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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%9326_NCAA_Division_I_women%27s_basketball_season] \| [TOKENS: 1006]
Contents 2025–26 NCAA Division I women's basketball season The 2025–26 NCAA Division I women's basketball season began on November 3, 2025. The regular season will end on March 15, 2026, with the 2026 NCAA Division I women's basketball tournament beginning with the first four on March 18 and ending with the championship game on April 5, at Mortgage Matchup Center in Phoenix, Arizona. Rule changes Season headlines Conference membership changes A total of 6 schools joined new conferences for the 2025–26 season. Of these, 5 moved within Division I, 1 began reclassification from NCAA Division II. The 2025–26 will be the last season in their respective conferences for at least 28 Division I schools. Arenas Seasonal outlook The Top 25 from the AP and USA Today Coaching polls Top 10 matchups Rankings reflect the AP poll Top 25. Regular season An upset is a victory by an underdog team. In the context of NCAA Division I women's basketball, this generally constitutes an unranked team defeating a team currently ranked in the top 25. This list will highlight those upsets of ranked teams by unranked teams as well as upsets of No. 1 teams. Rankings are from the AP poll. Bold type indicates winning teams in "true road games"—i.e., those played on an opponent's home court (including secondary homes). Italics type indicates winning teams in an early season tournament (or event). Early season tournaments are tournaments played in the early season. Events are the tournaments with the same teams in it every year (even rivalry games). In addition to the above listed upsets in which an unranked team defeated a ranked team, there have been ten non-Division I teams that defeated a Division I team so far this season. Bold type indicates winning teams in "true road games"—i.e., those played on an opponent's home court (including secondary homes). Italics type indicates winning teams in an early season tournament (or event). Early season tournaments are tournaments played in the early season. Events are the tournaments with the same teams in it every year (even rivalry games). Each of the 31 Division I athletic conferences will end its regular season with a single-elimination tournament. The team with the best regular-season record in each conference receives the number one seed in each tournament, with tiebreakers used as needed in the case of ties for the top seeding. Unless otherwise noted, the winners of these tournaments will receive automatic invitations to the 2026 NCAA Division I women's basketball tournament. Conference standings ** ineligible for both the 2026 NEC tournament and the 2026 NCAA tournament due to transition from Division IIAs of February 19, 2026 Postseason tournaments The NCAA tournament tipped off on March 18, 2026, with the First Four, and will conclude on April 5 at Mortgage Matchup Center in Phoenix, Arizona. A total of 68 teams entered the tournament. Thirty-one of the teams earned automatic bids by winning their conferences tournaments. The remaining 37 teams were granted "at-large" bids, which were extended by the NCAA Selection Committee. Per the NCAA, an upset occurs when the losing team in an NCAA tournament game was seeded at least two seed lines better than the winning team." After the NCAA tournament field is announced, the NCAA invites 32 teams to the Women's Basketball Invitation Tournament. The teams determined by the NCAA tournament selection committee to be the "first four out" of the NCAA tournament receive the top four seeds in the WBIT. Also, teams that won regular-season conference titles but did not receive NCAA tournament invitations, if otherwise eligible for NCAA-sponsored postseason play, receive automatic bids. All WBIT games through the quarterfinals are held at campus sites, with the semifinals and finals taking place in Wichita, Kansas at Charles Koch Arena. 2026 Women's Basketball Invitation Tournament After the NCAA tournament and WBIT fields are announced, the Women's National Invitation Tournament will invite 48 teams to participate. WNIT participants and sites will be announced when the field is set on March 16. 2026 Women's National Invitation Tournament Award winners The NCAA has never recognized a consensus All-America team in women's basketball. This differs from the practice in men's basketball, in which the NCAA uses a combination of selections by the Associated Press (AP), the National Association of Basketball Coaches (NABC), The Sporting News and the United States Basketball Writers Association (USBWA) to determine a consensus All-America team. The selection of a consensus team is possible because all four organizations select at least a first and second team, with only the USBWA not selecting a third team. Coaching changes Many teams will change coaches during the season and after it ends. Attendances The top 30 NCAA Division I women's basketball teams by average home attendance: Television viewers and ratings See also References
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_ATP_Tour] \| [TOKENS: 427]
Contents 2026 ATP Tour The 2026 ATP Tour is the global elite men's professional tennis circuit organized by the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) for the 2026 tennis season. The 2026 ATP Tour calendar comprises the Grand Slam tournaments, supervised by the International Tennis Federation (ITF), the ATP Finals, the ATP Tour Masters 1000, the ATP 500, the ATP 250, and the United Cup (organized with the WTA). Also included in the 2026 calendar are the Davis Cup (organized by the ITF), Next Gen ATP Finals, Hopman Cup and Laver Cup, none of which distribute ranking points. Schedule This is the schedule of events on the 2026 calendar. Statistical information These tables present the number of singles (S), doubles (D), and mixed doubles (X) titles won by each player and each nation during the season, within all the tournament categories of the 2026 calendar: the Grand Slam tournaments, the ATP Finals, the ATP Masters 1000, the ATP 500 tournaments, and the ATP 250 tournaments. The players/nations are sorted by: The following players won their first main circuit title in singles, doubles, or mixed doubles: The following players defended a main circuit title in singles, doubles, or mixed doubles: The following players achieved their career-high ranking in this season inside top 50 (in bold the players who entered the top 10 or became the world No. 1 for the first time):[b] ATP rankings [vedit · edit section] [vedit · edit section] Point distribution Points are awarded as follows: Prize money leaders Retirements The following is a list of notable players (winners of a main tour title, and/or part of the ATP rankings top 100 in singles, or top 100 in doubles, for at least one week) who announced their retirement from professional tennis, became inactive (after not playing for more than 52 weeks), or were permanently banned from playing, during the 2026 season: Comebacks and appearances See also Notes References External links
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borislav_Paravac] \| [TOKENS: 331]
Contents Borislav Paravac Borislav Paravac (Serbian Cyrillic: Борислав Паравац; 18 February 1943 – 18 February 2026) was a Bosnian Serb politician who served as the 4th Serb member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2003 to 2006. Previously, he was a member of both the national House of Peoples and House of Representatives. Paravac was a member of the Serb Democratic Party. Early life and education Paravac was born on 18 February 1943 in Kostajnica, near Doboj, in northern Bosnia and Herzegovina. He graduated from the Faculty of Economics at the University of Zagreb in 1966. Career From 4 December 1998 until 31 January 2003, Paravac was a member of the national House of Peoples. In the 2002 general election, he was elected to the national House of Representatives. Following the dismissal of Mirko Šarović from his post at the Bosnian Presidency by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lord Paddy Ashdown, Paravac was appointed to the post on 10 April 2003. He held the position of Presidency Chairman on two occasions. His term as Presidency member ended on 6 November 2006 and was succeeded by Nebojša Radmanović. Death Paravac died after a long illness in Doboj, on 18 February 2026, his 83rd birthday. References External links
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tom_Noonan] \| [TOKENS: 941]
Contents Tom Noonan Tom Noonan (April 12, 1951 – February 14, 2026) was an American actor, director and screenwriter, best known for his roles as Francis Dollarhyde in Manhunter (1986), Frankenstein's Monster in The Monster Squad (1987), Cain in RoboCop 2 (1990), The Ripper in Last Action Hero (1993), Kelso in Heat (1995), Sammy Barnathan in Synecdoche, New York (2008), Mr. Ulman in The House of the Devil (2009), Reverend Nathaniel in Hell on Wheels (2011–2014), the Pallid Man in 12 Monkeys (2015–2018), and as the voice of everyone but Michael and Lisa in Anomalisa (2015). Noonan was also a writer and director of theatre and film. His debut feature film as a filmmaker What Happened Was... (1994), won the Dramatic Grand Jury Prize and Screenwriting Award at the Sundance Film Festival. Early life Tom Noonan was born on April 12, 1951 in Greenwich, Connecticut, the son of Rita (McGannon), a mathematics teacher, and John Noonan Sr., a jazz musician and doctor of dental surgery. He had an older brother, John Ford Noonan, an actor, playwright, and screenwriter, and two sisters, Barbara and Nancy. Noonan was a very talented basketball player, and said "playing basketball is how I learned to perform in a lot of ways. It's how I got interested in performing... I never acted as a kid. I never did school plays. I never acted until I was 27...you learn a lot when you're in front of people and you've got a crowd going and you're doing something that you love to do. A lot of the skills that you would need for acting come through that... It's like a life and death struggle in front of people that you hope to impress." Career Noonan started working in theatre (appearing in the original Off-Broadway production of Sam Shepard's play Buried Child), but in the 1980s he began working in film. At 6 ft 5 in (1.96 m) tall, Noonan's imposing presence was probably responsible for his tendency to be cast as menacing villains, as in RoboCop 2, Last Action Hero, Manhunter, and The Pledge. His height was used for comic effect in "The Moving Finger," the series finale of the horror anthology Monsters (several episodes of which he also directed and wrote). In 1986, Noonan played Francis Dollarhyde, a serial killer who kills entire families, in Michael Mann's Manhunter, the first movie to feature Hannibal Lecter. Another supporting role, and another collaboration with Mann was in 1995, as Kelso in Heat. He also played the Frankenstein monster in The Monster Squad and drug kingpin Cain in RoboCop 2. During the 1990s, he wrote various plays, including two that he made into movies, What Happened Was... (1994) and The Wife (1995). In the 2000s, Noonan appeared in various other movies, including Charlie Kaufman's directorial debut, as Sammy Barnathan in Synecdoche, New York. Noonan also made numerous appearances in television series, including The X-Files (in the much-praised 1996 episode "Paper Hearts" that was written specifically for him), Law & Order: Criminal Intent, Law & Order: Special Victims Unit, Tales from the Darkside, and CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, (in which he starred alongside William Petersen, who played his nemesis, Will Graham, in Manhunter), and Detective Victor Huntley in Damages. He appeared on Blacklist as The Stew Maker, Louie as a doctor who takes the young Louie through the crucifixion in graphic anatomical detail. He also portrayed the Reverend Nathaniel Cole in the AMC original series Hell on Wheels. In 2015, Noonan voiced all of the supporting characters in Duke Johnson and Charlie Kaufman's stop-motion comedy-drama film Anomalisa, for which he won the San Diego Film Critics Society Award for Best Supporting Actor. Death On February 14, 2026, Noonan died at the age of 74. His death was initially announced by actress Karen Sillas on her Instagram account, and later confirmed by Fred Dekker in a tribute on Facebook. Filmography References External links
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/קובץ:MinistryOfCom.png] \| [TOKENS: 758]
תוכן עניינים קובץ:MinistryOfCom.png תקציר זהו סמליל (לוגו) של חברה מסחרית או ארגון אחר. כל הזכויות עליו שמורות, ההערכה היא שניתן להשתמש בתמונות מסוג זה בוויקיפדיה בערך העוסק בחברה הספציפית או בארגון הספציפי תחת תנאי השימוש ההוגן. אי לכך, ניתן להשתמש בתמונה זו בערך משרד התקשורת בלבד. למפעילים: נא לא למחוק ללא בדיקה אם הקובץ בוויקישיתוף כולל אישור OTRS או שהוא ברישיון ללא סף מקוריות. ראו גם כאן. היסטוריית הקובץ ניתן ללחוץ על תאריך/שעה כדי לראות את הקובץ כפי שנראה באותו זמן. אין באפשרותך לדרוס את הקובץ הזה. שימוש בקובץ הקובץ הבא זהה לקובץ זה (לפרטים נוספים): הדפים הבאים משתמשים בקובץ זה: מטא־נתונים קובץ זה מכיל מידע נוסף, שכנראה הגיע ממצלמה דיגיטלית או מסורק שבהם הקובץ נוצר או עבר דיגיטציה. אם הקובץ שונה ממצבו הראשוני, כמה מהנתונים להלן עלולים שלא לשקף באופן מלא את הקובץ הנוכחי.
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lionel_Fogarty] \| [TOKENS: 668]
Contents Lionel Fogarty Lionel Fogarty (1958 – 12 February 2026), also published as Lionel Lacey, was an Indigenous Australian poet and political activist. Early life Fogarty was born in 1958 on an Aboriginal reserve at Barambah (now called Cherbourg) in Queensland, where he grew up. He was of the Yoogum (Yugambeh) and Kudjela (?) peoples. Activism Fogarty was involved in Aboriginal activism from his teenage years, including involvement with such organisations as Aboriginal Legal Service, Aboriginal Housing Service, Black Resource Centre, Black Community School and Murrie Coo-ee. He worked mainly in southern Queensland on issues such as land rights, Aboriginal health and deaths in custody. His brother, Daniel Yock, died in the back of a police van shortly after being arrested, in 1993. He met activist Cheryl Buchanan (born 1955), later the mother of his six children, in Melbourne, who was working with the National Union of Australian University Students (NUAUS). He assisted in publishing the newspaper Black News Service (1975–1977), originally out of the Black Resource Centre (BRC) in Melbourne (supported by the NUAUS) and later from Brisbane. Buchanan had been involved in the setup of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy in 1972, and became inaugural director of the BRC. The centre later moved to Brisbane. Buchanan also took him up to Aurukun festival and to meet Mapoon people whose land near Weipa had been taken from them in the 1930s and 1940s. The BRC was involved in the defence and acquittal of the "Brisbane Three" in 1975. Fogarty was one of the three: he faced charges of conspiracy against the state in Brisbane, along with Denis Walker and Chilean national John Garcia. The charges, which had been laid by then premier of Queensland Joh Bjelke-Petersen's Special Branch in 1974, were on various offences relating to an alleged plot to "kidnap" Jim Varghese, students' union president at the University of Queensland. After this, Fogarty started writing on political issues. As well as travelling around Australia promoting Murri culture and Aboriginal causes, in 1976 he travelled to the Second International Indian Treaty Council in South Dakota, United States, part of the American Indian Movement. In the International Year for the World's Indigenous People in 1993, Fogarty went on an extensive tour in Europe, reading his work. Poetry Fogarty's poetry can be seen as an extension of this activism; common themes include the maintenance of traditional Aboriginal culture and the effects of European occupation. His work has been described as "experimental", and sometimes "surrealist". He uses Aboriginal language in his poetry, partly as an attempt to extend the dialogue between Australian cultures. He was involved with not-for-profit poetry organisation, The Red Room Company, participating in Unlocked, a program for inmates in New South Wales correctional centres, as well its creative projects including Clubs and Societies and The Poet's Life Works. Death Fogarty died on 12 February 2026, at the age of 68. Recognition and awards Selected works Fogarty's works include: References External links
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palmerston_(cat)] \| [TOKENS: 461]
Contents Palmerston (cat) Palmerston (2014 – 12 February 2026) was a black-and-white tuxedo cat who was the resident Chief Mouser of the UK's Foreign & Commonwealth Office. He held the role for four years, from 2016 until his retirement in 2020. He briefly came out of retirement in 2025, when he was taken to Bermuda with Andrew Murdoch, his owner since retirement, who had taken on the position of Governor of Bermuda. Biography Palmerston was born in 2014. He was from Battersea Dogs & Cats Home and was named after the former Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister Lord Palmerston. In 2016 he began working as Chief Mouser of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) at Whitehall in London, and was employed at the King Charles Street building. The inception of the position of Chief Mouser at the FCO followed from the position Chief Mouser to the Cabinet Office, Larry, and from visits from George Osborne's cat Freya who made regular visits to the office. Palmerston was in the news on 3 May 2016, as it was reported that he had caught his first mouse. On 11 July 2016, Palmerston was caught on camera in a stand-off between himself and Larry in and around Downing Street. On 26 July 2016, Palmerston was caught sneaking into Number 10, when the black door was left open. He was later evicted by resident police. On 1 August 2016, a journalist caught Palmerston and Larry having a serious cat-fight, which led to Palmerston having damage to his ear and Larry losing his collar. On 7 August 2020, Palmerston retired as the FCO's Chief Mouser, moving to the countryside to "spend more time relaxing away from the limelight"; his "resignation" was announced on Twitter. On 3 February 2025, it was reported that Palmerston had come out of retirement to take up a role in Bermuda as "feline relations consultant" to the new Governor of Bermuda, Andrew Murdoch, who had owned Palmerston since his retirement. Palmerston died on 12 February 2026. See also References External links
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/מרדכי_צפורי] \| [TOKENS: 2387]
תוכן עניינים מרדכי צפורי מרדכי (מוטק'ה) צפורי (בנקוביץ'-הנדין) (15 בספטמבר 1924, ט"ז באלול ה'תרפ"ד – 29 במאי 2017, ד' בסיוון ה'תשע"ז) היה חבר הכנסת מטעם סיעת הליכוד. כיהן כשר התקשורת וכסגן שר הביטחון בממשלות ישראל. לפני כן שרת כקצין בצה"ל והגיע לדרגת תת-אלוף. ביוגרפיה צפורי נולד בפתח תקווה והצטרף למחתרת האצ"ל בשנת 1939. נעצר ונכלא במחנה המעצר בלטרון בשנת 1945 עד הגלייתו לסודאן, קניה ואריתריאה. השתתף בבריחה ממעצר באריתריאה, אולם נתפס ונכלא שוב. עם הקמת מדינת ישראל שב לישראל והתגייס לצה"ל. השתתף בקורס קצינים בשנת 1950 ובהמשך למד במכללה הבין-זרועית לפיקוד ולמטה. שירת כמפקד פלוגה בחטיבת גבעתי ובבה"ד 1, עבר הסבה לשריון, שירת כמפקד פלוגת טנקים, מדריך בשריון ובפו"ם ומפקד גדוד 9. פיקד על חטיבה 14 המשוריינת במלחמת ששת הימים בקרב אום-כתף במסגרת המערכה על חצי האי סיני. מונה למפקד בית הספר לשריון ב-1968. ב-1971 התמנה לסגן מפקד גייסות השריון, באוגוסט 1973 מונה למפקד המכללה הבין-זרועית לפיקוד ולמטה ובמינוי חירום לסגן מפקד אוגדה 440. במלחמת יום הכיפורים קיבל מינוי חירום של קצין שריון ראשי לאחר שמפקד גייסות השריון, אברהם אדן וסגנו דב תמרי פיקדו על אוגדה 162 בחזית המצרית. ציפורי פעל לארגן את שיבוצי כוחות השריון ותגבור הכוחות הלוחמים. בספטמבר 1974 מונה לעוזר ראש אג"ם במטכ"ל. את שירותו הצבאי סיים בתחילת 1977 בדרגת תת-אלוף. לאחר שהשתחרר מצה"ל, הצטרף למפלגת הליכוד ונבחר מטעמה לכנסת התשיעית. ב-1977, לאחר המהפך, התמנה לסגן שר הביטחון בממשלת בגין. בתקופה שבין התפטרות שר הביטחון עזר ויצמן, בחודש מאי 1980, ועד לכינונה של ממשלת ישראל התשע עשרה, בחודש אוגוסט 1981, כיהן מנחם בגין אף כשר הביטחון, וצפורי נשא בניהול השוטף של מערכת הביטחון בישראל. בתקופת כהונתו יצא לפועל מבצע אופרה להשמדת הכור הגרעיני בעיראק. לאחר הבחירות לכנסת העשירית נתמנה לשר התקשורת. בעת שירותו בממשלה ביקר את פעולות הממשלה בזמן מלחמת לבנון הראשונה והיה אחד השרים היחידים שהתעמתו עם אריאל שרון על התנהלות המלחמה. ב-1986 מונה למנכ"ל המוסד לביטוח לאומי ושימש בתפקיד עד 1993. לקראת הבחירות לכנסת העשרים (בשנת 2015), הודיע כי לא יצביע לליכוד בראשותו של בנימין נתניהו, אלא למחנה הציוני. לדידו, "הביבי הזה הוא הבלוף הכי גדול בעולם. הוא אולי מדבר יפה, במיוחד באנגלית, אבל אם אי פעם פסיכולוגים ומומחים אחרים ינתחו את כל הנאומים שלו, מהראשון ועד האחרון, יתברר שהכול רק בלון מלא אוויר חם". צפורי היה נשוי לטובה לבית גלס, אם ארבעת ילדיו, אותה הכיר בימי חברותו באצ"ל. אחיו היה אל"ם ישראל בן אמיתי, שהיה קצין תותחנים ראשי. את קורות חייו סיפר בספר "בקו ישר", שנכתב על ידי אריה קרישק ויצא בהוצאת ידיעות אחרונות, בשנת 1997. הספר היה לרב-מכר ונחשב לאחד הספרים החשובים על מלחמת לבנון הראשונה. נפטר ב-29 במאי 2017. גלריה קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fred_Smith_(bassist)] \| [TOKENS: 367]
Contents Fred Smith (bassist) Fredrick Edward Lefkowitz (April 10, 1948 – February 5, 2026), known professionally as Fred Smith, was an American bass guitarist, best known for his work with the rock band Television. He was the original bassist with Angel and the Snake, which changed names to Blondie and the Banzai Babies, and then Blondie. He quit on March 7, 1975 to replace Richard Hell who had left Television over disputes with Tom Verlaine. Hell went on to form The Heartbreakers with Johnny Thunders and Jerry Nolan of the New York Dolls. At the time, Television played at CBGB along with Blondie. According to Smith, "Blondie was like a boat that was sinking and Television was my favourite band". He stayed with the band until they broke up in 1978 and rejoined them when they reunited in 1992; the band has played off and on ever since. Smith also participated in the solo albums of the Television guitarists Tom Verlaine and Richard Lloyd, and played with such artists as The Roches, Willie Nile, Peregrins, and The Revelons. From 1988 to 1989 he played bass, recorded, and toured with The Fleshtones. In 1999, he and his wife, artist Paula Cereghino, started making wine in their apartment on Houston Street in New York City's East Village. In 2003 they shifted production to Bloomington, New York, and in 2007 formally established their artisanal winery, Cereghino Smith. Smith died of cancer at a hospital in Manhattan, New York on February 5, 2026, at the age of 77. References External links
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrance_Gore] \| [TOKENS: 1319]
Contents Terrance Gore Terrance Jamar Gore (June 8, 1991 – February 6, 2026) was an American professional baseball outfielder. He played college baseball at Gulf Coast Community College. He made his Major League Baseball (MLB) debut in 2014 with the Kansas City Royals and also played in MLB for the Chicago Cubs, Los Angeles Dodgers, Atlanta Braves, and New York Mets. Gore was regarded as one of the fastest players in baseball and was mainly used as a pinch runner. Gore was frequently added to expanded rosters on contending teams late in the season and was on the postseason roster of a championship team three times—the Royals in 2015, the Dodgers in 2020, and the Braves in 2021. Amateur career Born and raised in Macon, Georgia, Gore attended Jones County High School in Gray, Georgia, where he starred in baseball and football as a running back and wide receiver. During his senior year, Gore compiled over 1,000 rushing yards and averaged over nine yards per carry. During his four years playing baseball at the school, he stole 145 bases and hit .474 as a senior. Gore later attended Gulf Coast Community College in Panama City, Florida, turning down football scholarships from the University of Georgia and Georgia Tech. Gore spent one season at Gulf Coast, batting .330 with 51 steals in 54 attempts. Professional career The Kansas City Royals selected Gore in the 20th round of the 2011 Major League Baseball draft. During the 2014 season, Gore expressed a desire to quit baseball to his agent, Jay Witasick, as he was about to raise a family and was not progressing professionally as much as he would have liked. Royals special assistant Mike Sweeney also advised Gore against retirement, and, in early August, Gore was duly promoted to the Omaha Storm Chasers to focus on pinch-running and stealing bases. On August 31, 2014, Gore was promoted to the Royals. Gore became the 16th-known player in Major League Baseball history to wear No. 0. He was the second Royal to wear the number after George Scott Jr. He was used primarily as a designated pinch runner. He went 5-for-5 in stolen bases in the major leagues and played for the Royals during the 2014 MLB postseason. Gore appeared for the Royals in the 2015 MLB postseason, playing in the 2015 ALDS and 2015 ALCS. He was not on the roster for the World Series. Regardless, Gore received his first World Series ring. Gore was non-tendered by the Royals on December 1, 2017, and signed a minor league contract with them the following day. On August 15, 2018, Gore was traded to the Chicago Cubs in exchange for cash considerations, and assigned to the Triple-A Iowa Cubs. He was promoted to the major leagues on September 1. On September 8, he recorded his first major league hit in the first game of a double header against the Washington Nationals pitcher Max Scherzer. Gore elected free agency following the season on November 2. On December 18, 2018, Gore signed a one-year contract to return to the Royals. He was designated for assignment on July 12, 2019, despite hitting .275 with 13 stolen bases. On July 17, 2019, Gore was traded to the New York Yankees in exchange for cash considerations. He was subsequently assigned to the Triple-A Scranton/Wilkes-Barre RailRiders, for whom he batted .164/.324/.255 with one home run and three RBI. Gore elected free agency following the season on November 4. On February 17, 2020, Gore signed a minor league contract with the Los Angeles Dodgers. On July 23, he was added to the Opening Day roster. Gore appeared in two games for the Dodgers, playing one inning as a defensive replacement in the outfield and also pinch running before he was designated for assignment on July 30. The Dodgers added Gore to their 28-man roster for the 2020 Wild Card Series matchup against the Milwaukee Brewers. He did not appear in either of the two games in that series but remained on the roster for the second-round series against the San Diego Padres. Manager Dave Roberts said that Gore might not appear in the series "but if that situation presents itself, to not have him on the roster would be pretty costly, in my opinion." He did not play in any games in the postseason as he was left off the roster for the NLCS and the World Series. Despite being left off the NLCS and World Series rosters, Gore still received a ring following the Dodgers championship victory, the second in his career. On October 31, Gore was outrighted off the 40-man roster. He became a free agent on November 2. On February 25, 2021, Gore signed a minor league contract with the Atlanta Braves organization. Playing in 2021 for the Triple-A Gwinnett Stripers he batted .232/.361/.319 and stole 18 bases while being caught four times. On October 8, 2021, Gore was announced as part of the Braves 26-man roster for the 2021 NLDS. In the series against the Milwaukee Brewers, he had one appearance as a pinch runner. He was removed from the National League Championship Series roster, and though he returned to the World Series roster, did not appear in any of the ensuing games. The Braves won the 2021 World Series, giving the Braves their first title since 1995, and Gore his second in a row, and third in seven years. On November 6, 2021, Gore was outrighted off of the 40-man roster and elected free agency the next day. On June 6, 2022, Gore signed a minor league deal with the New York Mets organization. He was selected to the active roster on August 31. On November 10, he was removed from the 40-man roster and sent outright to the Triple-A Syracuse Mets; he elected free agency the same day. Personal life and death Gore was married to Britney, with whom he raised three children. According to a social media post from his wife, Britney, Gore died due to complications following a routine surgical procedure on February 6, 2026, at the age of 34. References External links
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeane_Freeman] \| [TOKENS: 2288]
Contents Jeane Freeman Jeane Tennent Freeman (September 1953 – 7 February 2026) was a Scottish businesswoman and politician who served as Cabinet Secretary for Health and Sport from 2018 to 2021. A member of the Scottish National Party (SNP), she was the Member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) for the Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley constituency from 2016 to 2021. Born into a Labour-supporting, working-class family in South Ayrshire, Freeman attended the Glasgow College of Technology, studying sociology and politics. She became politically active at an early age and was a member of the Communist Party's student wing, before joining the Labour Party. In 1987, she established Apex Scotland, a criminal justice employment organisation, and was CEO until 2000. Freeman later was a political adviser to the Labour First Minister Jack McConnell from 2001 to 2005. In the run-up to the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, she and several other women, founded Women for Independence. Freeman campaigned in support for Scottish independence and in the aftermath of the Yes Scotland campaign's defeat in the referendum, she joined the Scottish National Party. The following year Freeman was selected as the SNP's candidate for the Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley constituency in the 2016 Scottish Parliament election. She was elected to the 5th Scottish Parliament and was subsequently appointed to a junior ministerial post as Minister for Social Security. In this role, she worked alongside the Cabinet Secretary for Communities, Social Security and Equalities to establish Social Security Scotland, which claims as her "greatest achievement". Following a 2018 cabinet reshuffle of the Second Sturgeon government, Freeman was promoted to the Scottish Cabinet as Cabinet Secretary for Health and Sport. During Freeman's tenure as the Scottish Health Secretary, she played a vital role in Scotland's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. She led press briefings to the public, was criticised for handling of care homes and announced Scotland's preparation plan for delivering COVID-19 vaccines. In 2020, she announced her intention to step down as an MSP, therefore relinquishing her role as Health Secretary. Early life Jeane Tennent Freeman was born in Ayr in September 1953. She was raised in South Ayrshire with her two brothers, to a trade union, Labour supporting family. Her mother was a nurse and her father, son of an immigrant family, was an aircraft fitter and was in the RAF during WWII. After coming back from war, he was determined to create social justice, something that Freeman aspired to continue from her father. She was educated at Ayr Academy and from 1975 to 1979, she attended the Glasgow College of Technology, studying sociology and politics. Freeman also trained to be a nurse and went on to earn a degree. Freeman was a leading member of the Communist Party's student wing and in 1979 she became the first woman to chair the National Union of Students Scotland. In 1983 Freeman was a member of the Communist party's Congress Arrangements Committee which oversaw the running of that year's party congress. Early career In 1987, Freeman established Apex Scotland, a criminal justice employment organisation for which she was chief executive for twelve years. She was appointed a member of the Parole Board for Scotland in 2006 and also played roles on the Scottish Police Services Authority Board. She was appointed a Lay Member to the Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland, commencing November 2011 for a four-year period. In 2008 she was appointed to the board of the National Waiting Times Centre, the special health board that runs the Golden Jubilee National Hospital. In January 2015 she was reappointed the Chair of the National Waiting Times Centre Board. In March 2016 she stepped down from this role. In the 2013/14 financial year Freeman worked for a number of bodies, including Police Scotland, the NHS National Waiting Time Centre and the Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland. She billed taxpayers for 376 days work – leading her to be dubbed 'the Quango Queen' in the press. A spokesman for Freeman said, "A contracted day does not mean sitting in an office – indeed, many boards meet during the evening. It is entirely routine for members of public boards to have a number of other interests." Early political career Freeman later joined the Scottish Labour Party and was a member until the late 1990s. Between 2001 and 2005, Freeman was a senior political adviser to First Minister Jack McConnell. In this role, she worked on the Scottish Budget, the government's legislative programme, relations with the UK government, and in the Finance, Health and Justice portfolios. She left the position voluntarily, though there were reports of a row between Freeman and John Elvidge, which were dismissed by the Scottish Executive. Months after she left, the Scottish Executive hired her consultancy firm, Freeman Associates, in a consultancy capacity, generating accusations of cronyism. As a member of Scottish Labour, Freeman had never supported Scottish independence. Her experience of working in the Scottish Executive, became an option "worth considering". Freeman was active in the campaign for Scottish independence since the announcement of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. In May 2012 it was announced that she was a part of Yes Scotland. She was a founding member of Women for Independence and spoke at a meeting of the Labour for Independence group. During the referendum campaign she made appearances on television programmes as a commentator. In November 2014, when the SNP voted in favour of allowing non-members to stand as their candidates in the general elections, Nicola Sturgeon named Freeman as an example of the sort of person that might be chosen by a constituency branch. In August 2015, Freeman was selected to be the SNP candidate for the Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley constituency in the 2016 Scottish elections. In April 2016, former Labour politician Brian Wilson covered the topic of Freedom of information (FOI) requests in his column in The Scotsman, observing that her company Freeman Associates had recently been the subject of a request to the Scottish Government. The Ministers had responded to the applicant that the cost of replying to this specific request would exceed £600 and they were therefore not obliged to comply. Following a review, the applicant remained dissatisfied and applied to the Information Commissioner for a decision. Freeman was elected as the Member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley at the 2016 Scottish Parliament election. In May 2016, she was appointed a junior minister post in the Second Sturgeon government as Minister for Social Security. As the inaugural holder, she worked alongside Angela Constance, the Cabinet Secretary for Communities, Social Security and Equalities, to help establish Social Security Scotland, with Scotland's new social security powers from Westminster. Freeman stated: “It was a real privilege to help lay the foundations for a social security service, and I use the word service because we are about dignity and respect and I was immensely proud to do that.” Scottish Health Secretary (2018–2021) In a cabinet reshuffle by First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, she was appointed Cabinet Secretary for Health and Sport on 26 June 2018. As Health Secretary she played a big part in the Scottish Government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2019, Freeman faced calls for her resignation following ten cases of infections linked to water contamination at the Queen Elizabeth University Hospital. