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Aisha | When Muhammad and his followers carried out a raid on the Banu Mustaliq tribe, he brought along Aisha, who was 13 years old at the time. She was carried in a closed litter on the back of a camel. Aisha recounted that when the raiding party was resting at night on the way home to Medina from the successful operation, she went out to relieve herself. After doing so and returning to her litter, she realized that her necklace was missing, so she traced her way back to look for it. By the time she found it, the convoy had already left, thinking she was in the litter. Assuming that they would notice her absence and return to look for her, Aisha decided to stay where she was.
Aisha related that Safwan ibn Muattal, a young Muslim from the raiding party, had lagged behind for some reason. On his solo return journey to Medina, he came across Aisha sleeping on the ground by herself. He addressed her, let her ride on his camel while he guided it, and escorted her home to Medina. It was not until the morning that Muhammad's convoy realized that Aisha was not in her litter. And later, when they were taking a break from the hot midday sun, Aisha and Safwan ran into them. A rumor was spread by one of the leading hypocrites in Medina at the time, Abdullah Ibn Ubayy Ibn Salool accusing Aisha of committing adultery with Safwan. Moreover, it was said that she had conversed with him several times before. This rumor of adultery, if true, could've led to Aisha being stoned to death.
Upon their arrival in Medina, Aisha fell ill and sensed that Muhammad was uncharacteristically cold toward her. She only learned of the rumor some three weeks later when Umm Mistah told her on their way back from defecating in an open field at night, as was customary for Muslim women at that time. Aisha subsequently went to her mother, asking what the people were talking about, and she replied, "Daughter, be at peace, for I swear by God that no beautiful woman is married to a man who has other wives, but that these other wives would find fault with her." So Aisha cried all night long.
Muhammad, despite his fondness for Aisha, was unsure of her innocence. He asked Usama ibn Zayd and Ali for their opinions. Usama vouched for Aisha's innocence, but Ali said, "Women abound; you can easily find a substitute. Ask her slave; she might reveal the truth." When the slave girl arrived, Ali beat her severely and said, "Mind you tell the apostle the truth." But her answer was that she knew only good things about Aisha, with the single exception that when Aisha was entrusted with watching over a dough, she dozed off and allowed a sheep to eat it.
Muhammad later visited Aisha at her parents' house and advised her to confess if she had sinned, as God was merciful towards those who seek repentance. It had been more than a month since Aisha had returned alone with Safwan. Despite Muhammad's advice, Aisha refused to apologize as it would indicate guilt. She told Muhammad that she could find no better parallel for her current situation than that of Joseph's father, who had endured disbelief despite telling the truth and had no other choice but to remain patient. Shortly thereafter, Muhammad experienced a trance and received verses (Quran 24:11–15) that confirmed Aisha's innocence. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aisha |
Desertification | As there are many different types of deserts, there are also different types of desert reclamation methodologies. An example for this is the salt flats in the Rub' al Khali desert in Saudi Arabia. These salt flats are one of the most promising desert areas for seawater agriculture and could be revitalized without the use of freshwater or much energy.
Farmer-managed natural regeneration (FMNR) is another technique that has produced successful results for desert reclamation. Since 1980, this method to reforest degraded landscape has been applied with some success in Niger. This simple and low-cost method has enabled farmers to regenerate some 30,000 square kilometers in Niger. The process involves enabling native sprouting tree growth through selective pruning of shrub shoots. The residue from pruned trees can be used to provide mulching for fields thus increasing soil water retention and reducing evaporation. Additionally, properly spaced and pruned trees can increase crop yields. The Humbo Assisted Regeneration Project which uses FMNR techniques in Ethiopia has received money from The World Bank's BioCarbon Fund, which supports projects that sequester or conserve carbon in forests or agricultural ecosystems.
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations launched the FAO Drylands Restoration Initiative in 2012 to draw together knowledge and experience on dryland restoration. In 2015, FAO published global guidelines for the restoration of degraded forests and landscapes in drylands, in collaboration with the Turkish Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs and the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency.
The "Green Wall of China" is a high-profile example of one method that has been finding success in this battle with desertification. This wall is a much larger-scale version of what American farmers did in the 1930s to stop the great Midwest dust bowl. This plan was proposed in the late 1970s, and has become a major ecological engineering project that is not predicted to end until the year 2055. According to Chinese reports, there have been nearly 66 billion trees planted in China's great green wall. The green wall of China has decreased desert land in China by an annual average of 1,980 square km. The frequency of sandstorms nationwide have fallen 20% due to the green wall. Due to the success that China has been finding in stopping the spread of desertification, plans are currently being made in Africa to start a "wall" along the borders of the Sahara desert as well to be financed by the United Nations Global Environment Facility trust.
In 2007 the African Union started the Great Green Wall of Africa project in order to combat desertification in 20 countries. The wall is 8,000 km wide, stretching across the entire width of the continent and has 8 billion dollars in support of the project. The project has restored 36 million hectares of land, and by 2030 the initiative plans to restore a total of 100 million hectares. The Great Green Wall has created many job opportunities for the participating countries, with over 20,000 jobs created in Nigeria alone. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desertification |
World Heritage Site | The UNESCO-administered project has attracted criticism. This was caused by perceived under-representation of heritage sites outside Europe, disputed decisions on site selection and adverse impact of mass tourism on sites unable to manage rapid growth in visitor numbers. A large lobbying industry has grown around the awards, because World Heritage listing can significantly increase tourism returns. Site listing bids are often lengthy and costly, putting poorer countries at a disadvantage. Eritrea's efforts to promote Asmara are one example.
In 2016, the Australian government was reported to have successfully lobbied for the World Heritage Site Great Barrier Reef conservation efforts to be removed from a UNESCO report titled "World Heritage and Tourism in a Changing Climate". The Australian government's actions, involving considerable expense for lobbying and visits for diplomats, were in response to their concern about the negative impact that an "at risk" label could have on tourism revenue at a previously designated UNESCO World Heritage Site.
In 2021, international scientists recommended UNESCO to put the Great Barrier Reef on the endangered list, as global climate change had caused a further negative state of the corals and water quality. Again, the Australian government campaigned against this, and in July 2021, the World Heritage Committee, made up of diplomatic representatives of 21 countries, ignored UNESCO's assessment, based on studies of scientists, "that the reef was clearly in danger from climate change and so should be placed on the list." According to environmental protection groups, this "decision was a victory for cynical lobbying and [...] Australia, as custodians of the world's biggest coral reef, was now on probation."
Several listed locations, such as Casco Viejo in Panama and Hội An in Vietnam, have struggled to strike a balance between the economic benefits of catering to greatly increased visitor numbers after the recognition and preserving the original culture and local communities.
Another criticism is that there is a homogeneity to these sites, which contain similar styles, visitor centres, etc., meaning that a lot of the individuality of these sites has been removed to become more attractive to tourists.
Anthropologist Jasper Chalcraft said that World Heritage recognition often ignores contemporary local usage of certain sites. This leads to conflicts on the local level which can result in the site being damaged. Rock art under world heritage protection at the Tadrart Acacus in Libya have occasionally been intentionally destroyed. Chalcraft links this destruction to Libyan national authorities prioritizing World Heritage status over local sensibilities by limiting access to the sites without consulting with the local population.
UNESCO has also been criticized for alleged geographic bias, racism, and colourism in world heritage inscription. A major chunk of all world heritage inscriptions are located in regions whose populations generally have lighter skin, including Europe, East Asia, and North America. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Heritage_Site |
Saudi-led intervention in the Yemeni civil war | In March 2015, in a joint statement, the member-states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (with the exception of Oman) said they had decided to intervene against the Houthis at the request of Hadi's government.
The coalition declared Yemeni airspace to be a restricted area, with King Salman declaring the RSAF to be in full control of the zone. Saudi Arabia began airstrikes, reportedly relying on US intelligence reports and surveillance images to select and hit targets, including weapons, aircraft on the ground and air defences. Al Jazeera reported that Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, a Houthi commander appointed in February as president of the Revolutionary Committee, was injured and three other Houthi commanders were killed by airstrikes in Sanaʽa.
Strikes on 26 March also hit Al Anad Air Base, a former US special operations forces facility in Lahij Governorate seized by Houthis earlier in the week. The targets reportedly included the Houthi-controlled missile base in Sanaʽa and its fuel depot. Strikes overnight also targeted Houthis in Taiz and Sa'dah. Thousands demonstrated in Sanaʽa against the intervention, which ex-president Ali Abdullah Saleh also condemned. In Taiz thousands came out supporting Hadi and Saudi Arabia.
The scope of strikes expanded further on 27 March, with a radar installation in the Marib Governorate and an airbase in the Abyan Governorate coming under air attack. The commander of the operation dismissed reports of civilian casualties, saying airstrikes were being carried out with precision. Additional strikes early on the next day hit targets in Al Hudaydah, Sa'dah and the Sanaʽa area, as well as Ali Abdullah Saleh's main base. Rumours indicated Saleh fled to Sanhan, on the outskirts of the Houthi-controlled capital. An Aden government official said Saudi strikes destroyed a long-range missile facility controlled by the Houthis.
The Houthis claimed to have shot down a Sudanese Air Force plane over northern Sanaʽa and captured its pilot on 28 March. The Sudanese government denied that any of its four warplanes had come under fire or been shot down. On the previous day, the Houthis claimed to have shot down a "hostile" Saudi drone in Sanaʽa.
Airstrikes hit an arms depot, military airbase and special forces headquarters in Sanaʽa early on 29 March. A weapons depot outside Sanaʽa was destroyed, causing damage to an airport and planes on the ground. Sa'dah and Al Hudaydah were targeted as well. Brigadier General Ahmed Asiri, the coalition's spokesman, said Saudi artillery and Apache attack helicopters were mobilised to "deter" Houthi fighters massing on the border with Saudi Arabia.
On 30 March, at least 40 people including children were killed and 200 were injured by an airstrike that hit Al-Mazraq refugee camp near a military installation in northern district of Haradh, international organizations said. Airstrikes also hit areas near the presidential palace in Sanaʽa, as well as Aden International Airport.
Food storage of Yemen Economic Corporation in Hodeidah was destroyed by three coalition strikes on 31 March. Airstrikes were not limited to the Yemeni mainland. Missiles struck homes on the island of Perim, according to residents who fled by boat to Djibouti. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi-led_intervention_in_the_Yemeni_civil_war |
Battle of Mosul (2016–2017) | Twenty airstrikes by the US-led coalition were heard on the morning of 6 December, following an assault on the city's strategic main (old) bridge that was held by ISIL. In the overnight hours, ISIL launched a counter-attack in the southeastern area of Mosul, near al-Salam. On the same day, the PMU stated that it had captured the southern section of Tal Abta. Following the overnight ISIL attack, Iraqi forces continued to secure the al-Salam area on 7 December, capturing al-Salam hospital. However, ISIL recaptured the hospital after a counter-attack, which destroyed or disabled 20 Iraqi vehicles. On 9 December, Iraqi Joint Operations Command announced that they had captured the three east Mosul districts of Saha, Adel, and Tahrir, adding that Iraqi forces had captured 27 districts of Mosul, with clashes ongoing in 4 districts. On 11 December, the CTS forces mentioned that they had the al-Nour neighborhood of east Mosul.
On 13 December, CTS commander Abdul Wahab al-Saedi stated that there were only 6 districts left to be captured by the CTS forces in East Mosul, and that they had already captured 32 of them. While the PMF to the west continued clearing villages in the desert region of the ISIL heartland in the Nineveh Governorate, it was reported on the same day that the Badr militia was targeting villages around Tal Afar to "surround Daesh and tighten the noose around them", while Kata'ib Hezbollah advanced further west towards the Syrian border. On 15 December, CTS commander Abdul Ghani al-Assadi announced that the first phase of retaking the eastern shores of the city was completed, with CTS forces capturing 40 out of the 56 eastern districts.
On 16 December, the PMF captured the Tel Abtah district, home to almost 50,000 people and a major strategic ISIL stronghold, and advanced on more villages to the south and southwest of Tal Afar. On 18 December, the 9th Division, with the assistance of CTS, started attacking al-Wehda district of east Mosul, in order to regain control of al-Salam hospital. On 19 December, Iraqi forces stormed into the al-Mazare' area, after retaking large parts of al-Wahda in southeastern Mosul, and also killed 14 ISIL fighters, including four suicide bombers. On 21 December, U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Matthew Isler announced that pro-government forces had entered a planned operational refit, which included repairing vehicles, re-supplying ammunition and preparing for the next stage of the battle. He also stated that they had captured more than a quarter of the city.
On 23 December, the Iraqi Army captured the Mosul Police Academy headquarters in Al-Qahira district, which was their first major advance since the suspension of military operations a week earlier. On 24 December, U.S. Army Colonel Brett G. Sylvia stated that American soldiers assisting Iraqi forces would be embedded more extensively and would partner with additional formations. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi stated that Iraqi forces were in control of over a third of Mosul, while Iraqi Joint Operations Command spokesperson Yahia Rasoul stated that Iraqi forces controlled 44% of Nineveh Governate. He added that CTS forces controlled 40 districts in east Mosul, while the Iraqi Army's 9th Battalion held six districts. On 25 December, the CTS reportedly stormed into the Al-Quds district, later in the day. On 26 December, Commander of Nineveh Operations Major General Najim al-Jabouri announced that new military reinforcements had arrived in the Mosul neighborhoods retaken by Iraqi forces. On 27 December, the ISIL-run Amaq News Agency stated that the anti-ISIL coalition had destroyed the Old Bridge, the last functioning bridge in Mosul. The US-led Coalition stated that it had disabled a Mosul bridge with airstrikes, without providing further details.
On 29 December, Iraqi forces launched the second phase of the battle, pushing from three directions into the remaining eastern Mosul districts. Iraqi soldiers and Federal Police entered about half a dozen southeastern districts, while the CTS advanced in the al-Quds and Karama districts. In the third front, Iraqi soldiers also pushed toward the northern city limits. An ISIL headquarters in al-Thobat district was reportedly destroyed in coalition airstrikes, killing 12 militants. Later in the day, the commander of the operation declared that they had captured two villages to the north of Mosul, killing 70 militants. Iraqi forces had captured half of the al-Quds district by early afternoon. On 30 December, Iraqi security forces advanced in several areas. In the northern front, the 16th Division stormed the Habdaa district while also trying to cut off the supply lines to Tel Kayf. Ammar al-Haweidi, who was an elite leader of ISIL, was reported to have been killed by the Iraqi Federal Police. On 31 December, heavy clashes occurred at the southeastern and northern fronts of Mosul. An Iraqi Army officer deployed in the southeastern front reported that their advances had slowed down, due to heavy clashes and difficulty in differentiating between civilians and militants. Iraqi forces on the northern front advanced towards the periphery of Mosul, with an officer stating that heavy clashes were ongoing in the Argoob area. The CTS destroyed four VBIEDs, when ISIL tried to attack them in the street linking al-Ta'mim neighborhood and the garage area in east Mosul. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Mosul_(2016%E2%80%932017) |
Isma'ilism | After the imprisonment of Nizar by his younger brother Ahmad al Mustaali, various sources indicate that Nizar's son Ali Al-Hadi ibn Nizari survived and fled to Alamut. He was offered a safe place in Alamut, where Hassan-Al-Sabbah welcomed him. However, it is believed this was not announced to the public and the lineage was hidden until a few Imāms later to avoid further attacks hostility.
It was announced with the advent of Imam Hassan II. In a show of his Imamate and to emphasize the interior meaning (the batin) over the exterior meaning (the zahir), only two years after his accession, the Imām Hasan 'Ala Zikrihi al-Salam conducted a ceremony known as qiyama (resurrection) at the grounds of the Alamut Castle, whereby the Imam would once again become visible to his community of followers in and outside of the Nizārī Ismā'īlī state. Given Juwayni's polemical aims, and the fact that he burned the Isma'ili libraries which may have offered much more reliable testimony about the history, scholars have been dubious about his narrative but are forced to rely on it given the absence of alternative sources. Fortunately, descriptions of this event are also preserved in Rashid al-Din’s narrative and recounted in the Haft Bab Baba-yi Sayyidna, written 60 years after the event, and the later Haft Bab-i Abi Ishaq, an Ismaili book of the 15th century AD. However, Rashid al-Din's narrative is based on Juwayni, and the Nizari sources do not go into specific details. Since very few contemporary Nizari Ismaili accounts of the events have survived, and it is likely that scholars will never know the exact details of this event. However, there was no total abrogation of all law; only certain exoteric rituals like the Salah/Namaz, Fasting in Ramadan, Hajj to Makkah, and facing Makkah in prayer were abrogated; however, the Nizaris continued to perform rituals of worship, except these rituals were more esoteric and spiritually oriented. For example, the true prayer is to remember God at every moment; true fasting is to keep all of the body's organs away from whatever is unethical and forbidden. Ethical conduct is enjoined at all times.
Afterward, his descendants ruled as the Imams at Alamut until its destruction by the Mongols. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isma%27ilism |
Yemeni Air Force | The Yemen Arab Republic Air Force (YARAF) was officially established on 20 November 1967. On this month, the Soviets delivered nine MiG-17 fighters and a single MiG-15UTI training aircraft, as well as four Ilyushin Il-28s, and three Antonov An-2s. Together with four MiG-17Fs, two Il-28s, two Il-14s and some Yakovlev Yak-11s donated by the Egyptians when they withdrew, and the remaining Zlin Z-126s, these aircraft constituted the whole fleet of the newly created air force as of late 1967. The YARAF was immediately engaged in the fighting against Royalist tribesmen, notably during the Siege of Sanaa. Some of the aircraft were flown by Soviet and Syrian pilots. While MiG-17s, Yak-11s and Il-28s attacked Royalist troops, Il-14s brought in supplies and evacuated the wounded from the besieged capital. During the 70 days of the siege, two MiG-17s were destroyed and their pilots killed, as well as one Yak-11 that was piloted by a Soviet, who was killed too. Five more airmen were killed during the siege, in unknown circumstances.
Meanwhile, in what would then become South Yemen, the British had started to form an embryonic air force. Called the South Arabian Air Force (as an air corps of the Federation of South Arabia under British protection), it had received six de Havilland Canada DHC-2 Beavers, eight BAC Jet Provost Mk52As, six Bell 47G helicopters and four Douglas C-47s by December 1967. Four BAC Strikemaster Mk 81s were delivered in 1970. When the Federation of South Arabia was released into independence, on 30 November 1967, it was instantly renamed the People's Republic of Yemen. A day later, the new country's air force was officially established, and named the People's Republic of Yemen Air Force (PRYAF). The nationality markings on the aircraft were changed too. Roundels and fin flashes using the colors of the FSA's flag were replaced by a light blue triangle with a dark outer part and a red star in the centre, and the new national tricolor flag with a blue triangle bearing a red star, respectively. In 1968, Soviet advisors arrived in the country to help build up the air force. The first 10 MiG-17Fs arrived in January 1969, and they were reinforced by eight more in 1970: these aircraft were used by No. 5 Squadron. On 1 December of the same year, the country was renamed the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), and the air force's name was changed accordingly. It was in this period that the triangular roundel was replaced by a circular one, consisting of the three colors of the national flag, with the top quarter being a sky-blue chevron with a red star in the middle. By 1972, the PDRYAF had received eight Mil Mi-8 and four Kamov Ka-26 helicopters, four Ilyushin Il-28s, and eight Antonov An-24 and Antonov An-26 transport aircraft from the Soviet Union. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemeni_Air_Force |
Habesha peoples | Judaism in Ethiopia is believed to date from very ancient times. Precisely what its early history was, however, remains obscure. The now dominant Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church claims it originated from the visit of the Queen of Sheba to King Solomon back in the 10th century BCE. This visit is mentioned in the Hebrew Scriptures (I Kings 10:1), Sheba was a kingdom that stretched from Ethiopia to the south of the Yemen. Yemen is very close to Ethiopia across the Red Sea, and it has been recorded that modern Ethiopia has been heavily influenced by the ancient Sabean kingdom. Moreover, the details of the queen's visit, including the alleged theft of the Holy Ark as well as Solomon getting her pregnant with a child who established the "Solomonic" lineage in Ethiopia, as given in Christian Ethiopian tradition, were written in the Kebra Nagast the Ethiopian chronicle of its early history. The oldest known existing copies of the book date from as far back as the 13th century. Jewish Ethiopians are mentioned in both the Torah Old Testament as well as the Christian New Testament. It is clear that the Jewish presence in Ethiopia dates back at least 2,500 years.
The Jewish Pre-settlement Theory essentially states that starting around the 8th century BCE until about the 5th century BCE, there was an influx of Jewish settlers both from Egypt & Sudan in the north, and southern Arabia in the east.
The chief Semitic languages of Ethiopia also suggest an antiquity of Judaism in Ethiopia. "There still remains the curious circumstance that a number of Abyssinian words connected with religion—Hell, idol, Easter, purification, alms—are of Hebrew origin. These words must have been derived directly from a Jewish source, for the Abyssinian Church knows the scriptures only in a Ge'ez version made from the Septuagint."
Beta Israel traditions claim that the Ethiopian Jews are descended from the lineage of Moses himself, some of whose children and relatives are said to have separated from the other Children of Israel after the Exodus and gone southwards, or, alternatively or together with this, that they are descended from the tribe of Dan, which fled southwards down the Arabian coastal lands from Judaea at the time of the breakup of the Kingdom of Israel into two kingdoms in the 10th century BCE. (precipitated by the oppressive demands of Rehoboam, King Solomon's heir), or at the time of the destruction of the northern kingdom of Israel in the 8th century BCE. Certainly there was trade as early as the time of King Solomon down along the Red Sea to the Yemen and even as far as India, according to the Bible, and there would, therefore, have been Jewish settlements at various points along the trade routes. There is definite archaeological evidence of Jewish settlements and of their cultural influence on both sides of the Red Sea well at least 2,500 years ago, both along the Arabian coast and in the Yemen, on the eastern side, and along the southern Egyptian and Sudanese coastal regions. Modern day Ethiopian Jews are adherents of Haymanot, a sect that is close to Karaite Judaism.
Some Ethiopian Jews, especially those living in Israel, follow mainstream Judaism, mainly due to the Israeli government making 'proper conversion' a prerequisite for being recognized as Jews. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habesha_peoples |
OPEC | The differing economic needs of OPEC member states often affect the internal debates behind OPEC production quotas. Poorer members have pushed for production cuts from fellow members, to increase the price of oil and thus their own revenues. These proposals conflict with Saudi Arabia's stated long-term strategy of being a partner with the world's economic powers to ensure a steady flow of oil that would support economic expansion. Part of the basis for this policy is the Saudi concern that overly expensive oil or unreliable supply will drive industrial nations to conserve energy and develop alternative fuels, curtailing the worldwide demand for oil and eventually leaving unneeded barrels in the ground. To this point, Saudi Oil Minister Yamani famously remarked in 1973: "The Stone Age didn't end because we ran out of stones." To elucidate Saudi Arabia's contemporary approach, in 2024, Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman articulated a stance that reflects how the kingdom has adapted to the evolving economic needs within OPEC and the broader international community. Emphasizing the need for a balanced and fair global energy transition, he highlighted the importance of diversifying energy sources and noted significant investments in natural gas, petrochemicals, and renewables. These efforts support economic development in emerging countries and align with global climate objectives. Additionally, he addressed shifting energy security concerns, stating, "Energy security in the 70s, 80s, and 90s was more dependent on oil. Now, you get what happened last year... It was gas. The future problem on energy security will not be oil. It will be renewables. And the materials, and the mines."
On 10 September 2008, with oil prices still near US$100/bbl, a production dispute occurred when the Saudis reportedly walked out of a negotiating session where rival members voted to reduce OPEC output. Although Saudi delegates officially endorsed the new quotas, they stated anonymously that they would not observe them. The New York Times quoted one such delegate as saying: "Saudi Arabia will meet the market's demand. We will see what the market requires and we will not leave a customer without oil. The policy has not changed." Over the next few months, oil prices plummeted into the $30s, and did not return to $100 until the Libyan Civil War in 2011. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OPEC |
Arab migrations to the Maghreb | The 11th century witnessed the most significant wave of Arab migration, surpassing all previous movements. This event unfolded when the Zirid dynasty of Ifriqiya proclaimed its independence from the Fatimid Caliphate of Egypt. In retribution against the Zirids, the Fatimids dispatched large Bedouin Arab tribes, mainly the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaym, to defeat the Zirids and settle in the Maghreb. These tribes followed a nomadic lifestyle and were originally from the Hejaz and Najd.
To persuade the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaym to migrate to the Maghreb, the Fatimid caliph gave each tribesman a camel and money and helped them cross from the east to the west bank of the Nile River. The severe drought in Egypt at the time also persuaded these tribes to migrate to the Maghreb, which had a better economic situation at the time. The Fatimid caliph instructed them to rule the Maghreb instead of the Zirid emir Al-Mu'izz and told them "I have given you the Maghrib and the rule of al-Mu'izz ibn Balkīn as-Sanhājī the runaway slave. You will want for nothing." and told Al-Mu'izz "I have sent you horses and put brave men on them so that God might accomplish a matter already enacted".
Upon arriving in Cyrenaica, the Arab nomads found the region almost empty of its inhabitants, except a few Zenata Berbers that Al-Mu'izz had already mostly destroyed. The number of Hilalians who moved westward out of Egypt has been estimated as high as 200,000 families. Cyrenaica was left to be settled by Banu Sulaym while the Hilalians marched westwards. As a result of the settlement by Arab tribes, Cyrenaica became the most Arab place in the Arab world after the interior of Arabia. According to Ibn Khaldun, the Arab tribes were accompanied by their wives, children and stock. They settled in the Maghreb after repeatedly fighting battles against the Berbers, such as the Battle of Haydaran. The Zirids abandoned Kairouan to take refuge on the coast where they survived for a century. The Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaym spread on the high plains of Constantine where they gradually obstructed the Qal'at Bani Hammad as they had done to Kairouan a few decades ago. From there, they gradually gained control over the high plains of Algiers and Oran. In the second half of the 12th century, they went to the Moulouya valley and the Atlantic coast in the western Maghreb to areas such as Doukkala.
They heavily transformed the culture of the Maghreb into Arab culture, and spread nomadism in areas where agriculture was previously dominant. It played a major role in spreading Bedouin Arabic to rural areas such as the countryside and steppes, and as far as the southern areas near the Sahara. In addition, they destroyed the Berber Zirid state and most of its cities, sparing only the Mediterranean coastal strip at al-Mahdiyya, and deeply weakened the neighboring Hammadid dynasty and the Zenata. Their influx was a major factor in the linguistic, cultural, genetic and ethnic Arabization of the Maghreb. According to Ibn Khaldun, the lands ravaged by Banu Hilal invaders had become desertified and turned into completely arid desert. The journey of Banu Hilal is recounted in the Arabic oral poem of Sirat Bani Hilal.
Sources estimated that the total number of Arab nomads who migrated to the Maghreb in the 11th century was at around 1 million Arabs. Historian Mármol Carvajal estimated that more than a million Hilalians migrated to the Maghreb between 1051-1110, and estimated that the Hilalian population at his time in 1573 was at 4,000,000 individuals, excluding other Arab tribes and other Arabs already present. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_migrations_to_the_Maghreb |
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Roemer, H. R. (1986). "The Turkmen dynasties". In Lockhart, Laurence; Jackson, Peter (eds.). The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 6: The Timurid and Safavid Periods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-20094-6.
Roy, Kaushik (2014). Military Transition in Early Modern Asia, 1400-1750. Bloomsbury. Post-Mongol Persia and Iraq were ruled by two tribal confederations: Akkoyunlu (White Sheep) (1378–1507) and Qaraoyunlu (Black Sheep). They were Persianate Turkoman Confederations of Anatolia (Asia Minor) and Azerbaijan.
Savory, R. M. (2009). "The Struggle for Supremacy in Persia after the death of Tīmūr". Der Islam. 40. De Gruyter: 35–65. doi:10.1515/islm.1964.40.1.35. S2CID 162340735. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qara_Qoyunlu |
Iraqi Armed Forces | The Iraqi Army, officially the Iraqi Ground Forces (Arabic: القوات البرية العراقية), is the ground force component of the Iraqi Armed Forces. It was known as the Royal Iraqi Army up until the coup of July 1958.
The Iraqi Army in its modern form was first created by the United Kingdom during the inter-war period of British control of Mandatory Iraq. Following the invasion of Iraq by U.S. forces in 2003, the Iraqi Army was rebuilt along U.S. lines with enormous amounts of U.S. assistance at every level. After the Iraqi insurgency coalesced shortly after the invasion, the Iraqi Army was redesigned as a counter-insurgency force. After the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2010, Iraqi forces assumed full responsibility for the country's security. A New York Times article suggested that, between 2004 and 2014, the U.S. had provided the Iraqi Army with $25 billion in training and equipment in addition to an even larger sum from the Iraqi treasury.
The Iraqi Army was designed as a counter-insurgency force that was developed under United States Army tutelage from 2003 to 2009. The force generation plan as of November 2009 includes 14 divisions, each consisting of 4 brigades. The Iraqi Army was described as the most important element of the counter-insurgency fight. The tactic is to provide security and other services on a local level by using infantrymen on dismounted patrols. As insurgents lose passive or active support from the local population, they will more easily be defeated, it was believed.
Light infantry brigades are equipped with small arms, machine guns, RPGs, body armor and light armored vehicles. Mechanized infantry brigades are equipped with T-54/55 main battle tanks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. The Hungarian Defence Forces donated 77 Soviet-made T-72 tanks from their own arsenal. The tanks were refurbished by Hungarian specialists and were delivered in fully battle-ready condition in 2004. Training of personnel was also provided to the newly forming Iraqi Army. Iraq was planned to receive 280 M1A1M tanks from 2010 and 2013.
The Army extensively collaborated with Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces during anti-ISIL operations.
From its creation in 1922 to 2003, the army suffered from a number of serious difficulties, junior tactical leadership among them. "Iraqi forces consistently had problems because of a dearth of technical skills and a limited exposure to machinery." However it also had significant strengths, particularly in two areas: logistics and combat engineering. Two impressive logistical accomplishments of the army included the ability to sustain an armoured corps in Syria during the Yom Kippur War/1973 Arab–Israeli War and their ability to move formations of corps size from one end of the country to another in days during the Iran–Iraq War. Since 2003, creation of combat forces has been the priority, and logistical support was initially supplied in one way or another by the coalition. As of mid 2008, logistical problems included a maintenance crisis and ongoing supply problems. Logistical capabilities have been developing, however, and the build-up of a nationwide logistical structure, with the Taji National Depot at its centre, is now well under way. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_Armed_Forces |
Kalmyk Khanate | Historically, the West Mongolian tribes identified themselves by their respective tribal names. Most likely in the 15th century, the four major West Mongolian tribes formed an alliance, adopting "Dörbet Oirat" as their collective name. After the alliance dissolved, the West Mongolian tribes were simply called "Oirat." In the early 17th century, a second great Oirat State emerged, called the Dzungar Khanate. While the Dzungars (initially Choros, Dörbet and Khoit tribes) were establishing their empire in Western Inner Asia, the Khoshuts were establishing the Khoshut Khanate in Tibet, protecting the Gelugpa sect from its enemies, and the Torghuts formed the Kalmyk Khanate in the lower Volga region.
After encamping, the Oirats began to identify themselves as "Kalmyk." This name was supposedly given to them by their Muslim Kazakh neighbors and later used by the Russians to describe them. The Oirats used this name in their dealings with outsiders, viz., their Russian and Muslim neighbors. But they continued to refer to themselves by their tribal, clan, or other internal affiliations.
The name Kalmyk, however, was not immediately accepted by all of the Oirat tribes in the lower Volga region. As late as 1761, the Khoshut and Dzungars (refugees from the Qing Empire) referred to themselves and the Torghuts exclusively as Oirats. The Torghuts, by contrast, used the name Kalmyk for themselves as well as the Khoshut and Dzungars.
Generally, European scholars have identified all West Mongolians collectively as Kalmyks, regardless of their location (Ramstedt, 1935: v–vi). Such scholars (e.g. Sebastian Muenster) have relied on Muslim sources who traditionally used the word Kalmyk to describe the Oirats in a derogatory manner. But the Oirats of China and Mongolia have regarded that name as a term of abuse (Haslund, 1935:214–215). Instead, they use the name Oirat or go by their respective tribal names, e.g., Khoshut, Dörbet, Choros, Torghut, Khoit, Bayid, Mingat, etc. (Anuchin, 1914:57).
Over time, the descendants of the Oirat migrants in the lower Volga region embraced the name Kalmyk, irrespective of their locations, viz., Astrakhan, the Don Cossack region, Orenburg, Stavropol, the Terek and the Urals. Another generally accepted name is Ulan Zalata, or the "red buttoned ones" (Adelman, 1960:6). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalmyk_Khanate |
Republic of Sudan (1956–1969) | The new civilian government, which operated under the 1956 Transitional Constitution, tried to end political factionalism by establishing a coalition government. There was continued popular hostility to the reappearance of political parties, however, because of their divisiveness during the Abbud government. Although the new government allowed all parties, including the SCP, to operate, only five of fifteen posts in Khatim's cabinet went to party politicians. The prime minister gave two positions to nonparty southerners and the remaining eight to members of the National Front for Professionals, which included several communists.
Eventually two political parties emerged to represent the south. The SANU, founded in 1963 and led by William Deng and Saturnino Ohure – a Roman Catholic priest – operated among refugee groups and guerrilla forces. The Southern Front, a mass organization led by Stanislaus Payasama that had worked underground during the Abbud government, functioned openly within the southern provinces. After the collapse of government-sponsored peace conferences in 1965, Deng's wing of SANU—known locally as SANU-William—and the Southern Front coalesced to take part in the parliamentary elections. The grouping remained active in parliament for the next four years as a voice for southern regional autonomy within a unified state. Exiled SANU leaders baulked at Deng's moderate approach to form the Azania Liberation Front based in Kampala, Uganda. Anyanya leaders tended to remain aloof from political movements. The guerrillas were fragmented by ethnic and religious differences. Additionally, conflicts resurfaced within Anyanya between older leaders who had been in the bush since 1955, and younger, better educated men like Joseph Lagu, a former Sudanese army captain, who eventually became a stronger leader, largely because of his ability to get arms from Israel.
When the government scheduled national elections for March 1965, they announced that the new parliament's task would be to prepare a new constitution. The deteriorating southern security situation prevented elections from being conducted in that region, however, and the political parties split on the question of whether elections should be held in the north as scheduled or postponed until the whole country could vote. The People's Democratic Party and the Sudanese Communist Party, both fearful of losing votes, wanted to postpone the elections, as did southern elements loyal to Khartoum. Their opposition forced the government to resign. The new president of the reinstated Supreme Commission, who had replaced Abbud as chief of state, directed that the elections be held wherever possible; the PDP rejected this decision and boycotted the elections.
The 1965 election results were inconclusive. Apart from a low voter turnout, there was a confusing overabundance of candidates on the ballots. As a consequence few of those elected won a majority of the votes cast. The non-Marxist Umma Party captured 75 out of 158 parliamentary seats while its NUP ally took 52 of the remainder. The two parties formed a coalition cabinet in June headed by Umma leader Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub, whereas Azhari, the NUP leader, became the Supreme Commission's permanent president and chief of state.
The Mahjub government had two goals: progress toward solving the southern problem and the removal of communists from positions of power. The army launched a major offensive to crush the rebellion and in the process augmented its reputation for brutality among the southerners. Many southerners reported government atrocities against civilians, especially at Juba and Wau. Sudanese army troops also burned churches and huts, closed schools, destroyed crops and looted cattle. To achieve his second objective, Mahjub succeeded in having parliament approve a decree that abolished the SCP and deprived the eleven communists of their seats. By October 1965, the Umma-NUP coalition had collapsed owing to a disagreement over whether Mahjub, as prime minister, or Azhari, as president, should conduct Sudan's foreign relations. Mahjub continued in office for another eight months but resigned in July 1966 after a parliamentary vote of censure, which split Umma. A traditional wing led by Mahjub, under the Imam Al Hadi, al Mahjub's spiritual leadership, opposed the party's majority. The latter group professed loyalty to the Imam's nephew, the younger Sadiq al Mahdi, who was the Umma's official leader and who rejected religious sectarianism. Sadiq became prime minister with backing from his own Umma wing and from NUP allies.
