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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%932026_China%E2%80%93Japan_diplomatic_crisis] | [TOKENS: 13621] |
Contents 2025โ2026 ChinaโJapan diplomatic crisis Relations between China and Japan entered a state of crisis in November 2025, after Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi said in the Japanese parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could potentially constitute an "existential crisis for Japan" under the Legislation for Peace and Security, allowing Japan to take military action in collective self-defence. Following these remarks, the Chinese consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian, made threatening comments against Takaichi on X (formerly Twitter), triggering a diplomatic row between the countries. Both sides protested the other's remarks. In response to questions from Japanese parliamentarians, Takaichi refused to withdraw her remarks, arguing that they were consistent with the Japanese government's existing position on the issue. Japan requested that China take "appropriate measures" against Xue. China refused, demanded Takaichi retract her statements, and issued numerous retaliatory measures against Japan, including issuing a travel advisory, restricting travel and cultural exchanges, and cutting off seafood imports from the country. In 2026, the dispute further escalated with China restricting the export of dual-use items and rare earth materials to Japan. Background From 1895 to 1945, the island of Taiwan along with the Penghu islands was under Japanese colonial rule by the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in the aftermath of the First Sino-Japanese War. Following the surrender of Japan in the conclusion of World War II, Taiwan was handed over to the Republic of China (ROC) in 1945, but the ROC soon lost its mainland territory due to its defeat in the Chinese Civil War and retreated its government to Taiwan in 1949. Japan formally "renounced all right, title, and claim" to Taiwan in 1952, without naming the specific receiver of Taiwan's sovereignty, which began a long-standing geopolitical dispute. Since 1947, under the auspices of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, the Japanese constitution has maintained a clause of Article 9, which prohibits the use of force to resolve international disputes. From the 1980s the Japanese government has taken the stance that protection of the sea lane between Japan and the Bashi Channel south of Taiwan is permissible as self-defence, and that it would not constitute collective self-defence. In 2015, Shinzo Abe's government passed legislation that allowed Japan to engage in collective self-defence in specific cases, such as if an ally like the United States came under attack. In 2021, after his resignation, Abe said that a Chinese attack on Taiwan, or what he referred to as a "Taiwan emergency", would be an emergency for Japan and the USโJapan alliance. Sanae Takaichi, who was elected as the Prime Minister of Japan in October 2025, has been generally seen as pro-Taiwanese and hawkish on China. In April 2025, she visited Taiwan and met with President Lai Ching-te. She has repeated Abe's statement that a "Taiwan emergency is a Japan emergency." Her election as Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leader also led Komeito, which maintains friendly ties with China, to break its coalition with the LDP. Chinese leader Xi Jinping made an unusual move by not sending a congratulatory telegram on the day Takaichi assumed the post of prime minister, but a JapanโChina summit meeting between Xi and Takaichi took place on 31 October at the APEC South Korea 2025. However, after Takaichi held talks with Taiwan's former Vice Premier Lin Hsin-i on 1 November, China lodged a protest with Japan, and Japan counter-argued, leading to the deterioration of the relationship. Dispute During deliberations in the National Diet on 7 November, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute "an existential crisis for Japan" under the Legislation for Peace and Security formulated in 2015, allowing it to take military action in self-defence.[a] Under the conditions of Legislation, a survival-threatening situation refers to an attack on a country with close ties to Japan that threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to the lives of its people as a legal prerequisite for Japan exercising its right to collective self-defense, even if Japan itself is not directly attacked. Japanese: ใใใๆฆ่ฆใไฝฟใฃใฆใใใใฆๆญฆๅใฎ่กไฝฟใไผดใใใฎใงใใใฐใใใใฏใฉใ่ใใฆใๅญ็ซๅฑๆฉไบๆ
ใซใชใๅพใใฑใผในใงใใใจ็งใฏ่ใใพใใ [If it were to involve the use of warships and the exercise of force, then by any measure, it could constitute a situation threatening Japanโs survival.] โ Sanae Takaichi Takaichi made this remark in response to a question from opposition parliamentarian Katsuya Okada about a hypothetical naval blockade of the Bashi Channel between the Philippines and Taiwan. In response to the comments, the Chinese consul-general in Osaka, Xue Jian, wrote on X that "we have no choice but to cut off that dirty neck that has lunged at us without a moment's hesitation. Are you ready?",[b] although the post was later deleted after a protest by the Japanese government. We have no choice but to cut off that dirty neck that has lunged at us without a moment's hesitation. Are you ready?