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde later reported two deaths of children, who had been linked to infection from the hospital. When asked if she would resign on an interview with the BBC, she stated: "No I'm not because my focus is on fixing these matters and restoring public confidence. That's the right thing for me to do." In February 2020, Freeman was forced to up her security presence amid death threats against her. The threats were in relation to the Glasgow hospital infection crisis and Police Scotland had charged a man. She told Holyrood Magazine: “I think the threats are a symptom of this notion that I am personally responsible for everything that happens. I cannot be personally responsible, but I am accountable for how well our health service performs and how well I act to resolve those areas where it’s not doing as it should do." Freeman served as Health Secretary during the COVID-19 pandemic in Scotland and briefed the public in press conferences. In April 2020, she said in a statement in the Scottish Parliament a network of COVID-19 local assessment centres was to be set up across Scotland with 50 planned in the first wave. A network of "humanitarian assistance centres" were also set up, working with GPs and other local partners to arrange delivery of medicine, care services and grocery delivery. In November 2020, Freeman delivered a statement to the Scottish Parliament on vaccines. She announced that Scotland was ready to administer the first vaccine for COVID-19 in the first week in February, if the vaccine is given safety clearance. Freeman also announced the priorities list for the first wave of vaccinations, which ran from December to February 2021. The priorities are: “frontline health and social care staff, older residents in care homes, care home staff, all those aged 80 and over, unpaid carers and personal assistants & those delivering the vaccination.” During the pandemic, 1,300 elderly patients were transferred into care homes without receiving a negative coronavirus test result. Many had the disease and ended up passing the virus onto other care home residents. Over three thousand care home residents died from coronavirus; in some care homes dozens of pensioners died – contributing significantly to Scotland recording one of the highest death tolls in Europe. Gary Smith, Scotland secretary of the GMB, said the policy turned “care homes into morgues” and in March 2021 Freeman admitted to the BBC: "We [the Scottish Government] didn’t take the right precautions to make sure that older people leaving hospital going into care homes were as safe as they could be and that was a mistake." After leaving office Freeman said that the characterisation of the policy as a "death sentence" for the elderly had hurt her personally and that the criticism from opposition parties was "not fair" although the criticism continued with many observers considering her decisions leading to many deaths of the elderly in care home, for which Operation Koper is investigating. On 24 August 2020, Freeman confirmed that she would not recontest her seat at the 2021 Scottish Parliament election. After parliament In 2022, Freeman was appointed an honorary professor at Queen Margaret University (QMU). Death Freeman died at the Queen Elizabeth University Hospital in Glasgow, on 7 February 2026, at the age of 72. She had been diagnosed with terminal cancer less than four weeks prior. Tributes were paid by First Minister John Swinney as well as former First Ministers Jack McConnell and Nicola Sturgeon; the latter describing Freeman as amongst her "best and closest" friends. Awards and honours In the 1996 Birthday Honours, she was awarded an OBE for her services to the rehabilitation of offenders. References External links
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matti_Caspi] \| [TOKENS: 955]
Contents Matti Caspi Matti Caspi (Hebrew: מתי כספי; 30 November 1949 – 8 February 2026) was an Israeli composer, musician, singer, arranger and lyricist. He has been hailed as one of Israel's most beloved and prolific musicians. His music was influenced by classical music, Brazilian and Latin music, jazz, rock, and other genres. Among the composers who inspired him most he cited Sasha Argov, with whom he recorded two albums. Music career As a child Caspi developed an interest in music after listening to Shmuel Gogol play the harmonica. He begged his parents for piano lessons, which had to be approved by the kibbutz. His first public appearance was at the age of 16, performing on Kol Yisrael's Teshu'ot Rishonot, a talent show for teenagers. He recorded a song, "Leiẓan Kippurim", the following year. For his mandatory service in the Israel Defense Forces he performed with the Southern Command Band. He formed a trio with two of his friends, Gadi Oron and Ya'akov Noy, called The Three Fatsoes. With this trio Caspi came out with his first big hit, "Ani Met" (I'm dying). After Caspi's military service, The Three Fatsoes was renamed the They Don't Care trio. In the Yom Kippur War, he toured army bases along with Leonard Cohen, who arranged his 1974 song "Lover Lover Lover" with Caspi. During the 1970s he worked closely with Ehud Manor, another Israeli songwriter, and released some of his most popular songs: "Lo Yadati SheTelchi Mimeni" (I Didn't Know You Would Leave Me), "Brit Olam" (Covenant of Love), and "Shir HaYonah" ( Song of the Dove). Over the next few decades Caspi released dozens of records and collaborated with some of the most well known Israeli artists of the time: Shlomo Gronich, Ehud Manor, Yehudit Ravitz, and Shalom Hanoch, among others. His last album, Like in a Dance, came out in 2017. Caspi released close to 1,000 songs, both remakes of older songs and original creations. Musicologist Tsippi Fleischer said: He wrote lyrics for other Israeli artists and in some cases even worked as a producer, as he did for Riki Gal in 1996, both writing the songs and producing her album Ohevet otcha yoter (I Love You More). At the 1976 Eurovision Song Contest, he also served as a conductor, leading the Netherlands' Metropole Orkest in his composition "Emor Shalom", performed by Chocolate, Menta, Mastik, which he also arranged. Personal life Matityahu (Matti) Caspi was born in Kibbutz Hanita, Israel on 30 November 1949, and was of Romanian-Bessarabian ancestry. He studied piano at the conservatory in Nahariya. After his military service he married Galia Superstein, whom he divorced in less than a year. In 1972 he met actress (Patty) Doreen Lubetzky. They married three years later and had two children, Brit (born 1981) and Bar (born 1985). In 1990 Caspi separated from his wife and met Raquel Wenger. The couple emigrated to Canada and married in California in 1994. They had two children, Suyan (born 1992) and Sean (born 1995). Caspi was granted a divorce by the Beverly Hills Rabbinical Court, although at the time the case was still pending in Israel. In 1997 Caspi returned to Israel and appeared in several concerts, including the Arad Festival. In 2002 a Tel Aviv court determined that he was still legally married to Doreen and found him guilty of bigamy. The court imposed a six-month suspended sentence and a small fine. An appeal to the District Court failed, and in 2004 the original sentence was upheld. In May 2025, Caspi revealed that he was suffering from cancer and subsequently cancelled all of his future concerts; and in July 2025 he launched a fundraiser to help pay for his medical care. Death Caspi died of cancer at Ichilov Hospital in Tel Aviv on 8 February 2026 at the age of 76. Discography References External links
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/דליה_איציק] \| [TOKENS: 4908]
תוכן עניינים דליה איציק דליה איציק (נולדה ב-20 באוקטובר 1952) היא פוליטיקאית ישראלית המשמשת יו"ר הדירקטוריון של המרכז הרפואי הדסה. כיהנה כיושבת הראש ה-15 של הכנסת, כשרה בממשלות ישראל וכחברת הכנסת מטעם הסיעות "קדימה" ו"העבודה". במהלך 2007 כיהנה כנשיאת מדינת ישראל בפועל, במשך כחצי שנה, לאחר שהנשיא המכהן משה קצב יצא לנבצרות. ביוגרפיה דליה איציק נולדה בירושלים, למרסל וגרשון בלאס, יוצאי עיראק. למדה בתיכון הדתי "אוולינה דה רוטשילד" בירושלים. בתום לימודיה פנתה ללימודים בסמינר למורות אפרתה. היא בעלת תואר ראשון בספרות והיסטוריה מטעם האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים ובנוסף, תואר ראשון במשפטים מהמרכז הבינתחומי הרצליה. עסקה בהוראה, והייתה יושבת ראש הסתדרות המורים בירושלים. במקביל לכהונתה בהסתדרות המורים שימשה כחברה בוועד המנהל של רשות השידור. ב-26 באוקטובר 1988 התנגש רכב בו נסע חבר הכנסת מיכאל רייסר מהליכוד ברכבה של איציק. רייסר נפצע אנושות ולמחרת ב-27 באוקטובר מת מפצעיו ואיציק נפצעה קשה. לאחר שכיהנה כיו"ר הסתדרות המורים בירושלים הצטרפה למפלגת "העבודה" ונבחרה מטעם רשימת "ירושלים אחת" למועצת העיר בירושלים ובהמשך כיהנה כסגנית ראש עיריית ירושלים טדי קולק והממונה על תחום החינוך בעירייה. הפריצה שלה לפוליטיקה הארצית התרחשה בשנת 1992 כאשר נבחרה בפריימריס למקום ה-25 ברשימת מפלגת העבודה לכנסת ה-13, כחברת כנסת מטעם מפלגת העבודה. במהלך כהונתה לאורך השנים בכנסת שימשה כיו"ר ועדת החינוך והתרבות (בכנסת ה-13) ויו"ר ועדת המדע והטכנולוגיה (בכנסת ה-14). בשנת 1996 נבחרה לעשירייה הראשונה (מקום 6). לקראת הבחירות לכנסת ולראשות הממשלה ב־1999 נבחרה למקום השישי בבחירות המקדימות לרשימת המפלגה. לאחר ניצחון המפלגה בבחירות מונתה איציק לשרה להגנת הסביבה בממשלת אהוד ברק, אף שחפצה בתיק החינוך. בשנת 2001 בעקבות התפטרותו של ברק מראשות הממשלה התקיימו בחירות מיוחדות לראשות הממשלה בהן הפסיד ברק לאריאל שרון. איציק מונתה ב-13 במרץ 2001 לשרת התעשייה והמסחר בממשלת שרון (האשה הראשונה שנבחרה לתפקיד). בהתמודדותה בבחירות המקדימות של מפלגת העבודה לכנסת ה-16 קבלה מספיק קולות כדי להיבחר לכנסת ללא שריון לנשים והגיעה למקום הרביעי ברשימה. איציק שימשה במערכת הבחירות כיו"ר צוות התגובות של מפלגת העבודה. בשנת 2003 עם כינון הכנסת ה-16 לא הצטרפה סיעת העבודה לממשלת שרון ונשארה בשורות האופוזיציה. איציק נבחרה כיו"ר סיעת העבודה-מימד בכנסת והובילה את סיעות האופוזיציה נגד ממשלת שרון השנייה תחת יו"ר האופוזיציה שמעון פרס. בתקופה זו שימשה כחברת הוועדה לבחירת שופטים. בשנת 2005 עמדה בראש צוות המשא ומתן של העבודה מול הליכוד ועם כניסת מפלגת העבודה לממשלה, שימשה כשרת התקשורת (עד פרישת מפלגת העבודה מן הממשלה, ב-23 בנובמבר 2005). ב-28 בנובמבר 2005 הכריזה על פרישתה ממפלגת העבודה ועל מעברה למפלגת קדימה, יחד עם חיים רמון ושמעון פרס, שהפסיד בבחירות על ראשות מפלגת העבודה לטובת עמיר פרץ. בעקבות החלטתו של היועץ המשפטי לממשלה, מני מזוז, כי לא תוכל להתמנות לשרה בממשלת המעבר עקב היותה סיעת יחיד, התפטרה ב-17 בינואר 2006. בפברואר 2006 עתרה מפלגת העבודה לוועדת הבחירות המרכזית לכנסת ה-17 ולבג"ץ כדי למנוע מאיציק, פרס ורמון להתמודד במסגרת רשימת קדימה בטענה שלא פרשו מן הכנסת בסמוך להודעת הפרישה שלה ממפלגת "העבודה" על פי האמור בחוק. שתי העתירות נדחו ואיציק הוצבה במקום ה-14 ברשימת קדימה ונבחרה לכנסת ה-17. ב-4 במאי 2006, לאחר הבחירות לכנסת ה-17, נבחרה איציק ליושבת ראש הכנסת, והייתה לאישה הראשונה והיחידה לכהן בתפקיד. היא נבחרה פה אחד בהצבעה גלויה שתמכו בה 107 חברי הכנסת. בעקבות חקירת חשדות לעבירות מין של נשיא המדינה משה קצב הכריזה ועדת הכנסת, לבקשת הנשיא קצב, על נבצרותו מלשמש כנשיא בזמן השבעת נשיאת בית המשפט העליון, דורית ביניש. על פי החוק, יו"ר הכנסת משמש כממלא מקום נשיא המדינה, כך שבתקופת נבצרותו של קצב (שארכה 16 שעות ב-14 בספטמבר 2006) הייתה איציק נשיאה בפועל והשביעה את ביניש לנשיאת בית המשפט העליון. ב-25 בינואר 2007 אישרה ועדת הכנסת את הודעת הנשיא משה קצב, כי נבצר ממנו למלא את תפקידו כנשיא המדינה, לנוכח הודעת היועץ המשפטי לממשלה, מני מזוז, כי יש כוונה להגיש כנגדו כתב אישום. בעקבות הודעה זו החלה איציק לכהן בתור נשיאה בפועל של מדינת ישראל, ובזמן זה חננה אסירים, השביעה שגרירים והשתתפה בטקסים ואירועים בארץ ובעולם. ב-1 ביולי 2007 נכנסה לתוקף התפטרותו של משה קצב, ואיציק כיהנה כנשיאה בפועל עד השבעתו של שמעון פרס לנשיא ב-15 ביולי. בבחירות המקדימות של מפלגת קדימה בדצמבר 2008, הגיעה למקום הראשון מבין המתמודדים. בהתאם לכך, מוקמה במקום השלישי ברשימת המפלגה לכנסת ה-18, לאחר יושבת הראש, ציפי לבני ושאול מופז, אשר שוריין למקום השני ברשימה, עם כישלונו בהתמודדות על ראשות התנועה ומונתה ליו"ר מטה הבחירות (הרשימה השיגה 28 מנדטים בבחירות). בכנסת ה-18 שימשה יושבת ראש סיעת קדימה, והייתה חברה בוועדת הכנסת. במהלך כהונתה בכנסת ה-18 יזמה את חקיקתם של מספר חוקים, בהם חוקים אלה: ב-5 בדצמבר 2012 הודיעה כי היא פורשת מן החיים הפוליטיים ולא תתמודד בבחירות לכנסת ה-19. לאחר הפרישה מהחיים הפוליטיים, מונתה ב-10 באפריל 2013 לחברת דירקטוריון ברשת רמי לוי שיווק השקמה. לדירקטורית בתאגיד המיחזור אל"ה ושמשה כחברת ועדת ההיגוי העליונה של מיזם "סיסמה לכל תלמיד", שמטרתו צמצום הפערים החברתיים בחינוך על ידי קידום, פיתוח והטמעת תחום התקשוב במוסדות חינוך בפריפריה. ב-2014, התמודדה איציק בבחירות לנשיאות, אך לא העפילה לסיבוב השני. מ-2016, מכהנת איציק כיושבת ראש חבר הנאמנים של "הדסה אינטרנשיונל – ישראל", הגוף העוסק בפיתוח משאבים, כולל גיוס תרומות וייעוץ עסקי עבור מרכז רפואי הדסה. בנובמבר 2020, דווח כי איציק מתמודדת לתפקיד יושב ראש מרכז רפואי הדסה. בינואר 2019, הצטרפה איציק לדירקטוריון חברת כנפיים אחזקות בעלת השליטה באל על. במרץ 2021, מונתה ליו"ר הדירקטוריון של המרכז הרפואי הדסה. איציק נשואה ואם לשלושה. לקריאה נוספת קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/מרדכי_נורוק] \| [TOKENS: 5594]
תוכן עניינים מרדכי נורוק הרב מרדכי (מקס) נוּרוֹק (כ' בחשוון ה'תר"ם 7 בנובמבר 1879 – י"א בחשוון תשכ"ג 8 בנובמבר 1962) היה חבר הכנסת מטעם תנועת המזרחי, ושר הדואר הראשון בממשלת ישראל. קודם לכן היה פעיל ציוני בלטביה וחבר הפרלמנט הלטבי, הסאימה. בשנת 1926 עמד נורוק בראש גוש המיעוטים אשר הצליח להפיל את ממשלת לטביה. בעקבות זאת הוטלה עליו מלאכת הרכבת הממשלה החדשה, ולמעשה האפשרות לעמוד בעצמו בראשותה. נורוק עמד במשימה אך סירב לעמוד בראשות הממשלה. אף שנמנע מלהצטרף לקבינט, העיתונות הלטבית המשיכה לכנות את הממשלה החדשה בשם "ממשלת נורוק". בפועל, הממשלה הונהגה על ידי המפלגה הסוציאל-דמוקרטית ועמד בראשה מרגיירס סקוייניקס – שנרצח כעבור שנים בידי שלטונו של סטלין. ביוגרפיה נורוק נולד בעיר טוקום (Tukums) שבקורלנד (אז באימפריה הרוסית, כיום בלטביה) לרב צבי הירש נורוק ולצירה דבורה, בתו של הרב אליעזר ליפמן ליכטנשטיין, רבה של טוקום. אביו שימש רב הערים אייזפוטה ומיטאו, ונורוק למד תחתיו לימודים תורניים והוסמך לרבנות. במיטאו סיים את לימודיו התיכוניים ולאחר מכן למד באוניברסיטאות בסנקט פטרבורג, בגרמניה ובשווייץ. הוא ומשפחתו עברו לעיר מיטאו, לאחר שאביו נהיה רב העיר. בשנות חייו האחרונות של אביו סייע לו בהנהגת הקהילה היהודית, ולאחר פטירת האב בשנת 1913 נבחר כממלא מקומו. בין פעולותיו בשנים אלו הביא לאישור מגורי יהודים בפלך קורלנד שבו חי ופעל, מחוץ לתחום המושב, וייסד בו רשת קופות מלווה ובתי ספר דתיים. בשנת 1902 השתתף בוועידת ציוני רוסיה במינסק, ולאחריה יצר לראשונה קשר עם בנימין זאב הרצל. בשנה שלאחר מכן השתתף כציר בקונגרס הציוני השישי מטעם תנועת "המזרחי". במלחמת העולם הראשונה הקים בקורלנד בית חולים לפצועי המלחמה. ב-1915 עבר לסנקט פטרבורג, ומשם למוסקבה, שם פעל למען היהודים שגורשו מאזור החזית. בתקופת מהפכת 1917 המשיך לפעול למען יהדות רוסיה, והיה בין מייסדי מפלגת מסורת וחרות לליכוד היהודים הדתיים וגיוסם לפעולות התנועה הציונית. לאחר האיסור על עיסוק בשאלת הלאומיות היהודית חזר לקדם מפעלי עזרה וסיוע ופעל במסגרת הוועד הציבורי היהודי והג'וינט. נבחר לנשיאות הארגון המשותף למוסדות הסעד היהודיים ברוסיה. כן עסק נורוק בהחזרת פליטים לעיירותיהם, ובמיוחד להחזרת יהודי קורלנד למקומם. בתקופה זו נבחר אחיו אהרון דב נורוק, רב העיר ליבאו, לאספה המכוננת של לטביה. ב-1921 עבר לריגה, בירת לטביה והיה מראשי יהדות לטביה. בשנת 1922 נבחר לסאימה הלטבי, ועמד בראש גוש המיעוטים, אשר בשנת 1926 הביא להפלת הממשלה. נשיא לטביה הטיל עליו את הקמת הממשלה החדשה, מה שעורר במדינה סערה רבתי. נורוק הקים ממשלה ללא תפקיד מיניסטריאלי לו עצמו. לאחר הקמת ממשלה חלופית עמד נורוק בראש גוף ביצועי משותף לסוציאל-דמוקרטים ולפרוגרסיבים, ותיקן תקנות הנוגעות לחינוך לאומי ורכישת קרקעות בידי מיעוטים. בשנים אלו השתתף בוועידות הארגון הבין-פרלמנטרי, ומשנת 1921 חזר והשתתף בקונגרסים ציוניים. בשנת 1923 נבחר לחבר הוועד הפועל הציוני ובמהלך השנים היה יו"ר הוועדה המדינית בוועד ומשנת 1929 חבר הוועד המנהל של הסוכנות היהודית. במספר קונגרסים ניתנה בידו זכות נשיאת נאום הסיכום. מלבד זאת היה נורוק פעיל במוסדות "המזרחי" וחבר מרכז התנועה העולמי. כמו כן, היה חבר אגודת הרבנים בפולין ונאם בכינוסה בשנת 1922. בשנת 1921 ייסד בלטביה ובאסטוניה את קרן היסוד, ושימש נשיא הקרן בלטביה וחבר הדירקטוריון העולמי. בפעילויותיו השונות קידם את יסודות התנועה הציונית ובשנת 1932 ביקר בארץ ישראל במסגרת משלחת של ממשלת לטביה. היה חבר נשיאות הקונגרס היהודי העולמי. עם פרוץ מלחמת העולם השנייה עסק בפעולות למען פליטים, וקידם פעולות הצלה והעברת יהודי לטביה לשוודיה. עיכובים שונים הביאו להרג רבים מיהודי לטביה, ובהם אשתו דבורה (לבית אולשוונגר) ושני ילדיהם אליהו וצבי-ברוך. במאי 1941 נורוק נאסר על ידי הסובייטים. נורוק הוגלה לסיביר, ונכלא למשך 14 חודשים (1941–1942). בתום המלחמה עבר לפולין וממנה לשוודיה ולנורווגיה. ב-1947 עלה לארץ ישראל והיה לחבר בוועד הציוני העליון לשעת חירום. לקראת הבחירות לכנסת הראשונה עסק בהקמת החזית הדתית המאוחדת ונבחר מטעמה כחבר הכנסת. החל מהבחירות הבאות נבחר מטעם המזרחי, וכיהן כחבר כנסת עד לפטירתו במהלך הכנסת החמישית, ב-1962. היה מועמד לנשיאות המדינה בבחירות הנשיאותיות ב-1952. בכנסת השנייה היו למזרחי רק שני מנדטים ולמרות זאת מונה דוד צבי פנקס לשר, "בגלל כשרונותיו האישיים" כדברי גורמים במפא"י, ובגלל תמיכה של הפועל המזרחי שהיו לה רק שני שרים עבור 8 חברי כנסת. לאחר פטירתו של פנקס לא מונה שר אחר מהמזרחי במקומו ופועלי אגודת ישראל, שגם לה היו שני מנדטים, דרשה את תפקיד השר לעצמה. אולם לאחר פרישת אגודת ישראל ופועלי אגודת ישראל מהקואליציה, מונה נורוק לשר הדואר, בתחילת נובמבר 1952. עם הקמת ממשלת ישראל הרביעית בה היו חברים גם אנשי הציונים הכלליים, לא ראתה מפא"י צורך לרצות את המזרחי בתפקיד שר, והציע לה רק תפקיד של סגן שר. נורוק סירב להתמנות לסגן שר ובמקומו התמנה לתפקיד חברו לסיעה, ישראל שלמה בן-מאיר. בעקבות זאת, היה בן מאיר לאיש החזק בסיעה ובבחירות לכנסת השלישית הוצב נורוק במקום העשירי של הרשימה המשותפת למזרחי ולפועל המזרחי, ובכנסת זו היה זקן חברי הכנסת. בבחירות לכנסות הרביעית והחמישית נדחק נורוק למקום ה-12 ברשימה. ב-1954 היה נורוק אמור להיות אחד מעדי התביעה הראשיים במשפטו של סגן שר הסעד מטעם המזרחי ישראל שלמה בן-מאיר, בהאשמות שחיתות. משפט זה עמד להתקיים בעקבות גילויים שארגון שורת המתנדבים חשף כנגד סגן השר. השופט החוקר קבע באותו עניין כי: "צר לי להעיר כי ד"ר נורוק לא עשה כמיטב יכולתו לעזור לבית המשפט בחקירה זו. נראה לי כי על ידי מאמץ קל היה מצליח ד"ר נורוק להעלות בזכרונו ולמסור פרטים בעלי חשיבות בקשר להאשמות המפורטות בכתב האישום." בעקבות זאת נמנעה הגשת כתב האישום כנגד סגן השר. בעקבות הפרשה בקשו בהפועל המזרחי שהמזרחי תרענן את השורות של נציגיה לכנסת, אולם במזרחי סירבו. מתוקף היותו זקן חברי הכנסת, קיבל מידי הנשיא יצחק בן צבי את ניהול ישיבת הפתיחה של הכנסת השלישית. בפעילותו בכנסת היה יו"ר ועדה לפניות הציבור ויו"ר ועדת משנה להעלאת ארונו של הרצל. נשלח כנציג במשלחת הראשונה מטעם הכנסת לארגון הבין-פרלמנטרי. את נאומיו בכנסת נהג לפתוח באומרו: בית גבוה (שלא כמקובל: כנסת נכבדה). נורוק היה פעיל בחקיקה שנגעה לשואה ולתוצאותיה. בין היתר היה מיוזמי "חוק לעשיית דין בנאצים ובעוזריהם 1950" ו"חוק יום הזיכרון לשואה ולגבורה 1959". נורוק כתב מאמרים רבים בעברית, ביידיש, בגרמנית וברוסית. מרדכי נורוק נפטר בתל אביב ונטמן בבית הקברות סנהדריה בירושלים. על שמו נקראו רחובות בירושלים, בנתניה, בבני ברק, בהרצליה, באשקלון ובראשון לציון. כתביו לקריאה נוספת קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/גד_יעקבי] \| [TOKENS: 5080]
תוכן עניינים גד יעקבי גד יעקבי (18 בינואר 1935 – 27 באוגוסט 2007) היה חבר הכנסת, שר בממשלות ישראל ושגריר ישראל באו"ם. בנוסף לפעילותו הציבורית היה משורר פורה, ופרסם ספרי עיון וספרי ילדים. ביוגרפיה יעקבי נולד בכפר ויתקין לאלכסנדר ושרה יעקבי, משפחה בעלת רקע חקלאי. סיים את בית הספר התיכון בכפר ויתקין בשנת 1953. שירת בצה"ל בחיל המודיעין, ולאחר שהשתחרר למד באוניברסיטת תל אביב. בשנת 1958 סיים את לימודי התואר ראשון במדע המדינה ובשנת 1960 סיים את לימודי המוסמך בכלכלה, כאשר את חלק מלימודיו עשה באוניברסיטת הרווארד. כנער החל יעקבי בפעילות ציבורית במסגרת תנועת העבודה. בתחילה היה פעיל בתנועת הנוער העובד והלומד, ועם סיום לימודיו החל בפעילות מפלגתית שקירבה אותו אל משה דיין, ממנהיגי מפא"י. בשנת 1959 שימש מנהל לשכתו ודובר משרדו של דיין, לאחר שזה נבחר לתפקיד שר החקלאות בכנסת הרביעית. הוא שימש עוזר שר החקלאות בשנים 1960–1961 וראש המרכז לתכנון ופיתוח כלכלי במשרד החקלאות בשנים 1961–1966, בתמיכת פטרונו הפוליטי דיין. המשבר הפוליטי שהביא להקמת רפ"י הביא לפרישת משה דיין ממשרד החקלאות בשלהי שנת 1964, ובשנת 1966 פרש גם יעקבי מתפקידיו במשרד והצטרף לרפ"י. הוא שימש נציגה של המפלגה החדשה בוועדה המרכזת של ההסתדרות ובהנהלת חברת העובדים. כשהתמזגה רפ"י לתוך מפלגת העבודה, התמנה לחבר לשכת המפלגה, ובבחירות לכנסת השביעית בשנת 1969 נבחר לראשונה לחבר הכנסת. בבחירות אלו בחרה כל אחת מהמפלגות שהרכיבו את המערך את מועמדיה בנפרד, ואנשי רפ"י בחרו את מועמדיהם בבחירות חשאיות שנערכו בין חברי "לשכת המפלגה". בבחירות אלו זכה יעקבי במקום השני, המבטיח משרת שר על פי ההסכמים שבין מפלגות המערך, כשהוא מקדים את שמעון פרס הוותיק. למרות זאת, ויתר יעקבי על מקומו לטובת פרס ושימש חבר הכנסת בלבד, כשהוצב במקום ה-31 ברשימת המערך, בעוד שפרס מונה במקומו לשר. באוקטובר 1970 מונה לסגן שר התחבורה. בשנת 1972 מונה יעקבי לסגן שר התחבורה, וב-1974 התמנה לשר התחבורה בממשלת רבין הראשונה. בשנה זו בחר טיים מגזין את "50 מנהיגי העתיד" ממדינות שונות בעולם, וציין את יעקבי ואת שולמית אלוני כמנהיגי העתיד של ישראל. בשנת 1977 הוצג יעקבי על ידי שמעון פרס כמועמד המערך לתפקיד שר האוצר והוצב במקום ה-12 ברשימה. אולם לאחר הבחירות לכנסת התשיעית ותבוסת המערך בבחירות הסתפק בתפקיד יושב ראש ועדת הכלכלה. בממשלת האחדות הלאומית שהוקמה ב-1984, לאחר שהוצב במקום השמיני ברשימת המערך, מונה לשר הכלכלה והתכנון. משרד הכלכלה והתכנון היה קיים בין 1981 ל-1995, ועסק בתיאום כלכלי בין משרדי הממשלה. על אף שרבים סברו שהמדובר במשרה חסרת תוכן שנוצרה מטעמים קואליציוניים, ניסה יעקבי לקבל למשרדו סמכויות כלכליות רבות ככל האפשר. בתקופה זו נטל חלק בעיצוב מדיניותה הכלכלית של ישראל, וביישום תוכנית הייצוב הכלכלית של 1985, שהביאה לישראל יציבות כלכלית לאחר האינפלציה הגבוהה בשנים שקדמו ל-1985. יעקבי ניסה להכניס תוכן כלכלי למשרת שר זו, תוך כדי שהוא מנסה לשמור על מעמדו כאישיות הכלכלית הבכירה במפלגת העבודה גם בתקופה בה שימש שמעון פרס שר האוצר. ביוני 1987 לאחר פרישת אמנון רובינשטיין מהממשלה, שימש יעקבי גם שר התקשורת, תפקיד בו שירת גם במהלך ממשלת ישראל העשרים ושלוש עד נפילתה בעקבות "התרגיל המסריח". בתקופת כהונתו כשר נראה יעקבי כאיש המרכז-שמאל, והשמיע דעות בעד "שלום תוך ויתור על רוב שטחי יהודה שומרון וחבל עזה המאוכלסים בצפיפות על ידי ערבים". יעקבי ראה עצמו כאיש "דור הביניים" במפלגת העבודה, אליו היו שייכים אישים כמשה שחל, יעקב צור ושושנה ארבלי-אלמוזלינו. עם תחילת שנות ה-90 נראה לרבים כי היריבות רבת השנים בין שמעון פרס ויצחק רבין הביאה את המפלגה להפסדים במערכות הבחירות, וכי הגיע תורו של דור זה לצעוד לקדמת הבמה ולקבל את ההנהגה. בשנת 1992 העמיד עצמו יעקבי כמועמד לראשות מפלגת העבודה, בבחירות בהן התמודדו שמעון פרס, יצחק רבין, אורה נמיר וישראל קיסר. בצעד מפתיע, הודיע יעקבי לבסוף כי ויתר על התמודדותו, וביקש מתומכיו לבחור ביצחק רבין. לאחר מכן, ולאור תוצאות הבחירות המקדימות, טען יעקבי כי צעד זה הוא שהביא לבחירתו של רבין, שנבחר בסיבוב הראשון במספר קולות גבוה אך במעט מ-40%, ולולא תמיכת אנשי יעקבי, לא היה מצליח להגיע ל-40%, ולפי חוקת המפלגה היה צורך בסיבוב שני, שיש סיכויים רבים לכך שבו היה מנצח פרס. יעקבי נכשל בבחירות המקדימות לתפקיד חבר הכנסת במפלגת העבודה כשזכה במקום ה-45, ולא נבחר לכנסת ה-13. רבין מינה אותו לשגריר ישראל באו"ם - תפקיד אותו מילא בין ספטמבר 1992 ליוני 1996, עת נבחר בנימין נתניהו לראשות הממשלה. מששב לישראל מונה ליו”ר חברת החשמל, תפקיד שמילא עד דצמבר 1998 וליו”ר רשות הנמלים והרכבות מאוקטובר 2000 עד אוקטובר 2003. כיהן כמרצה במרכז הבינתחומי הרצליה ובהנהלת מספר עמותות ציבוריות, בהן מרכז רבין. קיבל את פרס בן-גוריון בשנת 2004. לאחר פרישתו מהחיים הפוליטיים המשיך להשמיע דעותיו בענייני השעה. במהלך כל הקריירה הפוליטית שלו פרסם יעקבי ספרים רבים – ספרי עיון, אוטוביוגרפיות, ספרי ילדים וספרי שירה. שיריו של יעקבי זכו לתשבחות ופורסמו בהוצאות ספרים מכובדות. המשוררת חלי אברהם איתן כתבה על ספר שיריו "עד בוא היום" כי "המשורר מיטיב לחדור, מזווית העין של האמן המאמין בקיום המטאפיזי, לנבכי נפשו שלו ולנבכי נפש האדם באשר הוא, לדלות ממרחבי המקום והזמן את חומריה, ונע בין תודעת הסוף והאינסוף בעולמנו". המשוררת אורנה רב-הון כתבה כי "שירתו של גד יעקובי היא שירה קסומה ומלאת מעמקים, וכל הקורא בה ידלה ממנה ניצוצות נסתרים, ניצוצות של חמלה ואהבת האדם". בצעירותו נישא יעקבי לטובה, ולזוג נולדו שלושה ילדים. בהם, יואב, שהתפרסם כמתופף של להקת הפאנק Mr. Error Sound System (שבהמשך קיצרה את שמה ל-M.E.S.S). בשנת 1974 התגרש ונישא לנלה, דיילת באל על ואלמנתו של לוחם ממלחמת ההתשה. נולדה להם בת ב-1982. מאוחר יותר התגרש מנלה ונישא בשלישית לאסתר בכרך יעקבי, אדריכלית פנים ונשיאת אגודת "סיסטיק פיברוזיס ישראל". יעקבי יצא לטורונטו שבקנדה לצורך ניתוח בלבו ונפטר בבית חולים שם ב-27 באוגוסט 2007, י"ג באלול ה'תשס"ז בגיל 72. הוא נקבר למחרת בבית העלמין קריית שאול. ספריו ספרי עיון: לקריאה נוספת קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים
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Contents Chuck Negron Charles Negron II (June 8, 1942 – February 2, 2026) was an American singer-songwriter. He was best known as a founding member and lead vocalist of the rock band Three Dog Night. Early life Chuck Negron was born in Manhattan, New York City on June 8, 1942, to Charles Negron, a Puerto Rican nightclub singer, and Elizabeth Rooke. When Negron was five years old, his parents divorced. Negron and his twin sister, Nancy, were raised by their mother, who placed them in a daycare facility while she supported her young children. Though Negron referred to this facility as an orphanage, it was a mansion in the Bronx that contained a swimming pool, gymnasium, arts and crafts, and more. The facility did house some long-term residents, though this did not include Negron and his sister. He grew up in the Bronx, where he sang in local doo-wop groups and played basketball both in schoolyard pickup games and at William Howard Taft High School. He was recruited to play basketball at Allan Hancock College, a small community college in Santa Maria, California and played later at California State University, Los Angeles. Career In 1967, singer Danny Hutton invited Negron to join him and Cory Wells to found the band Three Dog Night. The group became one of the most successful bands of the late 1960s and early 1970s, selling approximately 60 million records and earning gold records for singles that featured Negron as lead vocalist, including "One", "Easy to Be Hard", "Joy to the World", "An Old Fashioned Love Song", "Pieces of April", "The Show Must Go On", and "Til the World Ends". Negron developed a serious heroin addiction, which began in the early 1970s. In July 1975, the British music magazine NME reported that Negron had been arrested for cocaine possession in Kentucky. Three Dog Night disbanded in 1976. After many attempts at rehabilitation, Negron overcame his addiction in September 1991 and embarked on a solo career that continued until the COVID-19 pandemic, recording the albums: He wrote his autobiography, Three Dog Nightmare (1999), in which he described his life as a high school athlete and a member of a successful rock band. He wrote about his descent into drug abuse and attributes his recovery from heroin addiction to his turning to God in desperation after dropping out from more than thirty drug treatment facilities. A revised edition with several new chapters was released in 2008 and an updated version was released in 2018. Personal life and death In 2006, Negron was featured in an episode of the A&E documentary television series Intervention about his son, Chuckie, and grandson, Noah. Negron was married four times. He married Paula Louise Ann Goetten in 1970 and they divorced in 1973. Together they had a daughter, Shaunti Negron-Levick. In 1976, he married Julia Densmore, ex-wife of The Doors drummer John Densmore. They were married for twelve years and divorced in 1988. Together they had a son, Charles "Chuckie" Negron III, and Julia also has a son, Berry Duane Oakley Jr., from a previous relationship with bassist Berry Oakley. In 1993, Negron married Robin Silna. They had a daughter, Charlotte Rose, and divorced in 2001. He married his manager, Ami Albea, on May 9, 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the wedding took place on the balcony of their home, with his two youngest daughters and the minister on the street below. Negron had a daughter, Annabelle Negron, with actress Kate Vernon. Actor and comedian Taylor Negron was Negron's cousin. Negron died of heart failure and COPD at his home in Studio City, Los Angeles, on February 2, 2026, at the age of 83. Solo discography References Sources External links
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Contents Shirley Raines (non-profit founder) Shirley Raines (December 29, 1967 – January 27, 2026) was an American community activist. She was the founder of the non-profit Beauty 2 the Streetz, which provides hair and makeup services, food, clothing, hygiene and safety items to thousands of homeless people in Skid Row, Los Angeles. In 2021, she was chosen to be the CNN Hero of the Year. She was also chosen to be the NAACP Image Award Winner for Outstanding Social Media Personality in 2025. Early life and career Raines grew up in Compton, California. In 1990, her two-year-old son, Demetrius, died of accidental poisoning while staying with Raines's grandmother. For decades following this, Raines struggled with financial insecurity, grief, and loss. Following this loss, she found that self-care and beautification helped her face her grief. In 2017, when on a feeding mission on Skid Row with her church group, Raines found a "purpose for her pain," seeing a connection with the experience of the Skid Row community members. Her personal style garnered interest from the homeless residents she was serving. At the time, she was working as a medical biller. Raines and her children regularly returned to Skid Row, helping to hand out food, drinks, hygiene kits and beauty products that Raines funded. Raines returned alone to color people's hair and do their makeup. When Raines began livestreaming the events and posting pictures to her the Beauty 2 the Streetz Instagram and TikTok pages, her efforts gained popularity, and Raines was contacted by licensed hair stylists, barbers, makeup artists and makeup companies who wanted to join her work.[citation needed] In 2019, Raines registered Beauty 2 the Streetz as a 501(c)(3) organization. At the time, she made about 400 meals a week in her apartment in Long Beach each week, which she then delivered to Skid Row. When the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020, Raines shifted the priorities of Beauty 2 the Streetz to adapt to the changing needs, working with health services to turn their outpost into a COVID testing and vaccination site and providing PPE and education along with the food and other supplies Beauty 2 the Streetz normally provided. Raines also advocated for the homeless community, who had minimal access to important hygiene resources. In 2023, Raines expanded outreach services to San Diego. By January 2026, Raines' TikTok page, which covered some of her community activism, had five million followers. Death Raines died in Las Vegas on January 27, 2026, at the age of 58. On February 18th, Raines's cause of death was revealed to be hypertensive heart disease. A spokesperson for the Clark County Coroner's Office confirmed the cause of death and added that the manner of death was natural. Awards and recognition In 2021, she was chosen to be the CNN Hero of the Year, also receiving a $100,000 grant for her work. In 2022, Raines was one of 17 activists who shared the stage with Lizzo upon accepting the People's Choice Awards for "The People's Champion." In 2025, she was nominated for the 56th NAACP Image Awards in the category Outstanding Social Media Personality of the Year. Similarly, TIME named Raines as one of their TIME100 Creators for 2025. References External links
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/אהרן_ידלין] \| [TOKENS: 6005]
