, so Lebanese immigrants came to the region, either to escape the oppression of the feudal lords and governors, or to seek livelihood. Many of them have succeeded, amassing huge fortunes and occupying prominent positions in administration, journalism and commerce. Among the most prominent settlers in Egypt were Salim and Bishara Taqla, Yaqoub Sarouf and Faris Nimr, sheikh Rashid Rida, and Jurji Zaidan.
After Egypt, Lebanese immigrants headed to North and South American countries such as the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. The news about the fertility of the soil and richness of life in the New World and Australia was spread, expanded and magnified, to the Arab East, tempting people and pushing them to migrate. It is said that the first of these was a young man from the village of Salima named Antoine Al-Busha'lāni, who landed in Boston in 1854, and died in New York two years later. In commemoration of his 100th anniversary, the Lebanese government considered 1955 the year of expatriates, so it received their delegations in that year and held large festivals in their honour. The Lebanese writer Mikhail Naimy talks about immigration during the Mutasarrifate era during the year 1900 and how it tore his family apart:
"In the fall of that year, the news of the death of my eldest uncle Ibrahim came to us from Egypt. His death was a disaster... for my mother, who... was so saddened that she neglected herself, her home, and her children, including her infant child. And the drunkness goes and the contemplation comes. Died who had died...And the mulberry orchard in the village will not produce silk that fills the family treasury with pennies. Where is the exit? – America! With a heavy heart, my mother makes the decision to send my brother Adib to the United States...His father had traveled before him and had not succeeded. Perhaps he will be more fortunate than his father... Perhaps he will return after years to pull the family from the bottom to the top, as some of the sons of Baskinta did. My father reluctantly acquiesces... But the problem of the "Nāwlūn" remains – the air ticket. It was about twenty gold pounds. My father owes the sum from my uncle Suleiman... My brother Adib, upon the blessings of God, travels with a group of Baskinta's sons and daughters, and he is the youngest of them."
In the era of the Mutasarrifate, the number of Lebanese immigrants to Australia and the New World began to increase steadily, and their money continued to flow to their families, so immigration became a highly talked-about topic among the people in the mountain villages. It is narrated that the cordwainer "Faddūl Mitrī Bshāra" immigrated from the town of Shweir to Brazil around the year 1885. No sooner had two years passed since his emigration until he sent to his father in Lebanon fifty pounds in gold. His father was given the money sent to him, so he bought broadcloth pants, a precious overcoat, and a cashmere shawl, and started strutting in the Shweir market. The town was shocked and eighty people rushed to America in one year and traveled at once. It is said that, between 1900 and 1915, 100,000 citizens left Mount Lebanon, a number that amounted to a quarter of the total population at the time. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mount_Lebanon_Mutasarrifate |
Demon | The ancient Mesopotamians believed that the underworld was home to many demons, which are sometimes referred to as "offspring of arali". These demons could sometimes leave the underworld and terrorize mortals on earth. One class of demons that were believed to reside in the underworld were known as galla; their primary purpose appears to have been to drag unfortunate mortals back to Kur. They are frequently referenced in magical texts, and some texts describe them as being seven in number. Several extant poems describe the galla dragging the god Dumuzid into the underworld. Like other demons, however, galla could also be benevolent and, in a hymn from King Gudea of Lagash (c. 2144 – 2124 BCE), a minor god named Ig-alima is described as "the great galla of Girsu".
Lamashtu was a demonic goddess with the "head of a lion, the teeth of a donkey, naked breasts, a hairy body, hands stained (with blood?), long fingers and fingernails, and the feet of Anzû". She was believed to feed on the blood of human infants and was widely blamed as the cause of miscarriages and cot deaths. Although Lamashtu has traditionally been identified as a demoness, the fact that she could cause evil on her own without the permission of other deities strongly indicates that she was seen as a goddess in her own right. Mesopotamian peoples protected against her using amulets and talismans. She was believed to ride in her boat on the river of the underworld and she was associated with donkeys. She was believed to be the daughter of An.
Pazuzu is a demonic god who was well known to the Babylonians and Assyrians throughout the first millennium BCE. He is shown with "a rather canine face with abnormally bulging eyes, a scaly body, a snake-headed penis, the talons of a bird and usually wings". He was believed to be the son of the god Hanbi. He was usually regarded as evil, but he could also sometimes be a beneficent entity who protected against winds bearing pestilence and he was thought to be able to force Lamashtu back to the underworld. Amulets bearing his image were positioned in dwellings to protect infants from Lamashtu and pregnant women frequently wore amulets with his head on them as protection from her.
Šul-pa-e's name means "youthful brilliance", but he was not envisioned as youthful god. According to one tradition, he was the consort of Ninhursag, a tradition which contradicts the usual portrayal of Enki as Ninhursag's consort. In one Sumerian poem, offerings made to Šhul-pa-e in the underworld and, in later mythology, he was one of the demons of the underworld.
According to The Jewish Encyclopedia, originally published in 12 volumes from 1901 to 1906, "In Chaldean mythology the seven evil deities were known as shedu, storm-demons, represented in ox-like form." They were represented as winged bulls, derived from the colossal bulls used as protective jinn of royal palaces. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demon |
1950–1951 Baghdad bombings | Historian Abbas Shiblak, Iraqi Jew Naeim Giladi and CIA agent Wilbur Crane Eveland have argued that Jews were involved in the bombings.
In 1949, Zionist emissary Yudka Rabinowitz complained that the complacency of the Iraqi Jews was "hampering our existence" and proposed to the Mossad "throwing several hand-grenades for intimidation into cafes with a largely Jewish clientele, as well as leaflets threatening the Jews and demanding their expulsion from Berman", using the code name for Iraq. The Mossad forbade him to conduct negotiations about or carry out any acts of terror, an order which he reported that he had "confirmed and accepted".