The Sadiq al Mahdi government, supported by a sizeable parliamentary majority, sought to reduce regional disparities by organizing economic development. Sadiq al Mahdi also planned to use his personal rapport with southern leaders to engineer a peace agreement with the insurgents. He proposed to replace the Supreme Commission with a president and a southern vice president calling for approval of autonomy for the southern provinces. The educated elite and segments of the army opposed Sadiq al Mahdi because of his gradualist approach to Sudan's political, economic, and social problems. Leftist student organizations and the trade unions demanded the creation of a socialist state. Their resentment of Sadiq increased when he refused to honour a Supreme Court ruling that overturned legislation banning the SCP and ousting communists elected to parliamentary seats. In December 1966, a coup attempt by communists and a small army unit against the government failed. Many communists and army personnel were subsequently arrested.
In March 1967, the government held elections in thirty-six constituencies in pacified areas of the south. Sadiq al Mahdi's wing of the Umma won fifteen seats, the federalist SANU ten, and the NUP five. Despite this apparent boost in his support, Sadiq's position in parliament had become tenuous: concessions he had promised to the south in order to bring an end to the civil war were not agreed. The Umma traditionalist wing opposed Sadiq al Mahdi: they argued strongly against constitutional guarantees for religious freedom and his refusal to declare Sudan an Islamic state. When the traditionalists and the NUP withdrew their support, the government fell.
In May 1967, Mahjub became prime minister and head of a coalition government whose cabinet included members of his wing of the Umma, of the NUP, and of the PDP. In December 1967, the PDP and the NUP formed the DUP under Azhari's leadership. By early 1968, widening divisions in the Umma threatened the survival of the Mahjub government. Sadiq al Mahdi's wing held a majority in parliament and could thwart any government action. When Mahjub dissolved parliament Sadiq refused to recognize the legitimacy of the prime minister's action. An uneasy crisis developed: two governments functioned in Khartoum — one meeting in the parliament building and the other on its lawn — both of them claimed to represent the legislature's will. The army commander requested clarification from the Supreme Court regarding which of them had authority to issue orders. The court backed Mahjub's dissolution; and the government scheduled new elections for April.
Although the DUP won 101 of 218 seats, no single party controlled a parliamentary majority. Thirty-six seats went to the Umma traditionalists, thirty to the Sadiq wing, and twenty-five to the two southern parties—SANU and the Southern Front. The SCP secretary general, Abd al Khaliq Mahjub, also won a seat. In a major setback, Sadiq lost his own seat to a traditionalist rival. Because it lacked a majority, the DUP created an alliance with the Umma traditionalists, who received the prime ministership for their leader, Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub, and four other cabinet posts. The coalition's program included plans for government reorganization, closer ties with the Arab world, and renewed economic development efforts, particularly in the southern provinces. The Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub government also accepted military, technical, and economic aid from the Soviet Union. Sadiq al Mahdi's wing of the Umma formed the small parliamentary opposition. When it refused to participate in efforts to complete the draft constitution, already ten years overdue, the government retaliated by closing the opposition's newspaper and clamping down on pro-Sadiq demonstrations in Khartoum.
By late 1968, the two Umma wings agreed to support the Ansar chief Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi in the 1969 presidential election. At the same time, the DUP announced that Azhari also would seek the presidency. The communists and other leftists aligned themselves behind the presidential candidacy of former Chief Justice Babiker Awadallah, whom they viewed as an ally because he had ruled against the government when it attempted to outlaw the SCP. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Sudan_(1956%E2%80%931969) |
Oman | Torture methods in use in Oman include mock execution, beating, hooding, solitary confinement, subjection to extremes of temperature and to constant noise, abuse and humiliation. There have been numerous reports of torture and other inhumane forms of punishment perpetrated by Omani security forces on protesters and detainees. Several prisoners detained in 2012 complained of sleep deprivation, extreme temperatures and solitary confinement. Homosexuality is criminalised within Oman.
The Omani government decides who can or cannot be a journalist and this permission can be withdrawn at any time. Censorship and self-censorship are a constant factor. Omanis have limited access to political information through the media. Access to news and information can be problematic: journalists have to be content with news compiled by the official news agency on some issues. Through a decree by the Sultan, the government has now extended its control over the media to blogs and other websites. Omanis cannot hold a public meeting without the government's approval. Omanis who want to set up a non-governmental organisation of any kind need a licence. The Omani government does not permit the formation of independent civil society associations. Human Rights Watch issued in 2016, that an Omani court sentenced three journalists to prison and ordered the permanent closure of their newspaper, over an article that alleged corruption in the judiciary.
Omani law prohibits criticism of the Sultan and government in any form or medium. Oman's police do not need search warrants to enter people's homes. The law does not provide citizens with the right to change their government. The Sultan retains ultimate authority on all foreign and domestic issues. Government officials are not subject to financial disclosure laws. Criticism of government figures and politically objectionable views have been suppressed. Publication of books is limited and the government restricts their importation and distribution, as with other media products.
Until 2023, Omani citizens needed government permission to marry foreigners. In April 2023 the law was changed by a royal decree, allowing Omani citizens to marry foreigners without government permission. According to HRW, women in Oman face discrimination.
The plight of domestic workers in Oman is a taboo subject. In 2011, the Philippines government determined that out of all the countries in the Middle East, only Oman and Israel qualify as safe for Filipino migrants. Migrant workers remained insufficiently protected against exploitation. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oman |
Ruhollah Khomeini | In a talk at the Fayzieah School in Qom on 30 August 1979, Khomeini warned pro-imperialist opponents: "Those who are trying to bring corruption and destruction to our country in the name of democracy will be oppressed. They are worse than Bani-Ghorizeh Jews, and they must be hanged. We will oppress them by God's order and God's call to prayer."
However, in 1983, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) helped him by providing a list of Soviet KGB agents and collaborators operating in Iran to Khomeini, who then executed up to 200 suspects and closed down the Communist Tudeh Party of Iran.
The Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and his family left Iran and escaped harm, but hundreds of former members of the overthrown monarchy and military were executed by firing squads, with exiled critics complaining of "secrecy, vagueness of the charges, the absence of defense lawyers or juries", or the opportunity of the accused "to defend themselves." In later years these were followed in larger numbers by the erstwhile revolutionary allies of Khomeini's movement—Marxists and socialists, mostly university students—who opposed the theocratic regime. From 1980 to 1981, the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran and other opposition groups (including leftist and moderate groups) rallied against the takeover of the Islamic Republic Party through large demonstrations. On Khomeini's order, the Islamic Republic responded by shooting the demonstrators and arresting them, including their leaders. The 1981 Hafte Tir bombing escalated the conflict, leading to increasing arrests, torture, and executions of thousands of Iranians. Targets also included "innocent, non political civilians, such as members of the Baha'i religious minority, and others deemed problematic by the IRP." The number of those executed between 1981 and 1985's "reign of terror" is reported to be between 8,000 and 10,000.
In the 1988 executions of Iranian political prisoners, following the People's Mujahedin of Iran unsuccessful operation Forough-e Javidan against the Islamic Republic, Khomeini issued an order to judicial officials to judge every Iranian political prisoner (mostly but not all Mujahedin) and kill those judged to be apostates from Islam (mortad) or "waging war on God" (moharebeh). Almost all of those interrogated were killed, 1,000 to 30,000 of them. Because of the large number, prisoners were loaded into forklift trucks in groups of six and hanged from cranes in half-hour intervals. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruhollah_Khomeini |
Battle of Tell El Kebir | 'Urabi had redeployed to defend Cairo against Wolseley. His main force dug in at Tel El Kebir, north of the railway and the Sweetwater Canal, both of which linked Cairo to Ismailia on the canal. The defences were hastily prepared, but included trenches and redoubts. Urabi's forces possessed 60 pieces of artillery and breech loading rifles. Wolseley made several personal reconnaissances, and determined that the Egyptians did not man outposts in front of their main defences at night, which made it possible for an attacking force to approach the defences under cover of darkness. Rather than make an outflanking movement around Urabi's entrenchments, which would involve a long march through waterless desert, or undertake formal bombardment and assault, Wolseley planned to approach the position by night and attack frontally at dawn, hoping to achieve surprise.
Wolseley began his advance from Ismailia on the night of 12 September, with two infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade. A brigade of Indian troops covered the flank on the southern bank of the Sweetwater Canal. The approach march of the main forces was made easier because the desert west of Kassassin was almost flat and unobstructed, making it look like a gigantic parade ground. Even though there were repeated halts to maintain dressing and alignment, the British troops reached the Egyptian position at the time Wolseley intended.
At 5:45 a.m. Wolseley's troops were six hundred yards from the entrenchments and dawn was just breaking, when Egyptian sentries saw them and fired. The first shots were followed by multiple volleys from the entrenchments and by the artillery.: 68 British troops, led by the Highland Brigade on the left flank, and the 2nd Brigade on the right flank with the Guards Brigade (commanded by Queen Victoria's third son, Prince Arthur, the Duke of Connaught and Strathearn) in support, charged with the bayonet.
The British advance was shielded from view by the smoke from the Egyptian artillery and rifles. Arriving in the trenches at the same time, all along the line, the resulting battle was over within an hour.: 68 Most of the Egyptian soldiers were tired from having stood on the alert all night. Because of the haste with which Urabi's forces had prepared their defences, there were no obstacles in front of them to disrupt the attackers. Several groups stood and fought, mainly the Sudanese troops in the front of the Highland Brigade, but those not overwhelmed in the first rush were forced to retreat. In the end, it was a crushing defeat for the Egyptians. Official British figures gave a total of 57 British troops killed. Approximately two thousand Egyptians died. The British army had more casualties due to heatstroke than enemy action.: 130
British cavalry pursued the broken enemy towards Cairo, which was undefended. Power was then restored to the khedive, the war was at an end and the majority of the British Army went to Alexandria and took ship for home, leaving from November, just an army of occupation.: 69
Lieutenant William Mordaunt Marsh Edwards was awarded a Victoria Cross for his gallantry during the battle. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tell_El_Kebir |
Transport in Somalia | Possessing the longest coastline on mainland Africa, Somalia has a number of maritime transport facilities across the country. In total, there are over 15 seaports. Major class ports are found at Mogadishu, Bosaso, Berbera and Kismayo. Two jetty class ports are also situated at Las Khorey and Merca. Additionally, Aluula, Maydh, Lughaya, Eyl, Qandala, Hafun, Hobyo, Garacad and El Maan all have smaller ports.
In October 2013, the federal Cabinet endorsed an agreement with the Turkish firm Al-Bayrak to manage the Port of Mogadishu for a 20-year period. According to the Prime Minister's Office, the deal was secured by the Ministry of Ports and Public Works, and also assigns Al-Bayrak responsibility for rebuilding and modernizing the port. In April 2014, the Federal Parliament postponed finalization of the Seaport Management Deal pending the approval of a new foreign investment bill. The MPs also requested that the agreement be submitted to the legislature for deliberation and to ensure that the interests of the port's manual labourers are taken into account. In September 2014, the federal government officially delegated management of the Mogadishu Port to Al-Bayrak.
According to Al-Bayrak, the majority of its revenue share will be re-invested in the seaport through additional port-based trade and new docks, construction materials and machinery. The company also plans to install an environment wall and a closed circuit camera system in accordance with international security protocols, erect a modern port administration building, and clean the ship entrance channels via underwater surveillance. As of September 2014, the first phase of the renovations are reportedly complete, with the second phase underway.
The Port of Bosaso was constructed during the mid-1980s by the Siad Barre administration for annual livestock shipments to the Middle East. In January 2012, a renovation project was launched, with KMC contracted to upgrade the harbor. The initiative's first phase saw the clean-up of unwanted materials from the dockyard and was completed within the month. The second phase involves the reconstruction of the port's adjoining seabed, with the objective of accommodating larger ships.
Adeso, an organization founded by Somali environmentalist Fatima Jibrell, began a project for the redevelopment of the Port of Las Khorey. The initiative was later taken up by Faisal Hawar, CEO of the Maakhir Resource Company. In 2012, he brokered an agreement with a Greek investment firm for the development of the commercial seaport. A team of engineers was subsequently enlisted by the Puntland authorities to assess the ongoing renovations taking place at the port. According to the Minister of Ports, Saeed Mohamed Ragge, the Puntland government intends to launch more such development projects in Las Khorey. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_in_Somalia |
Persian language | The Persian language influenced the formation of many modern languages in West Asia, Europe, Central Asia, and South Asia. Following the Turko-Persian Ghaznavid conquest of South Asia, Persian was firstly introduced in the region by Turkic Central Asians. The basis in general for the introduction of Persian language into the subcontinent was set, from its earliest days, by various Persianized Central Asian Turkic and Afghan dynasties. For five centuries prior to the British colonization, Persian was widely used as a second language in the Indian subcontinent. It took prominence as the language of culture and education in several Muslim courts on the subcontinent and became the sole "official language" under the Mughal emperors.
The Bengal Sultanate witnessed an influx of Persian scholars, lawyers, teachers, and clerics. Thousands of Persian books and manuscripts were published in Bengal. The period of the reign of Sultan Ghiyathuddin Azam Shah is described as the "golden age of Persian literature in Bengal". Its stature was illustrated by the Sultan's own correspondence and collaboration with the Persian poet Hafez; a poem which can be found in the Divan of Hafez today. A Bengali dialect emerged among the common Bengali Muslim folk, based on a Persian model and known as Dobhashi; meaning mixed language. Dobhashi Bengali was patronised and given official status under the Sultans of Bengal, and was a popular literary form used by Bengalis during the pre-colonial period, irrespective of their religion.
Following the defeat of the Hindu Shahi dynasty, classical Persian was established as a courtly language in the region during the late 10th century under Ghaznavid rule over the northwestern frontier of the subcontinent. Employed by Punjabis in literature, Persian achieved prominence in the region during the following centuries. Persian continued to act as a courtly language for various empires in Punjab through the early 19th century serving finally as the official state language of the Sikh Empire, preceding British conquest and the decline of Persian in South Asia.
Beginning in 1843, though, English and Hindustani gradually replaced Persian in importance on the subcontinent. Evidence of Persian's historical influence there can be seen in the extent of its influence on certain languages of the Indian subcontinent. Words borrowed from Persian are still quite commonly used in certain Indo-Aryan languages, especially Hindi-Urdu (also historically known as Hindustani), Punjabi, Kashmiri, and Sindhi. There is also a small population of Zoroastrian Iranis in India, who migrated in the 19th century to escape religious execution in Qajar Iran and speak a Dari dialect. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian_language |
Great Syrian Revolt | Ibrahim Hananu was born to a wealthy family in Kafr Takharim and raised in Aleppo. There is dispute on his birth date: one source mentions he was born in 1879, while another mentions he was born in 1869. He studied at the Imperial High School in Aleppo, and continued his studies at the Ottoman Law Academy of the prestigious Mülkiye school in Constantinople. As a student, he joined the Committee of Union and Progress, the political organ that later took stage following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.
Breaking out in the autumn of 1919 in the countryside surrounding Aleppo, when the French army had landed on the Syrian coast and was preparing to occupy all of Syria, Hananu launched his revolt, bringing Aleppo, Idlib and Antioch into a coordinated campaign against French forces. Hananu was responsible for the disarmament of many French troops, the destruction of railroads and telegraph lines, the sabotage of tanks, and the foiling of French attacks on Aleppo. On 23 July 1920, when the French army successfully attacked Aleppo, Hananu was forced to retreat to his village of Kafr Takharim Nahiyah and began to reorganize the revolt with Najeeb Oweid. The rebels decided to form a civilian government based in Armanaz Nahiyah, and sent Hananu to Turkey as a representative of the new civilian government to request for aid in fighting against the French. He received aid from the Turkish nationalist movement of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which was battling the French Army of the Levant for control of Cilicia and southern Anatolia. With the withdrawal of Turkish military assistance following the signing of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement in October 1921, Hananu and his men could no longer sustain a revolt, and their struggle collapsed. However, the revolt's failure, the organization of the northern areas of Syria with Turkish help, has been interpreted as a prototype for self-government that Hananu and other Syrians built upon in later years.
In 1922 Ibrahim Hananu was arrested and presented to the French military criminal court on criminal acts. The first session of the court was on 15 March 1922. One of the best lawyers at that time, Fathallah Saqqal defended Hananu, advocated for Hananu's innocence, and argued that Hananu was a political opponent, not a criminal.
On 25 March 1922, the French Attorney General requested the execution of Hananu, and he said, "if Hananu has seven heads, I will cut them all," the French judge ultimately released Hananu following an agreement between Hananu and the French government. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Syrian_Revolt |
Himyaritic language | Part of the issue with defining Himyaritic is that the term itself is a catch-all term used by Arab grammarians after the Arabization of the Yemeni highlands and in reality could represent a number of speech varieties belonging to the Sayhadic branch of Central Semitic, meaning that ultimately determining the "distribution" of said language could be misleading. As suggested by Peter Stein the language of the Himyarites may have been no different than that of neighboring Sabaic-speaking peoples and thus what is documented in works such as al-Hamdani's al-Iklīl may in fact be the mixed speech of individuals who speak early varieties of Arabic with influence from spoken Sayhadic languages of the time. Stein points out that the few supposed examples of Himyaritic lay outside of the Himyarite heartland and instead in areas that are historically Sabaic speaking with Qāniya and Ja 2353 being written in an area that historically used the Radmanite dialect of Sabaic and ZI 11 coming from Mārib, the historical center of the Sabaic language and Sabaean state. As noted by Alessandra Avanzini the problem with suggesting that the Himyarites had their own distinct language to begin with is that personal correspondences from that era of South Arabian history are still in Sabaic and that Robin's suggestion that Sabaic was supplanted by this supposed Himyarite language at this point are unsupported by this being that it is unlikely that personal correspondences would be in a dead language.
It has been suggested that the languages of the Yemeni highlands were not outright replaced by Arabic but instead because of their close relation to it the speech varieties gradually became "Arabized" into being considered what Arabists could consider to be Arabic, adding to Stein's point that "Himyaritic" as known to al-Hamdani in specific may have in reality been Arabized Sayhadic speech varieties or a group of varieties of Arabic that had a strong Sayhadic substrate. Restö (2000:115) goes as far as suggesting that even in the modern day a similar dynamic may exist for the so-called k-dialects of highland Yemen where "all other elements connecting them with other Arabic dialects are borrowings" and in reality they may be surviving Sayhadic speech varieties. Works such as al-Hamdani's Ṣifat Jazīrat al-Arab do not portray an objective description of the speech varieties and their features but instead gives a view into how language was taken into account in regards to the ranking at which al-Hamdani considered different peoples, social classes, and so forth. Much of what al-Hamdani notes as /ʃajʔun mina l-taħmir/ ('an element of Himyaritic') are instead irregularities in spoken Arabic that he could not attribute to Classical Arabic and his description of /ʔal-ħimjarijja ʔal-quħħa ʔal-mutaʔaqqida/ ('pure, incomprehensible Himyaritic') in some parts of the historic territory of the Himyarite confederacy may actually be describing any remnant speech communities using Sayhadic languages; albeit if they were Sabaic or any other it would not matter given that anything non-Arab and distinctive to the area at the time was simply "Himyaritic". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Himyaritic_language |
Khuzestan province | The province of Khuzestan can be basically divided into two regions; the rolling hills and mountainous regions north of the Ahvaz Ridge, and the plains and marsh lands to its south. The area is irrigated by the Karoun, Karkheh, Jarahi and Maroun rivers. The northern section maintains a non-Persian Bakhtiari minority, while the southern section always had diverse minority groups known as Khuzis. Since the 1940s, a flood of job seekers from all over Iran to the oil and commerce centers on the Persian Gulf Coast has made the region more Persian-speaking. Presently, Khuzestan still maintains its diverse group, but does have Arabs, Persians, Bakhtiari and ethnic Qashqais and Lors.
Khuzestan has great potential for agricultural expansion, which is almost unrivaled by the country's other provinces. Large and permanent rivers flow over the entire territory contributing to the fertility of the land. Karun, Iran's most effluent river, 850 kilometers long, flows into the Persian Gulf through this province. The agricultural potential of most of these rivers, however, and particularly in their lower reaches, is hampered by the fact that their waters carry salt, the amount of which increases as the rivers flow away from the source mountains and hills. In case of the Karun, a single tributary river, Rud-i Shur ("Salty River") that flows into the Karun above Shushtar contributes most of the salt that the river carries. As such, the freshness of the Karun waters could be greatly enhanced if the Rud-i Shur could be diverted away from the Karun. The same applies to the Jarahi and Karkheh in their lower reaches. Only the Marun is exempt from this.
The climate of Khuzestan is generally very hot and occasionally humid, particularly in the south, while winters can be cold and dry. Summertime temperatures routinely exceed 45 °C (113 °F) almost daily and in the winter it can drop below freezing, with occasional snowfall in mountains. Khuzestan is one of the hottest places on earth with maximum temperatures in summer exceeding 50 °C (122 °F) sometimes. Reliable measurements in the city range from −5 to 54.0 °C (23.0 to 129.2 °F).
Khuzestan has desert conditions and experiences many sandstorms. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khuzestan_province |
Greenwich Mean Time | As the United Kingdom developed into an advanced maritime nation, British mariners kept at least one chronometer on GMT to calculate their longitude from the Greenwich meridian, which was considered to have longitude zero degrees, by a convention adopted in the International Meridian Conference of 1884. Synchronisation of the chronometer on GMT did not affect shipboard time, which was still solar time. But this practice, combined with mariners from other nations drawing from Nevil Maskelyne's method of lunar distances based on observations at Greenwich, led to GMT being used worldwide as a standard time independent of location. Most time zones were based upon GMT, as an offset of a number of hours (and occasionally half or quarter hours) "ahead of GMT" or "behind GMT".
Greenwich Mean Time was adopted across the island of Great Britain by the Railway Clearing House in 1847 and by almost all railway companies by the following year, from which the term railway time is derived. It was gradually adopted for other purposes, but a legal case in 1858 held "local mean time" to be the official time. On 14 May 1880, a letter signed by "Clerk to Justices" appeared in The Times, stating that "Greenwich time is now kept almost throughout England, but it appears that Greenwich time is not legal time. For example, our polling booths were opened, say, at 8 13 and closed at 4 13 p.m." This was changed later in 1880, when Greenwich Mean Time was legally adopted throughout the island of Great Britain. GMT was adopted in the Isle of Man in 1883, in Jersey in 1898 and in Guernsey in 1913. Ireland adopted GMT in 1916, supplanting Dublin Mean Time. Hourly time signals from Greenwich Observatory were first broadcast by shortwave radio on 5 February 1924 at 17:30:00 UTC, rendering the time ball at the observatory redundant.
The daily rotation of the Earth is irregular (see ΔT) and has a slowing trend; therefore atomic clocks constitute a much more stable timebase. On 1 January 1972, GMT as the international civil time standard was superseded by Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), maintained by an ensemble of atomic clocks around the world. Universal Time (UT), a term introduced in 1928, initially represented mean time at Greenwich determined in the traditional way to accord with the originally defined universal day; from 1 January 1956 (as decided by the International Astronomical Union in Dublin in 1955, at the initiative of William Markowitz) this "raw" form of UT was re-labelled UT0 and effectively superseded by refined forms UT1 (UT0 equalised for the effects of polar wandering) and UT2 (UT1 further equalised for annual seasonal variations in Earth rotation rate).
Indeed, even the Greenwich meridian itself is not quite what it used to be—defined by "the centre of the transit instrument at the Observatory at Greenwich". Although that instrument still survives in working order, it is no longer in use and now the meridian of origin of the world's longitude and time is not strictly defined in material form but from a statistical solution resulting from observations of all time-determination stations which the BIPM takes into account when co-ordinating the world's time signals. Nevertheless, the line in the old observatory's courtyard today differs no more than a few metres from that imaginary line which is now the prime meridian of the world. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenwich_Mean_Time |
Lebanese Greek Orthodox Christians | Paul Anka – singer, songwriter and actor
Lydia Canaan – singer-songwriter, poet, humanitarian activist, and pioneering first rock star of the Middle East
Farid Makari – politician, former Lebanese Minister, Member of Parliament, Deputy Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament
William Hawi, Commander, of the Kataeb Party
Charles Debbas – former president (1926–1934)
Mounir Abou Fadel – former Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, Member of the Parliament
Marcos Baghdatis – tennis player
Charles Malik – former president of the United Nations General Assembly and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Antoun Saadeh – philosopher and founder of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party
Antoine Andraos – politician and a vice-president of the Movement of the Future
Elias Murr – former Deputy Prime Minister
Michel Murr – former Deputy Prime Minister
Michel Sassine – former Lebanese Minister, Member of the Parliament, Deputy Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, and Deputy Prime Minister of Lebanon
Mikhail Naimy – poet, novelist, and philosopher, famous for his spiritual writings, notably The Book of Mirdad
Elia Abu Madi – poet
George Antonius – author and diplomat, pioneering historian of Arab nationalism
George N. Atiyeh – librarian and scholar
Souha Bechara – resistance fighter and member of the Lebanese Communist Party
Yousef Beidas – banker
Marwan Abou Fadel – former MP of Mount Lebanon, co-founder of the Lebanese Democratic Party
Gabrielle Bou Rached – model and actress
Jurji Zaydan – novelist, journalist, editor and teacher, most noted for his creation of the magazine Al-Hilal, which he used to serialize his 23 historical novels. Also reputed to be the first Arab nationalist.
Elie Ferzli – politician
Fawaz Gerges – professor and author
Farid Habib – member of the Lebanese Forces party
Maya Diab - singer, actress and fashion icon
Nicolas Hayek – entrepreneur, co-founder, CEO and chairman of the board of the Swatch Group
Saint Joseph of Damascus – priest and educator who was canonized as a saint in 1993
Samir Kassir – professor of history at Saint-Joseph University, journalist and a prominent leftist political activist
Wehbe Katicha – politician and former general in the Lebanese Army
Elias Khoury – novelist, playwright, critic, and a prominent public intellectual
Giselle Khoury – talk show host on the Al Arabiya news channel
Jacobo Majluta Azar – former president of the Dominican Republic
Mikhail Mishaqa – first historian of modern Ottoman Syria
Tarek Mitri – scholar and independent politician
Samir Mouqbel – Deputy Prime Minister of Lebanon
Ibrahim Najjar – lawyer and politician
Octavia Nasr – journalist who covers Middle-Eastern affairs
Mona Ofeich – politician
Assi Rahbani – composer, musician, and producer
Ziad Rahbani – producer, lyricist, composer, arranger, orchestra conductor, pianist, and singer
Mansour Rahbani – composer, musician, poet, and producer
Raphael of Brooklyn – first Orthodox bishop to be consecrated in North America
Salim Saade – politician and member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party
Christina Sawaya – beauty queen
Cochrane Sursock – philanthropist, a prominent public figure, and an advocate of the arts in Lebanon
Nassim Nicholas Taleb – essayist and scholar whose work focuses on problems of randomness, probability, and uncertainty
Petro Trad – lawyer, politician, and former president of the French Mandate of Lebanon for a brief period (22 July 1943 – 21 September 1943)
Gebran Tueni – journalist and a figure of the Arab Renaissance
Ghassan Tueni – veteran journalist, politician, and diplomat who headed An Nahar, one of the Arab World's leading newspapers
Nayla Tueni – journalist and politician
Karim Azkoul – diplomat and philosopher
Jad Azkoul – musician
Zeina Mina – olympic athlete director of the games of the Francophonie. She holds a doctorate in Sciences and Techniques of Physical and Sports Activities | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanese_Greek_Orthodox_Christians |
Victoria and Albert Museum | The collection of textiles consists of more than 53,000 examples, mainly western European though all populated continents are represented, dating from the 1st century AD to the present, this is the largest such collection in the world. Techniques represented include weaving, printing, quilting embroidery, lace, tapestry and carpets. These are classified by technique, countries of origin and date of production. The collections are well represented in these areas: early silks from the Near East, lace, European tapestries and English medieval church embroidery.
The tapestry collection includes a fragment of the Cloth of St Gereon, the oldest known surviving European tapestry. A highlight of the collection is the four Devonshire Hunting Tapestries, very rare 15th-century tapestries, woven in the Netherlands, depicting the hunting of various animals; not just their age but their size make these unique. Both of the major English centres of tapestry weaving of the 16th and 17th centuries respectively, Sheldon & Mortlake are represented in the collection by several examples. Also included are tapestries from John Vanderbank's workshop which was the leading English tapestry manufactory in the late 17th century and early 18th century. Some of the finest tapestries are examples from the Gobelins workshop, including a set of 'Jason and the Argonauts' dating from the 1750s. Other continental centres of tapestry weaving with work in the collection include Brussels, Tournai, Beauvais, Strasbourg and Florence.
One of the earliest surviving examples of European quilting, the late 14th-century Sicilian Tristan Quilt, is also held by the collection. The collection has numerous examples of various types of textiles designed by William Morris, including, embroidery, woven fabrics, tapestries (including The Forest tapestry of 1887), rugs and carpets, as well as pattern books and paper designs. The art deco period is covered by rugs and fabrics designed by Marion Dorn. From the same period there is a rug designed by Serge Chermayeff.
The collection also includes the Oxburgh Hangings, which were made by Mary, Queen of Scots and Bess of Hardwick. However, the Oxburgh Hangings are on permanent long-term loan at Oxburgh Hall. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victoria_and_Albert_Museum |
Lebanon | On 17 October 2019, the first of a series of mass civil demonstrations erupted; they were initially triggered by planned taxes on gasoline, tobacco and online phone calls such as through WhatsApp, but quickly expanded into a country-wide condemnation of sectarian rule, a stagnant economy and liquidity crisis, unemployment, endemic corruption in the public sector, legislation (such as banking secrecy) that is perceived to shield the ruling class from accountability and failures from the government to provide basic services such as electricity, water and sanitation.
As a result of the protests, Lebanon entered a political crisis, with Prime Minister Saad Hariri tendering his resignation and echoing protestors' demands for a government of independent specialists. Other politicians targeted by the protests have remained in power. On 19 December 2019, former Minister of Education Hassan Diab was designated the next prime minister and tasked with forming a new cabinet. Protests and acts of civil disobedience have since continued, with protesters denouncing and condemning the designation of Diab as prime minister. Lebanon is suffering the worst economic crisis in decades. Lebanon is the first country in the Middle East and North Africa to see its inflation rate exceed 50% for 30 consecutive days, according to Steve H. Hanke, professor of applied economics at the Johns Hopkins University. On 4 August 2020, an explosion at the port of Beirut, Lebanon's main port, destroyed the surrounding areas, killing over 200 people, and injuring thousands more. The cause of the explosion was later determined to be 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate that had been unsafely stored, and accidentally set on fire that Tuesday afternoon. Protests resumed within days following the explosion, which resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister Hassan Diab and his cabinet on 10 August 2020, nonetheless continuing to stay in office in a caretaker capacity. Demonstrations continued into 2021 with Lebanese blocking the roads with burned tires protesting against the poverty and the economic crisis.
On 11 March 2021 the caretaker minister of energy Raymond Ghajar warned that Lebanon was threatened with "total darkness" at the end of March if no money was secured to buy fuel for power stations. In August 2021, a large fuel explosion in northern Lebanon killed 28 people. September saw the formation of a new cabinet led by former prime minister Najib Mikati. On 9 October 2021, the entire nation lost power for 24 hours after its two main power stations ran out of power due to the currency and fuel shortage. Days later, sectarian violence in Beirut killed a number of people in the deadliest clashes in the country since 2008. By January 2022, BBC News reported that the crisis in Lebanon had deepened further, with the value of the Lebanese pound plummeting and a scheduled general election expected to be delayed indefinitely. The postponement of parliamentary elections was said to prolong the political deadlock in the country. The European Parliament called Lebanon's present situation a 'man-made disaster caused by a handful of men across the political class'.
In May 2022, Lebanon held its first election since a painful economic crisis dragged it to the brink of becoming a failed state. Lebanon's crisis has been so severe that more than 80 percent of the population is now considered poor by the United Nations. In the election the Shia Muslim Hezbollah movement (and its allies) lost their parliamentary majority. Hezbollah did not lose any of its seats, but its allies lost seats. Hezbollah's ally, President Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement, was no longer the biggest Christian party after the election. A rival Christian party, the Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geagea, became the largest Christian-based party in parliament. The Sunni Future Movement, led by former prime minister Saad Hariri, did not participate the election, leaving a political vacuum to other Sunni politicians to fill. The Lebanese crisis became so severe that multiple boats left the coast holding migrants in a desperate run from the country. Many proved unsuccessful and fatal. In April 2022, 6 people died and around 50 people are rescued after an overloaded boat sunk in Tripoli. And on September 22, at least 94 people were killed when a boat carrying migrants from Lebanon capsized off Syria's coast. 9 people survived. Many were declared missing and some were found either dead or injured. Dead bodies were sent to nearby hospitals. 40 people are still missing as of 24 September. On 1 February 2023, the central bank of Lebanon devalued the Lebanese pound by 90% amid the ongoing financial crisis. This was the first time Lebanon had devalued its official exchange rate in 25 years. As of 2023, Lebanon is considered to have become a failed state, suffering from chronic poverty, economic mismanagement and a banking collapse. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanon |
Head of state | One of the most important roles of the modern head of state is being a living national symbol of the state; in hereditary monarchies this extends to the monarch being a symbol of the unbroken continuity of the state. For instance, the Canadian monarch is described by the government as being the personification of the Canadian state and is described by the Department of Canadian Heritage as the "personal symbol of allegiance, unity and authority for all Canadians".
In many countries, official portraits of the head of state can be found in government offices, courts of law, or other public buildings. The idea, sometimes regulated by law, is to use these portraits to make the public aware of the symbolic connection to the government, a practice that dates back to medieval times. Sometimes this practice is taken to excess, and the head of state becomes the principal symbol of the nation, resulting in the emergence of a personality cult where the image of the head of state is the only visual representation of the country, surpassing other symbols such as the flag.
Other common representations are on coins, postage and other stamps and banknotes, sometimes by no more than a mention or signature; and public places, streets, monuments and institutions such as schools are named for current or previous heads of state. In monarchies (e.g., Belgium) there can even be a practice to attribute the adjective "royal" on demand based on existence for a given number of years. However, such political techniques can also be used by leaders without the formal rank of head of state, even party - and other revolutionary leaders without formal state mandate.
Heads of state often greet important foreign visitors, particularly visiting heads of state. They assume a host role during a state visit, and the programme may feature playing of the national anthems by a military band, inspection of military troops, official exchange of gifts, and attending a state dinner at the official residence of the host.
At home, heads of state are expected to render lustre to various occasions by their presence, such as by attending artistic or sports performances or competitions (often in a theatrical honour box, on a platform, on the front row, at the honours table), expositions, national day celebrations, dedication events, military parades and war remembrances, prominent funerals, visiting different parts of the country and people from different walks of life, and at times performing symbolic acts such as cutting a ribbon, groundbreaking, ship christening, laying the first stone. Some parts of national life receive their regular attention, often on an annual basis, or even in the form of official patronage.
The Olympic Charter (rule 55.3) of the International Olympic Committee states that the Olympic summer and winter games shall be opened by the head of state of the host nation, by uttering a single formulaic phrase as determined by the charter.
As such invitations may be very numerous, such duties are often in part delegated to such persons as a spouse, a head of government or a cabinet minister or in other cases (possibly as a message, for instance, to distance themselves without rendering offence) just a military officer or civil servant.
For non-executive heads of state there is often a degree of censorship by the politically responsible government (such as the head of government). This means that the government discreetly approves agenda and speeches, especially where the constitution (or customary law) assumes all political responsibility by granting the crown inviolability (in fact also imposing political emasculation) as in the Kingdom of Belgium from its very beginning; in a monarchy this may even be extended to some degree to other members of the dynasty, especially the heir to the throne.
Below follows a list of examples from different countries of general provisions in law, which either designate an office as head of state or define its general purpose.
Example 1 (parliamentary monarchy): Section 56 (1) of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 states:
The King is the Head of State, the symbol of its unity and permanence. He arbitrates and moderates the regular functioning of the institutions, assumes the highest representation of the Spanish State in international relations, especially with the nations of its historical community, and exercises the functions expressly conferred on him by the Constitution and the laws.
Example 2 (parliamentary absentee monarchy): Article 2 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1986 states:
(1) The Sovereign in right of New Zealand is the head of State of New Zealand, and shall be known by the royal style and titles proclaimed from time to time.
(2) The Governor-General appointed by the Sovereign is the Sovereign's representative in New Zealand.
Example 3 (parliamentary non-executive monarchy): Article 1 of the Constitution of Japan states:
The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the People, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.
Example 4 (parliamentary republic): Title II, Article 87 of the Constitution of Italy states:
The President of the Republic is the Head of the State and represents national unity.