תוכן עניינים אהרן ידלין אהרן ידלין (17 באפריל 1926 – 12 באוגוסט 2022) היה פעיל ציבור, חבר הכנסת ושר החינוך בממשלת רבין הראשונה (1974–1977). חתן פרס ישראל לשנת 2010 (ה'תש"ע). ביוגרפיה ידלין נולד בתל אביב, בן לציפורה (לבית פולק) וחיים ידלין, שעלו מבסרביה בתחילת העלייה השלישית. גדל בבן שמן ורחובות ולמד בבית הספר היסודי "גאולה" ובבית הספר הריאלי בחיפה. היה פעיל בתנועת הצופים ושימש כרכז ארצי של התנועה. ידלין אהב מילדותו את הטבע, מה שהשפיע עליו לדבריו להפוך לחקלאי בקיבוץ. הוא הצטרף תחילה לגרעין של קיבוץ בארי ואף השתתף בעלייה של הקיבוץ לנקודת הקבע שלו בנגב, במסגרת עליית 11 הנקודות בנגב ב-1946. על רקע המחלוקת בקיבוץ המאוחד עבר לקיבוץ חצרים בנגב בו היה חבר עד לפטירתו. במלחמת העצמאות הצטרף לפלמ"ח. בשנים 1950–1952 היה חבר הוועד הפועל של ההסתדרות. למד באוניברסיטה העברית היסטוריה כללית, כלכלה וסוציולוגיה. היה ממקימי מכללת בית ברל, לימד שם סוציולוגיה והיה מנהלה-בפועל בשנים 1955–1957. ידלין הוצב במקום ה־48 ברשימת מפא"י לכנסת הרביעית. בחירות אלו זכתה מפא"י ב־47 מנדטים וידלין נכנס לכנסת חצי שנה לאחר הבחירות לאחר שאהרן בקר התפטר מהכנסת. באותה כנסת היה חבר ועדת החינוך וועדת הכלכלה. באוקטובר 1960 נבחר להנהלת בית ברל. לאחר הבחירות לכנסת החמישית שהיו בסימן ירידה בכוחה של מפא"י כתב ידלין מאמר שהזהיר מפני סכנת עליית הפאשיזם בישראל, בו הוא קרא למעבר לבחירות אזוריות ופעולה משותפת של תנועות הפועלים. ידלין ראה במשרד החינוך משרד שמשפיע השפעה חשובה על דמות החברה והמדינה, המעצב את דמותו של הדור הצעיר. על כן הוא אמר: "תנועת העבודה הרוצה לגדל דור צעיר לאור הערכים החברתיים שלה, אינה יכולה לוותר על מערכת החינוך", ושלל את האפשרות שמשרד החינוך יימסר לשר מגח"ל. הוא גם התנגד למינוי סגן שר מטעם מפד"ל במשרד החינוך. לקראת סוף כהונתה של הכנסת החמישית במאי 1964 נכנס שוב לכנסת. באותה תקופה הוא היה מועמד להיות מזכיר איחוד הקבוצות והקיבוצים, אולם לבקשת שר החינוך זלמן ארן, הוא נתמנה לסגן שר החינוך. הוא המשיך לכהן בכנסת ובתפקיד סגן שר החינוך בכל ימי כהונתו של זלמן ארן וחלק מכהונתו של יגאל אלון כשר חינוך. ב־21 ביוני 1972 נבחר פה אחד למזכ"ל מפלגת העבודה והתפטר מתפקיד סגן שר החינוך. הוא כיהן בתפקיד עד אוגוסט 1974. שימש גם כיו"ר הוועדה הציבורית לענייני תנועות נוער בישראל. ידלין המשיך לכהן בכנסת עד שנת 1979 ובממשלת ישראל השבע עשרה שהרכיב יצחק רבין היה לשר החינוך. על אף הבעיות הכלכליות של ישראל באותה עת, לא נפגע בתקופתו משרד החינוך מבחינה כספית והועמדו לרשותו תקציבים נדיבים. כשר חינוך הנחיל יום לימודים ארוך בבתי ספר בעיירות פיתוח ואזורי מצוקה, כולל מפעל הזנה ממלכתי ללא תשלום, ותוכנן להחיל את יום הלימודים הארוך בכל הארץ, דבר שלא התממש אחריו. לדבריו, "שנה אחרי מלחמת יום הכיפורים גיבשתי תקציב חינוך דיפרנציאלי שבו הוסטו משאבים רבים לעיירות הפיתוח. השארתי אחרי מערכת עם מפעל הזנה ממלכתי, תמכנו בתנועות הנוער וייסדנו יום לימודים ארוך. ממשלת בגין שלחה את הילדים הביתה ב־12:00, קיצצה, ולמעשה חיסלה את הכל". לאחר הבחירות לכנסת התשיעית ב־1977, שימש כיו"ר ועדת החינוך, התרבות והספורט של הכנסת, עד לפרישתו מהכנסת בתחילת 1979. כבר באמצע 1978 לחצו בקיבוץ חצרים על ידלין לשוב לעבודה מלאה בקיבוץ, לאור הזמן הרב בו היה בפעילות ציבורית מחוץ לקיבוץ. ידלין התנגד לפרסומות בטלוויזיה. על אף התעסקותו הרבה בענייני חינוך, עסק ידלין גם בנושאי ביטחון, עליהם הרצה בפורומים מפלגתיים וציבוריים וכתב מאמרים בעיתונות. הוא גם היה חבר בוועדת החוץ והביטחון בכנסת השביעית ובכנסת השמינית. במהלך כהונת הכנסת השישית היה גם חבר בוועדת חוקה חוק ומשפט של הכנסת. לאחר פרישתו מהכנסת שימש ידלין בתפקידים ציבוריים רבים, בהם מזכיר התק"ם (1985–1989), יו"ר תנועת העבודה הציונית העולמית (1992–2002), יו"ר מוסד ביאליק, יו"ר יד טבנקין, יו"ר בית יציב, סגן יושב-ראש הוועד המנהל של אוניברסיטת בן-גוריון בבאר שבע ויו"ר הנאמנים של קרן ראש הממשלה לסופרים. ביום העצמאות 2008 שימש כיושב-ראש חבר השופטים של חידון התנ"ך העולמי לנוער יהודי. בבחירות לכנסת ה-18 הוצב במקום ה-115 הסמלי ברשימת העבודה לכנסת ובבחירות לכנסת ה-19 במקום ה-118, ברשימת המפלגה לקראת בחירות לכנסת העשרים וארבע הוצב כמועמד אחרון במקום ה-71. ידלין הרבה להיפגש עם בני נוער, בעיקר הנוער הקיבוצי, וכן הרצה בפורומים שונים, בעיקר בנושאי חינוך, סוציאליזם ושאיפותיו לצדק ושוויון חברתי. פרסים הוקרה והנצחה חיים אישיים ידלין היה נשוי לעדה, בתו של דוד הכהן, אשר נפטרה בשנת 1998. לאהרן ועדה שלושה בנים, שאחד מהם הוא אלוף (מיל.) עמוס ידלין, שהיה ראש אמ"ן בצה"ל. בשנת 2007 נישא אהרן בשנית - לעדינה הנדלר לינדבורג. גיסו היה עוזי נרקיס, ובן דודו היה אשר ידלין. נכדתו, עורכת הדין רותם ידלין, נבחרה לראשות מועצה אזורית גזר בבחירות לרשויות המקומיות בשנת 2018. ידלין נפטר ב-12 באוגוסט 2022 בגיל 96, ונטמן בבית העלמין בקיבוץ חצרים, שבו התגורר. משנתו הרעיונית על חשיבות החינוך: "תנועת העבודה הרוצה לגדל דור צעיר לאור הערכים החברתיים שלה, אינה יכולה לוותר על מערכת החינוך" (דבר, 13 בנובמבר 1969). מפעל ההזנה ויום לימודים ארוך: "שנה אחרי מלחמת יום הכיפורים גיבשתי תקציב חינוך דיפרנציאלי שבו הוסטו משאבים רבים לעיירות הפיתוח. השארתי אחרי מערכת עם מפעל הזנה ממלכתי, תמכנו בתנועות הנוער וייסדנו יום לימודים ארוך. ממשלת בגין שלחה את הילדים הביתה ב–12:00, קיצצה, ולמעשה חיסלה את הכל" (הארץ, 2018). מדינת ישראל בשנת ה-70 שלה: "מדינת ישראל בשנת ה-70 עם כל החולשות שקיימות, היא בכל זאת מדינה חזקה - כלכלית, אקדמית מדעית - ולכן יש לי נחת" (ערוץ 7, 2018). חתירה לשלום עם הפלסטינים: "יש לנו פרטנר בצד השני. צריך לבנות אותו. השלום עם מצרים וירדן מחזיק מעמד, יש לנו קשר טוב עם סעודיה, וגם הרשות הפלסטינית משתפת איתנו פעולה באופן הדוק ברמה הביטחונית. אני חושב שצריך להיות יצירתיים. את עזה צריך להפוך לסוג של מדינה, עם כל המגבלות הביטחוניות. מדינה שלא קשורה לפתרון ביהודה ושומרון. אני לא פוסל שתי ישויות פלסטיניות כאלו. הייתי מחבר את עזה לאזור שייתנו להם בסיני כדי לפזר את האוכלוסייה, דואג שייתנו להם סיוע כלכלי בינלאומי, ומחסל סופית את ההתגרות הביטחונית" (ישראל היום, 2019) הקמת המדינה וחלוקת הארץ: "אמרתי לו [בן-גוריון, ע.ר.] שחייבים להקים מדינה בחלק של הארץ, שרובה יהיו יהודים" (שם). סוציאליזים: "הייתי בן־גוריוניסט. לא קיבלתי את הקומוניזם, והאמנתי כבר אז בסוציאל־דמוקרטיה" (שם). על בן-גוריון: "בן-גוריון, המייסד. הייתה לו חוכמת העיתוי בהקמת המדינה. הוא היה טוב מאוד, דאג למדינה, נתן גיבוי" (שם). דברים על מורשת ברל כצנלסון: ״זכות גדולה כבחור צעיר והעומד מול ארבעת הגדולים בן-גוריון, יערי, טבנקין וברל כצנלסון .. ממנו למדתי שתנועת העבודה בונה (קונסטרוקטיבית) ולא רק רעיון (אידאה), פשרה לניצול הזדמנות למדינה יהודית על חלק מארץ ישראל, סימון ב.גוריון כמנהיג, אין מונופול על המורשת היהודית ... ברל ראה במורשת היהודית בסיס רעיוני במובן - ואהבת לרעך כמוך וצדק צדק תרדוף ... וגם נלחם על אחדות בכל מובן ומקום ורבות בזכותו נוצרו המוסדות המאוחדים שהובילו למדינה״ (כנס "ירח 2020 לזכרו של ברל כצנלסון"). קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים שרים נוספים במשרד החינוך: חיים ביטון
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Floyd_Vivino] \| [TOKENS: 2618]
Contents Floyd Vivino Florio "Floyd" Vivino (October 19, 1951 – January 22, 2026), known professionally as Uncle Floyd, was an American television, film and stage performer primarily known for his comedy/variety television show The Uncle Floyd Show (1974–1998). Vivino had a cult following and a 13,000-member fan club. David Bowie and John Lennon considered themselves fans. He also ran as a write-in candidate for Governor of New Jersey in 2009 and 2017. Early life Vivino was born in Paterson, New Jersey, to Jerry Vivino, Sr., a jazz trumpeter, and Emily Vivino. He grew up in Paterson, Point Pleasant, Island Heights, and Glen Rock. He attended Glen Rock High School where he produced a musical revue starring the school's janitorial staff. Vivino began his live-performance career working as a child tap dancer in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and began his broadcast career over a friend's pirate radio station while in high school.[citation needed] He was the older brother of Jerry Vivino and Jimmy Vivino, who were members of the Basic Cable Band, formerly known as the Max Weinberg 7.[citation needed] Career The Uncle Floyd Show aired in New Jersey and New York from 1974 to 1998. The show adopted the visual style of a children's television show but used it to deliver deliberately odd, improvised, and often adult-leaning humor that functioned as a parody of the genre rather than a conventional kids' show. Much of the humor had a twist aimed at adults, in the style of shows by predecessor Soupy Sales (1950s–1970s). The show featured character comedy, puppetry, some audience participation, musical guests, and Vivino's piano playing. One of Vivino's puppet sidekicks, actually a Pelham Puppets Walter Ego ventriloquial puppet, was named Oogie. He would interact on-air with off-camera staff and sidekicks. Local bands such as The Smithereens, Mucky Pup, and R. Stevie Moore, and touring performers with Benny Bell, Blue Öyster Cult, Jan and Dean, Joe Jackson, David Johansen, Cyndi Lauper, NRBQ, The Misfits, Monty Python, Peter Tork, The Ramones, Squeeze, Paul Simon, Dave Edmunds, The Blasters, Marshall Crenshaw, Eddie Money, The Boomtown Rats, and Tiny Tim also appeared on Vivino's program. Jon Bon Jovi made his debut television performance on the show. The show made its debut on UA-Columbia Cable TV of New Jersey, now part of Cablevision, on January 29, 1974. Beginning in November 1974, it aired on UHF-TV station WBTB-TV, Newark, broadcasting on channels 68 and 60, which later became WTVG, then WWHT, as the station's ownership changed.[citation needed] The show's first cast members in 1974 included Pat Cupo, Bob D. Caterino (known for his Groucho Marx skits), and Marc Nathan, the cameraman. Later members were Scott Gordon, Craig "Mugsy" Calam, Richard "Netto" Cornetto, Jim Monaco, Art "Looney Skip" Rooney, Charlie Stoddard, David "Artie Delmar" Burd, and Clark the Wonder Dog. A phonograph album based on the show, The Uncle Floyd Show Album, was released on Mercury Records, and a number of 45 rpm singles on the Bioya label were released around 1979–83. Vivino also released a few CDs as a solo artist.[citation needed] In 1982, The Uncle Floyd Show went into a small syndication circuit, which included 17 markets, among them WNBC-TV channel 4 in New York, then WTAF-TV channel 29 in Philadelphia, WPWR-TV Channel 60 in Chicago, WSBK-TV Channel 38 in Boston, and WHCT-TV Channel 18 in Hartford. It aired right after SCTV on WNBC. The national syndication deal was seen as a huge step forward for the show, which until that point could only be viewed in and around New Jersey and New York City on a single UHF channel, and, at times, local cable.[citation needed] From 1983 to 1986, The Uncle Floyd Show ran on the statewide PBS network, New Jersey Network, which consisted of four channels: WNJS (Channel 23, Camden), WNJN (Channel 50, Montclair), WNJB (Channel 58, New Brunswick), and WNJT (Channel 52, Trenton). When the show was cancelled, the president of the Uncle Floyd Show fan club petitioned the New Jersey Network and received $159 back that he had donated to the public broadcasting station on the understanding that it would go directly to the show. Starting in late 1986, The Uncle Floyd Show was then seen on statewide cable channel CTN (Cable Television Network Of New Jersey). During this time, the show went through various incarnations, with Vivino sometimes hosting a music-only show, showcasing local bands. Vivino also hosted a show called Uncle Floyd's New Jersey, in which he would visit various towns and businesses in the state. First-run production of The Uncle Floyd Show ended in 1992, with CTN showing repeats until that channel's demise in 1999.[citation needed] From 1992 until 1996, cast member Mugsy produced and appeared in a spin-off show entitled The Eleventh Hour. The show was written and produced in the same vein as The Uncle Floyd Show. It was broadcast live from studios in Nutley, New Jersey, on the statewide CTN cable network, and on two Northern New Jersey public-access channels, Cablevision of Oakland and Suburban Cablevision of New Jersey in East Orange (later acquired by Comcast Corporation).[citation needed] In 1998, production of The Uncle Floyd Show began in the Cablevision studio in Oakland, New Jersey. One hundred shows were produced and aired on Cablevision systems throughout the region. Musical guests included Marky Ramone and The Misfits. Although viewer response was enthusiastic, the show was canceled by Cablevision management after the first cycle of episodes.[citation needed] At its peak, the Uncle Floyd Show fan club had 13,000 members. Floyd performed as an emcee, a stand-up comic and a live musician at shows up to 300 times a year at small venues across New Jersey and New York: nightclubs, restaurants, and Knights of Columbus halls at night, "Meatball the Clown" shows at schools during the day. He recorded a jingle for the Wild West City theme park and performed there often. Vivino appeared on several television shows filmed in New York City, including Law & Order, 100 Centre Street, and Cosby, and was a regular on the Sirius Satellite Radio program The Wiseguys Show on Raw Dog Comedy (channel 104) hosted by former The Sopranos cast member Vincent Pastore. Vivino performed the jingle of, as well as appeared in the TV commercial for, the frontier-themed amusement park Wild West City, located in Byram Township, New Jersey, a jingle that is still used today by the park. He also had parts in the movies Good Morning, Vietnam, Crazy People, and Mr. Wonderful. He also shot a scene for One-Trick Pony, which was deleted.[citation needed] In 2000, Vivino played the bit part of an announcer in the Insane Clown Posse movie, Big Money Hustlas.[citation needed] From 1987 to 2013, Vivino broadcast on WVIP-FM 93.5 radio from New Rochelle, New York, where he played a wide range of Italian music on his Sunday afternoon program, The Italian-American Serenade. He claimed to have the largest collection of Italian records in the world. The program was revived on sister station WVOX 1460 AM in September 2018.[citation needed] In 1999, Floyd set a Guinness World Record by playing a piano continuously for 24 hours and 15 minutes. From 2001 to 2004, "Uncle Floyd's Restaurant" operated out of the Holiday Inn in Wayne. Vivino performed there several nights a week. In January 2013, Vivino began the internet-based radio program The Uncle Floyd Radio Show, which was streamed twice a week from the show's website and through various SHOUTcast mobile apps and links.[citation needed] In April 2013, Uncle Floyd's Garage Sale Music began on WVOX 1460 in New Rochelle. This show featured records from Vivino's large personal collection, most of which he found in thrift shops, yard sales, and curbside garbage piles. The program featured discussion between Vivino and his co-host about the music and artists whose recordings are heard on the show, many of whom Vivino worked with personally. Also, some segments feature written comments and questions submitted by listeners. Beginning in June 2014, a second weekly Garage Sale Music program began airing and streaming on Sundays 9:00 to noon over WFDU 89.1 FM in Teaneck, New Jersey. The WVOX program ended in September 2018, returning to The Italian-American Serenade format.[citation needed] Vivino was selected to be the vocalist on Vince Giordano's 2020 recording of "Ain't Misbehavin'", but was replaced by Loudon Wainwright III due to a conflicting appearance commitment.[better source needed] Vivino hosted and starred in The Last Authentic American Traveling Burlesque Show, a tribute to the lost entertainment style of burlesque. Vivino also wrote a weekly column covering Italian and Italian American topics and culture, titled Italian American Serenade, for the Italian Tribune from 2000 to 2026. He was also the long time master of ceremonies for the Italian Tribune's Columbus Gala, which highlights accomplishments of Italian Americans from the proceeding year. In 2009 and 2017, Vivino ran for Governor of New Jersey as a write-in candidate. Tributes The first band to refer to The Uncle Floyd Show in a song was the Johnny Gork Band from Flemington, New Jersey, released on a 45 rpm single in 1982. David Bowie, a fan of Vivino's television show, recorded the song "Slip Away" on his 2002 album, Heathen, as a tribute. The lyrics mention Uncle Floyd and his puppets Oogie and Bones Boy. When asked how he had learned of the show, Bowie replied, "John Lennon told me about it." He also mentioned Iggy Pop regularly watching the show. While in Berlin in 2002 touring for his Heathen album, Bowie said, "This is another new song. It's about a television hero in America from '70s that myself, and Lennon and Iggy Pop used to watch in the afternoons. Crazy guy, and we were very addled and used to love fooling around watching this guy Uncle Floyd. And his song is called "Slip Away". This story is also told in the 2024 documentary Flipside, which features Uncle Floyd. The song "Work for Food" by Dramarama, on the 1994 album Hi-Fi Sci-Fi features the Uncle Floyd Show in the lyrics. Footage of Vivino as Cowboy Charlie also appears in the video for the song. The members of Dramarama were from Wayne, New Jersey, and made their first television appearance on The Uncle Floyd Show. The Ramones also recognized The Uncle Floyd Show in their song "It's Not My Place (In the Nine to Five World)", as well as in various live appearances. Also, Ramones guitarist Johnny Ramone could often be seen wearing an Uncle Floyd Show T-shirt in pictures of the band, while Joey Ramone often wore an Uncle Floyd Show button on his leather jacket. Personal life and death Vivino was married and divorced three times. He had a daughter and two sons from his second marriage, and two sons from his third marriage. He was the uncle of musical theater actress Donna Vivino. In April 2022, Vivino revealed that he had been diagnosed with cancer in both his bladder and prostate. In July 2023, Vivino suffered a stroke and was hospitalized. A full recovery was expected. Vivino died from complications of his 2023 stroke in Hackensack, New Jersey on January 22, 2026, at the age of 74. References External links
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lee_Hamilton] \| [TOKENS: 1754]
Contents Lee Hamilton Lee Herbert Hamilton (April 20, 1931 – February 3, 2026) was an American politician and lawyer from Indiana. He was a member of the United States House of Representatives and a member of the U.S. Homeland Security Advisory Council. A member of the Democratic Party, Hamilton represented the 9th congressional district of Indiana from 1965 to 1999. Following his departure from Congress, he served on a number of governmental advisory boards, most notably as the vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission. Early life and education Hamilton was born in Daytona Beach, Florida, on April 20, 1931, and raised in Evansville, Indiana. He attended public schools and graduated from Evansville Central High School in 1948. An outstanding basketball player, he led the Central Bears to the state title game in March 1948; he then continued his playing career at DePauw University, where he played for Coach Jay McCreary. Hamilton graduated from DePauw in 1952, and from the Indiana University School of Law in 1956. He worked as a lawyer in private practice for the next ten years in Columbus, Indiana. Congress Hamilton was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives as a Democrat as part of the national Democratic landslide of 1964. He chaired many committees during his tenure in office, including the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Joint Committee on Printing, and others. As chairman of the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran (1987), Hamilton chose not to investigate President Ronald Reagan or President George H. W. Bush, stating that he did not think it would be "good for the country" to put the public through another impeachment trial. Hamilton was later chair of the House October Surprise Task Force (1992). He remained in Congress until 1999; at the time he was one of two surviving members of the large Democratic freshman class of 1965 (the other being John Conyers). He was viewed as a potential Democratic vice-presidential running mate in 1984, 1988, and 1992, due to his foreign policy credentials and Indiana's potential to turn toward the Democratic Party due to economic concerns. Life after Congress In November 2002, President George W. Bush nominated Hamilton as the vice-chairman of the 9/11 Commission, officially titled The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. On March 15, 2006, Congress announced the formation of the Iraq Study Group, organized by the United States Institute of Peace, of which Hamilton was the Democratic co-chairman, along with the former Secretary of State (under President George H. W. Bush) James A. Baker III. Hamilton, like Baker, was considered a master negotiator. After leaving Congress, Hamilton served as a member of the Hart-Rudman Commission, and was co-chairman of the Commission to Investigate Certain Security Issues at Los Alamos. He sat on many advisory boards, including those of the CIA, the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council, and the United States Army. Hamilton was an advisory board member and co-chair for the Partnership for a Secure America, a not-for-profit organization dedicated to recreating the bipartisan center in American national security and foreign policy. He was previously the president and director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and was appointed to serve as the vice chair of the 9/11 Commission. From 2000 to 2001, he served as the American member of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which prepared the U.N policy of Responsibility to Protect, adopted in 2005. He was also a member of the board of advisors of the Albright Stonebridge Group. He was appointed co-chair of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future from 2010 to 2012 alongside Brent Scowcroft. He was also a member of a Washington D.C.–based think tank called the Inter-American Dialogue. Hamilton served as the co-chair of the National Security Preparedness Group (NSPG) at the Bipartisan Policy Center. Hamilton was the co-chair with Sandra Day O'Connor of the Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools. He also served as an advisory board member for the Partnership for a Secure America and for America Abroad Media. In 2004, Hamilton released the book "How Congress Works and Why You Should Care", in which he explains the role, workings and the importance of Congress to everyday Americans, drawing on reflections of his time as a member of the House. He also suggests improvements to Congress. On February 25, 2011, Hamilton wrote a letter to President Barack Obama urging him to commute Jonathan Pollard's sentence to time served. Pollard was serving a life sentence for providing Israel with classified information, without the intent to harm the United States, a crime which normally carries a sentence of two to four years. In his letter, he stated, "I do believe that he has served a disproportionately severe sentence." He also stated, "I have been acquainted for many years with members of his family, especially his parents, and I know how much pain and anguish they have suffered because of their son's incarceration." He contended that "commuting his sentence is a matter of basic compassion and justice." Pollard was granted parole on July 7, 2015, and released on November 20, 2015. On August 11, 2012, Hamilton's wife Nancy died in an auto-related accident; no one else was injured. Prior to her death, she was an accomplished artist. In 1981 her oil paintings and watercolors were featured in an exhibit at The Commons and in 1984 she had a one-woman show at a Seymour art gallery. Nancy also contributed thousands of hours at the INOVA Alexandria Virginia Hospital. He endorsed Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election. Hamilton was a member of the ReFormers Caucus of Issue One. He served as an honorary co-chair for the World Justice Project, an organization that works to strengthen the rule of law worldwide.[citation needed] Personal life and death Hamilton married Nancy Nelson in 1954. The couple had three children and were married until her death in 2012. Lee Hamilton died in Bloomington, Indiana, on February 3, 2026, at the age of 94. Honors and awards A nine-mile stretch of I-265 and Indiana 265 in Floyd and Clark counties, part of Hamilton's former House district, was designated the "Lee H. Hamilton Highway" shortly after his retirement from the House in 1999. The moniker is largely symbolic, as locals generally do not refer to the road by that name, although the name is used frequently by the traffic reporter for the area's largest radio station, WHAS 840-AM in nearby Louisville, Kentucky. In 1982, Hamilton was inducted into the Indiana Basketball Hall of Fame, in honor of his outstanding prep basketball career; he led the Evansville Central Bears to three deep runs in the IHSAA tournament. In 1946, the Bears made the state semi-finals, in 1947, they made the state quarter-finals; as a senior, he led them to the championship game. He was selected All-State his senior season and was awarded the Trester Award for mental attitude. He later starred for the DePauw Tigers, leading them in scoring average in 1951 and rebounds in 1951 and 1952. In 2001 Lee H. Hamilton was presented the Lifetime Contributions to American Diplomacy Award by the American Foreign Service Association. In 2005, Hamilton received the U.S. Senator John Heinz Award for Greatest Public Service by an Elected or Appointed Official, an award given out annually by Jefferson Awards. In 2007, Hamilton was elected as an honorary fellow in the National Academy of Public Administration. In 2011, Hamilton received the Benjamin Harrison Presidential Site Advancing American Democracy Award. In November 2015, Hamilton was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Barack Obama in a ceremony at the White House. In 2018, Indiana University Bloomington announced that the School of Global and International Studies would be renamed the Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies in honor of Hamilton and former U.S. senator Richard Lugar, describing both as "two immensely accomplished Indiana statesmen and two of the nation's most distinguished and influential voices in foreign policy." Bibliography References External links
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Parenti] \| [TOKENS: 3028]
Contents Michael Parenti Michael John Parenti (September 30, 1933 – January 24, 2026) was an American political scientist, academic historian and cultural critic who wrote on scholarly and popular subjects. He taught at universities and also ran for political office. Parenti was well known for his Marxist writings and lectures, and was an intellectual of the American Left. Education and early life Michael Parenti was born on September 30, 1933, to an Italian-American working-class family in the East Harlem neighborhood of New York City. After graduating from high school, Parenti worked for several years. Upon returning to school, he received a BA from the City College of New York. He was awarded a teaching fellowship at Brown University where he earned an MA in history in 1957. He completed his Ph.D. in political science at Yale University. Career Following completion of his doctorate, Parenti taught political and social science at various institutions of higher learning, including the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (UI). In May 1970 while he was an associate professor at UI, he participated in a rally protesting the recent Kent State shootings and ongoing Vietnam War. At the rally he was severely clubbed by state troopers and then held in a jail cell for two days. He was charged with aggravated battery (of a state trooper), disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest. After being released on bond, he started a new teaching job at the University of Vermont (UVM) in September. The next month he returned to Illinois to stand trial before a judge. According to Parenti, despite multiple witnesses offering exonerating testimony, the judge found him guilty on all three counts: In June 1971 I returned to Illinois for sentencing. Because I was already employed outside the state and because a host of academic lights from around the country had sent in appeals on my behalf, I was saved from having to do time. Instead, I was given two years probation, a fine, and ordered to pay court costs. This incident effectively ended Parenti's career as a professor. In December 1971, after his UVM department voted unanimously to renew his teaching contract, the UVM board of trustees and conservative state legislators intervened and voted to let his contract expire, citing Parenti's "unprofessional conduct." The battle over his continued presence on the UVM faculty lasted into early 1972, but ultimately he lost his position there. In subsequent years, he was unable to obtain another non-temporary teaching job. He learned from sympathetic associates at the colleges he applied to that he was being rejected for his leftist views and political activism. He chronicles this period of his life in the essay, "Struggles in Academe: A Personal Account", published in Dirty Truths. He discusses the broader question of political orthodoxy in U.S. higher education in "The Empire in Academia" chapter of his 1995 book, Against Empire. Because he couldn't earn a steady livelihood as a professor, Parenti began to devote himself full-time to writing, public speaking, and politics. In 1974, he ran for the U.S. House of Representatives in Vermont as the candidate of the democratic socialist Liberty Union Party; he finished in third place with 7.1% of the vote. During his years in Vermont, Parenti became good friends with Bernie Sanders. However, the two men later split over Sanders' support for the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. In the 1980s, Parenti was a visiting fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C. In 2003, the Caucus for a New Political Science gave him a Career Achievement Award. In 2007, he received a Certificate of Special Congressional Recognition from U.S. Representative Barbara Lee. He served for 12 years as a judge for Project Censored. He also was on the advisory boards of Independent Progressive Politics Network and Education Without Borders as well as the advisory editorial boards of New Political Science and Nature, Society and Thought. In his book To Kill a Nation: The Attack on Yugoslavia (2001), Parenti decried what he considered the demonization by Western leaders of Slobodan Milošević and his Serbian Socialist Party. Parenti wrote that contrary to Western media assertions about an official policy of ethnic cleansing, Serbia had long been the most ethnically diverse region in Yugoslavia (with 200,000 Muslims living in Belgrade), and that NATO engaged in "hypocritical humanitarianism" as a pretext for military intervention and the privatization of Serbia's public sector economy. In 2003, Parenti became Chairman of the U.S. National Section of the International Committee to Defend Slobodan Milošević (ICDSM). The committee was formed to urge an end to the war crimes trial of Milošević that commenced in 2002 at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. Personal life and death In the last decades of his life, he made his home in Berkeley, California. He was the father of Christian Parenti, an academic, author and journalist. Parenti died at an assisted living facility in Amherst, Massachusetts, on January 24, 2026, at the age of 92. Works Historian Marko Attila Hoare wrote that To Kill a Nation was "simply an outright apologia for Milošević and his regime. Period...", stating that Milošević himself had written the book's foreword. Hoare described the book as "simply worthless", stating that Parenti had mistakenly called the pre-1991 Yugoslavia the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), despite it actually being named the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), and criticized Parenti's sources as citing "the same or other similar authors in support of the same set of allegations, creating a closed circle of mutually supporting references that substitute for any genuine documentation or historical enquiry." According to David Walls, writing in New Politics, in Project Censored's 2000 volume, Parenti denied reports of genocide and mass rapes committed in Bosnia, writing: "Hyperbolic labeling takes the place of evidence: "genocide," "mass atrocities," "systematic rapes," and even "rape camps" - camps which no one has ever located." The Congress of North American Bosniaks (CNAB) and the Balkan Witness website characterized Parenti's views as Bosnian genocide denial. In 2012, after the San Jose Peace and Justice Center invited Parenti as a guest speaker, the CNAB published an open letter criticizing the Center's decision and stating that Parenti denied genocide and ethnic cleansing occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as "publicly disregard[ing] that approximately 50,000 Bosniak women were raped" during the war.[non-primary source needed] According to Balkan Witness, Parenti minimized the number of Muslims murdered in the Srebrenica massacre and, after Bosnian supporters in 24 countries wrote over 500 letters to the peace group, Parenti's speech was cancelled. In 2013, the Institute for the Research of Genocide, Canada criticized Lone Star College's decision to have Parenti appear at a speaking engagement, characterizing his views as genocide denial.