According to Moshe Gat, as well as Meir-Glitzenstein, Samuel Klausner, Rayyan Al-Shawaf and Yehouda Shenhav, there is "wide consensus among Iraqi Jews that the emissaries threw the bombs in order to hasten the Jews' departure from Iraq". Shenhav noted an Israeli Foreign Ministry memo which stated that Iraqi Jews reacted to the hangings of Salah and Basri with the attitude: "That is God's revenge on the movement that brought us to such depths."
The British Embassy in Baghdad assessed that the bombings were carried out by Zionist activists trying to highlight the danger to Iraqi Jews, in order influence the State of Israel to accelerate the pace of Jewish emigration. Another possible explanation offered by the embassy was that bombs were meant to change the minds of well-off Jews who wished to stay in Iraq.
In a 1954 operation by Israeli military intelligence, known as the Lavon Affair after the defence minister Pinchas Lavon, a group of Zionist Egyptian Jews attempted to plant bombs in a US Information Service library, and in a number of American targets in Cairo and Alexandria. According to Teveth, they were hoping that the Muslim Brotherhood, the Communists, 'unspecified malcontents' or 'local nationalists' would be blamed for their actions and this would undermine Western confidence in the existing Egyptian regime by generating public insecurity and actions to bring about arrests, demonstrations, and acts of revenge, while totally concealing the Israeli factor. The operation failed, the perpetrators were arrested by Egyptian police and brought to justice, two were sentenced to death, several to long term imprisonment.
The Israeli government has denied any link to the Baghdad bombings, and blamed Iraqi nationalists for the attacks on the Iraqi Jews. However, according to Shalom Cohen, when the Lavon affair broke in Israel, Lavon remarked, "This method of operating was not invented for Egypt. It was tried before in Iraq."
The Iraqi Jewish anti-Zionist author Naeim Giladi maintains that the bombings were "perpetrated by Zionist agents in order to cause fear amongst the Jews, and so promote their exodus to Israel." This theory is shared by Uri Avnery, who wrote in My friend, the enemy that "After the disclosure of the Lavon Affair... the Baghdad affair became more plausible" and Marion Wolfsohn.
Palestinian historian Abbas Shiblak believes that the attacks were committed by Zionist activists and that the attacks were the pre-eminent reason for the subsequent exodus of Iraqi Jews to Israel. Shiblak also argues that the attacks were an attempt to sour Iraq-American relations, saying "The March 1951 attack on the US Information Centre was probably an attempt to portray the Iraqis as anti-American and to gain more support for the Zionist cause in the United States".
Moshe Gat asserts that Avnery wrote "without checking facts", that Woolfsons writing serves to "distort the dates of the explosions" and that these works "served as the basis for the arguments of the Palestinian author Abbas Shiblak".
Giladi claims that it is also supported by Wilbur Crane Eveland, a former senior officer in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in his book Ropes of Sand. According to Eveland, whose information was presumably based on the Iraqi official investigation, which was shared with the US embassy, "In an attempt to portray the Iraqis as anti-American and to terrorize the Jews, the Zionists planted bombs in the U.S. Information Service library and in the synagogues. Soon leaflets began to appear urging Jews to flee to Israel... most of the world believed reports that Arab terrorism had motivated the flight of the Iraqi Jews whom the Zionists had 'rescued' really just in order to increase Israel’s Jewish population."
Shimon Mendes wrote in Ha'aretz that: "Someone had to act, and he took the appropriate action at the right time. For only an act like the explosions would have brought them to Israel. Anyone who understood politics and developments in Israel was long aware of that."
Yehuda Tajar, who spent ten years in Iraqi prison for his alleged involvement in the bombings, was interviewed in Arthur Neslen's 2006 book "Occupied Minds". According to Tajar, the widow of one of the Jewish activists, Yosef Beit-Halahmi, implied he had organized attacks after his colleagues were arrested for the Masuda Shemtov synagogue bombing, to prove that those on trial were not the perpetrators. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1950%E2%80%931951_Baghdad_bombings |
Diwan (poetry) | Ottoman Divan poetry was a highly ritualized and symbolic art form. From the Persian poetry that largely inspired it, it inherited a wealth of symbols whose meanings and interrelationships—both of similitude (مراعات نظير mura'ât-i nazîr / تناسب
tenâsüb) and opposition (تضاد tezâd)—were more or less prescribed. Examples of prevalent symbols that, to some extent, oppose one another include, among others:
the nightingale (بلبل bolbol) – the rose (ﮔل gol)
the world (جهان cihan; عالم ‘âlem) – the rosegarden (ﮔﻠﺴﺘﺎن golistan; ﮔﻠﺸﻦ golshen)
the ascetic (زاهد zâhid) – the dervish (درويش darvish)
As the opposition of "the ascetic" and "the darvish" suggests, Divan poetry—much like Turkish folk poetry—was heavily influenced by Sufi thought. One of the primary characteristics of Divan poetry, however—as of the Persian poetry before it—was its mingling of the mystical Sufi element with a profane and even erotic element. Thus, the pairing of "the nightingale" and "the rose" simultaneously suggests two different relationships:
the relationship between the fervent lover ("the nightingale") and the inconstant beloved ("the rose")
the relationship between the individual Sufi practitioner (who is often characterized in Sufism as a lover) and God (who is considered the ultimate source and object of love)
Similarly, "the world" refers simultaneously to the physical world and to this physical world considered as the abode of sorrow and impermanence, while "the rosegarden" refers simultaneously to a literal garden and to the garden of Paradise. "The nightingale", or suffering lover, is often seen as situated—both literally and figuratively—in "the world", while "the rose", or beloved, is seen as being in "the rosegarden".