Example 5 (parliamentary republic): Article 67 of the Iraqi constitution of 2005 states:
The President of the Republic is the Head of the State and a symbol of the unity of the country and represents the sovereignty of the country. He shall guarantee the commitment to the Constitution and the preservation of Iraq's independence, sovereignty, unity, and the safety of its territories, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Example 6 (semi-presidential republic): Title II, Chapter I, Article 120 of the Constitution of Portugal states:
The President of the Republic represents the Portuguese Republic, guarantees national independence, the unity of the state and the proper operation of the democratic institutions, and is ex officio Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
Example 7 (presidential republic): Chapter IV, Section 1, Article 66 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea states:
(1)The President shall be the Head of State and represent the State vis-à-vis foreign states.
(2)The President shall have the responsibility and duty to safeguard the independence, territorial integrity and continuity of the State and the Constitution.
Example 8 (semi-presidential republic): Chapter VI, Article 77 of the Constitution of Lithuania states:
The President of the Republic shall be Head of State.
He shall represent the State of Lithuania and shall perform everything with which he is charged by the Constitution and laws.
Example 9 (semi-presidential republic): Chapter 4, Article 80, Section 1-2 of the Constitution of Russia states:
1. The President of the Russian Federation shall be the Head of State.
2. The President of the Russian Federation shall be the guarantor of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and of human and civil rights and freedoms. In accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, he (she) shall adopt measures to protect the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, its independence and State integrity, and shall ensure the coordinated functioning and interaction of State government bodies.
Example 10 (presidential republic): Section 87 (Second Division, Chapter 1) of the Constitution of Argentina provides that:
The Executive Power of the Nation shall be vested in a citizen with the title of "President of the Argentine Nation". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Head_of_state |
Pyramidion of Amenemhat III | The four upper faces were polished and inscribed. The side which pointed to the east is adorned with a winged sun disk flanked by two uraei. Below, two wedjat represent the eyes of the king himself. Further down, three nefer signs stand for beauty or perfection. Finally, a sun disk represents the god Ra, from which the throne name of Amenemhat "Ni-maat-re" extends to the right and his personal name "Imen-em-hat" to the left. As a whole, the composition reads: "Amenemhat beholds the perfection of Ra".
Along the bottom of the four upper faces, two lines of inscriptions run:
Eastern Face
The eastern commences with: (top row) "Words spoken, may the sight be open to the king of upper and lower Egypt, the lord of the two lands, Nimaatre, so he may see the lord of the horizon and his crossing of the upper sky. May it be given the appearing to the Son of Ra, Amenemhat, as a god, lord of everlasting and indestructible. (bottom row) Word spoken, by the sovereign, I have given the beautiful horizon, the Two Ladies (Nekhbet and Wadjet), and he who takes the inheritance of the two lands, so you may rest upon it, which pleases the sky. Word spoken by the horizon: may you rest upon it, which please the sky".
Northern Face
The northern commences with: (top row) "Word spoken, higher is the Ba of the king of upper and lower Egypt, Nimaatre, than the height of Orion as it joins the Duat. Ra-Horakhty, he makes firm, the Son of Ra, of his body, Amenemhat, who is in the midst of the northern starry sky, and Neith who is content concerning it". (bottom row - starting from the centre proceeding to the left) The living Horus, great of might, the Two Ladies (Nebty), who inherited the two lands, the golden Horus - enduring of life, the Son of Ra - Amenemhat, given life, like Ra, forever. (back to the center proceeding to the right) The living Horus, great of might, the Two Ladies, who inherited the two lands, the golden Horus, enduring of life, the king of Upper and Lower Egypt, Nimaatre, given life, like Ra, forever".
Western Face
The western commences with: (top row) "... the great one, the ribs of Osiris, lord of the Thinite nome, that are under the feet of the good god, the lord of the two lands and of doing, the son of Ra, of his body, Amenemhat. Ptah, who is south of his wall, the lord of truth and the beloved Ankhtawy (the living two lands) ... (bottom row) Word spoken by Ptah, given all life, stability, power, to the good god, the golden Horus - enduring of life, Nimaatre. Words spoken by Sokar-Osiris, lord of all the living god, of ..."
Southern Face
The southern commences with: (top row) "Words spoken by, Imiut/Anubis, he who has upon his mountain, and behind the king of upper and lower Egypt, the lord of doing Nimaatre, united with the western desert inside the great shrine. The lord of good offering, who is in it and given it, his inheritance. The lord of eternity and for everlasting. (bottom row) Word spoken by Imuit/Anubis, I have given all places, good, pure and the spirit of the beautiful west to the king of upper and lower Egypt, the lord of the two lands, Nimaatre, commanding to him, may you rest the upon it, word spoken by the beautiful west, may you rest the upon it".
The name of the god Amen in Amenemhat's cartouches has been erased. If this was done during the reign of Akhenaten in the 18th Dynasty, the pyramidion may have laid on the ground since c. 1350 BC. The relative lack of damage raised the question whether or not it had ever been on top of the pyramid. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyramidion_of_Amenemhat_III |
Ahruf | Emphasizing the difficulty of the issue, conservative Islamic scholar Abu Ammaar Yasir Qadhi stated in a 2020 interview that "every single student of knowledge ... who studies ulm of Quran" knows "that the most difficult topics are ahruf and qira’at", so vexing that even "the most advanced of our scholars, they are not quite fully certain how to solve all of it and answer questions in there",
and so sensitive that it "should never be brought up in public” and is "not something you discuss among the masses".। He also added that "the standard narrative has holes in it" which raises a huge backlash among the scholars.
Were the variant ahruf readings approved by God?
Other reports of what the Prophet said (as well as some scholarly commentary) seem to contradict the presence of variant readings.
Abu Abd Al-Rahman al-Sulami writes, "The reading of Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Zayd ibn Thabit and that of all the Muhajirun and the Ansar was the same. They would read the Quran according to the Qira'at al-'ammah. This is the same reading which was read out twice by the Prophet to Gabriel in the year of his death. Zayd ibn Thabit was also present in this reading [called] the 'Ardah-i akhirah. It was this very reading that he taught the Quran to people till his death". According to Ibn Sirin, "The reading on which the Quran was read out to the prophet in the year of his death is the same according to which people are reading the Quran today".
Examining the hadith of Umar's surprise in finding out "this Quran has been revealed in seven Ahruf", Suyuti, a noted 15th-century Islamic theologian, concludes the "best opinion" of this hadith is that it is "mutashabihat", i.e. its meaning "cannot be understood."
Another critic, Shezad Salem has doubts about the validity of the hadith:
it is known that Hisham had accepted Islam on the day Makkah was conquered. If this Hadith is accepted, it would mean that for almost twenty years even the closest Companions of the Prophet like ‘Umar were unaware of the Qur’an being revealed in some other reading.
At least two Sahih al-Bukhari hadith explicitly state the Qur'an was revealed in the dialect of the Quraysh (Muhammad's tribe) -- making no mention of other ahruf—and that in case there are disagreements over recitation, this should clear everything up.
Narrated Anas bin Malik: (The Caliph 'Uthman ordered Zaid bin Thabit, Said bin Al-As, 'Abdullah bin Az-Zubair and 'Abdur-Rahman bin Al-Harith bin Hisham to write the Quran in the form of a book (Mushafs) and said to them. “In case you disagree with Zaid bin Thabit (Al-Ansari) regarding any dialectic Arabic utterance of the Quran, then write it in the dialect of Quraish, for the Quran was revealed in this dialect.” So they did it.
Narrated Anas bin Malik: Hudhaifa bin Al-Yaman came to Uthman at the time when the people of Sham and the people of Iraq were waging war to conquer Arminya and Adharbijan. Hudhaifa was afraid of their (the people of Sham and Iraq) differences in the recitation of the Qur'an, so he said to 'Uthman, "O chief of the Believers! Save this nation before they differ about the Book (Quran) as Jews and the Christians did before." So 'Uthman sent a message to Hafsa saying, "Send us the manuscripts of the Qur'an so that we may compile the Qur'anic materials in perfect copies and return the manuscripts to you." Hafsa sent it to 'Uthman. 'Uthman then ordered Zaid bin Thabit, 'Abdullah bin AzZubair, Said bin Al-As and 'AbdurRahman bin Harith bin Hisham to rewrite the manuscripts in perfect copies. 'Uthman said to the three Quraishi men, "In case you disagree with Zaid bin Thabit on any point in the Qur'an, then write it in the dialect of Quraish, the Qur'an was revealed in their tongue." They did so, and when they had written many copies, 'Uthman returned the original manuscripts to Hafsa. 'Uthman sent to every Muslim province one copy of what they had copied, and ordered that all the other Qur'anic materials, whether written in fragmentary manuscripts or whole copies, be burnt. Said bin Thabit added, "A Verse from Surat Ahzab was missed by me when we copied the Qur'an and I used to hear Allah's Apostle reciting it. So we searched for it and found it with Khuzaima bin Thabit Al-Ansari. (That Verse was): ‘Among the Believers are men who have been true in their covenant with Allah.’ (33.23)”
Furthermore, while some hadith refer to ahruf, there is no mention of seven ahruf or of different ways of reciting the Quran in the Quran itself, nor does the Quran ever refer to itself in the plural, (for example, 75:16-19). Since there are multiple verses of the Quran declaring that "our revelations" have been "explained in detail", (6:98, 6:114, 41:3) some mention of the existence multiple recitation or variants there would be expected | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahruf |
Kebab | Adana kebap (or kıyma kebabı) is a long, hand-minced meat kebab mounted on a wide iron skewer and grilled over charcoal. Named after the Turkish city of Adana, the kebab is generally "hot" or piquant. The traditional Adana kebab is made using lamb, with a high fatty content cooked over hot coals. Only three ingredients are used in a proper Adana kebab, minced lamb, red capsicum (pepper) and salt.
Ali Paşa kebabı, "Ali Pasha kebab" – cubed lamb with tomato, onion and parsley wrapped in phillo.
Alinazik – Ground meat kebab sautéed in a saucepan, with garlic, yogurt and eggplants added.
Beyti kebap – Ground lamb or beef, seasoned and grilled on a skewer, often served wrapped in lavash and topped with tomato sauce and yogurt, traced back to the famous kebab house Beyti in Istanbul and particularly popular in Turkey's larger cities.
Bostan kebabı – Lamb and aubergine casserole.
Buğu kebabı – Steam kebab, is a Turkish stew which is cooked in a pan or an earthenware casserole. The casserole's lid is sealed in order to cook the meat in its own juices. The dish is prepared with pearl onions, garlic, thyme and other spices. In Tekirdağ, it is served with cumin; in İzmir, it is served with mastic.
Cağ kebap, 'spoke kebab' – Cubes of lamb roasted first on a cağ (a horizontal rotating spit) and then on a skewer, a specialty of Erzurum region with recently rising popularity.
Ciğer kebabı, 'liver kebab' - usually eaten with sliced onions, salad and bread.
Çökertme kebabı – Sirloin veal kebap stuffed with yogurt and potatoes.
Çöp şiş, "small skewer kebab" – a speciality of Selçuk and Germencik near Ephesus, pounded boneless meat with tomatoes and garlic marinated with black pepper, thyme and oil on wooden skewers.
Döner kebap, literally "rotating kebab" in Turkish, is sliced lamb, beef, or chicken, slowly roasted on a vertical rotating spit. The Middle Eastern shawarma, Mexican tacos al pastor, and Greek gyros are all derived from the Turkish döner kebab, which was invented in Bursa in the 19th century. The German-style döner kebab sandwich, sometimes called simply "a kebab" in English, was introduced by Turkish immigrants in Berlin in the 1970s, and has become one of the most popular take-away foods in Germany and much of Europe. It is commonly sold by Turks, and considered a Turkish-German specialty, in Germany.
Hünkâri kebabı, 'Sultan's kebab' – Sliced lamb meat mixed with patlıcan beğendi (aubergine purée), basil, thyme and bay leaf.
İskender kebap – döner kebab served with yogurt, tomato sauce and butter, originated in Bursa. This kebab was invented by İskender Efendi in 1867. He was inspired from Cağ kebab and turned it from horizontal to vertical.
İslim kebabı, 'steamed kebab' – Another version of the aubergine kebab without its skin, marinated in sunflower oil.
Kağıt kebabı – Lamb cooked in a paper wrapping.
Kuzu şiş – Shish prepared with marinated milk-fed lamb meat.
Manisa Kebab – This Manisa region version of the kebab is smaller and flat size shish meat on the sliced pide bread, flavored with butter, and stuffed with tomato, garlic and green pepper.
Patlıcan kebabı, 'aubergine kebab' – Special kebap meat marinated in spices and served with eggplant (aubergine), hot pide bread and a yogurt sauce.
Shish kebap – is a dish consisting of small cubes of meat or fish threaded on a skewer and grilled. Şiş, pronounced [ʃiʃ], is a Turkish word meaning "sword" or "skewer". According to tradition, the dish was invented by medieval soldiers who used their swords to grill meat over open-field fires. In Turkey, shish kebab does not normally contain vegetables, though they may be cooked on a separate skewer. It can be prepared with lamb, beef, chicken, or fish, but pork is not used. The Pontian Greeks made a dish similar to shish kebabs, although theirs were cooked in a saucepan.
Tavuk şiş – Yogurt-marinated chicken grilled on a stick.
Testi kebabı, 'earthenware-jug kebab' – is a dish from Central Anatolia and the Mid-Western Black Sea region, consisting of a mixture of meat and vegetables cooked in a clay pot or jug over fire (testi means jug in Turkish). The pot is sealed with bread dough or foil and is broken when serving. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kebab |
Commission on Scientific Signs in the Quran and Sunnah | A criticism made of the commission is that in its enthusiasm to prove that evidence in favor of Qur'anic scientific miracles “is clear and obvious" and to demonstrate that "a group of eminent non-Muslim scholars in several fields” has testified to this miraculous connection, the commission has spread misleading, out-of-context statements by several of these non-Muslim scholars.
In 1984, a member of the commission, Mustafa Abdul Basit Ahmed, moved to the United States to recruit non-Muslim Western scientists to verify the miraculous signs of the Quran. However, in a 2002 story in the American newspaper The Wall Street Journal, several non-Muslim scientists spoke of questionable practices used by the commission to coax statements from them, such as hard-sell interviews by Sheikh Abdul Majeed al-Zindani,
and promises to be “completely neutral” that were not kept.
The commission drew the scientists to its conferences with first-class plane tickets for them and their wives, rooms at the best hotels, $1,000 honoraria, and banquets with Muslim leaders — such as a palace dinner in Islamabad with Pakistani President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq shortly before he was killed in a plane crash. Ahmed also gave at least one scientist a crystal clock.
Marine scientist William W. Hay complained of having fallen into a "trap" in interviews, while embryologist Gerald Goeringer claimed "mutual manipulation" between the scientists and conference organizers. Retired Geologist Professor Alfred Kröner of the University of Mainz has a standard e-mail reply clarifying his "out of context" remarks during one of the conferences and has described the proceedings which resulted in his remarks being used by Muslim apologists.
One product of Abdul Majeed al-Zindani's efforts was a video on "scientific miracles" called "This is Truth", which included clips of Western scientists allegedly expressing their astonishment with the prescience of the Quran on various scientific matters. In 2012, four of the Western scientists featured in "This Is The Truth" -- Alfred Kröner, William W. Hay, Allison (Pete) Palmer, and Tom Armstrong—were featured again in video interviews, this time by the video channel "This Is The Truth Uncut". They told the interviewer ("TheRationalizer") they were misrepresented, their video quotes were taken out of context (often after days of preparation to get them to say words that could be used in the video), and were sometimes quoted in written works saying things they had no recollection whatever of saying. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commission_on_Scientific_Signs_in_the_Quran_and_Sunnah |
History of slavery | During the 20th century the issue of slavery was addressed by the League of Nations, who founded commissions to investigate and eradicate the institution of slavery and slave trade worldwide. Their efforts continued the work of the first international attempt to address the issue made by the Brussels Anti-Slavery Conference 1889–90, which had concluded with the Brussels Conference Act of 1890. The 1890 Act was revised by the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye 1919, and when the League of Nations was founded in 1920, a need was felt to revise and continue the struggle against slavery.
The Temporary Slavery Commission (TSC) was founded by the League in 1924, which conducted a global investigation and filed a report, and a convention was drawn up in view of hastening the total abolition of slavery and the slave trade.
The 1926 Slavery Convention, which was founded upon the investigation of the TSC of the League of Nations, was a turning point in banning global slavery.
In 1932, the League formed the Committee of Experts on Slavery (CES) to review the result and enforcement of the 1926 Slavery Convention, which resulted in a new international investigation under the first permanent slavery committee, the Advisory Committee of Experts on Slavery (ACE).
The ACE conducted a major international investigation on slavery and slave trade, inspecting all the colonial empires and the territories under their control between 1934 and 1939.
Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948 by the UN General Assembly, explicitly banned slavery.
After World War II, legal chattel slavery was formally abolished by law in almost the entire world, with the exception of the Arabian Peninsula and some parts of Africa. Chattel slavery was still legal in Saudi Arabia, in Yemen, in the Trucial States and in Oman, and slaves were supplied to the Arabian Peninsula via the Red Sea slave trade.
When the League of Nations was succeeded by the United Nations (UN) after the end of the World War II, Charles Wilton Wood Greenidge of the Anti-Slavery International worked for the UN to continue the investigation of global slavery conducted by the ACE of the League, and in February 1950 the
Ad hoc Committee on Slavery of the United Nations was inaugurated, which ultimately resulted in the introduction of the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery.
The United Nations 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery was convened to outlaw and ban slavery worldwide, including child slavery.
In November 1962, Faisal of Saudi Arabia finally prohibited the owning of slaves in Saudi Arabia, followed by the abolition of slavery in Yemen in 1962, slavery in Dubai 1963 and slavery in Oman in 1970.
In December 1966, the UN General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was developed from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 4 of this international treaty bans slavery. The treaty came into force in March 1976 after it had been ratified by 35 nations.
As of November 2003, 104 nations had ratified the treaty. However, illegal forced labour involves millions of people in the 21st century, 43% for sexual exploitation and 32% for economic exploitation.
In May 2004, the 22 members of the Arab League adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights, which incorporated the 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, which states:
Human beings are born free, and no one has the right to enslave, humiliate, oppress or exploit them, and there can be no subjugation but to God the Most-High.
Currently, the Anti-trafficking Coordination Team Initiative (ACT Team Initiative), a coordinated effort between the U.S. Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Labor, addresses human trafficking. The International Labour Organization estimates that there are 20.9 million victims of human trafficking globally, including 5.5 million children, of which 55% are women and girls. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_slavery |
Architecture of Sudan | After the British Imperial Army under Lord Kitchener had defeated the Mahdist State with its capital in Omdurman in 1898, the urban district of downtown Khartoum was developed according to colonial rules of space zoning in a series of Union Jack patterns. British urban planner William Mclean designed the first master plan for Khartoum, and it was once called "the jewel in the crown" of British colonies in Africa.
New buildings in European styles were built between 1900 and 1912, such as the Government House (now the President's Palace) and other government buildings along Nile Street. Important buildings for education included the Gordon Memorial College, which later became the main building of today's University of Khartoum, its School of Medicine and the Catholic Comboni College. In 1902, the first school for girls was opened, which still exists as Unity High School.
The al-Kabir mosque for Friday prayers in Khartoum, built in Egyptian style, was inaugurated, when Khedive Abbas Pasha Helmy visited Sudan on 4 December 1901. The former Anglican All Saints cathedral (now Republican Palace Museum) and the Catholic St. Matthew's cathedral were both completed around 1910 in neo-Romanesque style. In 1926, the Ohel Shlomo synagogue was built in Sephardic style on former Victoria Avenue, now Al-Qasr Street, for the Jewish community of greater Khartoum.
For visitors, Khartoum also offered accommodation in several hotels, such as the Gordon Hotel and later, the Acropole hotel, run since 1952 by Greek owners. Other urban structures were marketplaces, such as Souq al-Arabi, banks and offices, as well as the infrastructure for railway services and the first bridges spanning the Nile. (The Blue Nile Bridge opened in 1909 and Omdurman Bridge in 1926.) In Khartoum North, a large prison, today called Kobar prison and still in use, was established in 1903 and gave its name to the adjacent neighbourhood. Even though these changes were made by and for foreigners and excluded most Sudanese inhabitants, the newly independent Republic of Sudan "inherited a fairly efficient system of education, public administration, transportation, recreation and other amenities."
Provincial towns and cities like Kassala, El-Gadarif, El-Obeid, Port Sudan, Shendi, Atbara, or Wad Madani also underwent important changes necessary for colonial rule, with modern buildings, long-distance roads and other infrastructure, such as a railway system linking the major economic centres. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Architecture_of_Sudan |
Abbasid Samarra | Samarra was founded by the eighth Abbasid caliph al-Mu'tasim (r. 833–842) in 836. Al-Mu'tasim's immediate motivation for the decision was a need to find housing for his newly formed Turkic and other army regiments. These troops, who were from groups that had previously held only a marginal role in the Islamic world, were deeply unpopular among the residents of Baghdad, and violent incidents had repeatedly broken out between the soldiers and Baghdadis. Al-Mu'tasim therefore resolved in ca. 835 to depart from Baghdad, the usual seat of the Abbasid caliphs since 762, and create a new capital city of his choosing.
Following a period of searching for an ideal spot, al-Mu'tasim settled on a site approximately 80 mi (130 km) north of Baghdad on the east side of the Tigris, near the head of the Nahrawan Canal. After sending men to buy up the local properties, including a Christian monastery, the caliph had his engineers survey the most suitable places for development. By 836, buildings had been erected at the site and al-Mu'tasim moved into the new city.
From the start, construction at Samarra was undertaken on a massive scale. Space was no object; land was plentiful and cheap, with little in the way of preexisting settlements to hinder expansion. Al-Mu'tasim marked out various allotments in the new city and granted these spaces to various elites of the army and administration for them to develop. Numerous cantonments were established for the army regiments, who in many cases were intentionally segregated from the residences for the general populace. Markets, mosques and baths for the people were built, together with a number of palaces for the caliph and other prominent individuals. Materials and laborers were shipped in from various parts of the Muslim world to help with the work; iron-workers, carpenters, marble sculptors and artisans all assisted in the construction.
Founding a new capital was a public statement of the establishment of a new regime, while allowing the court to be "at a distance from the populace of Baghdad and protected by a new guard of foreign troops, and amid a new royal culture revolving around sprawling palatial grounds, public spectacle and a seemingly ceaseless quest for leisurely indulgence" (T. El-Hibri), an arrangement compared by Oleg Grabar to the relationship between Paris and Versailles after Louis XIV. In addition, by creating a new city in a previously uninhabited area, al-Mu'tasim could reward his followers with land and commercial opportunities without cost to himself and free from any constraints, unlike Baghdad with its established interest groups. In fact, the sale of land seems to have produced considerable profit for the treasury: as Hugh Kennedy writes, it was "a sort of gigantic property speculation in which both government and its followers could expect to benefit". | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abbasid_Samarra |
Ali Abdullah Saleh | On 3 June 2011, Saleh was injured in a bomb attack on his presidential compound. Multiple C-4 (explosive) charges were planted inside the mosque and one exploded when the president and major members of his government were praying. The explosion killed four bodyguards and prime minister, Abdul Aziz Abdul Ghani (who died later of his wounds), deputy prime ministers, head of the Parliament, governor of Sanaa and many more. Saleh suffered burns and shrapnel injuries, but survived, a result that was confirmed by an audio message he sent to state media in which he condemned the attack, but his voice clearly revealed that he was having difficulty in speaking. Government officials tried to downplay the attack by saying he was lightly wounded. The next day he was taken to a military hospital in Saudi Arabia for treatment. According to U.S. government officials, Saleh suffered a collapsed lung and burns on about 40 per cent of his body. A Saudi official said that Saleh had undergone two operations: one to remove the shrapnel and a neurosurgery on his neck.
On 4 June 2011, Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was appointed as acting president, while Saleh remained the President of Yemen.
On 7 July 2011, Saleh appeared for his first live television appearance since his injury. He appeared badly burned and his arms were both bandaged. In his speech, he welcomed power-sharing but stressed it should be "within the framework of the constitution and in the framework of the law". On 19 September 2011, he was pictured without bandages, meeting King Abdullah.
On 23 September 2011, Yemeni state television announced that Saleh had returned to the country after three months amid increasing turmoil in a week that saw increased gun battles on the streets of Sana'a and more than 100 deaths.
Saleh said on 8 October 2011, in comments broadcast on Yemeni state television, that he would step down "in the coming days". The opposition expressed skepticism, however, and a government minister said Saleh meant that he would leave power under the framework of a Gulf Cooperation Council initiative to transition toward democracy.
On 23 November 2011, Saleh flew to Riyadh in neighbouring Saudi Arabia to sign the Gulf Cooperation Council plan for political transition, which he had previously spurned. Upon signing the document, he agreed to legally transfer the office and powers of the presidency to his deputy, Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. The agreement also led to the formation of a government divided by Saleh's political party (GPC) and the JMP.
It was reported that Saleh had left Yemen on 22 January 2012 for medical treatment in New York City. He arrived in the United States six days later. After his deputy Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi won the 2012 Yemeni presidential election on 21 February 2012 running unopposed, Saleh formally ceded power to him and stepped down as the President of Yemen on 27 February 2012, pledging to support efforts to "rebuild" the country still reeling from months of violence. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Abdullah_Saleh |
Mohammed Arkoun | Arkoun was born in 1928 in Taourirt Mimoun, a Berber village in Great Kabylia in northern Algeria. His family was traditional, religious and relatively poor. His father was a shopkeeper in Ain al-Arba'a, a wealthy French settlement in east of Oran. He attended primary school in his Berber-speaking home village until he was nine-years-old. As the eldest son, he was expected to learn his father's trade, while continuing to attend primary school. He studied at the Faculty of Literature of the university of Algiers and at the Sorbonne in Paris (agrégé in Arabic language and Literature, 1956 and Ph.D., 1968). He established his academic reputation with his studies of the history and philosophy of Ibn Miskawayh. As he began to consider how one might rethink Islam in the contemporary world, his questioning provided a counterpoint to the predominant interpretations of both the Muslim world and the non-Muslim West. As the editor of Arabica, he broadened the journal's scope, and played a significant role in shaping Western-language scholarship on Islam. He is the author of numerous books in French, English and Arabic, including most recently: Rethinking Islam (Boulder, Colorado, 1994), L'immigration: défis et richesses (Paris, 1998) and The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought (London, 2002). His shorter studies have appeared in many academic journals and his works have been translated into several languages.
He was decorated as a Commander of the French Legion of Honor in 2004, before that a Chevalier and Officer in 1984 and 1996, respectively. In 2001, Professor Arkoun was asked to deliver the Gifford Lectures, which enable a notable scholar to contribute to the advancement of theological and philosophical thought and was announced as the recipient of the Seventeenth Georgio Levi Della Vida Award for his lifelong contribution to the field of Islamic Studies.
Arkoun taught at the Lyon 2 University (1969–1972), as a professor, and at the Paris 8 University, and at the New Sorbonne University of Paris (1972–1992). He was a Fellow at Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin (1986–1987 and 1990) and at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A (1992–1993), visiting professor at University of California, Los Angeles (1969), Princeton University (1985), Temple University, the University of Louvain-la-Neuve, Wallonia, Belgium, (1977–1979), the Pontifical Institute of Arabic Studies in Rome and the University of Amsterdam (1991–1993) and served as a jury member for the Aga Khan Award for Architecture. At the time of his death he was Emeritus Professor at La Sorbonne as well as Senior Research Fellow and member of the Board of Governors of The Institute of Ismaili Studies (IIS), At IIS, he has taught various graduate courses including unthought in contemporary Islamic thought, rethinking Islam, contemporary challenges of Muslim world and traditions for almost a decade. He appeared on numerous occasions on French TV and magazines, on Berbère Télévision speaking in Kabyle, his mother tongue, and on Al Jazeera speaking in Arabic.
Arkoun died on the evening of September 14, 2010, in Paris. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_Arkoun |
Somali people | According to Y chromosome studies by Sanchez et al. (2005), Cruciani et al. (2004, 2007), the Somalis are paternally closely related to other Afro-Asiatic-speaking groups in Northeast Africa. Besides comprising the majority of the Y-DNA in Somalis, the E1b1b (formerly E3b) haplogroup also makes up a significant proportion of the paternal DNA of Ethiopians, Sudanese, Egyptians, Berbers, North African Arabs, as well as many Mediterranean populations. Sanchez et al. (2005) observed the E-M78 subclade of E1b1b1a in about 70.6% of their Somali male samples. According to Cruciani et al. (2007), the presence of this subhaplogroup in the Horn region may represent the traces of an ancient migration from Egypt/Libya.
After haplogroup E1b1b, the second most frequently occurring Y-DNA haplogroup among Somalis is the West Asian haplogroup T (M184). The clade is observed in more than 10% of Somali males generally, with a peak frequency amongst the Somali Dir clan members in Djibouti (100%) and Somalis in Dire Dawa (82.4%), a city with a majority Dir population. Haplogroup T, like haplogroup E1b1b, is also typically found among other populations of Northeast Africa, the Maghreb, the Near East and the Mediterranean.
In Somalis, the Time to Most Recent Common Ancestor (TMRCA) was estimated to be 4000–5000 years (2,500 BCE) for the haplogroup E-M78 cluster γ and 2100–2200 years (150 BCE) for Somali T-M184 bearers.
Deep subclade E-Y18629 is commonly found in Somalis and has a formation date of 3,700 YBP (years before present) and a TMRCA of 3,300 YBP.
According to mtDNA studies by Holden (2005) and Richards et al. (2006), a significant proportion of the maternal lineages of Somalis consists of the M1 haplogroup at a rate of over 20%. This mitochondrial clade is common among Ethiopians and North Africans, particularly Egyptians and Algerians. M1 is believed to have originated in Asia, where its parent M clade represents the majority of mtDNA lineages. This haplogroup is also thought to possibly correlate with the Afro-Asiatic language family: In addition, Somalis, and other Horn African populations, also carry a significant rate of maternal L lineages associated with sub-Saharan Africa.
"We analysed mtDNA variation in ~250 persons from Libya, Somalia, and Congo/Zambia, as representatives of the three regions of interest. Our initial results indicate a sharp cline in M1 frequencies that generally does not extend into sub-Saharan Africa. While our North and especially East African samples contained frequencies of M1 over 20%, our sub-Saharan samples consisted almost entirely of the L1 or L2 haplogroups only. In addition, there existed a significant amount of homogeneity within the M1 haplogroup. This sharp cline indicates a history of little admixture between these regions. This could imply a more recent ancestry for M1 in Africa, as older lineages are more diverse and widespread by nature, and may be an indication of a back-migration into Africa from the Middle East." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somali_people |
Bachir Gemayel | In 1975, Gemayel was accused by the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) of being responsible for the Black Saturday massacre of Palestinians and Lebanese Muslims. According to Phalange member Karim Pakradouni, Gemayel admitted to him that while being in an emotional state over the killing of four Phalangists earlier that day, he ordered his militiamen into the streets.
Christian East Beirut was ringed by heavily fortified Palestinian camps from which kidnappings and sniping against Lebanese civilians became a daily routine. Christian East Beirut were besieged by the PLO camps, with severe shortages of food and fuel. This unbearable situation led the Kataeb Forces and their allied Christian militias to besiege the Palestinian camps embedded in Christian East Beirut one at a time and bring them down. On January 18, 1976, Gemayel led the invasion of the heavily fortified Karantina camp that was located near the strategic Beirut Harbor: About 1,000 PLO fighters and civilians were killed. The Palestinian PLO and as-Saiqa forces retaliated by attacking the isolated defenseless Christian town of Damour about 20 miles south of Beirut on the coast, during the Damour massacre in which 1,000 Christian civilians were killed and 5,000 were sent fleeing north by boat, since all roads were blocked off. The Maronites retaliated with the invasion of the Tel al-Zaatar camp that same year, which was placed under siege for 52 days by the Tigers, the National Liberal Party militia led by Dany Chamoun, Gemayel played an important role in the last stages of the battle: he sent a group of his forces that moved through the sewers and they blew up the ammunition storage in the camp. This incident was considered to be the lethal blow that led the fall of the camp. The Christian militias also fought against the PLO and LNM militias at the Battle of the Hotels in central Beirut. Gemayel led the battle for the Holiday Inn that had an important strategic location. The battle was a success for Gemayel's troops, and they were able to move the PLO out of the hotel. After ensuring the safety of the rear lines and their effectiveness (necessary for the safety of Christian East Beirut), Gemayel and his troops decided to abandon the hotel.
In 1976, with the death of William Hawi, killed by a sniper during the battle of Tall Al-Zaatar, Gemayel became head of the Kataeb Regulatory Forces militia. Later that year, he became a leading member of the Lebanese Front, a coalition of several Christian parties, and commander of their military wing, the Lebanese Forces (LF). A military coalition of several Christian militias which not only opposed the PLO but also the Syrian Army presence, who had entered Lebanon at first to assist in defeating Palestinian militants, before turning into occupiers.
Gemayel led his troops in the infamous 'Hundred Days' War' in Lebanon in 1978, in which the Lebanese Forces successfully resisted the Syrian shelling and attacking of Eastern Beirut for about three months before an Arab-brokered agreement forced the Syrians to end the siege. Syrians took high buildings such as Burj Rizk Achrafieh and Burj El Murr using snipers and heavy weapons against civilians. The soldiers stayed for 90 days. Another major clash took place near the Sodeco area in Achrafieh where the LF fought ferociously and led the Syrian army out of the Rizk Building. This War led to the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from East Beirut and the free Christian Areas. At this time, Israel was the primary backer of the Lebanese Front's militia.
In 1981 at Zahlé in the Beqaa Governorate, the largest Christian town in the East, confronted one of the biggest battles – both military and political – between the LF and the Syrian occupying forces. The LF were able to confront them and reverse the result of the battle of 1981 with the help of 92 Lebanese Army Maghawirs sent from Beirut as well as the towns inhabitants. Regardless of the very bad weather and heavy bombing, convoys were sent in the snow to Zahle. The battle of Zahle gave the Lebanese Cause a new perspective in the International Communities, and by some was regarded as military and diplomatic victory. It strengthened Bachir Gemayel's position because of his leadership and important role in this battle. The battle started on 2 April 1981, and finished with a cease fire and Lebanese Internal Security Forces gendarmes were sent to Zahle. The 92 commandos returned to Beirut on 1 July 1981. (See: Battle of Zahleh for more details) | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bachir_Gemayel |
Internet censorship | Internet content is subject to technical censorship methods, including:
Internet Protocol (IP) address blocking: Access to a certain IP address is denied. If the target Web site is hosted in a shared hosting server, all websites on the same server will be blocked. This affects IP-based protocols such as HTTP, FTP and POP. A typical circumvention method is to find proxies that have access to the target websites, but proxies may be jammed or blocked, and some Web sites, such as Wikipedia (when editing), also block proxies. Some large websites such as Google have allocated additional IP addresses to circumvent the block, but later the block was extended to cover the new addresses. Due to challenges with geolocation, geo-blocking is normally implemented via IP address blocking.
Domain name system (DNS) filtering and redirection: Connections to blocked domain names are not resolved, or an incorrect IP address is returned via DNS hijacking or other means. This affects all IP-based protocols such as HTTP, FTP and POP. A typical circumvention method is to find an alternative DNS resolver that resolves domain names correctly, but domain name servers are subject to blockage as well, especially IP address blocking. Another workaround is to bypass DNS if the IP address is obtainable from other sources and is not itself blocked. Examples are modifying the Hosts file or typing the IP address instead of the domain name as part of a URL given to a Web browser.
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) filtering: URL strings are scanned for target keywords regardless of the domain name specified in the URL. This affects the HTTP protocol. Typical circumvention methods are to use escaped characters in the URL, or to use encrypted protocols such as VPN and TLS/SSL.
Packet filtering: Terminate TCP packet transmissions when a certain number of controversial keywords are detected. This affects all TCP-based protocols such as HTTP, FTP and POP, but Search engine results pages are more likely to be censored. Typical circumvention methods are to use encrypted connections – such as VPN and TLS/SSL – to escape the HTML content, or by reducing the TCP/IP stack's MTU/MSS to reduce the amount of text contained in a given packet.
Connection reset: If a previous TCP connection is blocked by the filter, future connection attempts from both sides can also be blocked for some variable amount of time. Depending on the location of the block, other users or websites may also be blocked, if the communication is routed through the blocking location. A circumvention method is to ignore the reset packet sent by the firewall.
Network disconnection: A technically simpler method of Internet censorship is to completely cut off all routers, either by software or by hardware (turning off machines, pulling out cables). A circumvention method could be to use a satellite ISP to access Internet.