[unreliable source?] The first notable book in Parenti's writing career was Democracy for the Few. Originally published in 1974, it has since gone through nine editions and been used as a textbook in college political science courses. Democracy for the Few contains a critical analysis of the workings of American government with particular focus on the relationship between economic power and political power. Parenti's Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media (1986) was reviewed by multiple scholarly journals and by Michael Pollan in The New York Times. Pollan wrote: "By documenting patterns of conservative bias in a dozen major news stories in the printed and broadcast press, Inventing Reality provides a valuable rebuttal to the drumbeat of criticism of the news media from the right. Unfortunately, Mr. Parenti is so simplistic and doctrinaire in accounting for this bias that he makes his book easy to dismiss." The reviewer went on to note how the author "paints the press in such broad, Marxist strokes that he ignores many details. He cannot, for example, adequately account for episodes of courage and independence, as during Vietnam and Watergate." In a response to the review published as a Letter to the Editor, Parenti challenged Pollan's negative assessment. Parenti continued his exploration of mass media in Make-Believe Media: The Politics of Entertainment (1992). The book dissects numerous popular movies and TV programs which, in Parenti's view, "have propagated images and themes that support militarism, imperialism, racism, sexism, authoritarianism, and other undemocratic values." He describes what he believes is a pattern of unflattering portrayals of working-class people and trade unions, and he disputes the notion that the major studios are "giving audiences what they want." Other leftist writers have been influenced by his media critiques, for instance, Tabe Bergman echoes Parenti's claim that "hegemony-undermining information and views" usually fail to get aired. In Through Jaundiced Eyes: How the Media View Organized Labor, William Puette lists Parenti's seven generalizations for how the media depict labor struggles. In a 2014 article on how the news and entertainment media "sell" counterterrorism, Brigitte Nacos and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon joined with Parenti in rejecting the conservative charge that Hollywood is "a den of leftist shills", and instead argued that "Concentrated corporate ownership and the influence of Pentagon, CIA, NASA, and other government agencies on war movies in particular" were providing political entertainment to generate sympathy for the status quo and America's use of political violence. In his foreword to Matthew Alford's 2010 book Reel Power: Hollywood Cinema and American Supremacy, Parenti reiterated several of the points from Make-Believe Media. Along with his interest in mass media's role in society, Parenti regularly published articles and books on cultural matters, e.g., "Reflections on the Politics of Culture", in which he agrees with Antonio Gramsci that culture "is largely reflective of existing hegemonic arrangements within the social order, strongly favoring some interests over others." He further develops this idea in his books Land of Idols, Superpatriotism, The Culture Struggle, and God and His Demons. In a Los Angeles Times review, political commentator Kevin Phillips dismissed Parenti's The Sword and the Dollar: Imperialism, Revolution and the Arms Race (1989) as a Marxist polemic, "albeit flavored with scholarship and sprinkled with footnotes". Phillips faulted Parenti for a biased comparison of U.S. and Soviet imperialisms, and for citing sources that too often included "New York's Monthly Review Press, International Publishers, Progress Publishers of Moscow and the like. One has visions of gray East Bloc bookstores and Upper West Side of Manhattan coffeehouses." Dirty Truths: Reflections on Politics, Media, Ideology, Conspiracy, Ethnic Life and Class Power (1996) contains Parenti's most wide-ranging collection of writings. Among its essays are "Fascism in a Pinstriped Suit" on the possibility of American fascism arriving subtly and gradually rather than intruding in a nightmarish "Big Brother" fashion; "Now for the Weather" on how even TV weather reports can be politicized; and "False Consciousness" on why the lower classes sometimes adopt the opinions and attitudes of the upper classes. In two essays on the JFK assassination, he breaks ranks with fellow leftists such as Noam Chomsky by giving credence to skeptics of the official government narrative. He also explores what he calls "Conspiracy Phobia on the Left". Dirty Truths concludes with autobiographical sketches and poems. Parenti's provocative 1997 book Blackshirts and Reds: Rational Fascism and the Overthrow of Communism begins by examining the ideological underpinnings of European fascism in the 1920s and '30s as well as its incarnations as neofascism. He then takes the controversial position of defending the Soviet Union and other communist countries from reflexive condemnation, arguing that they featured a number of advantages over capitalist countries, e.g., by ensuring less economic inequality. He summarizes his approach in the Preface to Blackshirts and Reds: This book invites those immersed in the prevailing orthodoxy of “democratic capitalism” to entertain iconoclastic views, to question the shibboleths of free-market mythology and the persistence of both right and left anti-communism, and to consider anew, with a receptive but not uncritical mind, the historic efforts of the much maligned Reds and other revolutionaries. He later argues that the Soviet Union's "well-publicized deficiencies and injustices" were exacerbated by the Russian Civil War, the Nazi-led multinational invasion, and by non-military modes of capitalist intervention against the Eastern Bloc. Moreover, he claims that "pure socialists" and "left anticommunists" had failed to specify a viable alternative to the "siege socialism" implemented in the Soviet model. By offering a rare defense of 20th century Communism, Blackshirts and Reds has elicited strong reactions from anarchist and Communist publications. Appearances in media Apart from video recordings of his public speaking engagements, Parenti also appeared in the 1992 documentary The Panama Deception, and in the 2004 Liberty Bound and 2013 Fall and Winter documentaries as an author and social commentator. In July 2003, he was invited on the C-SPAN Booknotes program to discuss his latest work, The Assassination of Julius Caesar: A People's History of Ancient Rome. He appeared in an episode of the Showtime series Penn & Teller: Bullshit!, speaking briefly about the Dalai Lama (Episode 305 – Holier Than Thou). Because of his research for the book To Kill a Nation: The Attack on Yugoslavia (2001) and his travel in the war-torn region shortly after the NATO bombing⁠, Parenti was interviewed in Boris Malagurski's documentary film The Weight of Chains (2010) and its sequel The Weight of Chains 2 (2014) about the former Yugoslavia. New York City-based punk rock band Choking Victim uses a number of samples from Parenti's lectures in its album No Gods, No Managers. Chilean hip-hop artist Ana Tijoux features a section of one of Parenti's lectures in her song "Caluga o menta". Bibliography See also References External links
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamist_insurgency_in_Niger] \| [TOKENS: 3695]
Contents Islamist insurgency in Niger Supported by: Russia United States France (2014–23) Since 2015, the border area between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger has been a hotbed for jihadist forces originating from Mali. The insurgency has taken place in two distinct regions of Niger. In southwest, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and the Nusrat al-Islam have carried out attacks in the tri-border area with Burkina Faso and Mali. Meanwhile, in the southeast, the Islamic State in the West African Province has established control in parts of southern Niger. Weak governance in the Sahel has been attributed the expansion of violent extremism in the region. The region's stability has been significantly impacted by frequent transfers of power, exemplified by Niger experiencing a failed attempted coup in 2021 and a successful coup in 2023. Background Several major attacks occurred in Niger between the 2010s and 2020s. Niger faces jihadist insurgencies both in its western regions (as a result of the spillover of the Mali War) and in its southeastern region (as a result of the spillover of the Boko Haram insurgency). The insurgency in the west of the country began with incursions in 2015 and intensified from 2017 onwards, with massacres carried out by groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State. In its southeastern regions, nevertheless, Niger mainly fights Boko Haram insurgents. Timeline On 10 December 2019, a large group of fighters belonging to the IS-GS attacked a military post in Inates, Niger, killing over seventy soldiers and kidnapping others. The attack was the deadliest single incident Niger's military has ever experienced. On 9 January 2020, a large group of IS-GS militants assaulted a Nigerien military base at Chinagodrar, in Niger's Tillabéri Region. At least 89 Nigerien soldiers were confirmed to have been killed in the attack, with more casualties suspected, making it the worst attack on the army since the start of the insurgency. It is also the first year in which attacks were carried out with frequency in the country. Attacks were carried out every month of 2021. The previous biggest attack in Niger against civilians was the 12 December 2020 Toumour attack, which resulted in 28 people killed. Both the December 2020 and January 2021 attacks were carried out during Niger's municipal and regional elections, while the February bombing specifically targeted members of the electoral commission. On 2 January, the villages of Tchombangou (at 14°49′48″N 01°48′45″E / 14.83000°N 1.81250°E / 14.83000; 1.81250) and Zaroumdareye (at 14°54′21″N 01°46′36″E / 14.90583°N 1.77667°E / 14.90583; 1.77667), which are seven kilometers apart, were attacked by several militants. The attack initially left 79 people dead and 75 wounded. Of the deceased victims, 49 were killed in Tchombangou and 30 in Zaroumdareye. A day after the attack, 21 more people were found dead and others succumbed to their injuries on Tchombangou, bringing the total death toll to 100. On 8 January, UN's High Commissioner for Refugees spokesman said that 73 people had been killed in the village of Tchouma Bangou and 32 in Zaroumdareye, making the total death toll 105. The government of Niger dispatched soldiers to the border after the attacks. The attackers are Islamist militants who arrived in the villages while crossing the border from Mali. Sometime before the massacre, two Islamist militants who were seen in the area were killed by the local villagers. Those attacks are suspected to be in retaliation for those killings, according to the country's interior minister. On 21 February, seven members of the electoral commission were killed, and three others injured in a landmine explosion in Tillabéri. The attack was carried out on the same day of the presidential election's second round. On 16 March, armed men on motorcycles attacked a convoy returning from a market in Banibangou by the Malian border to a nearby village in Southwestern Niger's Tillabéri Region, killing 58 people. On 21 March, militants riding motorbikes attacked Intazayene, Bakorat and Wistan, three villages in the Tahoua Region close to the Malian border, killing 137 people. The death toll would make the attack the deadliest committed by suspected jihadists in Niger's history. Newly elected President Mohamed Bazoum condemned the attacks and declared three days of national mourning. On 24 March, at least 10 people were killed during attacks at two villages in the Tillabéri Region. On 18 April, at least 19 civilians were killed and two wounded when armed men raided a village in Tillabéri Region. On 3 May, a military patrol was ambushed in the Tahoua Region, resulting in the killing of 16 soldiers and the wounding of six more. It was the first attack against soldiers in the country[citation needed] since the beginning of the year. On 12 May, five villagers were killed and two more wounded after militants stormed the village of Fantio, in the Tillabéri region, during Eid al-Fitr celebrations. On 30 May, four civilians and four soldiers were killed during a raid carried out by Boko Haram militants in the town of Diffa, in the Diffa Region. The jihadists attacked the town in the late afternoon, riding in about 15 vehicles, but were pushed back by responding security forces during a long gunfight, in which six attackers were killed. On 25 June, armed men attacked a village and nearby locations, killing a total of 19 civilians. Initially, the attackers stormed the Danga Zawne village, in the Tillabéri region, killing three people. They then attacked nearby farms, killing the other sixteen people. On 29 June, Boko Haram fighters opened fire on a bus along the road between Diffa and Maine Soroa, killing four civilians, including the bus driver, two villagers and a village chief; two more were wounded. The fighters then moved on another road and opened fire on a group of soldiers, wounding six of them. A gunfight erupted, and thirteen terrorists were killed. On 2 July, around 100 heavily armed “terrorists” riding motorcycles attacked the Tchoma Bangou village, killing four civilians. Security forces responded to the attack, starting a gun battle, resulting in the death of five soldiers and 40 terrorists. On 25 July, fourteen people were killed and one more was wounded as gunmen stormed the village of Wiye. Nine of the victims are killed while working at fields. On 28 July, 19 civilians were killed and five more wounded as militants stormed the village of Deye Koukou in the Banibangou area, near the border with Mali. On 1 August, Islamist militants ambushed and opened fire on a group of soldiers in Torodi, Tillabéri Region. As the soldiers were escaping and carried the wounded, a bomb exploded. Fifteen soldiers were killed in the attack, while six more are missing. On 16 August, gunmen on motorbikes stormed the village of Darey-Daye, Niger, opening fire against civilians while they were tending their fields, killing 37 people, including 14 children. On 20 August, gunmen opened fire against civilians who were praying at a mosque in the village of Theim, in the Tillaberi region, killing 16 people. On 25 August, hundreds of Boko Haram militants attacked a military post in Diffa, killing 16 soldiers and wounding nine others. In the ensuing gun battle, around 50 Islamist insurgents were killed. On 11 October, ten people were killed and another was wounded when gunmen opened fire at a mosque in the village of Abankor. On 18 October, gunmen opened fire against a police station in Tillaberi, killing three policemen and wounding seven others. On 20 October, six members of Niger's national guard were killed and several others were wounded when gunmen ambushed a convoy carrying the prefect of Bankilare and his bodyguards, who escaped unharmed. On 2 November, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-GS) gunmen attacked a delegation led by the mayor of Banibangou, killing 69 people. The mayor and the leader of a self-defence militia were among those killed. On 4 November, fifteen soldiers were killed as gunmen attacked a military outpost in the village of Anzourou. On 5 December, hundreds of motorcycle-equipped rebels raided an international military base in Tillabéri, killing 29 soldiers. 79 of the invaders were killed. On 5 December, 12 Nigerien soldiers and dozens of terrorists were killed in a battle near Fantio. On 20 December, Soumana Boura, a leading member of the IS-GS, was killed by a French drone strike. On 18 February, an air attack on Nachade, Maradi Region, killed seven children and wounded five others. Local media blamed Nigeria without providing evidence, and Nigeria said it was launching an investigation. On 20 February, at least 18 civilians were killed during an attack on their vehicle by armed men near the border with Mali. On 16 June, around 40 terrorists were killed in a series of French drone strikes near the border with Burkina Faso. On 10 February, at least 17 Nigerien soldiers were killed in the town of Intagamey. On 10 March, Nigerien forces were attacked in the western town of Tiloa. In pursuit of the attackers, Nigerien forces entered the Hamakat area of Mali, where they killed 79 terrorists. No casualties were reported by Niger. From 13 to 19 March, Nigerien forces killed around 20 Boko Haram militants and arrested 83 others in an operation at the border with Nigeria. On 7 May, seven Nigerien soldiers were killed after their vehicle ran over a landmine near the border with Burkina Faso. In the first week of July, two leading members of the IS-GS were captured in a joint operation by Nigerien and French troops near the border with Burkina Faso. On 14 July, one police officer and four civilians were killed in an attack near the border with Burkina Faso. Two terrorists were also killed. On 26 July, a coup occurred when Mohamed Bazoum was detained in the Presidential Palace and Abdourahamane Tchiani proclaimed himself the leader of a military junta. This led to a national and international crisis. On 17 August, suspected jihadists belonging to JNIM killed 17 Nigerien soldiers and injured 20 in an ambush near the town of Koutougou. Over 100 assailants were killed when they retreated. The ISSP also attacked three villages, killing at least 50 civilians. On 22 August, suspected Islamists killed 12 soldiers in Anzourou. On 2 October, over 100 Islamists killed 29 Nigerien soldiers in Tabatol using IEDs and “kamikaze vehicles”. The attack left an additional two soldiers seriously wounded, while several dozen jihadists were allegedly killed. From 15 to 16 October, six Nigerien soldiers were killed in a series of clashes with terrorists near Niger-Burkina Faso border, officials claimed that in the same clashes' terrorists suffered 31 fatalities. 2024 Tillabéri attack: On 21 March, an attack by the IS-GS killed 23 Niger soldiers and wounded another 17 in Tillabéri Region, Niger. Militants numbering over 100 attacked at night while the soldiers were in a security mission. The attack also led to the death of about 30 militants. On 23 June, the Niger army killed 9 IS-GS militants including a high ranking commander "Abdoulaye Souleymane Idouwal" and arrested another 31 militants in an operation in Tillabéri region. On 24 June, an attack by jihadist militants killed 20 Niger soldiers and one civilian in village of Tassia. A report by Niger army also stated that dozens of militants were killed in the attack and reinforcements were send to the village. On 5 July, the Niger army killed more than 100 jihadists in ground and air operation as a response to the attack on 24 June which killed 20 Nigerien soldiers. On 23 July, a clash occurred between the Niger army and jihadists near the village of Foneko along the border with Burkina Faso resulting in the death of 15 soldiers with another 16 injured and three missing. 21 jihadists were also killed in the clash. On 3 August, the Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin movement took two Russian citizens hostage in Mbanga. On 20 September, multiple jihadist attacks in Niger killed 12 Nigerien soldiers and wounded 30 others. In retaliation the Niger armed forces launched an air and ground assault killing more than 100 jihadists. On 12 December, a jihadist attack on the village of Petel Kole near Burkina Faso killed 10 Nigerien soldiers and resulting gunfight killed 26 militants. On 11 January IS–GS subcontractors abducted a 73-year-old Austrian development worker Eva Gretzmacher from her home in Agadez. On 21 March a jihadist attack against a mosque in Kokorou killed 44 people and injuring 13 others prompting the government to announce 3 days of mourning. On 13 April a 63-year-old Swiss immigrant Claudia Abbt was abducted from her home in Agadez by the same men who abducted Gretzmacher. On 24 April IS–GS insurgents ambushed a military unit north of the village of Sakoira killing 12. On 25 April five Indian workers were abducted from their worksite near the Kandadji Dam. On 15 May, suspected JNIM fighters took control of a military base in Boni, Torodi Department, near the border with Burkina Faso. The Burkinabe military reportedly sent a reconnaissance helicopter to assess the situation but left due to heavy gunfire. On 25 May, an attack was launched by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara on a base in Tillia commune, Tahoua region. Insurgents briefly occupied the base and looted ammunition, arms, and several vehicles. The death count was initially listed as 41, but was later appended to 58. On 19 June, hundreds of IS-GS militants launched an attack by motorcycle on Bani Bangou, Talliberi Region, near the border with Niger, where they allegedly set fire to the local army and national guard camp and looted the city before retreating. The Nigerien Ministry of Defense later confirmed the attack, claiming 34 soldiers were killed and 11 were injured. On 20 June, 71 civilians were massacred of and 20 more were injured during a Friday prayer gathering in Manda, Talliberi Region by IS-SP militants. On 24 and 25 June, mutinies occurred within the Nigerien Army occurred in Filingué and Téra and refused to partake in a combat mission, demanding better resources and intelligence. The commander of the company in Filingué, Lieutenant Colonel Massaoudou Dari Mossi, was beaten by his men after opposing the mutiny, being transported to Turkey for hospitalization. On 2 August, IS-SP militants claimed to have killed 31 government aligned militiamen near Anzourou, Tillaberi Region. On 10 September, at least 27 Nigerien soldiers were killed by IS-SP militants in two attacks on the outskirts of Tillaberi. The first attack was an ambush on 5 pick up trucks carrying National Guard soldiers, and killed 15 while the second attack was on an army position next to the airport, killing 12 and burning down a refugee camp. On 15 September, gunmen killed 22 people in Takoubatt, Tillabéri Region, including 15 who were at a baptism ceremony. On 17 December, IS-SP militants attacked a military patrol in Goubey, Dosso Region. The attack killed 10 soldiers and 3 other security personnel, as well as destroying two vehicles. On 4 January, jihadists attacked the residence of the prefect of Torodi, who also was a captain in the Nigerien Army, killing him and his entire family. The jihadists also seized government vehicles and freed a couple prisoners during the attack. On 18 January, over a hundred IS-SP militants entered the village of Bossiye, Tillaberi Region and rounded up 31 civilians, including 4 children, before executing them after they refused to pay a zakat. Another group of IS-SP militants opened fire at crowd in the village of Alfaga Daweyzé Koira who were protecting a villager accused of government collaboration, killing four and injuring five. On 29 January, around thirty IS-SP jihadists launched an attack on Diori Hamani International Airport, taking control of the airport for two hours. The attackers destroyed and damaged several military and civilian aircraft in the attack and killed up to 24 Nigerien Soldiers as well as three Russian soldiers. The Nigerien military killed 20 militants and captured 11. On 4 February, JNIM militants overran a Nigerien military postion in Makalondi, killing at least 36 soldiers and injuring several others. JNIM also captured 12 military vehicles with mounted machine guns. United States involvement See also References
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haitian_crisis_(2018%E2%80%93present)] \| [TOKENS: 8064]
Contents Haitian crisis (2018–present) 2021 causes 2022–2024 causes 2022–2024 goals Government of Haiti Jean-Charles Moïse Schiller Louidor Guy Philippe Jimmy Chérizier Jovenel Moïse X Fritz William Michel Jean-Michel Lapin Jean-Henry Céant Jack Guy Lafontant Ariel Henry The existing political, economic, and social crisis began with protests across cities in Haiti on 7 July 2018 in response to rising fuel prices. These protests gradually evolved into demands for the resignation of President Jovenel Moïse. Led by opposition politician Jean-Charles Moïse (no relation), protesters demanded a transitional government, provision of social programs, and the prosecution of corrupt officials. From 2019 to 2021, massive protests called for the Jovenel Moïse government to resign. Moïse had come to power in the 2016 presidential election, which had voter turnout of only 21%. Previously, the 2015 elections had been annulled due to fraud. On 7 February 2021, supporters of the opposition allegedly attempted a coup d'état, leading to 23 arrests, as well as clashes between protestors and police. On 7 July 2021, President Moïse was assassinated, allegedly by a group of 28 foreign mercenaries; three of the suspected assassins were killed and 20 arrested, while police searched for the other gunmen and the organizers of the attack. On 20 July, Ariel Henry assumed the office of acting prime minister. In September 2022, further protests erupted in response to rising energy prices, and a federation of gangs created a blockade around Haiti's largest fuel depot. Combined with an outbreak of cholera and widespread acute hunger, the crisis led the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions on Jimmy Chérizier, one of the country's gang leaders. In 2022, Canada issued sanctions against three wealthy businessmen—Gilbert Bigio, Reynold Deeb, and Sherif Abdallah—whom they accused of "participat[ing] in gross and systematic human rights violations in Haiti" along with numerous politicians including Michel Martelly, Laurent Lamothe, Jean-Henry Céant, Joseph Lambert, and Youri Latortue. A UN report to the Security Council in October 2023 likewise identified Martelly, Deeb, and Latortue as having ties to gangs. In March 2024, acting Prime Minister Henry was prevented from returning to Haiti after a trip intended to secure a peace-keeping force of Kenyan police to fight gang violence. The power vacuum and chaos in the streets led to the scheduling of an emergency CARICOM meeting on 11 March. The same day, Henry announced his resignation under pressure from protesters, gangs, and the international community, effective upon the naming of a new prime minister and cabinet by a transitional council. Background and origins A Senate probe released in November 2017 concerning the 2008–2016 period (the René Préval and Michel Martelly administrations) revealed significant corruption had been funded with Venezuelan loans through the Petrocaribe program. With the departure of the United Nations force in 2017, the power vacuum was occupied by gangs, some of which had been fostered, financed, and even created by Martelly, famous for his 2008 Bandi légal album and his ties to right-wing elements in the police. Protests broke out in February 2021 amid a dispute over President Jovenel Moïse's term. The protesters claimed that Moïse's term officially ended on 7 February 2021 and demanded that he step down. Moïse said that Haitian presidents have five years to serve according to the constitution and that he had one more year to serve since he only became president in February 2017. Protesters also expressed concerns about the 2021 Haitian constitutional referendum, a referendum proposed by Moïse which would reportedly scrap the ban on consecutive presidential terms and enable Moïse to run again. From 2017 to 2021, with Haiti's political leadership deadlocked, public administration virtually shut down due to a lack of funding, and the judicial system in shambles, gangs seized political power through co-operative politicians, and economic control through financing by the business elite, protection rackets, kidnappings and murders. 2018–2019 When Venezuela stopped shipping oil to Haiti in March 2018, this led to fuel shortages. With the removal of government subsidies in July, kerosene prices went up over 50 percent, with similarly steep hikes on other fossil fuels. These rises in taxes on gasoline, diesel, and kerosene that went into effect on 7 July 2018 brought Haitians into the streets. Flights were canceled into and out of Haiti by U.S. airlines. The government backed down on the tax increases, and the president accepted the resignation of the inexperienced Jack Guy Lafontant as prime minister on 14 July 2018, replaced one month later by Jean-Henry Céant. In mid-August 2018, Haitian-Canadian Gilbert Mirambeau Jr. tweeted a photo of himself blindfolded holding a cardboard sign with "Kot kòb PetwoKaribe a ?" ("Where did the PetroCaribe money go?") written on it. The hashtag petrocaribechallenge was soon circulated on social media. According to Shearon Roberts, such messaging served initially to inform the international community that a regime change effort was underway. Haitian media then shared the hashtag offline, amplifying the message within the country. Anger over the revelations and accusations from the continuing investigation simmered into the autumn and boiled over again, first in October 2018, with tense scenes and violence in Les Cayes, in Jacmel, and in Saint-Marc. A week of protests in November 2018 led to 10 deaths, including several killed when a government car "lost a wheel and plowed into a crowd." Significant protests broke out again in February 2019 following a report from the court investigating the Petrocaribe Senate probe. Economic problems and the increased cost of living helped fuel the protests. On 7 February, protesters targeted and damaged wealthy Haitians' luxury vehicles. The following day, the mayors of Pétion-Ville and Port-au-Prince announced the cancellation of pre-Haitian Carnival events. Two days later protestors clashed with police, with demonstrators throwing stones at the home of President Moïse, after one of his allies' security personnel struck a woman's car and began to beat her. On 12 February, protesters burned down a popular market, looted stores and assisted with a prison break in Aquin that freed all of the facility's prisoners. In Port-au-Prince, the building housing the Italian and Peruvian consulates was looted by protesters. Moïse addressed the country on 14 February, saying he would not step down and "give the country up to armed gangs and drug traffickers." During a funeral procession on 22 February, Haitian police fired tear gas at a crowd of about 200 people carrying the casket of a man killed during protests days earlier. Opposition leader Schiller Louidor called for future protests, though the overall size of protests began to subside that day. Three days after the lower house voted a censure motion against Céant's government on 18 March, Moïse replaced Céant with Jean-Michel Lapin. The change was not ratified Haitian Parliament for several months, which cost the country hundreds of millions in international aid—for which having a sitting government was a prerequisite. During escalating protests on 10 June, journalist Rospide Petion was shot and killed in a company car on his way home from Radio Sans Fin in Port-au-Prince, where he had criticized the government on air before leaving the station. On 4 October, thousands protested across Haiti. In Port-au-Prince, the mayor joined the protestors in calling for Moïse to step down. Two days earlier, the opposition sent a letter by delegation to the UN Secretary General denouncing the sitting president's role in the Petrocaribe affair and the government's role in a massacre in La Saline, a neighborhood in Port-au-Prince. Lyonel Trouillot wrote in L'Humanité "[w]ithout dipping into conspiracy theory, there is something worrying about the international community's silence about the Haitian situation." On 11 October, Néhémie Joseph, another radio journalist critical of the government, was found dead in the trunk of his car in Mirebalais. On 22 October, thousands of Catholics demonstrated in the capital. Archbishop Max Leroy Mésidor asked Haitian leaders to heed the people who "cannot go on any longer. We are fed up." Energy crises, road blockages, and widespread unrest have led to massive drops in tourism, causing the closure of hotels in Petion-ville, where the Best Western Premier closed permanently, and in Cap-Haïtien, where Mont Joli was closed. Two people were killed in protests in Port-au-Prince on 27 October. Masked police officers were out on the streets demonstrating that day because of low salaries and lack of health insurance. Although the Haitian constitution calls for legislative elections in October, none were held in October 2019. The United Nations announced they had counted 42 deaths and 86 injuries since mid-September. Peyi lok ("country lockdown") is how the situation was described in Haitian Creole in November 2019 after two and a half months with schools, courts, businesses, public services, and economic production largely shut down. Although parents and school directors still felt uneasy amidst barricades and gunfire, schools across the country began to reopen in December. U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale visited Haiti on 6 December, following up on U.S. Ambassador to the UN Kelly Craft's November visit. During his visit, he met with the administration and with leaders from several opposing political parties, some of whom, including Fanmi Lavalas and Fusion-Mache Kontre, refused any collaboration with Moïse. On 10 December, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee began hearings on the situation in Haiti, which Frederica Wilson had pushed for. At the hearing, Maxine Waters was sharply critical of U.S. support for Moïse. Neither the State Department nor USAID was present at the hearings. Moïse called for his opposition to participate in peaceful dialogue, saying that "the country's problems aren't solely political. The country's problems are social, economic and political." The national police stated that there are "malicious individuals" who had interrupted peaceful protests in the country. The opposition was being led by Jean-Charles Moïse. This opposition declined offers for dialogue, demanded President Moïse's resignation, and organized a nationwide general strike to attempt to force him to resign from office. Alongside opposition lawmakers, he called for a transitional government to replace Moïse: "If Jovenel Moïse does not want to step down from power, we are going to name an interim president in the coming days." The Port-au-Prince newspaper Le Nouvelliste reported on 18 February 2019 that a Haitian citizen and seven non-Haitians were arrested in the city. At the time of their arrest, they were carrying rifles, pistols, drones, and satellite phones in their vehicle, which did not have any license plates. Haitian Foreign Minister Bocchit Edmond confirmed that among them were five Americans. According to the editor of Haiti Liberté, the group included two former Navy SEALs, a former Blackwater employee, and two Serbian mercenaries living in the U.S. They were tasked with protecting the former head of the National Lottery, who intended to transfer US$80 million from a PetroCaribe bank account—controlled jointly by the president, the prime minister, and the president of the Central Bank—to a bank account solely controlled by President Moïse. 