Divan poetry was composed through the constant juxtaposition of many such images within a strict metrical framework, thus allowing numerous potential meanings to emerge. A brief example is the following line of verse, or mısra (مصراع), by the 18th-century judge and poet Hayatî Efendi:
بر گل مى وار بو گلشن ﻋالمدﻪ خارسز
Bir gül mü var bu gülşen-i ‘âlemde hârsız
("Does any rose, in this rosegarden world, lack thorns?")
Here, the nightingale is only implied (as being the poet/lover), while the rose, or beloved, is shown to be capable of inflicting pain with its thorns (خار hâr). The world, as a result, is seen as having both positive aspects (it is a rosegarden, and thus analogous to the garden of Paradise) and negative aspects (it is a rosegarden full of thorns, and thus different from the garden of Paradise). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diwan_(poetry) |
Mount Gerizim | A Samaritan temple dedicated to Yahweh was built on Mount Gerizim during the 5th century BCE. It existed alongside the Jewish Second Temple in Jerusalem. By that point, the Israelites were divided as "Samaritans" and "Jews", both claiming descendance from the Biblical Israelites and preaching adherence to the Torah, but diverging on the holiest place on Earth to adore God: Mount Gerizim, for the Samaritans, and Jerusalem, for the Jews.
An adjacent city was built by the Samaritans during the 3rd century BCE, and became the center for the Samaritan population. Religious rivalry between Samaritans and Jews led to Mount Gerizim being destroyed by the latter in 112-111 BCE, on orders of John Hyrcanus.
Even after the destruction of their temple by the Jews, Mount Gerizim continued to be the holy place for the Samaritans, as mentioned in the New Testament. Coins produced by a Roman mint situated in Nablus, dated to 138–161 CE, seemingly depict the destroyed Samaritan temple, showing a huge temple complex, statues, and a substantive staircase leading from Nablus to the temple itself.
In the Gospel of John of the Christian New Testament, in his discussion with the Samaritan woman at the well, Jesus reveals his feeling about worshipping in either Mount Gerizim (as the Samaritans did) or Jerusalem (as the Jews then did):Jesus said to her, "Woman, believe me, the hour is coming when you will worship the Father neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem. You worship what you do not know; we worship what we know, for salvation is from the Jews. But the hour is coming, and is now here, when the true worshipers will worship the Father in spirit and truth, for the Father seeks such as these to worship him. God is spirit, and those who worship him must worship in spirit and truth."
In 36 CE, unrest flared in Samaria when a charismatic figure rallied Samaritans to Mount Gerizim, claiming to unearth sacred vessels buried by Moses. Pontius Pilate, Roman governor of Judaea, alarmed by the growing assembly, deployed troops to block their ascent. This led to clashes, fatalities, and arrests, prompting Samaritan leaders to accuse Pilate of brutality. In response, Vitellius, the legate of Syria, appointed Marcellus to govern Judaea and recalled Pilate to Rome for investigation by Emperor Tiberius, who died before Pilate's arrival.
In the summer of 67 CE, during the First Jewish–Roman War, a large group of Samaritans gathered on Mount Gerizim. Vespasian dispatched Cerialis, who commanded Legio V Macedonica, with a small force of 600 cavalry and 3,000 infantry, probably banking on the Samaritans' lack of defenses and summer water shortages. While some surrendered upon the Romans' arrival, the majority chose to fight. The conflict resulted in significant Samaritan casualties, totaling 11,600, according to Josephus.
Eventually, when Christianity became the state church of the Roman Empire, Samaritans were barred from worshiping on Mount Gerizim. In 475 CE a Christian church was built on its summit. In 484, during the reign of Emperor Zeno, an octagonal, martyrium-type church dedicated to the Theotokos, the God-bearing Virgin Mary, was erected at the site. In 529, Justinian I made Samaritanism illegal, and arranged for a protective wall to be constructed around the church. As a result, the same year, Julianus ben Sabar led a pro-Samaritan revolt, and by 530 had captured most of Samaria, destroying churches and killing the priests and officials. However, in 531, after Justinian enlisted the help of Ghassanids, the revolt was completely quashed, and surviving Samaritans were mostly enslaved or exiled. In 533 Justinian had a castle constructed on Mount Gerizim to protect the church from raids by the few disgruntled Samaritans left in the area.
According to the Continuatio of the Samaritan Chronicle of Abu'l-Fath, during Sukkot in the seventh year of Abbasid Caliph al-Mutawakkil's reign (855 CE), the governor of Nablus forbade Samaritans from praying aloud and blowing the shofar. However, the following Thursday, they ascended the mountain and prayed loudly without interruption. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mount_Gerizim |
Enjoining good and forbidding wrong | Al-Ghazali provides "a survey" of wrongs commonly found in the mosque, the market, the street, the bath-house and hospitality".
For example, in "hospitality" there may be,
"laying out silk coverings for men, using censers made of silver or gold, hanging curtains with images on them [images of sentient beings are forbidden among some branches of Islam] and listening to musical instruments or singing-girls. Then there is the scandal of women gathering on roofs to watch men when there are youths among them who could give rise to temptation. Or forbidden food may be served or the house may be one occupied illegally, or someone present may be drinking wine or wearing silk or a golden signet ring, or a heretic may be holding forth about his heresy, or some joker may be regaling the party with ribald and untruthful humour. (Humour that is neither untruthful nor indecorous is acceptable in moderation, provided it does not become a habit.) On top of all this there may be extravagance and wastefulness."
Common wrongdoing described by Al-Ghazali committed (for example in the marketplace) may be divided into categories such as
commercial dishonesty (e.g. passing off used goods as new, concealing defects in goods),
transactions that violate Islamic law (e.g. allowing the customer to pay over time but charging interest), and
selling goods forbidden by Islamic law (musical instruments, wine).
