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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republican_insurgency_in_Afghanistan] | [TOKENS: 14795] |
Contents Republican insurgency in Afghanistan Independent militias and Taliban dissidents Islamic Emirate Army Various pro-Taliban militiasForeign Mujahideen (possibly affiliated with al-Qaeda) Pakistan Armed Forces (until 2024; unconfirmed, rejected by Pakistan) Various non-NRF militias Pakistan Armed Forces (since 2024) 2,000–10,000 (Panjshir resistance; estimates) Guerrilla groups including the National Resistance Front (NRF) and the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), which fight under the banner of the defunct Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, are conducting an ongoing low-level insurgency against the government of Afghanistan led by the Taliban. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of Kabul in August 2021, Ahmad Massoud travelled from Kabul to Panjshir where he formed the NRF with remnants of the Afghan National Army. The group initially managed to recapture some districts from the Taliban; however, by mid-September, the Taliban took control of all of Afghanistan and most of the NRF leadership fled to neighboring Tajikistan. Due to these developments, the NRF changed its strategy to guerrilla warfare and a hit-and-run technique. In March 2022, the AFF was founded under the control of Yasin Zia, former chief of general staff of the Afghan National Army. Since then, the AFF and the NRF have collaborated on anti-Taliban operations and maintain a presence in the northern provinces of Afghanistan. Background Historically, the Panjshir Valley was known for its natural defences. Surrounded by the Hindu Kush mountains, Panjshir never fell to the Soviets during the invasion of the 1980s nor to the Taliban during the civil war of the early 1990s. In the war of 1996–2001, Panjshir was a center of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. In these conflicts, Panjshir was under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Massoud who was killed by a suicide bomber in 2001. Soon after, the United States invasion of Afghanistan resulted in the overthrow of the previously dominant, Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the eventual establishment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Massoud and his family remained highly respected in Panjshir in the next two decades. The traditional anti-Taliban sentiment of the Panjshiris has an ethnic dimension: A majority of the population of the Panjshir Valley are ethnic Tajik people, while the majority of the Taliban are Pashtuns. However, in course of the Taliban insurgency, the Taliban began to recruit Tajiks into their ranks in an effort to improve their image in the northern areas of Afghanistan. In 2021, the Taliban overran most of Afghanistan in a lightning offensive; Panjshir Province was the only area which was able to resist until the offensive's conclusion. However, the valley's ability to withstand future Taliban assaults was hampered by it being cut off from outside support. In the 1980s and 1990s, Panjshir's forces had been able to keep supply lines to Tajikistan open. These were not accessible in the 2021 conflict, as the Taliban had successfully taken most of northern Afghanistan. Regardless, the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan initially continued to exercise de facto control over the Panjshir Valley, which was described by The Week as "the only region out of [the] Taliban's hands" as of August 2021. Former loyalists to the old republic fled to Panjshir, hoping to transform it into an anti-Taliban stronghold. Saleh and Massoud's announcements On 17 August 2021, former first vice president of Afghanistan Amrullah Saleh —citing provisions of the Constitution of Afghanistan— declared himself caretaker president of Afghanistan from the Panjshir Valley, and vowed to continue military operations against the Taliban from there. His claim to the presidency was endorsed by Ahmad Massoud and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Minister of Defence Bismillah Khan Mohammadi along with the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in Dushanbe. On 23 August 2021, Massoud made contact with unnamed American lawmakers. Disposition of forces Prior to the fall of Kabul, Panjshiris began moving military equipment from surrounding areas, including helicopters and armored vehicles, into Panjshir Province. There, they were joined by Afghan National Army commanders and soldiers, including commandos, ex-Mujahideen who had previously served Ahmad Massoud's late father, Ahmad Shah Massoud, and other anti-Taliban activists. Most of them regrouped at Baghlan Province's Andarab District before moving to Panjshir after making their escape from Kunduz, Badakhshan, Takhar, and Baghlan. According to a Russian estimate, the disparate Anti-Taliban forces had approximately 7,000 personnel under arms as of mid August 2021. Other estimates place this number as low as 2,000, though Saleh himself claims 10,000 men under arms. By 22 August 2021, Ahmad Massoud claimed to have gathered about 9,000 fighters and at least a "handful of armoured humvees" in the valley. The resistance forces in Panjshir organized as National Resistance Front (NRF). Within the NRF, there were differences between the forces loyal to Saleh and those loyal to Ahmad Massoud, as the former is hardcore anti-Taliban and anti-Pakistani, whereas the latter maintained good relations with Pakistan which was supportive of the Taliban. As a result, Massoud was more willing to negotiate with the Taliban. By 22 August, the resistance also confirmed that several local militias had begun to fight the Taliban on their own, independent of the Panjshir-based forces. According to Yasin Zia, the resistance had already secured access to five helicopters formerly used by the Afghan military. The NRF was greatly weakened by the fall of most of Panjshir to Taliban troops in September 2021, though the group continued to operate and expanded its activity across northern Afghanistan over the next months. By April 2022, the NRF was estimated to field a few thousand fighters, split into several branches such as the Andarab Resistance Front. By 2024, the NRF had expanded its operations and included members of several different ethnic groups, though its center of operations remained northern Afghanistan. Other pro-republican insurgent groups emerged after the fall of Panjshir. These included the "Ahmad Khan Samangani Front", Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), "Afghanistan Islamic National & Liberation Movement", the "High Council of National Resistance", the "Freedom Corps", "Liberation Front of Afghanistan", "Soldiers of Hazaristan", the "Freedom and Democracy Front", the "Wolf Unit", "National Front for Free Afghanistan", "Turkestan Freedom Tigers", and "Afghan United Front" (AUF) under Sami Sadat. By 2024, the AFF had become the most important republican rebel group aside of the NRF; the two groups coordinated their operations. An estimate by the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy made prior to the fall of Kabul estimated the strength of the Taliban, throughout the whole of Afghanistan, at 60,000 armed cadre supported by up to 200,000 irregulars. Due to the rapid capitulation of the Afghan National Army, the Taliban have since acquired substantial materiel of US manufacture, including armored vehicles and combat aircraft. The Taliban remain a movement consisting of many different sub-groups whose aims, strategies, beliefs, and loyalties vary. By March 2022, the Armed Forces of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan had taken over the previous government's land force corps, and deployed their own air force -consisting of helicopters- in combat against the republican rebels. By 2024, the Islamic Emirate's military remained largely in control of Afghanistan, though it had also become affected by the corruption and "ghost soldiers" just as the previous Afghan military. Timeline Around 17 August 2021, remnants of the Afghan National Army began massing in the Panjshir Valley at the urging of Massoud, along with local civilians who had responded to his mobilization calls. At the time, the Panjshir Valley was—according to one observer—"under siege on all sides" but had not come under direct attack. On 18 August, the number of admissions for war injuries was increasing at the Emergency Surgical Centre for War Victims in Anaba in Panjshir. By 22 August, Ahmad Massoud's forces were mostly focused on defending Panjshir as well as training. On 17 August, a negotiated end to the political impasse had been attempted, with Saleh calling for a "peace deal" with the Taliban. On 18 August, the possibility of including the Taliban in a coalition government was raised by a top Afghan diplomat as a means of ending the stalemate. On 18 August, local sources from Parwan Province reported that Saleh's forces had taken Charikar from Taliban fighters stationed in the area. In addition, there are reports of gunfights taking place near Salang Pass. On the following day, videos were released which showcased local fighters with flags of the old, anti-Taliban Northern Alliance parading through the streets of Charikar. On 20 August, anti-Taliban fighters reportedly recaptured Andarab, Puli Hisar and Dih Salah districts in Baghlan Province with the Taliban claiming 15 of its soldiers had been killed, while other sources reported that up to 60 Taliban fighters were killed or injured, and two dozen captured. The three districts had reportedly experienced a revolt, led by a local police chief, after Taliban had conducted unpopular house-to-house searches. Bismillah Khan Mohammadi announced the operational success of the districts being recaptured via Twitter. Audiovisual reports of the events circulated on social media and were reported by Pajhwok Afghan News. Later on the 20th, it was reported that the forces, led by Abdul Hamid Dadgar, had recaptured Andarab, though the Taliban had not yet commented. On 21 August, it was reported that Panjshir representatives were meeting with Abdullah Abdullah and Hamid Karzai, members of the Coordination Council, to "discuss the current situation and ways of providing security to Afghans". A source within the Panjshir resistance consequently confirmed their involvement in the operations in Baghlan Province, and stated that they planned on seizing a northern highway which could allow them to link up with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Taliban social media accounts called the counteroffensive a "betrayal" of the amnesty the Taliban had offered. It was reported on 22 August 2021 that Taliban fighters had been sent to the Keshnabad area of Andarab in order to kidnap the children of anti-Taliban forces. On 22 August, the Russian Embassy in Afghanistan was reportedly asked by a Taliban representative to reach out to Panjshir-based leaders to possibly mediate. Meanwhile, resistance spokesman Ali Nazary informed the Agence France-Presse that Ahmad Massoud's group would prefer a peaceful resolution of the conflict, under the condition that a future government implemented a system of "decentralisation" and "equal rights" across the country. On 23 August, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said that while Taliban fighters are being sent to Panjshir, the Taliban are willing to seek peaceful means to end the conflict. Simultaneously, the Taliban gave the opposition forces a four-hour ultimatum to surrender. In a statement to Al Arabiya, Massoud rejected the ultimatum. In response, the Taliban announced "hundreds" of its forces had been dispatched to the Panjshir Valley. It was reported on 23 August that talks between Taliban representatives and Panjshir leaders had broken down. Ali Maisam Nazary, spokesman for the resistance, said that the Taliban made demands for Massoud to accept no elections with a centralized government, which Massoud rejected as he wanted a future government to be decentralized, with respect for civil and semi-autonomy rights. An unidentified Taliban spokesperson proclaimed in a statement that "hundreds of Mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate are heading towards the state of Panjshir to control it, after local state officials refused to hand it over peacefully". It was reported that on 23 August, Taliban commander Qari Fashihuddin was tasked to lead offensive operations in Panjshir. The Taliban reported that several of their fighters were killed and others wounded in ambushes in Jabal Siraj. On 23 August, the Taliban claimed to have recaptured all 3 districts in Baghlan that fell to the resistance forces a week ago: Dih Salah District, Pul-e-Hisar and Andarab. A Taliban district chief stationed in Andarab was reported to be killed in the fighting. On 24 August, Panjshir resistance fighters reportedly retook control of Banu and Dih Salah districts, while Puli Hisar remained under Taliban control. Saleh publicly warned via Twitter that Taliban fighters in Andarab were blocking humanitarian assistance for civilians trying to escape from the fighting and called it a "humanitarian disaster". On the following day, Massoud's forces claimed to have ambushed a Taliban convoy in Andarab, destroying a critical bridge and inflicting heavy losses on the Islamists. On 24 August, Major Wazir Akbar, an ex-Afghan commando who joined the Panjshir-based resistance fighters, reported an attempted Taliban incursion at Anjuman Pass through Badakhshan province, which was repelled with heavy Taliban casualties. On 26 August 2021, a ceasefire was declared with the Taliban and the resistance entering into talks. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said that he was "80 percent confident of a solution without war in the Panjshir Valley". On 29 August, Panjshir representatives stated that there were no Taliban fighters trying to enter Panjshir, refuting information from Anaamullah Samangani, who is a member of the Taliban's Cultural Commission. On 1 September, it was reported that ceasefire talks failed. On 26 August, fighting had broken out between anti-Taliban fighters in Panjshir Valley and the Taliban. It was reported that more than 200 Taliban fighters were driven out the Panjshir Valley, with some being captured by anti-Taliban forces. The National Resistance Front (NRF) was also able to capture Pol-e-Hesar, Deh Salah and Banu districts. On 28 August, Panjshir fighters engaged Taliban fighters in Sanjan, Kapisa and in Khost Wa Fereng, Baghlan in response to allegations of ceasefire violations conducted by Taliban fighters in the area. On 29 August, internet and telecommunication services throughout Panjshir province were shut down on orders from the Taliban. On 30 August, Panjshir fighters ambushed Taliban fighters attempting to break into Panjshir from Andarab. On 31 August 2021, Taliban fighters commenced an offensive against the National Resistance Front in the provinces of Baghlan, Panjshir, and Parwan. Anti-Taliban sources claimed that the offensive involved al-Qaeda troops, a statement backed by videos in which pro-Taliban fighters were heard speaking non-native or locally uncommon languages such as Arabic. Sources reported that the offensive started when Taliban fighters were spotted entering Gulbahar and blocked the main road with a container. Taliban forces retook Dih Saleh District in Baghlan, allowing them to directly attack Panjshir. An initial Taliban assault through Khawak Pass connecting the Baghlan and central Panjshir Provinces failed. NRFA spokesperson Fahim Dashty said that the attack was likely done to test the area's defenses. Taliban troops also began to attack southern Panjshir from Gulbahar, resulting in heavy fighting. Despite being numerically superior to the defenders, the Taliban failed to break through. A refugee interviewed later by Al Jazeera stated that the Taliban had blocked roads out of Panjshir using shipping containers during their offensive, and the shutdown of internet connections and mobile phone services left residents unable to learn what was happening in other places. On 1 September, a day after clashes at the entry points of the valley were reported, Mullah Amir Khan Motaqi, the head of the Taliban's commission for guidance & encouragement stated over a Twitter audio message to the people of Panjshir that attempts at reaching a negotiated settlement were "unfortunately all in vain." He lay the blame with the leadership of the resistance in Panjshir, saying there are still some people in the valley who "don't want the problems to be solved peacefully." He went on to say that Taliban has selected a native of the province as their desired governor. Despite the Taliban shutdown of Panjshir's internet, Fahim Dashti, the spokesperson for the Panjshir Resistance managed to conduct an interview with BBC Persian, in which he stated that the negotiations failed because of a fundamental difference of goals between the two sides. According to him, Panjshir resistance had the intention of extracting commitments and guarantees protecting freedoms and human and political rights of ethnic and religious minorities as well as women, but Taliban's goal in the negotiation was not to negotiate such guarantees, but to negotiate the extent of participation of the Panjshir opposition in a Taliban-led government that would satisfy the resistance. On 2 September, Panjshir sources claimed that 13 Taliban fighters were killed in an ambush in Chikrinow district. Even though the offensive had stalled by this point, a Taliban spokesman said the valley was surrounded in all four directions and that a Panjshir resistance 'victory was impossible' as well as claiming Taliban territorial gains. Meanwhile, the Taliban claimed to have pushed into the Shotul district of Panjshir, but provided no firm proof for this claim. Analysts[who?] judged that the Taliban had probably advanced for a short time before being pushed back again. A minor Taliban attack on Anjuman Pass in northern Panjshir was reportedly easily repelled by Afghan commandos. In addition, local anti-Taliban forces from Andarab claimed to have retaken the crucial Khawak Pass. Meanwhile, revolts had erupted in Wardak Province and Daikundi Province which are home to many Hazaras, an ethnic group which had been previously discriminated against by the Taliban. The Taliban had begun reaching out to the Hazara community in the months leading up to their takeover, promising to respect their rights and traditions. Accordingly, the situation in Wardak and Daikundi is complex, as local militia leaders had aided the Taliban takeover despite the disapproval of much of the population. In Daikundi's Khadir District, a revolt erupted as the pro-Taliban Hazara commander Muhammad Ali Sedaqat was ordered to disarm locals, with some fearing that the disarmament was not properly recorded and would expose locals to harassment by the Taliban. Fighting consequently broke out between the Taliban, pro-republic Hazaras, and pro-Taliban Hazaras. Local militias began to ambush Taliban troops. On 3 September, the Taliban claimed to have captured Panjshir valley, however these claims were described as lies and propaganda by the local resistance leaders such as Saleh as well as international spectators. A NRF spokesperson stated that the situation was "difficult", but also that a Taliban push into the valley had resulted in the encirclement of a few hundred Taliban fighters. By the following day, heavy fighting was confirmed to be still continuing in the valley, with Paryan District reportedly being contested. An Italian medical aid organisation operating in the area confirmed that the Taliban had advanced up to Anaba; the Taliban claimed to have seized the districts of Khenj and Unabah. The NRF countered by claiming that they had managed to encircle even more Taliban troops, now numbering thousands, at Khawak Pass and Dashte Rewak. On 5 September, both sides achieved some successes: The NRF was able to force hundreds of encircled Taliban fighters to surrender in the valley, with the NRF claiming to have captured up to 1,500. In turn, local journalists confirmed that the Taliban had taken both Rukha and Paryan Districts, while NRF spokesman Fahim Dashty was killed in combat. The Taliban also claimed to have advanced into Panjshir's capital Bazarak. A The Times reporter who accompanied the Taliban testified that much of the valley appeared to be under Islamist control at this point, although groups of NRF fighters continued to strike at the Taliban behind the frontlines. Massoud reacted to the Taliban advance by declaring on Facebook that he was endorsing offers by local religious leaders to negotiate a peaceful solution of the conflict. Pakistani journalist and regional expert Ahmed Rashid argued that the Taliban had clearly expressed that they would not "tolerate what [Massoud is] asking for, which is a semi-autonomous region in the Panjshir Valley". The Taliban leadership indeed rejected Massoud's negotiation offer, stating that it would only accept the NRF's surrender. On 6 September, after heavy fighting resulting in high losses on both sides, the Taliban captured the governor's office in Bazarak, and claimed control of the whole Panjshir Valley. The remaining NRF troops had reportedly retreated into the mountains, with the Taliban stating that many had fled the region. An NRF official then claimed Massoud was at a safe location, while Saleh escaped to Tajikistan. Ali Nazary, head of foreign affairs for the resistance group, said that Ahmed Massoud was still present inside Afghanistan. The NRF contested the Taliban's conquest of Panjshir, arguing that resistance fighters were still present in strategic positions in the valley, continuing their fight. By 7 September, many civilians from Panjshir Valley had fled into the mountains to escape the Taliban, while Massoud made defiant statements and called for a large-scale, nation-wide uprising. The Panjshir locals were also threatened by starvation, as local supply remained cut-off. The remaining NRF troops were reportedly still resisting the Taliban in some areas. The NRF also claimed that the Taliban had begun to massacre local civilians. As of 9 September, OSINT evidence analyzed by Bellingcat researchers shows that the Taliban continue to advance, and control territory at least 60 kilometres (37 mi) into the valley. The Taliban has placed the valley under siege, not allowing journalists or goods to enter, so the extent of their control is difficult to surmise. Panjshir residents who were able to reach Kabul warned that supplies in the province are being exhausted due to the blockade. NRF spokesman Ali Nazary claimed that the Taliban had not conquered all of Panjshir, but only the main road, which allowed them to capture nearby Bazarak as well. He stated that the resistance forces had made a tactical withdrawal from the main road, while retaining 60–65% of the sub-valleys and strategic positions under their control. Mohammad Zahir Aghbar, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's ambassador to Tajikistan, meanwhile stated that Massoud and Saleh were still in Afghanistan but incommunicado for security reasons and had not fled to Tajikistan, contrary to earlier reports. By 10 September, the Taliban had captured the residence where Saleh had earlier been hiding and aired his latest video claiming he was still in Panjshir, with photos of a Taliban fighter posing at the same spot where Saleh had recorded the video, being posted on social media it was later claimed that Rohullah Saleh, Amrullah's brother, was killed while trying to escape the region. A three-day ceasefire was reported to be in effect, although not confirmed by any side. National Congress Party leader Abdul Latif Pedram meanwhile told TOLO News that NRF forces were present in all mountains of Panjshir. NRF commander Saleh Rigistani vowed that their forces will continue fighting, and added that the province was facing a shortage of food and medicinal supplies. Taliban Cultural Commission member Anaamullah Samangani however claimed that the NRF had no "public presence" in Panjshir and were hiding in caves and valleys, with talks for their surrender ongoing. Residents meanwhile complained that roads in Panjshir were blocked, while electricity and telecommunications were shut. A tribal elder meanwhile stated on 10 September that the Taliban was blocking food supplies and carrying out extrajudicial executions of civilians, adding that eight civilians were reportedly killed by them on 7 September. Ahmad Wali Massoud also accused the Taliban of killing civilians and stated that the NRF still controlled "major areas" in Panjshir. Saleh's son Shuresh stated on 11 September that his father's brother Rohullah Azizi, who had been fighting for the resistance, had been executed alongside his driver on 9 September by the Taliban, after being stopped at a checkpoint in Khanez village of Panjshir. An investigative report published by the BBC on 13 September found that the Taliban had executed at least 20 civilians in Panjshir since they entered the valley. Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid meanwhile denied the group had committed any human rights violation in the province. Agence France-Presse reporters allowed into Panjshir on 15 September found many villages in the three districts they visited nearly empty. Residents interviewed by them accused the Taliban of executing 19 civilians between the village of Khenj and Bazarak, and preventing civilians from fleeing the province in order to use them as human shields against attacks by resistance fighters. A doctor in Panjshir meanwhile told Al Jazeera that all hospitals in the province had been closed or were operating on limited supplies, except for an Italian-run emergency hospital. Journalists of The New York Times allowed into Panjshir on 13 September reported that fighting had mostly ceased, as the Taliban controlled much of the valley and the NRF was apparently limited to the nearly inaccessible mountain areas. Some local forces had also left the NRF without surrendering to the Taliban, instead acting as autonomous self-defense groups and controlling parts of the valley. In late September, a United States intelligence official, a US Department of Defense consultant, and two former Afghan government officials confirmed that Massoud and Saleh had fled to Tajikistan shortly after the Taliban took control of most of the valley. Massoud was relocated to a safe house in Dushanbe and Saleh to a nearby location. Regional experts argued that the reports of the exile of the NRF leadership were reliable and believable. Massoud, Saleh, Pedram, and others were reportedly attempting to organize further anti-Taliban resistance from Tajikistan. However, researchers judged their future prospects to be poor, as Tajikistan was supportive of them but probably unwilling to risk cross-border fighting, while the Taliban had managed to gain much international support, entrenching their position. Despite these reports, the NRF continued to claim that its leaders were still in Panjshir, and that the insurgency was continuing. On 6 October, Abdul Latif Pedram claimed that guerilla warfare continues in Panjshir. TASS reported heavy fighting at Zamankur, Anaba District. By early November 2021, Jacob Zenn argued in Terrorism Monitor that there were no more militant forces loyal to Massoud operating in Afghanistan, while the NRF continued its efforts to reorganize an insurgency. The government of Tajikistan was still hosting and supporting the remnants of the anti-Taliban political opposition, although more so to improve its image abroad and domestically than to actually influence the situation in Afghanistan. At this point, the only substantial armed resistance to the Taliban government was offered by the Islamic State's Khorasan Province (IS-KP). Zenn argued that IS-KP's insurgency was growing and could potentially allow pro-republican forces to make a comeback as the Taliban and the Islamic State were focused on fighting each other. However, some NRF holdouts continued to be active in Panjshir. On 15 October, Russian news agency Interfax reported NRF forces conducting a guerilla attack in Andarab, Baghlan, with Taliban losses being reported as six killed, four wounded, and two being captured by pro-NRF forces. At the same time, fighting was also reported in Balkh, with both sides suffering unknown casualties. Around late October, a visit by Radio Télévision Suisse into Bazarak would report an armed confrontation between the Taliban and pro-NRF forces occurring in an undisclosed location in the mountains surrounding Bazarak. The latter reportedly gained the upper hand with unknown casualties on both sides, thus confirming that the NRF is still active near Bazarak and in Panjshir despite claims of inactivity by local Taliban officials. On 12 November 2021, clashes between republicans and Taliban forces took place at Khoshudara, located in Baghlan Province's Khost wa Fereng District. Both sides suffered several losses. A local informed The Independent that the NRF still held settlements in Khost wa Fereng. On 29 November, a clash between Taliban and pro-NRF forces reportedly occurred in Samangan Province, with reportedly two republican fighters killed and one wounded from the engagement. The Independent reported that according to local sources a militia of 400 men took control of the mountainous area of Tondruk including 10 villages, located between the Hazrati Sultan District and the provincial capital of Aybak. The same source reported that in October, local Taliban officials attempted to take over the area, although the attack was called off due to the harsh terrain of the region and the military readiness of the local pro-NRF militia. The Samangan militia became known as the "Ahmad Khan Samangani Front", and consisted of several groups which were loyal to a commander named Hekmatullah Tour. The group was not part of the NRF, though aligned with it. On 6 and 7 December, NRF and Taliban forces clashed in the Hesa Duwum Kohistan District of Kapisa Province, with five Taliban militants killed or wounded, and two NRF killed (according to Mehr News Agency). Islamic World News had reported that according to local sources, NRF forces under the command of Hamed Seifi, General Kouhestani, General Hasibullah and General Munib Amiri, have been carrying out hit and run attacks against Taliban militants in the mountainous areas of Panjshir, Kapisa and Baghlan provinces. They also reported that an assassination of a Taliban member in the Kalafgan District of Takhar Province initially thought to have been carried out by ISKP, might have been perpetrated by the NRF, although the true perpetrators are yet to be confirmed. An independent anti-Taliban militia still held territory in Samangan Province as of December 2021. On 20 December, a member of the NRF in Baghlan reported to The Independent that the local resistance attacked Taliban positions in the village of Kaftarkhaneh, with the Taliban being driven out of the village and suffering 8 casualties, with four killed and four more wounded. NRF spokesman Sibghatullah Ahmadi would go on to confirm the engagement, also stating that pro-resistance forces had conducted attacks in Badghis Province on the same day, with unknown casualties. The spokesman also claimed on 17 December that the NRF had conducted attacks in 14 Afghan provinces (Kabul, Kapisa, Samangan, Takhar, Parwan, Badghis, Laghman, Balkh, Faryab, Ghazni, Ghor, Herat, Nangarhar, and Kunar provinces), killing 61 Taliban fighters within the last 8 days, while allegedly suffering 43 casualties with one dead and 42 wounded, alleging that more pro-NRF guerilla organizations will "soon announce their presence". On 26 December, hundreds of civilians from Anaba district, Panjshir went out to protest in response to the killing of Mohammad Agha by Taliban-affiliated militants. The victim was allegedly not associated with the National Resistance Front, however some reports stated that he served as a police officer in the previous Afghan government, who returned to his home believing in the promise of amnesty for those associated with the previous government given by the Taliban after the Fall of Kabul. Local Taliban officials confirmed the killing, claiming it was a misunderstanding, while promising to prosecute the perpetrators of the killing. In response to the killing, hundreds of civilians marched to the governor's office, chanting anti-Taliban slogans like "death to the Taliban" and "long live Ahmad Massoud". While the motives for the killing of Mohammad Agha have not been confirmed, the Taliban had been engaging in numerous summary executions and forced disappearances of former members of Afghan security forces, with the victim count being over 100 as of November, 2021, contrary to the promise of amnesty given to former government associates by the Taliban. The incident also allegedly occurred days after an attack conducted by the NRF in Panjshir against the Taliban. The deputy chief of security of Panjshir Abdul Hamid Khorasani was reported to have clashed with the protesters, although no casualties were reported. On 2 January 2022, The Independent reported that in the preceding few days, the Ahmad Khan Samangani Front clashed in the village of Kichi Manghar in the Hazrati Sultan district of Samangan, killing at least two members of the Taliban including a commander, while one of the militia's commanders was killed by the Taliban in the engagement. According to the source, a few hours after the end of the clash, Taliban forces attacked the village of Kichi Mungar and killed two of Abdul Halim's relatives who were not associated with the militia. There were also reports of fighting between the NRF and the Taliban in the Ishkamish District, Takhar Province, with one Taliban and one NRF member being killed in the village of Elich during the clashes. The Taliban has so far refused to comment on the attack. In the same month, photos of NRF fighters were shown having Russian PG-7VR tandem warheads for their RPG-7s, suggesting that they have outside sources that helped them provide said warheads. Talks between NRF and Taliban representatives were held in Tehran, Iran on 8 and 9 January, but were ultimately unproductive. On 12 January, Taliban security forces arrested Makhdum Alem, a long-time Uzbek Taliban commander. This sparked protests and a short-lived revolt at Maymana, as his supporters temporarily seized the city. After four days of negotiations, the uprising ended and the locals reaccepted Taliban rule, although Alem remained under arrest. Observers believed the short-lived revolt was a sign of the remaining tensions between the northern ethnic groups and the Pashtun-dominated Taliban, with even Uzbek as well as Tajik Taliban suspicious of the government. On 21 January, the Taliban leadership announced that its security forces had killed eight resistance fighters in a clash in Balkh Province, and seized their munitions. Three days later, a battle between the NRF and Taliban erupted in Baghlan's Khost wa Fereng District. Both sides lost several fighters, with the Taliban reportedly trying to arrest suspected pro-NRF civilians and besieging the village of Kazar. By the end of January, local media claimed that NRF guerrillas were still operating and occasionally attacking Taliban groups in the provinces of Baghlan, Balkh, Badakhshan, and Faryab. In contrast, combat was no longer reported in Panjshir at the time. On 13 February, a group affiliated with the NRF announced its existence in Farah Province, one of the first pro-NRF groups to emerge in a predominantly Pashtun province. It is commanded by Idris Mobarez, who is the son of Mohammad Salim Mobarez, a former commander of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Around that time, the NRF had increased its attacks against the Taliban. On 19 February, fighting resumed in Panjshir as NRF-aligned forces launched a missile attack into Darah, while pro-NRF troops located in the mountains of Panjshir clashed with local Taliban forces. The latter confirmed the engagement, but did not provide any further details. At the same time, local Afghan media had reported that the Taliban had launched air and ground attacks against resistance positions in the Andarab District, with unknown casualties. On 16 February, the Afghanistan Islamic National & Liberation movement announced its existence, which is believed to be the only Pashtun-led anti-Taliban insurgent group so far. It is led by former Afghan Army special forces commander Abdul Mateen Sulaimankhail. On 13 April, in an interview with the Afghanistan International TV network, Sulaimankhail claimed his group was engaged in "military and political activities" in 26 out of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, although researchers[who?] questioned that claim. The group was most likely responsible for the assassination of Taliban commander Maulvi Hanzala in Lashkargah, Helmand Province on 13 March. On 12 March, a new anti-Taliban insurgent and civil group, the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), had emerged, after reports of its existence started circulating in early February 2022. The group is separate from the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, and mainly composed of former Afghan soldiers. As of early March, the AFF had already launched ambushes in Baghlan, Kapisa, Parwan, and Panjshir, with the Taliban reportedly using heavy weapons and air operations to suppress AFF-aligned resistance cells. On 22 April, two people including the nephew of Atta Muhammad Nur were killed in a firefight in Balkh against local Taliban forces. This incident was possibly connected to the emergence of the High Council of National Resistance, a rebel group which was reportedly led by Nur, and backed by many former anti-Taliban warlords and politicians such as Abdul Rashid Dostum, Muhammad Mohaqiq, and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. The High Council received support from NRF leader Ahmad Massoud. On 30 April, NRF forces led by Khari Mohammad Andarabi carried out attacks against Taliban bases in the villages of Taghanak and Paskundi in the Pul-e-Hesar district, in the Andharab region of Baghlan. Casualties were reported on both sides, with 11 Taliban fighters and one NRF commander, Sabzali Andarabi, killed in the fighting, according to Hasht-e Subh Daily. Over the preceding weeks, the NRF had carried out attacks across the northern provinces. In May 2022, the NRF announced a new offensive against the Taliban in Panjshir. On September 15, 2022, a video circulated online showed captured individuals executed for supposedly being with the NRF. On 6 May 2022, the NRF launched an offensive, reportedly capturing three districts in Panjshir Province. The NRF spokesman Ali Nazary stated that the NRF had taken control of the three district's roads, villages, and outposts, after which they besieged the local Taliban offices. He also stated that "Many Taliban fighters have asked for time to surrender. The enemy has suffered heavy casualties." Taliban officials denied any fighting in the area. Local Panjshir residents reported heavy fighting during the night. The NRF also stated that the group would continue their presence across 12 provinces, mostly in the north. On 9 May, the NRF ambushed a Taliban vehicle in Qala-e-Olang and killed an unknown number of Taliban fighters, which they responded by firing on civilians in Qasan village as retaliation for the ambush. Approximately 30 Taliban fighters had been killed in the NRF offensive as of 12 May. The Taliban subsequently sent reinforcements from other provinces to bolster their garrisons in Panjshir. Fighting was concentrated at Abdullah Khel which the NRF temporarily seized before retreating. On 17 May, the first meeting of the Supreme Council of National Resistance took place in Ankara, Turkey with Abdul Rashid Dostum being involved. On 31 May, four NRF fighters were executed by the Taliban in the Tagab District, Badakhshan, while destroying an NRF hideout in the district according to Taliban security officials. By early June, NRF guerrilla attacks in Panjshir were taking place "regular[ly]" or "nearly daily". Despite the growing number of losses on both sides, the Taliban still claimed that there was no more resistance in the valley, even as they sent up to 10,000 reinforcements to strengthen their positions in Panjshir. The NRF claimed that it had expanded its operations into 12 provinces. However, researcher Roshni Kapur argued that the different anti-Taliban rebel groups were still too fractured and divided to pose an existential threat to the Taliban government. On 10 June, local sources reported heavy clashes in the Karaman valley area in Dara District, Panjshir between the NRF and the Taliban, after the latter attacked several positions of the former. It occurred after a "two-day break" in the fighting. No casualties were reported in that instance. Two days prior, a clash occurred in the Paryan district, Panjshir, with reportedly 20 Taliban fighters and one NRF fighter killed. On 11 June 2022, a Hazara Taliban commander, Mehdi Mujahid, rebelled against the Islamic Emirate, citing anti-Hazara policies by the Taliban. As Mehdi Mujahid's forces controlled Balkhab District, the entire district consequently passed under insurgent control. Pro-republican forces, including the NRF, voiced support for Mehdi