2020–2022 In September and October 2020, more protests occurred throughout the country in reaction to the perception of an insufficient government response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Haiti, in particular concerning support for those who lost their jobs because of the lockdown. Due to the lack of parliamentary elections, Moïse was governing through executive orders. Police held protests demanding better pay and working conditions. The police exchanged fire with Haitian soldiers outside the National Palace where police were protesting working conditions in February. In early 2020, a United Nations report said the Haitian police was corrupt and failing to protect the population. On 4 December, the Haitian National Police undertook its first operation under Léon Charles into Village de Dieu, in an effort to subdue the Five Seconds Base gang with tanks. While Charles claimed success, eye-witnesses were less convinced. On 14 January 2021, hundreds demonstrated in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, Jacmel, Saint-Marc, and Gonaïves against Moïse. Most of the demonstrations were peaceful, but some violence was reported. On 20 January, hundreds again demonstrated in Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien to protest against Moïse. One woman was shot by rubber bullets, and several others were wounded during protests. On 28 January, journalists, lawmakers, police officers, retirees, former police officers, and human rights judges led protests against human rights abuses and police brutality, violence, and repression against protesters and chanted "When they don't get paid, we're the ones they call!" On 7 February supporters of the opposition against Moïse allegedly attempted a coup d'état, claiming he should have stepped down five years after the end of Michel Martelly's administration on 7 Feb 2016, despite the year-long delay before he was sworn in in 2017. Moïse stated he had been the target of an assassination attempt and ordered the arrest of 23 people, including three Supreme Court judges. Throughout February, clashes with protesters and security forces occurred in Port-au-Prince, and Jacmel. On 25 February, at least 25 were killed and many injured during a prison break at Croix-des-Bouquets Civil Prison, during which gang leader Arnel Joseph escaped. Joseph was later found and killed in L'Estère. Thousands of Haitians, including doctors and lawyers, demonstrated peacefully in Port-au-Prince on 7 and 9 March, under the slogan #FreeOurCountry, calling for Moïse and Prime Minister Joseph Jouthe to resign and a crackdown on kidnappers. The hashtag FreeHaiti led opposition demonstrations across Haiti on 15 March, to protest the killing of four police officers in a village in Port-au-Prince, corruption, and armed gangs controlling cities. On 17 March, the Fantom 509 militia staged a jailbreak to free four arrested police officers. In late March, protests were focused on the unpopular referendum to amend the constitution scheduled for 27 June ahead of legislative, local and presidential elections scheduled for the fall. In April, protesters circled the Presidential Palace seven times drawing Vodou images in chalk on the ground in an effort to symbolically free themselves from the scourge of gang kidnappings. The protest was met by police firing tear gas. On 7 July 2021, Moïse was assassinated, allegedly by a group of 28 foreign mercenaries. Later that day, USGPN (L'Unité de Sécurité Générale du Palais National, or The General Security Unit of the National Palace) killed three of the suspected assassins and arrested 20 others. On 20 July, Ariel Henry assumed the office of prime minister. In September 2021, Henry fired a prosecutor who intended to question him about the record of phone calls, which he denied receiving, in the hours after the assassination from Joseph Felix Badio, whose involvement in the crime was suspected. Badio was arrested by Haitian police in connection with the murder. A former Haitian senator, Joseph Joël John, who hoped to become president, a retired Colombian army officer, Germán Alejandro Rivera Garcia, a Haitian businessman, Rodolphe Jaar, and a former DEA informant, Joseph Vincent, were sentenced to life in prison in a Miami court for their roles in the assassination. In February 2024, the fifth Haitian judge to lead the murder investigation charged Moïse's wife Martine Moïse and his prime minister Claude Joseph as co-conspirators in the assassination in part based on testimony from Badio. Joseph said that Henry was "weaponizing the Haitian justice system" and that the charges against him and against Moïse's widow were politically motivated. At the same time, former police chief Léon Charles was charged with both murder and attempted murder. On 30 January, the Transition Council defined by the August 2021 Montana Accord (named for the hotel in Pétion-ville where it was signed) elected the former interim prime minister and former Central Bank governor Fritz Jean as president and Steven Benoît as prime minister for a two-year transition government. While the political class called for him to step down at the end of Moïse's term (7 February 2022), Henry rejected these demands, along with the results of the Montana Accord election, as a "distraction", saying that organizing the next elections was part of his mandate. In April–May 2022, major clashes between the rival gangs 400 Mawozo and Chen Mechan took place in the Plain of the Cul-de-Sac area. In July 2022, an outbreak of gang violence occurred in Port-au-Prince, leaving 89 people dead and over 74 injured. In December 2023, the U.S. sanctioned four gang leaders, one of whom—Johnson André—was the leader of the 5 Segond gang, which the U.S. Treasury Department identified as being responsible for over 1,000 cases of sexual violence in 2022. Rape—which only became a criminal offense in Haiti in 2005—is being used by gangs as a means of humiliating those living in rival gang neighborhoods. Abortion is illegal in Haiti, so rape victims are legally required to carry any resulting pregnancy to term in a country with one of the highest mortality rates for mothers outside of war zones in Sudan and Yemen. In September 2022, protests erupted, sparked by a governmental decision to eliminate fuel subsidies which caused prices to double overnight. Jimmy Chérizier, the leader of the G9 Family and Allies gang alliance, organized a blockade of the country's largest oil terminal (Varreux). Gangs gunned down prominent figures, including journalists and a politician in October and November. Protests continued even after the lifting of the blockade on 7 November. Since 2023 In 2023 the situation continued to escalate, with the last democratically elected officials leaving office, leaving Haiti without an elected government. Four police officers killed by the Vitel'Homme gang in Petion-ville and seven police officers killed by the Savien gang on 25 January in Liancourt led protesting police to storm Henry's residence. The riots ended a few days later. Canada announced on 6 February that they would begin surveillance flights to Haiti in order to monitor the situation in the country. According to leaked American documents in late February, the Wagner Group began to explore pathways and expressed interest in intervening in Haiti. A series of battles between gangs in early March led to the deaths of 208 people, and kidnappings jumped 72% from the first quarter of the previous year. Doctors, lawyers, and other wealthy members of society were kidnapped and held for ransom. Examples include Jean-Dickens and Abigail Toussaint, a Haitian American couple who were kidnapped on 18 March and later released; Robert Denis, the director of the TV station Canal Bleu kidnapped on 11 April; and Harold Marzouka, the Vice-Consul of Saint Kitts and Nevis and CEO of Haiti Plastics, kidnapped on 15 April. Many victims were killed when ransom demands were not met, leading many to flee the country, further hampering efforts to pull the country out of the crisis. Violence continued into April, with three police officers being killed in an ambush on 9 April by the Ti Makak gang in the Thomassin neighborhood. 13 gang members were burned alive by a mob as they were being detained by police. On 27 July, the United States ordered its non-essential personnel to leave the country as quickly as possible. This order was given the same day an American nurse and her child were kidnapped, with 80% of the capital reportedly controlled by gangs. On 30 July, Kenya agreed to lead a multinational peace mission in the country. On 18 September, the feuding G-Pèp and G9 gangs reached an agreement to form a so-called Viv Ansanm ("Live together") coalition. Any hope this inspired was short-lived however, as by 22 September, the Taliban gang of Canaan run by Jeff Larose was leading an attack on the touristic town of Saut-d'Eau at the request of 5 Seconds gang leader Johnson "Izo" Alexandre, resulting in many injuries and at least 12 deaths. The motive for the attack, which lasted several days and spread to Mirebalais, was thought to be related to arms smuggling. The growing crisis led to discussions of a Kenyan-led police intervention into Haiti, which Kenya had previously offered but which Haiti was at first reluctant to accept. On 2 October 2023, United Nations Security Council resolution 2699 was approved, authorizing the "multinational security support mission" to Haiti, which is the first time an African Union country led a major peacekeeping operation outside of Africa. On 5 October 2023, Kenyan foreign minister Alfred Mutua was replaced by Musalia Mudavadi amid domestic controversy over the plans. In a 2023 UN report Robert Muggah estimated there could be as many as half a million weapons in Haiti. When interviewed in 2024, he said that "more than 80 percent" of those traced by the "ATF between 2020 and 2022 were made [in] or imported from the U.S." A UN report issued on 15 January indicated that in 2023 there had been 2,490 kidnappings and 4,789 reported homicides. On 1 February, Joly Germine, a leader of the 400 Mawozo gang, pleaded guilty in a U.S. federal court to smuggling arms such as "AK-47s, AR-15s, an M4 carbine rifle, an M1A rifle, and a .50 caliber rifle, described by the ATF as a military weapon," into Haiti, piloting the operation from a Haitian prison. On 13 March an American blogger Addison Pierre Maalouf, ignoring the "do not travel" recommendations of the U.S. State Department, was kidnapped by the 400 Mawozo gang while seeking to interview Jimmy Chérizier. He blamed corrupt police officers for the ambush which led to 17 days of captivity and $50,000 in ransom he says was paid to secure his release. According to Maalouf's father, who paid the ransom, pressure brought by Chérizier on gang leader Lanmò Sanjou (literally "la mort sans jour") helped secure the blogger's release. A surge in gang violence caused significant casualties, with 1,554 deaths and 826 injuries in the first quarter of the year. Gangs used sexual violence as a means of control and punishment, with reports of women being raped during gang invasions of neighborhoods, often after witnessing the murder of their partners. Gangs are also known to force women into exploitative relationships and use the rape of hostages to extort ransoms from families. They are also known for recruiting children. Starting in January 2024, after his deportation following release from a US prison, former senator Guy Philippe, led protests demanding the resignation of Ariel Henry. He was aided by the Brigade de sécurité des aires protégées, an armed militia gone rogue. On 26 January, a judge from Kenya's High Court halted the deployment of Kenyan peace-keepers to Haiti, on the grounds that the National Security Council lacked authority to send police officers abroad. The Kenyan government said it would appeal the ruling, offering to circumvent the High Court's earlier ruling. On 25 February 2024, Michel Patrick Boisvert assumed interim leadership of the Haitian government while Prime Minister Henry traveled to Kenya to negotiate the deployment of Kenyan police forces to Haiti. On 29 February, a wave of violence broke out. Gunfire was directed at the main airport, and many businesses in the area and two police stations were seized, fueling speculation that an alliance between rival gangs was forming to overthrow the government. Chérizier released a video saying that the goal of the operation was to prevent Henry from returning to Haiti. Chérizier was said to have the support of other gangs as part of Viv Ansanm coalition; though that coalition was quick to dissolve, other gangs still launched attacks together with Chérizier's G9 gang. Gangs stormed jails after diversionary attacks on police stations, resulting in thousands of inmates being freed. As the security situation in Port-au-Prince deteriorated, on 3 March Boisvert issued a state of emergency. More than 160,000 people were displaced within Port-au-Prince, which was effectively under siege by the gang alliance. Looting at the main port put at risk 300 containers filled with foreign aid. On 5 March, with the Port-au-Prince airport shut down by gang attacks, Henry's chartered plane was also prevented from landing in Santo Domingo and was diverted to San Juan, Puerto Rico. Over the next days US military airlifted out its embassy personnel, and the European Union evacuated all diplomatic staff from Haiti. After the 8 March attack on the National Palace, schools and government offices remained closed in the capital amid continuing attacks on police stations, hospitals, and courthouses. On 11 March Henry announced that he would resign and that a transitional council (whose membership would be determined in Jamaica at an emergency CARICOM meeting) would select an interim prime minister. The Kenyan government suspended the deployment of peace-keepers until a new Haitian government was in place. On 13 March, the Pitit Desalin party led by Jean-Charles Moïse withdrew from the transitional council to create its own council, slated to include Guy Philippe, who had called for amnesty for some in the gangs whose actions brought down the Henry government. One week later, after encouragement from "a big country", Moïse reversed course and decided to name Emmanuel Vertilaire, on advice from the National Network of Farmers. It was reported that Philippe had lost significant support in Haïti by early April. On 24 March, Dominique Dupuy, who had replaced the only other woman on the council (Marie Ghislaine Mompremier) four days earlier, resigned after receiving death threats and becoming the target of misogynistic comments. She was replaced by Smith Augustin. The members of the Transitional Presidential Council (French Conseil présidentiel de transition, CPT) were: In addition, there were two observers, Frinel Joseph and Régine Abraham. After weeks of negotiation, a deal was sent to CARICOM on 7 April for a temporary government whose mandate will end on 7 February 2026. One of the council's tasks was to select a prime minister, who could not be one of the members of the council or the provisional government. On 12 April the government published a decree in Le Moniteur officially creating the transitional council and specifying its mandate. The decree omitted the names of the representatives of the seven parties, subject to government confirmation. The next day, the council rejected the governmental decree and called upon the members of the resigning government to publish the council's original agreement without modification. Differences introduced in the government decree included that individuals are ineligible for appointment to the Council if they have been sanctioned by the United Nations, if they are under criminal indictment or have been found guilty of a crime in any jurisdiction, and that members must support the introduction of the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti. On 16 April, the government published a second order modifying the decree to include the names which had initially been proposed by the transitional council. The members were sworn in on 25 April. On 28 May, the Presidential Transitional Council held a meeting to choose the next prime minister. Garry Conille, who was briefly prime minister during the Martelly administration and worked as former UN Special Envoy Bill Clinton's chief of staff, was unanimously designated by the six councillors present. On 15 March, police entered Delmas in an attempt to capture Chérizier. The next day, they attempted to secure the principal port in Port-au-Prince, which had been closed since 7 March due to the violence. On 17 March, a UNICEF aid container carrying critical items for infants and mothers was looted in the port, while 60% of hospitals nationally were unable to operate due to medicine and fuel shortages. Looting and vandalism at St. Francis de Sales hospital in Port-au-Prince caused damages estimated at US$3 million. Up to 20% of medical staff had left Haiti by the beginning of the year. Even before violence escalated shutting down all but one of the capital's hospitals, Haiti had the worst conditions for childbirth in Latin America and the Caribbean, with only "war-torn countries like Sudan and Yemen" having higher mortality rates. Gangs raided a power station and four substations, stealing equipment and leaving parts of the capital Port-au-Prince without power. On 18 March, 14 bodies were found after a gang attack in Petion-ville, a wealthy neighborhood. Police came to rescue an administrative judge when his home was attacked. UNICEF executive director Catherine Russell compared the anarchy to the film Mad Max. On 19 March, Le Nouvelliste reported that outside of the capital, schools and universities remained open and that activity in cities such as Cap-Haïtien, Jacmel, and Jérémie was relatively normal. Throughout the country, prices were rising, with agricultural products spoiling in warehouses. Banks ran out of cash and experienced liquidity problems in several areas, while the health sector and public transportation were also disrupted. Public transportation union leaders painted a grim picture of kidnappings and brigandage on the roads, as armed gangs continued their nearly 3-year-long control of the national highway system, demanding tolls to allow traffic to pass. With the closure of the Port-au-Prince airport, all travellers within the country were forced to use the dangerous roads. Of the 33,000 people who fled the capital in the two weeks following the escalation of violence, 90% did so by bus. On 22 March, a police union representative said that officers in the capital were unable to cash their paychecks at the state bank. No ships had entered the container port since 5 March, and the sound of gunshots could be heard throughout the capital. According to the WFP, nearly half the population was going hungry, with over 1.6 million on the edge of starvation (IPC-4) with pockets in or near the capital (Croix-des-Bouquets and Cité Soleil) risking a return to the catastrophic (IPC-5) levels at the end of 2022. According to Le Nouvelliste, "one of the worst-hit areas is the Artibonite Valley—the country's bread basket—where gangs took possession of land and stole harvests". On 27 March, it was announced that the U.S. would provide $10 million worth of surplus helmets, bulletproof vests, weapons, and ammunition to the Haitian National Police, though U.S. funding for the Multinational Security Support was stalled. Also 170 French nationals and 70 others had been evacuated that week by special forces aboard helicopters flown into Fort-de-France for transport on the carrier Tonnerre. While police were tied up with the 1 April gang attack on the National Palace, fires were set in the administrative building of the nearby Petit Séminaire Collège Saint-Martial. Four cars parked in the courtyard were completely burnt and others vandalised. Computers, refrigerators, mattresses, generators, water purifiers, and solar panels were stolen during the six-hour attack. Two days later, the National Library was pillaged of furniture and the generator damaged. The previous week the École nationale supérieure had been set aflame, and the National School of Arts was looted along with 10 pharmacies and two hospitals. On 6 April, police were able to regain control of the Magalie, a freighter at the Varreux terminal in Port-au-Prince whose crew had been kidnapped and whose cargo had been looted of 10,000 bags of rice by the 5 Seconds and Taliban gangs two days earlier. Neither the rice nor the crew members were recovered in the operation. The Taliban gang was also reported to have destroyed a police station in the Canaan. Through 20 May 2024, civilian flights into Toussaint Louverture International Airport remained suspended, though authorities had nationalized space around the perimeter of the airport and torn down 350 buildings to create a security buffer zone. On 12 November, a Spirit Airlines flight attendant was injured by gunfire. The U.S. FAA ordered all air traffic diverted to Cibao International Airport in the Dominican Republic after at least three planes were targeted while landing at Toussaint Louverture. The "bwa kale" movement, which had begun in 2023 when a group of armed men "lynched and set fire to around a dozen men believed to be gang members", continued apace in late March 2024. In one case, on 29 March 2024, two men suspected of buying arms for gangs were taken from police custody and hacked to pieces by a mob in a small town near Mirebalais. Pierre Espérance, director of the National Human Rights Defense Network in Haiti, expressed concern about the risk of the transitional council giving power to people linked to gangs, drawing attention to vigilante action as a "clear expression of Haitians' revulsion for gangs", and to "rank-and-file police officers [who] are revolting against the chief, who they say is tied to gangs." In 2024, Haiti experienced a tenfold increase in sexual violence against children, as reported by the United Nations. UNICEF spokesman James Elder said that armed groups have inflicted severe harm on children, turning their bodies into battlegrounds. Concurrently, escalating armed violence has led to the internal displacement of over half a million children, representing nearly one in eight children nationwide—a 48% rise since September 2023. The United States pledged $200 million to the international police force approved by the UN and an additional $100 million in humanitarian aid. Canada announced $123 million to support Haiti, including $80.5 million for the mission. As of March 2024, the U.N. indicated that $78 million had been formally pledged, of which $10.8 million had been deposited, by Canada and France. The US military began flying cargo planes into the Port-au-Prince airport on 23 April and by mid-May had transported over 500 tons of material, including equipment for the Haitian National Police, medical equipment, and food. On 26 June Kenya's first contingent of 400 elite police officers landed in Port-au-Prince's international airport after months of delay. In October the Kenyan officers had been joined by two dozen from Jamaica, but the numbers fell far short of the 2,500 pledged by various countries, including Chad, Benin, Bangladesh and Barbados. Kenyan President William Ruto and Prime Minister Conille met in Nairobi, and said Kenya would deploy 600 additional officers the next month. They called for more international funding, in addition to the $85 million in pledges to the U.N. for the mission, with $68 million received. The Kenyan commander in Haiti said the fight against the gangs "is winnable" although they still controlled up to 80% of the capital, and civilian vigilante groups continued to fight back. In early October the U.N. Security Council extended the mandate of the multinational force, though declined to transform it into a U.N. peacekeeping mission. The Gran Grif gang, initially armed by politician Prophane Victor and led by Luckson Elan, issued a warning that they would attack residents in Pont-Sondé who had allied themselves with a self-defense group, hindering the gang's toll collection on the road from Port-au-Prince to Cap-Haitien. Arriving in Pont-Sondé by canoe, the gang attack on 3 October killed at least 115 people, and over 6,300 people were displaced. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, some reporters have been targeted by protesters. Reuters journalist Robenson Sanon was wounded during the protests in February 2019 but believes that it was accidental during the melees. Journalist Rospide Petion was killed on his way home from the Radio Sans Fin in Port-au-Prince on 10 June 2019 by an unknown gunman. Some correspondents filming protests on 9–10 June 2019 were targeted by both police and the crowds. On 11 October 2019, Néhémie Joseph, another radio journalist critical of the government, was found dead in Mirebalais after receiving death threats. Freelance journalist Vladjimir Legagneur is presumed to have been killed in March 2018 while reporting on gang activity in Grande Ravine. On 22 October 2024, SOS Journalists and the Association of Haitian Journalists released statements calling upon authorities to take measures to protect journalists threatened by Viv Ansamm. Response According to an official source from the United States Congress, On 6 February 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the United States "will continue to support the mission" and that he had issued a waiver to allow approximately $40 million of security assistance to flow to the MSS mission and the Haitian National Police amid the Trump administration's foreign assistance "pause." In May 2025, the administration designated Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists. In 20 May testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rubio suggested that the Organization of American States (OAS) could play a larger role in Haiti and potentially coordinate a security mission, asserting that the MSS "alone will not solve this problem." Rubio stated that the Trump administration is "prepared to play a leading role" in supporting the OAS but that buy-in would be necessary from other partners in the region. See also References
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglophone_Crisis] \| [TOKENS: 22039]
Contents Anglophone Crisis The Anglophone Crisis (French: Crise anglophone), also known as the Ambazonia War, is an ongoing armed conflict in the English-speaking Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon, between the Cameroonian government and Ambazonian separatist groups, part of the long-standing Anglophone problem. Following the suppression of 2016–17 protests by Cameroonian authorities, separatists in the Anglophone regions (formerly collectively known as the Southern Cameroons) launched a guerrilla campaign and later proclaimed independence. Within two months, the government sent its army into the Anglophone regions. Starting as a low-scale insurgency, the conflict spread to most parts of the Anglophone regions within a year. By the summer of 2019, the government controlled the major cities and parts of the countryside, while the Ambazonian nationalists held parts of the countryside and regularly appeared in the major cities. Separatists have occasionally carried out raids into the neighboring Francophone regions of Littoral and West. Thousands of people have been killed in the war, and more than half a million have been forced to flee their homes. The Cameroonian government was supported by the Buhari administration in Nigeria, while at least one Ambazonian group is allied to Biafran separatists. Talks mediated by Switzerland in 2019 ultimately failed, and the Ambazonian leadership crisis has complicated any diplomatic process. Separatist leaders who were extradited from Nigeria in 2018 were in 2019 handed life sentences by a military tribunal. Facing mounting international pressure for a global ceasefire, in July 2020, Cameroon began negotiating with these imprisoned leaders. The talks were held between Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe and other imprisoned leaders and representatives of the Cameroonian government. The talks outlined a series of conditions for the Cameroonian government to accept, which Ayuk Tabe said would create an "enabling environment" for substantial negotiations to occur. These talks ultimately failed, and fighting continued. Background The name "Ambazonia" is taken from Ambas Bay and Ambozes, the local name of the mouth of the Wouri River. This is where the English language was permanently established for the first time in Southern Cameroons, when missionary Alfred Saker founded a settlement of freed slaves by Ambas Bay in 1858, which was later renamed Victoria (present-day Limbe). In 1884, the area became the British Ambas Bay Protectorate, with Victoria as its capital. Britain ceded the area to the German territory of Kamerun in 1887. Germany had some trouble establishing control over the hinterlands of Victoria, and fought the Bafut Wars against local fondoms until 1907. Following World War I and the Treaty of Versailles, Kamerun was divided between a French and a British League of Nations Mandate. The French mandate was known as Cameroun, and comprised most of the former German territory. The British mandate was an elongated strip of land along the border of Colonial Nigeria, consisting of Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons, including the historical Ambas Bay Protectorate. This territory was organized as British Cameroons. The British administered the territories through indirect rule, allowing native authorities to administer the population according to their own traditions. In 1953, the Southern Cameroons delegation at a conference in London asked for a separate region. The British agreed, and Southern Cameroons became an autonomous region with its capital still at Buea. Elections were held in 1954 and the parliament met on 1 October 1954, with E. M. L. Endeley as Premier. The United Nations organised a plebiscite in the region on 11 February 1961 which put two alternatives to the people: union with Nigeria or union with Cameroon. The third option, independence, was opposed by the British representative to the UN Trusteeship Council, Sir Andrew Cohen, and as a result was not listed. In the plebiscite, 60% of voters in the Northern Cameroons voted for union with Nigeria, while 70% of voters in the Southern Cameroons opted for union with Cameroon. The results owed partly to a fear of domination by much larger Nigeria. Endeley was defeated in elections on 1 February 1959 by John Ngu Foncha. Southern Cameroons federated with Cameroon on 1 October 1961 as "West Cameroon", with its own prime minister. However, the English-speaking peoples of the Southern Cameroons did not believe that they were fairly treated by the 80% majority French-speaking government of the country. Then-president Ahmadou Ahidjo feared that Southern Cameroons would secede from the union, taking its natural resources with it. Following a French Cameroon unilateral referendum on 20 May 1972, a new constitution was adopted in Cameroon which replaced the federal state with a unitary state, and also gave more power to the president. Southern Cameroons lost its autonomous status and became the Northwest Region and the Southwest Region of the Republic of Cameroon. Pro-independence groups claimed that this violated the constitution, as the majority of deputies from West Cameroon had not consented to legitimize the constitutional changes. They argued that Southern Cameroons had effectively been annexed by Cameroon. Shortly afterwards, French Cameroun's political leadership changed the constitution again, appointed French-speaking Paul Biya as Prime Minister and successor to Ahmadou Ahidjo. In a memorandum dated 20 March 1985, Anglophone lawyer and President of the Cameroon Bar Association Fongum Gorji Dinka wrote that the Cameroonian government led by Paul Biya was unconstitutional and announced the former Southern Cameroons should become independent as the Republic of Ambazonia. Dinka was incarcerated the following January without trial. Three years later, he escaped to Nigeria. In 1993, representatives of Anglophone groups convened the first All Anglophone Conference (AAC1) in Buea. The conference issued the "Buea Declaration", which called for constitutional amendments to restore the 1961 federation. This was followed by the second All Anglophone Conference (AAC2) in Bamenda in 1994. This conference issued the "Bamenda Declaration", which stated that if the federal state was not restored within a reasonable time, Southern Cameroons would declare its independence. The AAC was renamed the Southern Cameroons Peoples Conference (SCPC), and later the Southern Cameroons Peoples Organisation (SCAPO), with the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) as the executive governing body. Younger activists formed the Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) in Buea on 28 May 1995. The SCNC sent a delegation, led by John Foncha, to the United Nations, which was received on 1 June 1995 and presented