On the other hand, looking at the violations (found not just in the marketplace) through modern eyes, they can be categorized into a different set of norms being violated:
Narrow "religious norms", such as "sloppy prayer, faulty recitation of the Quran". These were relatively rare, based on the fact that they were seldom mentioned in sources available to determine "what forbidding wrong was really like" in the pre-modern Islamic world, i.e. the writings of the same scholars who wrote about forbidding wrong.
"Secular norms", i.e. the straightward "rights of other humans in this world", such as commercial dishonesty mentioned above and things like "blocking a street". These were even more rare than violations of the narrow "religious norms. It "is worth noting", however, that among these violations Al-Ghazali gives no sign of ... a concern for what we might call social justice", though there are occasional references to injustices such as a master beating his slave, or a man depriving "his sisters of rights of inheritance",
"puritanical norms", usually involving "wine, women and song". These violations, "are by far" the most widespread of the three kinds of wrongs, and among these "puritanical" violations, "liquor and music" were "the most widespread" wrongs "by far", with forbidden relations between the sexes taking "a poor third" according to the scholars. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enjoining_good_and_forbidding_wrong |
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Wildberg, Christian (1988). John Philoponus' Criticism of Aristotle's Theory of Aether. De Gruyter. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ancient_Greek_astronomy |
Sennacherib | After the Babylonian war, Sennacherib's second campaign was in the Zagros Mountains. There, he subdued the Yasubigallians, a people from east of the Tigris river, and the Kassites, a people who had ruled Babylonia centuries before. Sennacherib's third campaign, directed against the kingdoms and city-states in the Levant, is very well-documented compared to many other events in the ancient Near East and is the best-documented event in the history of Israel during the First Temple period. In 705 BC, Hezekiah, the king of Judah, had stopped paying his annual tribute to the Assyrians and began pursuing a markedly aggressive foreign policy, probably inspired by the recent wave of anti-Assyrian rebellions across the empire. After conspiring with Egypt (then under Kushite rule) and Sidqia, an anti-Assyrian king of the city of Ashkelon, to garner support, Hezekiah attacked Philistine cities loyal to Assyria and captured the Assyrian vassal Padi, king of Ekron, and imprisoned him in his capital, Jerusalem. In the northern Levant, former Assyrian vassal cities rallied around Luli, the king of Tyre and Sidon. Sennacherib's arch-enemy Marduk-apla-iddina encouraged the anti-Assyrian sentiment among some of the empire's western vassals. He corresponded with and sent gifts to western rulers like Hezekiah, probably hoping to assemble a vast anti-Assyrian alliance.
In 701 BC, Sennacherib first moved to attack the Syro-Hittite and Phoenician cities in the north. Like many rulers of these cities had done before and would do again, Luli fled rather than face the wrath of the Assyrians, escaping by boat until he was beyond Sennacherib's reach. In his stead, Sennacherib proclaimed a noble by the name Ethbaal as the new king of Sidon and his vassal and oversaw the submission of many of the surrounding cities to his rule. Faced with a massive Assyrian army nearby, many of the Levantine rulers, including Budu-ilu of Ammon, Kamusu-nadbi of Moab, Mitinti of Ashdod and Aya-ramu of Edom, quickly submitted to Sennacherib to avoid retribution.
The resistance in the southern Levant was not as easily suppressed, forcing Sennacherib to invade the region. The Assyrians began by taking Ashkelon and defeating Sidqia. They then besieged and took numerous cities, including Beth-Dagon, Joppa, Banai-Barqa, and Azjuru. As the Assyrians were preparing to retake Ekron, Hezekiah's ally, Egypt, intervened in the conflict. The Assyrians defeated the Egyptian expedition in a battle near the city of Eltekeh. They took the cities of Ekron and Timnah and Judah stood alone, with Sennacherib setting his sights on Jerusalem. While a portion of Sennacherib's troops prepared to blockade Jerusalem, Sennacherib himself marched on the important Judean city of Lachish. Both the blockade of Jerusalem and the siege of Lachish probably prevented further Egyptian aid from reaching Hezekiah, and intimidated the kings of other smaller states in the region. The siege of Lachish, which ended in the city's destruction, was so lengthy that the defenders eventually began using arrowheads made of bone rather than metal, which had run out. To take the city, the Assyrians constructed a great siege mound, a ramp made of earth and stone, to reach the top of Lachish's walls. After they had destroyed the city, the Assyrians deported the survivors to the Assyrian Empire, forcing some of them to work on Sennacherib's building projects, and others to serve in the king's personal guard. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sennacherib |
Persian Gulf campaign of 1809 | The British flotilla arrived off the independent town of Ras Al Khaimah on 11 November, discovering Minerva and a fleet of dhows in the harbour. The pirate fleet initially sailed out to attack the British but retreated once the size of the expeditionary force became clear. Minerva failed to make the return to port successfully and was wrecked on a sandbank, the crew setting fire to their ship to prevent her seizure by boats launched from Chiffonne. Onshore, the Al Qasimi and their Bedouin allies (whose numbers are unknown, but were significantly less than 20,000) formed a series of emplaced defences around the town that were protected from offshore bombardment by sandbanks that blocked the approach of Wainwright's heavier warships. On 12 November, Wainwright deployed his smaller ships close inshore to bombard the town and provide cover for his troop dispositions offshore.
At 02:00 on 13 November, two squadrons of ship's boats made amphibious landings: a small force under Lieutenant Samuel Leslie landed to the north of the emplaced positions, acting as a diversion while the main body of the expeditionary force landed to the south under Lieutenant Colonel Smith. Leslie's diversion distracted the Arab defenders, but enough remained in the southern defences to make a significant counterattack on Smith's beachhead. Cannon fire from the ship's boats covering the landing drove the Arabs back, and Smith ordered his men to advance with their bayonets fixed, pushing into the town and driving out the Arabs house by house. To cover their advance, Smith's men set fire to the buildings in their path, which created a pall of smoke under cover of which Smith was able to storm and capture the Sheik's palace.