Mujahid's forces. In the following weeks, Taliban forces repeatedly attempted to retake Balkhab, but were repelled. On 16 June 2022, the NRF shot down a Taliban Mil Mi-17 in the Arezoo valley. During the shootdown of the helicopter, NRF fighters killed two Taliban fighters and captured four more. By 25 June, according to anti-Taliban sources, Mehdi Mujahid's forces had surrounded "hundreds of Taliban fighters" in the Bakhlab district, with dozens of Taliban fighters killed or wounded during the preceding days. By the end of June, NRF attacks were confirmed in Badakhshan, Kabul, Panjshir, Kapisa, and Takhar Provinces. The Taliban imposed a blockade on Kohistan District, Kapisa, as the NRF had launched an offensive there. Besides Mehdi Mujahid's rebellion, clashes between different Taliban factions were also reported in Baghlan, Bamyan, and Faryab Provinces. Between 16 and 17 June, the Taliban carried out multiple operations against NRF bases in Rokha, Anaba, and Shotul districts. In the Chamalwarda area of Rokha district alone, 51 Taliban fighters were killed or wounded, while two NRF fighters were killed and another wounded. On 22 June, an audio tape was published in which the Taliban acting minister of defence Mullah Yaqoob mentioned that several Taliban outposts in the Khavash valley in the Khost wa Fereng District were evacuated and capture by NRF forces, while complaining about the Taliban's purported lack of obedience and organization. On 8 July, NRF fighters engaged Taliban forces in the Khost district, Baghlan and took control of several areas. On 10 July, NRF forces attacked a Taliban outpost in Baghlan, killing two Taliban fighters and destroying a military vehicle. Sometime around early July, the Taliban captured Golwarz village near Bakhlab as part of a general campaign against the Bakhlab insurgents. Several war crimes were reportedly committed by the Taliban against the mostly Hazara population throughout the campaign, causing refugees to flee to neighboring provinces. Starting on 13 July, the Taliban and the NRF clashed in the Khenj and Shotul Districts of Panjshir. On 16 July, a planned offensive by the Taliban in the Arzoo valley of the Shotul district was met with an NRF counterattack led by Haseeb Qowai Markaz, which resulted in 12 Taliban dead and 9 wounded. This came after the Taliban had reportedly launched several attacks on NRF positions in the valley, only to be repelled by NRF forces. On 16 July, fighting flared up in the Qasan valley of Andarab as part of a series of clashes in Baghlan province. By the next day, the Taliban reportedly lost 17 fighters with 10 more injured, while NRF casualties were not reported besides three being injured. Fighting would continue up to 21 July, during which Taliban fighters committed war crimes including beheading a 17-year-old boy despite no confirmed affiliation with any resistance group. On 20 July, the Taliban launched an offensive against NRF positions in Warsaj District, Takhar province, reportedly gathering over 300 fighters for the job. On 23 July, according to Iranian state-owned news Pars Today, the Taliban discovered and confiscated an ammunition warehouse in Varsaj District, Takhar province. On 25 July, NRF forces based in Kapisa province attacked Taliban positions in the Kohistan District, reportedly killing three Taliban fighters and wounding two. On 27 July, a senior NRF member had announced that it had carried out an offensive against a Taliban base in the Kalahan village, Kapisa on the night of 26 July. According to the NRF, five Taliban members were killed and one was wounded in the attack. On 10 August, fighting flared up in Panjshir between the NRF and Taliban, with the latter reportedly losing 25 fighters, while no casualties were reported for the NRF side. On 15 August, the one year anniversary since the fall of Afghanistan, the NRF launched an offensive in Panjshir, reportedly capturing seven villages in the Bazarak, Dara, Annaba, Shotul, Paryan, and Khenj districts, while surrounding Taliban fighters in several positions. Up to 40 Taliban fighters were captured in the Dara district, a statement which was backed by former Vice President Amrullah Saleh. By 16 August, 58 Taliban fighters were reportedly killed, with another 12 wounded, while casualty figures for the NRF were not reported. At the same time, the Taliban launched an operation in the Ishkashim District, Takhar, only to be besieged by the NRF in the village of Anjiristan on 15 August. On the next day, clashes occurred in the Ishkashim and Chal Districts, with the Taliban reportedly suffering heavy casualties according to the NRF. In the previous two weeks, the NRF had reportedly carried out several offensive attacks in the Farkhar District. On 17 August, the Hazara anti-Taliban rebel Mehdi Mujahid was captured and executed by the Taliban in the Kohsan District of Herat Province, who was reportedly attempting to travel to Iran prior to his execution. On 18 August, the NRF and Taliban clashed in the Taghanak village of Pul-e-Hesar district in Baghlan, resulting in 10 Taliban fighters killed and 8 wounded. At the same time, more NRF-Taliban clashes reportedly occurred in the Qeshlaq village of the Rustaq District of Takhar province, in which a local member of the Taliban intelligence was killed. Simultaneously, a fight broke out in the Raghistan District of Badakhshan, with the Taliban claiming three NRF killed. On 19 August, the NRF reportedly attacked a Taliban checkpoint in the Darah District of Panjshir, resulting in 10 Taliban fighters killed according to the NRF. On 21 August, Abdul Qayyum Zakir was appointed as the military commander of Panjshir province. Long War Journal notes that Zakir appointment to lead the fight against National Resistance Front (NRF) in Panjshir and the district of Andarab is a clear indication that the NRF is challenging the Taliban's primacy in central and northern Afghanistan. At the same time, several local sources had reported that the Taliban had converted 32 schools across Panjshir into military bases, likely as a result of the increased clashes in Panjshir. On the same day, the NRF claimed that 7 Taliban members were killed and 5 others wounded as a result of a Taliban convoy hitting a roadside mine in the Rukha district of Panjshir. On 6 September 2022, the Taliban mobilized 500 fighters from Herat to be deployed in Panjshir. Young people in Jowzjan were paid by the Taliban to fight against the NRF. On 10 September, there were gunfights between NRF and Taliban forces in Hesarak, Parian, Abshar, Dara and Hessa I districts. Taliban forces in Paryan have told villagers to leave. On 14 September, the Taliban claimed to have killed 40 rebels during an anti-insurgency operation in the province. In mid-September, a video was released by Taliban militants showing the execution of at least 27 men, allegedly captured rebels somewhere in Panjshir. Afghan Witness (AW) - an open-source project based in the United Kingdom opened an investigation into the mass execution. On 21 September, a Taliban attack on an anti-Taliban base in Yakawlang district of Bamyan and Balkhab was repulsed by fighters under Mohammad Tahir Zahir with reports of four Taliban fighters wounded. On 13 December, the NRF reported three commanders were captured by Taliban fighters due to one of their own fighters having links with the Taliban government. On 26 December, NRF forces in Andarab repelled attacks from Taliban in Taghanak, Khej and Bagh Dara villages, with unconfirmed reports of casualties on both sides, which included NRF commander Khair Mohammad Andrabi. The NRF released statements to condemn Andarabi's death, who was killed while holding off a Taliban advance. On 25 January 2023, NRF forces attacked a Taliban camp in Kapisa, killing three fighters and wounding two with no casualties from the NRF. On 30 January, a SIGAR quarterly report noted the presence of NRF-Taliban clashes in Badakhshan, Baghlan, Kapisa, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Panjshir, Parwan, Sar-e Pul, and Takhar, stating that the NRF had expanded their operations outside of the eastern and north-eastern regions, but the most significant clashes occurring in Panjshir, according to UNAMA. They also noted other anti-Taliban groups clashing with the Taliban, including the Afghanistan Liberation Movement in Kandahar, the Afghanistan Freedom Front in Kandahar and Zabul, and Watandost Front in Ghazni. They also state that according to UNAMA, 22 anti-Taliban groups claimed to operate in Afghanistan, but none control significant territory. As of yet, no anti-Taliban group are considered an existential threat to the Taliban. On 23 February, a Taliban commander named Mullah Samiullah Mewand was killed in a mine explosion in the Sartepe Karte No district of Kabul. The Independent Persian reports that the mine was planted by NRF guerillas, and that Mewand was a senior commander who had arrested members of the NRF in Kabul. On 28 February, the NRF raided Taliban headquarters in Takhar's Dashti Qala District. On 15 March, locals in Baghlan reported 8 Taliban fighters killed by the NRF. On 29 March, Sibghatullah Ahmadi announced that a new season is starting with fresh raids on Taliban forces. On the same day, Admadi also claimed that an attack was carried out by the NRF against a Taliban educational centre in the Pol-e Chakri area of Kabul, resulting in significant Special Taliban Unit casualties, although no concrete number was given. On 10 April, clashes in the Shatal District of Panjshir resulted in the death of AFF commander Akmal Amir and 8 of his subordinates. 5 Taliban were killed in the fighting. The fighting reportedly started due to the Taliban launching a major military operation against AFF and NRF positions in the village of Henroh-Bala in Koklamy valley of Salang district in Parwan province. Fighting continued in the Salang district for the next few days, resulting in the death of AFF member Fahim Salangi and six other members of the group on 11 April. Another identified NRF commander found dead was Nasir Ahmad Andarabi. In response to the clashes, on 14 April, the Taliban detained 100 individuals in the district for suspected collaboration with anti-Taliban groups. On 1 May, the NRF claimed its fighters killed two Taliban soldiers in an assault on a Taliban outpost in Parwan Province. The attack came two days after insurgents from the AFF killed two Taliban fighters and wounded another in an attack on a police station in Kabul. On 7 May, the NRF claimed that its fighters had killed 8 Taliban fighters and injured 15 losing 4 NRF fighters in Khost district of Baghlan Province. The clashes came after the Taliban conducted house to house searches in the Jangalak village causing a skirmish to break out between NRF and Taliban forces lasting up to 10 hours. The NRF also confirmed that the Taliban were using heavy weapons and barrel bombs during the attacks. On 4 June, the AFF conducted an attack in Baglan province, resulting in two Taliban deaths and four injuries. On 4 July, the AFF announced the killing of a Taliban member and the injuring of three other members in Kapisa Province. On 28 July, the NRF attacked Taliban positions in Kapisa province, resulting in three Taliban deaths caused by snipers, with unknown casualties due to rocket fire. The NRF had also announced it carried out attacks in Takhar, Badakhshan, Kapisa, Parwan, and Kabul provinces. This series of attacks represented a shift in strategy in the NRF and AFF from frontal attacks to guerilla attacks, including the use of weapons equipped with night-vision cameras to attack the Taliban. On 31 July, the NRF conducted another attack in the same area, resulting in further two Taliban deaths, with unknown NRF casualties. On 5 August, the NRF claimed an attack on Taliban intelligence agents, killing four in Kabul and wounding one. In Takhar province, NRF fighters killed two Taliban fighters, including a local commander. On 14 August, NRF forces in Badakhshan province attacked a Taliban base at Sina village, Jurm district with three Taliban fighters killed and seizing their weapons and ammo. On 16 August, NRF fighters in Takhar province killed two Taliban fighters and wounded two. On 17 August, locals in Badakhshan province reported the deaths of four NRF fighters, including a commander, during a gunfight with Taliban forces. On 2 September, the NRF reported killing two Taliban fighters in Baghlan and Kapisa provinces. On 5 September, the NRF reported the death of Qamaruddin Andarabi, a senior commander in Andarab district, Baghlan by an alleged mole working for the Taliban. On 20 September, the AFF claimed to have killed a senior Taliban commander in Puli Khumri, along with four other Taliban members. The NRF and Afghanistan Freedom Front claimed to have killed at least 50 Taliban officials and soldiers during November. Analysts noted that the NRF lacked the strength to topple the Taliban at least for the near future, but appear to be creating political and governance challenges for the Taliban. Additionally, former Afghan military officials opened the office of Afghanistan United Front in the United States and Sami Sadat, a former Afghan general, asked for U.S. help during a hearing with the U.S. House of Representatives. On 12 December, the Afghanistan Freedom Front claimed to have killed three Taliban fighters and wounded two others by attacking a Taliban outpost in Aybak city of Samangan province. The AFF had been increasing their attacks across Afghanistan in recent weeks. As of December 2023, NRF leader Ahmad Massoud claimed that the NRF was conducting attacks against the Taliban in 20 out of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. On 11 January 2024, the Afghanistan Freedom Front claimed responsibility for an attack on a Taliban intelligence forces' convoy in Kabul's Khairkhana area, killing three Taliban and wounding another two. The Taliban convoy was allegedly targeting girls and detaining them in the Panjsad Family neighbourhood, something which the AFF condemned as the AFF pledged to stand up for women's rights in Afghanistan. It was reported on 26 February that NRF fighters targeted Kabul International Airport, killing four Taliban fighters and wounding three others. On 9 March, the NRF reported carrying out attacks against Taliban fighters in Parwan and Herat with four Taliban fighters killed, including the chief of staff of Bagram division. On 5 April, the NRF claimed responsibility for an assault on a Taliban base in Takhar, which killed one Taliban fighter. On 13 April, the AFF reported their fighters killed two Taliban fighters in Kabul. On 17 April, it was reported that the Afghanistan Freedom Front had resumed guerrilla attacks on Taliban targets. The NRF also claimed responsibility for an attack on a vehicle in Kabul's fourth police district which killed three Taliban fighters. On 27 April, the NRF reported that they killed two Taliban fighters in Herat. On 18 May, the AFF attempted to assassinate Hibatullah Akhundzada, the Supreme Leader of Afghanistan, which failed to kill the Supreme Leader but did succeed in killing three members of the Taliban's special security guard unit and injuring another. On 24 May, the NRF launched an attack in Herat, killing two Taliban fighters and injuring another. On 8 June, more than 50 Shia figures from Afghanistan gathered in Europe and said that the Shia community must, if necessary, stand against the oppression of the Taliban, even through armed resistance. On 21 June, the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) published documentation of a surge in anti-Taliban attacks in Afghanistan, stating that NRF and AAF forces carried out 29 attacks, including 20 in Kabul, in the preceding three months. UNAMA stated that the attack count was a lower limit, since Taliban repression of the media made verification difficult. UNAMA judged that the attacks "did not pose a serious challenge" to Taliban rule. NRF spokesperson Ali Maisam Nazary stated that the NRF had carried out 160 "successful operations" in 2024. On 1 September, in an interview with CNN, Massoud claimed that the NRF had more than 5,000 permanent forces scattered in some 20 provinces and had conducted 207 operations in the country since January. Massoud claimed that the Republican insurgency was a "fight for the soul and future of our nation, and we are determined to win, no matter the odds." On 6 September, the NRF claimed that 13 Taliban fighters were killed with six wounded in operations conducted in Herat and Takhar. On 12 September, the AFF claimed killing six Taliban fighters in Kabul and Balkh. On 13 October, the AFF claimed killing three Taliban members in Kabul, including one intelligence official. On 4 November, the Asia Times reported that the AFF had conducted 16 attacks across 7 provinces in a fortnight, and had even gone as far as attacking the Taliban's interior ministry in Kabul on October 18, killing four fighters. The Asia Times reported that the confidence of these anti-Taliban groups is rising. The AFF used the third anniversary of the Taliban’s return to call for better “unity, cohesion, and alignment” among all anti-Taliban groups, while veteran warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum has recently called a government in exile to overthrow the Taliban with the backing of the international community. On 22 November, the FDD's Long War Journal reported that General Yasin Zia and the Afghan Freedom Front had been taking a more prominent role in anti-Taliban resistance. General Zia told the FDD in an interview that "“In 2025, we plan to place more political and military pressure on the Taliban...We’re fighting for equality, justice, and to return the power to the Afghan people.” Daoud Naji, head of the AFF's Political Committee, told LWJ "In the beginning, most of our attacks were on small checkpoints, but our operations are becoming more sophisticated because we’re attracting more former Afghan Security Force members.” On 29 December, a major attack occurred, when the NRF attacked a convoy of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, killing 10 Taliban soldiers and destroying 3 vehicles. On 29 December, an explosion targeted the Taliban Ministry of Interior Affairs in Kabul, killing 10 Taliban fighters and wounding five more. The NRF claimed responsibility, and said that a Taliban commander was killed and three military vehicles destroyed. This came just after Pakistan launched airstrikes into Afghanistan, targeting the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), in retaliation for an attack in South Waziristan in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province which reportedly killed 16 Pakistani soldiers. The airstrike led to a large escalation in the already violent Afghanistan–Pakistan border skirmishes. This led some to believe that Pakistan was supporting the NRF and other Afghan resistance groups as payback for the Afghan Taliban's support for the Pakistan Taliban. On 11 January 2025, Afghanistan International reported that Ali Maisam Nazary, the head of foreign relations of the National Resistance Front, called on Donald Trump and his administration to support their movement against terrorism. Further, the journal reported that Abbas Stanekzai, the deputy foreign minister of the Taliban, was seeking to establish a relationship with the US president. On 24 February, Ahmad Massoud stated in an interview with the Hudson Institute that he wished for closer cooperation with the United States and Donald Trump to enable a free and democratic Afghanistan. On 10 May, the AFF reportedly killed and wounded Taliban fighters in Kunduz and Panjshir. On 17 May, the NRF claimed that they killed 13 Taliban fighters and wounded four during an attack on a Taliban base in Dara district, which was confirmed by local residents. On 16 August, the AFF reported that they killed 225 Taliban fighters after they carried out a total of 88 attacks since the beginning of 2025. They also reportedly carried out raids in Takhar and Kunduz provinces, killing and wounding seven Taliban fighters. The NRF carried out its own operation, raiding a Taliban checkpoint in Kunduz, killing two and wounding two Taliban fighters. On 19 August, the Islamic Liberation Movement of the People of Afghanistan reported that its fighters killed Mawlawi Hassan in Herat. During the border skirmishes between Pakistan and the Taliban in October 2025, the NRF released a statement in support of the Pakistani strikes against the Taliban. The NRF itself conducted an attack on 15 October, assassinating Qari Bashir, the deputy head of the Taliban's Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice in Kunduz. On 30 November, the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) claimed that its fighters killed three Taliban members and wounded two more in a rocket attack in Badakhshan Province, Afghanistan. The NRF claimed an attack on the Taliban's check post in Panjshir on 7 December 2025, killing 17 members of the group. Foreign involvement As of 23 August 2021, there was no public support for the resistance from the international community. At the start of the conflict, the US and other potential allies were focused on the concurrent Kabul airlift, which required the Taliban's cooperation. Massoud's op-ed in The Washington Post requesting Western support may be evidence of a lack of enthusiasm (for the resistance) in the US government. On 21 August 2021, former Indian Chief of the Army Staff Shankar Roychowdhury said that the Government of India must reach out to Panjshir-based resistance forces alongside Taliban factions that may be friendly to India. On 25 August 2021, Bilal Y. Saab, an ex-Pentagon senior advisor, and Mick Mulroy, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, Marine veteran and ex-CIA Special Activities Center operator, argued in a Time editorial that Washington, D.C. should provide support in Afghanistan by allowing the CIA to station its officers with counterterrorism responsibilities to secretly assist anti-Taliban resistance groups. U.S. senator Lindsey Graham and representative Michael Waltz advocated for giving NRF support so that they can hold their ground against the Taliban after they captured Kabul. On 27 August, Tajiks from Kulob, Tajikistan volunteered to prepare to fight against the Taliban, despite warnings from Tajik officials that it can be deemed illegal. In an interview on 2 September, Erika Simpson, president of the Canadian Peace Research Association, said that it was potentially risky for a country to publicly support the resistance from inside Afghanistan and suggested that it was better to support anti-Taliban resistance groups based overseas. On 6 September, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh strongly condemned the Taliban assault on the Panjshir Valley. On 10 September, a road named Panjshir Alley in Tehran was officially named and approved by the Tehran City Council. In mid-September 2021, in a move aimed at increasing inclusivity in the Taliban government, 20 European Parliament members filed a motion to invite NRF leader Ahmad Massoud to address the European Council and the EP, just as his father did 20 years earlier. The Spectator noted in a May 2024 interview with NRF leader Ahmad Massoud that the NRF runs a significant lobbying operation, with an office in Washington DC, and that it had friendly senators such as U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham supporting its cause. Following the death of Fahim Dashti, a journalist with the Afghanistan National Journalists Union and spokesperson for the National Resistance Front, officials from the NRF accused Pakistan of aiding the Taliban and stated that Dashti had died in a drone strike carried out by the Pakistan Air Force. The former parliamentary representative of Samangan Province, Zia Arianjad reiterated the claim to the Iranian Aamaj News, stating that PAF was assisting the Taliban in Panjshir with drone strikes using smart bombs. According to defense analyst Babak Taghvaee, Pakistan was using CH-4 drones to assist the Taliban in Panjshir. Faiz Hameed, the head of the Inter-Services Intelligence, the military intelligence agency of Pakistan, had visited Kabul prior to Dashti's death, to assist the Taliban in reorganising the Afghan military according to a senior Pakistani official. Tajuden Soroush, a correspondent with Iran International, stated that Kamaluddin Nezami, the governor of Panjshir, had told him that drones were used to target the resistance on several occasions. Fox News reported that a CENTCOM source had identified Pakistani special forces accompanied with drone strikes were assisting the Taliban. Republican Congressman Adam Kinzinger stated that if the report were confirmed then the United States should sanction Pakistan for creating and protecting the Taliban. According to the Austrian public broadcaster Österreichischer Rundfunk, the reports are unconfirmed. The Taliban denied the claim that Dashti had died in a drone strike, and the Pakistani Foreign Office has rejected the reports that allege Pakistani involvement in Panjshir. Analysis Shortly after the fall of Kabul, journalists Carlotta Gall and Adam Nossiter wrote in The New York Times that the international community would be in a bind if they showed some form of support for the resistance because of the airlift operations that were then ongoing. Abdul Matin Beyk suggested that other anti-Taliban forces were waiting to see if the Panjshir-based fighters would either resist to the end or keep considering negotiations with Taliban representatives. He suggested that their successes could inspire others to do the same. Analysts Bill Roggio and Andrew Tobin speculated that the eventual success of the Taliban offensive against the Panjshir Valley in early September 2021 might have been related to the previous attempts of the NRF to expand into neighbouring districts. Accordingly, the NRF would have been overextended and had not prepared its defences well enough. The Institute for the Study of War assessed that the NRF controlled at least five villages in Tagab District, Badakhshan Province for a few days in June 2022, and a valley in Khost wa Fereng District, Baghlan Province for less than one month in July 2022. On 17 November 2022, FDD's Long War Journal assessed that the NRF controlled a small number of bases, villages, and valleys across eight districts in northeastern Afghanistan. On 29 November 2022, the Institute for the Study of War assessed that the NRF conducted defensive maneuvers in several areas of northeastern Afghanistan. As of 15 August 2023[update], FDD's Long War Journal assesses that the NRF and allies conduct guerilla operations but do not control territory. By 22 May 2024, FDD's Long War Journal assessed that the NRF and its allies had gained in strength since their inception but did not yet pose a threat to the Taliban's rule. The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization stated on 28 May 2024 that the AFF and NRF were increasing their cooperation, such as coordinating anti-Taliban attacks in Kabul, and expected the AFF and NRF to conduct their first joint military operations in mid 2024. The report stated that while the NRF and AFF were still too weak to hold territory, the Taliban are incapable of preventing guerilla attacks and are unable to retaliate against the resistance. The report concludes by arguing that the early 2024 activities of the resistance fighters had already made the Taliban commanders and influential functionaries afraid to move around the city at night, due to the ability of urban guerrilla groups to conduct targeted operations, and that the NRF's intelligence wing had managed to infiltrate and seize significant sensitive data of both the Taliban leadership and its governmental departments. According to the Hudson Institute in August 2024, the NRF's objective was to continue to hold onto its presence in Panjshir, where the resistance continued to control much of the mountainous terrain of the province, and grow its grassroots armed resistance across the whole of Afghanistan. In the longer term, the resistance's goal would be to control some districts outside Panjshir, ultimately building toward a larger base of operations to use against the Taliban similar to the Northern Alliance in the 1990s. The Hudson Institute analysis found that the NRF was also actively working to discourage international recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, while pushing themselves as a credible alternative. The article found that Massoud was promoting ethnic diversity amongst the resistance, because while the NRF is largely ethnically Tajik, it had been increasing its representation of Uzbeks and Hazaras in its conferences with like-minded groups. The article stated that the Taliban possessed far greater manpower and equipment due to the NRF's lack of international backing, and urged American support towards the NRF. As of November 2025, the Republican resistance has struggled to garner political support from Western countries. However, due to deteriorating Afghanistan–Pakistan relations following the 2025 Afghanistan–Pakistan conflict, Islamabad has opened channels of dialogue with opposition representatives and is exploring the possibility of supporting the Republican opposition. While Pakistani support would make many resistance members uncomfortable due to Pakistan's past support for the Taliban, it is believed that potential Pakistani support for the opposition could play a critical role in the resistance's chances. See also Notes References |
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Contents Afghan conflict Ongoing low-level conflict: The Afghan conflict (Pashto: دافغانستان جنګونه; Dari: درگیری افغانستان) is the series of events that have kept Afghanistan in a near-continuous state of armed conflict since the 1970s. Early instability followed the collapse of the Kingdom of Afghanistan in the largely non-violent 1973 coup d'état, which deposed Afghan monarch Mohammad Zahir Shah in absentia, ending his 40-year-long reign. With the concurrent establishment of the Republic of Afghanistan, headed by Mohammad Daoud Khan, the country's relatively peaceful and stable period in modern history came to an end. However, all-out fighting did not erupt until after 1978, when the Saur Revolution violently overthrew Khan's government and established the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Subsequent unrest over the radical reforms that were being pushed by the then-ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) led to unprecedented violence, prompting a large-scale pro-PDPA military intervention by the Soviet Union in 1979. In the ensuing Soviet–Afghan War, the anti-Soviet Afghan mujahideen received extensive support from Pakistan, the United States, and Saudi Arabia in a joint covert effort that was dubbed Operation Cyclone. Although the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the various mujahideen factions continued to fight against the PDPA government, which collapsed in the face of the Peshawar Accord in 1992. However, the Peshawar Accord failed to remain intact in light of the mujahideen's representatives' inability to reach an agreement on a power-sharing coalition for the new government, triggering a multi-sided civil war between them. By 1996, the Taliban, supported by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, had seized the capital city of Kabul in addition to approximately 90% of the country, while northern Afghanistan remained under the authority of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. During this time, the Northern Alliance's Islamic State of Afghanistan enjoyed widespread international recognition and was represented at the United Nations, as opposed to the Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which only received diplomatic recognition from three nations. Despite the fall of Kabul to the Taliban, the Northern Alliance continued to resist in another civil war for the next five years. After the September 11 attacks were carried out by al-Qaeda against the United States in 2001, the Taliban granted Saudi-born jihadist Osama bin Laden political asylum in the Islamic Emirate's territory. The group's subsequent non-compliance with the demand by the Bush administration to extradite him prompted the American-led invasion of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, which bolstered the Northern Alliance by toppling the Islamic Emirate and installing the Afghan Transitional Authority in 2002. The invasion triggered the 20-year-long War in Afghanistan, in which NATO and NATO-allied countries fought alongside the nascent Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to combat the Taliban insurgency. During the Battle of Tora Bora, the American-led military coalition failed to capture bin Laden, who subsequently relocated to Pakistan and remained there until he was killed by U.S. SEAL Team Six in Abbottabad in 2011. Nonetheless, the fighting in Afghanistan continued, eventually leading to the 2020–2021 American withdrawal and ultimately ending with the 2021 Taliban offensive, which led to the re-establishment of the present-day Islamic Emirate. Though the country-wide war ended in 2021, clashes and unrest currently persist in some parts of Afghanistan due to the ISIS–Taliban conflict and the anti-Taliban Republican insurgency. As of 2026[update], the collapsed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan remains the internationally recognized government of the country. List of major events By 2014, adding different estimates of casualties for some of these individual conflicts together, 1,405,111 to 2,084,468 people had been killed over the duration of the Afghanistan conflict.[disputed – discuss] Prelude From 1933 to 1973, the Kingdom of Afghanistan experienced a lengthy period of peace and relative stability. It was ruled as a monarchy by King Zahir Shah, who belonged to the Afghan Musahiban Barakzai dynasty. In the 1960s, Afghanistan as a constitutional monarchy held limited parliamentary elections. Shah was overthrown by his cousin Mohammad Daoud Khan in July 1973, after discontent with the monarchy grew in the urban areas of Afghanistan. The country had experienced several droughts, and charges of corruption and poor economic policies were leveled against the ruling dynasty. Khan abolished the monarchy and declared the Republic of Afghanistan, and he became the first president of Afghanistan. He was supported by a faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Afghanistan's communist party, which was founded in 1965 and enjoyed a strong relationship with the Soviet Union. In The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region, Neamatollah Nojumi writes: "The establishment of the Republic of Afghanistan increased the Soviet investment in Afghanistan and the PDPA influence in the government's military and civil bodies." In 1976, alarmed by the growing power of the PDPA and the party's strong affiliation with the Soviet Union, Khan tried to scale back the PDPA's influence. He dismissed PDPA members from their government posts, appointed conservative elements instead and finally announced the dissolution of the PDPA, arresting senior party members. On 27 April 1978, the PDPA and military units loyal to the PDPA revolted and killed Khan, his immediate family and bodyguards in a violent coup during the battle to seize control of the capital, Kabul, in the Saur Revolution. As the PDPA had chosen a weekend holiday to conduct the coup, when many government employees were having a day off, Khan was not able to fully activate the well-trained armed forces which remained loyal to him to counter the coup. The PDPA's Democratic Republic The PDPA formed a new government through a 'revolutionary council', which attempted to balance the two major competing factions within itself—the more radical and revolutionary Khalq and the more moderate and reformist Parcham. The Khalqist wing, led by the charismatic Nur Muhammad Taraki, who became the new chairman, gained supremacy in the aftermath of the revolution and adopted a program of land reform, abolition of feudal and tribal structures and equality for women. The council also prefixed the term "Democratic" to the country's Daoud-era name, making it the "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." Though these reforms were supported by the army and city-dwelling population, they opposed the very traditional, religious and tribal customs of rural Afghanistan, which in turn led to strong rural and clerical opposition to the government and various anti-government uprisings. Around this time, the party came to be influenced by Hafizullah Amin, who undermined Taraki despite being a fellow Khalqist, purged Parchamites from the party and began ruthlessly cracking down on political opposition. Therefore, a hostile doctrine against any political dissent was adopted, whether inside or outside the party. Taraki, who had ruled for only about a year, was assassinated by Amin, who took over formal leadership of the country. Amin was known for his independent and nationalist inclinations and was also seen by many as a ruthless leader. He has been accused of killing tens of thousands of Afghan civilians at Pul-e-Charkhi and other national prisons while cracking down on both the opposition and the Parchamites: 27,000 politically motivated executions reportedly took place at Pul-e-Charkhi prison alone. Afghans generally held Amin personally responsible for most of the repression, while the Soviet Union considered his government illegitimate, discredited and doomed to collapse in a civil war. The Soviet Union secured an alliance with the more moderate Babrak Karmal and his Parchamite faction, invading Afghanistan on 24 December 1979 and originally meeting only limited resistance. Amin was deposed from power almost immediately, as he and 200 of his guards were killed during Operation Storm-333 on 27 December by Soviet Army Spetsnaz, replaced by Karmal. After deployment into Afghanistan, Soviet forces, whom the locals dubbed Shuravi, along with government forces would begin to engage in a protracted counterinsurgency war against a wide coalition of various anti-government insurgent forces, who in turn styled themselves as mujahideen—Islamic holy warriors. Karmal declared a general amnesty for people imprisoned during Taraki and Amin's rule and restored the Afghan national symbols in place of the Khalqist red flag. He also granted several concessions to religious leaders and at least partially restored property seized during the original Khalqist land reform. However, this did not satisfy the opposition, as they considered his ascension to power during the Soviet intervention to be a mark that he would rule as a "Soviet puppet", thus continuing their insurgency against the government. The Soviet government realized that a military solution to the conflict would require far more troops. Because of this they discussed troop withdrawals and searched for a political and peaceful solution as early as 1980, but they never took any serious steps in that direction until 1988. Early Soviet military reports confirm the difficulties the Soviet army had while fighting on the mountainous terrain, for which the Soviet army had no training. Parallels with the Vietnam War were frequently referred to by Soviet army officers. Policy failures and the stalemate that ensued after the Soviet intervention led the Soviet leadership to become highly critical of Karmal's leadership. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union was able to depose Karmal and replace him with Mohammad Najibullah. Karmal's leadership was seen as a failure by the Soviet Union because of the rise of violence and crime during his administration. Najibullah, another Parchamite, attempted to end the insurgency through a policy of accommodation and power sharing known as the National Reconciliation. He reversed several of his predecessor's unpopular reforms, abolished the one-party system, reinstated Islam as the state religion (though still maintaining a fairly secular legal and political setup), replaced the Revolutionary Council with a republican presidency and bicameral parliament, removed communist symbols deemed "provocative" to the opposition from the country's national emblem, dropped the "Democratic" prefix from the country's name, offered amnesty to mujahideen fighters and called for a six-month ceasefire in which fighting would stop in exchange for political negotiations intended to create a coalition government between the PDPA and various rebel groups in an attempt to end the country's crisis. The talks did not succeed in reconciling the government and the mujahideen, though it was noted that they increased the government's popularity among urban areas, stabilized the armed forces and led to a round of defections from disillusioned mujahideen fighters to government militias. Despite this, the only insurgent group to fully reconcile with the government was the Shia-dominated Afghan Hizbullah. A mujahideen boycott of the 1988 elections, which were the first-ever Afghan elections to allow competing political parties, foiled Najibullah's attempt to reconstruct the nation's parliament, who in turn ordered 50 seats be left vacant to offer to the mujahideen if they decided to reconcile at a later date. Moreover, though Najibullah presented himself personally as a pious Muslim and restored the legal status of Islam, his government was unable to acquire the same Islamic credentials that the mujahideen forces wielded, which in turn meant that many of his reforms were not nearly as successful at convincing the devout, conservative rural and tribal population as Najibullah had hoped. Most importantly, Najibullah oversaw the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The withdrawal was to be done according to the Geneva Accords, which entailed a full removal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in exchange for the end of American and Pakistan support to the mujahideen. Throughout the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, troop convoys came under attack by Afghan rebel fighters. In all, 523 Soviet soldiers were killed during the withdrawal. The total withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan was completed in February 1989. The last Soviet soldier to leave was Lieutenant General Boris Gromov, leader of the Soviet military operations in Afghanistan at the time of the Soviet invasion. In total, 14,453 Soviet soldiers died during the Soviet–Afghan War. Though the Soviet forces did withdraw, the mujahideen refused to abide by the accords since they were not party to the negotiations. Furthermore, the United States reneged on its agreement and continued funding the insurgent groups even after the Soviet withdrawal. Najibullah's government further complained to the UN that Pakistan had also continued supplying, training and arming the rebel forces fighting against his government. The Soviet war had a damaging impact on Afghanistan. The death of up to 2 million Afghans in the war has been described as a "genocide" by a number of sources. Five to ten million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran, amounting to 1/3 of the prewar population of the country, and another 2 million were displaced within the country. Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province functioned as an organisational and networking base for the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance, with the province's influential Deobandi ulama playing a major supporting role in promoting the jihad. After the Soviet withdrawal, the Republic of Afghanistan under Najibullah continued to face resistance from the various mujahideen forces and instituted a state of emergency as he prepared to fend off the armed opposition on his own. Nevertheless, Najibullah received funding and arms from the Soviet Union until 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed. For several years the Afghan army had actually increased their effectiveness past levels ever achieved during the Soviet military presence. The Afghan army was able to prove itself in combat during the Battle of Jalalabad in 1989, where it defeated a major assault on the city by mujahideen forces with U.S. and Pakistani backing, inflicting on them greater than 3,000 losses. Moreover, it was actually able to go on the offensive, forestalling several more attacks and preventing the governmental collapse that both American and Pakistani policymakers expected. This greatly increased army morale and demoralized the rebel groups, who had hoped for a quick post-withdrawal victory. In 1990, Najibullah reformed the PDPA into the Watan (Homeland) Party, which rejected Marxism–Leninism in favour of leftist Afghan nationalism. This did not necessarily have the desired effect, as it did not lead to significant drop in opposition, but did enrage several of his party members, not only Khalqists but also pro-Karmal Parchamites, who accused him of conceding too much of the Saur Revolution's gains to the mujahideen. Najibullah rejected the accusations, stating that his actions had been done in an attempt to preserve and protect the gains of the revolution, not sacrifice them. Regardless, these reforms caused further rifts within the ruling party. These tensions boiled over in the 1990 Afghan coup d'état attempt, in which a group of disillusioned Khalqists, led by Defence Minister Shahnawaz Tanai, attempted to overthrow Najibullah with the aid of Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin and external support from Pakistan. The coup failed but led to many pro-Khalqist officers either fleeing the country or being sacked by Najibullah, considerably weakening the Afghan armed forces. The resulting instability led to a defeat in the Siege of Khost a year later to the hands of Pakistan-backed mujahideen forces after ten years of heavy fighting. Another blow was dealt to his government in late 1991, as the dissolution of the Soviet Union signalled the end of foreign aid for Najibullah's Afghanistan, as Russian president Boris Yeltsin had neither the resources nor the desire to aid the Afghan government. Because of this and with Afghanistan being landlocked and not having a fuel supply of its own, the relatively modern and formidable Afghan Air Force essentially became grounded by a lack of fuel, which in turn made it all the more difficult to supply the army and various pro-government militias spread across Afghanistan's harsh geography, consequently causing a considerable increase in desertion. A few months later and with the war still continuing, Najibullah offered his entire government's resignation and voiced his support for a United Nations plan for a transitional administration including both Watan and all mujahideen groups in the country. This announcement led to the desertion of many of his own supporters, who feared the end of his government. In these circumstances, Abdul Rashid Dostum, a leading army general, created an alliance with the Shura-e Nazar of Ahmad Shah Massoud and turned against Najibullah, taking with him over 40,000 previously pro-government soldiers. Najibullah sent a high-ranking army general to talk to Dostum and attempt to salvage the situation, only to learn that the general had also defected, alongside his own foreign minister. These defections devastated the Afghan Armed Forces' morale, and large parts of the Afghan government and armed forces capitulated to the forces of Massoud in early 1992. By April, Najibullah stated that he would be handing power to a seven-member transitional council and resigning immediately. Mujahideen forces loyal to Massoud and Dostum entered and captured Kabul shortly, thereafter, leading to the definitive end of PDPA/Watan rule in Afghanistan. Najibullah was granted safety by the UN office in Kabul. He had obtained political asylum in India but was unable to leave as he was prevented from doing so by forces loyal to Massoud, Dostum and Hekmatyar. Because of this, he was forced to remain in the UN building until he was captured, dragged from a truck, castrated and executed by the Taliban several years later. After the Soviet defeat, The Wall Street Journal named Massoud "the Afghan who won the Cold War". He had defeated the Soviet forces nine times in his home region of the Panjshir Valley in northeastern Afghanistan. Pakistan tried to install Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in power in Afghanistan despite the opposition of all other mujahideen commanders and factions. As early as October 1990, the Inter-Services Intelligence had devised a plan for Hekmatyar to conduct a mass bombardment of the Afghan capital Kabul with possible Pakistani troop enforcements. This unilateral ISI-Hekmatyar plan came although the thirty most important mujahideen commanders had agreed on holding a conference inclusive of all Afghan groups to decide on a common future strategy. Peter Tomsen reports that the protest by the other mujahideen commanders was like a "firestorm". Ahmad Zia Massoud, the brother of Ahmad Shah Massoud, said that his faction strongly opposed the plan and like other factions would take measures if any "Pakistani troops reinforced Hekmatyar". Abdul Haq was reportedly so angry about the ISI plan that he was "red in the face". And Nabi Mohammad, another commander, pointed out that "Kabul's 2 million could not escape Hekmatyar's rocket bombardment—there would be a massacre." Representatives for Massoud, Haq and Wardak said that "Hekmatyar's rocketing of Kabul ... would produce a civilian bloodbath." The United States finally put pressure on Pakistan to stop the 1990 plan, which was subsequently called off until 1992. Peshawar Accord and Afghan Civil War After the fall of Najibullah's government in 1992, the Afghan political parties agreed on a power-sharing agreement, the Peshawar Accord. The Peshawar Accord created the Islamic State of Afghanistan and appointed an interim government for a transitional period to be followed by general democratic elections. Human Rights Watch said: "The sovereignty of Afghanistan was vested formally in the Islamic State of Afghanistan, an entity created in April 1992, after the fall of the Soviet-backed Najibullah government. ... With the exception of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, all of the parties ... were ostensibly unified under this government in April 1992. ... Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, for its part, refused to recognize the government for most of the period discussed in this report and launched attacks against government forces and Kabul generally. ... Shells and rockets fell everywhere." Hekmatyar received operational, financial and military support from Pakistan. On Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, Afghanistan expert Amin Saikal says that "Pakistan was keen to gear up for a breakthrough in Central Asia. ... Islamabad could not possibly expect the new Islamic government leaders ... to subordinate their own nationalist objectives in order to help Pakistan realize its regional ambitions. ... Had it not been for the ISI's logistic support and supply of a large number of rockets, Hekmatyar's forces would not have been able to target and destroy half of Kabul. In addition, Saudi Arabia and Iran—as competitors for regional hegemony—supported Afghan militias hostile towards each other. According to Human Rights Watch, Iran was assisting the Shia Hazara Hezb-i Wahdat forces of Abdul Ali Mazari, as Iran was attempting to maximize Wahdat's military power and influence. Saudi Arabia supported the Wahhabite Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and his Ittihad-i Islami faction. Conflict between the two militias soon escalated into a full-scale war. A publication by the George Washington University describes the situation: "[O]utside forces saw instability in Afghanistan as an opportunity to press their own security and political agendas." Owing to the sudden initiation of the war, working government departments, police units or a system of justice and accountability for the newly created Islamic State of Afghanistan did not have time to form. Atrocities were committed by individuals of the different armed factions while Kabul descended into lawlessness and chaos as described in reports by Human Rights Watch and the Afghanistan Justice Project. Because of the chaos, some leaders increasingly had only nominal control over their (sub-)commanders. For civilians there was little security from murder, rape and extortion. An estimated 25,000 people died during the most intense period of bombardment by Hekmatyar's Hezb-i Islami and the Junbish-i Milli forces of Dostum, who had created an alliance with Hekmatyar in 1994. Half a million people fled Afghanistan. Human Rights Watch writes: "Rare ceasefires, usually negotiated by representatives of Ahmad Shah Massoud, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi or Burhanuddin Rabbani [the interim government], or officials from the International Committee of the Red Cross, commonly collapsed within days." Southern Afghanistan was not under the control of foreign-backed militias nor was it under the control of the government in Kabul; instead, it was ruled by local leaders such as Gul Agha Sherzai and their militias. In 1994, the Taliban (a movement which originated in Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam religious schools for Afghan refugees in Pakistan) also developed as a political-religious force in Afghanistan, reportedly in opposition to the tyranny of the local governor. Mullah Omar founded his movement with less than 50 armed madrassah students in his home town of Kandahar. When the Taliban took control of the city in 1994, they forced dozens of local Pashtun leaders who had presided over a situation of complete lawlessness and atrocities to surrender. In 1994, the Taliban took power in several provinces in southern and central Afghanistan. In late 1994, most of the militia factions (Hezb-i Islami, Junbish-i Milli and Hezb-i Wahdat) which had been fighting in the battle for control of Kabul were defeated militarily by forces of the Islamic State's Secretary of Defense Massoud. Bombardment of the capital came to a halt. Massoud tried to initiate a nationwide political process with the goal of national consolidation and democratic elections, also inviting the Taliban to join the process. Massoud had united political and cultural personalities, governors, commanders, clergymen and representatives to reach a lasting agreement. Massoud, like most people in Afghanistan, saw this conference as a small hope for democracy and for free elections. His favourite for candidacy to the presidency was Dr. Mohammad Yusuf, the first democratic prime minister under Zahir Shah, the former king. In the first meeting representatives from 15 different Afghan provinces met, in the second meeting there were already 25 provinces participating. Massoud went unarmed to talk to several Taliban leaders in Maidan Shar, but the Taliban declined to join this political process. When Massoud returned safely, the Taliban leader who had received him as his guest paid with his life: he was killed by other senior Taliban for failing to execute Massoud while the possibility was there. The Taliban started to shell Kabul in early 1995 but they were defeated by the forces of the Islamic State government under Massoud. Amnesty International, referring to the Taliban offensive, wrote in a 1995 report: "This is the first time in several months that Kabul civilians have become the targets of rocket attacks and shelling aimed at residential areas in the city." The Taliban's early victories in 1994 were followed by a series of defeats that resulted in heavy losses. Pakistan provided strong support to the Taliban. Many analysts like Amin Saikal describe the Taliban as developing into a proxy force for Pakistan's regional interests which the Taliban deny. On 26 September 1996, as the Taliban, with military support from Pakistan and financial support from Saudi Arabia, prepared for another major offensive, Massoud ordered a full retreat from Kabul. The Taliban seized Kabul on 27 September 1996 and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Taliban vs. Northern Alliance The Taliban imposed on the parts of Afghanistan under their control their interpretation of Islam. The Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) stated: "To PHR's knowledge, no other regime in the world has methodically and violently forced half of its population into virtual house arrest, prohibiting them on pain of physical punishment." Women were required to wear the all-covering burqa, they were banned from public life and denied access to health care and education, windows needed to be covered so that women could not be seen from the outside, and they were not allowed to laugh in a manner that could be heard by others. The Taliban, without any real court or hearing, cut people's hands or arms off when they were accused of stealing. Taliban hit-squads watched the streets, conducting arbitrary brutal public beatings. The Taliban began preparing offensives against the remaining areas controlled by Massoud and Dostum. The former foes responded by allying to form the United Front (Northern Alliance) against the Taliban. In addition to the dominantly Tajik forces of Massoud and the Uzbek forces of Dostum, the United Front included Hazara factions and Pashtun forces under the leadership of commanders such as Abdul Haq or Haji Abdul Qadir. Prominent politicians of the United Front were Afghan Prime Minister Abdul Rahim Ghafoorzai and the United Front's foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah. From the Taliban conquest in 1996 until November 2001 the United Front controlled roughly 30% of Afghanistan's population in provinces such as Badakhshan, Kapisa, Takhar and parts of Parwan, Kunar, Nuristan, Laghman, Samangan, Kunduz, Ghōr and Bamyan. According to a 55-page report by the United Nations, the Taliban, while trying to consolidate control over northern and western Afghanistan, committed systematic massacres against civilians. UN officials stated that there had been "15 massacres" between 1996 and 2001. They also said "these have been highly systematic and they all lead back to the [Taliban] Ministry of Defense or to Mullah Omar himself." In a major effort to retake the Shomali plains, the Taliban indiscriminately killed civilians, while uprooting and expelling the population. Kamal Hossein, a special reporter for the UN, reported on these and other war crimes. Upon taking Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998, about 4,000 civilians were executed by the Taliban and many more reported tortured. The Taliban especially targeted people of Shia religious or Hazara ethnic background. Among those killed in Mazari-i-Sharif were several Iranian diplomats. Others were kidnapped by the Taliban, touching off a hostage crisis that nearly escalated to a full-scale war, with 150,000 Iranian soldiers massed on the Afghan border at one time. It was later admitted that the diplomats were killed by the Taliban, and their bodies were returned to Iran. The documents also reveal the role of Arab and Pakistani support troops in these killings. Osama Bin Laden's so-called 055 Brigade was responsible for mass killings of Afghan civilians. The report by the United Nations quotes eyewitnesses in many villages describing Arab fighters carrying long knives used for slitting throats and skinning people. Pakistan's ISI wanted the mujahideen to establish a government in Afghanistan. The director-general of the ISI, Hamid Gul, was interested in an Islamic revolution which would transcend national borders, not just in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also in Central Asia. To set up the proposed mujahideen government, Gul ordered an assault on Jalalabad with the intent on using it as the capital for the new government Pakistan was interested in establishing in Afghanistan. The Taliban were largely funded by ISI in 1994. The ISI used the Taliban to establish a regime in Afghanistan which would be favorable to Pakistan, as they were trying to gain strategic depth. Since the creation of the Taliban, the ISI and the Pakistani military have given financial, logistical and military support. According to Pakistani Afghanistan expert Ahmed Rashid, "between 1994 and 1999, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan" on the side of the Taliban. Peter Tomsen stated that Pakistani military and ISI officers along with thousands of regular Pakistani Armed Forces personnel had been involved in the fighting in Afghanistan. In 2001 alone, according to several international sources, 28,000–30,000 Pakistani nationals, 14,000–15,000 Afghan Taliban and 2,000–3,000 Al Qaeda militants were fighting against anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan as a roughly 45,000-strong military force. Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf – then as Chief of Army Staff – was responsible for sending thousands of Pakistanis to fight alongside the Taliban and Bin Laden against the forces of Massoud. Of the estimated 28,000 Pakistani nationals fighting in Afghanistan, 8,000 were militants recruited in madrassas filling regular Taliban ranks. A 1998 document by the U.S. State Department confirms that "20–40 percent of [regular] Taliban soldiers are Pakistani." The document further states that the parents of those Pakistani nationals "know nothing regarding their child's military involvement with the Taliban until their bodies are brought back to Pakistan." According to the U.S. State Department report and reports by Human Rights Watch, the other Pakistani nationals fighting in Afghanistan were regular Pakistani soldiers especially from the Frontier Corps but also from the Pakistani Army providing direct combat support. In 2000, Human Rights Watch wrote: "Of all the foreign powers involved in efforts to sustain and manipulate the ongoing fighting [in Afghanistan], Pakistan is distinguished both by the sweep of its objectives and the scale of its efforts, which include soliciting funding for the Taliban, bankrolling Taliban operations, providing diplomatic support as the Taliban's virtual emissaries abroad, arranging training for Taliban fighters, recruiting skilled and unskilled manpower to serve in Taliban armies, planning and directing offensives, providing and facilitating shipments of ammunition and fuel, and ... directly providing combat support. On 1 August 1997, the Taliban launched an attack on Sheberghan, the main military base of Dostum. Dostum has said the reason the attack was successful was that 1,500 Pakistani commandos took part and that the Pakistani Air Force also gave support. In 1998, Iran accused Pakistani troops of war crimes at Bamiyan and claimed that Pakistani warplanes had, in support of the Taliban, bombarded Afghanistan's last Shia stronghold. The same year Russia said, Pakistan was responsible for the "military expansion" of the Taliban in northern Afghanistan by sending large numbers of Pakistani troops some of whom had subsequently been taken as prisoners by the anti-Taliban United Front. In 2000, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo against military support to the Taliban, with UN officials explicitly singling out Pakistan. The UN secretary-general implicitly criticized Pakistan for its military support, and the Security Council "expressed deep distress over reports of involvement in the fighting, on the Taliban side, of thousands of non-Afghan nationals, some of whom were below the age of 14." In July 2001, several countries including the United States, accused Pakistan of being "in violation of UN sanctions because of its military aid to the Taliban." The Taliban also obtained financial resources from Pakistan. In 1997 alone, after the capture of Kabul by the Taliban, Pakistan gave $30 million in aid and a further $10 million for government wages. In 2000, British Intelligence reported that the ISI was taking an active role in several Al Qaeda training camps. The ISI helped with the construction of training camps for both the Taliban and Al Qaeda. From 1996 to 2001 the Al Qaeda of Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri became a state within the Taliban state. Bin Laden sent Arab and Central Asian Al-Qaeda militants to join the fight against the United Front, among them his 055 Brigade. Dostum and his forces were defeated by the Taliban in 1998. Dostum subsequently went into exile. Massoud became the only leader to remain in Afghanistan and who was able to defend vast parts of his area against the Taliban. In the areas under his control, Massoud set up democratic institutions and signed the Women's Rights Declaration. In the area of Massoud, women and girls did not have to wear the Afghan burqa. They were allowed to work and to go to school. In at least two known instances, Massoud personally intervened against cases of forced marriage. To Massoud there was reportedly nothing worse than treating a person like an object. He stated: "It is our conviction and we believe that both men and women are created by the Almighty. Both have equal rights. Women can pursue an education, women can pursue a career, and women can play a role in society — just like men." In Massoud: From Warrior to Statesman, author Pepe Escobar writes "Massoud is adamant that in Afghanistan women have suffered oppression for generations. He says that 'the cultural environment of the country suffocates women. But the Taliban exacerbate this with oppression.' His most ambitious project is to shatter this cultural prejudice and so give more space, freedom and equality to women — they would have the same rights as men." While it was Massoud's stated conviction that men and women are equal and should enjoy the same rights, he also had to deal with Afghan traditions which he said would need a generation or more to overcome. In his opinion that could only be achieved through education. Humayun Tandar, who took part as an Afghan diplomat in the 2001 International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, said that "strictures of language, ethnicity, region were [also] stifling for Massoud. That is why ... he wanted to create a unity which could surpass the situation in which we found ourselves and still find ourselves to this day." This applied also to strictures of religion. Jean-José Puig describes how Massoud often led prayers before a meal or at times asked his fellow Muslims to lead the prayer but also did not hesitate to ask a Christian friend Jean-José Puig or the Jewish Princeton University Professor Michael Barry: "Jean-José, we believe in the same God. Please, tell us the prayer before lunch or dinner in your own language." Human Rights Watch cites no human rights crimes for the forces under direct control of Massoud for the period from October 1996 until the assassination of Massoud in September 2001. One million people fled the Taliban, many to the area of Massoud. In its Inside the Taliban documentary, National Geographic states: "The only thing standing in the way of future Taliban massacres is Ahmad Shah Massoud." The Taliban repeatedly offered Massoud a position of power to make him stop his resistance, but Massoud declined. He explained in one interview: "The Taliban say: 'Come and accept the post of prime minister and be with us', and they would keep the highest office in the country, the presidentship. But for what price?! The difference between us concerns mainly our way of thinking about the very principles of the society and the state. We can not accept their conditions of compromise, or else we would have to give up the principles of modern democracy. We are fundamentally against the system called "the Emirate of Afghanistan." In another interview, he was quoted as saying: "There should be an Afghanistan where every Afghan finds himself or herself happy. And I think that can only be assured by democracy based on consensus." With his proposals for peace, Massoud wanted to convince the Taliban to join a political process leading towards nationwide democratic elections in a foreseeable future. Massoud stated: "The Taliban are not a force to be considered invincible. They are distanced from the people now. They are weaker than in the past. There is only the assistance given by Pakistan, Osama bin Laden and other extremist groups that keep the Taliban on their feet. With a halt to that assistance, it is extremely difficult to survive." In early 2001, Massoud employed a new strategy of local military pressure and global political appeals. Resentment was increasingly gathering against Taliban rule from the bottom of Afghan society including the Pashtun areas. Massoud publicized their cause of "popular consensus, general elections and democracy" worldwide. At the same time he was very wary not to revive the failed Kabul government of the early 1990s. In 1999, he began training police forces specifically to keep order and protect the civilian population, in case the United Front was successful. Massoud also addressed the European Parliament in Brussels asking the international community to provide humanitarian help to the people of Afghanistan. He stated that the Taliban and Al Qaeda had introduced "a very wrong perception of Islam" and that without the support of Pakistan and Bin Laden the Taliban would not be able to sustain their military campaign for up to a year. On this visit to Europe, he also warned that his intelligence had gathered information about a large-scale attack on U.S. soil being imminent.[failed verification] The president of the European Parliament, Nicole Fontaine, called him the "pole of liberty in Afghanistan". On 9 September 2001, Massoud was the target of a suicide attack by two Arabs posing as journalists at Khwaja Bahauddin in the Takhar Province. Massoud died in a helicopter taking him to a hospital. The funeral, though in a rather rural area, was attended by hundreds of thousands of mourning people. The assassination was not the first time Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Pakistani ISI—and before them the Soviet KGB, the Afghan Communist KHAD and Hekmatyar—had tried to assassinate Massoud. He survived countless assassination attempts over a period of 26 years. The first attempt on Massoud's life was carried out by Hekmatyar and two Pakistani ISI agents in 1975, when Massoud was only 22 years old. In early 2001, Al-Qaeda would-be assassins were captured by Massoud's forces while trying to enter his territory. The assassination of Massoud is believed to have a strong connection to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, which killed nearly 3,000 people and appeared to be the terrorist attack that Massoud had warned the European Parliament about when he made his speech in the presence of it several months earlier. John P. O'Neill was a counter-terrorism expert and the assistant director of the FBI until late 2001. He retired from the FBI and was offered the position of director of security at the World Trade Center (WTC). He took the job at the WTC two weeks before 9/11. On 10 September 2001, O'Neill allegedly told two of his friends, "We're due. And we're due for something big.... Some things have happened in Afghanistan (referring to the assassination of Massoud). I don't like the way things are lining up in Afghanistan...I sense a shift, and I think things are going to happen...soon." O'Neill died when the South Tower collapsed. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Massoud's United Front troops, with American air support, ousted the Taliban from power in Kabul in Operation Enduring Freedom. In November and December 2001, the United Front gained control of much of the country and played a crucial role in establishing the post-Taliban interim government of Hamid Karzai in late 2001. NATO-led invasion and Taliban insurgency The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan began on 7 October 2001, as Operation Enduring Freedom. It was designed to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda militants, as well as replace the Taliban with a U.S.-friendly government. The Bush Doctrine stated that, as policy, it would not distinguish between al-Qaeda and nations that harbor them. Several Afghan leaders were invited to Germany in December 2001 for the UN sponsored Bonn Agreement, which was to restore stability and governance in their country. In the first step, the Afghan Transitional Administration was formed and was installed on 22 December. Chaired by Hamid Karzai, it numbered 30 leaders and included a Supreme Court, an Interim Administration, and a Special Independent Commission. A loya jirga (grand assembly) was convened in June 2002 by former King Zahir Shah, who returned from exile after 29 years. Karzai was elected president for the two years in the jirga, in which the Afghan Interim Authority was also replaced with the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA). A constitutional loya jirga was held in December 2003, adopting the 2004 constitution, with a presidential form of government and a bicameral legislature. Karzai was elected in the 2004 presidential election followed by winning a second term in the 2009 presidential election. Both the 2005 and the 2010 parliamentary elections were also successful. In the meantime, the reconstruction process of Afghanistan began in 2002. There were more than 14,000 reconstruction projects, such as the Kajaki Dam and the Salma Dam. Many of these projects were supervised by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The World Bank Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund was set up in 2002, which was financed by 24 international donor countries and spent more than $1.37 billion as of 2007. Approximately 30 billion dollars were provided by the international community for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, most of it from the United States. In 2002, the world community allocated $4 billion at the Tokyo conference followed by another $4 billion in 2004. In February 2006, $10.5 billion were committed for Afghanistan at the London Conference and $11 billion from the United States in early 2007. Despite these vast investments by the international community, the reconstruction effort's results were mixed. Implementation of development projects was frequently marred by lack of coordination, knowledge of local conditions, and sound planning on the side of international donors as well as by corruption and inefficiency on the side of Afghan government officials. On the provincial and national level, projects such as the National Solidarity Programme, inter-provincial road construction, and the U.S.-led revamping of rural health services met with more success. NATO and Afghan troops led many offensives against the Taliban in this period. By 2009, a Taliban-led shadow government began to form, complete with their own version of mediation court. In 2010, U.S. president Barack Obama deployed an additional 30,000 soldiers over a period of six months and proposed that he would begin troop withdrawals by 2012. At the 2010 International Conference on Afghanistan in London, Karzai said he intended to reach out to the Taliban leadership (including Mullah Omar, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar). Supported by senior U.S. officials Karzai called on the group's leadership to take part in a loya jirga meeting to initiate peace talks. According to The Wall Street Journal, these steps were initially reciprocated with an intensification of bombings, assassinations and ambushes. Many Afghan groups (including the former intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh and opposition leader Dr. Abdullah Abdullah) believed that Karzai's plan aimed to appease the insurgents' senior leadership at the cost of the democratic constitution, the democratic process and progress in the field of human rights, especially women's rights. Abdullah stated: "I should say that Taliban are not fighting in order to be accommodated. They are fighting in order to bring the state down. So it's a futile exercise, and it's just misleading. ... There are groups that will fight to the death. Whether we like to talk to them or we don't like to talk to them, they will continue to fight. So, for them, I don't think that we have a way forward with talks or negotiations or contacts or anything as such. Then we have to be prepared to tackle and deal with them militarily. In terms of the Taliban on the ground, there are lots of possibilities and opportunities that with the help of the people in different parts of the country, we can attract them to the peace process; provided, we create a favorable environment on this side of the line. At the moment, the people are leaving support for the government because of corruption. So that expectation is also not realistic at this stage." According to a report by the United Nations, the Taliban were responsible for 76% of civilian casualties in 2009. Afghanistan was struggling to rebuild itself while dealing with the results of 30 years of war, corruption among high-level politicians and the ongoing Taliban insurgency which according to different scientific institutes such as the London School of Economics, senior international officials, such as former United States chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Admrial Michael Mullen, believed the Taliban was backed by the ISI. At the end of July 2010, the Netherlands became the first NATO ally to end its combat mission in Afghanistan after 4 years military deployment including the most intense period of hostilities. They withdrew 1,900 troops. The Atlantic Council described the decision as "politically significant because it comes at a time of rising casualties and growing doubts about the war." Canada withdrew troops in 2011, but about 900 were left to train Afghani soldiers. In February 2012, a small number of American service members burned several copies of the Quran. Some Afghans responded by staging massive demonstrations and riots in Kabul and other areas. Assailants killed several American military personnel, including two officers in the Interior Ministry building following this event. On 11 March 2012, an American soldier, Robert Bales, killed 16 civilians in the Kandahar massacre. According to ISAF there were about 120,000 NATO-led troops in Afghanistan per December 2012, of which 66,000 were US troops and 9,000 British. The rest were from 48 countries. A process of handing over power to local forces had started and according to plans a majority of international troops would leave in 2014. On 24 November 2013, Karzai held a loya jirga and imposed a ban on NATO house raids. This ban was put in place, and NATO soldiers were instructed to adhere to it. In December 2013, a house raid in Zabul Province was exceptionally carried out by two NATO soldiers. Karzai condemned this in a highly publicised speech. On 3 January 2014 a bomb blast was heard by NATO soldiers in a base in Kabul; there were no reported casualties or injuries. The day after, a bomb hit a U.S. military base in Kabul and killed one U.S. citizen. The bomb was planted by the Taliban, and the American service member was the first combat casualty in Afghanistan in that year. The Taliban immediately claimed responsibility for the attack. On 1 May 2015 the media reported a scheduled meeting in Qatar between Taliban insurgents and peacemakers, including the Karzai, about ending the war. In 2016, the government signed a peace deal with Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, which was at the time the second largest anti-government insurgent after the Taliban. The deal proved controversial, and several sectors of Afghan society protested against it because of the Hekmatyar's alleged war crimes. Tensions between the U.S. and Pakistan worsened as U.S. president Donald Trump accused Pakistan of harboring the Taliban. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani offered unconditional peace talks to the Taliban, offering them legal status as a regular political party, alongside the release of Taliban prisoners. Over 20 nations and organizations backed the deal, but it was rejected by the Taliban who refused to negotiate with the Afghan government. The Taliban insisted on only negotiating directly with the United States and only upon a full U.S. withdrawal from the country—a demand the U.S. rejected. An unprecedented three-day ceasefire was negotiated in 2018 around the Eid al-Fitr celebrations, with Taliban members openly approaching and talking to civilians and government forces. The ceasefire was widely celebrated, and Ghani announced it would be extended by ten days, with some societal leaders calling for it to be made permanent. The Taliban, however, rejected the extension and relaunched their military campaign against the government at the end of the original three-day period. As the Afghan government had fallen into a major dispute over the 2019 Afghan presidential election, in which both Ghani and his rival Abdullah Abdullah claimed victory, a power-sharing deal between the two men was signed, which assigned responsibility for the peace negotiations to the latter. Eventually and after several years of back-and-forth negotiations, the U.S. Trump Administration struck a major deal with the Taliban in 2020, known as the Doha Agreement. The deal provided for a full but staggered U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in exchange for a Taliban pledge not to allow Al-Queda to reestablish itself in the country and commit itself to talks with the Afghan government (which was not a party to the agreement). The deal also required the Afghan president to release 5,000 Taliban prisoners in exchange for a Taliban release of 1,000 captive Afghan soldiers. Ghani, having never agreed to the deal, rejected the prisoner release, stating that it was not a U.S. prerogative and adding that he would reject any other releases as a prerequisite to Taliban-Afghan government talks. The Taliban replied by reiterating that they would not start any talks with the Afghan government until the 5,000 prisoners were released. The situation led to an increase in Taliban attacks, with the group having launched more than 4,500 attacks on government forces during the 45-day period following the signing of the Doha Agreement—a 70% increase compared to the same period during the previous year. As the U.S. had stopped conducting airstrikes on Taliban targets as part of the agreement (in exchange for a halting of Taliban attacks on U.S. forces), Taliban casualties dropped by about two thirds during this period. Following what was described as some of the bloodiest fighting in 19 years, the U.S. conducted several airstrikes against the group in early March 2020. Ghani agreed on releasing 1,500 Taliban prisoners, so long as those prisoners signed a pledge not to return to combat once released. The Taliban rejected this move, insisting on the full and unconditional release of the full 5,000 prisoner list. By August, the government agreed to free the 5,000 Taliban captives but stated that it could not release 400 of them, as they had been accused of serious crimes against civilians, calling a loya jirga to decide their fate. It ruled in favor of release, and all of the prisoners were freed. Following these developments, the first intra-Afghan talks between the Taliban and Afghan government were held in Qatar. In April 2021, the newly inaugurated U.S. president Joe Biden announced that all U.S. troops would withdraw from the country by 11 September 2021, the 20-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. He later brought this date forward to 31 August. As U.S. forces started to withdraw in May, the Taliban stepped up attacks on the Afghan government. The group began by first capturing the countryside to surround regional capitals, then taking those capitals without facing any major resistance. The United States Intelligence Community warned in July that the Afghan government was likely to collapse 6–12 months after the U.S. withdrawal. Biden stated that he would not cease or delay the withdrawal, regardless of the situation. By 15 August, almost the entire country was under the control of the Taliban, who had already encircled and were preparing to enter the nation's capital. Ghani fled the country to Tajikistan, and Kabul was captured that same day, with the entire political and military apparatus of the Islamic Republic having collapsed. The remainder of the NATO forces in the country occupied the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, evacuating hundreds of thousands of servicemen and civilians. In their last act while in Afghanistan, coalition forces destroyed or damaged most of what was left behind in the airport to prevent it from being used by the Taliban, totalling 75 aircraft and over 100 vehicles and other equipment, alongside the airport's anti-air defences, before definitively leaving the country on 30 August, thus meeting Biden's withdrawal deadline. Biden defended his decision, stating that he did not wish to prolong the "forever war" and blamed the Afghan authorities for not having found a political settlement and fleeing the country for the collapse of the country's government, adding that the collapse had nevertheless "unfolded more quickly than anticipated". According to Biden, the American mission in the country had never been nation-building, but instead a pre-emption of attacks on the U.S. homeland, which he considered to have been a success. Following the coalition's withdrawal, Taliban forces captured the airport and announced they would form a new government shortly thereafter. Despite the call to have some refugees admitted to the U.S. after the withdrawal of NATO troops, only a tiny percentage of vulnerable Afghans seeking to move to the United States under a refugee resettlement program were admitted to the U.S. Refugees admitted through the P-2 criteria by the State Department's pre-existing Priority 1 program had the only option to be referred to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees or a designated NGO. Return of the Taliban government As the Taliban took over Kabul, a Coordination Council was formed to transfer power to the Taliban, consisting of former mujahideen and Hezb-e Islami commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, former president Hamid Karzai and political leader Abdullah Abdullah. The latter two then met with Taliban representatives with the stated goal of ensuring safety and returning normalcy to the capital. However, it was reported that the two would likely not be a part of the future Taliban government. The New York Times reported that Karzai had been forced out of his home after the Taliban disarmed his guards and took over security at his residence, instead moving in to live in Abdullah's house. According to a source cited by the CNN, both had effectively been placed under house arrest, with their security details removed and at the mercy of the Taliban. Following the Taliban's victory across Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic's vice president and long-time opponent of the Taliban, Amrullah Saleh, cited provisions in the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan which would make him acting president of the country. In doing so, he appealed to a sense of continuity of the Islamic Republic, which would lend him political legitimacy. As Kabul, alongside the vast majority of Afghanistan, was under Taliban control, he joined forces with Ahmad Massoud, son of former mujahideen commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, in declaring the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (also known as the Panjshir Resistance), an anti-Taliban coalition based in the Panjshir Valley. In turn, he was recognized as president by Massoud, as well as Defence Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammadi. A small-scale uprising led by the group in August 2021 succeeded in ousting the Taliban from three districts, establishing its own control in the valley. The front, often compared to the Northern Alliance, reached a ceasefire with the Taliban shortly thereafter. The ceasefire did not last long and by the start of September the Taliban had launched an assault against the Panjshir resistance. By 3 September, the Taliban claimed to have defeated the resistance, establishing Taliban control over the entirety of Afghanistan for the first time in the country's history. These claims were dismissed as lies by resistance forces, which in turn claimed they were still in control of much of their positions and were actively fighting the Taliban. Fighting continued into the following day, and Mark Milley, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned that the situation could develop into a full-scale civil war. At the same time, notable regional leaders Tajik Atta Muhammad Nur and Uzbek Abdul Rashid Dostum (the PDPA-era commander who turned on Najibullah in 1991 and formed his own Uzbek-dominated and relatively left-secular political movement Junbish) fled the country to avoid what they dubbed conspiracy as Mazar-i-Sharif fell to the Taliban. The two had been bitter political rivals but joined forces in the face of the Taliban advance. According to Nur, the local equipment of the armed forces had been handed over to the Taliban in a "cowardly plot" intended to entrap him and Dostum, which led to the fall of the city. The two joined with other regional strongmen and politicians in creating a front for negotiations with the Taliban, in which they would hope to achieve concessions from the predominantly Pashtun group for their respective local movements and ethnicities. The two stated that they would never accept a surrender and were preparing for armed anti-Taliban resistance should the talks fail, prior to the ultimate fall of the Panjshir Valley to the Taliban the following day. Both Saleh and Massoud fled the Panjshiri capital but remained in the province. At least 14 armed anti-Taliban resistance groups, including the National Resistance Front, Afghanistan Freedom Front, Supreme Resistance Council, Freedom Uprising are active in Afghanistan. Afghan–Iranian clashes occurred in December 2021, overlapping with the Republican insurgency in Afghanistan, between the restored Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Iran in Nimruz over border checkpoints. It resulted in a de facto Taliban victory, with the Islamic Emirate capturing various border checkpoints. However, the Taliban later withdrew from the checkpoints and things returned to status quo ante bellum. See also References Bibliography Further reading External links |
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Contents Central African Republic Civil War Ongoing Séléka takeover (2012–2013) Séléka–Anti-balaka conflict (2013–2020) CPC rebellion (2020–) The Central African Republic Civil War is an ongoing civil war in the Central African Republic (CAR) involving the successive governments, rebels from the former Séléka coalition, the Anti-balaka militias, and various foreign and international forces. In the preceding Central African Bush War (2004–2007), the government of President François Bozizé fought with rebels until a peace agreement in 2007. The current conflict arose when a new coalition of varied rebel groups, known as Séléka, accused the government of failing to abide by the peace agreements, captured many towns in 2012 and seized the capital in 2013. Bozizé fled the country, and the rebel leader Michel Djotodia declared himself president. Renewed fighting began between Séléka and militias opposed to them called Anti-balaka. In September 2013, President Djotodia disbanded the Séléka coalition, which had lost its unity after taking power, and resigned in 2014. He was replaced by Catherine Samba-Panza, but the conflict continued. In July 2014, ex-Séléka factions and Anti-balaka representatives signed a ceasefire agreement. By the end of 2014, the country was de facto partitioned with the Anti-Balaka controlling the south and west, from which most Muslims had evacuated, and ex-Séléka groups controlling the north and east. Faustin-Archange Touadéra, who was elected president in 2016, ran and won the 2020 election, which triggered the main rebel factions to form an alliance opposed to the election called the Coalition of Patriots for Change, which was coordinated by former president Bozizé. Peacekeeping largely transitioned from the ECCAS-led MICOPAX to the African Union-led MISCA to the United Nations-led MINUSCA, while the French peacekeeping mission was known as Operation Sangaris. In July 2025, a peace agreement was achieved, in which 3R and UPC, the two largest remaining rebel groups, disarmed and dissolved in a public ceremony. Much of the tension is over religious identity between Muslim Séléka and Christian Anti-balaka, and ethnic differences among ex-Séléka factions, and historical antagonism between agriculturalists, who largely comprise Anti-balaka, and nomadic groups, who constitute most Séléka fighters. Other contributing factors include the struggle for control of diamonds and other resources in the resource-rich country and for influence among regional powers such as Chad, Sudan and Rwanda and foreign powers such as France and Russia. More than 1.1 million people have fled their homes in a country of about 5 million people, the highest ever recorded in the country. Background The peacekeeping force Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC) was formed in October 2002 by the regional economic community Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). After François Bozizé seized power in 2003, the Central African Bush War (2004–2007) began with the rebellion by the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) in northeastern CAR, led by Michel Djotodia. During this conflict, the UFDR rebel forces also fought with several other rebel groups including the Group of Patriotic Action for the Liberation of Central Africa (GAPLC), the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), the People's Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD), the Movement of Central African Liberators for Justice (MLCJ), and the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC). Tens of thousands of people were displaced by the unrest, which continued until 2007, with rebel forces seizing several cities during the conflict.[citation needed] On 13 April 2007, a peace agreement between the government and the UFDR was signed in Birao. The agreement provided for an amnesty for the UFDR, its recognition as a political party, and the integration of its fighters into the army. Further negotiations resulted in a Libreville Global Peace Accord agreement in 2008 for reconciliation, a unity government, local elections in 2009 and parliamentary and presidential elections in 2010. The new unity government that resulted was formed in January 2009. On 12 July 2008, with the waning of the Central African Bush War, the larger overlapping regional economic community to CEMAC called the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), replaced FOMUC, whose mandate was largely restricted to security, with the Central African Peacebuilding Mission (MICOPAX), who had a broader peace building mandate. Rebel groups alleged that Bozizé had not followed the terms of the 2007 agreement and that there continued to be political abuses, especially in the northern part of the country, such as "torture and illegal executions". Course of the conflict In August 2012 a peace agreement was signed between the government and the CPJP. On 20 August 2012, an agreement was signed between a dissident faction of the CPJP, led by Colonel Hassan Al Habib calling itself Fundamental CPJP, and the Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK). Al Habib announced that, in protest of the peace agreement, the Fundamental CPJP was launching an offensive dubbed "Operation Charles Massi", in memory of the CPJP founder who was allegedly tortured and murdered by the government, and that his group intended to overthrow Bozizé. In September, Fundamental CPJP, using the French name Alliance CPSK-CPJP, took responsibility for attacks on the towns of Sibut, Damara and Dekoa, killing two members of the army. It claimed that it had killed two additional members of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) in Damara, capturing military and civilian vehicles, weapons including rockets, and communications equipment, and launched unsuccessful assault on a fourth town, Grimari, and promised more operations in the future. Mahamath Isseine Abdoulaye, president of the pro-government CPJP faction, countered that the CPJP was committed to the peace agreement and the attacks were the work of Chadian rebels, saying this group of "thieves" would never be able to march on Bangui. Al Habib was killed by FACA on 19 September in Daya, a town north of Dekoa. In November 2012, in Obo, FACA soldiers were injured in an attack attributed to Chadian Popular Front for Recovery rebels. On 10 December 2012, the rebels seized the towns of N'Délé, Sam Ouandja and Ouadda, as well as weapons left by fleeing soldiers. On 15 December, rebel forces took Bamingui, and three days later they advanced to Bria, moving closer to Bangui. The Alliance CPSK-CPJP for the first time used the name Séléka (meaning "union" in the Sango language) with a press release calling itself "Séléka CPSK-CPJP-UFDR", thus including the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR). The Séléka claim they are fighting because of a lack of progress after a peace deal ended the Bush War. Following an appeal for help from Central African President François Bozizé, the President of Chad, Idriss Déby, pledged to send 2,000 troops to help quell the rebellion. The first Chadian troops arrived on 18 December 2012 to reinforce the CAR contingent in Kaga-Bandoro, in preparation for a counter-attack on N'Délé. Séléka forces took Kabo on 19 December, a major hub for transport between Chad and CAR, located west and north of the areas previously taken by the rebels. On 18 December 2012, the Chadian group Popular Front for Recovery (FPR) announced their allegiance to the Séléka coalition. On 20 December 2012, a rebel group based in northern CAR, the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC) joined the Séléka coalition. Four days later the rebel coalition took over Bambari, the country's third largest town, followed by Kaga-Bandoro on 25 December. Rebel forces reached Damara, bypassing the town of Sibut where around 150 Chadian troops were stationed together with CAR troops that withdrew from Kaga-Bandoro. On 26 December, hundreds of protesters surrounded the French embassy accusing the former colonial power of failing to help the army. Josué Binoua, the CAR's minister for territorial administration, requested that France intervenes in case the rebels, now only 75 km (47 mi) away, manage to reach the capital Bangui. On 27 December, Bozizé asked the international community for assistance. French president François Hollande rejected the appeal, saying that French troops would only be used to protect French nationals in CAR, and not to defend Bozizé's government. Reports indicated that the U.S. military was preparing plans to evacuate "several hundred" American citizens, as well as other nationals. Gabonese General Jean-Félix Akaga, commander of the Economic Community of Central African States' (ECCAS) Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC), said the capital was "fully secured" by the troops from its MICOPAX peacekeeping mission, adding that reinforcements should arrive soon. However, military sources in Gabon and Cameroon denied the report, claiming no decision had been taken regarding the crisis. Government soldiers launched a counterattack against rebel forces in Bambari on 28 December, leading to heavy clashes, according to a government official. Several witnesses over 60 km (37 mi) away said they could hear detonations and heavy weapons fire for a number of hours. Later, both a rebel leader and a military source confirmed the military attack was repelled and the town remained under rebel control. At least one rebel fighter was killed and three were wounded in the clashes, and the military's casualties were unknown. Meanwhile, the foreign ministers in the ECCAS announced that more troops from the Multinational Force for Central Africa (FOMAC) would be sent to the country to support the 560 members of the MICOPAX mission already present. The announcement was done by Chad's Foreign Minister Moussa Faki after a meeting in the Gabonese capital Libreville. At the same time, ECCAS Deputy Secretary-General Guy-Pierre Garcia confirmed that the rebels and the CAR government had agreed to unconditional talks, with the goal to get to negotiations by 10 January at the latest. In Bangui, the U.S. Air Force evacuated around 40 people from the country, including the American ambassador. The International Committee of the Red Cross also evacuated eight of its foreign workers, though local volunteers and 14 other foreigners remained to help the growing number of displaced people. Rebel forces took over the town of Sibut without firing a shot on 29 December, as at least 60 vehicles with CAR and Chadian troops retreated to Damara, the last city standing between Séléka and the capital. In Bangui, the government ordered a 7 pm to 5 am curfew and banned the use of motorcycle taxis, fearing they could be used by rebels to infiltrate the city. Residents reported many shop-owners had hired groups of armed men to guard their property in anticipation of possible looting, as thousands were leaving the city in overloaded cars and boats. The French military contingent rose to 400 with the deployment of 150 additional paratroopers sent from Gabon to Bangui M'Poko International Airport. French prime minister Jean-Marc Ayrault again stressed that the troops were only present to "protect French and European nationals" and not deal with the rebels. On 30 December, President Bozizé agreed to a possible national unity government with members of the Séléka coalition. On 2 January 2013, the president took over as the new head of the defense ministry from his son and dismissed army chief Guillaume Lapo. Meanwhile, rebel spokesman Col. Djouma Narkoyo confirmed that Séléka had stopped their advance and will enter peace talks due to start in Libreville on 8 January, on the precondition that government forces stop arresting members of the Gula tribe. The rebel coalition confirmed it would demand the immediate departure of President Bozizé, who had pledged to see out his term until its end in 2016. By 1 January reinforcements from FOMAC began to arrive in Damara to support the 400 Chadian troops already stationed there as part of the MICOPAX mission. With rebels closing in on the capital Bangui, a total of 360 soldiers were sent to boost the defenses of Damara – Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 120 each from Gabon, Republic of the Congo and Cameroon, with a Gabonese general in command of the force. Jean-Félix Akaga, the Gabonese general in charge of the MICOPAX force, sent by the ECCAS, declared that Damara represented a "red line that the rebels cannot cross", and that doing so would be "a declaration of war" against the 10 members of the regional bloc. France had further boosted its presence in the country to 600 troops. On 6 January, South African President Jacob Zuma announced the deployment of 400 troops to CAR to assist the forces already present there. On 11 January 2013, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Libreville, Gabon.[citation needed] On 13 January, Bozizé signed a decree that removed Prime Minister Faustin-Archange Touadéra from power, as part of the agreement with the rebel coalition. The rebels dropped their demand for President François Bozizé to resign, but he had to appoint a new prime minister from the opposition by 18 January 2013. On 17 January, Nicolas Tiangaye was appointed prime minister. The terms of the agreement also included that National Assembly of the Central African Republic be dissolved within a week with a year-long coalition government formed in its place and a new legislative election be held within 12 months (with the possibility of postponement). In addition, the temporary coalition government had to implement judicial reforms, amalgamate the rebel troops with the Bozizé government's troops to establish a new national military, set up the new legislative elections, as well as introduce other social and economic reforms. Furthermore, Bozizé's government was required to free all political prisoners imprisoned during the conflict, and foreign troops must return to their countries of origin. Under the agreement, Séléka rebels were not required to give up the cities they have taken or were then occupying, allegedly as a way to ensure that the Bozizé government would not renege on the agreement. Bozizé would be allowed to remain president until new presidential elections in 2016. On 23 January 2013, the ceasefire was broken, with the government blaming Séléka and Séléka blaming the government for allegedly failing to honor the terms of the power-sharing agreement. By 21 March, the rebels had advanced to Bouca, 300 km from the capital Bangui. On 22 March, the fighting reached the town of Damara, 75 km from the capital. On 18 March 2013, the rebels, having taken over Gambo and Bangassou, threatened to take up arms again if their demands for the release of political prisoners, the integration of their forces into the national army and for South African soldiers to leave the country were not met within 72 hours. Three days later, they took control of the towns of Damara and Bossangoa. By 23 March, they entered Bangui. On 24 March, rebels reached the Presidential Palace in the centre of the capital. The Presidential Palace and the rest of the capital soon fell to rebel forces and Bozizé fled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was followed by widespread looting in the capital. By 2 April, only 20 of the original 200 South African National Defence Force troops stationed in CAR remained in the country. A company of French troops secured Bangui M'Poko International Airport and France sent 350 soldiers to ensure the security of its citizens, bringing the total number of French troops in CAR to nearly 600. On 25 March 2013, Séléka leader Michel Djotodia, who served after the January agreement as First Deputy Prime Minister for National Defense, declared himself president, becoming the first Muslim to ever hold the office. Djotodia said that there would be a three-year transitional period and that Nicolas Tiangaye would continue to serve as prime minister. Djotodia promptly suspended the constitution and dissolved the government, as well as the National Assembly. He then reappointed Tiangaye as prime minister on 27 March 2013. In the following two days top military and police officers met with Djotodia and recognized him as president on 28 March 2013, in what was viewed as "a form of surrender", and the overall security situation was beginning to improve. A new government headed by Tiangaye, with 34 members, appointed on 31 March 2013, included nine members of Séléka, along with eight representatives of the parties that had opposed Bozizé, while only one member of the government was associated with Bozizé, and 16 positions were given to representatives of civil society. The former opposition parties declared on 1 April that they would boycott the government to protest its domination by Séléka, arguing that the 16 positions given to representatives of civil society were in fact "handed over to Séléka allies disguised as civil society activists". On 3 April 2013, African leaders meeting in Chad declared that they did not recognize Djotodia as president; instead, they proposed the formation of an inclusive transitional council and the holding of new elections in 18 months, rather than three years as envisioned by Djotodia. Speaking on 4 April, Information Minister Christophe Gazam Betty said that Djotodia had accepted the proposals of the African leaders; however, he suggested that Djotodia could remain in office if he were elected to head the transitional council. Djotodia accordingly signed a decree on 6 April for the formation of a transitional council that would act as a transitional parliament. The council was tasked with electing an interim president to serve during an 18-month transitional period leading to new elections. The transitional council, composed of 105 members, met for the first time on 13 April 2013 and immediately elected Djotodia as interim president; there were no other candidates. A few days later, regional leaders publicly accepted Djotodia's transitional leadership, but, in a symbolic show of disapproval, stated that he would "not be called President of the Republic, but Head of State of the Transition". According to the plans for the transition, Djotodia would not stand as a candidate for president in the election that would conclude the transition. On 13 September 2013, Djotodia formally disbanded Séléka, which he had lost effective control of once the coalition had taken power. This had little actual effect in stopping abuses by the militia soldiers who were now referred to as Ex-Séléka. Self-defense militias called Anti-balaka previously formed to fight crime on a local level, had organized into militias against abuses by Séléka soldiers. On 5 December 2013, called "A Day That Will Define Central African Republic", the Anti-balaka militias coordinated an attack on Bangui against its Muslim population, killing more than 1,000 civilians, in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Djotodia. On 14 May, CAR's PM Nicolas Tiangaye requested a UN peacekeeping force from the UN Security Council, and on 31 May former president Bozizé was indicted for crimes against humanity and incitement of genocide. On the same day as the 5 December attacks, the UN Security Council authorized the transfer of MICOPAX to the African Union–led peacekeeping mission, the International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA or AFISM-CAR), with troop numbers increasing from 2,000 to 6,000; it also authorized the French peacekeeping mission called Operation Sangaris. Interim president Michel Djotodia and Prime Minister Nicolas Tiangaye resigned on 10 January 2014 yet the conflict still continued. The National Transitional Council elected the new interim president of the Central African Republic after Alexandre-Ferdinand Nguendet became the Acting Chief of State. Nguendet, being the president of the provisional parliament and viewed as being close to Djotodia, did not run for the election under diplomatic pressure. On 20 January 2014, Catherine Samba-Panza, the mayor of Bangui, was elected as the interim president in the second round voting. Samba-Panza was viewed as having been neutral and away from clan clashes. Her arrival to the presidency was generally accepted by both the Ex-Séléka and the Anti-balaka sides. Following the election, Samba-Panza made a speech in the parliament appealing to the Ex-Séléka and the Anti-balaka for putting down their weapons. On 27 January, Séléka leaders left Bangui under the escort of Chadian peacekeepers. The aftermath of Djotodia's presidency was said to be without law, a functioning police and courts leading to a wave of violence against Muslims. The European Union decided to set up its first military operations in six years when foreign ministers approved the sending of up to 1,000 soldiers to the country by the end of February, to be based around Bangui. Estonia promised to send soldiers, while Lithuania, Slovenia, Finland, Belgium, Poland and Sweden were considering sending troops; Germany, Italy and Great Britain announced that they would not send soldiers. The UN Security Council unanimously voted to approve sending European Union troops and to give them a mandate to use force, as well as threatening sanctions against those responsible for the violence. The E.U. had pledged 500 troops to aid African and French troops already in the country. Specifically the resolution allowed for the use of "all necessary measures" to protect civilians. The first batch of 55 EUFOR troops arrived in Bangui, according to the French army, and carried out its first patrol on 9 April with the intention of "maintaining security and training local officers". On 15 February, France announced that it would send an additional 400 troops to the country. French president François Hollande's office called for "increased solidarity" with the CAR and for the United Nations Security Council to accelerate the deployment of peacekeeping troops to the CAR. Ban Ki-moon then also called for the rapid deployment of 3,000 additional international peacekeepers. Because of increasing violence, on 10 April 2014, the UN Security Council transferred MISCA to a UN peacekeeping operation called the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) with 10,000 troops, to be deployed in September that year. MINUSCA drew figurative "red lines" on the roads to keep the peace among rival militias. France called for a vote at the UNSC in April 2014 and expected a unanimous resolution authorising 10,000 troops and 1,800 police to replace the over 5,000 African Union soldiers on 15 September; the motion was then approved. After an incident where civilians were killed that involved Chadian soldiers, Chad announced the withdrawal of its forces from MISCA in April 2014. As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned of a de facto partition of the country into Muslim and Christian areas as a result of the sectarian fighting, he also called the conflict an "urgent test" for the UN and the region's states. Amnesty International blamed the Anti-balaka militia of causing a "Muslim exodus of historic proportions." Samba-Panza suggested poverty and a failure of governance was the cause of the conflict. Some Muslims of the country were also weary of the French presence in MISCA, with the French accused of not doing enough to stop attacks by Christian militias. One of the cited reasons for the difficulty in stopping attacks by Anti-balaka militias was the mob nature of these attacks. After three days of talks, a ceasefire was signed on 24 July 2014 in Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo. The Séléka representative was General Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane, and the Anti-balaka representative was Patrick Edouard Ngaïssona. The talks were mediated by Congolese president Denis Sassou Nguesso and South Sudanese diplomat Albino Aboug. The Séléka delegation had pushed for a formalization of the partition of the Central African Republic with Muslims in the north and Christians in the south but dropped that demand in talks. Many factions on the ground claimed the talks were not representative and fighting continued with Séléka's military leader Joseph Zoundeiko rejected the ceasefire agreement the next day saying it lacked input from his military wing and brought back the demand for partition. Ngaïssona told a general assembly of Anti-balaka fighters and supporters to lay down their arms and that Anti-balaka would be turned into a political party called Central African Party for Unity and Development (PCUD) but he had little control over the loose network of fighters. In May 2015, a national reconciliation conference organized by the transitional government of the Central Africa Republic took place. This was called the Bangui National Forum. The forum resulted in the adoption of a Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation and Reconstruction and the signature of a Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Repatriation (DDRR) agreement among 9 of 10 armed groups. Months after the official dissolution of Séléka it was not known who was in charge of Ex-Séléka factions during talks with Anti-balaka until on 12 July 2014, Michel Djotodia was reinstated as the head of an ad hoc coalition of Ex-Séléka which renamed itself "The Popular Front for the Rebirth (or Renaissance) of Central African Republic" (FPRC). Later in 2014, Noureddine Adam led the FPRC and began demanding independence for the predominantly Muslim north, a move rejected by another general, Ali Darassa, who formed another Ex-Séléka faction called the "Union for Peace in the Central African Republic" (UPC), which was dominant in and around Bambari, while the FPRC's capital is in Bria. Darassa rebuffed multiple attempts to reunify Séléka and threatened FPRC's hegemony. Noureddine Adam declared the autonomous Republic of Logone or Dar El Kuti on 14 December 2015 and intended Bambari as the capital, with the transitional government denouncing the declaration and MINUSCA stating it will use force against any separatist attempt. Another group is the "Central African Patriotic Movement" (MPC), founded by Mahamat Al Khatim. Since 2014, there has been little government control outside of the capital. Armed entrepreneurs have carved out personal fiefdoms in which they set up checkpoints, collect illegal taxes, and take in millions of dollars from the illicit coffee, mineral, and timber trades. At least 14 armed groups vied for territory, notably four factions formed by Ex-Séléka leaders who controlled about 60% of the country's territory. In January 2015, talks in Nairobi between Joachim Kokate representing the Anti-balaka and Djotodia and Adam of FPRC led to another ceasefire agreement where they called for amnesty for all perpetrators of abuses and the removal of the current transitional authorities. The transitional government and the international community dismissed the deal as it excluded them from the negotiations and termed the parties "Nairobists". By October 2015, Samba-Panza accused the Nairobists of plotting a coup and dozens of FPRC combatants even walked from the north-east of the country to Sibut, a few kilometres from the capital, threatening the transitional authorities, but were stopped by international forces. With the de facto partition of the country between Ex-Séléka militias in the north and east and Anti-balaka militias in the south and west, hostilities between both sides decreased but sporadic fighting continued. In February 2016, after a peaceful election, the former prime minister Faustin-Archange Touadéra was elected president. In October 2016, France announced that it was ending its peacekeeping mission in the country, Operation Sangaris, and largely withdrew its troops, saying that the operation was a success. By March 2014, the UNSC had authorised a probe into possible genocide, which in turn followed International Criminal Court Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda initiating a preliminary investigation into the "extreme brutality" and whether it falls into the court's remit. The UNSC mandate probe would be led by Cameroonian lawyer Bernard Acho Muna, who was the deputy chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, former Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs Jorge Castañeda and Mauritanian lawyer Fatimata M'Baye. The ICC began prosecutions and Alfred Yekatom of the Anti-Balaka who was involved in the 'Battle of Bangui' and Patrice Edouard Ngaïssona of the Anti-Balaka were arrested in 2018, although no one from the Ex-Séléka was arrested. In eastern CAR, tensions erupted in competition between Ex-Séléka militias arising over control of a goldmine in November 2016, where MPC and the FPRC coalition, which incorporated elements of their former enemy, the Anti-balaka, attacked UPC. The violence is often ethnic in nature with the FPRC associated with the Gula and Runga people and the UPC associated with the Fulani. Most of the fighting was in the centrally located Ouaka prefecture, which has the country's second largest city Bambari, because of its strategic location between the Muslim and Christian regions of the country and its wealth. The fight for Bambari in early 2017 displaced 20,000. MINUSCA made a robust deployment to prevent FPRC taking the city and in February 2017, Joseph Zoundeiko, the chief of staff of FPRC who previously led the military wing of Séléka, was killed by MINUSCA after crossing one of the red lines. At the same time, MINUSCA negotiated the removal of Ali Darassa from the city. This led to UPC to find new territory, spreading the fighting from urban to rural areas previously spared. Additionally, the thinly spread MINUSCA relied on Ugandan as well as American special forces to keep the peace in the southeast, as they were part of a campaign to eliminate the Lord's Resistance Army, but the mission ended in April 2017. By the latter half of 2017, the fighting largely shifted to the southeast where the UPC reorganized and were pursued by the FPRC and Anti-balaka with the level of violence only matched by the early stage of the war. About 15,000 people fled from their homes in an attack in May and six U.N. peacekeepers were killed – the deadliest month for the mission yet. In June 2017, another ceasefire was signed in Rome by the government and 14 armed groups including FPRC, but the next day fighting between an FPRC faction and Anti-balaka militias killed more than 100 people. In October 2017, another ceasefire was signed between the UPC, the FPRC, and Anti-balaka groups, and FPRC announced Ali Darassa as coalition vice-president, but fighting continued afterward. By July 2018 the FPRC was headed by Abdoulaye Hissène and based in the northeastern town of N'Délé. In 2019, the FPRC split into two factions, a Runga group on one side, including Abdoulaye Hissene, and rival fighters from the Gula and Kara on the other side. In western CAR, another rebel group, with no known links to Séléka or Anti-balaka, called "Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation" (3R) formed in 2015 reportedly by Sidiki Abass, claiming to be protecting Muslim Fulani people from an Anti-balaka militia led by Abbas Rafal. They are accused of displacing 17,000 people in November 2016 and at least 30,000 people in the Ouham-Pendé prefecture in December 2016. In northwestern CAR around Paoua, fighting since December 2017 between "Revolution and Justice" (RJ) and "Movement for the Liberation of the Central African Republic People" (MNLC) displaced around 60,000 people. MNLC, founded in October 2017, was led by Ahamat Bahar, a former member and co-founder of FPRC and MRC, and is allegedly backed by Fulani fighters from Chad. The Christian militant group RJ was formed in 2013, mostly by members of the presidential guard of former president Ange-Félix Patassé, and were composed mainly of ethnic Sara-Kaba. While both groups had previously divided the territory in the Northwest, tensions erupted after the killing of RJ leader, Clément Bélanga, in November 2017. Beginning around 2017, Russia began to increasingly support the government of Touadéra, whose personal guard became largely Russian as well. Three Russian journalists were killed in 2018 while investigating Russian mercenary groups in CAR. In August 2018, Russia and Sudan helped broker another tentative agreement among armed groups. After talks in Khartoum, an African Union led initiative led to an accord between the government and 14 rebel groups in February 2019 called the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, the eighth such agreement since the war started in 2012. As part of the accord, Ali Darassa of UPC, Mahamat Al-Khatim of MPC and Sidiki Abass of 3R were given positions as special military advisers to the prime minister's office overseeing special mixed units made of government and rebel soldiers in regions of the country that they already controlled. This did not stop the violence, with 3R killing more than 50 people in several villages in May 2019, leading to MINUSCA to launch a military operation against them. In August 2019, Sidiki Abbas of 3R and Mahamat Al-Khatim of MPC resigned from their government posts. Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC) leader Abdoulaye Miskine refused to take his government post and joined a new rebel group formed in June 2019 called "Partie du Rassemblement de la Nation Centrafricaine" (PRNC) to oppose the peace deal, claiming that the deal is a way of rebel leaders to gain money and posts from the government. In September 2019, fighting between two rebel groups that signed the February 2019 deal, FPRC and the mostly Kara "Movement of Central African Liberators for Justice" (MLCJ), which was founded by Abakar Sabon and was not part of the Séléka alliance that overthrew Bozizé, killed at least 24 people and displaced about 24,000. On 19 December 2020 six rebel groups who together control two-thirds of the country's territory, including 3R, FPRC, and UPC, announced they had formed an alliance called the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), and accused President Touadéra of trying to rig the election scheduled for that month and stated their intent to advance to the capital. Ousted president François Bozizé had announced his intent to run in the presidential election. Bozizé, of the Gbaya, the country's largest ethnic group, retained much support among the population and army members. The government accused Bozizé of fomenting a coup with the rebels after his candidacy for presidential elections was rejected by the country's highest court, but Bozizé denied this. On 20 December 2020 Rwanda confirmed it had sent troops and Russia said it had sent 300 military instructors. On 22 December, the CPC, in an offensive led by UPC, had taken the country's fourth largest city, Bambari, according to its mayor, but the UN stated that its peacekeepers had retaken the city the next day. On 28 December, it was announced by the electoral commission that 800 (14%) of polling stations failed to operate during the presidential and legislative elections due to violent attacks from armed rebels. On 3 January 2021, MINUSCA reported that the rebel coalition partially captured Bangassou, adding that the fighters were allied to former president François Bozizé. It is argued that the arrival of the Rwandans and Russians thwarted the rebels from reaching Bangui and so the rebels adopted a long-term strategy of suffocating Bangui by controlling the resources around it, however, on 13 January, the CPC attacked the capital but were eventually repelled. On 4 January, the electoral commission declared Touadéra the winner of the presidential election. A state of emergency was declared in 25 January, and President Touadéra has been accused of using that opportunity to crack down on opponents and consolidate power. Pro-Touadéra militias known as the "Sharks" and "7th Territorial Infantry Battalion" are alleged to have been involved in disappearances of members of Bozizé's party and former president's Catherine Samba-Panza, as well as challengers of Touadéra in the recent polls, Anicet-Georges Dologuélé and Martin Ziguélé, report being prevented from exiting the country. On 11 July 2025, The UPC and 3R signed disarmament agreements with the government of President Touadéra, with UPC leader Ali Darassa in personal attendance. The deal was precipitated by a ceasefire agreement and negotiations mediated by and ensured by Chad. Under the terms agreed to by the government and the two groups, they will totally disarm, dissolve, and reintegrate with normal society, with Darassa declaring that "our commitment is sincere and total, with no turning back". Since January 2021, due to the actions of Russia's neo-Nazi-linked[b] Wagner Group and neo-Nazi Russian Imperial Movement, the rebels have been on the retreat for the first time in years. On 25 January 2021, CAR forces, backed by Russian PMCs and Rwandan troops, attacked Boyali, killing 44 rebels who were plotting an assault on the capital. Subsequently, CAR forces, supported by the Russian contractors and Rwandan troops, captured a number of strategic towns throughout February 2021, including Bossembele, Bouar, Beloko and Bossangoa. As the rebels were being pushed back, Valery Zakharov urged them to hand over their leaders to the CAR's security forces. During the fighting, the rebel Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) claimed its fighters killed several Wagner Group PMCs and captured one when they destroyed their truck near Bambari on 10 February. Government advances, with the support of Russian and Rwandan forces, continued during March, April and May 2021.[citation needed] This included the capture of the strategic towns of Bria and Kaga-Bandoro and the Bakouma sub-prefecture. Some towns were also seized solely by the Russian PMCs,[citation needed] including Nzacko. In at least one instance, the contractors reportedly included Syrians.[citation needed] On 25 March, 3R rebel leader Sidiki Abass, whose group is accused of war crimes, succumbed to his injuries in the northern part of the country. In April 2021, the UPC, then the biggest of the armed rebel groups, withdrew from the CPC and asked to talk with the government which has declined so far. The rebels were seen to be moving away from cities and towards peripheral areas and turning to guerilla tactics instead of open fighting. By mid-May, the Russians have captured a village about 40 km from Bambari during fighting that left 20 people dead.[citation needed] In addition, at the end of the month, Russian and Syrian PMCs of the Wagner Group attacked a rebel checkpoint at the entrance of a village 28 km from Bria, killing three CPC fighters.[citation needed] Towards the end of July, the CAR military was leaving the frontline against the CPC to the PMCs. The plan was for government troops to occupy the captured positions after they had been secured by the contractors. The increase in influence by Russia at the expense of France in its former colony led to a disinformation campaign on Facebook between the two powers and France suspending aid and military cooperation with the CAR government in May 2021. On 5 October 2021, 34 civilians were killed by alleged UPC rebels in the village of Matchika near Bambari. Between 6 and 16 December 2021 Anti-balaka fighters from pro-government faction killed number of Muslim civilians in Boyo commune for their alleged links with UPC rebels.[citation needed] On 16 and 17 January 2022, Russian mercenaries killed at least 65 civilians in Aïgbado and Yanga villages. In March 2022, they launched a large offensive against armed groups in the northern part of the country, during which they reportedly killed hundreds of civilians, mostly artisanal miners. In April 2022 a series of intercommunal clashes involving 3R rebels and pro-government faction of Anti-balaka led to dozens of deaths and displacement of more than 1,000 people in Gadzi. On 4 December 2022 leader of four armed groups (MLCJ, RPRC, UFR and UFR-R) signed in Bangui an agreement announcing their dissolution. Atrocities It is argued that the focus of the initial disarmament efforts exclusively on the Séléka inadvertently handed the anti-Balaka the upper hand, leading to the forced displacement of Muslim civilians by anti-Balaka in Bangui and western CAR. While comparisons were often posed as the "next Rwanda", others suggested that the Bosnian Genocide's may be more apt as people were moving into religiously cleansed neighbourhoods. Even as Séléka was closing in on the capital, clashes began in Bangui's PK5 neighborhood, where members of ethnic groups with ties to Séléka were attacked, such as the Gula. After the withdrawal of Séléka leaders from Bangui, there was a wave of attacks against Muslims with anti-Muslim pogroms and looting of Muslim neighborhoods, including the lynching of the Muslim former Health Minister Joseph Kalite by Christian self-defence groups. Accounts state of lynch mobs, including that of uniformed soldiers, stoning or hacking Muslims then dismembering and burning their bodies in the streets. In 2014, Amnesty International reported several massacres committed by the anti-balakas against Muslim civilians, forcing thousands of Muslims to flee the country. Other sources report incidents of Muslims being cannibalized. On 10 April, MISCA troops escorted over 1,000 Muslims fleeing to Chad with a police source saying "not a single Muslim remains in Bossangoa." The Muslim population of Bangui dropped 99% from 138,000 to 900. In 2015, Samantha Power, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said 417 of the country's 436 mosques had been destroyed, and Muslim women were so scared of going out in public they were giving birth in their homes instead of going to the hospital. Eric Danboy Bagale, head of former president François Bozizé's guard and head of the mostly Christian anti-Balaka militias, was arrested in Paris on 19 September 2020 for war crimes in relation to revenge killings. Much of the tension is also over historical antagonism between agriculturalists, who largely comprise Anti-balaka and nomadic groups, who largely comprise Séléka fighters. There was ethnic violence during fighting between the Ex-Séléka militias FPRC and UPC, with the FPRC targeting Fulani people who largely make up the UPC and the UPC targeting the Gula and Runga people, who largely make up FPRC, as being sympathetic to FPRC. In November 2016 fighting in Bria that killed 85 civilians, FPRC was reported targeting Fulani people in house-to-house searches, lootings, abductions and killings. Within the FPRC, the Gula wing attacked the Runga wing in Ndele in April 2020, with at least 25 people being killed. It is also reported that in 2019, violence broke out in the northeastern region, where the killing of an ethnic Kara man sparked heavy fighting between the mainly Kara MLCJ and largely Runga FPRC. In 2015, humanitarian aid workers in the CAR were involved in more than 365 security incidents, more than Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. By 2017, more than two-thirds of all health facilities have been damaged or destroyed. The crimes are often committed by individuals not associated with any armed rebel groups. There have been jail breaks with more than 500 inmates escaping from Nagaragba Central Prison, including fighters of both Christian and Muslim militias. By 2017, only eight of 35 prisons function and few courts operate outside the capital. The international press freedom organization Reporters Without Borders said it was concerned that the rebel attacks were taking their toll on the ability of radio stations to operate in the CAR, with condemnation of the killing of journalist Elisabeth Blanche Olofio, who worked for Radio Bé-Oko which is part of a network of apolitical radio stations known as L'Association des Radios Communautaires de Centrafrique. The civil war has inflicted a severe economic toll on the country. Research employing the synthetic control method (SCM)—a statistical technique that constructs a counterfactual scenario using data from comparable countries—estimates that the conflict caused a national GDP per capita decline of 45.3 percent to 47.8 percent over the decade from 2013 to 2022. This translates to a cumulative GDP loss ranging from US$29.7 billion to US$32.4 billion in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Even under the most conservative estimates, a minimum decline of 35.3 percent in GDP per capita is observed over the same period. These findings are reinforced by remote sensed GDP data derived from nighttime lights and population data, which provide an alternative measure of economic activity in areas with limited official statistics. In comparison to other conflicts analyzed using similar methods, the economic cost of the CAR civil war ranks among the highest in terms of relative GDP per capita decline. Moreover, the estimates surpass the economic costs of the Rwandan genocide—derived from another statistical methodology—which were estimated to reach between 25 and 30 percent of per capita GDP one decade after, which seems striking given the humanitarian cost of this event. One potential explanation for the significant economic impact of the conflict is the disruption of the two main trade corridors: the road axis from Douala to Bangui and the river axis from Pointe-Noire-Brazzaville up to the port of Bangui, especially during the initial years of the war, particularly during the Séléka occupation of the capital city. Another contributing factor could be the direct and indirect destruction of capital stock, resulting from fiscal inability to maintain existing infrastructure, and the long-term impact of the war on technical capacities for both the private sector and the administration. Fatalities Total fatalities were 2,286 – at least 2,396.[clarification needed] Displaced people In May 2014, it was reported that around 600,000 people in CAR were internally displaced with 160,000 of these in the capital Bangui. By May 2014, 100,000 people had fled to neighbouring Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad. As of 2017, there are more than 1.1 million displaced people in a country of about 5 million people, the highest ever recorded in the country, with about half a million refugees outside CAR and about 600,000 internally displaced. Cameroon hosted the most refugees, more than 135,000, about 90% of whom are Fulani, even though they constituted 6% of CAR's population. In December 2020, after a contested election, rebels known as the Coalition of Patriots for Change or the CPC seized main roadways and prevented the flow of goods into Bouar. These and other similar efforts have caused an estimated 100,000 to leave their homes. A month later, January 2021, the number had doubled to 200,000, including 92,000 refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 13,000 in Chad, the Republic of the Congo, and Cameroon. International response See also Notes References Further reading External links |
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Contents 2026 2026 (MMXXVI) is the current year, and is a common year starting on Thursday of the Gregorian calendar, the 2026th year of the Common Era (CE) and Anno Domini (AD) designations, the 26th year of the 3rd millennium and the 21st century, and the 7th year of the 2020s decade. Events Predicted and scheduled events Deaths References External links |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_against_the_Islamic_State] | [TOKENS: 20844] |
Contents War against the Islamic State Donald Trump (2017–2021 and from 2025) Pete Hegseth (from 2025) Keir Starmer (from 2024) John Healey (from 2024) Emmanuel Macron (from 2017) Sébastien Lecornu (from 2022) Anthony Albanese (from 2022) Bart De Wever (from 2025) Theo Francken (from 2025) Hamad Al Khalifa Mette Frederiksen (from 2019) Troels Lund Poulsen (from 2023) Mark Carney (from 2025) David McGuinty (from 2025) Friedrich Merz (from 2025) Boris Pistorius (from 2023) Giorgia Meloni (from 2022) Guido Crosetto (from 2022) Ahmed al-Sharaa (from 2024) Mohammed Shia' Al Sudani (from 2022) Nechirvan Barzani (from 2019) Khalifa Haftar (from 2014) Saddam Haftar (from 2016) Ali Khamenei Joseph Aoun (from 2025) Shehbaz Sharif (2022–2023 and from 2024) Hibatullah Akhundzada (from 2016) Abdel Fattah el-Sisi Bola Tinubu (from 2023) Mahamat Déby (from 2021) Paul Biya Abdourahamane Tchiani (from 2023) Joe Biden (2021–2025) Lloyd Austin (2021–2025) Barack Obama (until 2017) Chuck Hagel (until 2015) Ash Carter (2015–2017) Jim Mattis (2017–2019) Mark Esper (2019–2020) Rishi Sunak (2022–2024) Liz Truss (2022) Boris Johnson (2019–2022) Theresa May (2016–2019) David Cameron (until 2016) Philip Hammond (2014) Michael Fallon (2014–2017) Gavin Williamson (2017–2019) Penny Mordaunt (2019) Ben Wallace (2019–2023) Grant Shapps (2023–2025) François Hollande (until 2017) Jean-Yves Le Drian (2014–2017) Florence Parly (2017–2022) Scott Morrison (2018–2022) Malcolm Turnbull (2015–2018) Tony Abbott (until 2015) Dennis Richardson (2015–2017) Alexander De Croo (2020–2025) Sophie Wilmès (2019–2020) Charles Michel (2014–2019) Elio Di Rupo (until 2014) Pieter De Crem (2014) Steven Vandeput (2014–2018) Didier Reynders (2018–2019) Philippe Goffin (2019–2020) Ludivine Dedonder (2020–2025) Justin Trudeau (2015–2025) Stephen Harper (until 2015) Robert Nicholson (2014–2015) Jason Kenney (2015) Anita Anand (2021–2023) Bill Blair (from 2023) Lars Løkke Rasmussen (2015–2019) Helle Thorning-Schmidt (until 2015) Nicolai Wammen (2014–2015) Carl Holst (2015) Peter Christensen (2015–2016) Claus Hjort Frederiksen (2015–2019) Trine Bramsen (2019–2022) Morten Bødskov (2022) Jakob Ellemann-Jensen (2022–2023) Olaf Scholz (2021–2025) Angela Merkel (until 2021) Ursula von der Leyen (2014–2019) Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (2019–2021) Christine Lambrecht (2021–2023) Mario Draghi (2021–2022) Giuseppe Conte (2018–2021) Paolo Gentiloni (2016–2018) Matteo Renzi (until 2016) Roberta Pinotti (2014–2018) Elisabetta Trenta (2018–2019) Lorenzo Guerini (2019–2022) Mark Rutte (2010–2024) Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert (2014–2017) Ank Bijleveld (2017–2021) Henk Kamp (2021–2022) Kajsa Ollongren (2022–2024) Erna Solberg (until 2021) Ine Eriksen Søreide (2014–2017) Frank Bakke-Jensen (2017–2021) Odd Roger Enoksen (2021–2022) Bjørn Arild Gram (2022–2025) King Abdullah # (until 2015) İsmet Yılmaz (2015–2016) Vecdi Gönül (2015) Fikri Işık (2016–2017) Nurettin Canikli (2017–2018) Hulusi Akar (2018–2023) Dmitri Medvedev (until 2020) Sergei Shoigu (until 2024) Iyad Allawi (2014–2018) Adil Abdul-Mahdi (2018–2020) Haider al-Abadi (2014–2018) Nouri al-Maliki (until 2014) Masoud Barzani (until 2017) Imran Khan (2018–2022) Shahid Khaqan Abbasi (2017–2018) Nawaz Sharif (until 2017) Ashraf Ghani (2015–2021) Akhtar Mansour † (2015–2016) Goodluck Jonathan (until 2015) Muhammadu Buhari (until 2023) Idriss Déby † (until 2021) Mohamed Bazoum (2021–2023) Mahamadou Issoufou (until 2021) Pierre Nkurunziza † (until 2020) Michel Aoun (until 2022) Bashar al-Assad (until 2024) Qasem Soleimani † (until 2020) Hassan Nasrallah † (until 2024) Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (Leader) 13,568+ Iraqi civilians killed by Islamic State 5,939+ Syrian civilians killed by Islamic State 8,317–13,190 civilians killed by Coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria (per Airwars) 1,417 civilians killed by Coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria (per Coalition) 4,096–6,085 civilians killed by Russian airstrikes in Syria 3,300,000 Iraqi civilians displaced Support: Local forces: Egyptian-led intervention: (in Libya) Egypt Libya Nigerian-led intervention: (Boko Haram as part of the IS since 2015) Nigeria Cameroon Chad Niger Burundi United StatesSee also: American military intervention Major insurgent attacks Foreign interventions IS genocide of minorities IS war crimes Timeline Many states began to intervene against the Islamic State, in both the Syrian civil war and the War in Iraq (2013–2017), in response to its rapid territorial gains from its 2014 invasion of Iraq, widely condemned executions, human rights abuses and the fear of further spillovers of the Syrian civil war. In later years, there were also minor interventions by some states against IS-affiliated groups in Nigeria and Libya. All these efforts significantly degraded the Islamic State's capabilities by around 2019–2020. While moderate fighting continues in Syria, as of 2026, IS has been contained to a small area and force capability. In mid-June 2014, Iran, according to American and British information, started flying drones over Iraq, and, according to Reuters, Iranian soldiers were in Iraq fighting IS. Simultaneously, the United States ordered a small number of troops to Iraq and started flying crewed aircraft over Iraq. In July 2014, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran sent Sukhoi Su-25 aircraft to Iraq, and Hezbollah purportedly sent trainers and advisers to Iraq in order to help Shia militias to monitor IS's movements. In August 2014, the US and Iran separately began a campaign of airstrikes on IS targets in Iraq. Since then, fourteen countries in a US-led coalition have also executed airstrikes on IS in Iraq and in Syria. Starting from September 2014, United States began closely co-operating with Saudi Arabia and Jordan to wage a co-ordinated aerial bombing campaign against IS targets across Iraq and Syria. In September 2015, Russian forces launched their military intervention in Syria to support that country's ally Bashar al-Assad in the fight against the Islamic State. Although Moscow officially portrayed its intervention as an anti-IS campaign and publicly declared support for the "patriotic Syrian opposition", the vast majority of its bombings were focused on destroying bases of the Syrian opposition militias of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Southern Front. On the other hand, United States and its Western allies have been opposed to the former Ba'athist regime for its purported state-sponsorship of terrorism, violent repression of Syrian revolution and extensive use of chemical weapons. The US-led coalition trained, equipped and supported secular Free Syrian and Kurdish militias opposed to the Assad government during its anti-IS campaign. In the months following the beginning of both air campaigns, IS began to lose ground in both Iraq and Syria. Civilian deaths from airstrikes began to mount in 2015 and 2016. In mid-2016, the US and Russia planned to begin coordinating their airstrikes; however, this coordination did not materialize. As of December 2017, IS was estimated to control no territory in Iraq, and 5% of Syrian territory, after prolonged actions. On 9 December 2017, Iraq declared victory in the fight against ISIL and stated that the War in Iraq was over. On 23 March 2019, IS was defeated territorially in Syria after losing the Battle of Baghuz Fawqani, after which the group was forced into an insurgency. IS's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, died during a US special operations raid in northern Syria in October 2019 and was succeeded by Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. The United Nations estimated in August 2020 that over 10,000 IS fighters remained in Syria and Iraq, mainly as sleeper cells. International coalitions against the Islamic State On the margins of the 4/5 September 2014 NATO summit in Wales, on 5 September 2014, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry invited Ministers of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey and the United Kingdom, for a separate meeting in which he pressed them to support the fight against ISIL militarily and financially. Those nine countries agreed to do so by supporting anti-ISIL forces in Iraq and Syria with supplies and air support, according to a statement that day from Kerry and U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel. In September 2014, Jordanian and Saudi Air Forces began their co-ordination with United States to wage a joint aerial bombing campaign against IS bases in its territories across Iraq and Syria. On 17 October 2014, the Department of Defense formally established Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR)—"in order to formalize ongoing military actions against the rising threat posed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria." On 3 December 2014, at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, diplomats and foreign ministers from 59 countries gathered to plot a way forward against the threat of ISIL. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry told the gathering, that "defeating the ideology, the funding, the recruitment" of Daesh (ISIL) must be the primary focus of their discussion, more important than airstrikes and other military action. The countries represented on 3 December were: the nine countries of the above-mentioned 5 September coalition in Wales (see above); the extra 18 countries of the 15 September France-led coalition in Paris (see below) except for China and Russia; and 33 additional countries: Albania, Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, New Zealand, Portugal, South Korea, Romania, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Sweden, Taiwan and Ukraine. They styled themselves as the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and agreed to a strategy that included: On 15 September 2014, at the 'International Conference on Peace and Security in Iraq' hosted by the French President François Hollande in Paris, 26 countries were represented: the countries of a US-led coalition that on 5 September in Wales (see above) had agreed on a coalition against ISIL except Australia and Poland, and furthermore Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Belgium, China, Czech Republic, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia and Spain. They committed themselves to supporting the Iraqi government with military assistance in its fight against ISIL, and they reaffirmed their commitment to UNSC Resolution 2170 of 15 August (condemning all trade with ISIL and urging to prevent all financial donations and all payments of ransoms to ISIL), so reported the French government. In retaliation for the November 2015 Paris attacks, the French Air Force significantly intensified airstrikes against ISIL targets in Syria, hitting among other targets the Syrian city of Raqqa, the de facto capital of ISIL. The French Navy deployed the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle with eighteen Rafale, eight Mirage 2000, two E-2 Hawkeye and 4 helicopters. The aircraft carrier travelled with the frigate Chevalier Paul and HMS Kent. At the end of September 2015, Russia, Iraq, Iran and Syria set up a 'joint information center' in Baghdad to gather, process and analyse intelligence regarding ISIL and operations near the Syria-Iraq border. On 30 September 2015, Russia began its air campaign on the side and in support of the Syrian government. Russia was also reported to have reached agreements on co-ordination of operations in Syria with Jordan and Israel. On 14 March 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a partial withdrawal from Syrian territory, citing the success of the ongoing ceasefire and greater security of the Syrian government. On 10 December 2017 Vladimir Putin ordered a similar withdrawal of Russian forces from Syria, stating that a complete withdrawal would be dependent on the ongoing situation. On 14 December 2015, Saudi Deputy Crown Prince and Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud announced that 34 countries would join in the fight against Muslim extremism, which he called a "disease." Based out of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the coalition includes Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Maldives, Mali, Malaysia, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, Togo, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Syria On 4 July 2014, the U.S. bombed the "Osama bin Laden" ISIL military base in the village of Uqayrishah, Syria. Two dozen American Delta Force operators then touched down in an effort to rescue hostages, including James Foley. The effort failed, with the hostages having been moved to another location days prior. In a series of videos, Foley, Steven Joel Sotloff, and several more hostages were murdered. On 26 August 2014, the U.S. began sending surveillance flights, including drones, into Syria to gather intelligence. The Syrian Arab Republic was not asked for permission. On 28 August, speaking about combating ISIL in Syria, President Obama said "we don't have a strategy yet." The British Royal Air Force has been operating over Syria in a surveillance role since 21 October 2014, making the UK the first Western country other than the United States to operate in both Iraq and Syria simultaneously. At the direction of President Obama, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency played an active role since the early stages of the Syrian Civil War. The U.S. initially supplied the vetted militias of the Free Syrian Army with non-lethal aid but soon escalated to providing training, money, and intelligence to the rebel commanders. In June 2014, Obama requested Congressional authorization of $0.5 billion to train, arm and support vetted Free Syrian militias as a counter-force against both Assad regime and IS. On 17 September 2014, the House of Representatives voted to authorize the proposal to train and arm pro-Western Free Syrian militias, with the objective of training 5,000–10,000 troops. Syrian opposition's National Revolutionary Coalition welcomed Obama's announcement of extending the anti-IS bombing campaign into Syria, stating: “The Syrian Coalition ... stands ready and willing to partner with the international community not only to defeat ISIS but also rid the Syrian people of the tyranny of the Assad regime” The United Kingdom announced in March 2015 that it would send 75 military personnel to help train Western-vetted Free Syrian militias in the use of small arms, infantry tactics and basic medical skills. The training was supposed to take place in Turkey as part of the U.S.-led effort. According to the United States Department of Defense, Saudi Arabia proposed that they could provide training to Syrian rebels so they could return to Syria and battle ISIL. The effort to train a large force of Syrian rebels from anti-Assad factions to fight ISIL ultimately failed, with only 54 fighters in Division 30 trained and many captured, killed or not fighting. U.S. President Barack Obama announced on 10 September 2014 that he would begin to extend aerial campaign to Syria with or without congressional approval. Many Senators were opposed to Obama's policy of unilateral intervention, without requesting a congressional mandate. While Obama acknowledged the broad consensus in the US intelligence community that IS were not a "current threat" to United States, he claimed that IS posed a future danger to the US, citing the anti-American rhetoric of IS leadership. Pentagon leadership preferred a greater involvement of US boots to combat IS, but this was rejected by Obama, who instead favoured working with Iraqi Ground forces, Peshmerga and Syrian opposition militias. Starting on 22 September 2014, the U.S., Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates began numerous large-scale airstrikes against ISIL targets in Syria with fighters, bombers, and sea-based Tomahawk cruise missiles. The strikes were the largest aerial bombing operations launched against IS targets since US launched its military campaign against IS in August 2014. Hadi al-Bahra, President of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, stated that the strikes were "necessary" to aid the Syrian people's fight against ISIL and urged the Coalition Forces to steer clear of civilian casualties. United States has ruled out any co-operation with Bashar al-Assad in the fight against IS, instead issuing warnings to the Syrian military to disengage from Coalition aircraft. State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki stated that no notifications had been issued to Assad regime with regard to US operations in Syrian airspace. Additionally, on the first night, the U.S. forces also launched eight cruise missile strikes against the al-Qaeda-affiliated Khorasan. Many airstrikes were focused against IS command & control facilities, training camps, supply depots, military facilities, etc. in and around Raqqa. Strikes continue to take place in Syria daily. In early November early December 2014, the U.S. launched additional airstrikes against the same group. In November 2014, Morocco sent 3 F-16s to be deployed in UAE, to fight ISIL in Iraq and Syria under U.S.-led operations. On 24 December 2014, ISIL shot down a Jordanian fighter jet over Syria and captured its pilot, Jordanian air force lieutenant Muath Al-Kasasbeh. Al-Kasabeh was offered in exchange for captured ISIL fighters. Jordan offered to make the exchange, but demanded "proof of life" first. However, Al-Kasabeh had already been executed by immolation. When video of the pilot's execution was released, a moratorium on executions in Jordan was lifted and the Al-Qaida operatives, Sajida al-Rishawi and Ziad al-Karbouli were executed. On 21 August 2015, three ISIL fighters, two with UK nationality, were targeted and killed in Raqqa, Syria by a British Royal Air Force MQ-9 Reaper strike. Prime Minister David Cameron gave a statement to Parliament that one of the British nationals targeted had been plotting attacks in the United Kingdom. Another British national was killed in a separate air strike by US forces in Raqqa on 24 August. In October and November 2015, the U.S. intensified its airstrikes on ISIL-held oil facilities in an operation named "Tidal Wave II", after the World War II campaign against Axis oil targets in Romania. The U.S. strategy aimed "to knock out specific installations for six months to a year" by focusing on facilities near Deir el-Zour. The Omar oil field, which produced 30,000 barrels of oil per day and $1.7 million to $5.1 million in revenue per month at full capacity, was hit on 21 October, reducing it to roughly a third of its capacity. French aircraft also participated in the strikes. On 16 November 2015, a U.S. Operation Tidal Wave II sortie destroyed 116 ISIL fuel tankers clustered near Abu Kamal, a city on the Syrian border with Iraq. Four A-10 Thunderbolt IIs and two AC-130 Spectre gunships participated in the raid. Before attacking the trucks the planes conducted several low-level, 'show of force' passes. On 2 December 2015, the Parliament of the United Kingdom voted in favour (397 to 223) to authorise air strikes in Syria. Within hours, RAF Tornado jets carried out their first air strikes, targeting the Omar oil fields in eastern Syria, which were under ISIL control. Tornado GR-4 jets were used for surveillance and a further six Typhoons left RAF Lossiemouth, Scotland to join forces at RAF Akrotiri, Cyprus. On 4 December 2015 Germany intervened in reaction to the November 2015 Paris attacks by sending the frigate Augsburg (F213) and Panavia Tornado reconnaissance aircraft to the region. The Augsburg concluded its first deployment in March 2016, redeploying in September and concluding its mission on 14 November 2016. On 29 January 2016, the Netherlands announced its intent on expanding its airstrike operations to Syria. In June 2016, Omar Mateen, the attacker from the Pulse nightclub shooting pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and gave U.S. collaboration with Russia in airstrikes against I.S. as a reason for the attack. On 11 September 2015, a Syrian military source made mention of Russian troops present in Syria to help the Syrian government in its fight against ISIL, as part of Operation Rescue. On 17 September, Syrian warplanes carried out a wave of airstrikes in the ISIL-held city of Raqqa with Russian weapons supplied by Russian Armed Forces. On 20 November, Russia claimed to have killed over 600 terrorists using cruise missiles in one mission. ISIL is suspected of involvement in or responsibility for terrorist attacks in Turkey in May 2013 in Reyhanlı and March 2014 on Turkish police, kidnapping 49 Turkish diplomats in June 2014, the 5 June 2015 Diyarbakır rally bombing and 20 July 2015 Suruç bombing which killed 32 young activists. Until July 2015, the Turkish government attacked ISIL only once, in January 2014. In September 2014 Turkey joined a US-led coalition 'to fight ISIL'. On 23 July 2015, according to various Turkish news outlets, 60 elite Special Forces (ÖKK) operatives reportedly infiltrated Elbeyli-Ayyase village, 9 kilometers from the Syria-Turkey border in Syria, and took it back from ISIL militants. Turkish tanks shelled the village the same day of the ground operation. The operation reportedly lasted over an hour and killed over 100 ISIL militants, according to reports. The Turkish General Staff neither confirmed nor denied the special forces foray but did confirm shelling the village. The same day, Turkey allowed the United States to use İncirlik and Diyarbakır air bases in southern Turkey for airstrikes on ISIL in Syria, and after an alleged ISIL attack on a Turkish border outpost in Kilis Province killing one Turkish soldier, the Turkish army shelled ISIL militants in Syria, killing one militant and destroying several ISIL vehicles. On 24 July, an anonymous report appeared on a Turkish newspaper website stating that the United States had agreed with Turkey on a 'partial no-fly zone' in northern Syria. On 24 and 25 July launched a military operation entitled 'Operation Martyr Yalçın' against both ISIL in Syria and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Iraq, deploying at least 70 F-16 fighter jets. As the conflict intensified after the rise of IS in 2014 and the subsequent deterioration of the regime’s control, Iran dramatically escalated its involvement. By mid-2014, Iran began dispatching members of its elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including its Quds Force, along with other Iranian armed-forces personnel. At the same time, Iran organized, trained and deployed a wide array of Shiite militias: foreign volunteers, Iraqi militias that Tehran already supported, and locally raised Syrian pro-regime militias. At the height of its intervention from 2015-2018, estimates suggest that Iran had placed as many as 10,000 IRGC personnel and a substantial number of Iranian-led foreign militias on the ground in Syria. Iranian forces backed by drones, ballistic-missiles, and air-power carried out hundreds of strikes against IS targets. By October 2018, Iranian drones alone had reportedly launched more than 700 strikes on Islamic State forces. By 2025 more than 2,100 Iranian soldiers had been killed in Syria. The collapse of the regime’s stability in late 2024 then significantly undermined Iran’s influence in Syria. Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria is a major theater in the war against the Islamic State in Syria. During the Syrian Civil war, Kurdish forces led by the People's Protection Units (YPG) took control of Northern Syria and launched campaigns to take control of the Islamist-controlled areas. The Syrian Democratic Forces went on to take substantial territory from the Islamic State and played a major role in the liberation of Raqqa and the battle for Deir Ezzor, ending Islamic State rule in Syria. The Lebanese Shiite militia and political-military group Hezbollah intervened in Syria early in the civil war, initially as military advisers and fighters sent to support the regime of Assad, but over time their role grew both in scale and strategic importance. Starting around 2012-2013, Hezbollah began deploying operatives to Syria, initially to assist in key regions like Homs, the Qusayr area, and around Damascus; including to defend Shi’a holy sites and minority communities. Hezbollah’s involvement was not only military: it helped organize, train, and lead many of the pro-regime militias later subsumed under broader entities like the National Defence Forces (NDF). Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria effectively ended with the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. The group withdrew its fighters, and clashes began between the new Syrian transitional government and Hezbollah along the Lebanese-Syrian border. Lebanon In June 2015, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah claimed that ISIL and Nusra had taken a foothold in Lebanon and that fierce battles were raging between them and Hezbollah, as well as each other. Egypt The Sinai insurgency began during the height of the 2011 Egyptian revolution when Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was overthrown and a jihadist group called the Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (ABM) launched attacks against Egyptian security forces and civilians in the Sinai. Sometimes, the group conducted cross-border attacks against Israel as well. After another Egyptian president, President Mohamed Morsi, was overthrown in 2013, the ABM intensified its attacks against the Egyptian forces and governmental figures. In November 2014, the ABM swore allegiance to the Islamic State and its then-leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. After making the commitment, the group changed its name to Islamic State – Sinai Province (IS-SP) and gained recognition as an affiliate of the ISIS, thus Egypt's involvement against the Islamic State became explicit. In 2015, the United States increased military aid to Egypt after lifting its suspension due to the 2013 coup. This included help with counterterrorism, sharing intelligence, and providing military equipment to fight Sinai-linked militants. Israel also permitted Egypt to exceed the quantity of troops and heavy equipment Egypt could deploy in the Sinai than allowed under the 1979 Egypt–Israel peace treaty. Israel also shared reconnaissance intelligence and sometimes performed airstrikes in the Sinai with Egyptian permission. During this period, the Egyptian Armed Forces significantly expanded its operations by demolishing suspected terrorist-controlled buildings and underground smuggling caves connecting Egypt and Gaza, establishing buffer zones near the borders of Gaza, implementing strict curfews in the Sinai, and turning to the scorched earth strategy. However, the Egyptian Security Forces were subsequently accused of war crimes, mainly by the Human Rights Watch (HRW), due to excessive force causing civilian casualties and widespread displacement. Multiple intense clashes occurred, mainly in January and July 2015, which resulted in heavy losses on both sides. On 7 September 2015, Egypt launched Operation Martyr’s Right, a six-phased long-term campaign aiming to "rooting out and killing ‘terrorists'". By late September 2015, during the second phase of the operation, the Egyptian military had impounded multiple weapons, ammunitions, vehicles, and communicating devices, with 535 militants dead with another 578 arrested. Following clashes in early 2015, Metrojet Flight 9268, a Russian airliner flight flying from Egypt to Russia with 224 people on board, disintegrated somewhere over northern Sinai by a bomb planted by the IS-SP, killing everyone on board. The insurgency had reached a deadlock by 2016 and 2017, with ongoing fighting leading to heavy casualties on both sides but no clear winner.: 2 While Egyptian forces controlled major towns and carried out operations to contain the militants, the militants maintained a stronghold in rural and desert areas, although some progress was made in the continued destruction of the underground smuggling tunnels between Egypt and Gaza, increased enforcement of established buffer zones near the Egypt–Gaza border, and increased inspection of vehicles crossing the Egypt–Libya border. On 24 November 2017, a large group of the IS-SP militants coordinated an attack on a mosque in northern Sinai, killing 311 people and injuring 128 more. It is the deadliest terrorist attack in Egypt until today. Current Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi vowed for revenge and gave the Egyptian military a three-month deadline to launch an operation to stabilise the Sinai. On 9 February 2018, three months after the 2017 Sinai mosque attack, one of the largest Egyptian operations in this conflict was launched by the Egyptian Armed Forces. Particularly in northern Sinai, the Egyptian National Police and the Egyptian Military forces conducted multiple raids in buildings and intensified in the continued-demolition of buildings as well. Multiple airstikes were also performed. The Egyptian Navy also continued to secure the northern coast of the Sinai. A reported 464 militants were killed along with 7491 others being arrested. In 2023, with the loss of around 3000 military men with more than 12000 injured, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi declares victory over the militants. The high-leveled attacks conducted by the IS-SP was categorised as low-level attacks due to the significant military presence and continued military operations against the militants. Egypt's first direct major international involvement against the Islamic State was in Libya when, on 15 February 2015, some Islamic State militants executed 21 Coptic Christians, 20 of which were Egyptians. In retaliation, Egypt launched airstrikes against ISIS positions in Libya the next day using F-16s, which effectively associated Egypt in the Second Libyan Civil War. The airstrikes had killed more than 60 ISIS militants and some civilians. Iraq After having started flying crewed aircraft over Iraq and sending some troops in June, in August 2014 the US military began supplying Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga with weapons, dropping food for refugees fleeing from ISIL, and airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq. On 9 August, speaking about U.S. airstrikes in Iraq, President Barack Obama said "this is going to be a long-term project." Since then, nine countries allied with the US have also executed airstrikes on ISIL in Iraq, and various countries have contributed military and humanitarian aid to Iraqi government and Iraqi Kurdish ground forces. On 16–19 August, according to the U.S., Iraqi government forces and Kurdish Peshmerga, with the help of U.S. airstrikes, took back the Mosul Dam, the largest dam in Iraq. (For further wins and losses in Iraq against ISIL, see War in Iraq (2014–2017)). President Obama announced on 10 September 2014 that the number of airstrikes in Iraq would increase and that he had dispatched 500 more US troops there. On 10 September 2019, US Air Force F-35s and F-15E Strike Eagles dropped bombs weighing 36,000 kg on an Iraqi island "infested" by ISIS. On 5 August 2014, Zalmay Khalilzad, the former US ambassador to Iraq and the UN, wrote in the Washington Post that the United States is involved in "the direct supply of munitions to the Kurds and, with Baghdad's agreement, the shipment of some Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program weapons to the Kurds." The United States moved from indirectly supplying Kurdistan with small arms through the CIA to directly giving them weapons such as man-portable anti-tank systems. In a coordinated effort led by the United States, many allied countries including NATO members and Middle Eastern partners have supplied or plan to supply Iraqi and/or Kurdish forces with heavy military equipment, small arms, ammunition, non-lethal military gear, and training support. The Building Partner Capacity (BPC) program is meant to help the Iraqi government to prepare forces for the counter-attack against ISIL and the regaining of its territory. According to the US Department of Defense, by May 2015 a dozen countries had committed themselves to the BPC program: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and United States, and 6,500 Iraqi forces had been trained by BPC. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, supported by international partners, launched a large humanitarian effort to support refugees stranded in northern Iraq. This included air-dropping tens of thousands of meals and thousands of gallons of drinking water to Yazidi refugees stranded in the Sinjar Mountains and threatened by advancing ISIL forces, between 7–14 August 2014, in what was later described as "the first mass air delivery of humanitarian cargo since the outbreak of violence in East Timor in 1999." Thousands of Yazidis and other Iraqi civilians fled to the area following attacks on their villages and the town of Sinjar throughout late July and early August 2014. Several human rights and observer organizations in the region reported that those who fled to the mountains were subjected to starvation, and lacked clean drinking water and medical care for several months as ISIL militants surrounded them. Hundreds of men, women, and children were abducted and killed. In response to the immediate threat to the approximately 30,000 people trapped on the mountain, coalition aircraft commenced humanitarian aid drops. These air drops included basic supplies such as food, water, and shelter and were conducted at low flight levels by coalition transport aircraft under the threat of ISIL surface-to-air attacks. In direct support of humanitarian aid drops, CF-18s provided top cover for a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) C-130 Hercules transport aircraft on 20 November, ensuring the transport crew was able to safely parachute supplies to waiting refugees below. Canadian fighter jets remained in close proximity to the transport aircraft to protect it from ISIL surface-to-air threats or attacks. Unlike their coalition partners, and unlike previous American combat operations, no name was initially given to the 2014 intervention against ISIL by the U.S. government. The decision to keep the conflict nameless drew considerable media criticism. U.S. Service members remain ineligible for Campaign Medals and other service decorations due to the continuing ambiguous nature of the continuing U.S. involvement in Iraq. On 15 October 2014, the United States Central Command announced that the U.S.-led air campaign against ISIL in Iraq and Syria was henceforth designated as Operation Inherent Resolve. The CENTCOM news release noted: "According to CENTCOM officials, the name INHERENT RESOLVE is intended to reflect the unwavering resolve and deep commitment of the U.S. and partner nations in the region and around the globe to eliminate the terrorist group ISIL and the threat they pose to Iraq, the region and the wider international community. It also symbolizes the willingness and dedication of coalition members to work closely with our friends in the region and apply all available dimensions of national power necessary—diplomatic, informational, military, economic—to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL." In June 2014, U.S. forces had started undertaking reconnaissance missions over northern Iraq. On 7 August, President Obama gave a live address describing the worsening conditions in Iraq and that the plight of the Yazidis particular had convinced him that U.S. military action was necessary to protect American lives, protect minority groups in Iraq, and to stop a possible ISIL advance on Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish Autonomous Region. On 8 August, the United States started to bomb ISIL targets in Iraq. By 10 August, assisted by these air attacks, Kurdish forces claimed to have recaptured the towns of Mahmour and Gweyr from Islamic State control. Additional Iraqi airstrikes conducted in Sinjar were reported to have killed 45 ISIL militants and injured an additional 60 militants. On 11 August, a spokesperson for The Pentagon said the airstrikes had slowed down ISIL's advance in northern Iraq, but were unlikely to degrade ISIL's capabilities or operations in other areas. Between 8 and 13 August, U.S. airstrikes and Kurdish ground forces enabled 35,000 to 45,000 of Yazidi refugees to escape or be evacuated from the Sinjar Mountains. On 16 August, U.S. air power began a close air campaign aimed at supporting the advance of Kurdish fighters moving toward the Mosul Dam. Kurdish sources commented that it was the "heaviest US bombing of militant positions since the start of air strikes". President Obama on 17 August defended this usage of U.S. Forces as support of the Iraqi and Kurdish fight in general against ISIL—which indeed went beyond Obama's reasoning for launching airstrikes on 7 August. On 8 September, the Iraqi Army, with close air support from the U.S., retook the key Haditha Dam, and recaptured the town of Barwanah, killing 15 ISIL fighters. ISIL responded with the public execution of David Haines. By the end of September 2014, the United States had conducted 240 airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, as well as 1,300 tanker refueling missions, totaling 3,800 sorties by all types of aircraft. A tactical arrangement with Kurdish and Iraqi forces, and drone videos are being used to coordinate close air support without needing U.S. troops in ground combat. On 19 December 2014, US General James Terry announced that the number of US airstrikes on ISIL had increased to 1,361. On 25 December 2014, Hassan Saeed Al-Jabouri, the ISIL governor of Mosul, who was also known as Abu Taluut, was killed by a US-led Coalition airstrike in Mosul. It was also reported that the US planned to retake the city of Mosul in January 2015. On 15 January 2015, it was reported that over 16,000 airstrikes had been carried out by the Coalition. The U.S. Air Force has carried out around 60 percent of all strikes. Among them, F-16s performed 41 percent of all sorties, followed by the F-15E at 37 percent, then the A-10 at 11 percent, the B-1 bomber at eight percent, and the F-22 at 3 percent. The remaining 40 percent has been carried out by the US Navy and allied nations. On 20 January 2015, the SOHR reported that al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIL, had been wounded in an airstrike in Al-Qa'im, an Iraqi border town held by ISIL, and as a result, withdrew to Syria. On 21 January 2015, the US began coordinating airstrikes with a Kurdish launched offensive, to help them begin the planned operation to retake the city of Mosul. On 21 July 2015, it was reported that nearly 44,000 sorties have flown since August 2014. Throughout 2015, the vast majority of bombs and missiles launched by the US (approximately 22,000 of 23,000 total) were directed at targets in Iraq and Syria, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. In 2016, the Pulse nightclub shooting was carried out in retaliation for the U.S. Airstrikes in Iraq and Syria.[additional citation(s) needed] In 2019 U.S military carried out an airstrike in Baghuz town in Syria leading to death of 64 women and children, marking the largest civilian casualty incidents of the war against the Islamic State. The incident was concealed by the U.S. military and it was reported by the New York Times for the first time on November 14, 2021. In June 2020, coalition aircraft destroyed three ISIL camps in northern Iraq. In July, President Obama announced that due to the continuing violence in Iraq and the growing influence of non-state organizations, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the United States would be elevating its security commitment in the region. Approximately 800 U.S. troops secured American installations like the Embassy in Baghdad and the Consulate in Erbil as well as taking control of strategic locations like the Baghdad airport in cooperation with Iraqi troops. U.S. forces also undertook a mission to "assess and to advise [Iraqi security forces] as they confront [ISIL] and the complex security situation on the ground." Reports from these American units about the capabilities of the Iraqi military have been consistently grim, viewing them as "compromised" by sectarian interests. On 13 August 2014, the U.S. deployed another 130 military advisers to Northern Iraq and up to 20 U.S. Marines and special forces servicemen landed on Mount Sinjar from V-22 aircraft to coordinate the evacuation of Yazidi refugees joining British SAS already in the area. On 3 September 2014, Obama announced increase of U.S. forces in Iraq to 1,213. On 10 September, Obama gave a speech reiterating that U.S. troops will not fight in combat, but about 500 more troops will be sent to Iraq to help train Iraqi forces. In early November 2014, Obama announced that he would be doubling the U.S. ground presence inside Iraq to around 3,000 men. By early December 2014, the number of U.S. ground troops in Iraq had increased to 3,100. On 9 December 2014, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations authorized U.S. military force against ISIL. However, it limits military force to three years, requires the administration to report to Congress every 60 days, and prohibits the deployment of U.S. combat troops, except in specific cases, such as those involving the rescue or protection of U.S. soldiers, or for intelligence operations. During the early morning hours of 14 December 2014, U.S. ground forces allegedly clashed with ISIL alongside the Iraqi Army and Tribal Forces near the Ain al-Assad Airbase, west of Anbar, in an attempt to repel them from the base of which includes about 100 U.S. advisers in it, when ISIL attempted to overrun the base. According to a field commander of the Iraqi Army in Al Anbar Governorate, said that "the U.S. force equipped with light and medium weapons, supported by F-18, was able to inflict casualties against fighters of ISIL organization, and forced them to retreat from the al-Dolab area, which lies 10 kilometers from Ain al-Assad base." Sheikh Mahmud Nimrawi, a prominent tribal leader in the region, added that "U.S. forces intervened because of ISIL started to come near the base, which they are stationed in so out of self-defense," he responded, welcoming the U.S. intervention, and saying "which I hope will not be the last." This was said to be the first encounter between the United States and the Islamic State, in four years. However, this claim has been stated to be "false" by The Pentagon. On 5 January 2015, The Pentagon acknowledged that ISIL had been ineffectively mortaring the base. In late February 2015, another 1,300 US soldiers were deployed to Iraq, increasing the number of US ground troops in Iraq to 4,400. On 9 March 2020, the Pentagon released a statement claiming that two American Marines were killed on 8 March 2020 during an anti-ISIS operation in a mountainous area of north central Iraq. Col. Myles B. Caggins III, a spokesman for the OIR coalition, later identified the Marines as Gunnery Sgt. Diego D. Pongo, 34, of Simi Valley, California, and Capt. Moises A. Navas, 34, of Germantown, Maryland, who were also MARSOC Raiders, and that they died during an operation which also claimed the lives of four ISIS fighters during an American-led operation which involved clearing an ISIS cave complex in the Makhmur Mountains, south of Erbil. The coalition officially concluded its combat mission in Iraq on 9 December 2021, but U.S. troops remained in Iraq to advise, train, and assist Iraqi security forces against the ongoing ISIL insurgency, including providing air support and military aid. On 3 October 2014, Prime Minister Tony Abbott and the Australian Cabinet approved for RAAF Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter bombers to begin airstrikes against Islamic State militants. Abbott said "It is in our national interest that we do so, it is in the interests of civilisation that we do so. It is in everyone's best interests that the murderous rage of the ISIL death cult be checked and rolled back and that's what we're determined to do." On 6 October, Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin announced two Super Hornets had conducted armed combat missions over Iraq although no armaments were expended. An Australian Air task Group KC-30A and an E-7A Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft have also been flying in support to fighter bombers belonging to coalition forces. The KC-30A performs airborne refueling for coalition aircraft. Binskin said "One of our Super Hornet packages on the first night ... had an identified target which it was tracking and that particular target moved into an urban area where the risks of conducting a strike on that target increased to a point where it exceeded our expectations of collateral damage, so they discontinued the attack at that point." On 9 October, Prime Minister Tony Abbott confirmed that RAAF Super Hornets had been involved in a "strike missions on an ISIL position in Iraq". The aircraft dropped two bombs onto an isolated building which ISIL was using as a command and control center. As of 17 October, the Royal Australian Air Force had conducted 43 combat sorties over Iraq. Recent strikes had targeted equipment facilities, with "at least two" resulting in ISIL casualties after Australian aircraft had increased the number of missions flown to allow U.S. and coalition forces to assist Kurdish fighters around Kobanî, in northern Syria. After more than 2 years of involvement in the coalition, Australia announced the end of its airstrikes in Iraq, after informing Iraq and other allies. On 12 August 2014, the United Kingdom deployed six Tornado GR4 strike aircraft to RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus to help coordinate its humanitarian aid airdrops in Northern Iraq. On 16 August 2014, following the completion of humanitarian aid airdrops, the Tornado GR4s, along with an RC-135 Rivet Joint signals intelligence aircraft, were re-tasked to provide aerial surveillance to coalition forces. In early September 2014, British Prime Minister David Cameron began voicing his support for British airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq. Weeks later, Parliament was recalled and Members debated whether or not to authorise airstrikes. The seven-hour debate resulted in overwhelming support for airstrikes, with 524 votes in favour and 43 votes against. On 27 September 2014, the first armed sortie took place over Iraq. A pair of Tornado GR4s left Cyprus armed with laser-guided bombs, supported by a Voyager aerial refueling tanker. Ultimately, the aircraft did not locate any targets requiring immediate air attack and so gathered intelligence for coalition forces instead. The Royal Air Force (RAF) conducted its first airstrike on 30 September 2014. A pair of Tornado GR4s engaged an ISIL heavy weapon position and an armed pickup truck using a laser-guided bomb and air-to-surface missile. On 3 October 2014, the RAF deployed two additional Tornado aircraft to bring its deployed fleet up to eight aircraft. During the same month, it was also confirmed that the Royal Navy was involved in anti-ISIL operations in a support role, with air defence destroyer HMS Defender providing escort to U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush as she launched aircraft into Iraq and Syria. Nick Clegg, then Deputy Prime Minister, also disclosed during an interview that there was a nuclear attack submarine armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles deployed to the region. On 16 October 2014, the Ministry of Defence announced it would deploy MQ-9 Reaper drones to assist with surveillance, although, Defence Secretary Michael Fallon stated that the drones could also conduct airstrikes if required. The first Reaper drone strike occurred weeks later in Bayji, north of Baghdad, against a group of ISIL militants which had been laying improvised explosive devices. As of September 2015, a year after operations first began, more than 330 ISIL fighters had been killed by British airstrikes in Iraq, without any civilian casualties. In addition to operations over Iraq, the United Kingdom had also intervened in Syria by 21 October 2014, making it the first Western country, other than the United States, to do so. However, British aircraft were not permitted to carrying out airstrikes until Parliament had voted to give its authorization. Despite this, the Royal Air Force carried out a drone strike in Syria on 21 August 2015, against two UK-born ISIL fighters which had been plotting attacks against the United Kingdom. Prime Minister David Cameron insisted that it was a lawful act of self-defense. Since the authorization of airstrikes in Iraq, Prime Minister David Cameron had made persistent calls for airstrikes in Syria; however, he affirmed that no airstrikes would take place until after a vote in Parliament. On 2 December 2015, following the November 2015 Paris attacks and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2249, David Cameron opened a ten-hour debate in Parliament on Syrian airstrikes, which ended with a final vote. 397 MPs voted in favour of airstrikes, whilst 223 voted against. Airstrikes commenced two hours after the vote, taking place in eastern Syria against the ISIL-held Oman oilfield. Defence Secretary Michael Fallon also subsequently announced that the UK's "strike force" based in Cyprus would double, with the addition of six Eurofighter Typhoons and two Tornado GR4s. In addition to airstrikes, the United Kingdom has also made significant contributions towards the coalition's ISTAR capabilities. The Royal Air Force has deployed Sentinel R1, Sentry AEW1, RC-135W Rivet Joint and Shadow R1 aircraft to gather surveillance, in addition to Tornado GR4 and MQ-9 Reaper strike aircraft. In September 2015, the United Kingdom was responsible for a third of all coalition surveillance flights over Iraq and Syria, with the Tornado GR4s RAPTOR reconnaissance pod accounting for 60% of the coalition's entire tactical reconnaissance in Iraq alone. In December 2016, the Telegraph reported that Secretary of State for Defence Sir Michael Fallon said "The British Army have trained over 31,000 Iraqi and Peshmerga who are taking the fight to Daesh" It was also reported that the Royal Air Force is operating at its most intense for 25 years in a single theatre of operation which far outstripped the UK involvement in the Iraq War and the War in Afghanistan (2001–2014), with RAF jets having dropped 11 times more bombs on Syria and Iraq in the preceding 12 months than they had in the busiest year of action in Afghanistan a decade previously. Canada took part in airstrikes against ISIL from 2 November 2014 until 22 February 2016 when following the election of Justin Trudeau to Prime Minister withdrew its CF-18s fighter jets and ended all airstrikes in Syria and Iraq. The Canadian contribution was code-named Operation Impact by the Canadian Department of National Defence. Canadian aircraft left for the Middle East to join in airstrikes on 21 October 2014. In total, six CF-18 fighter jets, an Airbus CC-150 Polaris air-to-air refueling tanker and two CP-140 Aurora surveillance aircraft were sent, along with 700 military personnel. Canadian CF-18 fighter jets completed their first operational flights departing from Kuwait on 31 October. The first Canadian airstrikes began on 2 November. Canada also flew an extra CF-18 to Kuwait to be used as a spare if the need arises, however a maximum of six are authorized to fly with the coalition missions. On 4 November 2014, Royal Canadian Air Force CF-18s destroyed ISIL construction equipment using GBU-12 bombs. The construction equipment was being used to divert the Euphrates River to deny villages water, and to flood roads, diverting traffic to areas with IEDs. On 12 November 2014, Canadian jets destroyed ISIL artillery just outside the Northern Iraqi town of Baiji. Airstrikes continued throughout December and into January, 2015, totaling 28 strike missions. It was then reported that Canadian special forces troops, which had been highlighting targets for airstrikes, had engaged in fighting after coming under attack. On 19 January 2015, Canadian special operations forces came under ISIL attack for the first time in Iraq, and returned sniper fire to "neutralize" the threat. Canadians are "enabling airstrikes from the ground," meaning they are actively finding targets for jets flying overhead. On 29 January 2015, Canadian special forces in Iraq came under fire from ISIL forces, causing the Canadian troops to return fire, killing some ISIL militants. On 6 March, a Canadian soldier was killed in a friendly fire incident by Kurdish forces while returning to an observation post. On 8 April 2015, two CF-18s carried out their first airstrike against ISIL in Syria, hitting one of the group's garrisons. From 2 November 2014 to 13 May 2015 the Canadian armed forces struck 80 ISIL fighting positions, 19 ISIL vehicles, and 10 storage facilities. On 21 October 2015, Canadian Prime Minister-designate Justin Trudeau informed U.S. President Barack Obama that he intended to withdraw Canadian aircraft from operations over Iraq and Syria but increase training missions on the ground. On 8 February 2016, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that the CF-18s would be withdrawn from the bombing mission no later than 22 February 2016. However, the surveillance aircraft and air-to-air jet refueller would continue. In addition, the amount of training troops would triple. The Canadian Government would extend the Operation until 31 March 2025. On 24 September 2014, the Dutch government announced its participation in "the military campaign" against ISIL which, as they claimed, had been started by the United States, and sent six F-16 fighter jets to Iraq to bomb ISIL. Their motivations to join this war: ISIL's advance in Iraq and Syria, while displaying "unprecedented violence" and "perpetrating terrible crimes against population groups", formed "a direct threat for that region"; ISIL's advance in Iraq and Syria "causes instability at the borders of Europe" which threatens "our own [Dutch] safety". Figures requested by RTL Nieuws in August 2015 showed that the Netherlands was among the most active countries within the coalition, third behind only the United States and the United Kingdom. In January 2016, the Netherlands extended their bombings of ISIL to Syrian territory. By the end of July 2016 the Dutch Air Task Force flew more than 2100 missions and carried out over 1800 air strikes. At the end of the Dutch contribution to the Air Task Force, in December 2018, the Royal Netherlands Air Force had flown over 3000 missions and conducted approximately 2100 air strikes. On 19 September 2014, the French Air Force used its Rafale jets to conduct airstrikes on IS targets in Mosul. The airstrikes were approved by French President François Hollande, which indicated that France was committed to fighting IS using air power alongside the United States. Hollande mentioned that no ground troops would be used in the conflict. To conduct its airstrikes, France deployed 9 Rafale fighters to the United Arab Emirates, 6 Dassault Mirage 2000 fighters to Jordan, in addition to an Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft, a Boeing E-3 Sentry airborne early warning and control aircraft, and a Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refueling tanker. On 23 February 2015, the French Navy also deployed its Task Force 473 carrier strike group to the Persian Gulf with the intent on conducting airstrikes from the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. The Charles de Gaulle contributed 12 Rafale fighters, 9 Dassault-Breguet Super Étendard strike aircraft, and 2 E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning and control aircraft. The task force also included the French frigate Chevalier Paul (D621), a Rubis-class submarine, a Durance-class tanker, and the British frigate HMS Kent. After eight weeks of operations, the task force left the Persian Gulf on its way to India, heralding the end of its contribution to Operation Chammal. On 5 November 2015, it was announced that the Charles de Gaulle would resume operations in Syria to fight IS. On 15 November 2015, after the November 2015 Paris attacks, the French Air Force launched its largest airstrike of the bombing campaign sending 12 planes, including 10 fighters, that dropped 20 bombs in training camps and ammunition facilities in Raqqa, the de facto capital of IS. After the downed Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh was executed by IS by being burned to death, King Abdullah II vowed revenge and temporarily took the lead in the bombing raids on IS during February 2015. On 8 February, Jordan claimed that during the course of 3 days, from 5–7 February, their airstrikes alone had killed 7,000 ISIL militants in Iraq and Syria, and also reportedly degraded 20% of the militant group's capability. In December 2014 Morocco sent 4 F-16s to bomb ISIL positions, initially in the outskirts of Baghdad and other undisclosed locations. The planes operated under the command of the UAE and suspended operations in February 2015. See overview in section Turkish intervention. In mid-June 2014, according to American and British sources, Iran sent Qasem Soleimani, commanding general of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force (IRGC-QF), to Iraq to help the government organize against ISIL. Later that month Iran started flying drones over Iraq, and by August, according to sources like Reuters, Iranian soldiers were in Iraq fighting ISIL. One war correspondent suggested that Iran "joined the air war" against ISIL on 21 June. In July, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran sent several Su-25 aircraft to Iraq, supported by Iranian/Iraqi ground crews trained in Iran. In early August, those Su-25s began combat against ISIL, according to Business Insider. By September, according to Business Insider, Iranian Quds Force personnel were deployed to Samarra, Baghdad, Karbala, and the abandoned U.S. military post formerly known as Camp Speicher. At the end of November 2014, an Israeli website claimed to have seen Iranian F-4 Phantom II jet-fighters bombing ISIL in eastern Iraq; a claim the U.S. army verified. In March and May 2015, American commentators indicated Qasem Soleimani was "leading Iraq's military strategy against ISIL". Iran was mainly involved in the fight against Islamic State by supporting Shia militias from the Popular Mobilization Units both financially and militarily. Already "for a long time" before June 2014, Hezbollah had a presence in Iraq of advisers offering guidance to Shia fighters, according to a Hezbollah commander interviewed by The National. In June 2014, Hezbollah reportedly set up a dedicated command center in Lebanon to monitor developments in Iraq. On 17 June, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said that the party was "ready to sacrifice martyrs in Iraq five times more than what we sacrificed in Syria in order to protect shrines." In July 2014, Hezbollah sent more technical trainers and advisers to Iraq, to monitor ISIL's movements, according to a Hezbollah commander. Shortly thereafter, Hezbollah commander Ibrahim al-Hajj was reported killed in action near Mosul. An August Reuters story reported there were "dozens" of Hezbollah "battle-hardened veterans" in Iraq, while the Christian Science Monitor reported the party had deployed a 250-man unit "responsible for advising, training, and coordinating the Iraqi Shia militias." In February 2015, Nasrallah confirmed that he had sent troops to fight in Iraq. Libya After ISIL killed 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya, Egypt conducted airstrikes on ISIL targets in Libya on 16 February 2015, killing a total of 64 ISIL militants (50 in Derna). Warplanes acting under orders from the "official" Libyan government also struck targets in Derna, reportedly in coordination with Egypt's airstrikes. A Libyan official stated that more joint airstrikes would follow. Concern over ISIL activities in Derna District in Libya in December 2014 led to U.S. drones and electronic surveillance planes making "constant flights" from Italian bases, over the district of Derna. On 15 November 2015, the United States launched an airstrike in Derna, Libya. Two U.S. F-15E fighter jets targeted senior ISIL leader Abu Nabil al-Anbari in the airstrike, who was the top ISIL commander in Libya. In January 2016, ISIL's Libyan faction confirmed Abu Nabil's death in a eulogy to him. Administration officials are weighing a new campaign plan for Libya that would deepen the United States' military and diplomatic involvement, on yet another front against ISIL. The United States and its allies are increasing reconnaissance flights and intelligence collecting there—and even preparing for possible airstrikes and raids, according to senior American officials. Special Operations forces have met with various Libyan groups over the past months to vet them for possible action against ISIL. On 19 February 2016, US warplanes carried out an airstrike on multiple ISIL targets in Libya, hitting an Islamic State training camp and a senior extremist leader, the training camp was near Sabratha, Libya, 60 people were present at the camp at the time of the strike, more than 40 people were killed with more wounded, some critically, On 14 February 2016, a U.N.-designated council presented a new 18-member Libyan cabinet in the Moroccan city of Skhirat, weeks after an earlier lineup was rejected. The internationally recognized parliament has to endorse the new unity cabinet. If approved, the new unity government could eventually seek international military intervention against Islamic State extremists who have taken advantage of the country's political vacuum since 2014. On 1 August 2016, U.S. crewed and uncrewed aircraft carried out airstrikes on ISIL targets in Libya, responding to the U.N.-backed government's request to help push the militants from their stronghold of Sirte, in what U.S. officials described as the start of a sustained campaign against the extremist group in the city. President Barack Obama authorized the airstrikes after a recommendation by U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter; the strikes hit an ISIL tank and two vehicles that posed a threat to forces aligned with Libyan GNA (Government of National Accord). This was the third U.S. air strike against Islamic State militants in Libya, but this time U.S. officials said it marked the start of a sustained air campaign rather than another isolated strike, U.S. airstrikes will continue to target ISIL in Sirte in order to enable the GNA to make a decisive, strategic advance. U.S. AFRICOM command is overseeing the US effort, which is known as Operation Odyssey Lightning, AV-8B Harrier II assigned to the 22nd MEU flying off USS Wasp conducted the airstrikes and uncrewed aircraft launched from undisclosed locations. Airstrikes continued, on 2 August, airstrikes hit a rocket launcher, an excavator and a pickup truck with a mounted recoilless rifle and on 3 August airstrikes struck a pickup truck with a mounted recoilless rifle; by 9 August the U.S. conducted 28 strikes against ISIL in Libya, with more than half of the strikes being conducted from uncrewed aircraft. By 16 August, U.S. airstrikes hit an ISIL vehicle and 4 militant positions in Sirte, bringing the number of U.S. airstrikes in Libya to 48. On 17 August, U.S. Africa Command officials announced on 16 August airstrikes on ISIL targets in Sirte struck 7 enemy fighting positions, 4 vehicle-borne bombs, 1 pickup truck with a mounted recoilless rifle, 12 enemy fighting positions and 1 command-and-control vehicle, bringing the total number of airstrikes in support of Operation Odyssey Lightning to 57. On 22 August, Stars and Stripes reported that U.S. Marine AH-1W SuperCobra helicopters participated in strikes against ISIL militants in Sirte on 20 and 21 August; a small detachment of US special forces in Sirte provided most of the targeting information for the airstrikes which were then relayed to U.S. forces through Libyan government troops. On 31 August, Stars and Stripes reported that in the past month, the U.S. military conducted 104 airstrikes against IS targets in Libya. On 22 September, Stars and Stripes reported that the pace of US airstrikes against IS militants in Libya slowed in September as the number of insurgents holed up in a hard-to-target section of Sirte had shrunk, (the US conducted 50 airstrikes against IS targets, compared with 108 in August) with about 200 militants remaining. On 28 September, Fox News reported that as of 26 September, U.S. Marine Corps Harrier jets and attack helicopters as well as drones conducted 175 airstrikes against ISIL in Libya, according to the U.S. military's Africa Command. According to a U.S. official the number of ISIL fighters in Sirte was estimated to be "under 100" and that "ISIS is only in three neighborhoods." On 3 October, Stars and Stripes reported that on 2 October the US conducted 20 airstrikes (bringing the total number of strikes to 201) in Libya: knocking out a command and control facility, nearly 70 IS fighting positions and several other sites in what was the heaviest day of bombing since the operation began, according to U.S. Africa Command data. The strikes were in support of an offensive by ground forces aligned with the internationally backed Libyan government. On 11 October, Stars and Stripes reported that U.S. warplanes conducted 51 airstrikes against ISIL targets in Libya, particularly in and around Sirte, between 7 and 10 October, marking it as some of the heaviest bombing since the start of the Operation; bringing the total number of U.S. airstrikes in Libya to 261. On 17 October, Fox News reported that US airstrikes against ISIS in Libya doubled in less than a month (bringing the number of airstrikes up to 324). On 21 October 2016, Stars and Stripes reported that USS San Antonio deployed to the Mediterranean Sea as part of Operation Odyssey Lightning to replace USS Wasp that was carrying out operations against ISIS. San Antonio will carry UH-1Y Hueys and AH-1W Cobras from the 22nd MEU's Aviation Combat Unit, VMM-264; Marine Harrier fighters were part of the operation aboard Wasp, however San Antonio does not host fighter jets. On 4 November 2016, Fox News reported that the U.S. military ended its bombing campaign against ISIS in Sirte after three months of round-the-clock airstrikes the U.S. military conducted a total of 367 airstrikes since 1 August 2016, according to officials, no American airstrikes took place since 31 October; units taking part in the operation received orders on 1 November from AFRICOM to end offensive and collective self-defence airstrikes. A senior defense official said the U.S. military would "continue to provide military support to the GNA ... ISIL-held territory in Sirte is down to a few hundred square meters. We'll continue to discuss with the GNA leadership what additional support they may need moving forward including air strikes." Sirte was liberated by GNA forces in early December; on 20 December 2016, ABC news reported that AFRICOM said that it carried out 495 airstrikes against militant vehicles and positions in the former IS stronghold of Sirte, Operation Odyssey Lightning concluded on 19 December, following an announcement from the Libyan government of the end of offensive military operations in Sirte. On 18 January 2017, ABC News reported that two USAF B-2 bombers struck two ISIL camps 28 miles south of Sirte. The airstrikes targeted between 80 and 100 ISIS fighters in multiple camps, an uncrewed aircraft also participated in the airstrikes. One official called the airstrikes "a huge success," with more than 80 ISIL fighters killed, one counterterrorism official told ABC News there were "zero survivors" at the camps. Many of the ISIS fighters in the camps had fled Sirte during the battle, according to another official; Pentagon press secretary Peter Cook said in a statement ISIS fighters had fled to the remote desert camps "in order to reorganize and they posed a security threat to Libya, the region, and U.S. national interests;" The militants were carrying weapons, wearing tactical vests and standing in formation. The airstrikes were authorised by President Obama and were carried out in coordination with GNA; they are considered to be an extension of Operation Odyssey Lightning. BBC News reported that the B-2s flew a round-trip of around 34 hours from Missouri and dropped around 100 bombs on their targets, US Defence Secretary Ash Carter said those targeted were "actively planning" attacks in Europe. NBC News later reported that the number of ISIL fighters killed was revised upward to 90; a U.S. defense official said that "This was the largest remaining ISIS presence in Libya," and that "They have been largely marginalised but I am hesitant to say they've been completely eliminated in Libya." On 22 September 2017, the US military conducted 6 airstrikes with unmanned aircraft on an ISI: camp 150 miles southeast of Sirte, killing 17 militants and destroying three vehicles. CNN reported an AFRICOM statement that the strikes took place "In coordination with Libya's Government of National Accord and aligned forces" and that "The camp was used by ISIS to move fighters in and out of the country; stockpile weapons and equipment; and to plot and conduct attacks". The strikes marked the first time airstrikes had been carried out in the country under the Donald Trump administration. The U.S. military has been closely monitoring ISIL movements in Libya, and small teams of U.S. military personnel moved in and out of the country over a period of months in early 2016. British, French, Italian and Jordanian special forces as well as the British RAF were also in Libya helping with aerial surveillance, mapping and intelligence gathering in several cities, including Benghazi in the east and Zintan in the west, according to two Libyan military officials who were coordinating with them. British and American special forces were also carrying out intelligence-gathering operations around Sirte. Since the beginning of 2016, British Special forces have been escorting teams of MI6 agents to meet with Libyan officials and organise the supplying weapons and training to the Libyan Army and to militias fighting against ISIL. On 27 February 2016, The Telegraph reported that British special forces had deployed alongside its U.S. counterparts in the city of Misrata to stop Islamist militants progress, their main role is to give tactical training to local militias and to build an army to fight ISIL. In May 2016, it was reported that British special forces engaged in frontline combat against ISIL in Libya; in particular they destroyed two ISIL suicide vehicles that were targeting Libyan fighters. On 12 May, at the Shaddadah Bridge, 50 miles south of Misrata, the approach of a suicide vehicle sent Libyan forces fleeing in panic, British special forces intervened and destroyed the vehicle with a missile. An estimated dozen U.S. special forces operated out of a base near Misrata and were in action near Tripoli. In a plan disclosed in late 2015, Britain was to offer the Libyan government 1,000 troops as part of a 5,000-strong combined with Italy, to train and equip the Libyan forces rather than take part in frontline fighting. In addition, British defence minister Michael Fallon announced that Britain is sending 20 troops from the 4th Infantry Brigade to Tunisia to help prevent Islamic State fighters from moving into the country from Libya. In June 2016, it was reported that ISIL militants were retreating from Sirte and some fighters reportedly cutting off their beards and long hair to blend in with civilians as militia fighters allied to the unity government pushed into the city in tanks and armed trucks. The militias, mostly from Misrata, are allied to and are the main fighting force for the U.N.