Portal censorship and search result removal: Major portals, including search engines, may exclude web sites that they would ordinarily include. This renders a site invisible to people who do not know where to find it. When a major portal does this, it has a similar effect to censorship. Sometimes this exclusion is done to satisfy a legal or other requirement, other times it is purely at the discretion of the portal. For example, Google.de and Google.fr remove Neo-Nazi and other listings in compliance with German and French law.
Computer network attacks: Denial-of-service attacks and attacks that deface opposition websites can produce the same result as other blocking techniques, preventing or limiting access to certain websites or other online services, although only for a limited period of time. This technique might be used during the lead up to an election or some other sensitive period. It is more frequently used by non-state actors seeking to disrupt services.
See also: Internet censorship circumvention, Internet forum#Word censor and Anti-spam techniques#Detecting spam | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship |
United Arab Emirates | During the 19th and early 20th centuries, the pearling industry thrived, providing both income and employment to the people of the Persian Gulf. The First World War had a severe impact on the industry, but it was the economic depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s, coupled with the invention of the cultured pearl, that wiped out the trade. The remnants of the trade eventually faded away shortly after the Second World War, when the newly independent Government of India imposed heavy taxation on imported pearls. The decline of pearling resulted in extreme economic hardship in the Trucial States.
In 1922, the British government secured undertakings from the rulers of the Trucial States not to sign concessions with foreign companies without their consent. Aware of the potential for the development of natural resources such as oil, following finds in Persia (from 1908) and Mesopotamia (from 1927), a British-led oil company, the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), showed an interest in the region. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC, later to become British Petroleum, or BP) had a 23.75% share in IPC. From 1935, onshore concessions to explore for oil were granted by local rulers, with APOC signing the first one on behalf of Petroleum Concessions Ltd (PCL), an associate company of IPC. APOC was prevented from developing the region alone because of the restrictions of the Red Line Agreement, which required it to operate through IPC. A number of options between PCL and the trucial rulers were signed, providing useful revenue for communities experiencing poverty following the collapse of the pearl trade. However, the wealth of oil which the rulers could see from the revenues accruing to surrounding countries remained elusive. The first bore holes in Abu Dhabi were drilled by IPC's operating company, Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd (PDTC) at Ras Sadr in 1950, with a 13,000-foot-deep (4,000-metre) bore hole taking a year to drill and turning out dry, at the tremendous cost at the time of £1 million.
The British set up a development office that helped in some small developments in the emirates. The seven sheikhs of the emirates then decided to form a council to coordinate matters between them and took over the development office. In 1952, they formed the Trucial States Council, and appointed Adi Al Bitar, Dubai's Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum's legal advisor, as secretary general and legal advisor to the council. The council was terminated once the United Arab Emirates was formed. The tribal nature of society and the lack of definition of borders between emirates frequently led to disputes, settled either through mediation or, more rarely, force. The Trucial Oman Scouts was a small military force used by the British to keep the peace.
In 1953, a subsidiary of BP, D'Arcy Exploration Ltd, obtained an offshore concession from the ruler of Abu Dhabi. BP joined with Compagnie Française des Pétroles (later Total) to form operating companies, Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Ltd (ADMA) and Dubai Marine Areas Ltd (DUMA). A number of undersea oil surveys were carried out, including one led by the famous marine explorer Jacques Cousteau. In 1958, a floating platform rig was towed from Hamburg, Germany, and positioned over the Umm Shaif pearl bed, in Abu Dhabi waters, where drilling began. In March, it struck oil in the Upper Thamama rock formation. This was the first commercial discovery of the Trucial Coast, leading to the first exports of oil in 1962. ADMA made further offshore discoveries at Zakum and elsewhere, and other companies made commercial finds such as the Fateh oilfield off Dubai and the Mubarak field off Sharjah (shared with Iran).
Meanwhile, onshore exploration was hindered by territorial disputes. In 1955, the United Kingdom represented Abu Dhabi and Oman in their dispute with Saudi Arabia over the Buraimi Oasis. A 1974 agreement between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia seemed to have settled the Abu Dhabi-Saudi border dispute, but this has not been ratified. The UAE's border with Oman was ratified in 2008.
PDTC continued its onshore exploration away from the disputed area, drilling five more bore holes that were also dry. However, on 27 October 1960, the company discovered oil in commercial quantities at the Murban No. 3 well on the coast near Tarif. In 1962, PDTC became the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company. As oil revenues increased, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, undertook a massive construction program, building schools, housing, hospitals and roads. When Dubai's oil exports commenced in 1969, Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, the ruler of Dubai, was able to invest the revenues from the limited reserves found to spark the diversification drive that would create the modern global city of Dubai. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Arab_Emirates |
Chickpea | Chickpeas are usually rapidly boiled for 10 minutes and then simmered for longer. Dried chickpeas need a long cooking time (1–2 hours) but will easily fall apart when cooked longer. If soaked for 12–24 hours before use, cooking time can be shortened by around 30 minutes. Chickpeas can also be pressure cooked or sous vide cooked at 90 °C (194 °F).
Mature chickpeas can be cooked and eaten cold in salads, cooked in stews, ground into flour, ground and shaped in balls and fried as falafel, made into a batter and baked to make farinata or socca, or fried to make panelle. Chickpea flour is known as gram flour or besan in South Asia and is used frequently in South Asian cuisine.
In Portugal, chickpeas are one of the main ingredients in rancho, eaten with pasta, meat, or rice. They are used in other hot dishes with bacalhau and in soups, meat stews, salads mixed with tuna and vegetables, olive oil, vinegar, hot pepper and salt. In Spain, they are used cold in tapas and salads, as well as in cocido madrileño.
Hummus is the Arabic word for chickpeas, which are often cooked and ground into a paste and mixed with tahini (sesame seed paste) to make ḥummuṣ bi ṭaḥīna, usually called simply hummus in English. By the end of the 20th century, hummus had become common in American cuisine: by 2010, 5% of Americans consumed it regularly, and it was present at some point in 17% of American households.
In the Middle East, chickpeas are also roasted, spiced, and eaten as a snack, such as leblebi.
Chickpeas and Bengal grams are used to make curries. They are one of the most popular vegetarian foods in the Indian subcontinent and in diaspora communities of many other countries, served with a variety of bread or steamed rice. Popular dishes in Indian cuisine are made with chickpea flour, such as mirchi bajji and mirapakaya bajji. In India, as well as in the Levant, unripe chickpeas are often picked out of the pod and eaten as a raw snack, and the leaves are eaten as a leaf vegetable in salads. In India, desserts such as besan halwa and sweets such as mysore pak, and laddu are made.
Chickpea flour is used to make "Burmese tofu", which was first known among the Shan people of Burma. In South Asian cuisine, chickpea flour (besan) is used as a batter to coat vegetables before deep frying to make pakoras. The flour is also used as a batter to coat vegetables and meats before frying or fried alone, such as panelle (little bread), a chickpea fritter from Sicily. Chickpea flour is used to make the Mediterranean flatbread socca and is called panisse in Provence, southern France. It is made of cooked chickpea flour, poured into saucers, allowed to set, cut into strips, and fried in olive oil, often eaten during Lent. In Tuscany, chickpea flour (farina di ceci) is used to make an oven-baked pancake: the flour is mixed with water, oil and salt. Chickpea flour, known as kadlehittu in Kannada, is used for making sweet dish Mysore pak.
In the Philippines, chickpeas preserved in syrup are eaten as sweets and in desserts such as halo-halo.
Ashkenazi Jews traditionally serve whole chickpeas, referred to as arbes (אַרבעס) in Yiddish, at the Shalom Zachar celebration for baby boys. The chickpeas are boiled until soft and served hot with salt and lots of ground black pepper.
Guasanas or garbanza is a Mexican chickpea street snack. The beans, while still green, are cooked in water and salt, kept in a steamer to maintain their humidity, and served in a plastic bag.
A chickpea-derived liquid (aquafaba) can be used as an egg white replacement to make meringue or ice cream, with the residual pomace used as flour. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chickpea |
Mogadishu | The founding ethnicity of Mogadishu and its subsequent sultanate has been a topic of intrigue in Somali Studies. Ioan Lewis and Enrico Cerulli believed that the city was founded and ruled by a council of Arab and Persian families. However, the reference I.M Lewis and Cerulli received traces back to one 19th century text called the Kitab Al-Zunuj, which has been discredited by modern scholars as unreliable and unhistorical. More importantly, it contradicts oral, ancient written sources and archaeological evidence on the pre-existing civilizations and communities that flourished on the Somali coast, and to which were the forefathers of Mogadishu and other coastal cities. Thus, the Persian and Arab founding "myths" are regarded as an outdated false colonialist reflection on Africans ability to create their own sophisticated states. It has now been widely accepted that there were already communities on the Somali coast with ethnic Somali leadership, to whom the Arab and Persian families had to ask for permission to settle in their cities. It also seems the local Somalis retained their political and numerical superiority on the coast while the Muslim immigrants would go through an assimilation process by adopting the local language and culture.
Mogadishu along with Zeila and other Somali coastal cities was founded upon an indigenous network involving hinterland trade and that happened even before significant Arab migrations or trade with the Somali coast. That goes back approximately four thousand years and are supported by archaeological and textual evidences.
This is corroborated by the first century AD Greek document the Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, detailing multiple prosperous port cities in ancient Somalia, as well as the identification of ancient Sarapion with the city that would later be known as Mogadishu. When Ibn Battuta visited the Sultanate in the 14th century, he identified the Sultan as being of Barbara origin, an ancient term to describe the ancestors of the Somali people. According to Ross E. Dunn neither Mogadishu, or any other city on the coast could be considered alien enclaves of Arabs or Persians, but were in-fact African towns.
Yaqut al-Hamawi, a Muslim medieval geographer in the year 1220 describes Mogadishu as the most prominent town on the coast. Yaqut also mentioned Mogadishu as being a town inhabited by Berbers, described as "dark-skinned" and considered ancestors of modern Somalis. By the thirteenth century, Ibn Sa'id described Mogadishu, Merca and Barawa located in the Benadir coast had become Islamic and commercial centers in the Indian Ocean. He said the local people in the Benadir coast and the interior were predominantly inhabited by Somalis with a minority of Arab, Persian and Indian merchants living in the coastal towns. Ibn al-Mujawir mentions the Banu Majid who fled the Mundhiriya region in Yemen in the year 1159 and settled in Mogadishu and also traders from the port towns of Abyan and Haram.
Mogadishu is traditionally inhabited by four clans. These are the Moorshe, Iskashato, DhabarWeyne, and the Bandawow. Moorshe is regarded the oldest group in Mogadishu and is considered to be a sub-clan of Ajuran who established one of the most powerful medieval kingdoms in Africa, the Ajuran Sultanate. The Gibil Madow (Dark Skins) faction of the Benadiri are said to hail from the Somali clan groups from inland which make up the majority of Benadiris with a small minority being Gibil Cads (Light Skins) which descend from Muslim immigrants. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mogadishu |
Musical instrument | During the period of time loosely referred to as the post-classical era and Europe in particular as the Middle Ages, China developed a tradition of integrating musical influence from other regions. The first record of this type of influence is in 384 AD, when China established an orchestra in its imperial court after a conquest in Turkestan. Influences from Middle East, Persia, India, Mongolia, and other countries followed. In fact, Chinese tradition attributes many musical instruments from this period to those regions and countries. Cymbals gained popularity, along with more advanced trumpets, clarinets, pianos, oboes, flutes, drums, and lutes. Some of the first bowed zithers appeared in China in the 9th or 10th century, influenced by Mongolian culture.
India experienced similar development to China in the post-classical era; however, stringed instruments developed differently as they accommodated different styles of music. While stringed instruments of China were designed to produce precise tones capable of matching the tones of chimes, stringed instruments of India were considerably more flexible. This flexibility suited the slides and tremolos of Hindu music. Rhythm was of paramount importance in Indian music of the time, as evidenced by the frequent depiction of drums in reliefs dating to the post-classical era. The emphasis on rhythm is an aspect native to Indian music. Historians divide the development of musical instruments in medieval India between pre-Islamic and Islamic periods due to the different influence each period provided.
In pre-Islamic times, idiophones such as handbells, cymbals, and peculiar instruments resembling gongs came into wide use in Hindu music. The gong-like instrument was a bronze disk that was struck with a hammer instead of a mallet. Tubular drums, stick zithers (veena), short fiddles, double and triple flutes, coiled trumpets, and curved India horns emerged in this time period. Islamic influences brought new types of drum, perfectly circular or octagonal as opposed to the irregular pre-Islamic drums. Persian influence brought oboes and sitars, although Persian sitars had three strings and Indian version had from four to seven. The Islamic culture also introduced double-clarinet instruments as the Alboka (from Arab, al-buq or "horn") nowadays only alive in Basque Country. It must be played using the technique of the circular breathing.
Southeast Asian musical innovations include those during a period of Indian influence that ended around 920 AD. Balinese and Javanese music made use of xylophones and metallophones, bronze versions of the former. The most prominent and important musical instrument of Southeast Asia was the gong. While the gong likely originated in the geographical area between Tibet and Burma, it was part of every category of human activity in maritime Southeast Asia including Java.
The areas of Mesopotamia and the Arabian Peninsula experiences rapid growth and sharing of musical instruments once they were united by Islamic culture in the seventh century. Frame drums and cylindrical drums of various depths were immensely important in all genres of music. Conical oboes were involved in the music that accompanied wedding and circumcision ceremonies. Persian miniatures provide information on the development of kettle drums in Mesopotamia that spread as far as Java. Various lutes, zithers, dulcimers, and harps spread as far as Madagascar to the south and modern-day Sulawesi to the east.
Despite the influences of Greece and Rome, most musical instruments in Europe during the Middles Ages came from Asia. The lyre is the only musical instrument that may have been invented in Europe until this period. Stringed instruments were prominent in Middle Age Europe. The central and northern regions used mainly lutes, stringed instruments with necks, while the southern region used lyres, which featured a two-armed body and a crossbar. Various harps served Central and Northern Europe as far north as Ireland, where the harp eventually became a national symbol. Lyres propagated through the same areas, as far east as Estonia.
European music between 800 and 1100 became more sophisticated, more frequently requiring instruments capable of polyphony. The 9th-century Persian geographer Ibn Khordadbeh mentioned in his lexicographical discussion of music instruments that, in the Byzantine Empire, typical instruments included the urghun (organ), shilyani (probably a type of harp or lyre), salandj (probably a bagpipe) and the lyra. The Byzantine lyra, a bowed string instrument, is an ancestor of most European bowed instruments, including the violin.
The monochord served as a precise measure of the notes of a musical scale, allowing more accurate musical arrangements. Mechanical hurdy-gurdies allowed single musicians to play more complicated arrangements than a fiddle would; both were prominent folk instruments in the Middle Ages. Southern Europeans played short and long lutes whose pegs extended to the sides, unlike the rear-facing pegs of Central and Northern European instruments. Idiophones such as bells and clappers served various practical purposes, such as warning of the approach of a leper.
The ninth century revealed the first bagpipes, which spread throughout Europe and had many uses from folk instruments to military instruments. The construction of pneumatic organs evolved in Europe starting in fifth-century Spain, spreading to England in about 700. The resulting instruments varied in size and use from portable organs worn around the neck to large pipe organs. Literary accounts of organs being played in English Benedictine abbeys toward the end of the tenth century are the first references to organs being connected to churches. Reed players of the Middle Ages were limited to oboes; no evidence of clarinets exists during this period. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Musical_instrument |
Umayyad state of Córdoba | Upon rising to power, Abd al-Rahman I initially resided in several palace-villas on the outskirts of Cordoba, most notably one called ar-Ruṣāfa. Ar-Ruṣāfa may have originally been a Roman villa or a Roman-Visigothic estate which was taken over and adapted by a Berber chieftain named Razin al-Burnusi who accompanied the original Muslim invasion by Tariq ibn Ziyad earlier that century. After a failed plot against him in 784, Abd al-Rahman I moved his residence definitively to the site of the Alcázar in the city. He and his successors built and continuously developed the Alcázar into the official royal residence and seat of power in Al-Andalus. Abd al-Rahman II was responsible for improving the water supply for both the city and the palace gardens. He may have also built the Albolafia and other norias (waterwheels) along the Guadalquivir River.
In 785, Abd al-Rahman I founded the Great Mosque of Cordoba, one of the most important monuments of the architecture of the western Islamic world. The mosque was notable for its vast hypostyle hall composed of rows of columns connected by double tiers of arches (including horseshoe arches on the lower tier) composed of alternating red brick and light-colored stone. The mosque was subsequently expanded by Abd al-Rahman II in 836, who preserved the original design while extending its dimensions. The mosque was again embellished with new features by his successors Muhammad I, Al-Mundhir, and Abdallah. One of the western gates of the mosque, known as Bab al-Wuzara' (today known as Puerta de San Esteban), dates from the 9th century expansion and is often noted as an important prototype of later Moorish architectural forms and motifs.
The palaces and the Great Mosque in Cordoba were linked via a high covered passage (sabbat) which was raised over the street between them, allowing the caliph direct access to the maqsurah area of the mosque via a corridor behind the qibla wall. The first sabbat was built by the Umayyad emir Abdallah (r. 888–912) for security reasons and was later replaced by al-Hakam II when the latter expanded the mosque.: 21
The original Great Mosque of Seville, also known as the Ibn Addabas Mosque, was either built or enlarged by Abd al-Rahman II c. 830. It is now occupied by the Collegiate Church of the Divine Savior (Iglesia Colegial del Salvador), which preserves minor remains of the mosque. In Mérida, following a violent revolt, Abd al-Rahman II also built a fortress, now known as the Alcazaba of Mérida, which was later re-used by the Knights of Santiago and remains standing today. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umayyad_state_of_C%C3%B3rdoba |
Famine in Yemen (2016–present) | The famine is the direct result of the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen and blockade. Yemen was already the most impoverished nation in the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East, and Al Hudaydah one of the poorest cities of Yemen, but the war and the naval blockade by the Saudi-led coalition made the situation much worse. Fishing boats, the main livelihood of Al Hudaydah's residents, were destroyed by Saudi airstrikes, leaving them without any means to provide for their families. As a result, one child dies every ten minutes on average. A UN panel of experts found that Saudi Arabia is purposefully obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid into Yemen.
Saudi Arabia was reported to be deliberately targeting means of food production and distribution in Yemen by bombing farms, fishing boats, ports, food storages, food factories, and other businesses in order to exacerbate famine. These actions led to the UN accusing the Saudi-led coalition of committing war crimes and having a "complete disregard for human life". 1,500 schools were damaged and destroyed during Yemeni Civil War. After Saudi-backed Hadi's forces retook Mocha from Houthis they barred fishermen from working. The Union of Yemeni fishermen accused the coalition of waging war against fishermen.
U.S. Senator Chris Murphy accused the United States of complicity in Yemen's humanitarian crisis, saying: "Thousands and thousands inside Yemen today are dying. ... This horror is caused in part by our decision to facilitate a bombing campaign that is murdering children and to endorse a Saudi strategy inside Yemen that is deliberately using disease and starvation and the withdrawal of humanitarian support as a tactic."
The British researcher Alex de Waal has considered the famine in Yemen as
The world's worst since North Korea in the 1990s and the one in which Western responsibility is clearest... Britain has sold at least £4.5 billion in arms to Saudi Arabia and £500 million to the UAE since the war began. The US role is even bigger: Trump authorized arms sales to the Saudis worth $110 billion last May. Yemen will be the defining famine crime of this generation, perhaps this century.
Doctors Without Borders (MSF) has been assisting victims of the famine and the cholera outbreak, as well as providing mental health assistance to those who have been affected by the war. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Famine_in_Yemen_(2016%E2%80%93present) |
Al-Shabaab (militant group) | Some al-Shabaab members viewed the 2010 Ramadan offensive as disastrously ill-conceived, and subsequent territorial losses galvanised internal opposition to the leadership of Ahmed Abdi Godane, who was publicly named the group's emir in December 2007. As a severe drought afflicted the region, critics, generally associated with the leadership of Hassan Dahir Aweys and Mukhtar Robow, opposed al-Shabaab's response to the resulting famine, particularly its obstruction of foreign humanitarian aid to populations in its territories (see below). More broadly, they argued that the group's authoritarian style of governance, and use of violence, were causing the group to lose public support. Some suggested that these leadership missteps were the result of Godane's lack of clan roots, which they said led him to undervalue the lives both of civilians and of al-Shabaab fighters.
These criticisms became intertwined with a broader and pre-existing dispute over the increasingly globalist flavour of al-Shabaab's ideology – Godane was among the faction which viewed Somalia as only one battleground of global jihad. Godane's announcement in February 2012 of a merger with al-Qaeda (see § Al-Qaeda) thus also met opposition. Other senior al-Shabaab members met at a conference in Baidabo, and outlined a policy programme which diverged from Godane's: they rejected Godane's proposal to change the group's name to al-Qaeda in East Africa, and resolved to focus on domestic issues rather than global jihad. They also resolved to establish a national shura of Islamic clerics, independent of al-Qaeda control. Godane's rival Aweys declared publicly that "Al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda are merely a small part of the larger Islamic group and al-Qaeda's ideology should not be viewed as the sole, righteous path for Islam."
In 2013, these internal rifts led to internecine violence as Godane effected what was virtually a purge of his critics. Among those killed were Ibrahim al-Afghani and three other senior commanders, executed in June; and Omar Shafik Hammami, killed in September. Journalist Simon Tisdall viewed the September 2013 Westgate shopping mall shooting in Nairobi, Kenya as a reflection of the internal power struggle, with Godane's hardline globalist faction seeking to exert its authority. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Shabaab_(militant_group) |
Iranian Revolution | The most important bodies of the revolution were the Revolutionary Council, the Revolutionary Guards, Revolutionary Tribunals, Islamic Republican Party, and Revolutionary Committees (komitehs).
While the moderate Bazargan and his government (temporarily) reassured the middle class, it became apparent they did not have power over the "Khomeinist" revolutionary bodies, particularly the Revolutionary Council (the "real power" in the revolutionary state), and later the Islamic Republican Party. Inevitably, the overlapping authority of the Revolutionary Council (which had the power to pass laws) and Bazargan's government was a source of conflict, despite the fact that both had been approved by and/or put in place by Khomeini.
This conflict lasted only a few months however. The provisional government fell shortly after American Embassy officials were taken hostage on 4 November 1979. Bazargan's resignation was received by Khomeini without complaint, saying "Mr. Bazargan ... was a little tired and preferred to stay on the sidelines for a while." Khomeini later described his appointment of Bazargan as a "mistake."
The Revolutionary Guard, or Pasdaran-e Enqelab, was established by Khomeini on 5 May 1979, as a counterweight both to the armed groups of the left, and to the Shah's military. The guard eventually grew into "a full-scale" military force, becoming "the strongest institution of the revolution."
Serving under the Pasdaran were/are the Baseej-e Mostaz'afin, volunteers in everything from earthquake emergency management to attacking opposition demonstrators and newspaper offices. The Islamic Republican Party then fought to establish a theocratic government by velayat-e faqih.
Thousands of komiteh or Revolutionary Committees served as "the eyes and ears" of the new rule and are credited by critics with "many arbitrary arrests, executions and confiscations of property".
Also enforcing the will of the government were the Hezbollahi (the Party of God), "strong-arm thugs" who attacked demonstrators and offices of newspapers critical of Khomeini.
Two major political groups that formed after the fall of the Shah that clashed with and were eventually suppressed by pro-Khomeini groups, were the moderate religious Muslim People's Republican Party (MPRP) which was associated with Grand Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, and the secular leftist National Democratic Front (NDF). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Revolution |
Kingdom of Kush | Mentuhotep II, the 21st century BC founder of the Middle Kingdom, is recorded to have undertaken campaigns against Kush in the 29th and 31st years of his reign. This is the earliest Egyptian reference to Kush; the Nubian region had gone by other names in the Old Kingdom. Under Thutmose I, Egypt made several campaigns south.
The Egyptians ruled Kush in the New kingdom beginning when the Egyptian King Thutmose I occupied Kush and destroyed its capital, Kerma.
This eventually resulted in their annexation of Nubia c. 1504 BC. Around 1500 BC, Nubia was absorbed into the New Kingdom of Egypt, but rebellions continued for centuries. After the conquest, Kerma culture was increasingly Egyptianized, yet rebellions continued for 220 years until c. 1300 BC. Nubia nevertheless became a key province of the New Kingdom, economically, politically, and spiritually. Indeed, major pharaonic ceremonies were held at Jebel Barkal near Napata. As an Egyptian colony from the 16th century BC, Nubia ("Kush") was governed by an Egyptian Viceroy of Kush.
Resistance to the early eighteenth Dynasty Egyptian rule by neighboring Kush is evidenced in the writings of Ahmose, son of Ebana, an Egyptian warrior who served under Nebpehtrya Ahmose (1539–1514 BC), Djeserkara Amenhotep I (1514–1493 BC), and Aakheperkara Thutmose I (1493–1481 BC). At the end of the Second Intermediate Period (mid-sixteenth century BC), Egypt faced the twin existential threats—the Hyksos in the North and the Kushites in the South. Taken from the autobiographical inscriptions on the walls of his tomb-chapel, the Egyptians undertook campaigns to defeat Kush and conquer Nubia under the rule of Amenhotep I (1514–1493 BC). In Ahmose's writings, the Kushites are described as archers, "Now after his Majesty had slain the Bedoin of Asia, he sailed upstream to Upper Nubia to destroy the Nubian bowmen." The tomb writings contain two other references to the Nubian bowmen of Kush. By 1200 BC, Egyptian involvement in the Dongola Reach was nonexistent.
Egypt's international prestige had declined considerably towards the end of the Third Intermediate Period. Its historical allies, the inhabitants of Canaan, had fallen to the Middle Assyrian Empire (1365–1020 BC), and then the resurgent Neo-Assyrian Empire (935–605 BC). The Assyrians, from the tenth century BC onwards, had once more expanded from northern Mesopotamia, and conquered a vast empire, including the whole of the Near East, and much of Anatolia, the eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus and early Iron Age Iran.
According to Josephus Flavius, the biblical Moses led the Egyptian army in a siege of the Kushite city of Meroe. To end the siege Princess Tharbis was given to Moses as a (diplomatic) bride, and thus the Egyptian army retreated back to Egypt. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Kush |
Roman–Persian Wars | When the Roman and Parthian Empires first collided in the 1st century BC, it appeared that Parthia had the potential to push its frontier to the Aegean and the Mediterranean. However, the Romans repulsed the great invasion of Syria and Anatolia by Pacorus and Labienus, and were gradually able to take advantage of the weaknesses of the Parthian military system, which, according to George Rawlinson, was adapted for national defense but ill-suited for conquest. The Romans, on the other hand, were continually modifying and evolving their "grand strategy" from Trajan's time onwards, and were by the time of Pacorus able to take the offensive against the Parthians. Like the Sasanians in the late 3rd and 4th centuries, the Parthians generally avoided any sustained defense of Mesopotamia against the Romans. However, the Iranian plateau never fell, as the Roman expeditions had always exhausted their offensive impetus by the time they reached lower Mesopotamia, and their extended line of communications through territory not sufficiently pacified exposed them to revolts and counterattacks.
From the 4th century AD onwards, the Sasanians grew in strength and adopted the role of aggressor. They considered much of the land added to the Roman Empire in Parthian and early Sasanian times to rightfully belong to the Persian sphere. Everett Wheeler argues that "the Sassanids, administratively more centralized than the Parthians, formally organized defense of their territory, although they lacked a standing army until Khosrau I". In general, the Romans regarded the Sasanians as a more serious threat than the Parthians, while the Sasanians regarded the Roman Empire as the enemy par excellence. Proxy warfare was employed by both Byzantines and the Sasanians as an alternative to direct confrontation, particularly through Arab kingdoms in the south and nomadic nations in the north.
Militarily, the Sasanians continued the Parthians' heavy dependence on cavalry troops: a combination of horse-archers and cataphracts; the latter were heavy armored cavalry provided by the aristocracy. They added a contingent of war elephants obtained from the Indus Valley, but their infantry quality was inferior to that of the Romans. The combined forces of horse archers and heavy cavalry inflicted several defeats on the Roman foot-soldiers, including those led by Crassus in 53 BC, Mark Antony in 36 BC, and Valerian in 260 AD. The Parthian tactics gradually became the standard method of warfare in the Roman empire and cataphractarii and clibanarii units were introduced into the Roman army; as a result, heavily armed cavalry grew in importance in both the Roman and Persian armies after the 3rd century AD and until the end of the wars. The Roman army also gradually incorporated horse-archers (Equites Sagittarii), and by the 5th century AD they were no longer a mercenary unit, and were slightly superior individually in comparison to the Persian ones, as Procopius claims; however, the Persian horse-archer units as a whole always remained a challenge for the Romans, which suggests the Roman horse-archers were smaller in numbers. By the time of Khosrow I the composite cavalrymen (aswaran) appeared, who were skilled in both archery and the use of lance.
On the other hand, the Persians adopted war engines from the Romans. The Romans had achieved and maintained a high degree of sophistication in siege warfare and had developed a range of siege machines. On the other hand, the Parthians were inept at besieging; their cavalry armies were more suited to the hit-and-run tactics that destroyed Antony's siege train in 36 BC. The situation changed with the rise of the Sasanians, when Rome encountered an enemy equally capable in siege warfare. The Sasanians mainly used mounds, rams, mines, and to a lesser degree siege towers, artillery, and also chemical weapons, such as in Dura-Europos (256) and Petra (550–551). Use of complex torsion equipment was rare, since traditional Persian expertise in archery reduced their apparent benefits. Elephants were employed (e.g. as siege towers) where the terrain was unfavorable for machines. Recent assessments comparing the Sasanians and Parthians have reaffirmed the superiority of Sasanian siegecraft, military engineering, and organization, as well as ability to build defensive works.
By the beginning of Sasanian rule, a number of buffer states existed between the empires. These were absorbed by the central state over time, and by the 7th century the last buffer state, the Arab Lakhmids, was annexed to the Sasanian Empire. Frye notes that in the 3rd century AD such client states played an important role in Roman–Sasanian relations, but both empires gradually replaced them by an organized defense system run by the central government and based on a line of fortifications (the limes) and the fortified frontier cities, such as Dara. Towards the end of the 1st century AD, Rome organized the protection of its eastern frontiers through the limes system, which lasted until the Muslim conquests of the 7th century after improvements by Diocletian. Like the Romans, the Sasanians constructed defensive walls opposite the territory of their opponents. According to R. N. Frye, it was under Shapur II that the Persian system was extended, probably in imitation of Diocletian's construction of the limes of the Syrian and Mesopotamian frontiers of the Roman Empire. The Roman and Persian border units were known as limitanei and marzobans, respectively.
The Sasanians, and to a lesser extent the Parthians, practiced mass deportations to new cities as a tool of policy, not just the prisoners-of-war (such as those of the Battle of Edessa), but also the cities they captured, such as the deportation of the Antioch's people to Weh Antiok Khosrow, which led to the decline of the former. These deportations also initiated the spread of Christianity in Persia.
The Persians seem to have been reluctant to resort to naval action. There was some minor Sasanian naval action in 620–23, and the only major Byzantine navy's action was during the Siege of Constantinople (626). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman%E2%80%93Persian_Wars |
Umayyad Caliphate | The Hashimiyya movement (a sub-sect of the Kaysanites Shia), led by the Abbasid family, overthrew the Umayyad caliphate. The Abbasids were members of the Hashim clan, rivals of the Umayyads, but the word "Hashimiyya" seems to refer specifically to Abu Hashim, a grandson of Ali and son of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya. According to certain traditions, Abu Hashim died in 717 in Humeima in the house of Muhammad ibn Ali, the head of the Abbasid family, and before dying named Muhammad ibn Ali as his successor. This tradition allowed the Abbasids to rally the supporters of the failed revolt of Mukhtar, who had represented themselves as the supporters of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya.
Beginning around 719, Hashimiyya missions began to seek adherents in Khurasan. Their campaign was framed as one of proselytism (dawah). They sought support for a "member of the family" of Muhammad, without making explicit mention of the Abbasids. These missions met with success both among Arabs and non-Arabs (mawali), although the latter may have played a particularly important role in the growth of the movement.
Around 746, Abu Muslim assumed leadership of the Hashimiyya in Khurasan. In 747, he successfully initiated an open revolt against Umayyad rule, which was carried out under the sign of the black flag. He soon established control of Khurasan, expelling its Umayyad governor, Nasr ibn Sayyar, and dispatched an army westwards. Kufa fell to the Hashimiyya in 749, the last Umayyad stronghold in Iraq, Wasit, was placed under siege, and in November of the same year Abul Abbas as-Saffah was recognized as the new caliph in the mosque at Kufa. At this point Marwan mobilized his troops from Harran and advanced toward Iraq. In January 750 the two forces met in the Battle of the Zab, and the Umayyads were defeated. Damascus fell to the Abbasids in April, and in August, Marwan was killed in Egypt. Some Umayyads in Syria continued to resist the takeover. The Umayyad princes Abu Muhammad al-Sufyani, al-Abbas ibn Muhammad, and Hashim ibn Yazid launched revolts in Syria and the Islamic–Byzantine frontier around late 750, but they were defeated.
The victors desecrated the tombs of the Umayyads in Syria, sparing only that of Umar II, and most of the remaining members of the Umayyad family were tracked down and killed. When Abbasids declared amnesty for members of the Umayyad family, eighty gathered to receive pardons, and all were massacred. One grandson of Hisham, Abd al-Rahman I, survived, escaped across North Africa, and established an emirate in Moorish Iberia (Al-Andalus). In a claim unrecognized outside of al-Andalus, he maintained that the Umayyad Caliphate, the true, authentic caliphate, more legitimate than the Abbasids, was continued through him in Córdoba. It was to survive for centuries.
Some Umayyads also survived in Syria, and their descendants would once more attempt to restore their old regime during the Fourth Fitna. Two Umayyads, Abu al-Umaytir al-Sufyani and Maslama ibn Ya'qub, successively seized control of Damascus from 811 to 813, and declared themselves caliphs. However, their rebellions were suppressed.
Previté-Orton argues that the reason for the decline of the Umayyads was the rapid expansion of Islam. During the Umayyad period, mass conversions brought Persians, Berbers, Copts, and Aramaic to Islam. These mawalis (clients) were often better educated and more civilised than their Arab overlords. The new converts, on the basis of equality of all Muslims, transformed the political landscape. Previté-Orton also argues that the feud between Syria and Iraq further weakened the empire. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umayyad_Caliphate |
Lajat | In 24 BC, the Roman Empire conquered Syria and assigned the region of Trachonitis, which was inhabited by nomadic marauders and cattle herders living in caves, to the authority of Herod the Great, king of Judaea. The area was not part of Herod's original kingdom in 40 BCE but was given to him by the Romans by the end of 27 BCE. To address the issue of local brigands, Herod settled 3,000 Idumaeans in Trachonitis. Later, around 7 BCE, Herod invited Zamaris, a Jew from Babylonia, and his contingent of 500 mounted archers to settled the village of Bathyra in Batanea (possibly near modern-day as-Sanamayn), giving them an exemption from taxation. This settlement, led by the family of Zamaris, was tasked with protecting the people of Batanea from Trachonite brigands and ensuring the safety of Jewish pilgrims traveling from Babylonia to Jerusalem. According to Josephus, these troops were accompanied by settlers from various places who were dedicated to the "ta patria of the Jews". With Herod's death in 4 BCE, Trachonitis was given to his son Philip the Tetrarch. After the latter's death, circa 34 CE, the area was incorporated into the province of Syria.
During the Roman era, Trachonitis' inhabitants gradually became settled and gained exemption from taxation. Under emperor Trajan, the region was transferred to the province of Arabia. The Romans built a road that passed through the center of Trachonitis and connected with the Roman road system in Syria. Several towns and villages sprang up in Trachonitis between the 1st and 4th centuries AD. Many of these settlements had theaters, colonnades and temples. There are almost twenty sites in the Lajat that contain ruins and inscriptions from the Roman period, including Phillipopolis (modern-day Shahba) and Sha'ara (ancient name unknown). The town of Zorava (modern-day Izra') was the political center of Trachonitis and its earliest inhabitants were Nabatean Arabs. The main Nabatean tribes of the town were the Sammenoi and the Migdalenoi (migrants from nearby al-Mujaydil). The inhabitants practiced a Roman pagan cult as early as 161 AD. In the 3rd century, they built numerous houses and baths from basaltic stone, and the town had a relatively urban character. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lajat |
Quran | Since Muslims could regard criticism of the Qur'an as a crime of apostasy punishable by death under sharia, it seemed impossible to conduct studies on the Qur'an that went beyond textual criticism. Until the early 1970s, non-Muslim scholars of Islam —while not accepting traditional explanations for divine intervention— accepted the above-mentioned traditional origin story in most details.