With the harbour secure, Wainwright ordered the squadron into the bay and there burnt over 50 Al Qasimi craft, including 30 large bhagalas. Smith secured the town itself, burning warehouses and destroying the ammunition stores and fortifications around the town. The Arab forces, who had retreated after the fall of the palace, taunted the British from the surrounding hills but did not make any counterattacks. By the morning of 14 November, the operation was complete and the British force returned to their ships, having suffered light casualties of five killed and 34 wounded. Arab losses are unknown, but were probably significant, while the damage done to the Al Qasimi fleets was severe: over half of the largest and most dangerous vessels had been destroyed at Ras Al Khaimah. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian_Gulf_campaign_of_1809 |
Women's rights in Saudi Arabia | Western critics often compare the treatment of Saudi women to a system of apartheid, analogous with South Africa's treatment of non-whites during South Africa's apartheid era. As evidence, they cite restrictions on travel, fields of study, choice of profession, access to the courts, and political speech. Mona Eltahawy, a columnist for The New York Times wrote, "Saudi women are denied many of the same rights that 'Blacks' and 'Coloreds' were denied in apartheid South Africa and yet the Kingdom still belongs to the very same international community that kicked Pretoria out of its club."
Some commentators have argued that Saudi gender policies constitute a crime against humanity and warrant intervention from the international community. They criticize the U.S. government for decrying the Taliban's sexist policies while allied to Saudi Arabia. Mary Kaldor views gender apartheid in Saudi Arabia as similar to that enforced by the Taliban in Afghanistan. In contrast, political commentator Daniel Pipes sees Saudi gender apartheid as tempered by other practices, such as allowing women to attend school and work.
Critics also blame Western corporations that cooperate with the enforcement of gender segregation. American chains such as Starbucks and Pizza Hut maintain separate eating areas; the men's areas are typically high-quality, whereas the women's are rundown and sometimes even lack seats. In a 2001 column, Washington Post editor Colbert I. King commented:
As with Saudi Arabia, white-ruled South Africa viewed external criticism as a violation of its sovereignty and interference with its internal affairs. And U.S. corporations in South Africa, as with their Saudi Arabian counterparts, pleaded that they had no choice but to defer to the local 'culture.'
King went on to question why there is nothing like the Sullivan Principles for gender-based discrimination. Journalist Anne Applebaum argues that gender apartheid in Saudi Arabia gets a free pass from American feminists. She questions why American civil rights leaders like Jesse Jackson were active in protesting South Africa's racial apartheid, but American feminists rarely venture beyond reproductive rights when discussing international politics: "Until this changes, it will be hard to mount a campaign, in the manner of the anti-apartheid movement, to enforce sanctions or codes of conduct for people doing business there."
Cultural relativism is the root of activist inaction according to feminists such as Azar Majedi, Pamela Bone, and Maryam Namazie. They argue that political Islam is misogynistic, and the desire of Western liberals to tolerate Islam blinds them to women's rights violations. Majedi and Namazie, both born in Iran, consider cultural relativism racist: "To put it bluntly, according to this concept, because of my birthplace, I should enjoy fewer rights relative to a woman born in Sweden, England, or France." Pamela Bone argues feminist apathy is supported by "the dreary cultural relativism that pervades the thinking of so many of those once described as on the Left. We are no better than they are. We should not impose our values on them. We can criticise only our own. The problem with this mindset is that, with all its faults, Western culture is clearly, objectively, better." Bone argues that cultural relativism comes from a fear that criticizing Islam will be considered racist.
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, an American specialist in Islamic law, sees gender apartheid as enshrined in the Saudi Basic Law:
Article 9. The family is the kernel of Saudi society, and its members shall be brought up on the basis of the Islamic faith, and loyalty and obedience to Allah, His Messenger, and to guardians; respect for and implementation of the law, and love of and pride in the homeland and its glorious history as the Islamic faith stipulates.Article 10. The state will aspire to strengthen family ties, maintain its Arab and Islamic values and care for all its members, and to provide the right conditions for the growth of their resources and capabilities.
Mayer argues that Articles 9 and 10 deny women "any opportunity to participate in public law or government."
In January 2019, British parliamentarians and lawmakers sought access to eight detained female activists in Saudi Arabia. The request followed a report by the Human Rights Watch, which claimed that the women were subject to abuse, electric shocks, beatings, flogging, and rape threats. Crispin Blunt, UK Conservative Member of Parliament, said:
There are credible concerns that the conditions in which the Saudi women activists are being detained may have fallen significantly short of both international and Saudi Arabia's own standards. We make this request to the Saudi authorities so that we can assess for ourselves the conditions in which the Saudi women activists have been and are being detained today. No person should be subjected to the type of treatment that has allegedly been inflicted upon these women activists while in detention. The implications of activists being detained and tortured for exercising their freedom of speech and conducting peaceful campaigns is concerning for all individuals seeking to exercise their human rights in Saudi Arabia.
On 15 October 2020 UK-based rights advocacy group Amnesty International urged the participants of Women 20 Summit to demand Riyadh to release the imprisoned women's rights activists. According to Amnesty International, participants of the W20 had the opportunity and shared the responsibility to not only stand for the detained Saudi women rights defenders but also promote a meaningful human rights campaign.