๐ก 8 November 2025 This exchange of words led to a diplomatic row between Japan and China. Chinese officials condemned Takaichi's remarks as they cast doubt on Japan's stance regarding the one China principle and constitutes interference in China's internal affairs, while Japanese officials and the US ambassador to Japan criticized Xue's comment. The Taiwanese government attempted to keep a low profile regarding the conflict, with the opposition parties displaying mixed attitudes. During further discussion in Parliament on 12 November, Takaichi said that her remarks were in accord with the government's longstanding position and would not be withdrawn. She also said that she would refrain from making statements about specific cases in the future. On 13 November, Chinese deputy foreign minister Sun Weidong summoned the Japanese ambassador to China, Kenji Kanasugi, to protest Sanae Takaichi's remarks. Kanasugi rejected the Chinese argument, explained the Japanese position, and protested Consul General Xue Jian's remarks. On 14 November, Japanese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Takehiro Funakoshi summoned the Chinese ambassador to Japan, Wu Jianghao, to protest Xue Jian's remarks. According to press releases by the Japanese and Chinese Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Wu said Takaichi's remarks were "complete misjudgment of the situation and an overestimation of Japan's capabilities" while "Funakoshi countered these statements based on the Japanese government's consistent and long-standing position." On 17 November, Masaaki Kanai, Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arrived in China and met with Liu Jinsong, Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 18 November. During the meeting, Liu protested Takaichi's remarks and requested that they be retracted. Kanai responded by saying Japan's security policy did not change and protested Consul General Xue Jian's remarks and criticized China's moves to limit the movement of people between the two countries. After the meeting, the Chinese side took the unusual step of allowing reporters into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building to take pictures. Chinese media published pictures of Liu, who was wearing a Chinese tunic suit in the style of the May Fourth Movement and had the national emblem pinned to his chest, speaking, while Kanai listened with his head down, a move considered by Nippon Television to be China trying to manipulate public opinion. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara said that the Chinese side had unilaterally permitted photography without agreement from Japan. On 18 November, at the plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly on Security Council reform, Fu Cong, China's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, said Japan was "totally unqualified to demand a permanent seat on the Security Council". A Japanese representative described Fu's accusations as groundless and said Tokyo had contributed to maintaining peace and prosperity in the world. On 22 November, Fu delivered a letter to the UN Secretary-General Antรณnio Guterres to be distributed to all UN member states which said if Japan were to intervene militarily in the event of a war between China and Taiwan, it would constitute an act of aggression and that China would exercise its right of self-defense under the UN Charter and international law. In an emailed statement to Reuters, Japan's Foreign Ministry said it was aware of Fu's letter for the claim of military intervention which is "entirely unacceptable" and reiterated the country's commitment to peace. On 24 November, Japanese Ambassador to the UN Kazuyuki Yamazaki [ja] wrote a letter to Secretary-General Guterres, stating China's assertions were "erroneous" and that Japan's defense policy is exclusively defense-oriented, while also criticizing China's military build-up. He also stated Japan's position on Taiwan had not changed. On 1 December, Fu sent a second letter to Secretary-General Guterres as a reply to Yamazaki's letter, in which he wrote that Takaichi's statement was the "greatest challenge" which damaged relations between the two countries, and said Japan should "clearly reaffirm the one-China principle, immediately retract the erroneous remarks and take practical steps to honor its commitments to China". He also called on the international community to "remain highly vigilant against Japan's ambitions to expand its military capabilities and revive militarism". In response, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kihara called China's allegations "not true at all" and "totally unacceptable", saying Japan has "consistently contributed to the peace and prosperity" since the end of World War II. On 4 December, Japanese ambassador Yamazaki again issued a rebuttal, calling China's assertions "inconsistent with the facts, unsubstantiated, and are categorically unacceptable". On 15 December, at an open debate of the UN Security Council regarding leadership for peace, Fu urged Takaichi to withdraw her remarks, saying they had "gone against the trend", and said Japan had launched aggression 80 years ago "in the name of self-defense, bringing profound catastrophes" to China and Asia, saying that the world "must never allow the resurgence of militarism and fascism". Yamazaki replied by saying Japan had consistently pursued the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II and that China's comments were not appropriate for the Security Council's agenda. On 26 January 2026, Fu addressed a UN Security Council meeting on international rule of law by stating Takaichi's remarks constitute a "brazen intervention in China's internal affairs" and are an open breach of Japan's obligations as a country defeated in World War II, to which Japanese representative Kazuyuki responded by saying it was "regrettable" that the Chinese delegation made groundless statements against Japan. On 18 February, Fu said that Japan was "attempting to intervene militarily in the Taiwan issue under the guise of collective self-defence", which he said "would constitute an aggression against China". Chinese retaliatory measures On 15 November, the China Maritime Safety Administration announced that the People's Liberation Army would conduct live-fire exercises in the central Yellow Sea from 17 to 19 November, and that navigation in this area would be prohibited during this period. The notice drew criticism from Taiwan, which accused Beijing of saber-rattling at Japan for political gain. On 16 November, the China Coast Guard announced that a formation of its ships carried out a patrol within the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, a territory disputed between China Japan, and Taiwan. The Japan Coast Guard said it drove the ships away. On 2 December, Chinese and Japanese