a petition against the 'annexation' of the Southern Cameroons by French Cameroon. This was followed by a signature referendum the same year, which the organisers claim produced a 99% vote in favour of independence with 315,000 people voting. SCNC activities were routinely disrupted by police. On 23 March 1997, about ten people were killed in a raid on a gendarme camp in Bamenda. The police arrested between 200 and 300 people, mostly SCNC supporters, but also members of the Social Democratic Front, an opposition party with significant support in the Anglophone regions. In the subsequent trials, Amnesty International and the SCNC found substantive evidence of admissions through torture and force. The raid and trial resulted in a shutdown of SCNC activities. In response to this, in April 1998 a small faction elected Esoka Ndoki Mukete, a high-ranking member of the Social Democratic Front, as the new chair of the SCNC. In October 1999, when many of the accused were found guilty in the 1997 trial, the faction led by Mukete became more assertive. On 1 October 1999, militants took over Radio Buea to proclaim the independence of Southern Cameroons, but failed to do so before security forces intervened. The leadership and many members of the SCNC were subsequently arrested. After clashes with the police, the SCNC was officially declared illegal by the Cameroonian authorities in 2001. In 2006, a faction of SCNC once again declared the independence of Ambazonia. Prelude On 6 October 2016, the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium, an organization consisting of lawyer and teacher trade unions in the Anglophone regions, initiated a strike. Led by Barrister Agbor Balla, Fontem Neba, and Tassang Wilfred, they were protesting against the appointment of Francophone judges in the Anglophone regions. They saw this as threatening the common law system in the Anglophone regions, as well as part of the general marginalization of Anglophones. The strikes were supported by peaceful protests in the cities of Bamenda, Buea and Limbe. The activists demanded protection of the law system of the Anglophone regions and opposed the civil law system used by the Francophone magistrate replacing the common law system. They asked for several laws to be translated into English, and that the common law system should be taught at the University of Buea and the University of Bamenda. The Cameroonian government deployed security forces to crack down the protests. Protesters were attacked with tear gas, and protesters and lawyers were allegedly assaulted by soldiers. Throughout November 2016, thousands of teachers in the Anglophone regions joined the lawyers' strike. All schools in the Anglophone regions were shut down. Two weeks into the protests, more than 100 protesters had been arrested, and six were reported dead. Unconfirmed videos released over social media showed various violent scenes, including the beating of protesters by policemen. In January 2017, the Cameroonian government set up a committee to initiate a dialogue with the lawyer activists. The lawyers refused to talk, demanding that all arrested activists be released before any dialogue. The lawyers submitted a draft for a federal state, and the government responded by banning their movements altogether. The protesters were now openly regarded as a security threat by the Cameroonian government, and more arrests followed. The government also implemented an Internet blockade in cities across the Anglophone regions. At this point, the crisis began to attract international responses. More than 13,000 Anglophone Cameroonians living in Maryland protested against the Cameroonian government crackdown. On 27 June, United States Congressman Anthony Brown filed a petition with the United States Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, to call for the government of Cameroon to immediately show concern and solve the ongoing crises. The United States condemned the loss of life and brutality against Anglophone protesters. Many separatists and federalists hoped that the crackdown would lead to an international military intervention against the Cameroonian government. The government crackdown on the protests contributed to mainstream separatist movements. In September 2017, Ambazonian separatists began to take up arms against the government. Timeline In early September 2017, the Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC), a separatist movement established in 2013 through the merger of several groups, formally deployed the Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF) in Southern Cameroons. On 9 September, the ADF carried out its first military action, attacking a military base in Besongabang, Manyu. Three Cameroonian soldiers were killed in the attack, while the ADF claimed their soldiers managed to return to base unreduced. Throughout September, separatists carried out two bombings; one targeting security forces in Bamenda, and another targeting police officers. While the first bombing failed, the second injured three policemen. On 22 September, Cameroonian soldiers opened fire on protesters, killing at least five and injuring many more. On 1 October, the Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF), an umbrella movement consisting of several independence movements, unilaterally declared the independence of Ambazonia. This declaration was followed by mass demonstrations across the Anglophone regions. The separatists strategically chose this date, as it is the anniversary for the unification of Cameroon and Southern Cameroons. SCACUF would later transform itself into the Interim Government of Ambazonia (IG). Several months into the war, the IG would reject the idea of an armed struggle, preferring instead a diplomatic campaign and civil disobedience. This stance would eventually change. The Cameroonian Army moved into the regions in force to fight the separatists and quell the demonstrations. Throughout the day, at least eight demonstrators were killed in Buea and Bamenda. The Cameroonian military also reinforced the Nigerian border, and on 9 October, it claimed to have stopped "hundreds of Nigerian fighters" from crossing into Cameroon. Throughout November, eight soldiers, at least 14 civilians and five fugitives were confirmed killed due to the conflict. Separatists killed two gendarmes in Bamenda in the first week of the month. On the last two days of November, five soldiers and five policemen were killed in two separate separatist attacks near Mamfe. On 1 December, the Cameroonian government ordered the evacuation of 16 villages in Manyu ahead of a military offensive, and on 4 December it formally declared war on the separatists. The Cameroonian Army moved into Manyu, retaking two villages on 7 December and securing Mamfe by 15 December, partly with elite troops. During the offensive, the ADF carried out guerrilla attacks on the Cameroonian Army, killing at least seven soldiers throughout December. On 18 December, the Cameroonian Army began to destroy dozens of civilian homes in retaliation, and killed several civilians. The December offensive also saw occasional spillover across the Nigerian border. By the end of 2017, several separatist militias had emerged, with the ADF standing out as the most prominent one. During the guerrilla campaign in Manyu and Mezam, it had clashed with the army 13 times. The separatists had also spread out, and by the end of the year, they were active in five departments. The separatists suffered a major setback at the beginning of 2018. On 5 January, members of the IG were detained by Nigerian authorities, which proceeded to hand them over to Cameroon. A total of 69 leaders and activists were extradited to Cameroon and subsequently arrested, including President Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe. Since most of the individuals had submitted asylum claims, the deportation immediately became controversial, as it possibly violated the Nigerian constitution. They spent 10 months at a gendarme headquarters, before being transferred to a maximum security prison in Yaoundé. Samuel Ikome Sako was announced as Acting President on 4 February, replacing Tabe for the time being. January saw an escalation in guerrilla attacks on symbolic targets, as well as repeated spillover into Nigeria. The separatists began to target traditional village chiefs, as well as local administrators whom they accused of siding with the security forces. Attacks on gendarmes intensified, and gunmen also began to target schools to enforce a school boycott. On 24 February, separatists abducted the government's regional representative for social affairs in the Northwest Region, apparently looking to exchange him for imprisoned separatist activists. The Battle of Batibo was fought on 3 March, producing unprecedented casualties on both sides and forcing over 4,000 locals to flee. On 20 March, Cameroonian soldiers freed two Cameroonian and one Tunisian hostage in Meme Department. A similar operation freed seven Swiss, six Cameroonian and five Italian hostages on 4 April, prompting the ADF to declare that it did not take hostages nor target foreigners. On 25 April, separatists forced the Cameroonian Army to retreat from the town of Belo. Throughout May, there were heavy clashes in Mbonge and Muyuka, resulting in heavy casualties. On 20 May, in an effort to boycott celebrations of Cameroon's National Day, Ambazonian forces struck in several villages throughout Southern Cameroons, including Konye, Batibo and Ekona, and abducted the mayor of the town of Bangem. On 24 May, Cameroonian soldiers killed at least 30 people while storming a hotel in Pinyin. By the end of May, Cameroon had also retaken Belo, though fighting continued around the town, which was almost completely abandoned by its inhabitants. In mid-June, Ambazonian forces started a blockade of the Kumba-Buea highway at Ekona, a town located approximately 10 kilometers from Buea. A military assault on the separatists in Ekona failed to lift the blockade. While casualties related to the battle of Ekona remain unconfirmed, the Cameroonian government later declared that more than 40 soldiers and policemen died in the later half of June across Southern Cameroons. By now, the war had fully extended to Buea, with separatists mounting road blocks and attacking government soldiers on 29 June. Attacks in Buea intensified in July, with one invasion on 1 July, another on 9 July and another on 30 July. On 16 August, separatists attacked a convoy transporting a member of parliament in Babungo, Ngo-Ketunjia Department, killing at least four soldiers. A civilian who got caught in the crossfire was also killed. Eight days later, a successful guerrilla attack killed two gendarmes and wounded a brigade commander in Zhoa in Wum, Northwest Region. As a response, the Cameroonian Army burned down the village. September saw some setbacks for the separatists, as the government launched attacks into the rural areas they controlled. There was heavy fighting in Muyuka, where Cameroon launched an offensive. The Cameroonian Army enjoyed some success in weeding out separatist camps. In a particularly lethal raid on 4 September, Cameroonian soldiers killed 27 suspected separatists near Zhoa. Another raid on separatist camps near Chomba killed at least 15 separatists. The separatists also had their successes; On 9 September 50 or more separatists successfully carried out three coordinated attacks on multiple targets in Oku, burning down the police station, destroying the Assistant Division Officer's belongings, stealing a police van and abducting three police officers. On 11 September, separatists took control of two neighborhoods of Buea, blocking the main entrances to the city and killing a soldier from the Rapid Intervention Brigade (BIR). An attempt was also made to abduct the Fon of Buea. On 27 September, separatists forced the police and gendarmes to retreat from Balikumbat, Ngo-Ketunjia. Despite government offensives in September, the separatists remained in control of many rural and urban areas. On 30 September, in anticipation of the first anniversary of Ambazonia's declaration of independence on 1 October, the authorities imposed a 48-hour curfew throughout the Anglophone region. This was done to prevent a re-occurrence of the mass demonstrations that took place the year before. People were forbidden from moving across sub-division boundaries, and gatherings of four or more people in public were prohibited. Businesses were shut down and motor parks were closed as well. Meanwhile, in anticipation of the Cameroonian presidential election on 7 October, the separatists started enforcing a lock-down of their own, blocking major highways with trees or car wrecks. Throughout the day, security forces and separatists clashed in Buea, Bamenda and other cities. By October, the conflict had spread to most of Southern Cameroons. The ADF alone had clashed with the army 83 times, separatist militias were now active in 12 divisions, and attacks were now more lethal. According to an International Crisis Group analyst, by October the war had reached a stalemate, with the army being unable to defeat the separatists, while the separatists were not militarily strong enough to expel the army. Others described the separatists as severely outgunned and on the verge of defeat, mostly due to their lack of access to proper weapons. On 7 October, the day of the Cameroonian presidential election, there were clashes all over Southern Cameroons with both sides blaming the other; the Cameroonian government claimed that separatists moved to prevent what they considered a foreign election to take place in the Anglophone regions, while the separatists blamed the government for instigating the violence. This resulted in a very low turnout, as "more than 90 percent of residents" fled violence in some localities; and in many cases no officials showed up to man the polling stations. In Bamenda, at least 20 separatist fighters moved around openly to prevent people from voting. Two separatists were killed by government troops while attacking a polling station. Following the election, two people from Kumba were murdered for having voted. On 17 October, SDF President John Fru Ndi's house in Bamenda was set on fire by armed men. On 23 October, the Cameroonian Army launched simultaneous attacks on seven or more separatist camps in the Northwest Region, initiating battles that continued for more than 24 hours. At least 30 separatists were killed, as well as an unknown number of Cameroonian soldiers. In the beginning of November, 79 students and four staff members were kidnapped from a school in Nkwen, near Bamenda. All 79 students were released without ransom three days later. The Ambazonia Self-Defence Council claimed that they not only had nothing to do with the kidnappings, but had also sent its own fighters to try to locate the children. November also saw several major confrontations. On 11 November, according to the separatists, 13 Cameroonian soldiers and two separatists were killed when separatists carried out a successful ambush. The next day, Cameroonian soldiers ambushed and killed at least 13 suspected separatists in Donga-Mantung, and another 25 near Nkambé the next day. On 22 November, around 40 Ambazonian fighters and unarmed civilians were killed in Bali by government soldiers, who then set their corpses on fire. With no trace of bullet wounds on any of the bodies, unconfirmed reports alleged the use of chemicals by the soldiers. On 28 November, separatists blocked the Buea-Kumba Highway. The month also saw the first major spillover into other parts of Cameroon; On 29 November, at least 30 people were kidnapped by ten unidentified gunmen in Bangourain, West Region, and transported with canoes across the Lake Bamendjing reservoir. A month later, two suspected separatists were lynched by the villagers, and the Cameroonian Army launched an offensive nearby. Bangourain was attacked once more on 22 December, prompting the separatists to accuse the government of carrying out a false flag operation to incite Cameroonian Francophones. In Kembong, just south of Mamfe, a military vehicle hit a road bomb; no soldiers died, but the vehicle was destroyed. December saw more burning of houses by government soldiers in Romajia, Kikiakom and Ekona. On 15 December, at least five separatists were summarily executed, possibly by fellow separatists. On 21 December, ADF General Ivo Mbah was killed during a military raid in Kumba. On 31 December, the presidents of Cameroon and Ambazonia addressed the ongoing conflict in their end of year speeches. President Paul Biya of Cameroon promised to "neutralize" all separatists who refused to disarm, while emphasizing that anyone who drops their guns can be reintegrated into society. Interim President Sako of Ambazonia said that the separatists would switch from a defensive to an offensive strategy in the war, and announced that a Mobile Wing Police would be created to capture territory and defeat government militias. He also condemned anyone engaged in kidnappings of civilians, and promised to fight back against anyone involved in such practices. The same night, separatist fighters attacked the convoy of the Governor of the Northwest Region, injuring at least one government soldier. The Cameroonian Army also announced the killing of Lekeaka Oliver, Field Marshall of the Red Dragon militia, in Lebialem; the killing was denied by the IG, and was also denied by sources within the Cameroonian Army. Oliver resurfaced in a video a week later, proving that reports of his death were false. 2019 started off with further escalation of the war. On 6 January, Anglophone Cameroonians in the diaspora organized protests to mark the first anniversary of the arrest of the Ambazonian leadership. Throughout the day, armed clashes took place in Muyuka, Bafut, Mundum and Mamfe. In Mamfe, two Ambazonian generals were killed when their camps were raided by the BIR. On 24 January, General Andrew Ngoe of SOCADEF was killed in Matoh, Mbonge. January also saw the start of the trials of the Ambazonian leaders, including Ayuk Tabe, who had spent a year in prison. The trial was complicated by all the Ambazonian leaders rejecting their Cameroonian nationality, which the court ultimately ignored. The leaders then refused to be tried by Francophone judges. On 1 March, the trial took a diplomatic twist; a Nigerian court determined that the deportation of the Ambazonian leadership had been unconstitutional, and ordered their return to Nigeria. Nevertheless, the trial resumed. The separatists got bolder with enforcing lockdowns. The same day as the start of the trial, the streets of Buea were almost completely deserted. On 4 February, in anticipation of Youth Day on 11 February, separatists declared a 10-day lockdown, telling people all across the Anglophone regions to stay at home from 5–14 February. The lockdown was a matter of controversy among the separatists, with a spokesperson of the Ambazonia Defence Forces arguing that it would be counterproductive. The next day, large parts of Buea were closed down, while armed clashes took place in Muea and Muyuka. Most of Bamenda was also closed down, with smaller clashes taking place. In Muyuka, an Ambazonian Colonel was killed alongside two other separatist fighters. In Mbengwi, two separatists died while attacking the Divisional Office there. As a result of the lockdown, Youth Day celebrations had negligible turnout in Southern Cameroons. In Bamenda, the Governor of Northwest Region, Adolph Lele l'Afrique, was escorted by soldiers to attend a small celebration. The military escort came under fire while driving to the ceremony, possibly resulting in casualties. The celebrations were boycotted in most major cities in the Anglophone regions, including Buea, Kumbo, Belo, Ndop, Ndu, Wum, Muyuka, Mamfe, Tombem, Mundemba and Lebialem, while there was a comparatively significant turnout in Nkambe. Early March saw two serious kidnapping incidents; one on the Kumba-Buea Highway, which was quickly foiled by the BIR, and one at the University of Buea, where more than 15 students were kidnapped, beaten and released. The separatists set up several road blocks, including an overnight mission where the Seven Karta militia blocked the Bafut-Bamenda Highway with concrete walls On 14 March, Cameroonian soldiers burned down several houses in Dunga Mantung and Menchum, and killed at least 12 people (several of whom were burned alive). At the end of March, an ADF leader announced that they would take the war into the French-speaking parts of Cameroon. A week later, separatists – possibly the ADF – raided Penda Mboko, Littoral Region, and injured three gendarmes. This was done in defiance of the IG. On 31 March, various Ambazonian independence movements agreed to form the Southern Cameroons Liberation Council (SCLC), a united front consisting of both separatists and federalists. On 4 April, separatists imposed a 10-day lockdown on Buea. On 9 April, the newly established SCLC declared an early end to lockdown, citing how it mainly affected civilians. However, the Ambazonia Self-Defence Council (ASC), the armed wing of the IG, declared that the SCLC had no authority to call off the lockdown without consulting it first. On 14 April, four Cameroonian soldiers and three separatist fighters were killed in Bali. In Ekona, at least six people were killed in a government offensive. The next day, security forces carried out mass arrests in Buea as they searched for separatist bases. On 24 April, gunmen burned down the house of the mayor of Fundong. On 27 April, SDF leader John Fru Ndi was kidnapped in Kumbo by separatists, but was released the same day. Fru Ndi had travelled to Kumbo to attend the funeral of Joseph Banadzem, the Parliamentary group leader of the SDF. Local separatist fighters had consented to the funeral taking place, provided that no Francophone Cameroonians attended it. On 30 April, government soldiers killed one person and burned at least 10 houses in Kikaikelaiki, Bui. May saw the Anglophone Crisis get some international attention. On 5 May, following appeals by the European Union Parliament, it was announced that the Anglophone Crisis would be debated at the United Nations Security Council. Days later, the Cameroonian government announced it was ready for an "inclusive" dialogue where anything except Ambazonian independence could be discussed. Meanwhile, a leadership crisis erupted within the IG, forcing smaller separatist movements to pick their loyalties. In June, the separatists announced that they had started producing their own weapons in the warzone. Shortly afterwards, a mine killed four policemen and wounded another six, convincing many that the separatists were no longer outgunned, but indeed well-armed. The same month, it was revealed that the government of Cameroon and separatist movements would enter negotiations. On 27 June, John Fru Ndi was kidnapped for the second time in two months. Heavy fighting took place in July. On 3 July, separatists ambushed a military boat carrying 13 Cameroonian soldiers on the Ekpambiri river, Manyu Division. Three soldiers managed to escape, two were rescued, one was found dead after five days, and seven remain unaccounted for. The Cameroonian Army declared that they knew which base the attackers had come from, and that an operation would be launched to destroy it. On 8 July, at least two gendarmes were killed and several more were wounded in an ambush in Ndop. On 11 July, at least seven separatist fighters were killed in Esu. The next day, armed men kidnapped 30 bus passengers passing through Belo, in an apparent case of infighting among local separatist militias. One Cameroonian soldier and three separatists were killed in Buea on 14 July, and at least one Cameroonian soldier and at least five separatists were killed in Mbiame three days later. Towards the end of July, two major prison riots took place. On 22 July, separatist inmates at Kondengui Central Prison took part in staging a protest against the prison conditions. The protest escalated into a riot, which was eventually quelled violently. A similar protest and crackdown took place at Buea Central Prison a few days later. More than 100 inmates were moved to undisclosed locations for detention, some of whom were subjected to torture, and there were speculations that some had been killed during the riots. The IG demanded that the Cameroonian government account for the missing inmates, threatening to impose a lockdown encompassing the entire Anglophone regions if it failed to do so. The lockdown started on 29 July. Midnight to 31 July, the ten detained members of the IG, including Ayuk Tabe, went on a hunger strike over the missing convicts. On 4 August, separatist fighters ambushed and killed a soldier and his civilian driver in Penda Mboko, Littoral Region, the second attack there since March. On 14 August, in an effort to sabotage the new school year, separatist militias announced that region-wide lockdowns would be enforced on 2–6 September and 9–13, covering the first two weeks of the academic year. On 15 August, at least seven soldiers from the BIR were injured when their vehicle skidded off the road in Kumba; while separatists claimed responsibility for the incident, the army claimed it was simply a road accident. On 20 August, the ten detained members of the IG, including Ayuk Tabe, were sentenced to life imprisonment by the Yaoundé Military Tribunal. This was followed by a military escalation and a series of lockdowns, crushing hopes that the school year could start as normal in early September. Within a week, violence and uncertainty had triggered tens of thousands of people to flee from the Anglophone regions. Due to the escalation, a government-led effort to reopen at least 4,500 schools by 2 September ultimately failed. In September, President Paul Biya announced the Major National Dialogue, a political dialogue that would be held before the end of the month. While separatists were quick to reject the initiative, citing the recent life sentences handed to the separatist leaders, opposition parties in Cameroon showed interest in the initiative and started submitting proposals. Meanwhile, the war continued; on 20 September, separatist fighters launched a failed attack on a hotel in Bamenda where several government officials were staying. While the Major National Dialogue was happening, a significant number of Anglophones celebrated Ambazonia's third independence day on 1 October. Nine people were killed in clashes all across the Anglophone regions that day, while "Field Marshall" Lekeaka Oliver of the Red Dragon militia used the occasion to declare himself Paramount Ruler of Lebialem. October also saw the public surrender of Ambazonian general Ekeom Polycarp, who was subsequently assassinated by other separatists. The separatists also started opening "community schools" across the Anglophone regions, providing an alternative to the government-run schools which they had boycotted for years. On 1 December, separatist fighters carried out their first attack on an airplane, firing at a Camair-Co passenger plane while it was landing at Bamenda Airport. No one was wounded in the attack, although several bullets penetrated into the cabin. This incident was the first of its kind, and possibly indicated that the separatists would take on larger government targets. The AGovC announced that the airline in question often transported soldiers, and that they thus considered their aircraft to be legitimate targets. The separatists also started their campaign to sabotage the upcoming 2020 Cameroonian parliamentary election, and within a week they abducted some 40 politicians, including two mayors and at least 19 councilors. A separatist attack on a civilian truck with a military escort left some three civilians dead on 19 December. Cameroon also launched a series of operations in Mezam, Boyo, Donga Mantung, Bui, Ngo Ketunjia and Boyo that would, over six days, force around 5,500 people to flee their homes. In their respective New Year speeches on 31 December, President Paul Biya of Cameroon and Samuel Ikome Sako of Ambazonia both promised to intensify the war in 2020. Separatist forces started the new year by declaring a five-day lockdown for February, intended to prevent the upcoming parliamentary election from taking place in the Anglophone regions. Clashes took place in Buea and Muyuka, where separatists burned down the office of the Divisional Officer. On 6 January, after failing to listen to demands from fellow separatists not to terrorize civilians, separatist commander "General Divine" was assassinated by his own men. Following instances of popular uprisings against the separatists in Balikumbat and Babungo, the ADF ordered its fighters to take action against anyone caught terrorizing civilians. January also saw what was possibly the most serious instance of separatist infighting to date; the Southern Cameroons Restoration Forces (loyal to the IG) abducted 40 fighters from the Ambazonia Defence Forces, six of whom were subsequently murdered. "General Chacha", the separatist commander responsible for the abduction, was captured and summarily executed by Cameroonian soldiers a week later. A parliamentary election was held in February, and was marked by unprecedented escalation on both sides. Hundreds of additional troops were deployed to combat separatist attempts to sabotage the election, while the separatists abducted 120 politicians within the two weeks preceding the election. Efforts by the Cameroonian government to prevent a repeat of the debacle surrounding the 2018 presidential election ultimately failed, as the turnout in the Anglophone regions was very low. The Ambazonians, who claimed that 98 percent of the population boycotted the election, hailed this as a great victory. The results in 11 constituencies were later nullified due to separatist activities, triggering a partial re-election in March. The results were largely the same, with a marginal turnout and clashes taking place throughout the day. Less than a week after the February election, Cameroonian soldiers and armed Fulani carried out the Ngarbuh massacre, killing at least 23 civilians in Ntumbo, Northwest Region and drawing international condemnation. On 1 March, Cameroonian soldiers raped 20 women, killed one man, and burned and plundered houses in Ebam, Southwest Region. 