On 29 November 2020 seven European human rights ambassadors criticized Saudi Arabia over the continued detention of at least five women's rights activists, including Loujain al-Hathloul. According to a statement by Loujain al-Hathloul's family, the court referred her case to the Specialized Criminal Court for terrorism and national security cases. According to Amnesty International, Samar Badawi was also referred to the same special court, while Nassima al-Sada, Nouf Abdulaziz and Maya’a al-Zahrani were to remain in detention. CNN reached out to the Saudi government for their response; the Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Adel Jubeir, told them that Loujain's case "was up to the courts" and that she was tried for matters concerning the national security of Saudi Arabia. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_rights_in_Saudi_Arabia |
Pan-Arabism | It was not until Gamal Abdel Nasser that Arab nationalism (in addition to Arab socialism) became a state policy and a means with which to define Egypt's position in the Middle East and the world, usually articulated vis-à-vis Zionism in the neighbouring state of Israel.
There have been several attempts to bring about a pan-Arab state by many well-known Arab leaders, all of which ultimately resulted in failure. British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden called for Arab unity during the 1940s, and was followed by specific proposals from pro-British leaders, including King Abdullah of Transjordan and Prime Minister Nuri al-Said of Iraq, but Egyptian proposals for a broader grouping of independent Arab states prevailed with the establishment of the League of Arab States, a regional international organization, in 1945. In large part representing the popularity Nasser had gained among the masses in the Arab world following the Suez Crisis, the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958 was the first case of the actual merger of two previously-independent Arab countries. Hastily formed under President Nasser's leadership but on the initiative of Syrian leaders who feared a takeover by communists or "reactionaries" and hoped to lead the new entity, the UAR was a unitary state, not a federal union, with its critics seeing this as hardly more than a small country being annexed by a larger one. It lasted until 1961, when Syrian army officers carried out a coup d'état and withdrew from the union. As politicians felt pressured by the wide public to espouse the idea of unity, Egypt, Syria and Iraq entered into an abortive agreement in 1963 to form the United Arab Republic, which was to be "federal in structure, leaving each member state its identity and institutions." By 1961, Egypt had become the only remaining member but continued to call itself "the UAR" (thereby implying it was open for unification with other Arab countries), but it eventually renamed itself the "Arab Republic of Egypt" in 1973.
Also in 1958, a Hashemite-led rival, the Arab Federation, was founded between Jordan and Iraq. Tensions with the UAR and the 14 July Revolution made the Arab Federation collapse after only six months. Another attempt, the United Arab States, existed as a confederation between the United Arab Republic and the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen, but it dissolved in 1961.
Two later attempts represented the enthusiasm of Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, the Federation of Arab Republics, which lasted five years, and the Arab Islamic Republic with Tunisia, which also aimed to include Algeria and Morocco but never emerged in practice. Muammar Gaddafi had talks with Chadli Bendjedid in 1988 about forming an Algeria-Libya union. Instead the Arab Maghreb Union was formed in 1989. Aside from the forcible unification of much of the Arabian Peninsula by the Saudi rulers of Najd during the 1920s, the unity of seven Arab emirates that form the United Arab Emirates and the unification of North Yemen and South Yemen stand today as rare examples of actual unification. The current Syrian government is and the former government of Iraq was led by rival factions of the Ba'ath Party, which continues to espouse pan-Arabism and is organized in several other countries. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan-Arabism |
Yom Kippur War | Kissinger found out about the Third Army's encirclement shortly thereafter. Kissinger considered that the situation presented the United States with a tremendous opportunity and that Egypt was dependent on the United States to prevent Israel from destroying its trapped army. The position could be parlayed later into allowing the United States to mediate in the dispute and wean Egypt from Soviet influence. As a result, the United States exerted tremendous pressure on the Israelis to refrain from destroying the trapped army, even threatening to support a UN resolution demanding that the Israelis withdraw to their 22 October positions if they did not allow non-military supplies to reach the army. In a phone call with Israeli ambassador Simcha Dinitz, Kissinger told the ambassador that the destruction of the Egyptian Third Army "is an option that does not exist."
The Israeli government also had its own motivations for not destroying the Third Army. These included the possibility of using the encircled Third Army as a bargaining chip for ending the Egyptian blockade of the Bab-el-Mandel Straits in the Red Sea and negotiating a repatriation of Israeli prisoners-of-war captured by Egypt. The exhausted state of the IDF, the possibility that humiliating Egypt by destroying the Third Army would make Sadat more bellicose and unwilling to cease hostilities, and Israel's intense fears that the Soviet Union would militarily intervene in the event the Third Army was destroyed were additional reasons for Israel ultimately deciding against destroying it.
Despite being surrounded, the Third Army managed to maintain its combat integrity east of the canal and keep up its defensive positions, to the surprise of many. According to Trevor N. Dupuy, the Israelis, Soviets and Americans overestimated the vulnerability of the Third Army at the time. It was not on the verge of collapse, and he wrote that while a renewed Israeli offensive would probably overcome it, this was not a certainty.
David T. Buckwalter agrees that despite the isolation of the Third Army, it was unclear if the Israelis could have protected their forces on the west bank of the canal from a determined Egyptian assault and still maintain sufficient strength along the rest of the front. This assessment was challenged by Patrick Seale, who stated that the Third Army was "on the brink of collapse". Seale's position was supported by P.R. Kumaraswamy, who wrote that intense American pressure prevented the Israelis from annihilating the stranded Third Army.
Herzog noted that given the Third Army's desperate situation, in terms of being cut off from re-supply and reassertion of Israeli air superiority, the destruction of the Third Army was inevitable and could have been achieved within a very brief period. Shazly himself described the Third Army's plight as "desperate" and classified its encirclement as a "catastrophe that was too big to hide". He further noted that, "the fate of the Egyptian Third Army was in the hands of Israel. Once the Third Army was encircled by Israeli troops every bit of bread to be sent to our men was paid for by meeting Israeli demands."