University of Chicago professor Fred Donner states that:[T]here was a very early attempt to establish a uniform consonantal text of the Qurʾān from what was probably a wider and more varied group of related texts in early transmission.… After the creation of this standardized canonical text, earlier authoritative texts were suppressed, and all extant manuscripts—despite their numerous variants—seem to date to a time after this standard consonantal text was established.Although most variant readings of the text of the Quran have ceased to be transmitted, some still are. There has been no critical text produced on which a scholarly reconstruction of the Quranic text could be based.
In 1972, in a mosque in the city of Sana'a, Yemen, manuscripts "consisting of 12,000 pieces" were discovered that were later proven to be the oldest Quranic text known to exist at the time. The Sana'a manuscripts contain palimpsests, manuscript pages from which the text has been washed off to make the parchment reusable again—a practice which was common in ancient times due to the scarcity of writing material. However, the faint washed-off underlying text (scriptio inferior) is still barely visible. Studies using radiocarbon dating indicate that the parchments are dated to the period before 671 CE with a 99 percent probability. The German scholar Gerd R. Puin has been investigating these Quran fragments for years. His research team made 35,000 microfilm photographs of the manuscripts, which he dated to the early part of the 8th century. Puin has noted unconventional verse orderings, minor textual variations, and rare styles of orthography, and suggested that some of the parchments were palimpsests which had been reused. Puin believed that this implied an evolving text as opposed to a fixed one.
In 2015, a single folio of a very early Quran, dating back to 1370 years earlier, was discovered in the library of the University of Birmingham, England. According to the tests carried out by the Oxford University Radiocarbon Accelerator Unit, "with a probability of more than 95%, the parchment was from between 568 and 645". The manuscript is written in Hijazi script, an early form of written Arabic. This possibly was one of the earliest extant exemplars of the Quran, but as the tests allow a range of possible dates, it cannot be said with certainty which of the existing versions is the oldest. Saudi scholar Saud al-Sarhan has expressed doubt over the age of the fragments as they contain dots and chapter separators that are believed to have originated later. The Birmingham manuscript caused excitement amongst believers because of its potential overlapping with the dominant tradition over the lifetime of Muhammad c. 570 to 632 CE and used as evidence to support conventional wisdom and to refute the revisionists' views that expresses findings and views different from the traditional approach to the early history of the Quran and Islam. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quran |
Aïr Mountains | More than 430 vascular species have been recorded so far in the Aïr mountains. The location of the Aïr as a southern extension of the Hoggar mountain range makes it a connection between the Saharan Flora and the Sahelian Flora. However, the presence of mountains up to 2000 m a.s.l. generates locally favourable conditions for several species of the Sudanian zone and the Mediterranean zone.
During the 20th century a series of scientific missions in the Aïr has permitted to identify the majority of plant species developing in the Aïr. Vachellia tortilis, subsp. raddiana (afagag) and Balanites aegyptiaca (aborak) are among the most frequent tree species in the intermountain zone. In the vicinity of temporary rivers named koris, species like Vachellia nilotica, Faidherbia albida and the palm Hyphaene thebaica coexist with date palm cultivars (Phoenix dactylifera). Severe droughts and high aridity have made the intermountain zone of the Aïr a particularly harsh place for plants to develop. The additional presence of domestic herbivores has led to a severe deficit in tree regeneration, which has been cited as a major ecological concern. Tree regeneration has been observed enhanced as soon as tree seedlings are protected by large tussocks of the frequent grass Panicum turgidum. This positive interaction between plants represents a promising restoration tool to be used by local inhabitants.
In comparison, mountainous areas are even less documented. Tropical tree species less resistant to drought have been described in the highlands, among which the Fabaceae Senegalia laeta and Vachellia seyal. Quezel has observed the remnant presence of a rare endemic taxon related to the olive in the northern sector of the Aïr range. Recently, this taxon, Olea europaea subsp. laperrinei, has been found in other mountains of the Aïr: these very isolated, small populations represent the southern limit of the species distribution.
A study led on the slopes of the highest summit in the Aïr, Mont Idoukal-n-Taghès (2022 m a.s.l.), identified plant species that had never been inventoried in Niger before. Among them, Pachycymbium decaisneanum, Cleome aculeata, Echinops mildbraedii and Indigofera nummularia are tropical species with relatively low resistance to water stress, whereas Silene lynesii, Tephrosia elegans, and Echinops mildbraedii have a Saharan-Mediterranean distribution. Three ferns were found for the first time in the Aïr recently, Cheilanthes coriacea, Actiniopteris radiata, and Ophioglossum polyphyllum, suggesting that ferns may be more prone to develop in arid environments than commonly proposed. All these data evidence a marked mountain climatic specificity in the Aïr, with a positive impact on species richness and species diversity. Because of their strong geographic isolation within a Saharan matrix, these species have a high conservation value. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A%C3%AFr_Mountains |
Meknes | Volubilis, a major Roman-era settlement in Morocco and one of its early urban centres, is located near the site of the current city of Meknes. The current city and its name, however, originate with a Berber tribe called the Miknasa who settled this region around the 10th century. A group of small unfortified Miknasa villages known as miknāsat al-zaytūn were established here in the 10th century. The Almoravids founded a fortress or fortified settlement just south of these villages after conquering the area in the 11th century. Originally called Tagrart or Taqrart, this Almoravid settlement formed the beginnings of what is now the old medina of Meknes.: 176 The Nejjarine Mosque, often reputed to be the oldest mosque in the city, dates back to the Almoravid period and may have served as the central mosque of the Almoravid settlement.: 177, 212–213 The mosque that became the present-day Grand Mosque of Meknes is believed to have been first built by the Almoravids in the 12th century.
The fortress resisted the military advance of the Almohads, who destroyed the city after a long siege in the 12th century. However, at the beginning of the 13th century the Almohad caliph Muhammad al-Nasir (ruled 1199–1213) rebuilt the city and its fortifications, as well as its Grand Mosque. The city enjoyed relative prosperity in this period, before being conquered again by the new Marinid dynasty in 1244. The first kasbah (citadel or governor's district) of Meknes was created afterwards by sultan Abu Yusuf Ya'qub in 1276 CE – the same year that the citadel of Fes el-Jdid was built in nearby Fes, the new capital. During this period, Meknes was frequently the residence of Marinid princes (often appointed there as governors) and especially of viziers.: 55 The Mosque of the Kasbah (the later Mosque of Lalla Aouda) was also founded and first built in 1276. The Marinids also carried out major restorations to the Grand Mosque in the 14th century and built the major madrasas of the city near it. The latter included the Bou Inania Madrasa (built in 1336) and two other madrasas, Madrasa al-Qadi and Madrasa Shuhud, all built by Sultan Abu el-Hassan.
After the end of the Marinid and Wattasid periods, however, Meknes suffered from neglect as the new Saadian dynasty (16th and early 17th century) focused their attention on their capital at Marrakesh and neglected the old northern cities of Morocco. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meknes |
Badr Shakir al-Sayyab | Badr Shakir al-Sayyab's experiments helped to change the course of modern Arabic poetry. He produced seven collections of poetry and several translations, which include the poetry of Louis Aragon, Nazim Hikmet, and Edith Sitwell, who, with T. S. Eliot, had a profound influence on him. At the end of the 1940s he launched the free verse movement in Arabic poetry, with fellow Iraqi poet Nazik al-Mala'ika, Abd al-Wahhab Al-Bayati and Shathel Taqa, giving it credibility with the many fine poems he published in the fifties. The publication of his third volume, Rain Song, in 1960 was one of the most significant events in contemporary Arabic poetry, instrumental in drawing attention to the use of myth in poetry. He revolutionized every element of the poem and wrote on highly involved political and social topics, as well as many personal themes. The Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish was greatly impressed and influenced by the poetry of Badr Shakir al-Sayyab.
Al-Sayyab’s rooms, with his poems that are full of longing for the homeland after his exile from it. The poet was very interested in the smallest details of Iraq and its parts. He was in a constant eagerness and longing for everything related to the homeland that he was forced to leave, and this is clear in the poem. This is a brief will in which he wished to find a grave. In his homeland when he died, but when he lived he wanted nothing but a small hut in his fields, pointing to the blessings that he would bestow upon Iraq through a letter addressed to his people, recommending it to his people. In it, he forbade them from denying blessings, and commanded them to adhere to it and not accept anything other than it, regardless of what...
They enjoy blessings from which he was deprived, and he spent his life seeking them. Then he concludes his poem by pointing out the rights of the homeland over its children. It is sufficient that he was created from his own soil and manna; So that this would be a sufficient reason for gratitude for the blessings, and eternal nostalgia and burning longing for Him.
In the realm of literary controversy, Sayyab stated that Nazik al-Malaikah's claim to have discovered free verse herself was false, and drew attention to the earlier work of Ali Ahmad Bakathir (1910–69) who had developed the two-hemistich format in the mid 1930s. It was Bakathir in fact who had written fractured (caesura) poetry for the first time in Arabic poetry. Bakathir (1910–69), in the second edition of his book "Akhnatun wa Nefertiti", acknowledged the recognition Sayyab had brought him.
In 2014, some of Sayyab's works were banned from the Riyadh International Book Fair by the Saudi authorities.
Just like many well-known and modern Iraqi figures, one of the tables in the Dar al-Atraqchi Café in Baghdad was named after him in his honor. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Badr_Shakir_al-Sayyab |
Kuwait | In the early to mid 1700s, Kuwait City was as a small fishing village. Administratively, it was a sheikhdom, ruled by local sheikhs from Bani Khalid clan. Sometime in the mid 1700s, the Bani Utbah settled in Kuwait City. Sometime after the death of the Bani Khalid's leader Barak bin Abdul Mohsen and the fall of the Bani Khalid Emirate, the Utub were able to wrest control of Kuwait as a result of successive matrimonial alliances.
In the latter half of the eighteenth century, Kuwait began establishing itself as a maritime port and gradually became a principal commercial center for the transit of goods between Baghdad, India, Persia, Muscat, and the Arabian Peninsula. By the late-1700s, Kuwait had established itself as a trading route from the Persian Gulf to Aleppo. During the Persian siege of Basra in 1775–79, Iraqi merchants took refuge in Kuwait and were partly instrumental in the expansion of Kuwait's boat-building and trading activities. As a result, Kuwait's maritime commerce boomed, as the Indian trade routes with Baghdad, Aleppo, Smyrna and Constantinople were diverted to Kuwait during this time. The East India Company was diverted to Kuwait in 1792. The East India Company secured the sea routes between Kuwait, India and the east coasts of Africa. After the Persians withdrew from Basra in 1779, Kuwait continued to attract trade away from Basra. The flight of many of Basra's leading merchants to Kuwait continued to play a significant role in Basra's commercial stagnation well into the 1850s.
The instability in Basra helped foster economic prosperity in Kuwait. In the late 18th century, Kuwait was a haven for Basra merchants fleeing Ottoman persecution. Kuwait was the center of boat building in the Persian Gulf, its ships renowned throughout the Indian Ocean. Its sailors developed a positive reputation in the Persian Gulf. In the 19th century, Kuwait became significant in the horse trade, with regular shipments in sailing vessels. In the mid 19th century, it was estimated that Kuwait exported an average of 800 horses to India annually.
In 1899, ruler Sheikh Mubarak Al Sabah signed an agreement with the British government in India (subsequently known as the Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement of 1899) making Kuwait a British protectorate. This gave Britain exclusive access and trade with Kuwait, while denying Ottoman provinces to the north a port on the Persian Gulf. The Sheikhdom of Kuwait remained a British protectorate until 1961.
After the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913, Kuwait was established as an autonomous kaza, or district, of the Ottoman Empire and a de facto protectorate of Great Britain.
During World War I, the British Empire imposed a trade blockade against Kuwait because Kuwait's ruler at the time, Salim Al-Mubarak Al-Sabah, supported the Ottoman Empire. The British economic blockade heavily damaged Kuwait's economy.
In 1919, Sheikh Salim Al-Mubarak Al-Sabah intended to build a commercial city in the south of Kuwait. This caused a diplomatic crisis with Najd, but Britain intervened, discouraging Sheikh Salim. In 1920, an attempt by the Ikhwan to build a stronghold in southern Kuwait led to the Battle of Hamdh. The Battle of Hamdh involved 2,000 Ikhwan fighters against 100 Kuwaiti cavalrymen and 200 Kuwaiti infantrymen. The battle lasted for six days and resulted in heavy but unknown casualties on both sides resulting in the victory of the Ikhwan forces and leading to the battle of Jahra around the Kuwait Red Fort. The Battle of Jahra happened as the result of the Battle of Hamdh. A force of three to four thousand Ikhwan, led by Faisal Al-Dawish, attacked the Red Fort at Al-Jahra, defended by fifteen hundred men. The fort was besieged and the Kuwaiti position precarious The Ikhwan attack repulsed for the while, negotiations began between Salim and Al-Dawish; the latter threatened another attack if the Kuwaiti forces did not surrender. The local merchant class convinced Salim to call in help from British troops, who showed up with airplanes and three warships, ending the attacks. After the Battle of Jahra, Ibn Saud's warriors, the Ikhwan, demanded that Kuwait follows five rules: evict all the Shias, adopt the Ikhwan doctrine, label the Turks "heretics", abolish smoking, munkar and prostitution, and destroy the American missionary hospital.
The Kuwait–Najd War of 1919–20 erupted in the aftermath of World War I. The war occurred because Ibn Saud of Najd wanted to annex Kuwait. The sharpened conflict between Kuwait and Najd led to the death of hundreds of Kuwaitis. The war resulted in sporadic border clashes throughout 1919–1920.
When Percy Cox was informed of the border clashes in Kuwait, he sent a letter to the Ruler of Arabistan Sheikh Khazʽal Ibn Jabir offering the Kuwaiti throne to either him or one of his heirs. Khaz'al refused. He then asked: ...even so, do you think that you have come to me with something new? Al Mubarak's position as ruler of Kuwait means that I am the true ruler of Kuwait. So there is no difference between myself and them, for they are like the dearest of my children and you are aware of this. Had someone else come to me with this offer, I would have complained about them to you. So how do you come to me with this offer when you are well aware that myself and Al Mubarak are one soul and one house, what affects them affects me, whether good or evil.
Following the Kuwait–Najd War in 1919–20, Ibn Saud imposed a trade blockade against Kuwait from the years 1923 until 1937. The goal of the Saudi economic and military attacks on Kuwait was to annex as much of Kuwait's territory as possible. At the Uqair conference in 1922, the boundaries of Kuwait and Najd were set; as a result of British interference, Kuwait had no representative at the Uqair conference. After the Uqair conference, Kuwait was still subjected to a Saudi economic blockade and intermittent Saudi raiding.
Kuwait immensely declined in regional economic importance, due to the trade blockades and the world economic depression. Before Mary Bruins Allison visited Kuwait in 1934, Kuwait had already lost its prominence in long-distance trade.
The Great Depression harmed Kuwait's economy, starting in the late 1920s. International trading was one of Kuwait's main sources of income before oil. Kuwait's merchants were mostly intermediary merchants. As a result of the decline of European demand for goods from India and Africa, Kuwait's economy suffered. The decline in international trade resulted in an increase in gold smuggling by Kuwait's ships to India. Some local merchant families became rich from this smuggling. Kuwait's pearl industry also collapsed as a result of the worldwide economic depression. At its height, Kuwait's pearl industry had led the world's luxury market, regularly sending out between 750 and 800 ships to meet the European elite's desire for pearls. During the economic depression, luxuries like pearls were in little demand. The Japanese invention of cultured pearls also contributed to the collapse of Kuwait's pearl industry.
Freya Stark wrote about the extent of poverty in Kuwait at the time:Poverty has settled in Kuwait more heavily since my last visit five years ago, both by sea, where the pearl trade continues to decline, and by land, where the blockade established by Saudi Arabia now harms the merchants.
On 22 February 1938, oil was first discovered in the Burgan field. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuwait |
Kabbalah | Kabbalah tended to be rejected by most Jews in the Conservative and Reform movements, though its influences were not completely eliminated. While it was generally not studied as a discipline, the Kabbalistic Kabbalat Shabbat service remained part of liberal liturgy, as did the Yedid Nefesh prayer. Nevertheless, in the 1960s, Saul Lieberman of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America is reputed to have introduced a lecture by Scholem on Kabbalah with a statement that Kabbalah itself was "nonsense", but the academic study of Kabbalah was "scholarship". This view became popular among many Jews, who viewed the subject as worthy of study, but who did not accept Kabbalah as teaching literal truths.
According to Bradley Shavit Artson (Dean of the Conservative Ziegler School of Rabbinic Studies) Many western Jews insisted that their future and their freedom required shedding what they perceived as parochial orientalism. They fashioned a Judaism that was decorous and strictly rational (according to 19th-century European standards), denigrating Kabbalah as backward, superstitious, and marginal.
However, in the late 20th century and early 21st century there has been a revival in interest in Kabbalah in all branches of liberal Judaism. The Kabbalistic 12th-century prayer Anim Zemirot was restored to the new Conservative Sim Shalom siddur, as was the B'rikh Shmeh passage from the Zohar, and the mystical Ushpizin service welcoming to the Sukkah the spirits of Jewish forebears. Anim Zemirot and the 16th-century mystical poem Lekhah Dodi reappeared in the Reform Siddur Gates of Prayer in 1975. All rabbinical seminaries now teach several courses in Kabbalah—in Conservative Judaism, both the Jewish Theological Seminary of America and the Ziegler School of Rabbinic Studies of the American Jewish University in Los Angeles have full-time instructors in Kabbalah and Hasidut, Eitan Fishbane and Pinchas Giller, respectively. In Reform Judaism, Sharon Koren teaches at the Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion. Reform rabbis like Herbert Weiner and Lawrence Kushner have renewed interest in Kabbalah among Reform Jews. At the Reconstructionist Rabbinical College, Joel Hecker is the full-time instructor teaching courses in Kabbalah and Hasidut.
According to Artson: Ours is an age hungry for meaning, for a sense of belonging, for holiness. In that search, we have returned to the very Kabbalah our predecessors scorned. The stone that the builders rejected has become the head cornerstone (Psalm 118:22)... Kabbalah was the last universal theology adopted by the entire Jewish people, hence faithfulness to our commitment to positive-historical Judaism mandates a reverent receptivity to Kabbalah.
The Reconstructionist movement, under the leadership of Arthur Green in the 1980s and 1990s, and with the influence of Zalman Schachter Shalomi, brought a strong openness to Kabbalah and hasidic elements that then came to play prominent roles in the Kol ha-Neshamah siddur series. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kabbalah |
Comoros | The level of poverty in the Comoros is high, but "judging by the international poverty threshold of $1.9 per person per day, only two out of every ten Comorians could be classified as poor, a rate that places the Comoros ahead of other low-income countries and 30 percentage points ahead of other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa." Poverty declined by about 10% between 2014 and 2018, and living conditions generally improved. Economic inequality remains widespread, with a major gap between rural and urban areas. Remittances through the sizable Comorian diaspora form a substantial part of the country's GDP and have contributed to decreases in poverty and increases in living standards.
According to ILO's ILOSTAT statistical database, between 1991 and 2019 the unemployment rate as a percent of the total labor force ranged from 4.38% to 4.3%. An October 2005 paper by the Comoros Ministry of Planning and Regional Development, however, reported that "registered unemployment rate is 14.3 percent, distributed very unevenly among and within the islands, but with marked incidence in urban areas."
In 2019, more than 56% of the labor force was employed in agriculture, with 29% employed in industry and 14% employed in services. The islands' agricultural sector is based on the export of spices, including vanilla, cinnamon, and cloves, and thus susceptible to price fluctuations in the volatile world commodity market for these goods. The Comoros is the world's largest producer of ylang-ylang, a plant whose extracted essential oil is used in the perfume industry; some 80% of the world's supply comes from the Comoros.
High population densities, as much as 1000 per square kilometre in the densest agricultural zones, for what is still a mostly rural, agricultural economy may lead to an environmental crisis in the near future, especially considering the high rate of population growth. In 2004 the Comoros' real GDP growth was a low 1.9% and real GDP per capita continued to decline. These declines are explained by factors including declining investment, drops in consumption, rising inflation, and an increase in trade imbalance due in part to lowered cash crop prices, especially vanilla.
Fiscal policy is constrained by erratic fiscal revenues, a bloated civil service wage bill, and an external debt that is far above the HIPC threshold. Membership in the franc zone, the main anchor of stability, has nevertheless helped contain pressures on domestic prices.
The Comoros has an inadequate transportation system, a young and rapidly increasing population, and few natural resources. The low educational level of the labour force contributes to a subsistence level of economic activity, high unemployment, and a heavy dependence on foreign grants and technical assistance. Agriculture contributes 40% to GDP and provides most of the exports.
The government is struggling to upgrade education and technical training, to privatise commercial and industrial enterprises, to improve health services, to diversify exports, to promote tourism, and to reduce the high population growth rate.
The Comoros is a member of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comoros |
Ottoman architecture | The first Ottomans were established in northwest Anatolia near the borders of the Byzantine Empire. Their position at this frontier encouraged influences from Byzantine architecture and other ancient remains, and there were examples of similar architectural experimentation by the other local dynasties of the region. One of the early Ottoman stylistic distinctions that emerged was a tradition of designing more complete façades in front of mosques, especially in the form of a portico with arches and columns. Another early distinction was the reliance on domes. The first Ottoman structures were built in Söğüt, the earliest Ottoman capital, and in nearby Bilecik, but they have not survived in their original form. They include a couple of small mosques and a mausoleum built in Ertuğrul's time (late 13th century). Bursa was captured in 1326 by the Ottoman leader Orhan. It served as the Ottoman capital until 1402, becoming a major center of patronage and construction. Orhan also captured İznik in 1331, turning it into another early center of Ottoman art. In this early period there were generally three types of mosques: the single-domed mosque, the T-plan mosque, and the multi-unit or multi-dome mosque.
The Hacı Özbek Mosque (1333) in İznik is the oldest Ottoman mosque with an inscription that documents its construction and it is the oldest example of the Ottoman single-domed mosque, consisting of a square chamber covered by a dome. Another early single-domed mosque is the Green Mosque in İznik (1378–1391), which is the first Ottoman mosque for which the name of the architect (Hacı bin Musa) is known. The main dome covers a square space and the transition between the round base of the dome and the square chamber below is achieved through a series of triangular carvings known as "Turkish triangles", a type of pendentive which was common in Anatolian Seljuk and early Ottoman architecture.
In 1334–1335, Orhan built a mosque in İznik that no longer stands but has been excavated by archeologists. It is significant as the earliest known example of a type of building called a zaviye (from Arabic zawiya), "T-plan" mosque, or "Bursa-type" mosque. This type of building is characterized by a central court, typically covered by a dome, with iwans (domed or vaulted halls that are open to the courtyard) on three sides, one of which is oriented towards the qibla (direction of prayer) and contains the mihrab (wall niche symbolizing the qibla). The front façade usually incorporated a portico along its entire width. The iwans on the side and the other various rooms attached to these buildings may have served to house Sufi students and traveling dervishes, since the Sufi brotherhoods were one of the main supporters of the early Ottomans. Variations of this floor plan were the most common type of major religious structure sponsored by the early Ottoman elites. The "Bursa-type" label comes from the fact that multiple examples of this kind were built in and around Bursa, including the Orhan Gazi Mosque (1339), the Hüdavendigar (Murad I) Mosque (1366–1385), the Yildirim Bayezid I Mosque (completed in 1395), and the Green Mosque built by Mehmed I (1412–1424). The Green Mosque is notable for its extensive tile decoration in the cuerda seca technique. It is the first instance of lavish tile decoration in Ottoman architecture. These mosques were all part of larger religious complexes (külliyes) that included other structures offering services such as madrasas (Islamic colleges), hammams (public bathhouses), and imarets (charitable kitchens).
The most unusual mosque of this period is the multi-domed congregational mosque known as the Grand Mosque of Bursa or Ulu Cami. The mosque was commissioned by Bayezid I after the Battle of Nicopolis in 1396 and finished in 1399–1400. It consists of a large hypostyle hall divided into twenty equal bays in a rectangular four-by-five grid, each covered by a dome supported by stone piers. After Bayezid I was defeated at the Battle of Ankara in 1402, the Ottoman capital was moved to Edirne in Thrace. The last major multi-dome mosque built by the Ottomans (with some exceptions), is the Old Mosque (Eski Cami) in Edirne, built between 1403 and 1414. In later periods, the multi-dome building type was adapted for use in non-religious buildings instead, such as bedestens (market halls).
The most important architectural development from the reign of Murad II (r. 1421–1451) is the Üç Şerefeli Mosque, built from 1437 to 1447. It has a very different design from earlier mosques, with a nearly square floor plan divided between a rectangular courtyard and a rectangular prayer hall. The courtyard has a central fountain and is surrounded by a portico of arches and domes, with a decorated central portal leading into the courtyard from the outside and another one leading from the courtyard into the prayer hall. The prayer hall is centered around a huge dome which covers most of the middle part of the hall, while the sides of the hall are covered by pairs of smaller domes. The central dome is larger than any other Ottoman dome built before this. The mosque has a total of four minarets, arranged around the four corners of the courtyard. Its southwestern minaret was the tallest Ottoman minaret built up to that time and features three balconies (from which the mosque's name derives). This new design was a culmination of previous architectural experimentation and foreshadowed the features of later Ottoman mosque architecture. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_architecture |
Ra's al Ghul | In The New 52 (a 2011 reboot of the DC Comics universe), Ra's al Ghul appears in a hooded robe at the League of Assassins' city of 'Eth Alth'eban. He enters the Well of Sins after an encounter with Jason Todd. When he emerges, Ra's is consumed by the evil that corrupted the Untitled centuries before, and he feels compelled to rid himself of the machinations of his daughter and Ducra by killing Jason. At Ra's' command, the prisoners are brought to him, and he promises to use his newfound power to destroy them. Red Hood engages Ra's, as Essence joins the battle. She insists that he will allow Jason and his friends to leave his realm, or he will be forced to die a mortal death just as he always feared he would. Despite having destroyed the All-Caste, Ra's al Ghul's actions have led to their eventual rebirth. Defeated, he swears that he will visit great agony upon Red Hood if he ever sees him again.
Batman and Aquaman head to an island, where the League of Assassins are located, after Ra's has the bodies of Damian Wayne and Talia exhumed. Ra's had ordered the hunt of whales, creating genetically altered super-humans in the wombs of sperm whales, part of a plan to rebuild the League of Assassins. Inside the compound, they find that Ra's is wiping the hard drives clean, preventing data recovery. As his parting gift, he has left Batman the Heretics to keep him entertained. Batman fights his way to Ra's escape aircraft. He sees Talia and Damian's bodies stored within it, and clings to the fuselage from outside as the plane takes off. Though Ra's plans to go to Paradise Island, he is nearly surprised to see Batman pounding on the cockpit's windshield. From outside, Batman screams for Ra's to give back his son, but Ra's responds that he is blood of Damian's blood and the boy is in good hands. He orders the plane to tilt its angle, causing the wind shear to rip Batman from his purchase and drop down into the sea, where he is caught by Aquaman.
Batman and Ra's then encounter Glorious Godfrey. Glorious Godfrey's reason to come to Earth is to retrieve the Chaos Shard, a powerful crystal once belonged to Darkseid which Ra's al Ghul revealed was hidden inside the sarcophagus he crafted for Damian.
During Batman Eternal, Bruce briefly speculates that Ra's is the mastermind behind most of the attacks against him that have left Wayne Enterprises bankrupt and Batman pushed to the limit. However, when he confronts Ra's, his foe reveals that, while he was invited to participate in the attack by the true mastermind, he rejected the offer as Ra's would prefer to destroy Batman when the Dark Knight believes that his legacy will be as eternal as Ra's, rather than tear him down in such a manner. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ra%27s_al_Ghul |
First Crusade | After passing through the Cilician Gates, Baldwin and Tancred broke away from the main body of the army and set off towards the Armenian lands. Baldwin desired to create a fiefdom for himself in the Holy Land, and, in Armenia, he could count on the support of the locals, especially an adventurer named Bagrat. Baldwin and Tancred led two separate contingents, departing Heraclea on 15 September. Tancred arrived first at Tarsus where he persuaded the Seljuk garrison to raise his flag on the citadel. Baldwin reached Tarsus the next day and, in a reversal, the Turks allowed Baldwin to take possession of two towers. Heavily outnumbered, Tancred decided not to fight for the town. Shortly thereafter, a group of Norman knights arrived, but Baldwin denied entry to them. The Turks slaughtered the Normans during the night, and Baldwin's men blamed him for their fate and massacred the remaining Seljuk garrison. Baldwin took shelter in a tower and convinced his soldiers of his innocence. A pirate captain, Guynemer of Boulogne, sailed up the Berdan River to Tarsus and swore fealty to Baldwin, who hired Guynemer's men to garrison the city while he continued his campaign.
Tancred had meanwhile seized the town of Mamistra. Baldwin reached the town on around 30 September. The Norman Richard of Salerno wanted to take revenge for Tarsus, causing a skirmish between the soldiers of Baldwin and Tancred. Baldwin left Mamistra and joined the main army at Marash, but Bagrat persuaded him to launch a campaign across a region densely populated by Armenians and he left the main army on 17 October. The Armenians welcomed Baldwin, and the local population massacred the Seljuks, seizing the fortresses Ravendel and Turbessel before the end of 1097. Baldwin made Bagrat the governor of Ravendel.
The Armenian lord Thoros of Edessa sent envoys to Baldwin in early 1098, seeking his assistance against the nearby Seljuks. Before departing for Edessa, Baldwin ordered the arrest of Bagrat, accused of collaboration with the Seljuks. Bagrat was tortured and forced to surrender Ravendel. Baldwin left for Edessa in early February, being harassed en route by the forces of Balduk, emir of Samosata. Reaching the city, he was well-received by both Thoros and the local Christian population. Remarkably, Thoros adopted Baldwin as a son, making him co-regent of Edessa. Strengthened by troops from Edessa, Baldwin raided Balduk's territory and placed a garrison in a small fortress near Samosata.
Shortly after Baldwin's return from the campaign, a group of local nobles began plotting against Thoros, likely with Baldwin's consent. A riot broke out in the town, forcing Thoros to take refuge in the citadel. Baldwin pledged to save his adoptive father, but when the rioters broke into the citadel on 9 March and murdered both Thoros and his wife, he did nothing to stop them. On the following day, after the townspeople acknowledged Baldwin as their ruler, he assumed the title of Count of Edessa, and so established the first of the Crusader states.
While the Byzantines had lost Edessa to the Seljuks in 1087, the emperor did not demand that Baldwin hand over the town. Moreover, the acquisition of Ravendel, Turbessel and Edessa strengthened the position of the main crusader army later at Antioch. The lands along the Euphrates secured a supply of food for the crusaders, and the fortresses hindered the movement of the Seljuk troops.
As his force was small, Baldwin had used diplomacy to secure his rule in Edessa. He married Arda of Armenia, who later became queen consort of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, and encouraged his retainers to marry local women. The city's rich treasury enabled him to employ mercenaries and to buy Samosata from Balduk. The resultant treaty for the transfer of Samosata was the first friendly arrangement between a crusader leader and a Muslim ruler, who remained governor of the city.
An important figure in the kingdom in the 12th century was Belek Ghazi, grandson of the former Seljuk governor of Jerusalem, Artuk. Belek was to play a small role in this story who, as an Artuqid emir, had hired Baldwin to suppress a revolt in Saruj. When the Muslim leaders of the town approached Balduk to come to their rescue, Balduk hurried to Saruj, but it soon became apparent that his forces were not able to resist a siege and the defenders yielded to Baldwin. Baldwin demanded Balduk's wife and children as hostages, and upon his refusal, Baldwin had him captured and executed. With Saruj, Baldwin now had consolidated the county and ensured his communications with the main body of Crusaders. Kerbogha, ever on guard to defeat the Crusaders, gathered a large army to eliminate Baldwin. During his march towards Antioch, Kerbogha besieged the walls of Edessa for three weeks in May, but could not capture it. This delay played a crucial part in the Crusader victory at Antioch. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Crusade |
2003 invasion of Iraq | Initially, the 1st Marine Division (United States) fought through the Rumaila oil fields, and moved north to Nasiriyah—a moderate-sized, Shi'ite-dominated city with important strategic significance as a major road junction and its proximity to nearby Tallil Airfield. It was also situated near a number of strategically important bridges over the Euphrates River. The city was defended by a mix of regular Iraqi army units, Ba'ath loyalists, and Fedayeen from both Iraq and abroad. The United States Army 3rd Infantry Division defeated Iraqi forces entrenched in and around the airfield and bypassed the city to the west.
On 23 March, a convoy from the 3rd Infantry Division, including the female American soldiers Jessica Lynch, Shoshana Johnson, and Lori Piestewa, was ambushed after taking a wrong turn into the city. Eleven U.S. soldiers were killed, and seven, including Lynch and Johnson, were captured. Piestewa died of wounds shortly after capture, while the remaining five prisoners of war were later rescued. Piestewa, who was from Tuba City, Arizona, and an enrolled member of the Hopi Tribe, was believed to have been the first Native American woman killed in combat in a foreign war. On the same day, U.S. Marines from the 2nd Marine Division entered Nasiriyah in force, facing heavy resistance as they moved to secure two major bridges in the city. Several marines were killed during a firefight with Fedayeen in the urban fighting. At the Saddam Canal, another 18 marines were killed in heavy fighting with Iraqi soldiers. An Air Force A-10 was involved in a case of friendly fire that resulted in the death of six Marines when it accidentally attacked an American amphibious vehicle. Two other vehicles were destroyed when a barrage of RPG and small arms fire killed most of the Marines inside. A Marine from Marine Air Control Group 28 was killed by enemy fire, and two Marine engineers drowned in the Saddam Canal. The bridges were secured and the Second Marine division set up a perimeter around the city.
On the evening of 24 March, the 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, which was attached to Regimental Combat Team One (RCT-1), pushed through Nasiriyah and established a perimeter 15 km (9.3 miles) north of the city. Iraqi reinforcements from Kut launched several counterattacks. The Marines managed to repel them using indirect fire and close air support. The last Iraqi attack was beaten off at dawn. The battalion estimated that 200–300 Iraqi soldiers were killed, without a single U.S. casualty. Nasiriyah was declared secure, but attacks by Iraqi Fedayeen continued. These attacks were uncoordinated, and resulted in firefights that killed many Fedayeen. Because of Nasiriyah's strategic position as a road junction, significant gridlock occurred as U.S. forces moving north converged on the city's surrounding highways.
With the Nasiriyah and Tallil Airfields secured, coalition forces gained an important logistical center in southern Iraq and established FOB/EAF Jalibah, some 10 miles (16 km) outside Nasiriyah. Additional troops and supplies were soon brought through this forward operating base. The 101st Airborne Division continued its attack north in support of the 3rd Infantry Division.
By 28 March, a severe sandstorm slowed the coalition advance as the 3rd Infantry Division halted its northward drive halfway between Najaf and Karbala. Air operations by helicopters, poised to bring reinforcements from the 101st Airborne, were blocked for three days. There was particularly heavy fighting in and around the bridge near the town of Kufl. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_invasion_of_Iraq |
Sheikhdom of Kuwait | In the early to mid 1700s, Kuwait was a small fishing village known as Grane (Kureyn). The region originally came under the rule of the Bani Khalid Emirate in 1670 after the expulsion of the Ottomans from Eastern Arabia (Lahsa Eyalet) by Barrack bin Ghurayr, Emir of the Bani Khalid, who successfully besieged the Ottoman governor Umar Pasha who surrendered and gave up his rule as the fourth Ottoman governor of al-Hasa. After Al-Hasa Expedition 1871 Kuwait become nominal vassal of The Ottoman Empire in 1875 was included in the Basra Vilayet.
The families of the Bani Utbah arrived in Kuwait sometime in the mid 1700s and settled after receiving permission from the Emir of Bani Khalid Sa'dun bin Muhammad. The Utubs did not immediately settle in Kuwait however, they roamed for half a century before finally settling in Kuwait. They first left the region of central Arabia and settled themselves in what is now Qatar, after a quarrel between them and some inhabitants of the region they departed and settled near Umm Qasr in December 1701. Living as brigands, raiding passing caravans and levying taxes over the shipping of the Shatt al-Arab. Due to these practices, they were driven out of the area by the Ottoman Mutasallim of Basra and later lived in Sabiyya, an area bordering the north of Kuwait Bay, until finally requesting permission from the Bani Khalid to settle in Kuwait.