36 people were taken to a military camp, where many were subjected to severe beating and torture. One person later died in captivity. The others were released between 4–6 March, after their families had paid money. On 7 March, around 20 separatist fighters carried out attacks on a police station and gendarmerie in Galim, West Region, killing two gendarmes, two police officers and four civilians. This was the third separatist attack in West Region. The next day, an improvised explosive device killed one soldier and injured four soldiers, two police officers and one civilian in Bamenda. Cameroon subsequently carried out an offensive in Ngo-Ketunjia, where it claimed to have destroyed 10 separatist camps and killed at least 20 fighters, including some of those who had participated in the Galim raid. On 26 March, SOCADEF declared a two-week ceasefire to give people time to get tested for COVID-19, a move that was welcomed by the United Nations. The IG and the AGovC declared their willingness to have their armed groups follow suit, but conditioned it on international monitoring and Cameroonian troops being confined to their bases. The same day as SOCADEF's unilateral ceasefire went into effect and, coincidentally, the same day as the first COVID-19 case was confirmed in the Anglophone regions, President Sako declared the shutting of Ambazonia's borders and restriction of movement and public gatherings in order to limit the spreading of the virus, effective from 1 April. However, the danger posed by COVID-19 did not bring about an immediate end of hostilities on the ground; just the day before Sako's declaration, separatists attacked an armored car, killing a soldier and 11 officials, including two deputy mayors. On 8 April, responding to claims by the Cameroonian government that the war was nearing an end, separatists attacked military bases and destroyed infrastructure in villages all across the Anglophone regions. While SOCADEF extended its unilateral ceasefire, separatists carried out coordinated attacks on several villages, assassinated members of a traditional council and abducted three government officials. Towards the end of the month, Cameroon initiated Operation Free Bafut, a series of raids in and around Bafut that aimed at completely rooting out separatist presence in the area. On 1 May, Cameroon announced the deaths of two separatist commanders known as General Alhaji and General Peace Plant; separatists confirmed the loss. There were also civilian casualties; one person was killed by soldiers on the first day of the operation. Local villagers claimed that 13 civilians were killed in the fighting; this was denied by the Cameroonian Army. On 10 May, separatist fighters assassinated the newly elected mayor of Mamfe, Ashu Priestly Ojong, and hours later the chief of the Babeke Telecentre, Kimi Samson, was murdered as well by suspected separatists. Tribal clashes took place in Ndu, where armed Fulani killed two civilians. On 19 May, one of the imprisoned members of the original cabinet of the IG, Barrister Shufai, who had been transferred to a hospital four days prior, was chained up and mistreated by guards. Shufai had been transferred to the hospital following 10 days of deteriorating health, and was unconscious when he arrived. He was then sent back to Kondengui Central Prison, despite the fact that he was immunocompromised and the risk of getting COVID-19 in a crowded prison. His treatment was condemned by his lawyers and by Human Rights Watch. The next day, Cameroon celebrated its annual Unity Day. Separatists had already announced a lockdown from 19 to 21 May, and fighters patrolled public places during the holiday to enforce the lockdown. According to the Cameroonian military, six people were killed in clashes in the preceding week. Separatists claimed to have abducted nine or more people who had watched the celebrations on TV. In Bamenda, the Cameroonian Army claimed to have discovered and disarmed several improvised explosive devices. On 24 May, the Cameroonian military set up a military base in Ngarbuh, with the stated aim of cutting off a separatist supply route from Nigeria. Within a week, more than 300 villagers had fled, fearing the presence of soldiers and a repeat of the Ngarbuh massacre. Four days later, Cameroonian soldiers killed four unarmed men in Buea. Another person was killed by soldiers in Mbiame. Towards the end of the month, separatists drew condemnation from Human Rights Watch for abducting and maltreating a humanitarian worker and members of a non-profit organization. All were eventually released. On 1 June, at least five Cameroonian soldiers were killed in a separatist ambush in Otu, Manyu. An unspecified number of soldiers were also wounded in the ambush. The next day, it was reported that Pidgin journalist Samuel Wazizi, who had been arrested on 3 August 2019 over alleged ties with separatists, had died at a military hospital after being tortured by Cameroonian soldiers. Cameroonian authorities confirmed Wazizi's death three days after the initial reports, reiterated the original accusation against Wazizi, and attributed his death to "severe sepsis". In Malende, Kumba, the Cameroonian Army carried out an operation to expel separatists from the area. According to Cameroon, seven separatists were killed as the Cameroonian Army overran their base. On 5 June, separatist fighters killed a gendarmerie commander in Njikwa. In mid-June, the Cameroonian Army launched two separate operations that killed a total of 24 separatists over four days; 11 in Mbokam, and 13 in Bali, Batibo and Widikum. Cameroon claimed to have suffered one dead and one wounded during the battles. During the four days of fighting, the Cameroonian Army lifted a blockade of the Bamenda-Enugu Road, where rebels had extorted money from travellers. Separatists condemned the blockade and denied having anything to do with it. In June, Cameroon planned to start rebuilding the Anglophone regions with the support of the UNDP. In response, separatists declared a three-day lockdown all across the Anglophone regions. Meanwhile, two explosive devices detonated in Yaoundé, raising suspicions that the separatists were now taking the war to Cameroon's capital; the Cameroonian police had warned about this back in January. Another explosion in the beginning of July wounded two people. Following the explosions, security forces started raiding houses in neighborhoods where displaced Anglophones were living. In the following days, many Anglophones accused the authorities of abuses. In early July, Cameroon launched "Operation Ngoke-Bui", a series of raids on separatist camps in Ngo-Ketunjia, in which 17 separatists and at least one Cameroonian soldier were killed. By the end of June, The Africa Report reported that Cameroon had largely pushed the separatists out of Buea (although they later clashed with the army there in early-July), where there had been much fighting back in 2018. Separatist militias in Northwest Region suffered heavy losses during operations in June, and a source in the Cameroonian military claimed that Cameroon was close to winning the war. Other sources claimed that neither side was winning, and that internal discontent was forcing Cameroon towards a ceasefire. International calls for a global ceasefire to deal with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic also put pressure on the Cameroonian government. On 2 July, Cameroonian officials met with the imprisoned leaders of the IG to discuss a ceasefire. Ayuk Tabe listed three conditions for a ceasefire; that it would be announced by President Biya, that the Cameroonian military would pull out of the Anglophone regions, and a general amnesty for separatists. According to an article published in The New Humanitarian "The two rounds of "pre-talks" – the last reportedly on 2 July – have been held outside the Kondengui Central Prison where Sisiku is being held and are seen as "confidence-building" steps." These talks were condemned by other factions of the Ambazonia independence movement, who argued that Ayuk Tabe had been corrupted by the Cameroonian government. Around the same time, separatists imposed a three-day lockdown in response to Cameroonian plans to begin rebuilding the Anglophone regions with the support of the UNDP, titled "Presidential Programme for the Reconstruction and Development" (PPRD). Heavy fighting took place in June, with the separatists suffering dozens of casualties. On 13 July, a separatist militia known as the "Gorilla Fighters" led by "General Ayeke" abducted 63 civilians from Mmuock Leteh, Lebialem. 25 of them were released the next day, and the rest were released on 15 July. At least some of the civilians paid ransom to secure their release. One anonymous hostage said that they had been maltreated. Between 13 and 19 July, the Cameroonian Army carried out raids in Awing and Pinyin, killing at least 15 separatist fighters, including a general known as "General Okoro". Another separatist general, "Bush General", was taken prisoner. On 14 August, villagers killed 17 separatist fighters in Nguti, Koupé-Manengouba. A local separatist leader identified those killed as rogue separatists. On 19 August, it was reported that more than 130 ex-separatist fighters had escaped from re-integration centers. According to local newspapers, a number had re-joined the separatist ranks. Taking steps to stop the separatists from producing their own weapons, the authorities banned the sale of machetes and iron rods in the Anglophone regions. September saw heavy escalation in Bamenda. Separatists killed a police officer on 1 September, Police forces responded by destroying shops and shooting indiscriminately, forcing people to stay indoors. In the following days, hundreds of people were detained, and locals accused the military of atrocities. Elsewhere in Bamenda, separatist fighters killed a police officer. and four days later, Cameroonian troops killed Ambazonian general Luca Fonteh in the city. On 8 September, Cameroon announced Operation Bamenda Clean to weed out separatists from the city; the announcement was followed shortly by civilians accusing soldiers of extortion. Cameroonian soldiers summarily executed two people on 14 September, and another five civilians days later. On 22 September, Cameroonian soldiers killed six civilians in Buea, allegedly for not showing them the locations of separatist hideouts. Another civilian was killed in Bui four days later. On 28 September, Cameroon announced that over the last four days it had expelled separatist fighters from at least a hundred schools across the Anglophone regions, with the aim of reopening schools on 5 October. At least nine separatist fighters and at least two Cameroonian soldiers died during the fighting. 1 October marked the three-year anniversary of Ambazonia's declaration of independence. To commemorate the occasion, separatist fighters raised flags in several areas in the Anglophone regions, including in Buea. Celebrations were also held in Lebialem. Anglophone refugees in Nigeria also celebrated the independence day. Cameroon sent reinforcements to stop the celebrations, and clashes were reported in Bui, Momo and Boyo. On 11 October, Cameroon initiated a three-day offensive against separatists in Wabane, Lebialem. Two days later, it was revealed that Cameroonian forces had killed "General Ayeke", commander of the "Gorilla Fighters" militia, in Besali, Wabane, Lebialem. Some 13 hostages were freed from the separatist camp, which was subsequently destroyed. One Cameroonian soldier was killed during the same incident, and the operation was described as "bloody", although the other separatist fighters at the base were reported to have escaped. The corpse of "General Ayeke" was flown to Kumba where it was publicly displayed. In total, three Cameroonian soldiers and at least 12 separatists died during the three-day offensive. On 24 October, the Kumba school massacre took place, with 10–12 gunmen killing 7 children and wounding another 13. No one claimed responsibility for the attack, and the Cameroonian government and the separatist movements blamed each other. Days later, the Cameroonian government announced that the BIR had identified and killed a separatist commander who was responsible for the massacre. On 4 December, separatist forces started enforcing a four-day lockdown aimed at disrupting the 6 December regional election. Throughout election day, there were clashes in Bamenda. A number of people were shot, and one CPDM Councilor was killed after getting caught in the crossfire during a shootout between separatist fighters and police forces. In Kumbo, separatist fighters entered a church and held the occupants hostage. There were also clashes in Buea. In Babessi, a separatist fighter was ambushed and killed in his home by soldiers. In an end-of-year speech, Samuel Ikome Sako of the Interim Government of Ambazonia declared that an All Ambazonia Constitutional Draft Conference would be held during 2021, and that Northeast and Southwest Region would be reorganized into Equatorial Zone, Midland Zone and Savanna Zone. Sako also said that the separatists were purchasing more weapons and that the fight would continue. Meanwhile, Biya thanked the population of the Anglophone regions for assisting the government in the fight against separatists, and called on other countries to crack down on separatist activities in the diaspora. On 6 January, separatist fighters ambushed the convoy of the Senior Divisional Officer of Momo near Njikwa, using improvised explosive devices. Five soldiers and one civilian were killed. Two days later, separatists killed three gendarme officers, one policeman and two civilians at a checkpoint in Matazem. Four others were injured. In mid-January, separatists moved to sabotage the postponed 2020 African Nations Championship in Limbe. On 14 January, explosions were heard outside Limbe Omnisport Stadium. A separatist militia called the "Fako Action Forces" claimed responsibility. The next day, suspected separatists burned a beer truck in Likomba, Fako Division. Security forces pursued the attackers, and an ensuing shootout left two suspected separatists dead. In the early months of 2021, the separatists began to rely heavily on IEDs while carrying out their ambushes, resulting in heavier Cameroonian casualties. On 18 February, seven Cameroonian soldiers were killed by an IED in Babessi. On 24 February, at least two soldiers were killed and at least another five were wounded in a separatist ambush in Kumbo with IEDs followed by gunfire. Following the incident, soldiers went on a shooting spree while searching for the attackers. In Bui, Cameroon launched "Operation Bui 1", which resulted in the deaths of 12 separatists and two Cameroonian soldiers; days later, a separatist militia known as the Bui Warriors launched a series of IED attacks against Cameroonian soldiers in Bui, followed by an attack on a prison. The Bui Warriors claimed to have killed at least five soldiers with the IED attacks alone. Three BIR soldiers were wounded when their vehicle struck an IED between Kumbo and Ndop on 10 April. The Red Dragon militia successfully ambushed a military vehicle in Alou with an IED on 24 April, while the Seven Karta militia carried out a similar IED attack in Bafut. On 29 April, the "Bambalang Marine Forces" carried out a cross-border raid into Ngalim, West Region, killing four soldiers and taking off with several weapons, suffering no losses on their own. A month later, the same militia killed five soldiers in an attack on an outpost in Bui, two weeks into a separatist offensive against Cameroon in the area. On 9 April, the AGovC formally allied itself with the Indigenous People of Biafra, led by Nnamdi Kanu. According to ADF deputy defense chief Daniel Caapo, this would entail joint military operations, joint training bases, and an effort to seize the mutual border and ensure a free flow of weapons and personnel. The ADF offered to train IPOB militants at camps in Ambazonian-controlled territory. Ayaba Cho Lucas also proposed an alliance with democratic forces within Cameroon, suggesting that Ambazonia should help overthrow Paul Biya. The AGovC-IPOB alliance was denounced by the Interim Government of Ambazonia as well as by other Biafran separatist groups. On 4 May, separatists carried out two ambushes with IEDs; in Akwaya, causing unknown casualties, and in Ekona. Three civilians were killed when a bus hit an IED in Sabga on 9 May; separatists claimed responsibility, and said that the IED had been meant for militar targets. In mid-May, the "Fako Mountain Lions" invaded Muyuka and Muea and essentially dared the Cameroonian Army to attack; the subsequent battle saw the deaths of two Cameroonian soldiers. In mid-May, separatists launched an offensive in Bui against the Cameroonian Army, which in turn retaliated by burning down civilian homes in several villages. Over the weekend 23–25 May, more than 25 Cameroonian soldiers were killed and more than 12 military vehicles were damaged in Kumbo, Bui. On 24 May, the Cameroonian Army claimed to have killed separatist commander "General Akwaba" and an unspecified number of fighters in a raid on their camp in Kumbo. The next day, five Cameroonian soldiers, including a brigade commander, were killed when separatist militia the Bambalang Marine Forces attacked an army outpost in Noni in Bui. The separatists also seized weapons and equipment. In Ekona, the Fako Mountain Lions carried out three IED attacks against the Cameroonian army, and three civilians were killed in the subsequent gunfights. In Jakiri, Bui, Cameroonian soldiers arrested three people and subsequently murdered them. On 3 January, separatists detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) in the town of Limbe, Southwest Region, which was set to host matches of the delayed 2021 Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON). Separatist fighters who had vowed to disrupt 2021 Africa Cup of Nations in the city said on social media they were responsible for the blast and stated that it was "a warning sign of what they will do during AFCON". The delayed AFCON is scheduled to be held in Limbe and Buea starting on 9 January. Cameroon has deployed additional troops to the cities, while separatists have warned the Confederation of African Football against holding the tournament. On 12 January, The Mali national football team suspended training before the AFCON game against Tunisia following clashes between separatists and the Cameroon Armed Forces in Buea, killing two. Three police officers were also injured by a homemade bomb. In a separate incident near Buea, a Cameroonian soldier was killed in a separatist IED ambush; the Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF) claimed responsibility. The Tunisian Football Federation decided to cancel the post-game recovery session of the Tunisia national football team due to "terrorist threats". On 31 January, a separatist militia known as the "Bui Warriors" battled Cameroonian forces in Bamkikai, Kumbo, until the Cameroonian Army withdrew from the area. At least three Cameroonian soldiers were reportedly killed, and one military vehicle was destroyed. On 2 March, seven people including a Divisional Officer, and a mayor were killed in a separatist IED ambush in Ekondo-Titi, Southwest Region. The ADF claimed responsibility. On 5 April, separatists attacked the University of Bamenda for defying a ghost town operation. In Manyu, at least seven Cameroonian soldiers were killed and another seven were wounded in a separatist attack on four military checkpoints. On 6 April, separatists abducted alleged anti-separatists protesters in Oku, Northwest Region. Separatists set ablaze an unspecified number of houses who reportedly belongs to the Mbororos people in Ndu, Northwest Region. 33 seminarians were kidnapped for ransom by separatists in Manyu, Mamfe, Southwest Region then released 24 hours after their kidnapping. Four Cameroonian soldiers were killed and another six were wounded in a separatist IED ambush in Mamfe. On 20 May, multiple clashes between the Cameroon Army and separatists took place in the English-speaking regions of Cameroon during the National Day. The Cameroonian Army claimed at least 28 separatists were killed during the battles, while the ADF claimed that 24 Cameroonian soldiers were killed. On 29 May, separatist forces invaded the villages of Obonyi and Kajifu in Akwaya, near the Nigerian border, reportedly with the aim of abducting selected individuals. Clashes ensued, and many villagers fled across the border into the villages of Bashu and Danare in Boki, Cross River State. The separatists pursued them into Nigerian territory and killed at least 20 people, injured another 70, and burned down dozens of houses. The invasion was condemned by the Biafra Nations League (BNL), a Biafran separatist group with otherwise friendly relations with the Ambazonian movement. The BNL threatened to respond unless Ambazonian leaders condemned the invasion. In Batibo, Cameroonian Army freed several hostages held by the ADF, including Senator Regina Mundi who had been held since 30 April. The army said that it had killed ten separatists and captured three. The ADF denied suffering any casualties, and said that the fighters had released the hostages in order to escape in time. The ADF also alleged that the Cameroonian Army had abused civilians during their search for the senator. In Kumbo, Cameroonian soldiers killed five people. On 7 June, between five and nine Cameroonian gendarmes were killed and another three were wounded in a separatist attack on a checkpoint in Njitapon, Kouoptamo, West Region. The attack was led by General No Pity. More than a hundred fighters participated in the attack, and they arrived in flying boats with the engines shut off in order not to make noise. The separatists then blew up the checkpoint with grenades, and used a rocket launcher to destroy army vehicles. Cameroonian Army reinforcements failed to arrive before the separatists had already withdrawn back across the river. On 25–26 June, the BIR carried out into the villages of Banten, Mborshia, and Yere in Bui division, during which they ambushed an ADF hideout and killed between two and five fighters. The ADF claimed that two Cameroonian soldiers were also killed. On 12 July, Ambazonian Field Marshall Lekeaka Oliver, leader of the Red Dragons, was killed in Menji. Cameroonian forces were able to retrieve the body three days later. According to the Cameroonian government, Oliver and one of his guards had been killed in a Cameroonian raid. Separatists claimed that Oliver had been killed by an insider during separatist infighting; his assassin had revealed the location of the body to Cameroonian forces. On 31 July, Cameroonian forces initiated a three-day, multi-front attack on the ADF in the Batibo district. Two separatist fighters known as "Colonel John" and "General Rasta" including 15 other ADF fighters were killed by the Cameroonian forces in Bambui, and another 18 were said to have been captured. The Cameroonian Army said that eleven of its forces were injured during the operation, while the ADF claimed to have killed "at least two dozen" soldiers. Local eyewitnesses reported losses on both sides, as well as civilian deaths. The ADF confirmed the death of eleven of their men, and said that they had cancelled an offensive in Bamenda involving 300 fighters due to the losses. In Bwabwa, six civilians were abducted by separatists. On 28 August, multiple separatist attacks occurred in at least three different localities across the Anglophone regions. Three soldiers were killed and many others injured in an IED ambush led by Seven Karta in Bafut. In Ngokuv, unknown casualties after the Bui Unity Warriors fired a rocket at an armored car. In Eyumodjock, a gendarmerie brigade was attacked by separatists; the gendarmes escaped before the attack occurred. On 1–2 January, following President Paul Biya's announcement in his New Years' speech that the Cameroonian military was crushing the Ambazonian rebellion, separatists moved to enforce local lockdowns. The Cameroon Armed Forces announced that it had deployed scores of troops to Oku, Kumbo and Jakiri, Northwest Region, and claimed to have killed 11 separatists. The Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF) announced that the separatists had expanded their territorial grip and that the war would continue. On 1–3 February, separatists carried out a string of attacks in Bamessing, Oku, Nkambe, Kumbo, Kom and Nkambe, using improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Cameroonian military said that several civilians were killed or abducted, while some military vehicles were also destroyed. Ambazonia Restoration Forces commander Sagon Jaguar said in a video that his forces had destroyed five military vehicles in Bamessing using IEDs. On 25 February, nineteen athletes were wounded in multiple explosions during the Mount Cameroon Race of Hope. The Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF) claimed responsibility, saying that their primary target had been Cameroonian elite forces. In the days leading up to the 12 March Cameroon senatorial election, separatists blocked roads and carried out a string of lethal attacks against military vehicles. Battles were recorded in Tadu, Bamenda, Ndop, Wum, Jakiri, Oku, Bambili, Sabga, Mamfe, Menji and Tiko. The Cameroonian Army said that two dozen separatists had been killed, while acknowledging the loss of several military vehicles. The SDF said that the clashes had made it impossible for its candidates to campaign. On 1 May, separatist fighters attacked a checkpoint in Matouke, Littoral Region, killing five soldiers or police officers and one civilian, and wounding many others. The separatists seized soldiers' clothing, weapons and ammunition before heading back into bordering Southwest Region. A small group of separatists from Ambazonia Liberation Council claimed responsibility. The attack was regarded as notable because Matouke is located less than 40 kilometers from Douala, the economic capital of Cameroon. In Mamu near Ekona, Muyuka, at least six people were killed and more were wounded in a raid by the Cameroonian Army. On 24 May, it was reported that separatists had abducted 30 women in Babanki days prior. Separatist activist Capo Daniel confirmed the abduction, stating that the women were being punished for "allowing Cameroon's administration to manipulate them". All the women were released the same day as the incident was first reported, many with serious injuries; a local source said that some had gunfire wounds and that one might require an amputation. On 16 July, gunmen killed ten people and injured another two at a busy junction in Bamenda. Seven of the dead were from West Region. Without claiming responsibility for the attack, Ayaba Cho Lucas declared that henceforth, whenever Cameroonian forces killed Anglophone civilians, the ADF would retaliate by killing civilians from the Francophone parts of Cameroon. On 6 November, separatist fighters carried out the Egbekaw massacre, killing at least 20 civilians, injuring another 10, and setting some 15 houses on fire in the Egbekaw, near Mamfe. Local sources reported more than 30 dead, many of whom were burned alive in their sleep. At least 15 people were abducted, and an unspecified number were raped. Cameroon News Agency reported that a group known as the "Tigers of Manyu" was responsible for the attack, and had carried it out as revenge for the death of one of their fighters two days prior. The perpetrators were reported to be natives of Egbekaw. On 5 December, Ambazonian separatists reportedly took control of the Belegete community inside Nigeria (in Obanliku), and abducted some 30 people including traditional leader Chief Francis Ogweshi. Two days later, Nigerian troops attempted a rescue mission in the jungle, during which an Ambazonian fighter was killed. The Ambazonians responded by killing the chief, whose corpse was discovered three days later. Ambazonian forces carried out subsequent attacks in Belegete, where they burned houses and attacked civilians with guns and cutlasses. Nigerian forces were later deployed to oust the Ambazonians, but they were unable to reach Belegete with a sizeable force due to the topography and the poor infrastructure, and camped at the Obudu Mountain Resort. The rebels later retreated from Belegete on their own, but threatened that they would return at a later date. On 1 January, writing from the Kondengui Central Prison, Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe (the first president of Ambazonia) called for an end of the Ambazonian leadership crisis and unity among separatist factions. On 6 January, footage surfaced in which armed men claiming to be part of the Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF) were torturing a civilian in Muyuka. On 9 January, Cameroonian forces raided a separatist hideout in Ewai. Cameroon claimed that at least five separatists were killed, while the separatists claimed to have suffered three dead. Hundreds of people fled Ewai during the raid. On 11 January, a gendarme officer shot a civilian dead in Mamfe. On 13 January, separatist fighters shot and tortured a civilian in Menchum, after accusing him of passing information to the Cameroonian military. On 21 January, it was confirmed that Cameroonian forces had captured top ADF commander "General Efang". On 24 January, suspected separatists burned a road construction equipment in Ndu. On 29 January, several people were feared dead and three vehicles were burned in a separatist attack in Buea. On 6 February, an official was abducted by unidentified kidnappers in Bamenda. He was rescued four hours later by the Cameroonian military. The kidnapping was attributed to the Red Dragon militia. On 7 February, four civilians were killed by Cameroonian forces in Kumbo. On 11 February, one person was killed and dozens more were injured, including children, in an explosion during Youth Day celebrations in Nkambe. On 16–17 February, eight separatists were killed during military operations in the locality of Ayukaba. Two persons were killed during clashes in Banga Bakundu. On 21 February, one person was killed during clashes in Banga Bakundu. On 26 February, Cameroonian security forces detected and deactivated an improvised explosive device (IED) in Galim, West Region. According to local sources, separatists meant to target the Divisional Officer of Galim. On 9–11 March, a separatist commander known as Barack was killed by the Rapid Intervention Brigade during clashes near Batibo. On 12 March, two civilians were killed in a suspected separatist attack on a Brasseries du Cameroun truck in Bamenda. On 22–23 March, a local elected official was shot dead in Babessi, in an attack claimed by separatists. On 25 March, the Cameroonian military said it had killed at least seven separatist fighters in Tubah. On 27 March, Cameroonian forces carried out a series of raids against separatist hideouts in Big Babanki, Bamenda and Bambui. 13 separatist fighters were reported killed in Bambui, and "several" were killed in Big Babanki. Two separatist fighters were also killed in Jakiri. On 31 March, a separatist group called the Ribbons of Ambazonia announced that they had banned farming on Mondays in the Meme and Ndian divisions. On 4 April, a severed head was discovered at the Azire Old Church Junction in Bamenda. Witnessed said that it was dropped there by separatist fighters. On 10 April, a battle took place in Kumbo: At night, a group of rebels stormed Kumbo and attacked the local BIR base, resulting in several deaths. The attack was reportedly carried out by the Bui Unity Warriors. Afterward, Cameroonian forces organized revenge raids in the area, set ablaze houses in three villages of the Bui Division, and killed three civilians and one separatist fighter in Bamfem. On 15 April, separatist fighters abducted two teachers in Njap, Donga-Mantung. On 24 April, separatist general Desmond Koa (known as "General Mad Dog") was killed along with four of his fighters by the Rapid Intervention Brigade in Mbonge, Ndian. On 29 April, three men were reportedly killed and several others injured in an alleged separatist attack in Kumba. A locally made bomb exploded in Nkwen, Bamenda, causing no casualties. The attack was claimed by ADF leader, Ayaba Cho Lucas. Separatist fighters set fire to a bulldozer working on the Tugi-Bamenda road. A commercial motorcycle was also seized and set on fire by the fighters for violating ghost town. On 1 May, separatist fighters abducted 28 people (including eight children) from the Catholic Church of Bai Panya in Meme. A group calling itself the "Al-Qaeda Squad of Meme", led by "Field Marshall Lucifer", claimed responsibility. The group accused the abducted civilians of attempting to get birth certificates for the upcoming 2025 Cameroonian presidential election, and threatened to summarily execute them. On 4 May, former ADF spokesperson and Ambazonia People's Rights Advocacy Group President Capo Daniel called for an end of the armed struggle against Cameroon. The communiqué called for negotiations and a switch to nonviolent resistance, and for fighters to only use their weapons defensively pending an agreement. On 5 May, a separatist commander known as General Sagon was killed by Cameroonian forces along with two of his collaborators in Bamunka, Ndop. Three days later, separatists blocked the Bamenda-Ndop road in retaliation. On 7 May, the Black Lions of Bamali seized a gendarmerie truck in Ndop. The action was led by "General Kolambo". On 8 May, separatist fighters led by "Field Marshall Lucifer" captured and burned down a military post in Bomana, Meme. On 10 May, separatists killed six gendarmes in Eyumodjock, including a commander, and seized weapons and uniforms. On 12 May, a soldier from the Rapid Intervention Brigade reportedly shot at civilians in a Limbe nightclub, killing one and wounding two, in revenge for the killings of his fellow soldiers in Bamenda by separatist fighters. On 14 May, suspected separatist fighters raided a school in Ndu and abducted two teachers. Four people including two government forces and two civilians were killed in a separatist attack in Bambui. On 15 May, ADF fighters attacked a school and burned materials. On 16 May, a brigade commander and a gendarme were killed in a separatist attack in Akwaya, Manyu. On 17 May, four separatist fighters were killed during a government offensive in Mbveh and Ndzenji, Bui. On 19 May, clashes between separatist fighters and Cameroonian forces left three people dead, including a separatist, a soldier and a young child in Akum, Mezam. On 20 May, during Cameroon's National Day, separatist fighters killed the mayor and two other people in Belo. Another attack took place in Njinkom. Separatist fighters killed a soldier in Mundemba. On 24 May, the Nigerian Army arrested eight men in Taraba State, on the border between Nigeria and Cameroon, for smuggling fuel to Ambazonian rebels. On 25 May, two people were killed and eleven seriously injured in an attack on a bar in Bamenda. On 28 May, a student and a policeman were injured in Bamenda during an attempt by separatists to disrupt the written part of the GCE exam. In Olu, Bui, separatist fighters launched an attack, killing one student and wounding others. On 29 May, a former Red Dragon fighter who had switched sides to fight for the government was killed in a suspected planned assassination. On 1 June, separatist fighters killed an official in a roadside ambush in Donga-Mantung. On 5 June, suspected separatist fighters killed a councillor in an ambush in Menchum. Separatists burned a taxi at a former hospital in Bamenda. On 8 June, armed men claiming to be ADF fighters set fire to a vehicle in Bamenda. On 10 June, suspected separatist fighters killed a bike rider and abducted a passenger in Bamenda. On 13 June, separatist commander Besaka Belget (known as "General Black Bat") was killed by Cameroonian forces in Kombone Bakundu, Meme. On 16 June, a former separatist fighter was killed by ADF in Bamenda. On 17 June, a nurse was killed by ADF fighters in Bafut. At least two people were reportedly injured in a separatist gunfire in Buea. Locals said the attackers identified themselves as the Mountain Lions of Fako. On 18 June, the ADF set fire to a cab in Bamenda. On 21 June, it was reported that Cameroonian forces had used civilians in Melim to search for IEDs, resulting in the deaths of two civilians. On 26 June, three civilians were killed in an IED attack in Oshum, Batibo. ADF claimed responsibility. On 30 June, two separatist fighters, including an ADF commander known as "General Stone", were killed during an operation by security forces in Bamenda. Their bodies were subsequently burned. On 1 July, two soldiers were killed in Munyenge, Muyuka. In Tadu, Bui, a soldier was killed and his weapon seized by separatist fighters. On 4 July, separatist fighters killed a man and abducted his son in Ntumbaw, Ndu, Donga-Mantung. On 7 July, Cameroonian forces reportedly invaded Bamali, killing two civilians and injuring others. On 8 July, a retired soldier and an internally displaced person was killed by suspected separatists in Bamenda. On 10 July, two separatist fighters, including a leader known as ''Commander Iron'', were killed during a military operation in Bamenda. On 14 July, separatist fighters killed a young man and