Shortly before the ceasefire came into effect, an Israeli tank battalion advanced into Adabiya, and took it with support from the Israeli Navy. Some 1,500 Egyptian prisoners were taken, and about a hundred Egyptian soldiers assembled just south of Adabiya, where they held out against the Israelis. The Israelis also conducted their third and final incursion into Suez. They made some gains, but failed to break into the city center. As a result, the city was partitioned down the main street, with the Egyptians holding the city center and the Israelis controlling the outskirts, port installations and oil refinery, effectively surrounding the Egyptian defenders. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War |
Syrian civil war | The U.S. Congress has enacted punitive sanctions on the Syrian government for its actions during the Civil War. These sanctions would penalize any entities lending support to the Syrian government, and any companies operating in Syria. U.S. President Donald Trump tried to protect the Turkish President Erdogan from the effects of such sanctions.
Some activists welcomed this legislation. Some critics contend that these punitive sanctions are likely to backfire or have unintended consequences; they argue that ordinary Syrian people will have fewer economic resources due to these sanctions (and will thus need to rely more the Syrian government and its economic allies and projects), while the sanctions' impact on ruling political elites will be limited.
Mohammad al-Abdallah, executive director of Syria Justice and Accountability Center (SJAC), said that the sanctions will likely hurt ordinary Syrian people, saying, "it is an almost unsolvable unfeasible equation. If they are imposed, they will indirectly harm the Syrian people, and if they are lifted, they will indirectly revive the Syrian regime;" he attributed the sanctions to "political considerations, as the United States does not have weapons and tools in the Syrian file, and sanctions are its only means."
Peter Ford, the former UK Ambassador to Syria, said "...going forward, we're seeing more economic warfare. It seems that the U.S., having failed to change the regime in Syria by military force or by proxies, is tightening the economic screws and the main reason why the U.S. is keeping hold of the production facilities in eastern Syria. So, the economic situation is becoming more and more serious and dire in Syria and it's a major reason why refugees are not going back."
In June, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced new economic sanctions on Syria targeting foreign business relations with the Syrian government. Under the Caesar Act, the latest sanctions were to be imposed on 39 individuals and entities, including Asma al-Assad, wife of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
On 17 June 2020, James F. Jeffrey, Special Representative for Syria Engagement, signalled that the UAE could be hit with sanctions under the Caesar Act if it pushed ahead with normalisation efforts with the Syrian regime. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_civil_war |
Al-Muti' | Al-Muti' was a weak figure, for all intents and purposes a puppet ruler of the Buyid ruler of Iraq, first Mu'izz al-Dawla, and then his son, Izz al-Dawla (r. 967–978). As a result of his lack of real power, al-Muti' himself barely figures in the chronicles of his reign, and medieval historians generally considered his tenure as the lowest ebb of the Abbasid caliphate, an opinion shared by modern scholars as well.
In theory, the Buyids and all their officials in Iraq continued to act in the name of the Abbasid caliph, and all appointments and legal acts continued to be made in his name. In practice, al-Muti' was deprived of any meaningful authority. In exchange for being allowed to lead a comfortable and secure life in the vast caliphal palaces, he served to provide legitimacy to the upstart Buyid regime in the eyes of the Muslim world. The options of abolishing the caliphate or installing an Alid as caliph were quickly rejected, if they were ever seriously entertained: such an act would cause widespread opposition, another Sunni caliphate might easily be set up elsewhere, but a docile caliph under Buyid control would help maintain the obedience of the Sunni majority to the new regime, as well as lend its symbolic weight to the Buyids in their relations with the other Muslim princes. Furthermore, there was a lack of suitable Alid candidates: the last imam of the Twelver Shi'a, who represented the main strand of Shi'a followers in the Buyid domains, was held to have gone into occultation seventy years earlier, and Zaydi doctrine held that the imams had to seize power themselves if they were to be legitimate.
The Buyids quickly integrated themselves into the traditional Abbasid system and eagerly sought the legitimacy conferred by the caliph, in the form of honorific titles and diplomas of governorship, or in his signature in treaties. At the same time, al-Muti' was effectively reduced to a salaried state official, and his responsibility was curtailed to the oversight over the judiciary, religious institutions, and the affairs of the members of the wider Abbasid clan. The caliph's chief secretary was no longer termed 'vizier' (wazir), but merely 'secretary' (katib), and his role was limited to the management of the diwan al-khilafa, a department managing the caliph's properties, the formal conferment of titles and offices and certificates in the name of the caliph, and the appointment of judges and jurors. In reality, judicial appointments too were under the purview of the Buyid emir, but at least for the more senior ones, such as the chief qadi of Baghdad, the caliph was expected to provide his assent, the robe of honour and the requisite diploma. With one known exception, al-Muti' generally complied with the emir's appointments.
The Buyids kept a close watch on the caliph, especially during their periodic conflicts with the Hamdanids, lest he might try to defect to them, as al-Muttaqi had done. During the battles of summer 946, when the Hamdanids briefly occupied East Baghdad, he was kept under house arrest in a church in West Baghdad, and not released until he had sworn an oath of loyalty to the Buyids. Whenever Mu'izz al-Dawla campaigned against rebels south of Baghdad, al-Muti' was forced to accompany the Buyid ruler, lest he defect north to the Hamdanids. Conversely, when the Buyid amir al-umara campaigned against the Hamdanids in the north, al-Muti' was left behind in Baghdad. In 948/49, Ispahdost, Mu'izz al-Dawla's brother-in-law, was arrested on suspicion of conspiring with al-Muti' (or with an unnamed Alid).