The head of each family in the village of Kuwait gathered and chose Sabah I bin Jaber as the Sheikh of Kuwait becoming a governor of sorts underneath the Emir of Al Hasa. During this time as well, the power in governance was split between the Al Sabah, Al Khalifa, and Al Jalahma families in which the Al Sabah will have control over the reins of power whereas the Al Khalifa were in charge of trade and the flow of money, and the Jalahma would be in charge over work in the sea.
Sometime in the 1750s, the sheikdom of Kuwait emerged after an agreement between the Sheikh of Kuwait and the Emir of Bani Khalid in which Al Hasa recognised Sabah I bin Jaber's independent rule over Kuwait and in exchange Kuwait would not ally itself or support the enemies of Bani Khalid or interfere in the internal affairs of Bani Khalid in any way. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheikhdom_of_Kuwait |
Palmyra | The senate building is largely ruined. It is a small building that consists of a peristyle courtyard and a chamber that has an apse at one end and rows of seats around it.
Much of the Baths of Diocletian are ruined and do not survive above the level of the foundations. The complex's entrance is marked by four massive Egyptian granite columns each 1.3 metres (4 ft 3 in) in diameter, 12.5 metres (41 ft) high and weigh 20 tonnes. Inside, the outline of a bathing pool surrounded by a colonnade of Corinthian columns is still visible in addition to an octagonal room that served as a dressing room containing a drain in its center. Sossianus Hierocles, a governor under Emperor Diocletian, claimed to have built the baths, but the building was probably erected in the late second century and Sossianus Hierocles renovated it.
The Agora of Palmyra is part of a complex that also includes the tariff court and the triclinium, built in the second half of the first century AD. The agora is a massive 71-by-84-metre (233 by 276 ft) structure with 11 entrances. Inside the agora, 200 columnar bases that used to hold statues of prominent citizens were found. The inscriptions on the bases allowed an understanding of the order by which the statues were grouped; the eastern side was reserved for senators, the northern side for Palmyrene officials, the western side for soldiers and the southern side for caravan chiefs.
The Tariff Court is a large rectangular enclosure south of the agora and sharing its northern wall with it. Originally, the entrance of the court was a massive vestibule in its southwestern wall. However, the entrance was blocked by the construction of a defensive wall and the court was entered through three doors from the Agora. The court gained its name by containing a 5-metre (16 ft) stone slab that had the Palmyrene tax law inscribed on it.
The Triclinium of the Agora is at the northwestern corner of the Agora and can host up to 40 people. It is a small 12-by-15-metre (39 by 49 ft) hall decorated with Greek key motifs that run in a continuous line halfway up the wall. The building was probably used by the rulers of the city; the French general director of antiquities in Syria, Henri Seyrig, proposed that it was a small temple before being turned into a triclinium or banqueting hall. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palmyra |
Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist | According to the constitution of Iran, Islamic republic is defined as a state ruled by Islamic jurists (Fuqaha). Article Five reads
"During the Occultation of the Walial-'Asr [Lord of the Age, i.e. the Hidden Imam] (may God hasten his reappearance), the wilayah and leadership of the Ummah [nation] devolve upon the just [ʿadil] and pious [muttaqi] faqih, who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and
possessed of administrative ability, will assume the responsibilities of this office in accordance with Article 107. (Other articles—107 to 112—specify the procedure for selecting the leader and list his constitutional functions.)
Articles 57 and 110 delineate the power of the ruling jurist. Article 57 states that there are other bodies/branches in the government but they are all under the control/supervision of the Leader.
The power of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive powers, functioning under the supervision of the absolute religious leader and the leadership of the ummah.
According to article 110, the supervisory powers of the
Supreme Leader as a Vali-e-faqih are:
appointing the jurists to the guardian council;
appointing the highest judicial authority in the country;
supreme command over the armed forces and Islamic Revolution Guards Corps;
signing the certificate of appointment allowing the president to take office;
dismissal of the president if he feels it is in the national interest;
granting amnesty on the recommendation of the supreme court.
The constitution quotes many verses of the Quran (21:92, 7:157, 21:105, 3:28, 28:5) in support of its aims and goals.
In support of "the continuation of the Revolution at home and abroad. ... [and working with] other Islamic and popular movements to prepare the way for the formation of a single world community", and "to assure the continuation of the struggle for the liberation of all deprived and oppressed peoples in the world." it quotes Q.21:92:
"This your community is a single community, and I am your Lord, so worship Me".
In support of "the righteous" assuming "the responsibility of governing and administering the country" it quotes Quranic verse Q.21:105:
"Verily My righteous servants shall inherit the earth".
On the basis of the principles of the trusteeship and the permanent Imamate, rule is counted as a function of jurists. Ruling jurists must hold the religious office of "source of imitation" and be considered qualified to deliver independent judgments on religious general principles (fatwas). Furthermore, they must be upright, pious, committed experts on Islam, informed about the issues of the times, and known as God-fearing, brave and qualified for leadership.
In chapter one of the constitution, where fundamental principles are expressed, article 2, section 6a, states that "continuous ijtihad of the fuqaha [jurists] possessing necessary qualifications, exercised on the basis of the Qur'an and the Sunnah" is a principle in Islamic government. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guardianship_of_the_Islamic_Jurist |
Afro-Emiratis |
Slavery persisted in the Trucial States from 1892 until the formation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971. The Trucial States comprised the sheikhdoms of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Ajman, Kalba, Umm Al Quwain, Fujairah, and Ras Al Khaimah. Enslaved individuals, primarily sourced from the Indian Ocean slave trade, were trafficked to the region from various areas including the Indian subcontinent, the Hejaz, Oman, and Persia. They were employed in industries such as pearl fishing, domestic servitude, and the burgeoning oil industry. Many Afro-Arab individuals trace their heritage to these enslaved populations.
The exact date of abolition remains unclear. Some sources suggest it was in 1963, marked by an agreement signed by Trucial rulers, while others point to 1971 when the UAE joined the UN and accepted anti-slavery conventions. However, the absence of enforceable legislation cast doubt on the effectiveness of these measures. Following abolition, the Kafala system emerged, resembling aspects of the previous slave labor system, particularly in its exploitation of vulnerable workers from Africa and South Asia.
Throughout history, the British Empire's involvement in the region intersected with efforts to combat slavery. Despite treaties against the slave trade, the practice persisted, with British reports highlighting Dubai's role as a major hub for slave trafficking. The British administration in the Trucial States, while officially condemning slavery, struggled to enforce anti-slavery measures due to concerns over economic stability and political unrest.
Slavery routes into the Trucial States varied, with enslaved individuals trafficked from East Africa, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Slaves endured harsh conditions, serving as soldiers, laborers, pearl divers, and concubines. Female slaves faced particular exploitation, often subjected to sexual servitude and enduring high mortality rates. The British Empire faced mounting pressure from international bodies like the League of Nations and the United Nations to address the issue, leading to increased scrutiny and calls for abolition.
After gaining independence in 1971, the UAE officially accepted international conventions prohibiting slavery and officially integrated former slaves into Emirati society.
== References == | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afro-Emiratis |
Abrahamic religions | Jerusalem is considered Judaism's holiest city. Its origins can be dated to 1004 BCE, when according to Biblical tradition David established it as the capital of the United Kingdom of Israel, and his son Solomon built the First Temple on Mount Moriah. Since the Hebrew Bible relates that Isaac's sacrifice took place there, Mount Moriah's importance for Jews predates even these prominent events. Jews thrice daily pray in its direction, including in their prayers pleas for the restoration and the rebuilding of the Holy Temple (the Third Temple) on mount Moriah, close the Passover service with the wistful statement "Next year in built Jerusalem," and recall the city in the blessing at the end of each meal. Jerusalem has served as the only capital for the five Jewish states that have existed in Israel since 1400 BCE (the United Kingdom of Israel, the Kingdom of Judah, Yehud Medinata, the Hasmonean Kingdom, and modern Israel). It has been majority Jewish since about 1852 and continues through today.
Jerusalem was an early center of Christianity. There has been a continuous Christian presence there since. William R. Kenan, Jr., professor of the history of Christianity at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, writes that from the middle of the 4th century to the Islamic conquest in the middle of the 7th century, the Roman province of Palestine was a Christian nation with Jerusalem its principal city. According to the New Testament, Jerusalem was the city Jesus was brought to as a child to be presented at the temple and for the feast of the Passover. He preached and healed in Jerusalem, unceremoniously drove the money changers in disarray from the temple there, held the Last Supper in an "upper room" (traditionally the Cenacle) there the night before he was crucified on the cross and was arrested in Gethsemane. The six parts to Jesus' trial—three stages in a religious court and three stages before a Roman court—were all held in Jerusalem. His crucifixion at Golgotha, his burial nearby (traditionally the Church of the Holy Sepulchre), and his resurrection and ascension and prophecy to return all are said to have occurred or will occur there.
Jerusalem became holy to Muslims, third after Mecca and Medina. The Al-Aqsa, which translates to "farthest mosque" in sura Al-Isra in the Quran and its surroundings are addressed in the Quran as "the holy land". Muslim tradition as recorded in the ahadith identifies al-Aqsa with a mosque in Jerusalem. The first Muslims did not pray toward Kaaba, but toward Jerusalem. The qibla was switched to Kaaba later on to fulfill the order of Allah of praying in the direction of Kaaba (Quran, Al-Baqarah 2:144–150). Another reason for its significance is its connection with the Miʿrāj, where, according to traditional Muslim belief, Muhammad ascended through the Seven heavens on a horse like winged beast named Buraq, guided by the Archangel Gabriel, beginning from the Foundation Stone on the Temple Mount, in modern times under the Dome of the Rock. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abrahamic_religions |
Banū Mūsā brothers | The Banū Mūsā assisted al-Ma'mun's in his obsession to obtain and translate works from Greek into Arabic. They sent for Greek texts from the Byzantines, or travelled themselves to Byzantium to acquire them. During their working lives they used their wealth and energy towards the translation of these works. On his way home to Baghdad from Byzantium, Muhammad met and recruited Thābit ibn Qurra, a money changer from Harran. Thābit went on to make important discoveries in algebra, geometry, and astronomy.
Under the direction of al-Ma'mun, the Banū Mūsā worked with the most talented men available, including al-Khwarizmi, al-Kindi, Al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf ibn Maṭar, and the mathematician and translator Hunayn ibn Ishaq, who became a close friend of one of the brothers, Muhammad. Of the translators, three were paid about 500 dinars a month. None of the brothers were medically trained, and relied upon Ishaq bin Hunayn and Thabit bin Qurra to translate Greek medical works. They exchanged ideas with other experts, including the astrologer Abu Ma'shar al-Balkhi, with whom Muhammed was in continuous contact.
The brothers are likely to have used portable instruments such as armillary spheres or dials when making their observations, which were recorded from around 847 to 869. From their Baghdad home, they observed stars in the constellation Ursa Major In 847–848, and measured the maximum and minimum altitudes of the Sun in 868–869. They also observed the September equinox in the city of Samarra. To calculate the difference in latitude between Samarra and Nishapur, they organized simultaneous observations of a lunar eclipse.
Whilst working for al-Ma’mun, the Banū Mūsā travelled to a desert near Sanjar, in northern Mesopotamia, with the aim of measuring the length of a degree of latitude along a meridian, and from that verifying a value of 25,000 miles (40,000 km) obtained by the Greeks for the Earth's circumference. They first measured the altitude of the Pole Star, and then, using pegs and a rope as they moved north, stopped again when the altitude of the star changed by one degree. They repeated the same measurement, this time travelling southwards. The process was repeated at al-Kufa. From their measurements, the brothers obtained a value for the circumference of the Earth of 24,000 miles (39,000 km).
Under the patronage of the caliphs that followed al Ma’mun—al-Mu'tasim, al-Wathiq, and al-Mutawakkil—the brothers continued to acquire great wealth and become influential in court. They used much of their wealth to collect the works of ancient writers, a practise that was later copied by other scholars at the House of Wisdom. The brothers were very active during the reign of al-Mutawakkil, who was interested in mechanics, and asked the Banū Mūsā to write on this subject. A son of al-Mu'tasim was educated by Ahmad, but the brothers' relations with the caliph are otherwise unknown. When close to death, al-Mu'tasim's successor al-Wathiq called together his astrologers, including Muhammed, who erroneously pronounced that the caliph would live for another 50 years. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ban%C5%AB_M%C5%ABs%C4%81_brothers |
Sudanese revolution | On 19 December 2018, a series of demonstrations broke out in several Sudanese cities, due in part to rising costs of living and deterioration of economic conditions at all levels of society. The protests quickly turned from demands for urgent economic reforms into demands for President Omar al-Bashir to step down.
The violence of the government's reaction to these peaceful demonstrations sparked international concern. On 22 February 2019, al-Bashir declared a state of emergency and dissolved the national and regional governments, replacing the latter with military and intelligence-service officers. On 8 March, al-Bashir announced that all of the women jailed for protesting against the government would be released. On the weekend of 6–7 April, there were massive protests for the first time since the declaration of the state of emergency. On 10 April, soldiers were seen shielding protesters from security forces, and on 11 April, the military removed al-Bashir from power in a coup d'état.
Following al-Bashir's removal from power, street protests organised by the Sudanese Professionals Association and democratic opposition groups continued, calling on the ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) to "immediately and unconditionally" step aside in favour of a civilian-led transitional government, and urging other reforms in Sudan. Negotiations between the TMC and the civilian opposition to form a joint transition government took place during late April and in May, but stopped when the Rapid Support Forces and other TMC security forces killed 128 people, raped 70 and injured others in the Khartoum massacre on 3 June.
Opposition groups responded to the massacre and post-massacre arrests by carrying out a 3-day general strike from 9–11 June and calling for sustained civil disobedience and nonviolent resistance until the TMC transfers power to a civilian government. On 12 June the opposition agreed to stop the strike and the TMC agreed to free political prisoners.
After renewed negotiations, a deal, called the Political Agreement, was agreed verbally between the TMC and the civilian protesters represented by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) on 5 July 2019 and a written form of the agreement was signed by the TMC and FFC on 17 July. The TMC and FFC announced that they would share power to run Sudan via executive and legislative institutions and a judicial investigation of post-coup events, including the Khartoum massacre, until elections occur in mid-2022. The Political Agreement was complemented by the Draft Constitutional Declaration, which was initially signed by the FFC and the TMC on 4 August 2019 and signed more formally on 17 August. The transition plan creates the Sovereignty Council as head of state, with a mixed civilian–military composition and leadership to be transferred from a military leader to a civilian leader 21 months after the transitional period begins, for a total 39-month transition period leading into elections.
The TMC was dissolved and the mostly male Sovereignty Council was created on 20 August 2019. Abdalla Hamdok was appointed Prime Minister on 21 August 2019. The Transitional Cabinet, with four female and 14 male civilian ministers and 2 male military ministers, was announced in early September. A "comprehensive peace process" between the Sudanese state and armed opposition groups was scheduled to start on 1 September 2019. Nemat Abdullah Khair was appointed as Sudan's first female Chief Justice on 10 October. Street protests continued during the transitionary period. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudanese_revolution |
Queen Alia International Airport | Queen Alia International Airport (QAIA) was built in 1983 in response to the growing airport traffic needs that Amman Civil Airport could not accommodate. At the time, passenger traffic was increasing at a rate above the international average, recording 25–30% growth per annum and placing considerable pressure on airport facilities despite continuous expansion and development. In 1981, the number of arriving, departing, and transit passengers exceeded 2.3 million, while cargo traffic reached 62,000 tonnes and aircraft traffic topped 27,000 movements.
The Jordanian Ministry of Transport undertook the building of a new international airport with sufficient capacity to cope with demand in the foreseeable future. QAIA was built at an estimated total cost of JOD 84 million (~120 million USD as of January 2023) . Passenger facilities were designed to serve 3.5 million passengers per year.
QAIA has since grown to become the kingdom's primary international gateway and a stop-over for international airlines in the Middle East. By 2012, QAIA was serving on average more than 6 million passengers and 40 airlines from around the world.
In 2007, the Government of Jordan selected Airport International Group (AIG) through an open tender to operate, rehabilitate and manage QAIA under a 25-year concession agreement. In response to the continual surge in passenger traffic at the time, AIG was also placed in charge of constructing a new terminal, one which not only would expand the airport's then insufficient annual capacity of 3.5 million passengers, but that would also introduce a "unique travel experience" to help advance QAIA's position as a niche transit hub in the region.
Accordingly, AIG invested an estimated $750 million USD in the construction of the new terminal.
The new terminal accommodates rising annual passenger traffic, taking the original airport capacity from 3.5 million passengers per year to 7.5 million.
Inaugurated by King Abdullah II on 14 March 2013, the new airport was launched officially following an overnight operational transfer which coincided the airport's 30th anniversary. The last flight departed from the old terminal at 10:05 pm on 20 March 2013, upon which all operations were shifted to the new terminal, where its first flight departed at 2:30 am on 21 March 2013.
On 20 January 2014, AIG launched the second phase of QAIA's expansion, valued at a total cost of over $100 million USD.
In 2016, the second expansion phase, costing $1 billion, was completed raising QAIA's annual passenger traffic capacity to 12 million, supporting Jordan's national tourism strategy to serve as a regional transit hub for leisure and business travel. The aim is to boost its capacity to 16 million passengers annually by the end of the concession time frame in 2032. Following the airport expansion, Emirates operated a one-off Airbus A380 service to Amman, celebrating 30 years of Emirates' operation to Jordan. The superjumbo (registration A6-EUC) operated EK901/EK902 on 25 September 2016, and it was the first-ever A380 service to the Levant. Since then, Emirates has continued daily A380 service to Amman through EK903/EK904.
On 14 March 2020, it was announced by the Jordanian Ministry of Health that "...all flights to and from the Kingdom will be suspended from Tuesday, 17 March 2020, until further notice, excluding commercial freight traffic." The airport had been closed to passenger traffic since 17 March 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, several Royal Jordanian flights were commissioned to return Jordanian citizens, especially students, back to Jordan during the pandemic if they desired.
On 8 September 2020, the airport was reopened for commercial flights but was subject to strict health and safety regulations. On 1 March 2022, all travel restrictions regarding the COVID-19 pandemic were subsequently lifted. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Queen_Alia_International_Airport |
The Great War for Civilisation | 1. "One of Our Brothers Had a Dream..." is about Fisk's first interview in 1996 with the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, in the mountains of Afghanistan. The title of the chapter is derived from bin Laden who explains that one of his fighters had a dream of Fisk, wearing a robe and with a beard, and who was approaching them on a horse, signifying that he was, according to bin Laden, a "true Muslim". Fisk understood this relating of the dream as an attempt by bin Laden to convert him to Islam.
2. They Shoot Russians is on the 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan where Fisk chronicles much of the problems the Soviet Union faced in dealing with the Afghan mujahideen when they entered the country as well as the invasion's galvanizing effect in recruiting thousands of foreign Muslim fighters to the country and the resurgence of Islamic extremism in the country.
3. The Choirs of Kandahar is essentially a continuation of Chapter 2.
4. The Carpet-Weavers begins with the CIA and MI6's successful 1953 Iranian coup d'état, the overthrowing of the democratically elected prime minister of Iran, Mohammed Mosaddeq. From there, it moves on to the events leading up to and following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 which deposed Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
5–8. The Path to War and the subsequent chapters The Whirlwind War, War Against War and the Fast Train to Paradise and Drinking the Poisoned Chalice deal with Baathist Iraq, the battles of the Iran-Iraq of the 1980s (including the Tanker War), Iran's use of human wave attacks, Saddam's use of chemical weapons against Iran, the roles of the US and other Western governments in the conflict, and the conclusion of the war.
9. Sentenced to Suffer Death is Fisk's account of his father, Bill Fisk, during his service in the British Army during World War I and his difficult decision to refuse to take part as a member of a firing squad ordered to execute another soldier.
10. The First Holocaust is devoted to the topic of the Armenian genocide. Its title is derived from the fact that the Genocide, organized by the government of the Ottoman Empire, took place in 1915, several decades before the Jewish Holocaust. In it, Fisk provides the historical context of the Armenian Genocide and includes his numerous interviews with survivors of the Genocide living in Lebanon and Armenia. Fisk strongly criticizes the denialist stance of the Turkish government, the successor to the Ottoman Empire, as well as the governments of Israel and the UK for refusing to recognize the massacres and deportations as genocide.
11–13. Fifty Thousand Miles from Palestine and the subsequent chapters The Last Colonial War and The Girl and the Child and Love are devoted to the Arab-Israeli conflict from the 1980s onward. The chapters deal with the deaths of civilians on both sides, suicide bombings and the Israeli government's treatment of Palestinian people. Much of these chapters also detail with media coverage of the conflict and the terms used by them to describe both sides, most notably the word "terrorist".
14. Anything to Wipe Out a Devil... briefly focuses on the Algerian War and the use of torture and terrorism by both the French military and FLN in the 1954–1962 war. After the French pullout and Algerian independence, the book details the internal power struggles among the secular and Islamist factions and continues on with this theme into the Algerian Civil War which began in 1991.
15. Planet Damnation gives an eyewitness report of the Gulf War. Fisk was stationed in the desert with the Allied forces and makes references both to the retreat of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and their subsequent slaughter by air bombardment on the Highway of Death during the Gulf War air campaign.
16. Betrayal describes the repression of the 1991 uprisings in Iraq by the Iraqi government, which had been encouraged but not supported by George H. W. Bush and the CIA.
17. The Land of Graves. The pun in the chapter's title points at the repercussions that the United Nations sanctions against Iraq had on the civilian population.
18. The Plague deals with the unusual illnesses which plagued the Iraqi public after the war.
19. Now Thrive the Armourers... is an incursion into the world of the manufacturers of "all nationalities, all faiths, all follies, all causes and all crimes," of the arms trade.
20. Even to Kings, He Comes... is an analysis of the deeds of King Hussein of Jordan and President Hafez al-Assad of Syria. The first, a controversial ruler, whose subjects were both acclaiming him and shrieking at his coffin during his burial ceremony, is put alongside "The Lion of Damascus", whose Hama massacre is looked into.
21. Why ? tries to find an explanation for the September 11, 2001, attacks.
22. The Die Is Cast examines the diplomatic and mass media moves which led to Operation Iraqi Freedom.
23. Atomic Dog, Annihilator, Arsonist, Anthrax, Anguish and Agamemnon describes in great detail the turbulences which have accompanied the occupation of Iraq and its capital, Baghdad.
24. Into the Wilderness is the last chapter of the book. It gives an idea of the challenges the Coalition Provisional Authority has faced in Iraq, and reports on the assassination of the Lebanese Prime-Minister Rafiq Hariri, witnessed by Fisk.
The book ends, as it has begun, in the "tiny village of Louvencourt, on the Somme," where Robert Fisk's father fought. This is not only meant as a homage to Bill Fisk, but is also an implicit reminder of one of the leitmotifs of the book: the volatile situation in the Middle East is a consequence of the political arrangements concluded in the aftermath of the First World War.
The work has a Chronology of the Middle East, starting with the birth of the Prophet Mohammed and ending in 2005, the year of the book's British release, with the words: "UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1968 – calling for Israel's withdrawal from occupied land – remains unfulfilled." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Great_War_for_Civilisation |
Sasanian Empire | In general, mass slavery was never practiced by the Iranians, and in many cases the situation and lives of semi-slaves (prisoners of war) were, in fact, better than those of the commoner. In Persia, the term "slave" was also used for debtors who had to use some of their time to serve in a fire-temple.
Some of the laws governing the ownership and treatment of slaves can be found in the legal compilation called the Matigan-i Hazar Datistan, a collection of rulings by Sasanian judges. Principles that can be inferred from the laws include:
Sources of slaves were both foreign (e.g., non-Zoroastrians captives from warfare or raiding or slaves imported from outside the Empire by traders) or domestic (e.g., hereditary slaves, children sold into slavery by their fathers, or criminals enslaved as punishment). Some cases suggest that a criminal's family might also be condemned to servitude. At the time of the manuscript's composition, Iranian slavery was hereditary on the mother's side (so that a child of a free man and a slave woman would be a slave), although the author reports that in earlier Persian history it may have been the opposite, being inherited from the father's side.
Slave-owners had the right to the slaves' income.
While slaves were formally chattel (property) and were liable to the same legal treatment as nonhuman property (for example, they could be sold at will, rented, owned jointly, inherited, given as security for a loan, etc.), Sasanian courts did not treat them completely as objects; for example, slaves were allowed to testify in court in cases concerning them, rather than only permitted to be represented by their owners.
Slaves were often given to the Zoroastrian fire temples as a pious offering, in which case they and their descendants would become temple-slaves.
Excessive cruelty towards slaves could result in the owners' being brought to court; a court case involving a slave whose owner tried to drown him in the Tigris River is recorded, though without stating the outcome of the case.
If a non-Zoroastrian slave, such as a Christian slave, converted to Zoroastrianism, he or she could pay his or her price and attain freedom; i.e., as long as the owner was compensated, manumission was required.
Owners could also voluntarily manumit their slaves, in which case the former slave became a subject of the Sasanian King of Kings and could not lawfully be re-enslaved later. Manumissions were recorded, which suggests that a freedman who was challenged would be able to document their free status.
Uniquely in comparison to Western slave systems, Sasanian slavery recognized partial manumission (relevant in the case of a jointly owned slave, only some of whose owners were willing to manumit). In case of a slave who was, e.g., one-half manumitted, the slave would serve in alternating years.
To free a slave (irrespective of his or her faith) was considered a good deed. Slaves had some rights including keeping gifts from the owner and at least three days of rest in the month.
The most common slaves in the Sasanian Empire were the household servants, who worked in private estates and at the fire-temples. Usage of a woman slave in a home was common, and her master had outright control over her and could even produce children with her if he wanted to. Slaves also received wages and were able to have their own families whether they were female or male. Harming a slave was considered a crime, and not even the king himself was allowed to do it.
The master of a slave was allowed to free the person when he wanted to, which, no matter what faith the slave believed in, was considered a good deed. A slave could also be freed if his/her master died. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sasanian_Empire |
Liberalism | Liberal feminism, the dominant tradition in feminist history, is an individualistic form of feminist theory that focuses on women's ability to maintain their equality through their actions and choices. Liberal feminists hope to eradicate all barriers to gender equality, claiming that the continued existence of such barriers eviscerates the individual rights and freedoms ostensibly guaranteed by a liberal social order. They argue that society believes women are naturally less intellectually and physically capable than men; thus, it tends to discriminate against women in the academy, the forum and the marketplace. Liberal feminists believe that "female subordination is rooted in a set of customary and legal constraints that blocks women's entrance to and success in the so-called public world". They strive for sexual equality via political and legal reform.
British philosopher Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797) is widely regarded as the pioneer of liberal feminism, with A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) expanding the boundaries of liberalism to include women in the political structure of liberal society. In her writings, such as A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft commented on society's view of women and encouraged women to use their voices in making decisions separate from those previously made for them. Wollstonecraft "denied that women are, by nature, more pleasure seeking and pleasure giving than men. She reasoned that if they were confined to the same cages that trap women, men would develop the same flawed characters. What Wollstonecraft most wanted for women was personhood".
John Stuart Mill was also an early proponent of feminism. In his article The Subjection of Women (1861, published 1869), Mill attempted to prove that the legal subjugation of women is wrong and that it should give way to perfect equality. He believed that both sexes should have equal rights under the law and that "until conditions of equality exist, no one can possibly assess the natural differences between women and men, distorted as they have been. What is natural to the two sexes can only be found out by allowing both to develop and use their faculties freely". Mill frequently spoke of this imbalance and wondered if women were able to feel the same "genuine unselfishness" that men did in providing for their families. This unselfishness Mill advocated is the one "that motivates people to take into account the good of society as well as the good of the individual person or small family unit". Like Mary Wollstonecraft, Mill compared sexual inequality to slavery, arguing that their husbands are often just as abusive as masters and that a human being controls nearly every aspect of life for another human being. In his book The Subjection of Women, Mill argues that three major parts of women's lives are hindering them: society and gender construction, education and marriage.
Equity feminism is a form of liberal feminism discussed since the 1980s, specifically a kind of classically liberal or libertarian feminism. Steven Pinker, an evolutionary psychologist, defines equity feminism as "a moral doctrine about equal treatment that makes no commitments regarding open empirical issues in psychology or biology". Barry Kuhle asserts that equity feminism is compatible with evolutionary psychology in contrast to gender feminism. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberalism |
Fula people | According to Tishkoff et al. (2009), the Fulani's genomic ancestry clusters near that of Chadic and Central Sudanic speaking populations, with genetic affinities observed to the Hausa people. Based on this, the researchers suggest that the Fulani may have adopted a Niger-Congo language at some point in their history, while intermarrying with local populations. Additionally, moderate levels of West Eurasian admixture was also observed among the Fulani samples, which the authors propose may have been introduced via the Iberian Peninsula and Northern Africa. Dobon et al. (2015), found that the Sudanese Fulani have largely ancestry from Niger-Kordofanian and Nilo-Saharan (Sudanic) speaking groups, with lower amounts of West-Eurasian ancestry.
Triska, Petr et al. (2015) showed that there is extensive admixture across the Sahel Belt, with the Fula carrying West African and East African components, as well as a Mozabite/North African component. These results support the hypothesis of a North African origin and a Western to Central Africa past migration for Fulani.
A full genome analysis was conducted by Vicente et al. in 2019, analyzing several different Fulani subgroups from various geographic regions. They found that the Fulani people are characterized by the admixture of local West African and East African components, but also display West-Eurasian admixture, mediated through historical North African groups. The West-Eurasian ancestry among Fulani was estimated to a mean average of 21,4% among the 53 samples from Ziniaré in Burkina Faso. According to the authors, there were two admixture events, the first being about 2000 years ago, with the second being more recent at around 300 years ago. This Eurasian ancestry was observed in the ancestry components of Mozabite people. They found that: "Our findings suggest that Eurasian admixture and the European LP allele was introduced into the Fulani through contact with a North African population/s. We furthermore confirm the link between the lactose digestion phenotype in the Fulani to the MCM6/LCT locus by reporting the first GWAS of the lactase persistence trait. e observed a T-13910 allele frequency of 48.0%, while the genome-wide European admixture fraction in the Fulani is 21.4% at K = 3. The notable European admixture fraction in the Fulani coupled with the high frequencies of the LP T-13910 allele suggests the possibility of adaptive gene flow into the Fulani gene pool". Another study in 2020 by Priehodová et al., suggest an older date for the introduction of one variant of the LP allele in the Sahel, about ~8.5 ka.
A study in 2019 by Fan et al., found that the Fulani sampled from Cameroon, clustered with Afro-Asiatic speakers from East Africa in the phylogenetic analysis, which the authors said indicates a potential shift in language to Niger-Congo. The analysis on autosomal markers found traces of West Eurasian-related ancestry in this population, which suggests a North African or East African origin (as North and East Africans also have such ancestry likely related to expansions of farmers and herders from the Near East) and is consistent with the presence at moderate frequency of the −13,910T variant associated with lactose tolerance in European populations.
In 2020, a study inferred that the Fulani of western Cameroon have 48% Mende-related, 23% East African-related, and 29% non-African-related ancestry.
In 2023, whole genomes of Fulani individuals from various Sahelian samples were analyzed, and the researches said the non-Sub-Saharan genetic ancestry within the Fulani cannot be solely explained by recent admixture events. Fulani may be descendants of Saharan cattle herders during the last Green Sahara, who had some genomic similarities to Late Neolithic Moroccans based on ancient samples.
Another 2023 study inferred that "The Fulani derived 50% of their ancestry from a population related to the Amhara and 50% from a population related to the Tikari (consistent with TreeMix results with 3 migration events)." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fula_people |
Names of God in Islam | Islamic tenets has detailed descriptions about to differentiate names with attributes (Arabic: صِفَة, romanized: ṣifāh plural of sˤi.faːt), which has literal abilities of their owns. Examples of the attributes are the name of "ar-Rahman" contains the attributes "mercifulness in general", or "fundamental mercy". According to Sahih Bukhari and Muslim, Allah has 100 kinds of Rahmat (grace/godsend), whereas only one of them already revealed to this world, while the other 99 still withheld for the afterlife. One of the "Rahmat" which sent to the world are sufficient to fulfil the needs of all creatures until the Judgement Day; including humans, Jinns, and even non-sentients such as animals, so the parents of animals would not trample their babies under their foots or wasting. Another example is name of al-ʿAliyy contains several attributes, such as "heightness" and "above all".
According to Samee-Ullah Bhat, there is difference between Divine attributes or characteristic of Allah with the characteristic of creature, as he quoted the Ash-Shu'ara 42:11. Thus, he stated according to Islamic teaching, the likening of Allah's attributes with human's attribute (Tamthil) are forbidden, as the attributes of creature is full of deficiency. and weakness. Samee-Ullah gave example the attribute of 'Anger' (Gadb) of Allah cannot be likened to the anger of humans. And also the naming of Allah solely with his attribute are deemed wrong by Samee-Ullah, such as "al-Gaadib (the Angry one)," as example, since This ruling is because the naming of Allah are limited by the evidences from Qur'an and Hadith. Thus, postulating the tenet in Islam's creed that essentialy, the name-bearing of Allah are different from attributes of Allah. Nevertheless, Al-Uthaymin stated the principal ruling of giving attributes to Allah is similar with the ruling about giving name to Allah; that is forbidden to gave attributes without evidences from Qur'an and Sunnah. One of the disputed name of Allah among the Islamic academic is "al-Hannan", Since it is considered as one of the attribute of "ar-Rahman" name in Maryam 19:13, not because al-Hannan is a name itself.
Both Ibn Taymiyya in his work, The treaty of Tadmur, and Ibn al-Qayyim has published their statements refuting Jahmiyya, and al-Juwayni respectively; as Jahmiyya scholars and al-Juwayni rejected the existence of the attributes of Allah and consider the names of Allah are just semantics without any substances in them. Both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim statement became the ruling which established by Saudi Council of Senior Scholars, as they stated that each of Allah's name contains multiple attributes. The Salafi scholars such as Abdul-Aziz Ibn Baz does not consent the interpretation of the attributes of Allah. Moreover, Walid Muhammad Abdullah Muhammad al-'Ali, exegesis professor of Islamic University of Madinah, has quoted Ibn al-Qayyim's concern regarding the importance names and its attributes of Allah as part of the first article of the six Articles of Faith, the Tawhid (oneness [of God]') article. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Names_of_God_in_Islam |
Wahhabi War | George Forster Sadleir left a record on the aftermath of the former capital of the First Saudi state:
"The site of Deriah is in a deep ravine north-west of Munfooah, about ten miles distant. It is now in ruins, and the inhabitants who were spared, or escaped from the slaughter, have principally sought shelter here ... Munfooah ... was surrounded with a wall and ditch which the Pacha ordered to be razed .... Riad is not so well peopled .... The inhabitants were at that time in a more wretched state than at any prior period since the establishment of the power of the Wahabees. Their walls, the chief security for their property, had been razed ... The year's crop had been consumed by the Turkish force"Saudi ruler 'Abdullah ibn Saud was transported first to Cairo and then to Istanbul, wherein he was beheaded alongside several other Wahhabi Imams. Other than 'Abdullah, most of the political leaders were treated well but the Ottomans were far harsher with the religious leaders that inspired the Wahhabi movement, executing Sūlayman ibn 'Abd Allah Aal-Shaykh and other religious notables, as they were thought to be uncompromising in their beliefs and therefore a much bigger threat than political leaders. The executions were also motivated by Ottoman resentment of Wahhabist views.
After the Destruction of Diriyya, Ibrahim Pasha rounded up the prominent survivors of the Saudi family and the scholarly Al ash-Sheikh many of whom were deported to Egypt. As per Ottoman estimates, over 250 members related to the Saudi family and 32 members related to the Al ash-Sheikh were exiled. Ottomans were far harsher with the religious leaders that inspired the Wahhabi movement, than with the members of the Saudi family. Prominent scholars such as the Qadi of Dir'iyya, Sulayman ibn 'Abd Allah (the grandson of Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhaab) were tortured, forced to listen to guitar (knowing the Najdi prescriptions and customs that prohibited music) and executed by a firing-squad. Other ulema such as Abd Allah ibn Muhammad Aal Al-Shaikh and his nephew Abd al Rahman ibn Hasan Aal Al-Shaikh would be exiled to Egypt. (the latter would return to Najd in 1825, to revive and lead the Wahhabi movement). Some other Qadis and scholars were hunted down and executed. Abd al Aziz ibn Hamad al Mu'ammar managed to settle in Bahrain, where the ruler welcomed him. Few scholars managed to escape to the remote Southern corners of Arabia. The executions reflected the deep Ottoman resentment of Wahhabi movement and also how seriously they viewed its threat. Altogether, the Najdis lost about two dozen scholars and men from the ulema families in the aftermath of the invasion. However, the suppression of Wahhabites in Central Arabia ultimately proved to be a failed campaign.