-brokered unity government installed in Tripoli the previous year. On 11 June, the BBC reported that Libyan forces claimed they retook control of part of Sirte after fierce fighting against ISIL militants. In July 2016, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said ISIL fighters in Libya were facing the "distinct possibility" of defeat in their last stronghold and are likely to scatter elsewhere in the country and the region; At the beginning of 2016, ISIL was believed to have more than 5,000 fighters in Libya, by August 2016, estimates said there could be less than 1,000 left, and by 9 August, only 350 ISIL fighters remained alive in Sirte. U.S. and British special forces were involved in the battle for Sirte: U.S. troops were operating out of a joint operations center on the city's outskirts, their role was limited to supporting forces unity government forces, providing direct, on-the-ground support. On 22 September, Stars and Stripes reported that Since the start of the battle, many ISIL members fled the city, "looking to hide among the population, relocate to other Libyan towns or attempting to leave Libya altogether." Afghanistan The BBC reported that IS's announcement of the establishment of its Afghanistan/Pakistan-based Khorasan Province (IS-KP) in January 2015, it was the first time that IS had officially spread outside the Arab world. Within weeks, the group appeared in at least five provinces in Afghanistan: Helmand, Zabul, Farah, Logar and Nangarhar-trying to establish pockets of territory from which to expand. In the first half of 2015, IS-KP managed to capture large parts of territory in eastern Nangarhar province. This became the de facto "capital" principally for two reasons: its proximity to the tribal areas of Pakistan, home of IS-KP's top leaders; and the presence of some people who follow a similar Salafi/Wahhabi interpretation of Islam to IS. IS-KP is also trying to get a foothold in northern Afghanistan, where it aims to link up with Central Asian, Chechen and Chinese Uighur militants; IS's numerical strength inside Afghanistan vary, ranging from 1,000 to 5,000. In February 2015, IS-KP deputy commander Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim was killed in a U.S. drone strike along with 5 others, his successor met the same fate a month later, and since then, the Islamic State has been absent from the southern Afghanistan. A report says that, according to a Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) spokesperson, in July 2015, a U.S. drone strike killed Shahidullah Shadid, a senior leader of IS-KP and 24 other militants, in Nangarhar province in Afghanistan. In January 2016, President Obama sent a directive to the Pentagon to make it easier for the military to get approval for strikes in Afghanistan, targeting militias that have sworn allegiance to IS. For 3 weeks in that month, the United States military carried out at least a dozen operations, including commando raids and airstrikes, many of these raids and strikes taking place in the Tora Bora region of Nangarhar Province. American commanders in Afghanistan said they believed that between 90 and 100 IS militants had been killed in these recent operations. On 1 February 2016, U.S. airstrikes in Nangarhar province eastern Afghanistan killed 29 IS fighters and struck the terrorist group's FM radio station. On 21 February, it was reported that just over a week before, Afghan forces supported by U.S. airstrikes pushed IS militants out of their stronghold in Nangarhar province in a military operation that had killed a total 43 IS militants by 22 February. On 6 March 2016, Afghanistan's president announced that the IS-KP had been defeated in the eastern parts of the country, Afghan forces claimed victory following the 21-day operation in 2 districts in Nangarhar province, claiming at least 200 militants killed. following this operation, an official confirmed that IS-KP militants had moved into Kunduz province and into Kunar province. In early April 2016, it was reported that US and Afghan forces had killed 1,979 suspected militants, 736 others wounded and 965 detained between April 2015 and March 2016, IS militants have also been trying to flee into Ghazni and Nuristan province, whilst there has been a rise in defections from the group to the government and the Taliban. U.S. commanders in Kabul have scaled back their threat assessment for IS-KP, since January, the U.S. and its allies launched between 70 and 80 airstrikes on IS militants in Afghanistan. In late June 2016, IS militants attacked police checkpoints in the Kot area of Nangarhar province and heavy fighting ensued, as many as 36 IS militants were killed in the assaults, at least a dozen Afghan security forces and civilians were killed, with another 18 wounded. The latest attacks indicate the group remains a potent threat to a government. On 8 July 2016, The Guardian reported that Prime minister David Cameron increased the number of British troops deployed to Afghanistan from 450 to 500, and that 21 of these additional troops would reinforce the counter-terrorism mission. On 23 July 2016, following the Kabul bombing, Afghan forces and U.S. special forces backed by U.S. airstrikes began an operation to retake parts on Nangarhar province from IS-KP militants. Over 24 and 25 July whilst clearing areas of southern Nangarhar with Afghan special operations troops, 5 U.S. special forces troops were wounded by small arms fire or shrapnel, making it the first reported instance of U.S. troops being wounded in fighting IS in Afghanistan. On 26 July, one of the most important leaders of IS in the region and one of the founders of the IS-KP, Saad Emarati, was killed along with 120 other suspected militants in Kot District, Afghan troops pushed into Kot District, meeting little resistance due to heavy air and artillery bombardment that forced IS fighters to flee into nearby mountain areas, Afghan forces found an already destroyed training camp. Overall, the operation reclaimed large and significant parts of eastern Afghanistan, forcing IS militants back into the mountains of southern Nangarhar with hundreds of IS militants killed; the estimated size of the IS-KP in January 2016 was around 3,000, but by July 2016 the number has been reduced to closely 1,000 to 1,500, with 70% of its fighters come from the TTP. In the operation, Afghan forces, backed by the US, killed an estimated 300 IS fighters. Between January and early August 2016, U.S. aircraft conducted nearly 140 airstrikes against IS targets in Afghanistan, according to the U.S. military. On 4 October 2016, a US soldier from B Company, 2nd Battalion, 10th SFG was killed by a roadside bomb blast in Achin, Nangarhar province, he was on a patrol with Afghan forces during an operation against IS-KP militants. This marked the first time a U.S. serviceman was killed in combat against IS militants in the country. On 24 December 2016, Military.com reported that Brigadier General Charles Cleveland said that ISIL-KP's presence in the country has been pushed back from nearly a dozen districts to just two or three, the number of its members in Afghanistan had been reduced to about 1,000 from an estimated strength of between 1,500 and 3,000 members the previous year. Overall, U.S. troops in Afghanistan conducted more than 350 operations against the IS and al-Qaeda this year. In early December, General John Nicholson, the international coalition's top military commander in Afghanistan, said U.S.-led counter-terrorism operations and Afghan government forces had killed 12 of the organization's top leaders in the country. U.S. officials have said IS fighters are primarily located in Nangarhar and Kunar Province's. Military.com reported that Nicholson estimated that his forces had killed about 500 ISIS fighters throughout 2016 (including the 12 most senior leaders), these losses accounted for about 25 to 30% of IS-KP's total number of fighters and reduced its foothold in the country from 9 districts to 3. In February 2017, the Washington Post reported that U.S. forces conducted more than 1,000 strikes in Afghanistan in 2016, including 267 against IS-K and 57 targeted al-Qaeda. The BBC also reported that IS-KP has largely been eliminated from southern and western Afghanistan by the Afghan Taliban and military operations conducted by Afghan and US/NATO forces. Several hundred IS-KP fighters have been killed in clashes with the Afghan Taliban. In early April 2017, the Washington Post reported that Captain Bill Salvin, a spokesman for NATOs' mission to Afghanistan that Afghan and international forces have reduced IS-KP controlled territory in Afghanistan by two-thirds and killed around half of their fighters in the previous 2 years. Since the beginning of 2017, there have been 460 airstrikes against terrorists (with drone strikes alone killing more than 200 IS militants); he added that the affiliate has an estimated 600 to 800 fighters in two eastern Afghan provinces. The Army Times reported that in early March 2017, American and Afghan forces launched Operation Hamza to "flush" IS-KP from its stronghold in eastern Afghanistan, engaging in regular ground battles. Stars and Stripes reported that General Dawlat Waziri, spokesman for Afghanistan's Defense Ministry, said that for four weeks before the 13 April Nangarhar airstrike (which was part of the operation), Afghan special forces unsuccessfully attempted to penetrate the area because of the difficult terrain and improvised explosive device (IEDs) planted by IS-KP militants. On 13 April, the Nangarhar airstrike took place, Stars and Stripes reported that 94 IS-KP militants, including 4 commanders were killed by a GBU-43/B MOAB bomb that was dropped on an IS tunnel complex in Achin District; the Huffington Post reported that the bomb was dropped from a U.S.Lockheed MC-130. In late April Military Times reported that Captain Bill Salvin said an estimated 400 to 700 fighters are active throughout Nangarhar and Kunar provinces. Sky News reported on 3 September 2018 that British special forces were also targeting IS-K in Afghanistan alongside US special forces. On 19 November 2019, Stars and Stripes reported that 243 IS fighters and nearly 400 family members surrendered to government forces in Nangarhar Province during the previous two weeks. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani declared that "the result is Daesh's backbone was broken". On 26 August 2021 during the American evacuation from Afghanistan, a member of IS-K detonated a bomb near a gate at Kabul International Airport, killing at least 183 civilians and 13 US soldiers. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the US conducted a retaliatory strike on a vehicle in Nangarhar province which was believed to be carrying "high-profile ISIS targets" and "planners and facilitators." Two days later, a US drone strike targeted what was believed to be a member of IS-K planning an attack, killing 10 civilians, including 7 children. The Pentagon later called the strike "an honest mistake" and announced that none of the military personnel involved would be subject to any disciplinary actions. Boko Haram-ISWAP insurgency In October 2015, with the approval of the Cameroonian government, the U.S. military deployed 300 personnel to Cameroon, their primary missions will revolve around providing intelligence support to local forces as well as conducting reconnaissance flights. The Philippines On 1 September 2017, the US Secretary of Defence Mattis designated Operation Pacific Eagle – Philippines (OPE-P) as a contingency operation to support the Philippine government and the Armed Forces of the Philippines in their efforts to isolate, degrade, and defeat the affiliates of ISIS (collectively referred to as ISIS-Philippines or ISIS-P) and other terrorist organisations in the Philippines. Maghreb and Sahel Yemen CNN reported that on 16 October 2017, US forces conducted airstrikes against two IS training camps located in al Bayda Governorate, Yemen, containing an estimated 50 fighters; a US defence official said that this is the first U.S. strike specifically targeting IS in Yemen, the strike disrupted the group's attempts to train more fighters. CNN reported that on 23 October that two U.S. airstrikes in al Bayda Governorate, the first strike killed 7 IS terrorists travelling in pickup trucks, a second strike (5 miles west) killed a further 2 IS terrorists. Military Times reported that on 25 October, two US airstrikes in al-Bayda Governorate killed 9 IS fighters, a CENTCOM statement said that "In the last ten days, U.S. forces have targeted and killed approximately 60 ISIS terrorists in Yemen." Maher Farrukh, an al-Qaida analyst for the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute said that "AQAP and ISIS cooperate on a tactical level in central Yemen against al Houthi-Saleh forces, they often co-claim attacks and likely share some militants," and that "ISIS' continued presence in Yemen is likely sustained by its cooperation with AQAP, but it does not appear to be growing at this time." Gaza Strip The Islamic Emirate of Rafah was a short-lived militant state established by the Jund Ansar Allah, an Islamist group, in the town of Rafah in the Gaza Strip. It was declared on 14 August 2009, by Abdul Latif Moussa, also known as Abu Noor al-Maqdisi, during a sermon at the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque. The emirate aimed to impose strict Islamic law and was aligned with the ideology of al-Qaeda and is believed to have been aided by ISIS. Jund Ansar Allah, translated as "Soldiers of the Followers of God," was founded by Abdul Latif Moussa in 2008. The group quickly garnered attention due to its extreme interpretation of Islam and its opposition to the ruling Hamas government in the Gaza Strip (known locally as the Palestinian Government in Gaza or Palestinian Authority in Gaza). Tensions between Jund Ansar Allah and Hamas escalated when Moussa declared the establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Rafah, challenging the authority of Hamas.[better source needed] The proclamation of the Islamic Emirate of Rafah was seen as a direct threat to the Hamas government, which had been the de facto authority in Gaza since 2007 (after winning the 2006 Palestinian legislative election but losing control of the West Bank Region in subsequent conflict). In response, Hamas launched a military operation against Jund Ansarf Allah. The confrontation culminated in a fierce battle at the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque, where Abdul Latif Moussa and several of his followers were killed many of whom were ISI operatives. The emirate was dismantled, and Hamas reasserted its control over Rafah. In 2012, Hamas publicly turned against the Assad government and endorsed the Syrian opposition who were attempting to overthrow him. In a speech in Cairo, when Ismail Haniyeh was visiting from the Gaza Strip, he said, "I salute all the nations of the Arab Spring and I salute the heroic people of Syria who are striving for freedom, democracy, and reform". Government and opposition forces later both fought against ISIS in a multi sided conflict.[better source needed] This also put Hamas on a different side of the conflict to Iran, who Netanyahu also claims resemble to ISIS. The Syrian civil war and insurgency included Aknaf Bait al-Maqdis (Arabic: أكناف بيت المقدس "The environs of Jerusalem", Full name: كتائب أكناف بيت المقدس على أرض الشام "Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis Brigades on the Land of the Levant"), a Palestinian militant group in the Yarmouk Camp in Damascus, with ambiguous connections to Hamas. The group fought against ISIS and against Assad government forces in the Yarmouk Camp. Some sources say Hamas deny being connected to the group. Violence in Yarmouk Camp first erupted in 2012. In 2015, ISIS attacked the Palestinian refugee camp at Yarmouk on the outskirts of Damascus. ISIS attacked Yarmouk again in 2018. Some PLO factions were involved in the fighting. The al-Qaeda splinter group Tahrir al-Sham was involved. As of 2021, 160,000 were still displaced. The violence in the Yarmouk camp made the Assad government very unpopular in Palestine.[better source needed] Hamas have a history of violently suppressing Islamic extremists in the Gaza Strip. They have particularly clashed with supporters of Al-Qaeda and ISIS, and groups who conducted attacks against Palestinian Christians or other targets in the Gaza Strip. In 2009, Hamas security forces eliminated a small group of Al-Qaeda sympathisers who established the Islamic Emirate of Rafah. ISIS arose in the rubble of the 2003 United States-led invasion of Iraq and the Syrian civil war (2011, ongoing), then later spread to the Sinai Peninsula and elsewhere. Hamas in Gaza clashed directly with the Sinai Province, but Hamas were also connected to groups on multiple sides of the conflict with ISIS in Syria. ISIS first discreetly issued threats to Hamas in 2015, in the same video message they also threatened Hamas' two rivals Israel and Fatah.[better source needed] In 2015, Hamas began a propaganda campaign to combat extremist ideologies in the Gaza Strip, At the time they denied it was targeted at ISIS or any other specific group. Mosques in the strip preached to promote a "centrist ideology". In 2017, an ISIS suicide bomber at Rafah Border Crossing killed a Hamas government border guard (Nidal al-Jaafari, 28) and injured several others. Before anyone had claimed responsibility, Hamas described the bomber as an outlaw and “a person of deviant ideology”, Hamas' terminology for Islamic extremists. Other factions also condemned the bomber. Hamas arrested dozens of Salafi militants in the Gaza Strip. In early January 2018, Palestinians from the Gaza Strip who had joined ISIS Sinai Province, captured and killed a man who they claimed was connected to the Qassam Brigades. The killers made a video of the murder and released it as a "declaration of war" against Hamas. The speaker in the video is referred to as Abu Kazem al-Maqdisi. By 2023, the Egyptian branch of ISIS appeared to be completely dormant. Somalia Military.com reported that on 3 November 2017, that a U.S. drone conducted two airstrikes against Islamic State in Somalia, at least six missiles were used which struck in Buqa, 37 miles north of Qandala, AFRICOM said in a statement that "several terrorists" were killed and that the strikes were carried out in coordination with Somalia's government; the strikes marked first time that the US has conducted airstrikes against ISS terrorists in Somalia. CNN reported that US drone aircraft conducted 5 strikes against al-Shabaab and ISS-linked militants between 9 and 12 November, killing 36 al-Shabaab and 4 ISIS terrorists. The US now estimates there are between 3,000 and 6,000 al-Shabaab fighters and less than 250 ISS operatives in Somalia. The US conducted a three strikes in al Bayda Governorate targeting ISIL in Yemen between 10 and 12 November 2017, killing 5 suspected militants. Sub-Saharan Africa Casualties On 22 January 2015, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Stuart Jones stated that the coalition airstrikes had degraded ISIL, including killing off half of their leaders in Iraq and Syria. In early February 2015, the Australian Defence Minister, Kevin Andrews, stated that more than 6,000 ISIL fighters had been killed in coalition airstrikes since they began, and that over 800 square kilometres (310 mi2) had been recaptured; yet ISIL strength was estimated to have grown during this period to around 31,500 core fighters, including 3,000 fighters from Western nations. On 23 February 2015, U.S. General Lloyd Austin stated that over 8,500 ISIL militants had been killed by Coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. In early March 2015, General Lloyd repeated this statement, saying that "ISIS has assumed a defensive crouch" in Iraq, and that "We are where we said we would be," in relation to the airstrikes. This was in contrast to Jordan's claim that its airstrikes alone had killed 7,000 ISIL militants in Iraq and Syria over the course of 3 days, from 5 to 7 February 2015. In June 2015, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that over 10,000 ISIL fighters had been killed by Coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State. On 21 January 2016, France's defence minister Jean-Yves Le Drian stated that over 22,000 ISIL fighters had been killed by Coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. In August 2016, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Sean MacFarland told reporters at a news briefing "Although it's no measure of success and its difficult to confirm, we estimate that over the past 11 months we've killed about 25,000 enemy fighters. When you add that to the 20,000 estimated killed prior to our arrival, that's 45,000 enemies taken off the battlefield." In December 2016, a senior US military official told CNN that as many as 50,000 ISIL fighters have been killed since the war against the terror group began. In 2023, the US Central Command issued a statement announcing that it had killed IS leader Khalid Aydd Ahmed al-Jabouri. According to the statement, al-Jabouri had been involved in planning attacks in the Middle East and Europe. The statement also claimed that no civilians were killed in the strike. According to Airwars, a team of independent journalists, by August 2015, 450 civilians had been killed by the U.S.-led coalition air campaign against ISIL in Iraq and Syria (of whom roughly 60% in Syria, 40% in Iraq). By that time, the U.S.-led coalition officially acknowledged only two non-combatant deaths. According to Airwars, by January 2016, "between 815 and 1,149 civilian non-combatants appear likely to have been killed in 135 incidents where there is fair reporting publicly available of an event, and where Coalition strikes were confirmed in the near vicinity on that date." According to Airwars, about 1000 civilians had been killed by the U.S.-led coalition air campaign in March 2017 alone, gathering controversy and concern relating to the presidency of Donald Trump. According to Airwars, the air strikes and artillery of U.S.-led coalition killed as many as 6,000 civilians in Iraq and Syria in 2017. According to Airwars, "In 2017 the war against ISIS [Islamic State] moved into the most densely-populated urban centres controlled by the group, with dire results for civilians." Amnesty International and monitoring group Airwars report said, more than 1,600 civilians were killed in US-led coalition include, United States, Britain and France, during the four-month airstrike campaign against ISIL group from the Syrian city of Raqqa in 2017. The Coalition states have conducted 34,464 strikes against ISIL targets between August 2014 and end of March 2019, and killed at least 1,291 civilians. According to a report published by Syrian Network for Human Rights in 2024, 927 children lost their lives in coalition attacks in Syria. Labeling On 1 February 2015, Iraq's Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari stated that the war on ISIL was effectively "World War III", due to ISIL's proclamation of a worldwide caliphate, its aims to conquer the world, and its success in spreading the conflict to multiple countries outside of the Levant region. Speaking of ISIL's destruction of pre-Islamic sites in the region, Syria's head of antiquities, Maamoun Abdul Karim, stated that "this is the entire world's battle". In June 2015, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that ISIL "stands for nothing and depends on people who will fall for anything." Involvement by country The table below summarizes each country's level of involvement in the overall international intervention against the Islamic State. Several countries that are militarily involved also provide humanitarian aid. See also References External links |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_in_heavy_metal_music] | [TOKENS: 60] |
Contents 2026 in heavy metal music This is a timeline documenting the events of heavy metal in the year 2026. Bands disbanded Bands reformed Events Deaths Albums expected Artists with material in production References This rock music–related article is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by adding missing information. |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_in_American_music] | [TOKENS: 57] |
Contents 2026 in American music The following is a list of events and releases that have happened or are expected to happen in 2026 in music in the United States. Notable events List of albums released List of albums set to be released Unknown date Top songs on record Deaths References |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia_talk:File_upload_wizard] | [TOKENS: 622] |
Contents Wikipedia talk:File upload wizard Get help at the Teahouse for using and editing Wikipedia. Uploading a logo etc Hallo, when I upload a logo such as File:Logo of National Tax Association (US) 2025.svg, using this wizard, it automatically fills in a certain amount of information about licensing: I just add the one sentence "File will be used once only in one article as a means of visual identification of the association " and put "none" in the "other info" box. But I find that someone else then comes along and edits the record as in this edit. If this is the desired outcome, could the Upload Wizard please be updated so that it creates it this way? (There were intervening edits to reduce the file size but I don't think they are relevant to my question). This isn't a one-off: I've seen it happen before as here. PamD 20:02, 26 May 2025 (UTC) I once experienced same issue and will love to be updated if this issue is resolved — Preceding unsigned comment added by Simi David (talk • contribs) 14:45, 10 February 2026 (UTC)[reply] Batch uploads The wizard worked perfectly for this old duffer, gave no problems despite my occasional stumbles uploading a sizeable batch of images. It would be helpful however if when re-using the form with the refresh button, to provide text boxes with the user's previous entry as a default. Doug butler (talk) 00:55, 6 August 2025 (UTC)[reply] Edit request for redesign Please merge the version at Wikipedia:File upload wizard/sandbox. It features a more modern UI by using Codex tokens, which you can test at . Please also merge Wikipedia:File upload wizard/sandbox/styles.css into MediaWiki:FileUploadWizard.css. Make sure to remove the templatestyles tag at the top, and change {{Clickable button 2|Upload a non-free file|url={{fullurl:{{FULLPAGENAME}}|withJS=MediaWiki:FileUploadWizard.js}}|style=border-radius:4px; font-size:1.5em; color:var(--color-progressive, #36c);}} back to {{Clickable button 2|Upload a non-free file|url={{fullurl:{{FULLPAGENAME}}|withJS=MediaWiki:FileUploadWizard.js&withCSS=MediaWiki:FileUploadWizard.css}}|style=border-radius:4px; font-size:1.5em; color:var(--color-progressive, #36c);}} Thanks, —Matrix ping mewhen u reply (t? - c) 14:47, 18 August 2025 (UTC)[reply] Protected edit request on 13 February 2026 Add a period after "so old its copyright has expired" like so: JJPMaster (she/they) 13:03, 13 February 2026 (UTC)[reply] |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_in_radio] | [TOKENS: 73] |
Contents 2026 in radio The following is a list of events affecting radio broadcasting in 2026. Events listed include radio program debuts, finales, cancellations, station launches, closures, and format changes, as well as information about controversies and deaths of radio personalities. Notable events References External links Media related to 2026 in radio at Wikimedia Commons |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:File_upload_wizard&action=history] | [TOKENS: 71] |
Wikipedia:File upload wizard: Revision history For any version listed below, click on its date to view it. For more help, see Help:Page history and Help:Edit summary. (cur) = difference from current version, (prev) = difference from preceding version, m = minor edit, → = section edit, ← = automatic edit summary |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:File_upload_wizard&action=edit] | [TOKENS: 44] |
View source for Wikipedia:File upload wizard You do not have permission to edit this page, for the following reason: Pages transcluded onto the current version of this page (help): Return to Wikipedia:File upload wizard. |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_state_leaders_in_2026] | [TOKENS: 133] |
Contents List of state leaders in the 2020s See also: This is a list of state leaders in the 2020s (2020 to today), such as the heads of state, heads of government, or the general secretaries of single-party states. These polities are generally sovereign states, including states with limited recognition (when recognised by at least one UN member state), but excludes minor dependent territories, whose leaders can be found listed under territorial governors in the 21st century. For completeness, these lists can include colonies, protectorates, or other dependent territories that have since gained sovereignty. Africa Americas Asia Europe Oceania See also Notes References |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tornadoes_of_2026] | [TOKENS: 1118] |
Contents Tornadoes of 2026 This page documents notable tornadoes and tornado outbreaks worldwide in 2026. Strong and destructive tornadoes form most frequently in the United States, China, the Pampas, the European Plain, South Africa, and Bengal, but they can occur almost anywhere under the right conditions. Tornadoes also develop occasionally in southern Canada during the Northern Hemisphere's summer and somewhat regularly at other times of the year across Europe, Asia, and Australia. Tornadic events are often accompanied by other forms of severe weather, including strong thunderstorms, winds, and hail. Worldwide, one tornado-related death has been confirmed in Israel. Events Confirmed tornadoes by International Fujita Rating January A brief multi vortex tornado was recorded in rural areas near Mercedes, in Paraná. It was rated an F1. There is some damage in the municipality, but it went further than recorded, and the funnel cloud resembled a scud cloud. During the evening hours of January 7, a strong tornado tracked through Kalpaki, Greece, causing significant damage to numerous structures. A large poultry farm was destroyed, with the walls collapsing and killing 30,000 to 40,000 chickens that were inside. A church and a military camp were also damaged. The tornado struck a car, completely overturning it in the middle of the roadway. The driver avoided any injuries due to local residents who rushed to assist. The tornado was rated IF2 on the International Fujita Scale. A small tornado event occurred in Oklahoma early on January 8, with five tornadoes being confirmed, one of which was rated low-end EF2 after it tore the roof off of a house southwest of Purcell. This tornado caused one injury along its path when it rolled a semi-truck as it crossed I-35 and also caused considerable damage in the town itself. The storms also brought an 88 mph (142 km/h) wind gust to Wynona, Oklahoma and an 81 mph (130 km/h) wind gust to Independence, Kansas. There were five additional tornadoes on January 9 and also on January 10. On January 9, Chicago recorded a 55 mph (89 km/h) wind gust. On the early evening of January 8, an IF2-rated tornado tracked through the villages of Kızılağaç, Karacalar, and Sülek in the Mediterranean region of Turkey. The roofs of six buildings were ripped away and numerous greenhouses were destroyed. The walls of various barns collapsed and trees along the tornado's path were uprooted and splintered. Several vehicles were damaged by the tornado, including a Fiat that was thrown into a nearby tractor, which struck a 20-year-old woman who sustained non-life-threatening injuries from the impact. A waterspout off the coast of Bat Yam caught three kitesurfers and expelled them at high speeds towards the shore. One was severely injured and later died from his injuries, and another was lightly injured. The waterspout went on to briefly make landfall on the beach, but caused no further damage. On the afternoon of January 10, an F2 tornado struck the city of São José dos Pinhais in the Metropolitan Region of Curitiba, Paraná, Brazil, with peak winds estimated at 180 km/h (110 mph). An estimated 1,200 people were affected, including two people sustaining minor injuries and two families displaced. At least 350 homes were impacted, several trees were overturned, and a warehouse was wrecked. In addition, multiple utility poles were toppled by the winds, causing some damage to the electrical grid. A small tornado outbreak occurred across two days in the Mediterranean Region of Turkey. Two of these tornadoes, one IF2 in Aksu District and the other IF1 Manavgat District each caused one injury. Infrastructural and tree damage was also reported and some boats were damaged or destroyed. A few other tornadoes were confirmed, mostly damaging roofs, greenhouses, and farms, although one, rated IF1.5, collapsed a Mosque tower in Denizyaka. A strong IF2 tornado struck the city of Plasencia, Spain in Province of Cáceres. In the vicinity of the Virgen del Puerto Hospital, the roof of the parking structure was torn off, and more than 50 cars were damaged. Damage was also reported on Dolores Ibárruri Avenue and in the Ciudad Jardín neighborhood. No injuries were reported. A strong IF2 tornado affected Mios in Gironde Department, damaging between 200 and 300 homes. The tornado ripped roofs off houses, collapsed walls, and uprooted power poles. It also downed many trees along its 20 km path. No injuries were reported, but more than 100 firefighters were called in to assist in clearing debris, including on several lanes of the A63 autoroute that were closed after trees blocked the road. February During the evening hours of February 19, several tornadoes touched down across the Ohio River Valley. A high-end EF1 tornado in Crawford County, Illinois damaged 12–15 homes and injured multiple people. One mobile home was rolled over by the tornado, trapping a woman inside. An EF2 tornado in Bloomington, Indiana prompted a "particularly dangerous situation" tornado warning for the city, with widespread damage being reported. The storm also led to two fatalities in Nebraska due to a car crash from the wintry conditions the storm brought. See also Notes References |
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Contents File:Example.jpg There are several images named "example": File:Local example.svg, File:Example.jpg, File:Example-4x3Landscape.jpg and File:Example-3x4Portrait.jpg are uploaded locally on English Wikipedia, while File:Example.png, File:Example.gif, File:Example.svg and File:Example2.svg are derived from Commons. There is also the sound file File:Example.ogg from Commons. None of these files should be used in articles. The JPG image is the example inserted when a user clicks the "embedded file" or "picture gallery" buttons in the edit toolbar. Pages (including user pages) with this image left may be actively sought out and fixed. If you need a test image for permanent demonstration purposes, for instance in a template's documentation, then instead use for instance the PNG image or Example-serious.jpg. The Ogg file is the example inserted when a user clicks the "file link" button in the edit toolbar. Summary An example image. This image should not be used in article namespace. Derived from File:Gutza Wikipedia logo.png Original by Gutza, modifications by Centrx See below. Licensing GFDL with disclaimers GNU Free Documentation License with disclaimers //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Text_of_the_GNU_Free_Documentation_License This licensing tag was added to this file as part of the GFDL licensing update. File history Click on a date/time to view the file as it appeared at that time. You cannot overwrite this file. File usage More than 100 pages use this file. The following list shows the first 100 pages that use this file only. A full list is available. View more links to this file. Metadata This file contains additional information, probably added from the digital camera or scanner used to create or digitize it. If the file has been modified from its original state, some details may not fully reflect the modified file. |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_in_Canada] | [TOKENS: 58] |
Contents 2026 in Canada ← → The following is a list of events of the year 2026 in Canada, as well as events that are scheduled or predicted to take place during the year. Incumbents Events Scheduled events Art and entertainment Holidays Source: Deaths See also References External links |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Upload/old] | [TOKENS: 181] |
Wikipedia:Upload/old This page is for uploading images and other media files to the English Wikipedia. Are you uploading a free image or media file? Please consider uploading it to the Wikimedia Commons. Items uploaded to the Commons can be used on Wikipedia and other Wikimedia projects, helping to create a central repository of free images and multimedia. Where is the media from? If you are familiar with our image policies and already know which license applies, you can go directly to the plain upload form. You must be an autoconfirmed user logged in here on the English Wikipedia before you can upload files directly to this project. If the image you are attempting to upload is free content, please consider uploading it instead to the Wikimedia Commons as explained above; it can then be displayed directly on all Wikimedia projects, including here on the English Wikipedia. Alternatively, requests for image uploads can be made at Wikipedia:Images for upload. |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/אהרון_ידלין] | [TOKENS: 6005] |