Upon taking power, Mu'izz al-Dawla distributed the former caliphal crown domains for the upkeep of the army, and al-Muti' had to content himself with a daily salary of 2,000 silver dirhams. When Basra was recovered from the Baridi family shortly after, he was assigned extensive possessions there, raising his income to 200,000 gold dinars per year. Although the general decline of Iraq later reduced his income by three quarters of its original value, this allowed the caliph to financially support members of the Abbasid clan in need, and to make rich gifts to the Kaaba. The income also sufficed for the construction of a series of pavilions in the caliphal palace grounds: the Peacock Palace (Dar al-Tawawis), the Octagon House (Dar al-Muthammana) and the Square House (Dar al-Murabba'a).
The troubled relations between the caliph and the Buyids gradually assumed a more regular and tranquil character: the Buyids at least formally respected the caliph's remaining responsibilities, and al-Muti' apparently accepted his subservient role, regained some freedom of action, and maintained cordial relations with Mu'izz al-Dawla. In 955/56, Mu'izz al-Dawla even appointed his 13-year-old son, the future Izz al-Dawla, as the caliph's chamberlain. The most notable exception to the good relationship between the caliph and the amir al-umara was the latter's attempt to rent out the appointment of chief qadi of Baghdad to Abdallah ibn Abi al-Shawarib for 200,000 dirhams per year between 961 and 963. This was opposed by both Sunni and Shi'a scholars as illegal, and al-Muti' refused to sign the appointments made by Mu'izz al-Dawla during this period. This is also almost the only reference in the sources to al-Muti's activity in the religious or judicial sphere; otherwise his reign is passed over in silence.
A positive corollary of this subservience was stability. Although of a sickly disposition, al-Muti' reigned as caliph for 29 Hijri years and four months, in stark contrast to his short-lived predecessors, and unlike them had to contend with remarkably few rival pretenders to the caliphate. A grandson of al-Muktafi rebelled in Armenia in 960 and claimed the caliphate as al-Mustajir Billah before being defeated by the local Sallarid rulers. In 968, Abu'l-Hasan Muhammad, a son of al-Mustakfi, who had fled to the Ikhshidid court in Egypt, gained considerable support in Iraq by hiding his identity and posing as the Mahdi (the Islamic messiah). The leading convert to his cause was a Buyid commander, the Turk Sübüktegin al-Ajami, who gave him protection and was preparing to mount a coup in his name, before his identity was uncovered and he was handed over to al-Muti'. The caliph did not severely punish him, other than ordering his nose cut off, thereby disqualifying him from the succession; although Abu'l-Hasan Muhammad eventually managed to escape, his hopes of seizing the throne were never realized, and the caliphal succession henceforth firmly remained with the line of al-Muqtadir. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Muti%27 |
Sudanese civil war (2023–present) | The RSF attacked the town of Wad Ashana in North Kordofan on 1 October along a key commercial route. In West Kordofan, an uptick in fighting was reported, with the RSF assaulting a "vital" oil field in Baleela, south of Al-Fulah. Geolocated footage showed RSF fighters celebrating around Baleela Airport after allegedly capturing it. The Battle of Khartoum continued with the RSF seizing the town of al-Aylafoun, southeast of the capital, on 6 October. In the process, the paramilitary gained control of key oil infrastructure. By late October the RSF controlled most of Khartoum but had failed to seize key military bases, while al-Burhan's government had largely relocated to Port Sudan.
The RSF sought to capitalize on its gains by stepping up attacks on SAF positions in Khartoum and Omdurman. Days of fighting culminated in the destruction of the Shambat Bridge, which connected Khartoum North to Omdurman over the Nile; the bridge's destruction severing a critical RSF supply chain. This effectively cut the RSF off from its forces in Omdurman, giving the SAF a strategic advantage. In an attempt to gain a new crossing over the Nile and supply its forces in Omdurman, the RSF launched an assault on the Jebel Aulia Dam in the village of Jabal Awliya. As Jebel Aulia could not be destroyed without flooding Khartoum, its capture would give the RSF a path over the Nile the SAF could not easily remove. A week-long battle commenced over the dam and its surrounding village, which ended in an RSF victory. The force captured the dam on 20 November, all SAF resistance ceasing in the village the following day.
On 5 December, local militias along with RSF soldiers attacked SPLM-N (al-Hilu) forces in the village of Tukma, southeast of Dalang in South Kordofan, resulting in the deaths of 4 people and the destruction of the village. The RSF leadership, not wanting hostilities with the neutral al-Hilu faction to escalate, issued a statement condemning this attack and denouncing it as "tribal violence". On 8 December, the RSF entered Gedaref State for the first time.
Pushing south from their gains around Jebel Aulia and Khartoum, RSF forces began to move into Gezira State on 15 December, advancing toward its capital Wad Madani. Elsewhere in Gezira the RSF made major gains, taking control of the city of Rufaa in the state's east and entering the Butana region. After several days of fighting the RSF seized the Hantoob Bridge on Wad Madani's eastern outskirts, crossing the Blue Nile and entering the city. The army put up little resistance in Wad Madani itself, the 1st Division withdrawing from the city as the RSF took over.
The fall of Wad Madani was viewed as a major blow to the SAF, as it dramatically widened the frontline and opened up large parts of the country to potential RSF offensives. The city's fall allowed the RSF to capture most of Gezira and to make inroads in White Nile State, capturing the town of El Geteina. Within a few days RSF fighters had advanced to within 25 km of Sennar, the largest city in Sennar State. Over the next few weeks RSF forces ventured into rural areas of Al Qadarif State and River Nile State, without establishing a significant presence. In Sennar State the RSF made some further minor advances, but had not attacked Sennar City by the year's end.
Amid the deteriorating situation, the SAF was reported to be arming civilians while government officials in the east called on the population to mobilize. Al-Burhan gave a widely promoted public speech to soldiers in Red Sea State, promising to arm civilian militias to fight the RSF and to fight against 'colonialism', which was viewed by observers as a reference to the United Arab Emirates' support of the RSF. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudanese_civil_war_(2023%E2%80%93present) |
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