Later, Ibrahim Pasha and his troops went on to conquer Qatif and el-Hasa. Remnants of Saudi fortifications were demolished across Najd. Emir's relatives and important Wahhabi leaders were made captives and sent to Egypt. In December 1819, Ibrahim Pasha returned to Egypt after formally incorporating Hejaz into the Ottoman Empire. However, they were unable to totally subdue the opposition forces and Central Arabia became a region of permanent Wahhabi uprisings. In the 1820s, Prince Turki ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Muhammed ibn Saud, gathering growing support from tribes and groups that opposed the Turkish occupation, would lay Siege to Riyadh in 1823. By August 1824, Saudi forces would capture Riyadh in a Second Siege, thus establishing the Second Saudi State with Riyadh as its capital.
Following the fall of Emirate of Dirʿiyya, the British empire launched their Persian Gulf campaign of 1819. A formidable force consisting of 2,800 British soldiers and 3 warships fought the Qasimi tribesmen allied to Dir'iyya. Their city Ras al Khaimah was demolished in 1819. The General Maritime treaty was concluded in 1820 with the local chieftains, which would eventually transform them into a protectorate of Trucial States; heralding a century of British supremacy in the Gulf.
This war had formed the basic hatred of the Wahhabi movement amongst the Ottomans, and continues to influence modern Turkey wherein many Turkish Islamic preachers consider Wahhabism to be un-Islamic. The Saudis, who would form the nation a century later, considered it as the first struggle for independence from the Ottoman Empire, and continued to view Turkey with suspicion. The current state of Saudi-Turkey relations are still influenced by this hostile past. To the present day, both Saudi and Turkish nationalist writers accuse each other of engaging in systematic campaigns to rewrite history. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wahhabi_War |
Israeli–Palestinian peace process | From December 2006 to mid-September 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority met 36 times; there were also lower-level talks. In 2007 Olmert welcomed the Arab League's re-endorsement of the Arab Peace Initiative. In his bid to negotiate a peace accord and establish a Palestinian state, Olmert proposed a plan to the Palestinians. The centerpiece of Olmert's detailed proposal is the suggested permanent border, which would be based on an Israeli withdrawal from most of the West Bank. Olmert proposed annexing at least 6.3% of Palestinian territory, in exchange for 5.8% of Israeli land, with Palestinians receiving alternative land in the Negev, adjacent to the Gaza Strip, as well as territorial link, under Israeli sovereignty, for free passage between Gaza and the West Bank. Israel insisted on retaining an armed presence in the future Palestinian state. Under Abbas's offer, more than 60 percent of settlers would stay in place. Olmert, for his part, was presenting a plan in which the most sparsely populated settlements would be evacuated. Olmert and Abbas both acknowledged that reciprocal relations would be necessary, not hermetic separation. They also acknowledged the need to share a single business ecosystem, while cooperating intensively on water, security, bandwidth, banking, tourism and much more. Regarding Jerusalem the leaders agreed that Jewish neighborhoods should remain under Israeli sovereignty, while Arab neighborhoods would revert to Palestinian sovereignty. The Palestinians asked for clarifications of the territorial land swap since they were unable to ascertain what land his percentages affected, since Israeli and Palestinian calculations of the West Bank differ by several hundred square kilometres. For them, in lieu of such clarifications, Olmert's 6.3–6.8% annexation might work out closer to 8.5%, 4 times the 1.9% limit the Palestinians argued a swap should not exceed. The talks ended with both sides claiming the other side dropped follow-up contacts.
Following the conflict that erupted between the two main Palestinian parties, Fatah and Hamas, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip, splintering the Palestinian Authority into two polities, each claiming to be the true representatives of the Palestinian people. Fatah controlled the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank and Hamas governed in Gaza. Hostilities between Gaza and Israel increased. Egypt brokered the 2008 Israel–Hamas ceasefire, which lasted half a year beginning on 19 June 2008 and lasted until 19 December 2008. The collapse of the ceasefire led to the Gaza War on 27 December 2008. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_peace_process |
Traditional medicine | American Native and Alaska Native medicine are traditional forms of healing that have been around for thousands of years. There are many ethnobotany plants involved in traditional medicine for Native Americans and some are still used today. When it comes to Native American traditional medicine, the ideas surrounding health and illness within the culture are virtually inseparable from the ideas of religion and spirituality. Healers within indigenous communities go by many names ranging from medicine man or woman to herbalist or even shaman and are considered spiritual or religious leaders within their respective tribes. When it comes to healing, tribal healers would look at a plant's characteristics to determine its efficacy for the treatment of an illness. Specific plant characteristics such as plant shape, smell, color, and taste could aid in determining how the plant could be used as a remedy. The Meskwaki tribe found they could use the juice from Arum maculatum for snakebites. This was inferred from the milky appearance of the juice from the plant which is said to resemble snake venom, and the plant's shape resembled the head of a snake. Native Americans used foxglove herb as a treatment for an illness they referred to as dropsy or edema, which is fluid buildup typically in the lower legs, and its common cause is heart failure. In modern medicine, foxglove extract is still used under the name digitalis, and its purpose is to moderate the heart rate. Native Americans were successful with some medical practices, such as treating fevers, gastrointestinal conditions, skin rashes, setting bones, as well as birthing babies, and aiding mothers in healing. A study conducted within an IHS hospital that allows Navajo healers to visit patients found that the hospital had an 80 percent success rate in getting comatose patients back to consciousness, which is higher than the rate of present-day biomedical management hospitals. The plant family Asteraceae has been commonly selected for orthopedic aids and pulmonary aids, specifically the species Achillea and Artemisia. A study conducted amongst 14 different tribes within North America found that Asteraceae was the most widely used plant family for its medicinal properties. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Traditional_medicine |
Crusades | By the end of the 11th century, the period of Islamic Arab territorial expansion had been over for centuries. The Holy Land's remoteness from focus of Islamic power struggles enabled relative peace and prosperity in Syria and Palestine. Muslim-Western European contact was only more than minimal in the conflict in the Iberian peninsula. The Byzantine Empire and the Islamic world were long standing centres of wealth, culture and military power. The Arab-Islamic world tended to view Western Europe as a backwater that presented little organised threat. By 1025, the Byzantine Emperor Basil II had extended territorial recovery to its furthest extent. The frontiers stretched east to Iran. Bulgaria and much of southern Italy were under control, and piracy was suppressed in the Mediterranean Sea. The empire's relationships with its Islamic neighbours were no more quarrelsome than its relationships with the Slavs or the Western Christians. The Normans in Italy; to the north Pechenegs, Serbs and Cumans; and Seljuk Turks in the east all competed with the Empire and the emperors recruited mercenaries—even on occasions from their enemies—to meet this challenge.
The political situation in Western Asia was changed by later waves of Turkish migration, in particular the arrival of the Seljuk Turks in the 10th century. Previously a minor ruling clan from Transoxania, they had recently converted to Islam and migrated into Iran. In two decades following their arrival they conquered Iran, Iraq and the Near East. The Seljuks and their followers were from the Sunni tradition. This brought them into conflict in Palestine and Syria with the Fatimids who were Shi'ite. The Seljuks were nomadic, Turkic speaking and occasionally shamanistic, very different from their sedentary, Arabic speaking subjects. This difference and the governance of territory based on political preference, and competition between independent princes rather than geography, weakened power structures. In 1071, Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes attempted confrontation to suppress the Seljuks' sporadic raiding, leading to his defeat at the battle of Manzikert. Historians once considered this a pivotal event but now Manzikert is regarded as only one further step in the expansion of the Great Seljuk Empire.
The evolution of a Christian theology of war developed from the link of Roman citizenship to Christianity, according to which citizens were required to fight the empire's enemies. This doctrine of holy war dated from the 4th-century theologian Saint Augustine. He maintained that aggressive war was sinful, but acknowledged a "just war" could be rationalised if it was proclaimed by a legitimate authority, was defensive or for the recovery of lands, and without an excessive degree of violence. Violent acts were commonly used for dispute resolution in Western Europe, and the papacy attempted to mitigate this. Historians have thought that the Peace and Truce of God movements restricted conflict between Christians from the 10th century; the influence is apparent in Urban II's speeches. Other historians assert that the effectiveness was limited and it had died out by the time of the crusades. Pope Alexander II developed a system of recruitment via oaths for military resourcing that his successor Pope Gregory VII extended across Europe. In the 11th century, Christian conflict with Muslims on the southern peripheries of Christendom was sponsored by the Church, including the siege of Barbastro and the Norman conquest of Sicily. In 1074, Gregory VII planned a display of military power to reinforce the principle of papal sovereignty. His vision of a holy war supporting Byzantium against the Seljuks was the first crusade prototype, but lacked support.
The First Crusade was an unexpected event for contemporary chroniclers, but historical analysis demonstrates it had its roots in earlier developments with both clerics and laity recognising Jerusalem's role in Christianity as worthy of penitential pilgrimage. In 1071, Jerusalem was captured by the Turkish warlord Atsiz, who seized most of Syria and Palestine as part of the expansion of the Seljuks throughout the Middle East. The Seljuk hold on the city was weak and returning pilgrims reported difficulties and the oppression of Christians. Byzantine desire for military aid converged with increasing willingness of the western nobility to accept papal military direction. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crusades |
Abu Bakr al-Razi | Al-Razi was born in the city of Ray (modern Rey, also the origin of his name "al-Razi"), into a family of Persian stock and was a native speaker of Persian language. Ray was situated on the Great Silk Road that for centuries facilitated trade and cultural exchanges between East and West. It is located on the southern slopes of the Alborz mountain range situated near Tehran, Iran.
In his youth, al-Razi moved to Baghdad where he studied and practiced at the local bimaristan (hospital). Later, he was invited back to Rey by Mansur ibn Ishaq, then the governor of Ray, and became a bimaristan's head. He dedicated two books on medicine to Mansur ibn Ishaq, The Spiritual Physic and Al-Mansūrī on Medicine. Because of his newly acquired popularity as physician, al-Razi was invited to Baghdad where he assumed the responsibilities of a director in a new hospital named after its founder al-Muʿtaḍid (d. 902 CE). Under the reign of Al-Mutadid's son, Al-Muktafi (r. 902–908) al-Razi was commissioned to build a new hospital, which should be the largest of the Abbasid Caliphate. To pick the future hospital's location, al-Razi adopted what is nowadays known as an evidence-based approach suggesting having fresh meat hung in various places throughout the city and to build the hospital where meat took longest to rot.
He spent the last years of his life in his native Rey suffering from glaucoma. His eye affliction started with cataracts and ended in total blindness. The cause of his blindness is uncertain. One account mentioned by Ibn Juljul attributed the cause to a blow to his head by his patron, Mansur ibn Ishaq, for failing to provide proof for his alchemy theories; while Abulfaraj and Casiri claimed that the cause was a diet of beans only. Allegedly, he was approached by a physician offering an ointment to cure his blindness. Al-Razi then asked him how many layers does the eye contain and when he was unable to receive an answer, he declined the treatment stating "my eyes will not be treated by one who does not know the basics of its anatomy".
The lectures of al-Razi attracted many students. As Ibn al-Nadim relates in Fihrist, al-Razi was considered a shaikh, an honorary title given to one entitled to teach and surrounded by several circles of students. When someone raised a question, it was passed on to students of the 'first circle'; if they did not know the answer, it was passed on to those of the 'second circle', and so on. When all students would fail to answer, al-Razi himself would consider the query. Al-Razi was a generous person by nature, with a considerate attitude towards his patients. He was charitable to the poor, treated them without payment in any form, and wrote for them a treatise Man La Yaḥḍuruhu al-Ṭabīb, or Who Has No Physician to Attend Him, with medical advice. One former pupil from Tabaristan came to look after him, but as al-Biruni wrote, al-Razi rewarded him for his intentions and sent him back home, proclaiming that his final days were approaching. According to Biruni, al-Razi died in Rey in 925 sixty years of age. Biruni, who considered al-Razi his mentor, among the first penned a short biography of al-Razi including a bibliography of his numerous works.
Ibn al-Nadim recorded an account by al-Razi of a Chinese student who copied down all of Galen's works in Chinese as al-Razi read them to him out loud after the student learned fluent Arabic in 5 months and attended al-Razi's lectures.
After his death, his fame spread beyond the Middle East to Medieval Europe, and lived on. In an undated catalog of the library at Peterborough Abbey, most likely from the 14th century, al-Razi is listed as a part author of ten books on medicine. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Bakr_al-Razi |
Latin translations of the 12th century | Just before the burst of translations in the 12th century, Constantine the African, a Christian from Carthage who studied medicine in Egypt and ultimately became a monk at the monastery of Monte Cassino in Italy, translated medical works from Arabic. Constantine's many translations included Ali ibn Abbas al-Majusi's medical encyclopedia The Complete Book of the Medical Art (as Liber Pantegni), the ancient medicine of Hippocrates and Galen as adapted by Arabic physicians, and the Isagoge ad Tegni Galeni by Hunayn ibn Ishaq (Johannitius) and his nephew Hubaysh ibn al-Hasan. Other medical works he translated include Isaac Israeli ben Solomon's Liber Febribus, Liber de Dietis universalibus et particularibus and Liber de Urinis; Ishaq ibn Imran's psychological work al-Maqala fi al-Malikhukiya as De Melancolia; and Ibn al-Jazzar's De Gradibus, Viaticum, Liber de Stomacho, De Elephantiasi, De Coitu and De Oblivione.
Sicily had been part of the Byzantine Empire until 878, was under Muslim control from 878–1060, and came under Norman control between 1060 and 1090. As a consequence the Norman Kingdom of Sicily maintained a trilingual bureaucracy, which made it an ideal place for translations. Sicily also maintained relations with the Greek East, which allowed for exchange of ideas and manuscripts.
A copy of Ptolemy's Almagest was brought back to Sicily by Henry Aristippus, as a gift from the Emperor to King William I. Aristippus, himself, translated Plato's Meno and Phaedo into Latin, but it was left to an anonymous student at Salerno to travel to Sicily and translate the Almagest, as well as several works by Euclid, from Greek to Latin. Although the Sicilians generally translated directly from the Greek, when Greek texts were not available, they would translate from Arabic. Admiral Eugene of Sicily translated Ptolemy's Optics into Latin, drawing on his knowledge of all three languages in the task. Accursius of Pistoja's translations included the works of Galen and Hunayn ibn Ishaq. Gerard de Sabloneta translated Avicenna's The Canon of Medicine and al-Razi's Almansor. Fibonacci presented the first complete European account of the Hindu–Arabic numeral system from Arabic sources in his Liber Abaci (1202). The Aphorismi by Masawaiyh (Mesue) was translated by an anonymous translator in late 11th or early 12th century Italy.
James of Venice, who probably spent some years in Constantinople, translated Aristotle's Posterior Analytics from Greek into Latin in the mid-12th century, thus making the complete Aristotelian logical corpus, the Organon, available in Latin for the first time.
In 13th century Padua, Bonacosa translated Averroes' medical work Kitab al-Kulliyyat as Colliget, and John of Capua translated the Kitab al-Taysir by Ibn Zuhr (Avenzoar) as Theisir. In 13th century Sicily, Faraj ben Salem translated Rhazes' al-Hawi as Continens as well as Ibn Butlan's Tacuinum Sanitatis. Also in 13th century Italy, Simon of Genoa and Abraham Tortuensis translated Abulcasis' Al-Tasrif as Liber Servitoris, Alcoati's Congregatio sive Liber de Oculis, and the Liber de Simplicibus Medicamentis by a pseudo-Serapion | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin_translations_of_the_12th_century |
Eurofighter Typhoon | In August 2006, Saudi Arabia confirmed it had agreed to purchase 72 Typhoons for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). In December 2006, it was reported in The Guardian that Saudi Arabia had threatened to buy Rafales because of a UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) investigation into the Al Yamamah defence deals which commenced in the 1980s.
On 14 December 2006, Britain's attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, ordered that the SFO discontinue its investigation into BAE Systems' alleged bribery of senior Saudi officials in the Al-Yamamah contracts, citing "the need to safeguard national and international security". The Times raised the possibility that RAF production aircraft would be diverted as early Saudi Arabian aircraft, with the RAF forced to wait for its full complement of aircraft. This arrangement would mirror the diversion of RAF Tornados to the RSAF. The Times also reported that such an arrangement would make the UK purchase of its Tranche 3 commitments more likely. On 17 September 2007, Saudi Arabia confirmed it had signed a £4.43 billion contract for 72 aircraft. 24 aircraft would be at the Tranche 2 build standard, previously destined for the UK RAF, the first being delivered in 2008. The remaining 48 aircraft were to be assembled in Saudi Arabia and delivered from 2011, however following contract renegotiations in 2011, it was agreed that all 72 aircraft would be assembled by BAE Systems in the UK, with the last 24 aircraft being built to Tranche 3 capability.
On 29 September 2008, the United States Department of State approved the Typhoon sale, required because of a certain technology governed by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) process which was incorporated into the MIDS of the Eurofighter.
On 22 October 2008, the first RSAF Typhoon made its maiden flight at Warton. Since 2010, BAE has been training Saudi Arabian personnel at Warton.
By 2011, 24 Tranche 2 Eurofighter Typhoons had been delivered to Saudi Arabia, consisting of 18 single-seat and six two-seat aircraft. After that, BAE and Riyadh entered into discussions over configurations and price of the rest of the 72-plane order. On 19 February 2014, BAE announced that the Saudis had agreed to a price increase. BAE announced that the last of the original 72 Typhoons had been delivered to Saudi Arabia in June 2017.
RSAF Typhoons are playing a central role in the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen. In February 2015, Saudi Typhoons attacked ISIS targets over Syria using Paveway IV bombs for the first time.
On 9 March 2018, a memorandum of intent for the additional 48 Typhoons was signed during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's visit to the United Kingdom, however the deal has not been completed due to German arms sanctions implemented in November 2018 in response to the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurofighter_Typhoon |
Qatar diplomatic crisis | On May 20, 2017 during the Riyadh Summit, Saudi and Emirati leaders held a private dinner with Senior Advisor to the President Jared Kushner and Chief Strategist Steve Bannon to inform them of their plan to blockade Qatar.
United States President Donald Trump claimed credit for engineering the diplomatic crisis in a series of tweets. On 6 June, Trump began by tweeting: "During my recent trip to the Middle East I stated that there can no longer be funding of Radical Ideology. Leaders pointed to Qatar – look!" An hour and a half later, he remarked on Twitter that it was "good to see the Saudi Arabia visit with the King and 50 countries already paying off. They said they would take a hard line on funding extremism, and all reference [sic] was pointing to Qatar. Perhaps this will be the beginning of the end to the horror of terrorism!" This was in contrast to attempts by the Pentagon and the Department of State to remain neutral. The Pentagon praised Qatar for hosting the Al Udeid Air Base and for its "enduring commitment to regional security." US Ambassador to Qatar, Dana Shell Smith, sent a similar message. Earlier, the US Secretary of State had taken a neutral stance and called for dialogue. On the same day, Trump also had a phone call with Saudi King Salman and rejected a Saudi proposal to invade Qatar. Instead, the United States requested Kuwaiti mediation with the goal of resolving the conflict.
On 8 June, President Donald Trump, during a phone call with the Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, offered to act as a mediator in the conflict with a White House meeting between the parties if necessary. The offer was declined, and a Qatari official stated, "The emir has no plans to leave Qatar while the country is under a blockade." On 9 June, Trump once again put the blame on Qatar, calling the blockade "hard but necessary" while claiming that Qatar had been funding terrorism at a "very high level" and described the country as having an "extremist ideology in terms of funding." This statement was in conflict with Secretary of State Tillerson's comments on the same day, which called on Gulf states to ease the blockade. In 13 June 2017 after meeting with Tillerson in Washington, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir stated that there was "no blockade" and "what we have done is we have denied them use of our airspace, and this is our sovereign right," and that the King Salman Centre for Humanitarian Aid and Relief would send food or medical aid to Qatar if needed. The following day, Trump authorized the sale of $12 billion of U.S. weapons to Qatar. According to The Intercept, Saudi Arabia and the UAE lobbied Trump to fire Rex Tillerson because he "intervened to stop a secret Saudi-led, UAE-backed plan to invade and essentially conquer Qatar."
On 21 June 2017, Trump told a crowd in Iowa that "We cannot let these incredibly rich nations fund radical Islamic terror or terrorism of any kind", noting that after his visit to Riyadh in May 2017 to meet with Saudi King Salman and urge an end to terror funding, "He has taken it to heart. And now they're fighting with other countries that have been funding terrorism. And I think we had a huge impact." | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qatar_diplomatic_crisis |
Dervish movement (Somali) | According to Abdullah A. Mohamoud, traditional Somali society followed a decentralized structure and a nomadic lifestyle dependent on livestock and pastureland. It was also predominantly Muslim. By the close of the 19th century, the European colonial powers expanded their reach in the Horn of Africa, the region of Somalia came under the influence of the British, Ethiopians and the Italians. The withdrawal of the Egyptian troops from Harar enabled Ras Makonnen and Menelik II to expand the burgeoning Ethiopian realm eastward into the Ogaden territory. In 1884, Britain established a protective authority over Somaliland, aiming to safeguard Aden and the Bab-el-Mandeb strait's strategic interests in the Red Sea. By 1893, following arduous negotiations, an Italian chartered company assumed control over the Benadir coastline in southern Somalia, with the remainder of the region placed under an Italian protectorate in 1889. With foreign rule came the centralization of the economy, which greatly upset the traditional livestock and pastureland based livelihood of the Somalis. The foreign powers were also all Christians, which created additional suspicions amongst the Somali religious elite. The Ethiopian troops had already proved to be a bane for the Somalis as they were the traditional raiders and plunderers of their grazing herds. The arrival of the colonial powers and the consequent partitioning of Africa greatly affected the Somalis, with Sufi poets such as Faarax Nuur writing poems expressing his opposition to foreign rule. The Dervish movement can thus be seen as a reaction against the establishment of foreign control in Somalia.
The Dervish movement was led by a Sufi poet and religious nationalist leader named Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, also known as Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xasan. According to Said M. Mohamed, he was born in Sacmadeeqo sometime between 1856 and 1864 to a father who was a religious teacher. He studied in Somali Islamic seminaries and later went on Hajj to Mecca where he met Shaykh Muhammad Salah of the Salihiya Islamic Tariqah, which states The Encyclopedia Britannica was a "militant, reformist, and puritanical Sufi order". The preachings of Salah to Hasan had roots in Saudi Wahhabism, and it considered it a religious duty "to wage a holy war (jihad) against all other forms of Islam, the Western and Christian presence in the Muslim world, and a religious revival", state Richard Shultz and Andrea Dew. When Hasan returned to the Horn of Africa, the Somali tradition states that he saw Somali children being converted to Christianity by missionaries in the British colony. Hasan began preaching against this religious conversion and the British presence. He earned the ire of the British colonial administration who termed him the 'mad mullah', and his Sufi teachings were also opposed by the rival Qadiriya Tariqah – another traditional Sufi group of the region, states Said M. Mohamed. Another version of the early events link the illegal sale of a gun to Hasan by a corrupt Somali officer in 1899, who reported his gun as stolen rather than purchased by Hasan. The British authorities demanded the gun's return, while Hasan replied that the British should leave the country, a sentiment he had previously claimed in 1897 when he declared himself "the leader of a sovereign nation". Hasan continued to preach against the British introduction of Christianity to Somalia, stating that the "British infidels have destroyed our [Islamic] religion and made our children their children".
Hasan left the urban settlement and moved to preach in the countryside. His influence spread in the rural parts and many elders, as well as youth, became his followers. Hasan converted the influenced youth from different clans into a Muslim brotherhood, rallying to protect Islam from the influence of the Christian missionaries. These formed Hasan's armed resistance group set to confront the colonial powers, and came to be known as Dervishes or Daraawiish, states Said M. Mohamed. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dervish_movement_(Somali) |
Arab conquest of Egypt | When Theodore returned to Alexandria, he dismissed Domentianus as the military commander of the garrison and exiled him from the city, replacing him with Menas, who was a non-Chalcedonian Copt and popular with the army. Menas held a grudge against Domentianus' brother Eudocianus for Eudocianus' torture of the Coptic prisoners in Babylon. Theodore was angry with Domentianus for his cowardly flight from Nikiu and took Menas' side in their quarrel. Despite being brothers-in-law, Domentianus also disrespected Cyrus and showed him unreasonable hatred. He enlisted the Blues in Alexandria to his side, to which Menas responded by enlisting the Greens. There also came to Alexandria Philiades, prefect of the province of Faiyum and brother of Patriarch George I of Alexandria. Philiades was Menas' friend, but unlike Menas he was corrupt and unpopular, so much so that he was nearly lynched.
Since Theodore and Cyrus' arrival in Egypt was on September 14, 641, the Feast of the Cross, a great procession was organised from their landing place to Alexandria. Their entire path was covered in carpets, hymns were sung, and a piece of the True Cross which was earlier brought to Egypt by John, Duke of Barcaina, and stored by the monks of Tabenna, was carried with Cyrus and Theodore. The procession passed between Cleopatra's Needles and entered the Caesareum Church, where a liturgy was prayed. The Psalm reading of the day was Psalm 118:24, but the deacon said another psalm hoping to praise Cyrus and congratulate him on his return. This was said to be a bad omen. Cyrus then gave a sermon about the discovery of the True Cross, perhaps encouraging them to resist the siege in the name of the Cross, despite having already decided in himself to forsake the Cross and surrender to the Muslims.
Cyrus then went to Babylon to negotiate with 'Amr, and agreed the following treaty:
Payment of a fixed tribute by all who came under the treaty.
An armistice of about eleven months, to expire the first day of the Coptic month Paophi, i.e. September 28, 642.
During the armistice the Arab forces to maintain their positions, but to keep apart and undertake no military operations against Alexandria; the Roman forces to cease all acts of hostility.
The garrison of Alexandria and all troops there to embark and depart by sea, carrying all their possessions and treasure with them: but any Roman soldiers quitting Egypt by land to be subject to a monthly tribute on their journey.
No Roman army to return or attempt the recovery of Egypt.
The Muslims to desist from all seizure of churches, and not to interfere in any way with the Christians.
The Jews to be suffered to remain at Alexandria.
Hostages to be given by the Romans, viz. 150 military and 50 civilian, for the due execution of the treaty.
He then returned to Alexandria and reported the terms of this humiliating treaty to Theodore and Constantine, convincing them that it was necessary and telling them to report it to the Emperor Heraclonas, who ratified it in what may had been his last act as Emperor, as he died in November. The local populace was not informed of it until an Arab army approached Alexandria to receive the tribute, and the Byzantine generals told the people not to resist. Realising what had happened, a furious mob attempted to stone Cyrus, but he said to them "I have made this treaty in order to save you and your children" and wept before them, which calmed the riot down. The first installment of tribute was paid on 10 December 641, sealing the surrender of Alexandria.
After the siege was over, Cyrus negotiated with 'Amr to allow the Egyptians who had taken refuge in Alexandria during the war to return to their lands, but he apparently did not allow them to do so. Towns along the northern coast of the Nile Delta remained outside Muslim control for some more years; 'Amr evidently did not consider them a priority. He began building his new capital, Fustat, just outside Babylon, and the Byzantine prefects and governors of Egypt either converted to Islam to retain their positions, or were replaced by Muslims. 'Amr and these Muslim governors forced the Christians to work for them, and made them dig a canal from the Nile to the Red Sea. According to John of Nikiu, 'Amr broke the terms of the treaty he had made with Cyrus. Cyrus fell into depression and died on Holy Thursday, March 21, 642. Theodore was appointed governor of Egypt after Cyrus' death, and arranged the withdrawal of Byzantine forces from Alexandria. On September 17, 642, Theodore left Egypt and set sail for Cyprus with the last Roman troops. Then on September 29, the 11 months of armistice ended, and 'Amr marched at the head of his Arab army into Alexandria, and thus ended Roman Egypt. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_conquest_of_Egypt |
Syro-Hittite states | One of the most contested issues within the field is related to the choice of proper terms for this group of states. On that issue, scholars are divided into several categories. Some prefer terms that are derived from endonymic (native) names for Luwians and Arameans, thus using terms like Luwian-Aramean or Aramean-Luwian. Others prefer to use terms that are derived from various exonymic (foreign) names, thus proposing designations like Syrian-Anatolian or Syro-Anatolian, based on Greek term Anatolia, combined with anachronistic application of Syrian labels, in the sense that was introduced much later, by ancient Greeks, as their designation for Arameans and their land (Aram). Such preference for foreign terms, advocated by some western scholars, is viewed as being culturally biased, and thus insensitive towards native (endonymic) terminology. Some scholars still use older terms, like Syro-Hittite and Neo-Hittite, but those terms have several additional meanings in scholarly literature. More precise term Post-Hittite is also used, as a broad designation for the entire period of Anatolian history spanning from the 12th to the 6th century BCE.
Anachronistic uses of Syrian labels in modern scholarly literature were additionally challenged after the recent discovery of the bilingual Çineköy inscription from the 8th century BCE, written in Luwian and Phoenician languages. The inscription contained references to the neighbouring Assyria, inscribed in a specific form that renders as Syria, thus providing additional (and in the same time the oldest) evidence for the dominant scholarly view on the origins and primary meanings of the term Syria, that originated as an apheretic form of the term Assyria, and was redefined much later, by ancient Greeks, who introduced a territorial distinction between two names, and started to use term Syria as a specific designation for western regions (ancient Aram). For ancient Luwians, Syria was designation for Assyria proper, thus revealing the later Greek use of the term Syria as very different from its original meaning, and also anachronistic if used in modern scientific descriptions of historical realities, related to Luwian and Aramean states of the Iron Age. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syro-Hittite_states |
Ahmad ibn Hanbal | There have some alleged views that his juristic views were not always accepted. Qur'anic exegete Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, who at one time had sought to study under Ibn Hanbal, later stated that he did not consider Ibn Hanbal a jurist and gave his views in the field no weight, describing him as an expert in prophetic tradition only. However this must be seen in context of its time, as Ibn Hanbal's school was still at its infancy and not followed by so many people yet compared to the other schools and the students had conflict with Al-Tabari's school. Consider how the Masa'il of Imam Ahmad, i.e. the first written compilation of Ibn Hanbal's question and answers, was written by Abu Bakr al-Khallal who lived around the same time as Al-Tabari, and the first written compilation of Ibn Hanbal's fiqh was Al-Khiraqi who also lived around that same time. The more systematic teaching of Ibn Hanbal's jurisprudence in education facilities only occurred after that point.
Likewise, some consider how the Andalusian scholar Ibn 'Abd al-Barr did not include Ibn Hanbal or his views in his book The Hand-Picked Excellent Merits of the Three Great Jurisprudent Imâms about the main representatives of Sunni jurisprudence. However, Ibn 'Abd al-Barr actually has praised Ibn Hanbal's jurisprudence by saying "He is very powerful in the fiqh of the madhab of the ahl al-hadith and he is the Imam of the 'ulama of ahl al-hadith."
Be that as it may, the vast majority of other scholars do recognize Ibn Hanbal's prowess as a master jurist worthy of one whose methodology became foundation for its own school of jurisprudence. Imam Shafi'i said, among many other praises, "Ahmad is an Imam in eight fields: he is an imam in hadith, jurisprudence, Al-Qur'an, Al-Lughah, Al-Sunnah, Al-Zuhd, Al-Warak, and Al-Faqr". Al-Dhahabi, one of the most major Islamic biographers, notes in his masterpiece Siyar A'lam Nubala that Ibn Hanbal's status in jurisprudence is alike Al-Layth ibn Sa'd, Malik ibn Anas, Al-Shafi'i, and Abu Yusuf. Muhammad Abu Zahra, a contemporary Hanafi scholar, wrote a book titled Ibn Hanbal: Hayatuhu wa `Asruhu Ara'uhu wa Fiqhuh, and there he mentioned the heavy praises of various other classical scholars towards Ibn Hanbal and his school of jurisprudence. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmad_ibn_Hanbal |
Boxing | There is a generally accepted rule of thumb about the success each of these boxing styles has against the others. In general, an in-fighter has an advantage over an out-fighter, an out-fighter has an advantage over a brawler, and a brawler has an advantage over an in-fighter; these form a cycle with each style being stronger relative to one, and weaker relative to another, with none dominating, as in rock paper scissors. Naturally, many other factors, such as the skill level and training of the combatants, determine the outcome of a fight, but the widely held belief in this relationship among the styles is embodied in the cliché amongst boxing fans and writers that "styles make fights".
Brawlers tend to overcome swarmers or in-fighters because, in trying to get close to the slugger, the in-fighter will invariably have to walk straight into the guns of the much harder-hitting brawler, so, unless the former has a very good chin and the latter's stamina is poor, the brawler's superior power will carry the day. A famous example of this type of match-up advantage would be George Foreman's knockout victory over Joe Frazier in their original bout "The Sunshine Showdown".
Although in-fighters struggle against heavy sluggers, they typically enjoy more success against out-fighters or boxers. Out-fighters prefer a slower fight, with some distance between themselves and the opponent. The in-fighter tries to close that gap and unleash furious flurries. On the inside, the out-fighter loses a lot of his combat effectiveness, because he cannot throw the hard punches. The in-fighter is generally successful in this case, due to his intensity in advancing on his opponent and his good agility, which makes him difficult to evade. For example, the swarming Joe Frazier, though easily dominated by the slugger George Foreman, was able to create many more problems for the boxer Muhammad Ali in their three fights. Joe Louis, after retirement, admitted that he hated being crowded, and that swarmers like untied/undefeated champ Rocky Marciano would have caused him style problems even in his prime.
The boxer or out-fighter tends to be most successful against a brawler, whose slow speed (both hand and foot) and poor technique makes him an easy target to hit for the faster out-fighter. The out-fighter's main concern is to stay alert, as the brawler only needs to land one good punch to finish the fight. If the out-fighter can avoid those power punches, he can often wear the brawler down with fast jabs, tiring him out. If he is successful enough, he may even apply extra pressure in the later rounds in an attempt to achieve a knockout. Most classic boxers, such as Muhammad Ali, enjoyed their best successes against sluggers.
An example of a style matchup was the historical fight of Julio César Chávez, a swarmer or in-fighter, against Meldrick Taylor, the boxer or out-fighter (see Julio César Chávez vs. Meldrick Taylor). The match was nicknamed "Thunder Meets Lightning" as an allusion to punching power of Chávez and blinding speed of Taylor. Chávez was the epitome of the "Mexican" style of boxing. Taylor's hand and foot speed and boxing abilities gave him the early advantage, allowing him to begin building a large lead on points. Chávez remained relentless in his pursuit of Taylor and due to his greater punching power Chávez slowly punished Taylor. Coming into the later rounds, Taylor was bleeding from the mouth, his entire face was swollen, the bones around his eye socket had been broken, he had swallowed a considerable amount of his own blood, and as he grew tired, Taylor was increasingly forced into exchanging blows with Chávez, which only gave Chávez a greater chance to cause damage. While there was little doubt that Taylor had solidly won the first three quarters of the fight, the question at hand was whether he would survive the final quarter. Going into the final round, Taylor held a secure lead on the scorecards of two of the three judges. Chávez would have to knock Taylor out to claim a victory, whereas Taylor merely needed to stay away from the Mexican legend. However, Taylor did not stay away, but continued to trade blows with Chávez. As he did so, Taylor showed signs of extreme exhaustion, and every tick of the clock brought Taylor closer to victory unless Chávez could knock him out.
With about a minute left in the round, Chávez hit Taylor squarely with several hard punches and stayed on the attack, continuing to hit Taylor with well-placed shots. Finally, with about 25 seconds to go, Chávez landed a hard right hand that caused Taylor to stagger forward towards a corner, forcing Chávez back ahead of him. Suddenly Chávez stepped around Taylor, positioning him so that Taylor was trapped in the corner, with no way to escape from Chávez' desperate final flurry. Chávez then nailed Taylor with a tremendous right hand that dropped the younger man. By using the ring ropes to pull himself up, Taylor managed to return to his feet and was given the mandatory 8-count. Referee Richard Steele asked Taylor twice if he was able to continue fighting, but Taylor failed to answer. Steele then concluded that Taylor was unfit to continue and signaled that he was ending the fight, resulting in a TKO victory for Chávez with only two seconds to go in the bout. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boxing |
Drug prohibition | The terms relegalization, legalization, legal regulations, or decriminalization are used with very different meanings by different authors, something that can be confusing when the claims are not specified. Here are some variants:
Sales of one or more drugs (e.g., marijuana) for personal use become legal, at least if sold in a certain way.