תוכן עניינים אהרן ידלין אהרן ידלין (17 באפריל 1926 – 12 באוגוסט 2022) היה פעיל ציבור, חבר הכנסת ושר החינוך בממשלת רבין הראשונה (1974–1977). חתן פרס ישראל לשנת 2010 (ה'תש"ע). ביוגרפיה ידלין נולד בתל אביב, בן לציפורה (לבית פולק) וחיים ידלין, שעלו מבסרביה בתחילת העלייה השלישית. גדל בבן שמן ורחובות ולמד בבית הספר היסודי "גאולה" ובבית הספר הריאלי בחיפה. היה פעיל בתנועת הצופים ושימש כרכז ארצי של התנועה. ידלין אהב מילדותו את הטבע, מה שהשפיע עליו לדבריו להפוך לחקלאי בקיבוץ. הוא הצטרף תחילה לגרעין של קיבוץ בארי ואף השתתף בעלייה של הקיבוץ לנקודת הקבע שלו בנגב, במסגרת עליית 11 הנקודות בנגב ב-1946. על רקע המחלוקת בקיבוץ המאוחד עבר לקיבוץ חצרים בנגב בו היה חבר עד לפטירתו. במלחמת העצמאות הצטרף לפלמ"ח. בשנים 1950–1952 היה חבר הוועד הפועל של ההסתדרות. למד באוניברסיטה העברית היסטוריה כללית, כלכלה וסוציולוגיה. היה ממקימי מכללת בית ברל, לימד שם סוציולוגיה והיה מנהלה-בפועל בשנים 1955–1957. ידלין הוצב במקום ה־48 ברשימת מפא"י לכנסת הרביעית. בחירות אלו זכתה מפא"י ב־47 מנדטים וידלין נכנס לכנסת חצי שנה לאחר הבחירות לאחר שאהרן בקר התפטר מהכנסת. באותה כנסת היה חבר ועדת החינוך וועדת הכלכלה. באוקטובר 1960 נבחר להנהלת בית ברל. לאחר הבחירות לכנסת החמישית שהיו בסימן ירידה בכוחה של מפא"י כתב ידלין מאמר שהזהיר מפני סכנת עליית הפאשיזם בישראל, בו הוא קרא למעבר לבחירות אזוריות ופעולה משותפת של תנועות הפועלים. ידלין ראה במשרד החינוך משרד שמשפיע השפעה חשובה על דמות החברה והמדינה, המעצב את דמותו של הדור הצעיר. על כן הוא אמר: "תנועת העבודה הרוצה לגדל דור צעיר לאור הערכים החברתיים שלה, אינה יכולה לוותר על מערכת החינוך", ושלל את האפשרות שמשרד החינוך יימסר לשר מגח"ל. הוא גם התנגד למינוי סגן שר מטעם מפד"ל במשרד החינוך. לקראת סוף כהונתה של הכנסת החמישית במאי 1964 נכנס שוב לכנסת. באותה תקופה הוא היה מועמד להיות מזכיר איחוד הקבוצות והקיבוצים, אולם לבקשת שר החינוך זלמן ארן, הוא נתמנה לסגן שר החינוך. הוא המשיך לכהן בכנסת ובתפקיד סגן שר החינוך בכל ימי כהונתו של זלמן ארן וחלק מכהונתו של יגאל אלון כשר חינוך. ב־21 ביוני 1972 נבחר פה אחד למזכ"ל מפלגת העבודה והתפטר מתפקיד סגן שר החינוך. הוא כיהן בתפקיד עד אוגוסט 1974. שימש גם כיו"ר הוועדה הציבורית לענייני תנועות נוער בישראל. ידלין המשיך לכהן בכנסת עד שנת 1979 ובממשלת ישראל השבע עשרה שהרכיב יצחק רבין היה לשר החינוך. על אף הבעיות הכלכליות של ישראל באותה עת, לא נפגע בתקופתו משרד החינוך מבחינה כספית והועמדו לרשותו תקציבים נדיבים. כשר חינוך הנחיל יום לימודים ארוך בבתי ספר בעיירות פיתוח ואזורי מצוקה, כולל מפעל הזנה ממלכתי ללא תשלום, ותוכנן להחיל את יום הלימודים הארוך בכל הארץ, דבר שלא התממש אחריו. לדבריו, "שנה אחרי מלחמת יום הכיפורים גיבשתי תקציב חינוך דיפרנציאלי שבו הוסטו משאבים רבים לעיירות הפיתוח. השארתי אחרי מערכת עם מפעל הזנה ממלכתי, תמכנו בתנועות הנוער וייסדנו יום לימודים ארוך. ממשלת בגין שלחה את הילדים הביתה ב־12:00, קיצצה, ולמעשה חיסלה את הכל". לאחר הבחירות לכנסת התשיעית ב־1977, שימש כיו"ר ועדת החינוך, התרבות והספורט של הכנסת, עד לפרישתו מהכנסת בתחילת 1979. כבר באמצע 1978 לחצו בקיבוץ חצרים על ידלין לשוב לעבודה מלאה בקיבוץ, לאור הזמן הרב בו היה בפעילות ציבורית מחוץ לקיבוץ. ידלין התנגד לפרסומות בטלוויזיה. על אף התעסקותו הרבה בענייני חינוך, עסק ידלין גם בנושאי ביטחון, עליהם הרצה בפורומים מפלגתיים וציבוריים וכתב מאמרים בעיתונות. הוא גם היה חבר בוועדת החוץ והביטחון בכנסת השביעית ובכנסת השמינית. במהלך כהונת הכנסת השישית היה גם חבר בוועדת חוקה חוק ומשפט של הכנסת. לאחר פרישתו מהכנסת שימש ידלין בתפקידים ציבוריים רבים, בהם מזכיר התק"ם (1985–1989), יו"ר תנועת העבודה הציונית העולמית (1992–2002), יו"ר מוסד ביאליק, יו"ר יד טבנקין, יו"ר בית יציב, סגן יושב-ראש הוועד המנהל של אוניברסיטת בן-גוריון בבאר שבע ויו"ר הנאמנים של קרן ראש הממשלה לסופרים. ביום העצמאות 2008 שימש כיושב-ראש חבר השופטים של חידון התנ"ך העולמי לנוער יהודי. בבחירות לכנסת ה-18 הוצב במקום ה-115 הסמלי ברשימת העבודה לכנסת ובבחירות לכנסת ה-19 במקום ה-118, ברשימת המפלגה לקראת בחירות לכנסת העשרים וארבע הוצב כמועמד אחרון במקום ה-71. ידלין הרבה להיפגש עם בני נוער, בעיקר הנוער הקיבוצי, וכן הרצה בפורומים שונים, בעיקר בנושאי חינוך, סוציאליזם ושאיפותיו לצדק ושוויון חברתי. פרסים הוקרה והנצחה חיים אישיים ידלין היה נשוי לעדה, בתו של דוד הכהן, אשר נפטרה בשנת 1998. לאהרן ועדה שלושה בנים, שאחד מהם הוא אלוף (מיל.) עמוס ידלין, שהיה ראש אמ"ן בצה"ל. בשנת 2007 נישא אהרן בשנית - לעדינה הנדלר לינדבורג. גיסו היה עוזי נרקיס, ובן דודו היה אשר ידלין. נכדתו, עורכת הדין רותם ידלין, נבחרה לראשות מועצה אזורית גזר בבחירות לרשויות המקומיות בשנת 2018. ידלין נפטר ב-12 באוגוסט 2022 בגיל 96, ונטמן בבית העלמין בקיבוץ חצרים, שבו התגורר. משנתו הרעיונית על חשיבות החינוך: "תנועת העבודה הרוצה לגדל דור צעיר לאור הערכים החברתיים שלה, אינה יכולה לוותר על מערכת החינוך" (דבר, 13 בנובמבר 1969). מפעל ההזנה ויום לימודים ארוך: "שנה אחרי מלחמת יום הכיפורים גיבשתי תקציב חינוך דיפרנציאלי שבו הוסטו משאבים רבים לעיירות הפיתוח. השארתי אחרי מערכת עם מפעל הזנה ממלכתי, תמכנו בתנועות הנוער וייסדנו יום לימודים ארוך. ממשלת בגין שלחה את הילדים הביתה ב–12:00, קיצצה, ולמעשה חיסלה את הכל" (הארץ, 2018). מדינת ישראל בשנת ה-70 שלה: "מדינת ישראל בשנת ה-70 עם כל החולשות שקיימות, היא בכל זאת מדינה חזקה - כלכלית, אקדמית מדעית - ולכן יש לי נחת" (ערוץ 7, 2018). חתירה לשלום עם הפלסטינים: "יש לנו פרטנר בצד השני. צריך לבנות אותו. השלום עם מצרים וירדן מחזיק מעמד, יש לנו קשר טוב עם סעודיה, וגם הרשות הפלסטינית משתפת איתנו פעולה באופן הדוק ברמה הביטחונית. אני חושב שצריך להיות יצירתיים. את עזה צריך להפוך לסוג של מדינה, עם כל המגבלות הביטחוניות. מדינה שלא קשורה לפתרון ביהודה ושומרון. אני לא פוסל שתי ישויות פלסטיניות כאלו. הייתי מחבר את עזה לאזור שייתנו להם בסיני כדי לפזר את האוכלוסייה, דואג שייתנו להם סיוע כלכלי בינלאומי, ומחסל סופית את ההתגרות הביטחונית" (ישראל היום, 2019) הקמת המדינה וחלוקת הארץ: "אמרתי לו [בן-גוריון, ע.ר.] שחייבים להקים מדינה בחלק של הארץ, שרובה יהיו יהודים" (שם). סוציאליזים: "הייתי בן־גוריוניסט. לא קיבלתי את הקומוניזם, והאמנתי כבר אז בסוציאל־דמוקרטיה" (שם). על בן-גוריון: "בן-גוריון, המייסד. הייתה לו חוכמת העיתוי בהקמת המדינה. הוא היה טוב מאוד, דאג למדינה, נתן גיבוי" (שם). דברים על מורשת ברל כצנלסון: ״זכות גדולה כבחור צעיר והעומד מול ארבעת הגדולים בן-גוריון, יערי, טבנקין וברל כצנלסון .. ממנו למדתי שתנועת העבודה בונה (קונסטרוקטיבית) ולא רק רעיון (אידאה), פשרה לניצול הזדמנות למדינה יהודית על חלק מארץ ישראל, סימון ב.גוריון כמנהיג, אין מונופול על המורשת היהודית ... ברל ראה במורשת היהודית בסיס רעיוני במובן - ואהבת לרעך כמוך וצדק צדק תרדוף ... וגם נלחם על אחדות בכל מובן ומקום ורבות בזכותו נוצרו המוסדות המאוחדים שהובילו למדינה״ (כנס "ירח 2020 לזכרו של ברל כצנלסון"). קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים שרים נוספים במשרד החינוך: חיים ביטון |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/דוד_ביטן] | [TOKENS: 4729] |
תוכן עניינים דוד ביטן דוד חי ביטן (נולד ב-8 באפריל 1960, י"א בניסן ה'תש"ך) הוא חבר כנסת ויו"ר ועדת הכלכלה מטעם הליכוד. בשנים 2016–2017 שימש יו"ר הקואליציה ויו"ר סיעת הליכוד, ובכנסת ה־23 שימש יו"ר ועדת העלייה והקליטה. בעבר היה יו"ר סניף הליכוד בראשון לציון וחבר מועצת העירייה מטעמו. ביוגרפיה ביטן נולד באל-קניטרה שבמרוקו לאלברט ומרגלית, ועלה לישראל בגיל חמש. שירת בצה"ל כחובש קרבי. בשנת 1987 סיים תואר ראשון בלימודי משפטים באוניברסיטת תל אביב ועסק בעריכת דין במשרד עצמאי. באוקטובר 2021 קיבל תואר דוקטור לשם כבוד מאוניברסיטת רובקידזה בגאורגיה. כיהן כחבר מועצת עיריית ראשון לציון מטעם הליכוד משנת 1988, אז נבחר לראשונה ליושב ראש סניף הליכוד בעיר, והתמודד למועצת העיר בראש רשימת הליכוד. מ-2011 חבר ביטן בחבר הנאמנים של הסוכנות היהודית. בשנים 2001–2008 עמד בראש קבוצת הכדורגל הפועל ראשון לציון. בתקופה זו התדרדר מצבה הכספי של הקבוצה. לפי תחקיר של TheMarker, ביטן והקבוצה הסתבכו עם השוק האפור בעקבות הלוואה שלקחו מהם. עקב כך ירד ביטן למחתרת לתקופה ארוכה מחשש מהמלווים, משכורתו עוקלה והחוב שולם לבסוף בסיוע בני משפחה וחברים. ביטן הגיב שהתחקיר הוא "מחזור של שקרים". ביטן התמודד בבחירות המקדימות לרשימת הליכוד לקראת הבחירות לכנסת החמש עשרה, הוצב במקום ה-39 לאחר שזכה ב-173 קולות, ולא נבחר לכנסת לאחר שהרשימה זכתה ב-19 מנדטים. בבחירות המקדימות לרשימת הליכוד לקראת הבחירות לכנסת התשע עשרה נבחר כנציג מחוז השפלה למקום ה-21. לאחר שילוב נציגי ישראל ביתנו ברשימת "הליכוד - ישראל ביתנו" הוצב במקום ה-35, ולא נבחר לכנסת לאחר שהרשימה זכתה ב-31 מנדטים. בבחירות המקדימות שנערכו לקראת הבחירות לכנסת העשרים נבחר פעם נוספת כנציג מחוז השפלה, והוצב במקום ה-16 ברשימת המפלגה לכנסת. לאחר שהליכוד זכה ב-30 מנדטים, הושבע ביטן ב-31 במרץ 2015 כחבר הכנסת ה-20. הוא מונה ליושב ראש ועדת הכנסת. במאי 2016, מונה ליושב ראש הקואליציה. לקראת הבחירות לכנסת ה-21 התמודד ברשימה הארצית בפריימריז של הליכוד והוצב במקום ה-23 ברשימה לכנסת. הוא הוצב באותו מקום בבחירות לכנסת ה-22 ונבחר. לאחר מכן מונה לסגן יושב ראש הכנסת. ב-5 בינואר 2020 הציע ראש הממשלה, בנימין נתניהו, למנותו לשר החקלאות בממשלת המעבר, אך בעקבות השהיית המינוי הודיע ביטן שהוא מוותר עליו. במאי 2020 מונה ליו"ר ועדת העלייה, הקליטה והתפוצות. בכנסת ה-24 נמנה, ככל חברי מפלגתו, עם האופוזיציה. באוגוסט 2021 נמנה עם העותרים לבג"ץ נגד החלטת הכנסת על הרכב ועדותיה. לקראת הבחירות לכנסת ה-25 התמודד ברשימה הארצית בפריימריז של הליכוד והוצב במקום ה-17 ברשימה לכנסת. לאחר הבחירות מונה ליו"ר ועדת הכלכלה. בכנסת ה-25 התבטא נגד ראש הממשלה ויו"ר מפלגתו נתניהו, והסתייג מחלקים ברפורמה המשפטית בישראל וממהלכים נוספים שהממשלה קידמה. בבחירות לראשות הליכוד העולמי שנערכו ביולי 2025 זכה ביטן במקום הראשון בקרב המצביעים בישראל. ב-29 בנובמבר 2025 הצהיר כי יתמודד על ראשות ועידת הליכוד, במסגרת התוכנית פגוש את העיתונות. בשנת 2010 נחקר ביטן בחשד לעבירות בתחום טוהר המידות. בעקבות החשדות ויתר ביטן על חלק מסמכויותיו בעירייה בנושאי בינוי. בהמשך הוקצו לו סמכויות בתחום תחבורה, תנועה ותרבות הדיור. לאחר הבחירות לרשויות המקומיות שנערכו ב-2013 הוחזר לו תיק ההנדסה, בשילוב ראשות ועדת המשנה העירונית לתכנון ובנייה. החל מדצמבר 2017 נחקר ביטן במשטרה בתיק 1803, בחשד לקבלת שוחד בעת כהונתו כסגן ראש עיריית ראשון לציון, וכן כחבר הכנסת. כמו כן נחקרה אשתו, חגית, בחשד להלבנת הון. בדצמבר 2017 פרש ביטן מתפקידו כיושב ראש הקואליציה בעקבות החקירות. במרץ 2019 פרסמה המשטרה את עמדתה כי התגבשה תשתית ראייתית מספקת לביסוס חשדות שלפיהם ביצע עבירות שוחד, הלבנת הון, קבלת דבר במרמה, מרמה והפרת אמונים ועבירות מס, ב-12 פרשות. במהלך חקירותיו ניצל ביטן את זכות השתיקה. ב-26 בינואר 2020 הודיע היועץ המשפטי לממשלה, אביחי מנדלבליט, על הגשת כתב אישום, בכפוף לשימוע, נגד ביטן, בעבירות של שוחד, מרמה והפרת אמונים ב-9 פרשות, שבמסגרתן נחשד בלקיחת שוחד בסכום מצטבר של 992 אלף ש"ח. ב-9 באוגוסט 2021 הוגש נגד ביטן כתב אישום על שוחד, מרמה והפרת אמונים. מאז מתנהל נגדו משפט פלילי באישומים של לקיחת שוחד, מרמה והפרת אמונים, הנוגעים בתשע פרשות, שאירעו בזמן שכיהן כסגן ראש עיריית ראשון לציון. לפי כתב האישום, אנשי עסקים וקבלנים שונים, בהם דרור גלזר ודניה סיבוס, שילמו לביטן סכומי כסף גדולים, של מאות אלפי שקלים במזומן, על מנת שיפעל עבורם מול עיריית ראשון לציון, משרד התחבורה וגורמים אחרים, בשעה שביטן כיהן כסגן ראש עיריית ראשון לציון ועמד בראשות ועדת המשנה לתכנון ולבנייה. הוא מואשם בעשרה סעיפים של שוחד, במרמה והפרת אמונים, וברצף של עבירות כלכליות. בספטמבר 2022, במסגרת הסדר טיעון, הורשעה רשת חצי חינם ומנהלת הנדל"ן שלה, ליהי סונק-קופרלי, במתן שוחד לביטן. ב-27 בדצמבר 2022 החל שלב ההוכחות במשפטו של ביטן בבית המשפט המחוזי בלוד. בספטמבר 2025 החלה עדותו של ביטן, שבה הכחיש את ההאשמות נגדו. בנובמבר 2025 העיד ביטן כי כחלק מהיערכותו לפריימריז בליכוד קיבל מספר תרומות חוקיות שהופקדו בחשבון מפוקח, אך לצד חשבון זה נפתחה גם "קופה סודית" שנוהלה על ידי עד המדינה, פעיל הליכוד, ואליה לפי כתב האישום זרמו מאות אלפי שקלים מכיסם של יזמי נדל"ן שנעזרו בביטן כדי לפתוח דלתות ולהשיג הטבות. ביטן אישר שהייתה קופה כזאת, אך לדבריו אין להתייחס לכספים בה כאל שוחד. חלק מהמעורבים בפרשה מואשמים אף הם במתן שוחד. ביטן מתגורר בראשון לציון, נשוי לחגית ולהם שתי בנות. בסוף 2020 חלה ביטן בקורונה, ואושפז במצב קשה בבית החולים. בזמן אשפוזו הוסיפה משפחתו לשמו את השם "חי". בפברואר 2025 אושפז במחלקת השבץ בשל סיבוכים רפואיים. קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ניסים_ואטורי] | [TOKENS: 4425] |
תוכן עניינים ניסים ואטורי ניסים ואטורי (נולד ב־23 באוקטובר 1969, י"א בחשוון ה'תש"ל) הוא חבר הכנסת מטעם הליכוד וסגן יו"ר הכנסת. כיהן כראש "נוער הליכוד". קורות חיים ואטורי נולד בשכונת רמת אליהו שבראשון לציון. אביו עלה מלוב בשנת 1949 ואימו תקווה עלתה מעיראק ב־1951. הוא היה חבר סניף תנועת הנוער הלאומי בית"ר בעיר, חניכו של דוד ביטן, לימים חבר הכנסת ויו"ר הקואליציה מטעם סיעת הליכוד. השניים התקרבו, ולאחר שבשנת 2020 ביטן נדבק בנגיף הקורונה, ואטורי הוסיף לו את השם "חי". בשנת 1991 הוא מונה ליו"ר נוער הליכוד. הוא שירת בצה"ל בדרגת רב-סמל בתפקיד מפקד צוות חילוץ מטוסים ממסלולי טיסה באחד מבסיסי חיל האוויר. בשנת 2011 קיבל תואר דוקטור במנהל עסקים שאינו מוכר בישראל, מאוניברסיטת IUBL האוקראינית, לאחר שלמד שנה בהתכתבות וללא שלמד לתארים מוקדמים יותר. בהמשך השלים תואר ראשון במשפטים ממכללת שערי מדע ומשפט. ואטורי הוא קבלן בניין רשום בפנקס הקבלנים. הוא הקים בקצרין בית קפה בזיכיון של רשת "קפה קפה" אשר נכשל מסחרית, ובשנת 2015 הגיש ואטורי בקשה לפשיטת רגל עקב חובות על סך 2.4 מיליון ש"ח. בשנת 2016 הוצא בעניינו צו כינוס וב-2018 הוצא נגדו צו פשיטת רגל. שניהם בוטלו בשנת 2020. באפריל 2024 השעה רשם הקבלנים את רישיונו של ואטורי לשלוש שנים לאחר שנתן לאדם אחר להשתמש ברישיון הקבלן שלו בניגוד לתקנות. בנוסף הוטל עליו קנס בסך 43,414 ש"ח, גובה הקנס המרבי שמאפשרות התקנות. ב־2012, לקראת הבחירות לכנסת התשע עשרה, התמודד על מקום ברשימת הליכוד במשבצת נציג מחוז מועצות אזוריות, והוצב בה לבסוף במקום ה-94 הסמלי. בבחירות לרשויות המקומיות בישראל בשנת 2018 נבחר למליאת המועצה האזורית גולן כנציג היישוב שהוא מתגורר בו, אלוני הבשן. במהלך 2019, לקראת הבחירות לכנסת העשרים ואחת התמודד בפריימריז לרשימת הליכוד, וזכה במשבצת המועצות האזוריות, שהוצבה במקום ה-37. לאחר שהכנסת העשרים ואחת התפזרה, הוחלט בליכוד להשתלב עם מפלגת כולנו, ולכן מקומו הועבר למקום ה-40. גם בבחירות לכנסת ה-22 ולכנסת ה-23 מוקם במקום זה. מפלגת הליכוד זכתה בשלוש מערכות אלו ב־32–36 מנדטים, וכך לא נכנס ואטורי לכנסת במערכות הבחירות הללו. ב־11 בדצמבר 2020 נכנס ואטורי לכנסת לאחר התפטרותו של גדעון סער. עם פרישת מספר חברים נוספים (בעיקר לתקווה חדשה, מפלגתו של סער) קודם למקום ה־37. לאחר כארבעה חודשים, בבחירות לכנסת ה-24, זכתה המפלגה בשלושים מנדטים בלבד וכך לא נכנס ואטורי לכנסת. ואטורי זכה בפריימריז ל-4,547 קולות, והוצב במקום ה-21 ברשימה. באותן בחירות זכתה מפלגתו ב-32 מנדטים, וכך נבחר ואטורי לכהן בכנסת ה-25. בהמשך מונה לסגן יו"ר הכנסת, יו"ר ועדת קרן העושר ברוטציה, חבר ועדת החוץ והביטחון, ועדת הפנים והגנת הסביבה, ועדה לצמצום פערים חברתיים בפריפריה, הוועדה המיוחדת לחיזוק ולפיתוח הנגב והגליל, ועדת הכנסת, ועדת המדע והטכנולוגיה, ועדת הכספים וועדת הבריאות. כדי שיוכל להתמודד על משבצת מחוז גליל ועמקים העביר ואטורי את כתובת מגוריו ב-2020 לקצרין. לאחר ניצחונו בהתמודדות ב-2022 הוגשה עתירה לבית הדין של הליכוד כנגדו. בפסק הדין לעתירה הוסכם שמעבר הכתובת נעשה אך ורק לצורך ההתמודדות אך בפועל מקום מגוריו של ואטורי נותר באלוני הבשן, אך העתירה נדחתה מאחר שהוגשה בשיהוי לאחר פרסום תוצאות הבחירות המקדימות, כי הליך העברת כתובת לצורך התמודדות בלבד אפשרי לפי תיקון לחוקת הליכוד, וכי חברותו של ואטורי בסניף הליכוד קצרין מאפשרת לו את ההתמודדות במשבצת המחוז אף אם אינו גר במקום. ואטורי הגיש ארבע תביעות דיבה נגד אזרחים שהכפישו אותו. בתביעה נגד רשי לב קיבל 20,000 ש"ח במסגרת הסכם פשרה, בתביעה נגד מוטי הררי נפסקו לזכות ואטורי פיצוי של 10,000 ש"ח בתוספת 7,000 ש"ח הוצאות משפט, ותביעה נוספת הסתיימה בהבעת חרטה של הנתבע. עמדותיו בנובמבר 2023 תיאר את הרב מאיר כהנא כ"צדיק גדול". לאחר מכן, בעקבות פרסום ברשת החברתית X בו כינה את חברות הכנסת עאידה תומא סלימאן ואימאן ח'טיב-יאסין כתומכות טרור נאצי, שללה ועדת האתיקה של הכנסת מוואטורי את זכות הדיבור במליאה למשך עשר ישיבות. בנובמבר 2025, בתגובה לטענה שהליכוד הפך מתנועה ליברלית ל"סניף עלוב של כהנא חי", אמר ואטורי במהלך נאום במליאת הכנסת כי כהנא "צדק בהרבה מקומות שעם ישראל טעה, וגם הליכוד טעה שהדיר אותו.. היום הוא היה קדוש" וכי כהנא היה צריך לקבל פרס ישראל. ב-17 בנובמבר 2023 פרסם פוסט במהלך מלחמת חרבות ברזל שבו קרא "לשרוף את עזה לא פחות!". דבריו צוטטו על ידי נציגת דרום אפריקה בתלונה נגד ישראל בגין רצח עם בבית הדין הבין-לאומי לצדק (ICJ). לקראת הדיון, ואטורי לא חזר בו מדבריו, ואף אמר "אשרינו שזכינו להיות נתבעים בהאג". בפברואר 2025 קרא להפריד את הילדים והנשים ברצועת עזה ולהוציא להורג את כל הגברים. ב-13 במרץ 2024 הביע תמיכה בתאוריית הקונספירציה על "בגידה מבפנים", לפיה צמרת צה"ל הכשילה בכוונה את ראש הממשלה בנימין נתניהו על מנת להחליף אותו, ולכן לא עידכנו אותו לגבי מידע מודיעיני לגבי כוונת חמאס לבצע את טבח שבעה באוקטובר. חיים אישיים ואטורי הוא דתי-לאומי, נשוי לאביטל ולהם שבעה ילדים. סובל ממחלת כליות מילדות ועבר השתלת כליה שתרמה אשתו. מאז 2001 מתגורר במושב אלוני הבשן שברמת הגולן, וב-2021 הודיע כי יתגורר גם במאחז מצפה יהודה שבגוש עציון. בתו בת-אל הקימה סניף נוער הליכוד בגולן ועמדה בראש "נוער הליכוד" בשנים 2017–2019. קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/מירון_ראובן] | [TOKENS: 1093] |
תוכן עניינים מירון ראובן מירון ראובן (נולד ב-8 בספטמבר 1961) הוא דיפלומט ישראלי המכהן משנת 2020 כקונסול ישראל בבוסטון. ביוגרפיה ראובן נולד בקייפטאון שבדרום אפריקה, ובשנת 1974 עלה לישראל. בשנת 1980 התגייס לצה"ל ושירת בחיל האוויר עד לשנת 1983. לאחר שירותו הצבאי למד דיפלומטיה ויחסים בינלאומיים באוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים. בשנת 1988 הצטרף ראובן לשירות במשרד החוץ וכיהן בתפקידים שונים. תחילה עבד במחלקה לענייני אירופה במשרד ובמחלקת המידע. בשנים שלאחר מכן יצא לדרום אמריקה ועסק בתפקידם שונים בשגרירויות ישראל במקסיקו ובצ'ילה. בשנת 1997 שב לישראל והיה מנהל מחלקת יהדות התפוצות ומנהל המחלקה לענייני הפלסטינים. בין השנים 2000–2002 היה שגריר ישראל בפרגוואי ובין השנים 2002–2003 בבוליביה. לאחר תקופה שהיה מנהל המחלקה לענייני אמריקה הלטינית והאיים הקריביים במשרד החוץ, מונה ראובן בשנת 2007 לשגריר ישראל בקולומביה. בספטמבר 2010 מונה לכהן כממלא מקום השגריר באומות המאוחדות. מינויו היה פשרה בין ראש הממשלה בנימין נתניהו ושר החוץ אביגדור ליברמן שלא הגיעו להסכמה על זהות השגריר באו"ם. במרץ 2011 סיים את שירותו באו"ם. בשנת 2015 מונה לתפקיד ראש הטקס במשרד החוץ. באוגוסט 2020 מונה ראובן לתפקיד הקונסול הכללי בבוסטון. ראובן גרוש ואב לשתי בנות. קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/יוראי_להב-הרצנו] | [TOKENS: 3361] |
תוכן עניינים יוראי להב-הרצנו יוראי להב-הרצנו (נולד ב-5 באוגוסט 1988, כ"ב באב ה'תשמ"ח) הוא חבר הכנסת מטעם מפלגת יש עתיד ויו״ר השדולה הגאה בכנסת. טרם בחירתו לכנסת שימש כיו"ר מועצת התלמידים של תל אביב-יפו ועמד בראש תא הנוער של מפלגת שינוי ומטה הצעירים של מפלגת יש עתיד. ביוגרפיה להב-הרצנו בעל תואר ראשון משולב במשפטים ובהיסטוריה של המזרח התיכון ואפריקה מאוניברסיטת תל אביב ותואר שני למנהלים במשפט ציבורי (ELLM) במסלול משולב מאוניברסיטת תל אביב ומאוניברסיטת נורת'ווסטרן בשיקגו. התנדב בצה"ל לאחר שקיבל פטור מסיבות בריאותיות, ושירת כשש שנים. את השנתיים האחרונות לשירותו ביצע כחלק ממשלחת מערכת הביטחון להודו, לסרי לנקה ולנפאל. השתחרר בדרגת סרן. שימש כיו"ר מועצת התלמידים של תל אביב-יפו במשך שלוש שנים. עמד בראש תא הנוער של מפלגת שינוי. הצטרף ל-"יש עתיד" בשנת 2013, הקים ועמד בראש "צעירי יש עתיד". התמודד למועצת העיר של הרצליה (מקום שלישי ברשימה) כחלק מרשימת יש עתיד. מוביל תאי הסטודנטים של המפלגה, סיירות השטח, תוכניות המנהיגות של יש עתיד, מערך קשרי החוץ של הצעירים, מרכז את פעילות הנוער ביש עתיד וכן כתב את תוכנית הצעירים של המפלגה. פעילות פוליטית לקראת הכנסת ה-20 הוצב במקום ה-30 ברשימת המפלגה לכנסת, שקיבלה 11 מנדטים באותן בחירות ועל כן לא נכנס לכנסת. הוצב במקום ה-15 ברשימת המפלגה בבחירות לכנסת העשרים ואחת, ועם הקמת רשימת "כחול-לבן" הוצב במקום ה-35 ונכנס לכנסת, בגיל 30, והיה חבר הכנסת הצעיר ביותר בכנסת העשרים ואחת. לקראת הבחירות לכנסת העשרים ושתיים הוצב במקום ה-35 ברשימת "כחול לבן" ולא נכנס לכנסת. עם זאת לאחר ההתפטרות של גדי יברקן וויתורו של עידן רול חזר למשכן. לקראת הבחירות לכנסת העשרים ושלוש הוצב במקום ה-35. הוא לא נכנס לכנסת בתחילת כהונתה, אך הפך לחבר הכנסת ביוני 2020, בעקבות התפטרותו מהכנסת, על-פי "החוק הנורווגי", שיזם חילי טרופר מסיעת כחול לבן. במהלכה, היה חבר משלחת הכנסת לאיגוד הבין-פרלמנטרי IPU, וכיהן בוועדת העבודה, הרווחה והבריאות וועדת הקורונה. בנוסף, במהלך הכנסת ה-23 קידם ח"כ להב הרצנו הצעת חוק "הורה 1 הורה 2" שביקשה לקבוע שבטפסי המדינה הרשמיים לא יצוין מינם של ההורים, כדי "לאפשר שוויון ולהפסיק את ההדרה של משפחות יחידניות וחד-מיניות מהשיח הציבורי". הצעת החוק נדחתה במליאת הכנסת, אך הציתה דיון ציבורי רחב שהוביל לאימוץ ההצעה בידי גופים ממשלתיים שונים כמו משרדי ממשלה, עיריות, אוניברסיטאות, מד"א ועוד. באוקטובר 2022 דורג במקום שלישי במדד ה'פרלמטר' של שקוף על פעילות בסוגיות אקלים וסביבה. לקראת הבחירות לכנסת העשרים וארבע בשנת 2021 הוצב להב-הרצנו במקום ה-14 ברשימת "יש עתיד" לכנסת ונכנס שוב לאחר שהמפלגה זכתה ב-17 מנדטים. לקראת הבחירות לכנסת העשרים וחמש הוצב להב-הרצנו במקום ה-15 ברשימת "יש עתיד" לכנסת ונכנס שוב לאחר שהמפלגה זכתה ב-24 מנדטים. כחלק מחברותו באופוזיציה, ח"כ להב הרצנו נחשב לאחד מהקולות הבולטים במאבק נגד הרפורמה המשפטית שקידמה ממשלת ישראל. ב־13 בפברואר 2023, במהלך ההצבעה בקריאה ראשונה בוועדת חוקה על שינוי הרכב הוועדה לבחירת שופטים, ח"כ להב הרצנו ביחד עם ולדימיר בליאק ושלי מירון ממפלגתו קפץ מעל שולחן הוועדה והתעמת עם יו"ר הוועדה ח"כ שמחה רוטמן (הציונות הדתית), בתמונה. פעולה זו גרמה לסערה ציבורית, ובעקבות זאת ועדת האתיקה של הכנסת החליטה לשלול מהרצנו, בליאק ומירון את האפשרות להשתמש בכלים פרלמנטריים (כמו העלאת הצעת חוק ושאילתות) עד סוף מושב החורף. להב הרצנו יזם וקידם חקיקה שתכיר בבן או בת זוג של נופלים להט"בים כאלמני צה"ל, זאת על רקע נפילתו של קצין הלוט"ר וחבר הקהילה הגאה רב-סרן (במיל') שגיא גולן ז"ל במהלך מלחמת "חרבות ברזל". חיים אישיים להב-הרצנו מתגורר בהרצליה עם בן זוגו צפריר אביר, דוקטורנט לפיזיקה. להב-הרצנו דובר עברית, אנגלית וצרפתית. בפברואר 2024 נולדה בתו, נעמי, באמצעות הליך פונדקאות בישראל. להב הרצנו ובן זוגו היו מהזוגות הראשונים שביצעו את הליך הפונדקאות בישראל מאז פסיקת בג"ץ בנובמבר 2021. קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:Current_events/April_2024] | [TOKENS: 567] |
Portal:Current events/April 2024 April 2024 was the fourth month of that leap year. The month, which began on a Monday, ended on a Tuesday after 30 days. Portal:Current events This is an archived version of Wikipedia's Current events Portal from April 2024. Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents Law and crime Business and economy Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents Health and environment Law and crime Politics and elections Science and technology Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Law and crime Science and technology Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Disasters and accidents Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy International relations Law and crime Science and technology Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents Law and crime Politics and elections Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents Politics and elections Science and technology Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Science and technology Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents International relations Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Business and economy International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents International relations Politics and elections Law and Crime Science and technology Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents Law and crime Politics and elections Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Disasters and accidents Health and environment Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents Health and environment International relations Law and crime Science and technology Ongoing events Elections and referendums Trials Sports Recent deaths Ongoing conflicts 2024 events and developments by topic |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/מרב_מיכאלי] | [TOKENS: 13236] |
תוכן עניינים מרב מיכאלי מרב מיכאלי (נולדה ב־24 בנובמבר 1966, י"א בכסלו ה'תשכ"ז) היא פוליטיקאית ישראלית, יושבת ראש מפלגת העבודה לשעבר וחברת כנסת מטעמה. כיהנה כשרת התחבורה והבטיחות בדרכים בממשלה ה-36. לפני בחירתה לכנסת נודעה כאשת טלוויזיה ורדיו, מרצה בנושאי תקשורת ומגדר, ופובליציסטית. ביוגרפיה מיכאלי נולדה וגדלה בפתח תקווה לעמי מיכאלי וסוזי קסטנר. אחיותיה הן מיכל מיכאלי, ממקימות קרן ההון סיכון "EVA Ventures", ועו"ד קרן מיכאלי, יועצת משפטית, לשעבר ראש המחלקה המשפטית בנציבות האו"ם לפליטים. היא נכדתם של נחמיה מיכאלי (יליד פולין, במקור מיכאלוביץ'), מזכירה האחרון של תנועת מפ"ם, ושל ד"ר ישראל קסטנר, מארגן רכבת קסטנר. מיכאלי הזכירה את פעולות ההצלה של סבה בנאום הבכורה שלה בכנסת, ב־27 בפברואר 2013. בילדותה למדה בלט ונגינה בפסנתר, והתחנכה בתנועת הצופים, שם שימשה גם מדריכה, רשג"דית ומרכזת שבט ראשונים בפתח תקווה, ומרכזת שבט הפיתוח שעריה בעיר, שם נתקלה לדבריה לראשונה בפערים מעמדיים וכלכליים. לפני גיוסה לצה"ל התנדבה לשנת שירות בירוחם, אותה לא השלימה, גם שם ריכזה שבט של תנועת הצופים. את שירותה הצבאי עשתה בתחנת הרדיו גלי צה"ל, כקריינית ומנחה. השתחררה מהשירות בסוף 1987 אך המשיכה בשירות קבע בתחנה. הייתה שותפה להקמת תחנת "גלגלצ" והיא שהציעה את שם התחנה והייתה המנהלת הראשונה שלה. את פעילותה בטלוויזיה החלה באפריל 1988, כשהצטרפה לצוות התוכנית מבט ספורט בערוץ הראשון, ובין היתר הגישה את תוכנית הספורט המרכזית ששודרה מדי שבוע במוצ"ש, "משחק השבת" לצד יורם ארבל, ניסים קיוויתי ואורי לוי, ושידורים מאולימפיאדת סיאול (1988). בהמשך הגישה את התוכנית הטלוויזיה "רואים 6/6" בטלוויזיה החינוכית. בשנת 1993, עם תחילת השידורים המסחריים בערוץ 2 הנחתה בו את התוכנית "שישי חי", ששודרה במסגרת "שידורי קשת", ב־1998 את תוכניות האירוח "עד עשר" בשידורי רשת, "כל ערב" בערוץ הראשון ו"מרב מיכאלי" בערוץ 3 ב־2000. בתחום הרדיו, הגישה את תוכנית הבוקר "לחמניות" ברדיו תל אביב, שהייתה ממייסדיו יחד עם ארז טל וראודור בנזימן. בתחילת 2003 הנחתה את תוכנית הבוקר של ערוץ 10, אך התוכנית ירדה משידור כחודשיים וחצי לאחר עלייתה. באותה שנה יצרה והפיקה שני סרטי טלוויזיה דוקומנטריים, "בכל מחיר" (על חייה של אתי אלון), ו"החצר האחורית"[דרוש מקור]. בשנת 2004 התחילה להנחות תוכנית רדיו בשם "התקווה" ברדיו ללא הפסקה, ובמקביל הנחתה את תוכנית הראיונות "האלוהים שלי" בערוץ 2. ב־2005 החלה להנחות את "חדשות HOT" של חברת הטלוויזיה בכבלים HOT. עד לבחירתה לכנסת הייתה מרצה בבית הספר לתקשורת של המסלול האקדמי המכללה למינהל, בבית הספר "כותרת" ובמכללה האקדמית ספיר. בנוסף, כתבה לעיתונים, פרסמה בקביעות מאמרים בעמודי הדעות של עיתון "הארץ" ובעיתון הנשים האמריקאי, "Women's Media Center". בשנת 1997 הקימה את השדולה "עזרת נשים" לקידום מרכזי הסיוע לנפגעות תקיפה מינית בישראל, והייתה פעילה בשדולת הנשים ובארגונים חברתיים. בפוליטיקה לקראת הבחירות לכנסת השמונה עשרה הוצע למרב מיכאלי להצטרף למפלגת מרצ אך היא דחתה את ההצעה. בשנת 2013 הצטרפה למפלגת העבודה. בהתאם לתוצאות הבחירות המקדימות הוצבה מיכאלי במקום החמישי ברשימת המפלגה, ששוריין לאישה. לאחר פרישתו של עמיר פרץ מהמפלגה, קודמה למקום הרביעי. מפלגת העבודה קיבלה 15 מנדטים בבחירות ומיכאלי נכנסה לכנסת התשע עשרה והפכה לחברה בוועדת החוץ והביטחון, ועדת החוקה, חוק ומשפט והייתה ליושבת ראש של כ־5 שדולות, בהן קידום ספורט הנשים ומיגור העוני. בין השנים 2013–2015 עמדה בראש קבוצת הידידות הפרלמנטרית של ישראל עם יבשת אפריקה ומדינת הונגריה. לקראת הבחירות לכנסת העשרים התמודדה בפריימריז של מפלגת העבודה והגיעה למקום החמישי, דבר שהציב אותה במקום התשיעי ברשימת המחנה הציוני לאחר שילוב מתמודדי מפלגת "התנועה" ברשימה. מיכאלי נכנסה לכנסת, ומונתה, על ידי יושב ראש המפלגה יצחק הרצוג, ליושבת ראש סיעת המחנה הציוני. באוקטובר 2017 הוחלפה על ידי יואל חסון בתפקיד. בכנסת זו הייתה חברה בכ־9 ועדות, בהן הוועדה המסדרת, הוועדה המיוחדת לפרשת היעלמותם של ילדי תימן, מזרח והבלקן, ועדת החוקה, חוק ומשפט וועדת החינוך, התרבות והספורט. בשנת 2015 החלה לעמוד בראש שדולות למען עצמאיות ועצמאים, הקהילה הגאה, שיתוף פעולה אזורי והמאבק בהתמכרות להימורים. הייתה ראשת קבוצת הידידות הפרלמנטרית של ישראל עם המדינות וייטנאם והפיליפינים עד 29 באפריל 2019. באוקטובר 2016 פרסם חיים לוינסון בעיתון הארץ כי מיכאלי פעלה למנות מקורבת שלה למנכ"לית עמותת שדולת הנשים, והציעה לגייס כספים עבורה, זאת בניגוד לכללי האתיקה של הכנסת, האוסרים על חברי כנסת לגייס כספים לכל עמותה שהיא. באותה שנה הפכה מיכאלי ליושבת הראש של שדולת נשים בעסקים ופירוק נישואים בשלום. לקראת הבחירות לכנסת העשרים ואחת הגיעה מיכאלי למקום החמישי בפריימריז והוצבה במקום השביעי ברשימה. המפלגה קיבלה שישה מנדטים ומיכאלי לא נכנסה לכנסת. לאחר התפטרותה של חברת הכנסת סתיו שפיר, שבה לכהן. לקראת הבחירות לכנסת העשרים ושתיים הוצבה במקום הרביעי ברשימת העבודה-גשר והייתה חברה בוועדת הכנסת. בסיום הבחירות לכנסת העשרים ושלוש הוצבה במקום השישי ברשימת העבודה-גשר-מרצ. בשני המקרים נבחרה לכנסת. הייתה חברה בוועדת החינוך, התרבות והספורט, הוועדה לקידום מעמד האישה ולשוויון מגדרי, ועדת הקורונה ומכהנת כיושבת ראש ועדת המשנה למאבק בסחר בנשים ובזנות. בנוסף היא חברת הוועדה לבחירת דיינים בכנסת החל מיולי 2020. מיכאלי הובילה את ההתנגדות בשורות המפלגה להצטרפות העבודה לממשלת האחדות, שהוקמה בעקבות הבחירות לכנסת ה־23, יחד עם מפלגת כחול לבן. אולם בהצבעה שנערכה בוועידת מפלגת העבודה באפריל 2020 אושרה הצעת עמיר פרץ ואיציק שמולי להצטרף לממשלה. כחברת סיעת העבודה הייתה מיכאלי חברה באופן פורמלי בקואליציה, אולם היא סירבה להישמע למשמעת הקואוליציונית והסיעתית, והצביעה בפועל עם האופוזיציה. מיכאלי התנגדה להצעת יו"ר המפלגה, עמיר פרץ, לבטל את הפריימריז לתפקיד היו"ר ולרשימת המועמדים לכנסת העשרים וארבע, ולהעביר את סמכות הבחירה לוועידת המפלגה, הצעה שאושרה בוועידת המפלגה בנובמבר 2020. היא עתרה נגד ההחלטה לבית המשפט, שקיבל את עתירתה בראשית ינואר 2021 וחייב את מפלגת העבודה לקיים בחירות מקדימות לתפקיד היו"ר בקרב כל חברי המפלגה. ב-24 בינואר 2021 נבחרה מיכאלי בפריימריז לתפקיד יושבת ראש מפלגת העבודה לאחר שקיבלה כ-77% מהקולות. עם כניסתה לתפקיד, מינתה מיכאלי את איש אמונה ניר רוזן לתפקיד מנכ״ל מפלגת העבודה. מיד עם היבחרה דרשה מיכאלי מהשרים עמיר פרץ ואיציק שמולי, להתפטר מתפקידם ולעזוב את ממשלת נתניהו. בתגובה עזבו פרץ ושמולי את המפלגה. מיכאלי יזמה עריכת פריימריז לרשימת המפלגה לכנסת ה־24, והעבירה בוועידת המפלגה החלטה שהעשירייה הראשונה תורכב מנשים וגברים לסירוגין. בבחירות לכנסת ה־24, שנערכו ב־23 במרץ 2021, זכתה מפלגת העבודה בראשותה ב־7 מנדטים. בבחירות לכנסת ה-24 במרץ 2021, מיכאלי ומפלגתה חתמו על הסכם קואליציני עם "יש עתיד" להקמת ממשלת חילופים בין נפתלי בנט ליו"ר "יש עתיד", יאיר לפיד. עם הקמת ממשלת ישראל השלושים ושש מונתה מיכאלי לשרת התחבורה והבטיחות בדרכים. שבועיים לאחר מינויה, הכריזה מיכאלי כי תמנה את סמנכ"לית משרד ראש הממשלה לשעבר, מיכל פרנק למנכ"לית משרד התחבורה. באוגוסט 2021, הצליחה לאשר בוועידת העבודה שינוי בחוקה, שנועד לחזק את השפעתם של מתפקדי המפלגה על קבלת הכרעות חשובות לדרכה של המפלגה, על חשבון החלשת סמכויות ועידת המפלגה, ולמנוע אפשרות של ביטול הפריימריז בקרב כלל חברי המפלגה בעתיד. הוועידה גם אישרה את הצעת מיכאלי להוסיף כ־300 צירות חדשות בוועידה, כחלק מיישום החלטה להחלת שוויון מגדרי בכל מוסדות העבודה. מיכאלי הכריזה על העדפת תיקצוב מקום לתחבורה ציבורית ולהולכי רגל על חשבון כבישים. באוקטובר 2021 הכריזה: "פינוי התחנה המרכזית (בתל אביב) קורה! אני מאושרת שהצלחנו לחתום את כל ההסכמים שצריך". אך לאחר מספר ימים התגלה, במסגרת חוק חופש המידע, כי למרות הצהרתה, ההסכמים המדוברים לא נחתמו. ואכן, ב־31 בדצמבר 2021, התאריך הקובע לביטול אופציית הארכת החוזה עם חברת נצבא – מפעילת התחנה המרכזית, התברר כי האופציה לא בוטלה, ופעילות האוטובוסים בתחנה תימשך. מתוקף היותה יו"ר הקבינט לשוויון מגדרי אישרה הצעה לתקצוב של 155 מיליון שקלים כדי להוציא לפועל את תוכנית למאבק באלימות נגד נשים. כחלק מחוק ההסדרים ותקציב המדינה, אושרה הצעתה של מיכאלי להגדלת תקציב משרד התחבורה ל-38 מיליארד ש"ח, שכ-80 אחוז מהם יושקעו בחיזוק התחבורה הציבורית (אוטובוסים ורכבות), ורק 20 אחוז יושקעו בכבישים ובכלי רכב פרטיים. מלבד זאת, אושרה יוזמתם של מיכאלי ושר האוצר אביגדור ליברמן להקים את רשות המטרו אשר תהיה אחראית לקידום פרויקט המטרו בגוש דן. באפריל 2022, הוצגה רפורמה בתעריפי התחבורה הציבורית בישראל. כמו כן, הודיעה כי שלושה רציפים שהיו ריקים יוקצו לנמלים הפרטיים. ביוני 2022, הציגה את התוכנית הממשלתית לפתרונות חלופיים לרכב הפרטי. ביולי 2022 נבחרה על ידי מגזין פורבס ישראל לאשה המשפיעה בישראל. לקראת הבחירות לכנסת העשרים וחמש נעשו ניסיונות לחיבור מפלגת העבודה עם מרצ, שבסקרים הייתה על סף אחוז החסימה. מיכאלי התנגדה למהלך, ולאחר שמרצ לא עברה את אחוז החסימה ספגה על כך ביקורת רבה. בבחירות זכתה מפלגת העבודה בארבעה מושבים, ונותרה באופוזיציה. לאחר הידרדרות המפלגה בסקרים אל מתחת לאחוז החסימה, ב-7 בדצמבר 2023 הודיעה מיכאלי על כוונתה להקדים את הבחירות המקדימות במפלגה ועל החלטתה שלא להתמודד בהן בפברואר 2024 בית הדין של מפלגת העבודה הורה למזכ"ל המפלגה לפתוח בהליך הדחה של מיכאלי מהמפלגה בשל התנהלותה במערכת הבחירות בבת ים. ב-28 במאי 2024 נערכו הבחירות לראשות העבודה (2024) ובהן נבחר יאיר גולן לראש המפלגה. על פי נתוני אתר "זמן כנסת" מאוקטובר 2024, במהלך כהונת הכנסת ה-25, מיכאלי, שהייתה יו"ר המפלגה עד מאי 2024, דורגה אחרונה בקרב חברי הכנסת של סיעת העבודה מבחינת נוכחות במשכן, ביקורים בוועדות והגשת שאילתות, ובמקום 96 בדירוג מבין כל חברי הכנסת ה-25. בעקבות זאת פנו קרוב לשליש מחברי ועידת המפלגה (כ-200 צירי ועידה) למיכאלי בבקשה לפנות את מקומה על מנת לאפשר לאדם אחר לייצג תחתיה את המפלגה בכנסת. בדצמבר 2024, מונתה לעמוד בראשות ועדת המשנה לענייני מוכנות ובט"ש, של ועדת החוץ והביטחון, וזאת לאחר שוועדה זו, בראשות ח"כ שלום דנינו, הייתה מושבתת מזה שנתיים. מיכאלי מכהנת כיושבת ראש של שלוש שדולות בכנסת ה-25: השדולה לשיתוף פעולה אזורי, שדולת השוויון והשדולה לחיזוק ירושלים הפלורליסטית. במרץ 2022, שעה לאחר פיגוע הירי בבאר שבע בו נרצחו ארבעה אזרחים, פרסם שמעון ריקלין ציוץ בטוויטר שבו ייחס למיכאלי ציטוט שקרי לפיו אמרה: "למה הרגו את המחבל? אובדן חיים מצער". בעקבות זאת הגישה מיכאלי נגד ריקלין תביעת לשון הרע בסך 300 אלף שקלים. בדיון בבית המשפט הודה ריקלין כי הדברים שיחס למיכאלי לא נאמרו על ידה מעולם. בנובמבר 2025, לאחר 3 שנים של דיונים בבית משפט השלום בתל אביב, ובעקבות הסדר פשרה שקיבל תוקף של פסק דין, פרסם ריקלין התנצלות בפני מיכאלי וחויב לשלם לה פיצוי בסך 16,000 ש"ח. בשנות פעילותה בכנסת יזמה מיכאלי כ־300 הצעות חוק. בין הצעותיה (כחתומה ראשונה או שנייה) שנכנסו לספר החוקים: עמדותיה מיכאלי מגדירה את עצמה כפמיניסטית. מאז שנת 2001 מקפידה לדבר בלשון זכר ונקבה, בפנייה לרבים ולרבות, או בלשון נקבה. סגנון זה הביא לעיתים לשיבושי לשון מכוונים כגון "הציבור יודעת" או "פתאום קמה אדם בבוקר והרגישה שהיא עם והתחילה ללכת". לטענתה, בעבר השפה העברית הייתה גברית בלבד, בתקופה בה נשים לא זכו לזכות הצבעה או אפשרות ללמוד לימודים אקדמיים, מה שהביא להדרתן לדעתה, ולכן היא פועלת לצמצומה בשימוש בלשון רבות. במהלך כהונתה בכנסת העשרים ושלוש, כיהנה כיושבת ראש השדולה למען נשים חרדיות בכנסת. בתקופה בה שימשה כמגישת מהדורת החדשות המקומית "חדשות הוט", עוררה מיכאלי סערה ציבורית, כאשר במהלך שידור חי הפשילה את חולצתה, כמחאה על ראיון רדיו שקיים רזי ברקאי עם אמנון שומרון ובו השמיעו השניים אמירות שנתפסו על ידי מיכאלי כבלתי־ראויות כלפי נשים. מיכאלי נוהגת ללבוש בגדים בצבע שחור; לדבריה, היא רוצה שיתרכזו במה שיש לה לומר ולא בהופעתה החיצונית. מיכאלי דוגלת במדינת רווחה ובגישה כלכלית סוציאל־דמוקרטית בה יינתן שירותי בריאות וחינוך חינם לכלל האזרחים ובמתן קצבאות לאוכלוסיות מוחלשות כגון נכים וניצולי שואה. היא יושבת ראש שדולות למען בעלי חיים, סגירת הפערים ברשויות הערביות, הצלת ים המלח ובקעת הירדן, מאבק בהימורים ועוד. היא תומכת במתן זכויות מלאות לקהילה הגאה. מיכאלי תומכת בחופשת לידה של כשנה לשני ההורים ובהפרדת דת ומדינה בה נכללים נישואים אזרחיים וקוראת למדינה לרשום נישואים רק בדרך זו בשל אפליית נשים ברבנות בקבלת גט ואי יכולתם של אזרחים לא יהודים על פי ההלכה להינשא לצד נישואיים חד מיניים. הביעה תמיכה במתן רשות חופשית לכל המעוניין לפתוח תחנת רדיו, וכינתה את המצב בו יש רק מעט תחנות רדיו הנבחרות במכרזים: "סתימת פיות בחסות המדינה". מיכאלי ביקרה את ממשלת ישראל על מה שהגדירה "כוחנותה ותוקפנותה". בהקשר לאירועי המשט לעזה כתבה: "ישראל היום שבויה בתודעת־קורבן כוזבת, ההולכת יד ביד עם תחושת כל־יכולה כוזבת, מצד אחד, ועם אשמה הנהפכת לתוקפנות, מצד אחר". בשנת 2009 קראה בעיתון הארץ לביטול גיוס נשים לצה"ל כיוון שלטענתה "השירות הצבאי הוא בית ספר עוצר נשימה בעוצמתו לנחיתות ולכפיפות של נשים". שנה לאחר מכן במסגרת חגיגות שישים שנה לגלי צה"ל אמרה כי "אמהות לא צריכות לשלוח את ילדיהן לצבא כשיש כיבוש שמתמשך למעלה מ־40 שנה והשלטון בישראל לא עושה מאמצים לפתור אותו בדרכים אחרות". בראיון בתוכנית הסאטירה גב האומה בשנת 2016, אמרה מיכאלי: "מעולם לא קראתי לא לשלוח ילדות וילדים לצבא, אני אומרת שאימהות ואבות צריכים לתפוס את עצמם ככוח פוליטי ולדרוש מכל שלטון לא משנה מה הוא לעשות כל מאמץ להסכם שלום לפני ששולחים את ילדינו למלחמה". במאמר בעיתון הארץ יצאה נגד מוסד הנישואים שאותו היא רואה כ"סידור כלכלי ומעמדי ופטנט לניהול קל יותר של החברה על ידי חלוקתה, עדיין, ל'בתי אב'". היא העבירה הרצאה תחת הכותרת "ביטול הנישואין" בוועידת TEDx שנערכה בישראל. מיכאלי מרבה לצטט את דברי פרופסור דפנה הקר בהם האמירה לפיה המבנה המשפחתי המסורתי הוא מחולל דיכוי בסיסי. היא הצהירה כי בחרה שלא להביא ילדים. בשנת 2017 בראיון לרשת טלוויזיה אוסטרלית אמרה מיכאלי כי התא המשפחתי הוא המקום הכי פחות בטוח לילדים, וטענה כי ילד לא צריך בהכרח לגדול אצל הוריו הביולוגיים, ושעל המדינה לקבוע קריטריונים שעל פיהם ייקבע מי יקבל את האחריות על הילד. בראיון לתוכנית הבוקר של קשת ב-2015, התנגדה לביטול חזקת הגיל הרך הקובע שבמקרה גירושין, ילדים עד גיל שש יהיו אוטומטית במשמורת האם. זאת לאחר שהצביעה נגד הצעת חוק מטעם הקואליציה, שביקשה לבטל סעיף זה המפלה אבות בנושא משמורת הילדים. בראיון אמרה: "לא יעלה על הדעת שילד או ילדה בני שלוש יעברו פעמיים שלוש בשבוע מבית לבית. חזקת הגיל הרך באה להגיד שעד גיל 6 זה לא פתוח למשא ומתן." ב־25 באוקטובר 2021, במהלך חילופי דברים בנושא הכותל המערבי בישיבת שדולת חופש הדת של הכנסת, אמרה מיכאלי שמאמץ ההסדרה של הכותל צריך להיות לא רק עבור יהדות התפוצות, אלא גם כצורך של החברה הישראלית. בין דבריה, "העובדה שהרוב המכריע של אזרחיות ואזרחי ישראל התרגלו להתייחס לכותל המערבי כאל בית כנסת חרדי היא קלקול". בינואר 2019 צייצה מיכאלי בחשבון הטוויטר שלה כי "ישראל היא הדמוקרטיה היחידה בעולם שאין בה תחבורה ציבורית בשבת. הגיע הזמן לשים לזה סוף". במענה לשאלה שהופנתה אליה בנושא בספטמבר 2021, השיבה בכובעה כשרת התחבורה כי: "עם מציאת המודל הנכון, גם את ואתה תוכלו לממש את חופש התנועה שלכןם בכל ימות השבוע בלי מגבלות ועם מקסימום אפשרויות". חיים אישיים במהלך שנות התשעים הייתה בזוגיות עם ארז טל. משנת 2007 בן זוגה הוא הסאטיריקן ומנחה הטלוויזיה ליאור שליין. היא מתגוררת בתל אביב, בסמוך לשליין. בעבר מיכאלי הצהירה שהיא אל־הורית ואינה מתחרטת על כך שלא הביאה ילדים. למרות זאת, נולדו לה ולבן זוגה שלושה ילדים: באוגוסט 2021 נולד להם בן ראשון בהליך פונדקאות בארצות הברית. באפריל 2023 נולד להם בן שני ובאפריל 2025 נולדה להם בת שלישית. קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:Current_events/September_2025] | [TOKENS: 685] |
Contents Portal:Current events/September 2025 September 2025 was the ninth month of that common year. The month, which began on a Monday, ended on a Tuesday after 30 days. Portal:Current events This is an archived version of Wikipedia's Current events Portal from September 2025. Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Science and technology Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents Health and environment International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents Health and environment International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Science and technology Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Disasters and accidents Law and crime Politics and elections Science and technology Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents Health and environment International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Science and technology Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Business and economy Disasters and accidents Health and environment International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Science and technology Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents Health and environment International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents Law and crime Politics and elections Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Health and environment Politics and elections Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents Health and environment International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Disasters and accidents Health and environment International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Science and technology Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Disasters and accidents Health and environment International relations Law and crime Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Disasters and accidents Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Science and technology Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Business and economy Disasters and accidents Health and environment International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Science and technology Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Disasters and accidents Law and crime Politics and elections Science and technology Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Science and technology Portal:Current events/September 2025/Sidebar Template:Events by month links |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:Current_events/December_2023] | [TOKENS: 605] |
Portal:Current events/December 2023 December 2023 was the twelfth and final month of that common year. The month, which began on a Friday, ended on a Sunday after 31 days. Portal:Current events This is an archived version of Wikipedia's Current events Portal from December 2023. Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Business and economy International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Science and technology Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and incidents Health and environment International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents Health and environment International relations Law and crime Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents Health and environment International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Science and technology Sports Arts and culture Disasters and accidents Law and crime Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Science and technology Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents International relations Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents Politics and elections Science and technology Armed conflicts and attacks International relations Law and crime Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy International relations Law and crime Science and technology Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Business and economy Disasters and accidents Health and environment Law and crime Politics and elections Science and technology Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents Health and environment Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Disasters and accidents Law and crime Science and technology Armed conflicts and attacks Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents Health and environment International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks International relations Law and crime Science and technology Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Arts and culture Business and economy Health and environment International relations Law and crime Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Law and crime Politics and elections Science and technology Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents Law and crime Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Sports Armed conflicts and attacks Business and economy Disasters and accidents Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks Disasters and accidents International relations Law and crime Politics and elections Armed conflicts and attacks The Israel Defense Forces says that dozens of militants killed in Gaza amid continued tank and aerial assaults on Khan Yunis. (Times of Israel) Disasters and accidents Law and crime Science and technology Armed conflicts and attacks Law and crime Politics and elections Ongoing events Elections and referendums Trials Sport Recent deaths Ongoing conflicts 2023 events and developments by topic |
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