abducted his brother in Bamenda. On 15 July, suspected separatists set fire to the palace of Chief Ewome John Eko in Bwassa, Southwest Region, resulting in the destruction of one section of the complex. The attackers left a note with a warning for collaborators, along with an Ambazonian flag. Separatists burned three bikes in Ngie, Momo. On 19 July, at least four armed separatists, including a deputy commander, were killed in a military offensive in Alabukam, Bamenda. On 21 July, the ADF attacked the office of the Divisional Officer in Jakiri, Bui. On 23 July, a single mother was killed by suspected separatist fighters in Bamenda. Separatist fighters attacked Mbessa, Boyo, killing one villager, kidnapping and wounding others. On 28 July, separatist fighters shot and wounded the deputy mayor of Oku. On 30 July, Fulani militants attacked the village of Sop in Ndu, burning several homes and killing at least one person. On 7 August, two police officers were killed and their weapon seized by separatist fighters in Bamenda. The ADF claimed responsibility. It was reported that Fulani militamen invaded once again the village of Sop in Ndu setting fire to houses, looting stores and attacking villagers, leaving many wounded. On 9 August, two police officers were killed in a bomb explosion in Bamenda. On 10 August, following the deaths of two separatist fighters in Bangulan, Ngo-Ketunjia, separatist commander "General No Mercy" declared an indefinite lockdown in the village. On 14 August, five cabs were set on fire by unidentified gunmen in Bamenda. On 16 August, separatist fighters imposed a blockade on the Kumba-Mamfe road. In Bui, a police inspector was killed in a separatist ambush. On 19 August, it was reported that Cameroonian forces carried out a combined ambush and targeting operation between Ndop and Bamessing, Ngo Kentunjia. During this operation, two key members of the "Only Bro" group were neutralized. On 20 August, separatist commander Tantoh Leonard (known as "General Colabo") was killed by his own fighters in Ndop, following a dispute over the distribution of ransom money. On 21 August, in a video, the separatist group Mountain Lions declared a two-week lockdown starting on 9 September in order to disrupt school resumption. On 23 August, suspected separatists burned a taxi in Bamenda. On 24 August, at least three police officers were killed in Buea. The Mountain Lions claimed responsibility for the attack. On 25 August, a driver for a health NGO was kidnapped and killed by gunmen in Bamenda. On 27 August, a soldier was killed in an alleged separatist attack near Bamenda. On 2 September, separatist fighters killed a biker and burnt down a taxi in Buea. In Mbatu, near Bamenda, three people were killed by armed separatists. On 8 September, a former separatist fighter was killed in an alleged targeted attack in Bamenda. In Sop, Bui, three separatist fighters were killed in a confrontation with the Cameroonian army. On 16 September, two separatist fighters were killed during an operation by the Rapid Intervention Brigade (BIR) in Worsing, Bali Nyonga. In a separate incident, another separatist fighter was killed in a BIR attack between Sabga, Kedjon Ketinguh and Bamessing. A civilian was also killed in the clashes. On 19 September, a suspected separatist IED detonated and numerous gunshots erupted in Bamenda. On 24 September, AGovC leader Ayaba Cho Lucas was arrested in Norway and charged with inciting crimes against humanity. AGovC vice president Julius Nyih took over as interim leader of the organization, in accordance with a contingency succession plan. On 1 October, separatists across the Anglophone regions celebrated Ambazonia's independence day with parades and meetings. In many of the major cities, the streets were deserted due to separatist-imposed ghost towns. Separatists held large parades in rural areas. A group known as the Ambazonia State Army, led by "General Talk and Do", held a military parade in Kikaikom. ADF commander "General Sumanguru" organized a similar parade in Momo department. On 8 October, Cameroonian forces raided a separatist stronghold in the village of Effa in Momo. A separatist commander known as "General Popo" was killed. On 9 October, two Cameroonian soldiers were killed in a separatist ambush in Mbingo, Boyo department. A separatist group known as the "Pythons of Boyo," led by "General Nyih", claimed responsibility. On 12 October, seven separatist fighters from Widikum surrendered and joined the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Centre in Bamenda. On 16 October, separatists executed two alleged gang members in Bali Nyonga, after a mob had seized them and handed them over to the separatists. On 18 October, six suspected Ambazonian separatists were arrested by Nigerian police in Akamkpa, Cross River State. On 26 October, following a public screening of a documentary on President Paul Biya organized by the ruling party, two residents were shot dead and a municipal official was abducted and murdered by unidentified gunmen in Bamenda II. Gunmen also attacked the Government Bilingual High School in Bamenda; one student was injured in the attack. No separatist group claimed responsibility. On 29 October, three suspected separatists were arrested by Cameroonian forces in a military operation in Kedjom Ketinguh, Ngo-Ketunjia. On 2 November, the BIR opened two new bases in Nguti and Alou, with the aim of combating ghost towns and increasing security along the Kumba-Mamfe road. On 4 November, a young man was killed in Mulang, Bamenda. Locals claimed that he was killed by soldiers. On 11 November, Cameroonian soldiers tortured a group of civilians in Ngoketunjia for several hours, killed one of them, and looted his possessions. On 14 November, separatist fighters abducted Langsi Abel, a former mayor of Bafut. He was released after eight days. On 15 November, armed men burned a man to death on Ayaba Street in Bamenda using tyres. On 17 November, separatist fighters attacked a vehicle on the Ndu-Foumban road, killing two civilians and a soldier. One more civilian was injured. The Ambazonia State Army claimed responsibility. On 24 November, Cameroonian forces ambushed and killed at least five ADF fighters in Nchulam, Bamenda, including a commander known as "General Weapon" and his deputy, "Colonel Mami". On 29 November, a police officer was killed and another was injured by separatist fighters in Bamenda. On 6–7 December, an explosion and gunshots were heard in Bamenda, as separatists moved to enforce a lockdown. At least one person was killed. On 11 December, Fon Richard Muntong III of Bamessing issued an ultimatum where he demanded that all separatist fighters leave his village by 31 December. On 13 December, two police officers were seriously injured in a clash with separatist fighters in Bamenda. The ADF claimed responsibility for the attack. On 14 December, separatists imposed a lockdown in Bamenda to mourn one of their members killed a few weeks earlier by security forces. On 18 December, the Nigerian Army arrested four suspected Ambazonian separatists in Takum, Taraba State, Nigeria. The four confessed to being involved with weapons smuggling. On 23 December, Cameroonian soldiers arrested three people in Bamenda. According to local sources, one of them was killed while attempting to escape. On 27 December, separatist fighters reportedly stabbed to death a man known as "Cho Pinyin" in Menka, Pinyin. On 29 December, a magistrate was kidnapped by unidentified gunmen from his home in Bamenda. Many other civilians were abducted the same day by suspected separatists in the town. On 30 December, a separatist fighter known as "Mission Commander" was reportedly killed by military forces in Rom, Nwa. In Makobe, Southwest Region, soldiers of the 21st Battalion killed a separatist fighter known as "Colonel Toless". By March 2025, Africa Confidential assessed that the Anglophone Crisis had remained a "bloody stalemate", with neither the government nor the rebels in a position to win the conflict. Meanwhile, infighting among the Ambazonia separatists had significantly increased, as had rebel attacks on civilians. Strategy The Cameroonian Army is fighting a counter-insurgency war, aiming to hit the separatists' support base. This includes burning houses where weapons are found and, according to locals but denied by the army, carrying out revenge attacks. In August 2018, the Defence Minister of Cameroon announced that the army would be expanded with 2,600 new recruits, 2,000 of whom would go to the BIR. In addition to expanding the army, the government has supported local vigilante groups, of which there were more than thirty as of October 2019. The government has also set up rehab centers in Bamenda and Buea to reintegrate separatists who have surrendered into civil society. With no military victory in sight, the Cameroonian Army has sought to at least contain the conflict to rural areas. As of late-2018, the Cameroonian Army aimed to control all urban areas as well as strategic points on the countryside, and did not seek to recapture the entire Anglophone regions. In some cases, this has involved a mutual tacit understanding on who controls certain areas; separatist and military checkpoints are sometimes in close proximity of each other, without either side attacking. Cameroon's strategy of prioritizing urban areas began to yield results during the first half of 2020; by June, the separatists had been largely pushed out of Buea. The Ambazonian separatists are fighting a guerrilla war. Numerically and materially disadvantaged, the separatists carry out hit-and-run attacks, ambushes and raids. According to the ADF, as of June 2018 there were 1,500 soldiers in the ADF, spread across 20 camps throughout Southern Cameroons. In May 2019, independent sources measured the total number of separatist fighters to be between 2,000 and 4,000, a figure that included numerous ex-soldiers and ex-policemen, a significant number of female combatants, and dozens of Nigerian mercenaries. The Nigerians among the rebels mostly consisted of criminals and ex-insurgents who had previously taken part in the conflict in the Niger Delta. Many separatist militias, including the ADF and SOCADEF, are directly commanded by diaspora leaders in the United States, Norway, Germany and other countries; aid agencies have oftentimes had to negotiate with these leaders over the phone, rather than with separatists on the ground. At the start of the war, the separatists struggled with gaining access to firearms, having to rely on hunting rifles and in some cases single-shot pistols. As the war went on, they gradually gained limited access to some more sophisticated weapons, capturing some from the Cameroonian Army and buying some in Nigeria (where they enjoyed the support of officers in the Nigerian Army). They also benefitted from fundraising campaigns (including the introduction of their own cryptocurrency, the AmbaCoin), launched by diaspora activists to purchase guns for the separatist militias. This began to yield visible results in the first half of 2019. From being severely outgunned in the fall of 2018, by the summer of 2019 the separatists had become well-armed. They also declared that they had started producing their own weapons within Southern Cameroons, a declaration followed shortly by an explosion in Mamfe that killed four policemen. By November 2020, the separatists' manufacturing of weapons within the Anglophone regions had become a serious problem for Cameroon. IEDs in particular proved effective for the separatists, and their frequent use, either alone or as part of ambushes, started to cause heavy Cameroonian casualties from the beginning of 2021. Cameroon only has a limited number of mine-protected armored vehicles, and IED attacks have been getting increasingly sophisticated (including remote detonation). This has caused severe loss of morale among Cameroonian soldiers. In addition, some Ambazonian militias began partnering with Biafran separatists, who helped them access the arms black market in Nigeria. In September 2021, following an ambush in which 15 soldiers were killed and two armored vehicles destroyed, Cameroon's Defense Minister Joseph Beti Assomo announced a "paradigm shift" in the war. The militias enjoy significant local support, with civilians giving them food, informing them on troop movements, or outright assisting them in carrying out attacks. In separatist-controlled territory, a common social contract is that civilians develop close connections with separatist fighters, who in turn defend them against Cameroonian raids. Unlike most Cameroonian soldiers deployed in the region, the separatists are locals, and are thus more familiar with the terrain. Cameroonian General Melingui stated that the separatists have a leverage over the army when it comes to familiarity with the battleground; "They know the terrain. These are youths from local villages. We try to seek them out but we can't find them. Our men aren't familiar with the forest." Cameroonian authorities have admitted that they have little control over the security situation outside the cities. Journalist Emmanuel Freudenthal, who spent a week with ADF rebels in 2018, stated that the separatists controlled much of the countryside because the infrastructure in Southern Cameroons is so poorly developed, making it hard for the Cameroonian government to access those areas. The IG has stressed that the war will take place solely within Southern Cameroons, and claims that attacks across the border have been false flag operations by the Cameroonian government. This stance is not shared by AGovC. In March 2019, the ADF announced that it would take the war into the French-speaking parts of Cameroon, defying the IG. The ADF allied itself with the Indigenous People of Biafra and its armed wing, the Eastern Security Network in 2021, and declared that this alliance would entail joint military operations. AGovC leader Ayaba Cho Lucas summed up the ADF strategy in the following way: "60% of the GDP of Cameroon is earned in Ambazonia. [...] We must try to raise the cost of the occupation to higher than the profits they get here." Retired American diplomat Herman Jay Cohen has argued that Cameroon's military approach to the conflict plays straight into the strategy of the separatists. Drawing parallels to the Eritrean War of Independence, he has claimed that the growing bitterness resulting from prolonged warfare will only serve to close the window of opportunity where reconciliation and territorial integrity is still an option, thereby – ironically – increasing the likelihood of Ambazonian secession. According to Millan Atam, chairperson of the Southern Cameroonians Congress of the People, the separatists are building up support for their cause through two distinct phases. The first phase was to build internal capability to resist the Cameroonian Army and raise faith in the cause. Once a significant portion of the population of Southern Cameroons clearly wanted separation, the separatists would approach the international community with their cause. The Cameroonian government has tried to limit the extent of which the conflict affects everyday life in Southern Cameroons, and portrays the war as a battle between chaos and stability in which the government represents the latter. To this end, local authorities have penalized businesses that respected "ghost towns" declared by the separatists. The government has fired and replaced local administrators who fled from the region, despite their fears of kidnappings. In order to fight the separatist school boycott, according to local sources in Ndop, Cameroonian soldiers have forced children to attend school, often through violence and threats. To prevent the Anglophone Crisis from becoming a full-fledged intercommunal war, Cameroonian authorities have sought to gain as much support among the Anglophone population as possible. In August 2018, Minister of Territorial Administration Atanga Nji offered amnesty to separatists who surrender their weapons, saying they would "be received as prodigal sons". The minister also announced a plan to rebuild infrastructure that had been destroyed due to the conflict. In February 2021, the government claimed that 4,000 Anglophones had applied to join the military, including hundreds of former separatist fighters. Both sides have used WhatsApp to spread propaganda. Cameroonian authorities have arrested journalists on the accusation of propagating false information, the punishment for which is six months to two years in prison. War crimes There is photographic evidence that shows a consistent strategy of burning down villages by Cameroonian forces. The army has claimed that the soldiers who were filmed were separatists wearing stolen Cameroonian Army uniforms, a claim that has been denied by local residents. Satellite images show extensive damage to villages. Journalists have been denied entry to the conflict zones, and soldiers have been forbidden from carrying mobile phones. In August 2018, the Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa published a list of 105 villages that had been raided by government forces since October 2017. Citing eyewitness accounts, videos and photos as evidence, the Centre claimed that 71 of these villages had been completely destroyed and depopulated, while the remaining 34 had been partially deserted. With IEDs becoming a growing threat to its soldiers, the BIR has allegedly forced civilians to act as human minesweepers. At the end of 2017, the separatists declared a school boycott, and have attacked and burnt down schools that refused to shut down. Between February 2017 and May 2018, at least 42 schools were targeted. Some separatists consider schools to be legitimate targets because the French language is taught as a mandatory subject. As of July 2019, close to 6,000 schools had shut down across the Anglophone regions, affecting more than 600,000 children. Separatists began opening their own schools in September 2019, but these were insufficient to cover the educational needs in the areas they controlled. In September 2020, prominent separatists Mark Bareta and Eric Tataw called for an end to the school boycott. However, this was rejected by Julius Ayuk Tabe, Samuel Ikome Sako and Ayaba Cho Lucas, all of whom insisted that a ceasefire had to precede school resumption. Attacks on schools have cost the separatists some loss of support among locals who had used to sympathize with their cause. In September 2021, the Ambazonia Defence Forces gave instructions for schools to reopen. In their effort to make the Anglophone regions ungovernable, separatist elements have maimed employees at state-owned corporations. Kidnapping for ransom has also occurred frequently, as well as blackmailing of civilians into transferring money to fund the struggle. Owing to the obscure nature of many of the separatist militias, some attacks attributed to separatists may as well be the acts of local criminals. Notwithstanding, it is beyond doubt that separatist elements have carried out numerous such acts, sometimes drawing condemnation from the Interim Government of Ambazonia. Throughout 2017, there were no reports of ADF using violence against civilians. As of October 2018, five such incidents had been reported, though these attacks were for the most part not lethal; one civilian death was attributed to an ADF attack. Other separatist groups had attacked civilians 25 times within the same time frame, and were responsible for 13 civilian deaths. Separatists have also been accused of using schools and churches as military barracks; in July 2019, Cameroon accused the separatists of occupying more than 50 schools. The Ambazonian forces have also engaged in widespread extortion of the civilian population in the Anglophone regions. In 2021, some separatist fighters began dressing up in captured Cameroonian military uniforms as a ruse of war, violating the Hague Convention of 1907 IV, Article 23. Casualties Between September 2017 and February 2018, Cameroon claimed to have lost 22 soldiers and policemen in the conflict. By May, at least 44 soldiers and policemen had been killed. In June 2018, the official figure rose to 84 dead. Within two weeks in the later half of June, the official figure went up to more than 120 dead. By October 2018, the military and police had lost at least 175 servicemen. Separatist losses were estimated to be in the hundreds. The war intensified in early 2019. By June, Cameroonian military and police casualties were estimated to be around 500 dead. The separatists had lost around 1,000 fighters. While civilian casualties are hard to determine, in May 2019 they were estimated by independent sources to be around 650 killed, out of a total death toll of 1,850. In January the same year, the Diocese of Kumbo had been able to document 385 civilian deaths in Kumbo alone within the past seven months. In September 2019, independent sources stated that the conflict had claimed the lives of around 3,000 people, counting both combatants and civilians. By February 2020, between 800 and 1,000 Cameroonian soldiers had been killed. In addition, at least 250 ethnic Mbororos had been killed as of July 2020, counting both civilians and pro-Cameroonian militants. Cameroonian casualties spiked in 2021, as separatists were becoming increasingly well-armed. Anglophone groups have disputed these figures. While federalist movements claimed that the conflict had taken 3,000–5,000 lives as of the summer of 2019, separatists claimed that between 5,000 and 10,000 people had been killed. Humanitarian consequences By January 2018, 15,000 people had fled from Southern Cameroons to Nigeria. This number increased to at least 40,000 people by February. By August 2018, more than 180,000 people had been displaced due to the war. As of May 2019, 530,000 people had been internally displaced, and 35,000 had fled to Nigeria. In June 2019, UNICEF said that 1.3 million people in the Anglophone regions needed humanitarian aid. It is clear that Anglophones and Francophones have experienced the crisis differently. Anglophones lost their family and friends in some of the riots. Some of them were severely beaten and many of them were arrested during the protests. The government cut the internet on the Anglophone side for about three months. Due to the lack of teachers, burned schools and the unsafe feeling of going to school, many Anglophones lost years of school. With the crisis boiling came the rise of separatists who committed inhumane acts. The separatists in Cameroon are "fighting to create an independent Anglophone state of "Ambazonia" since 2016". Armed separatist groups are kidnapping, terrorizing, and killing civilians across the English-speaking regions with no apparent fear of being held to account by either their own leaders or Cameroonian law enforcement". By 2024, Northwest Region had become the second most dangerous administrative division in Africa for civilians, with only Gezira State in Sudan being more dangerous. Other consequences The conflict has severely harmed the local economy. In June 2018, Cameroon Development Corporation, a state-owned company with 22,000 employees, declared the conflict could lead to the loss of 5,000 jobs on the short term. In July 2018, Cameroonian NGO Human Is Right reported that the war had caused a 70 percent increase in unemployment in the agricultural sector. The palm oil and cocoa sectors in Southwest Region had taken a severe blow, with state-owned company Pamol abandoning plantations in some areas. The private company Telcar Cocoa reported that the cocoa production had fallen 80 percent. The NGO suggested that companies make deals with the separatists in order to safeguard their facilities. By 2019, annual tax revenues in the Anglophone regions had dropped from US$800,000 to US$1,000, and by 2020 almost all tax officials had fled their crossing posts on the Nigerian border. The separatists aim to prevent the Cameroonian state from getting any income from the Anglophone regions, in order to make cost of controlling the region surpass the benefits. The conflict has triggered an exodus of the Nigerian business community from Southern Cameroons, as well as Nigerian traders who used to run key markets. Thousands of displaced people have fled to protected natural areas, endangering the wildlife there. Reactions The Anglophone Crisis has become a divisive question in Cameroonian politics. The Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM), the ruling party, regards the separatists as terrorists and supports a military solution to the conflict. The CPDM supported both the carrying out and conclusion of the Major National Dialogue, which was organized by the Cameroonian government. As of September 2020, the Cameroonian government was divided on the subject of talks with the separatists, with one camp, including the prime minister, advocating a negotiated end of the war, and the other camp opposing negotiations. Meanwhile, the opposition has been vocal in its criticism of the government's handling of the conflict. In January 2019, the Social Democratic Front announced it would oppose any future elections in the country while the war is still ongoing. The party supports a negotiated solution to the conflict, and has demanded a ceasefire, the opening of a dialogue, amnesty for everyone jailed because of the crisis, the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission, and decentralization of the country. In March 2019, the SDF accused members of the Cameroonian government of supporting certain armed elements in the Anglophone regions. In May 2019, the SDF announced it would boycott National Day celebrations in sympathy with people in Southern Cameroons living in a state of civil war. Smaller opposition parties, such as the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC), also blame the government for failing to solve the Anglophone Crisis. On 26 January 2019, supporters of the MRC invaded the Cameroonian embassy in Paris, citing – among other reasons – the Anglophone Crisis. In May 2019, the MRC joined the SDF in boycotting National Day celebrations. In August 2020, MRC leader Maurice Kamto threatened to start a "gigantic national campaign" to overthrow President Biya if the latter convened the electorate without first solving the Anglophone Crisis. The Cameroon People's Party has taken a nuanced approach, condemning both the government and the separatists. Party leader Kah Walla has said that the crisis can be solved by turning Cameroon into a federation. Mediation In 2019, the President of Cameroon initiated a 5-day dialogue between both parties. However, the dialogue was unsuccessful for different reasons. One of them being that separatists invited to the conversation were either in prison or were scared of being arrested by the government. "Their fears were credible" as most of the separatists leaders that were arrested earlier were "handed life sentences on charges of terrorism". The Anglophone Crisis has become a diplomatic challenge to Cameroon, and has damaged the country's relations with some of its allies. While member states of the African Union and France have taken either a neutral stance or sided with the Cameroonian government, several European countries and the United States have criticized Cameroon. The United States has been particularly vocal in its criticism; In July 2019, following a fact-finding mission by some of its members to the country, the House of Representatives called for a reintroduction of a federal system in Cameroon. In June 2019, Switzerland announced that both the Cameroonian government and the separatists had asked it to act as a mediator, and that negotiations would take place. This was the first known case of talks between the two warring sides, and was met with international endorsement. However, the talks ultimately failed. The talks were referred to as the "Swiss Process" but were only supported by one faction of the independence movement. Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe and Ayaba Cho Lucas both opposed them, and the Cameroonian Government did not buy into the talks either, rendering them ineffective. The faction of the movement aligned with Samuel Ikome Sako has continued to insist that the talks facilitated by Switzerland are the only means of resolving the conflict. See also References
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ישראל_כץ_(שר_העבודה_והרווחה)] \| [TOKENS: 5054]
תוכן עניינים ישראל כץ (שר העבודה והרווחה) ישראל כץ (6 בדצמבר 1927, י"ב בכסלו ה'תרפ"ח – 29 באוקטובר 2010, כ"א בחשוון ה'תשע"א) היה מנכ"ל המוסד לביטוח לאומי בשנים 1968–1973, מייסדו ומנהלו של מכון ברוקדייל לחקר הזִקנה בישראל בשנים 1974-1977, שר העבודה והרווחה בשנים 1977–1981, מייסדו ומנהלו של המרכז לחקר המדיניות החברתית בישראל (מרכז טאוב) בשנים 1982-1992. מבכירי מעצבי דמותה של מדינת ישראל כמדינת רווחה. ביוגרפיה ישראל כץ נולד בווינה בירת אוסטריה, בנם של משה יוסף כץ ופאני כץ לבית ברון. לאחר האנשלוס ב-1938 נשלח כץ לארץ ישראל כחלק מעליית הנוער. הוריו הצליחו לצאת מאוסטריה בקיץ 1939 והיו מגולי מאוריציוס. כץ נשאר בארץ ישראל ולמד בכפר ילדים ונוער אהבה שבקריית ביאליק עד 1944, שם למד חקלאות, כשהוא משלים את תעודת הבגרות בכוחות עצמו ובהצטיינות יתרה. בעקבות הצטיינותו קיבל מלגת לימודים, ובחר ללמוד באוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים. בשנים 1946–1947 למד באוניברסיטה כימיה, פיזיקה ומתמטיקה, והתגורר בעיסאוויה שלמורדות הר הצופים, שם למד. במהלך לימודיו עבד בטיפול בנוער עברייני בשכונת העוני מזכרת משה. במלחמת העצמאות שירת במחלקת המודיעין. ב-1951 למד עבודה סוציאלית-פסיכיאטרית באוניברסיטת קולומביה שבניו יורק מטעם הדסה ועליית הנוער. במקביל שימש כעובד סוציאלי פרטני במוסד לנוער "הות'ורן סידר נולס" (Hawthorne Cedar Knolls) במדינת ניו יורק, המטפל בילדים עם בעיות פסיכיאטריות. ב-1953 שב לישראל, ושימש כמפקח לחינוך מיוחד בעליית הנוער. במסגרת זו עבד עם קבוצות ילדים שהגיעו מארצות צפון אפריקה. בשנים 1954–1959 ניהל את כפר הנוער קריית יערים, המיועד לנוער מצוקה שאינו יכול להיקלט במסגרות החינוכיות הרגילות. בשנים 1959–1961, למד והשלים תואר דוקטור במינהל סוציאלי באוניברסיטת קייס וסטרן ריזרב שבקליבלנד, אוהיו, במימון "מועצת הנשים היהודיות" (National Council of Jewish Women) בארצות הברית. עם שובו לישראל ב-1962 היה המנהל הישראלי הראשון ואחד ממקימי בית הספר לעבודה סוציאלית ע"ש פאול ברוואלד באוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים, שהוקם במשותף עם ה"ג'וינט". כץ החזיק בתפקיד זה עד 1968. באותה בתקופה נפתחו בתי ספר לעבודה סוציאלית באוניברסיטת חיפה (1965) ובאוניברסיטת תל אביב (1969). בין 1964 ל-1968 שימש גם כיו"ר הוועדה לקביעת הצרכים המינימליים של "נצרכי סעד", מינוי שקיבל משר הסעד, יוסף בורג. כץ היה ממייסדי מפלגת רפ"י, והוצב במקום ה-21 ברשימתה לכנסת השישית ב-1965, אך לא נבחר. בשנים 1965–1967 שימש כיועץ למפלגה בנושאי חברה, על פי הזמנת דוד בן-גוריון. בשנים 1968 עד 1973 כיהן כץ כמנכ"ל המוסד לביטוח לאומי. בתקופה זו פעל למען חקיקת חוקים חברתיים שונים, בהם מתן מענקי משפחה ליוצאי צה"ל, ביטוח אבטלה, ביטוח נכות כללית, הצמדתן של קצבאות זקנה ושאירים לשכר הממוצע במשק (במקום למדד יוקר המחיה). כמו כן ייסד את כתב העת "ביטחון סוציאלי"' העוסק בענייני רווחה וביטוח סוציאלי, והכין תשתית למחקרים על שיעור העוני בישראל (קו העוני) – נתונים המתפרסמים מדי שנה. בשנת 1971 מונה על ידי ראש ממשלת ישראל גולדה מאיר לעמוד בראש "ועדת ראש הממשלה לילדים ונוער במצוקה" (ועדת כץ); ועדה ציבורית זו הוקמה כדי לבחון את הסיבות להתגברות עבריינות הנוער בישראל, ובעבודתה השתתפו כ-120 איש מהאקדמיה, השירות הציבורי והפרטי ומשרדי הממשלה השונים. הוועדה, שהגישה את מסקנותיה בסוף 1973, המליצה שמשפחות שהכנסתן נמוכה ממינימום הכרחי לקיום תזכינה להשלמת הכנסתן בידי המדינה, וכן הציעה להרחיב את החינוך הבלתי פורמלי, את התמיכה באזורי מצוקה ועוד. כץ נבחר כמועמד ברשימת המערך מטעם רפ"י בבחירות לכנסת השמינית, אך ויתר על כניסה לכנסת, כדי לייסד ולנהל ב-1974 את מכון ברוקדייל לחקר הזִקנה בישראל, שבראשו עמד עד 1977. לאחר מכן הצטרף למפלגת ד"ש והוצב כמועמד אחרון ברשימתה לבחירות לכנסת התשיעית. מספר חודשים לאחר הבחירות הצטרפה ד"ש לממשלתו הראשונה של מנחם בגין. כץ, שלא היה חבר הכנסת, נבחר על ידי המפלגה לתפקיד שר העבודה והרווחה, והושבע כשר, יחד עם שאר שרי ד"ש, ב-24 באוקטובר 1977. הוא היה השר הראשון במשרד במתכונתו זו, כמיזוג של משרד הסעד ומשרד העבודה. ראש האופוזיציה דאז, שמעון פרס, אמר על מינוי זה "האיש הנכון, במקום הנכון, רק במפלגה הלא-הנכונה". במהלך כהונתו דאג כץ להקמת מנגנון לשימור השווי של קצבאות הביטוח הלאומי בתקופה שבה הייתה אינפלציה גבוהה. כמו כן, הוביל את חקיקתם של חוק הבטחת הכנסה, שהעביר את הטיפול הכספי בנזקקים מלשכות הסעד למוסד לביטוח לאומי, ושל חוק ביטוח סיעוד, המעניק לגמלאים סיעודיים סיוע בכסף או בעזרה פיזית. כן היה מיוזמי פרויקט שיקום שכונות וממפעיליו הראשונים. הוא גרס כי הדגש של הפרויקט אמור להיות בשינוי חברתי ולא בשיקום מבנים, אולם עמדתו לא התקבלה. בעקבות רצונו של יגאל ידין לנהל את הפרויקט, נטלו כץ ומשרדו חלק משני בלבד בפרויקט שיקום השכונות. כץ כיהן כשר העבודה והרווחה עד סיום כהונת הממשלה ב-5 באוגוסט 1981. בבחירות לכנסת העשירית היה מפעילי מפלגת תל"ם. לאחר סיום כהונתו כשר, הקים כץ בשנת 1982 את המרכז לחקר המדיניות החברתית בישראל (מרכז טאוב), ועמד בראשו עד 1992. המרכז הוא גוף בלתי תלוי וללא מטרת רווח, הפועל במטרה להשפיע על עיצוב המדיניות החברתית של ישראל לפי ערכי שוויון חברתי וצדק. בהמשך שימש כץ כחבר ובהמשך כ"חבר כבוד" בחבר הנאמנים של המרכז. בנובמבר 1996 מונה על ידי שר המשפטים צחי הנגבי ושר העבודה והרווחה אלי ישי לעמוד בראש "הוועדה לבדיקת חקיקה מקיפה בנושא זכויות אנשים עם מוגבלות". ועדה זו מצאה כי למעלה מ-10% מתושבי ישראל הם אנשים עם מוגבלות, וכי הם סובלים מהפליה, קיפוח ונחיתות חברתית-כלכלית. הוועדה הגישה הצעת חקיקה מפורטת שהובילה לחקיקתו של חוק שוויון זכויות לאנשים עם מוגבלות. בבחירות לכנסת ה-15 שובץ במקום ה-42 האחרון והסמלי ברשימת "כח לגמלאים" בראשות גדעון בן-ישראל, שלא עברה את אחוז החסימה. לאורך השנים שימש כץ כיועץ לארגונים שונים בעולם, בין השאר בסינגפור, בארצות הברית ובקניה, כיושב ראש של קרנות וארגונים חברתיים שונים ועוד. ישראל כץ הלך לעולמו בגיל 82, והובא לקבורה בהר המנוחות בירושלים. הוא היה נשוי למרסל רוסו כץ, ולהם שני בנים. רשימת פרסומים חלקית לקריאה נוספת קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים
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