Sales of an extracts with a specific substance become legal sold in a certain way, for example on prescription.
Use or possession of small amounts for personal use do not lead to incarceration if it is the only crime, but it is still illegal; the court or the prosecutor can impose a fine. (In that sense, Sweden both legalized and supported drug prohibition simultaneously.)
Use or possession of small amounts for personal use do not lead to incarceration. The case is not treated in an ordinary court, but by a commission that may recommend treatment or sanctions including fines. (In that sense, Portugal both legalized and supported drug prohibitions).
There are efforts around the world to promote the relegalization and decriminalization of drugs. These policies are often supported by proponents of liberalism and libertarianism on the grounds of individual freedom, as well as by leftists who believe prohibition to be a method of suppression of the working class by the ruling class. Prohibition of drugs is supported by proponents of conservatism as well various NGOs. A number of NGOs are aligned in support of drug prohibition as members of the World Federation Against Drugs. WFAD members support the United Nations narcotics conventions.
According to some critics, drug prohibition is responsible for enriching "organised criminal networks" while the hypothesis that the prohibition of drugs generates violence is consistent with research done over long time-series and cross-country facts.
In the United Kingdom, where the principal piece of drug prohibition legislation is the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, criticism includes:
Drug classification: making a hash of it?, Fifth Report of Session 2005–06, House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, which said that the present system of drug classification is based on historical assumptions, not scientific assessment
Development of a rational scale to assess the harm of drugs of potential misuse, David Nutt, Leslie A. King, William Saulsbury, Colin Blakemore, The Lancet, 24 March 2007, said the act is "not fit for purpose" and "the exclusion of alcohol and tobacco from the Misuse of Drugs Act is, from a scientific perspective, arbitrary"
The Drug Equality Alliance (DEA) argue that the Government is administering the Act arbitrarily, contrary to its purpose, contrary to the original wishes of Parliament and therefore illegally. They are currently assisting and supporting several legal challenges to this alleged maladministration.
In February 2008 the then-president of Honduras, Manuel Zelaya, called on the world to legalize drugs, in order, he said, to prevent the majority of violent murders occurring in Honduras. Honduras is used by cocaine smugglers as a transiting point between Colombia and the US. Honduras, with a population of 7 million, suffers an average of 8–10 murders a day, with an estimated 70% being a result of this international drug trade. The same problem is occurring in Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Mexico, according to Zelaya. In January 2012 Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos made a plea to the United States and Europe to start a global debate about legalizing drugs. This call was echoed by the Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina, who announced his desire to legalize drugs, saying "What I have done is put the issue back on the table."
In a report dealing with HIV in June 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) of the UN called for the decriminalization of drugs particularly including injected ones. This conclusion put WHO at odds with broader long-standing UN policy favoring criminalization. Eight states of the United States (Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington), as well as the District of Columbia, have legalized the sale of marijuana for personal recreational use as of 2017, although recreational use remains illegal under U.S. federal law. The conflict between state and federal law is, as of 2018, unresolved.
Since Uruguay in 2014 and Canada in 2018 legalized cannabis, the debate has known a new turn internationally. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drug_prohibition |
Indus Valley Civilisation | Between 400 and as many as 600 distinct Indus symbols have been found on stamp seals, small tablets, ceramic pots and more than a dozen other materials, including a "signboard" that apparently once hung over the gate of the inner citadel of the Indus city of Dholavira. Typical Indus inscriptions are around five characters in length, most of which (aside from the Dholavira "signboard") are tiny; the longest on any single object (inscribed on a copper plate) has a length of 34 symbols.
While the Indus Valley Civilisation is generally characterised as a literate society on the evidence of these inscriptions, this description has been challenged by Farmer, Sproat, and Witzel (2004) who argue that the Indus system did not encode language, but was instead similar to a variety of non-linguistic sign systems used extensively in the Near East and other societies, to symbolise families, clans, gods, and religious concepts. Others have claimed on occasion that the symbols were exclusively used for economic transactions, but this claim leaves unexplained the appearance of Indus symbols on many ritual objects, many of which were mass-produced in moulds. No parallels to these mass-produced inscriptions are known in any other early ancient civilisations.
In a 2009 study by P.N. Rao et al. published in Science, computer scientists, comparing the pattern of symbols to various linguistic scripts and non-linguistic systems, including DNA and a computer programming language, found that the Indus script's pattern is closer to that of spoken words, supporting the hypothesis that it codes for an as-yet-unknown language.
Farmer, Sproat, and Witzel have disputed this finding, pointing out that Rao et al. did not actually compare the Indus signs with "real-world non-linguistic systems" but rather with "two wholly artificial systems invented by the authors, one consisting of 200,000 randomly ordered signs and another of 200,000 fully ordered signs, that they spuriously claim represent the structures of all real-world non-linguistic sign systems". Farmer et al. have also demonstrated that a comparison of a non-linguistic system like medieval heraldic signs with natural languages yields results similar to those that Rao et al. obtained with Indus signs. They conclude that the method used by Rao et al. cannot distinguish linguistic systems from non-linguistic ones.
The messages on the seals have proved to be too short to be decoded by a computer. Each seal has a distinctive combination of symbols and there are too few examples of each sequence to provide a sufficient context. The symbols that accompany the images vary from seal to seal, making it impossible to derive a meaning for the symbols from the images. There have, nonetheless, been a number of interpretations offered for the meaning of the seals. These interpretations have been marked by ambiguity and subjectivity.: 69
Photos of many of the thousands of extant inscriptions are published in the Corpus of Indus Seals and Inscriptions (1987, 1991, 2010), edited by Asko Parpola and his colleagues. The most recent volume republished photos taken in the 1920s and 1930s of hundreds of lost or stolen inscriptions, along with many discovered in the last few decades; formerly, researchers had to supplement the materials in the Corpus by study of the tiny photos in the excavation reports of Marshall (1931), MacKay (1938, 1943), Wheeler (1947), or reproductions in more recent scattered sources. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indus_Valley_Civilisation |
Kashgar | There were eras in Xinjiang's history where intermarriage was common, and "laxity" set upon Uyghur women led them to marry Chinese men in the period after Yakub Beg's rule ended. It is also believed by Uyghurs that some Uyghurs have Han Chinese ancestry from historical intermarriage, such as those living in Turpan.
Even though Muslim women are forbidden to marry non-Muslims in Islamic law, from 1880 to 1949 it was frequently violated in Xinjiang when Chinese men married Uyghur women. Because they were viewed as "outcast", Islamic cemeteries banned the Uyghur wives of Chinese men from being buried within them. Uyghur women got around this problem by giving shrines donations and buying a grave in other towns. Besides Chinese men, other men such as Hindus, Armenians, Jews, Russians, and Badakhshanis (Pamiris) intermarried with local Uyghur women.: 84 The local society accepted the Uyghur women and Chinese men's mixed offspring as their own people despite the marriages being in violation of Islamic law.
An anti-Russian uproar broke out when Russian customs officials, 3 Cossacks and a Russian courier invited local Uyghur prostitutes to a party in January 1902 in Kashgar. There was a general anti-Russian sentiment, but the inflamed local Uyghur populace started a brawl with the Russians on the pretense of protecting their women. Even though morality was not strict in Kashgar, the local population confronted with the Russians before they were dispersed by guards, and the Chinese then sought to end tensions by preventing the Russians from building up a pretext to invade.: 124
After the riot, the Russians sent troops to Sarikol in Tashkurghan and demanded that the Sarikol postal services be placed under Russian supervision. The locals of Sarikol believed that the Russians would seize the entire district from the Chinese and send more soldiers - even after the Russians tried to negotiate with the Begs of Sarikol and sway them to their side (they failed since the Sarikoli officials and authorities demanded in a petition to the Amban of Yarkand that they be evacuated to Yarkand to avoid being harassed by the Russians and objected to the Russian presence in Sarikol). The Sarikolis did not believe the Russian claim that they would leave them alone and only involved themselves in the mail service.: 125
In 1902, a magnitude 7.7 earthquake caused up to 10,000 fatalities, including 667 in Kashgar. The earthquake was followed by a major aftershock a few days later, measuring Ms 6.8.
The British Empire had a consulate from 1890 to 1948 in Kashgar. Though a British consulate, it was staffed and funded by the Indian Political Department of British India. The consulate was not fully recognised by the Qing until 1908. It was upgraded to a consulate-general in 1911. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashgar |
Oriental rug | The technically more advanced, stationary vertical looms are used in villages and town manufactures. The more advanced types of vertical looms are more comfortable, as they allow for the weavers to retain their position throughout the entire weaving process. In essence, the width of the carpet is limited by the length of the loom beams. While the dimensions of a horizontal loom define the maximum size of the rug which can be woven on it, on a vertical loom longer carpets can be woven, as the completed sections of the rugs can be moved to the back of the loom, or rolled up on a beam, as the weaving proceeds.
There are three general types of vertical looms, all of which can be modified in a number of ways: the fixed village loom, the Tabriz or Bunyan loom, and the roller beam loom.
The fixed village loom is used mainly in Iran and consists of a fixed upper beam and a moveable lower or cloth beam which slots into two sidepieces. The correct tension of the warps is obtained by driving wedges into the slots. The weavers work on an adjustable plank which is raised as the work progresses.
The Tabriz loom, named after the city of Tabriz, is used in Northwestern Iran. The warps are continuous and pass around behind the loom. Warp tension is obtained with wedges. The weavers sit on a fixed seat and when a portion of the carpet has been completed, the tension is released, the finished section of the carpet is pulled around the lower beam and upwards on the back of the loom. The Tabriz type of vertical loom allows for weaving of carpets up to double the length of the loom.
The roller beam loom is used in larger Turkish manufactures, but is also found in Persia and India. It consists of two movable beams to which the warps are attached. Both beams are fitted with ratchets or similar locking devices. Once a section of the carpet is completed, it is wound up on the lower beam. On a roller beam loom, any length of carpet can be produced. In some areas of Turkey several rugs are woven in series on the same warps, and separated from each other by cutting the warps after the weaving is finished.
The vertical loom enables weaving of larger rug formats. The most simple vertical loom, usually used in villages, has fixed beams. The length of the loom determines the length of the rug. As the weaving proceeds, the weavers' benches must be moved upwards, and fixed again at the new working height. Another type of loom is used in manufactures. The wefts are fixed and spanned on the beams, or, in more advanced types of looms, the wefts are spanned on a roller beam, which allows for any length of carpet to be woven, as the finished part of the carpet is rolled up on the roller beam. Thus, the weavers' benches always remain at the same height. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oriental_rug |
Anglo-Persian Oil Company | Later in March 1951, the Iranian parliament, the Majlis, voted to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and its holdings. In April, Mohammed Mossadegh, leader of the National Front and a champion of nationalisation, was elected prime minister; sparking the Abadan Crisis.
Mossadegh broke off negotiations with the AIOC in July 1951, after the AIOC threatened to pull its employees out of Iran, and Britain warned tanker owners that "the receipts from the Iranian government would not be accepted on the world market." The British ratcheted up the pressure on the Iranian government and drew up a detailed plan of an invasion to occupy Abadan, code named "Buccaneer". That plan was ultimately rejected by both Clement Attlee and Winston Churchill. US President Harry S. Truman and US ambassador to Iran Henry F. Grady opposed intervention in Iran but needed Britain's support for the Korean War.
The United States believed it was possible to reach a face-saving agreement with Mossadegh, under which actual control and management of the organisation would remain with the AIOC. Truman sent Averell Harriman to Iran to convince Mossadegh of such a scheme. Arriving in Tehran on 15 July 1951, Harriman claimed that the United States accepted nationalization of the concession but insisted on having "a foreign-owned company to act as an agent of NIOC in conducting operations in Iran". Harriman's British counterpart the Lord Privy Seal, Richard Stokes, signaled the UK also favoured such an arrangement. Mossadegh however adamantly opposed the idea, believing it would only "revive the former AIOC in a new form." Mossadegh's opposition caused the British to conclude that he had to go. Officials at the Ministry of Fuel and Power wrote in September 1951:
If Dr. Mussadiq [sic] resigns or is replaced, it is just possible that we shall be able to get away from outright nationalization ... It would certainly be dangerous to offer greater real control of oil operations in Persia. Although something might be done to put more of a Persian facade on the setup, we must not forget that the Persians are not so far wrong when they say that all our proposals are, in fact, merely dressing up the AIOC control in other clothing ... Any real concession on this point is impossible. If we reached settlement on Mussadiq's terms, we would jeopardise not only British but also American oil interests throughout the world. We would destroy prospects of the investments of foreign capital in backward countries. We would strike a fatal blow to international law. We have a duty to stay and use force to protect our interest ... We must force the Shah to bring down Mussadiq.
In October 1951, Mossadegh paid a visit to the United States, after the US embassy in Tehran had accidentally invited him (the invitation was actually meant for Churchill). There, in discussions with George C. McGhee, Mossadegh surprisingly agreed to a complex settlement, under which Iran would own the refinery in Kermanshah and administer the oilfields. The much larger Abadan Refinery was sold to a non-British company and the proceeds given to the AIOC as compensation. Further, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) would sell an annual minimum of 30 million tons of crude oil to the AIOC for the next fifteen years. The board of the NIOC would consist of three Iranians and four foreigners and would conduct most of its transactions using in sterling. Mossadegh prolonged his visit on Washington's urging because the US administration believed that the incoming Conservative government of Winston Churchill would be agreeable to that deal. However, the deal was rejected by the British, who believed Mossadegh's downfall was imminent. Several major oil companies, such as Socony-Vacuum and Shell, assured the Ministry of Fuel and Power that they were also opposed to the agreement.
Britain attempted to settle the dispute through the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but Iran contended that the issue lay outside the court's jurisdiction. On 22 July 1952, "the court accepted the Iranian argument that the dispute was between the Iranian government and a foreign corporation, not the British government; since the dispute was not about a treaty or convention with a foreign government, it was subject to Iranian domestic law".: 51–124
As the months went on, the crisis became acute. By mid-1952, an attempt by the Shah to replace Mossadegh backfired, and led to riots against the Shah and perceived foreign intervention. After that, Mossadegh returned with even greater prestige. At the same time however, his coalition was weakening, because Britain’s boycott/blockade of Iranian oil exports eliminated a major source of state revenue; many Iranians grew poorer and thus unhappier by the day. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Persian_Oil_Company |
Syrian revolution | In the southern city of Daraa, commonly called the "Cradle of the Syrian Revolution", protests had been triggered on 6 March by the incarceration and torture of 15 young students from prominent families who were arrested for writing anti-government graffiti in the city, reading: "الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام" – ("The people want the fall of the regime") – a trademark slogan of the Arab Spring. The boys also spray-painted the graffiti "Your turn, Doctor"; directly alluding to Bashar al-Assad. Security forces under the command of the city's security chief and the first cousin of President Assad, Atef Najib swiftly responded by rounding up the alleged perpetrators and detaining them for more than a month, which set off large-scale protests in Daraa Governorate that quickly spread to other provinces. According to information given by interviewees to 'Human Rights Watch', the protests in Daraa began as largely peaceful affairs, with demonstrators often carrying olive branches, unbuttoning their shirts to show that they had no weapons, and chanting “peaceful, peaceful” to indicate that they posed no threat to the security forces. The Syrian Arab Army was soon deployed to shoot at the protests; resulting in a popular resistance movement led by locals; which made Daraa one of the first provinces in Syria to break free of regime control.
The government later claimed that the boys weren't attacked, and that Qatar incited the majority of the protests. Writer and analyst Louai al-Hussein, referencing the Arab Spring ongoing at that time, wrote that "Syria is now on the map of countries in the region with an uprising". On 15 March, dubbed a "Day of Rage" by numerous demonstrators, pro-democracy activists and online opposition groups, hundreds of protestors marched in the cities of Damascus and Aleppo, demanding the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad. More than 35 protestors in Damascus were arrested by police forces in a subsequent crackdown ordered by Assad government.
In Daraa, demonstrators clashed with local police, and confrontations escalated on 18 March after Friday prayers. Security forces attacked protesters gathered at the Omari Mosque using water cannons and tear gas, followed by live fire, killing four. On 20 March, a crowd burned down the Ba'ath Party headquarters and other public buildings. Security forces quickly responded, firing live ammunition at crowds, and attacking the focal points of the demonstrations. The two-day assault resulted in the deaths of seven police officers and fifteen protesters.
Meanwhile, minor protests occurred elsewhere in the country. Protesters demanded the release of political prisoners, the abolition of Syria's 48-year emergency law, more freedoms, and an end to pervasive government corruption. The events led to a "Friday of Dignity" on 18 March, when large-scale protests broke out in several cities, including Banias, Damascus, al-Hasakah, Daraa, Deir az-Zor, and Hama. Police responded to the protests with tear gas, water cannons, and beatings. At least 6 people were killed and many others injured.
On 23 March, units of the Fourth Division led by Maher al-Assad stormed a gathering in a Sunni mosque in Daraa, killing five more civilians. Victims included a doctor who was treating the wounded. Anger at the incident arose exponentially in the province and across the country. The regime attempted to simmer down the protests by announcing tax-cuts and pay rises the next day. On 25 March, tens of thousands of people participated in the funerals of those killed, chanting: "We do not want your bread, we want dignity”. Statues and billboards of Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad were demolished during the events.
On 25 March, mass protests spread nationwide, as demonstrators emerged after Friday prayers. At least 20 protesters were killed by security forces. Protests subsequently spread to other Syrian cities, including Homs, Hama, Baniyas, Jasim, Aleppo, Damascus and Latakia. Over 70 protesters in total were reported killed.
In his public address delivered on 30 March, Assad condemned the protests as a "foreign plot" and described those who were killed by the firing as a "sacrifice for national stability", sparking widespread outcry. A protestor who was the relative of one of the detained boys told reporters: "He didn’t ask the MPs to stand for a minute’s silence and he said those who were killed were sacrificial martyrs.. But here in Daraa, the army and security deal with us like traitors or agents for Israel. We hoped our army would fight and liberate the occupied Golan, not send tanks and helicopters to fight civilians.” | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_revolution |
Malaysia | Malaysia is a federation of 13 states and three federal territories. These are divided between two regions, with 11 states and two federal territories on Peninsular Malaysia and the other two states and one federal territory in East Malaysia. Each state is divided into districts, which are then divided into mukim. In Sabah and Sarawak districts are grouped into divisions.
Governance of the states is divided between the federal and the state governments, with different powers reserved for each, and the Federal government has direct administration of the federal territories. Each state has a unicameral State Legislative Assembly whose members are elected from single-member constituencies. State governments are led by Chief Ministers, who are state assembly members from the majority party in the assembly. In each of the states with a hereditary ruler, the Chief Minister is normally required to be a Malay, appointed by the ruler upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Except for state elections in Sarawak, by convention state elections are held concurrently with the federal election.
Lower-level administration is carried out by local authorities, which include city councils, district councils, and municipal councils, although autonomous statutory bodies can be created by the federal and state governments to deal with certain tasks. The federal constitution puts local authorities outside of the federal territories under the exclusive jurisdictions of the state government, although in practice the federal government has intervened in the affairs of state local governments. There are 154 local authorities, consisting of 14 city councils, 38 municipal councils and 97 district councils.
The 13 states are based on historical Malay kingdoms, and 9 of the 11 Peninsular states, known as the Malay states, retain their royal families. The King is elected by and from the nine rulers to serve a five-year term. This King appoints governors serving a four-year term for the states without monarchies, after consultations with the chief minister of that state. Each state has its own written constitution. Sabah and Sarawak have considerably more autonomy than the other states, most notably having separate immigration policies and controls, and a unique residency status. Federal intervention in state affairs, lack of development, and disputes over oil royalties have occasionally led to statements about secession from leaders in several states such as Penang, Johor, Kelantan, Sabah and Sarawak, although these have not been followed up and no serious independence movements exist.
States
A list of thirteen states and each state capital (in parentheses):
Federal territories
Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur
Federal Territory of Labuan
Federal Territory of Putrajaya | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia |
LGBT rights in Egypt | Sunni Islam eventually supplanted Christianity as the dominant religion of Egypt in the centuries following the Muslim conquest of Egypt. Alongside Sunni Islam came a new ruling class: the Arabs, and later, the Mamluks. The cultural dialogue on homosocial and homosexual behaviors in medieval Egypt was usually critical. The native Egyptian population was tolerant of homosexual behaviors, and discussion of the matter was usually spearheaded by legalistic Islamic scholars from the Muslim ruling class. The Western concept of a homosexual, as presently understood, did not exist in medieval Egypt. Words describing homosexual-adjacent acts/behaviors described actions, and not a group of people. Furthermore, there is a lack of historically recorded evidence on homosexuality in Egypt until the 8th century: this marks the entrance of boy-love poetry into the historical record.
The existence of homosexual behaviors in the interim period shortly after the Muslim conquest is not in doubt, however. Medieval Egyptian society, though a Muslim society, did not by default share the same outlook on masculinity, homosexuality, and homoerotic behavior as other lands conquered by the Rashidun Caliphate, especially where Islam's influence was weaker. The cultural norms of homosexuality in medieval Egypt were in line with those of the Eastern Mediterranean; top-down societal pressure from Islam did cause these behaviors to be scrutinized more heavily than they were before, especially by religious officials. Coptic Christianity's interaction with Islam fostered a large Sufi mystic population, that, in turn, had its own cultural views on homoerotic behaviors, in the form of "gazing" at young men who were seen as earthly representations of the beauty of God. Sufi practices were attacked by religious conservatives and viewed as hotbeds of degeneracy.
Volney, a Frenchman who traveled through the later Mamluk Sultanate, said of the Mamluks: "They are, above all, addicted to that abominable wickedness which was at all times the vice of the Greeks ... It is difficult to account for this taste, when we consider that they all have women, unless we suppose they seek in one sex that poignancy of refusal which they do not permit the other." The practice described by Volney as "the vice of the Greeks" is known as pederasty, and this was a visible and tolerated expression of homosexual behaviors in both medieval Egypt and the historical Eastern Mediterranean. The introduction of Islam into the fold did not adversely impact this practice in the general public. In the Egyptian context, it was considered natural for older men to gaze upon younger men seen as desirable and beautiful, with some consideration given to their age, though not always. This attraction to male youth was viewed as natural and compatible with traditional Muslim gender roles; in that regard, pederasty was as natural as heterosexuality. Arab and Turkish poems dedicated to various beautiful young men began to appear in the 8th century in various Muslim countries, including medieval Egypt. The presence of homoerotic literature demonstrates the tolerance of certain same-sex behaviors in Arab and Muslim societies at large, with some cultural differences depending on the country in question. The prevalence of homoerotic behaviors in medieval Egyptian society as they pertain to men who already had wives was a topic of rigorous debate among religious authorities, though it was culturally tolerable in medieval Egypt. Islamic law on the matter of same-sex sexual activity was further expanded after the explosion of homoerotic narratives across the Muslim world in the 8th century. Medieval Egyptian society was tolerant of homosocial, homoerotic, and homosexual behaviors and acts; religious authorities were not. Islamic law tolerated a smaller subsection of behaviors (pederasty), for a time, and described certain acts as deeply dangerous to society and repugnant to the faith. Islam was discouraging of homosexual behaviors and non traditional gender roles, while native Egyptian cultural practices were tolerant of a larger array of homosexual behaviors, acts, and attractions. As such, it is best to consider the intersection of culture and religion at various moments in medieval Egyptian history when discussing the status of, by Western standards, LGBT individuals in medieval Egyptian society. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBT_rights_in_Egypt |
Rohingya people | (in alphabetical order)
Aye Chan (Autumn 2005). "The Development of a Muslim Enclave in Arakan (Rakhine) State of Burma (Myanmar)" (PDF). SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research. 3 (2). Archived from the original (PDF) on 12 July 2013. Retrieved 11 September 2017.
"Burma's Western Border as Reported by the Diplomatic Correspondence (1947–1975)" by Aye Chan
Charney, Michael W. (8 April 2018). "A Comparative Vocabulary of Some of the Languages Spoken in the Burma Empire written by Francis Buchanan". SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research. Retrieved 8 April 2018.
Harvey, G. E. (1925). History of Burma: From the Earliest Times to 10 March 1824. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
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Khin Maung Saw (1994). "The 'Rohingyas', Who Are They? The Origin of the Name 'Rohingya'" (PDF). In Uta Gärtner; Jens Lorenz (eds.). Tradition and Modernity in Myanmar: Proceedings of an International Conference held in Berlin from 7 to 9 May 1993. Münster: LIT. pp. 89–101. ISBN 978-3-89473-992-8. Archived from the original (PDF) on 5 March 2016. Retrieved 11 June 2012.
Leider, Jacques (2018). "Rohingya: The History of a Muslim Identity in Myanmar". In Ludden, David (ed.). Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.115. ISBN 9780190277727.
Leider, Jacques (2013). "Rohingya: The name, the movement and the quest for identity" (PDF). Network Myanmar. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2 October 2023.
Mahmood, Syed S., et al. "The Rohingya people of Myanmar: health, human rights, and identity." The Lancet 389.10081 (2017): 1841–1850. online Archived 2 January 2024 at the Wayback Machine
"Myanmar, The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied". Amnesty International. Archived from the original on 4 October 2023. Retrieved 13 August 2005.
"Myanmar:The Politics of Rakhine State" (PDF). International Crisis Group. 22 October 2014. Archived from the original (PDF) on 6 November 2014. Retrieved 8 February 2015.
Myint-U, Thant (2006). The River of Lost Footsteps—Histories of Burma. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. ISBN 978-0-374-16342-6.
Phayre, Lt. Gen. Sir Arthur P. (1883). History of Burma (1967 ed.). London: Susil Gupta.
Yegar, Moshe (2002). Between integration and secession: The Muslim communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma / Myanmar. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. ISBN 978-0-7391-0356-2.
Yegar, Moshe (1972). Muslims of Burma (PDF). Wiesbaden: Verlag Otto Harrassowitz. Archived from the original (PDF) on 3 February 2024. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rohingya_people |
Neo-Mandaic | Neo-Mandaic words range in size from one to five syllables. Each syllable consists of an onset (which is optional in word-initial syllables) and a rime. The rime consists of a nucleus (usually a vowel or a syllabic consonant) with or without a coda. The onset and the coda which frame the nucleus consist of consonants; the onset is mandatory for all word-internal syllables, but the coda is optional in all environments. Whenever an enclitic pronominal suffix (see 3.3. below) lacking an onset is added to a closed accented syllable, the coda of the syllable is geminated to form the onset of the following syllable. Whenever the voiceless interdental fricative /θ/ is geminated in this environment, its outcome is the cluster [χt] rather than the expected [θθ]. For example, when the pronominal suffixes are appended directly to the existential particle *eṯ [ɛθ] (Classical ‘it), it regularly takes the form ext- [ɛχt]. This rule affects the conjugation of the verb meṯ ~ moṯ (mɔyeṯ) ‘to die,’ e.g. meṯ ‘he died’ but mextat ‘she died.’ It is also responsible for the modern form of the abstract ending uxtɔ (Classical -uta).
The syllable patterns V (ɔ [ɔ] ‘this’), VC (ax [ɑχ] ‘that’), CV (mu [mu] ‘what’), and CVC (tum [tum] ‘then’) are the most common. Slightly less common are syllables containing clusters of consonantal or vocalic segments, such as VCC (ahl [ahl] ‘family’), CCV (klɔṯɔ [ˈklɔː.θɔ] ‘three’), CCVC (ṣṭɔnye [ˈstɔn.je] ‘he is a boy’), CVCC (waxt [væχt] ‘time’), CVVC (bieṯ [biɛ̆θ] ‘house’), and even CVVCC (šieltxon [ˈʃiɛ̆lt.χon] ‘I asked you (pl.)’). Permissible consonant clusters in Neo-Mandaic fall into two categories: clusters that form at the beginning or the end of a syllable, and those that span syllable boundaries. The former are strictly limited to certain combination of segments. The latter are less restricted; with few exceptions, Neo-Mandaic tolerates most clusters of two or occasionally even three consonants across a syllable boundary. Consonant clusters consisting of a stop followed by a sonorant, a sibilant followed by a sonorant, or a sibilant followed by a stop, are tolerated in both syllable-final and syllable-initial environments. Consonant clusters consisting of a sonorant and a stop or a sonorant and a fricative are tolerated in word final environment alone. /ə/ is regularly inserted as an anaptyctic vowel to break up impermissible consonant clusters; whenever a sonorant is the second segment in a word-final consonant cluster, the cluster is eliminated by syllabifying the sonorant. Neo-Mandaic does not tolerate clusters of the bilabial nasal /m/ and the alveolar trill /r/ in any environment. The voiced bilabial stop /b/ regularly intervenes between these two segments, e.g. lákamri [ˈlɑ.kɑm.bri] ‘he didn’t return it.’ Clusters of the voiceless glottal fricative /h/ with another consonant are also not tolerated, even across a syllable boundary; /h/ is generally deleted in this environment. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neo-Mandaic |
Jerba Berber | North Africa has a deeply stable edifice of language, within which three language sources claim influence. The indigenous Berber languages, Romance languages (Latin, French, Spanish, and Italian), and Semitic languages (Punic, Arabic) have shared the linguistic domain of the region dating back to the Classical Period, given the Maghreb's proximity to many other Mediterranean languages and cultures. An outdated and largely discredited linguistic model considers Tunisia to be distinct from other Maghrebi countries by having a historically "much more fragile" Berber influence than in Algeria or Morocco, for example. Given Tunisia's extensive history of colonial subjugation, this is a highly incomplete picture of Tunisia's linguistic history. As of 2011, however, Arabic and French are used nearly equally, while Berber languages are minimized or ignored.
This trend has been observed in Djerba as well. Some scholars claim that the Berber-speaking population of the island has been in decline since the end of the 19th century, in both numerical and statutory terms. While there is a severe lack of demolinguistic data that attempts to estimate the real number of Tamazight speakers, the most recent study estimates a few thousand speakers remain. Almost all speakers are concentrated in the south-east of Djerba, and practice mainly partial, discreet, and even cryptic dialects, of the native language. Given the steep rate of decline, and the social context of Mediterranean tourism (and its negative effects), Tamazight may not survive. Djerba families, having been constrained by the historically rural nature of the island, are rapidly being forced to adapt to a globalized, tri-lingual Tunisian culture.
The decline of Djerba Berber may be attributed in part to a lack of local Berber-speaking elites, which have been influential in the preservation of Berber languages at the university and administrative levels in Morocco and Algeria. In contrast, Tamazight is not taught in any primary/secondary schools or universities, and the Tunisian government has failed to protect or preserve indigenous languages in the country. Likewise, the international movement to support endangered languages and identities (UNESCO type) does not seem to have any influence on language policy in Tunisia. The confluence of these factors will likely end with the disappearance of Tamazight, a textbook case of language death. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jerba_Berber |
Saudi Arabia–United States relations | On September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, by four hijacked planes, occurred in New York City, Washington, D.C., and in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The attacks killed 2,977 victims and caused an estimated $150 billion in property and infrastructure damage and economic impact, exceeding the death toll and damage caused by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 60 years earlier. 15 of the 19 hijackers came from Saudi Arabia, as did their leader Osama bin Laden. In the U.S., there followed considerable negative publicity for, and scrutiny of, Saudi Arabia and its teaching of Islam. There was also a reassessment of the "oil-for-security" alliance with the Al Saud. A 2002 Council on Foreign Relations Terrorist Financing Task Force report found that "for years, individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia have been the most important source of funds for al-Qaeda. And for years, Saudi officials have turned a blind eye to this problem."
In the backlash against Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism, the Saudi government was portrayed in the media, Senate hearings, and elsewhere as:
a sort of oily heart of darkness, the wellspring of a bleak, hostile value system that is the very antithesis of our own. America's seventy-year alliance with the kingdom has been reappraised as a ghastly mistake, a selling of the soul, a gas-addicted alliance with death.
There was even a proposal at the Defense Policy Board, an arm of Department of Defense, to consider 'taking Saudi out of Arabia' by forcibly seizing control of the oil fields, giving the Hijaz back to the Hashemites, and delegating control of Medina and Mecca to a multinational committee of moderate non-Wahhabi Muslims.
Likewise in Saudi Arabia, anti-American sentiment was described as "intense" and "at an all-time high".
A Saudi intelligence survey of "educated Saudis between the ages of 25 and 41" taken shortly after the 9/11 attacks "concluded that 95 percent" of those surveyed supported Bin Laden's cause. (Support for Bin Laden reportedly waned by 2006, and by then the Saudi population become considerably more pro-American after Al-Qaeda linked groups staged attacks inside Saudi Arabia.) The proposal at the Defense Policy Board to "take Saudi out of Arabia" was spread as the secret U.S. plan for the kingdom.
In October 2001, the Wall Street Journal reported that Crown Prince Abdullah sent a critical letter to U.S. President George W. Bush on August 29: "A time comes when peoples and nations part. We are at a crossroads. It is time for the United States and Saudi Arabia to look at their separate interests. Those governments that don't feel the pulse of their people and respond to it will suffer the fate of the Shah of Iran."
For over a year after 9/11, Saudi Minister of the Interior (a powerful post whose jurisdiction included domestic intelligence gathering) Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, insisted that the Saudi hijackers were dupes in a Zionist plot. In December 2002, a Saudi government spokesman declared that his country was the victim of unwarranted American intolerance bordering on hate.
In 2003, several terror attacks occurred which targeted U.S. compounds, the Saudi ministry of interior, and several other places inside Saudi Arabia. As a result of these attacks, the U.S. decided to redevelop Saudi law enforcement agencies by providing them with anti-terrorism education, the latest technologies, and interactions with U.S. law enforcement agencies.
American politicians and media have accused the Saudi government of supporting terrorism and tolerating a jihadist culture. They noted that Osama bin Laden and fifteen out of the nineteen (or 78 percent of) 9/11 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia.
Some analysts have speculated that Osama bin Laden, who had his Saudi nationality revoked in 1994 and was expelled, had chosen 15 Saudi hijackers on purpose to break up U.S.–Saudi relations, as the U.S. was still suspicious of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis decided to cooperate with the U.S. on its war on terror. "Terrorism does not belong to any culture, or religion, or political system", said King Abdullah at the opening address of the Counter-terrorism International Conference (CTIC) held in Riyadh in 2005. The cooperation grew broader and covered financial, educational, and technological aspects both in Saudi Arabia and Muslim-like countries to prevent pro-Al-Qaeda terrorists' activities and ideologies. "It is a high time for the Ulma (Muslim Scholars), and all thinkers, intellectuals, and academics, to shoulder their responsibilities towards the enlightenment of the people, especially the young people, and protect them from deviant ideas" said Sheikh Saleh bin Abdulaziz Alsheikh, Minister of Islamic Affairs, in the CTIC.
Almost all members of the CTIC agreed that Al-Qaeda targeted less educated Muslims by convincing them that they are warriors of God but used them only to accomplish their political goals. Three years after the Saudi government took a serious and active role in anti-terrorism, Al-Qaeda began launching multiple attacks targeting Saudi government buildings and U.S. compounds on Saudi grounds. These attacks tried to corrode and destroy the U.S.–Saudi relationship and also exhibited Al-Qaeda's desire for revenge against Saudi Arabia for its co-operation with US anti-terrorism.
After these changes, the Saudi government was better prepared in preventing terrorist activities. They caught a large number of Saudi terrorists and terrorists from other countries (some of them American) that had connections with al-Qaeda in one way or another. Some of these criminals held a high rank in their respective terrorist organizations, which helped diffuse many terrorist cells. In a matter of months, Saudi law enforcement officials were successfully able to stop and prevent terrorist activities. Also, they were successful in finding the source of terrorist financing.
In March 2018, a U.S. judge formally allowed a lawsuit, brought by 9/11 survivors and victim's families, to move forward against the Saudi Arabian government.
In May 2021, 22 federal lawmakers from New York and New Jersey pressured President Joe Biden to release the classified FBI documents that cite the role of Saudi Arabia in the 9/11 terror attacks. In their letter to the US Attorney General Merrick Garland, the lawmakers' Ione Republican Nicole Malliotakis and NY Sens. Chuck Schumer and Kirsten Gillibrand challenged the "state secrets privilege" that was invoked by former US Presidents to restrict the classified FBI report from being released. The evidence of Saudi Arabian involvement in the September 11 attacks first surfaced in a 2012 FBI memo during the Operation Encore investigation. | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Arabia%E2%80%93United_States_relations |
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