coastguard vessels engaged in a standoff over the islands. China said it had implemented "necessary control measures" and driven a Japanese fishing boat away from the islands, while Japan stated it had intercepted and driven away two Chinese coastguard vessels that approached the fishing boat. From 6 to 7 December, the aircraft carrier Liaoning transited through the Miyako Strait between the islands of Okinawa and Miyakojima and began takeoff and landing drills with Shenyang J-15 jets; aircraft took off from and landed on the carrier roughly 100 times over two days. On 7 December, Japanese defense minister Shinjirล Koizumi accused China of two incidents on 6 December in which J-15 jets from the Liaoning carrier at locking their fire-control radar at Japanese F-15 jets near the Miyako Strait. The Japanese government formally protested to the Chinese side. Takaichi also called the incident "extremely disappointing". Japanese vice foreign minister Takehiro Funakoshi summoned Chinese ambassador Wu Jianghao over the incident; for his part, Wu lodged "stern representation and strong protest" to Japan at the meeting. The PLA Navy spokesperson Wang Xuemeng responded by accusing Japan of a "slander and smear campaign" and said the Liaoning was carrying "routine carrier-based fighter jet flight training". He also said Japan Self-Defense Forces aircraft had repeatedly approached and disrupted its fighter jet training. Japanese officials later said that their Chinese counterparts didn't answer the hotline during the incident. Koizumi also said that while notified, Japan "did not receive sufficient information" regarding the drills, while Kihara said Japanese jets were far away from the Chinese jets while training. The U.S. criticized the radar targeting of Japanese aircraft and reinforced the U.S. alliance with Japan. A US State Department spokesperson also stated that "Chinaโs actions are not conducive to regional peace and stability". The aircraft carrier group travelled northeast from their position east of Kikaijima following the incident. A Chinese naval Type 054 frigate also sailed through the Miyako Strait on 8 December, while another travelled through the Osumi Strait. On 9 December, two Russian Tupolev Tu-95 bombers, two Chinese Xi'an H-6 bombers and four Chinese Shenyang J-16 fighter jets flew through the Miyako Strait into the Pacific Ocean as part of joint exercises. On 10 December, two US B-52 bombers flew together with three Japanese F-35 jets and three F-15 jets, which Japanese defense ministry said "reaffirmed their strong resolve to prevent any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force". On 29 December, the PLA's Eastern Theater Command announced a major military exercise around Taiwan codenamed Justice Mission 2025, involving the command's land, sea, air, and rocket forces. On 27 January 2026, Reuters reported that since late 2025, the Japanese government had been advising fishers to avoid the Senkaku Islands in order to not escalate relations with China. On 13 February, the Japanese government announced it had seized a Chinese fishing boat in Japan's exclusive economic zone near Nagasaki Prefecture. Japan subsequently released the captain of the ship after China submitted documents guaranteeing payment of bail. On 16 November, the Japanese think tank Genron NPO stated the 20th BeijingโTokyo Summit and the release of the results of a joint Sino-Japanese opinion poll would be postponed after it received a request for cancellation from its Chinese partner, the China International Communications Group, in which it blamed Takaichi's remarks for undermining the atmosphere for normal exchanges between the two countries. A delegation from Xuzhou, Jiangsu cancelled its visit to its sister city, Handa, Aichi. On 17 November, the release of Japanese films Crayon Shin-chan the Movie: Super Hot! The Spicy Kasukabe Dancers and Cells at Work!, which were originally scheduled to be released in China, were temporarily postponed. The decision was made by the China Film Administration, which it said was based on a reassessment of the overall market outlook of Japanese film imports and sentiment of Chinese audiences, and that it had paused the approval process for new movies from Japan. Hong Kong's public broadcaster RTHK also stopped airings of Cells at Work! On the same evening, QQ Music announced the cancellation of a JO1 fan meeting that was scheduled to be held in Guangzhou. On 18 November, the 8th JapanโChina Friendship Exchange Conference in the Western Japan Region event originally scheduled to be held by the Consulate General of China in Osaka in Hiroshima on 21 November was cancelled at its request due to security concern. Xue Jian was originally scheduled to attend the conference. On 19 November, a concert by Kokia was cancelled after her band was denied access to their venue. On 25 November, Hong Kong singer Ekin Cheng cancelled a planned performance in Tokyo in December. On the same day, The Asahi Shimbun reported that censors appeared to be removing comments and videos on Chinese social media platforms which expressed views supportive of Japan or that deviated from the government's official line on Takaichi's remarks. On 28 November, Japanese singer Ayumi Hamasaki announced the cancellation of a concert in Shanghai scheduled for 29 November as part of the I Am Ayu Tour; she later performed in front of an empty stage. During an appearance in Shanghai, Japanese singer Maki Otsuki's performance was interrupted mid-song, when the lights and sound were cut, and was asked to leave the stage, followed by the cancellation of a Japanese anime event. Japanese idol girl group Momoiro Clover Z also cancelled a planned performance. In the same day, South China Morning Post reported that China had cancelled youth exchange programs with Japan. In December, CNN estimated that performances and fan meet-and-greets from at least 30 Japanese performers had been canceled. In reporting on the cancellations of events in China featuring Japanese musicians, Reuters noted that the Chinese government had a history of using cultural boycotts against countries as a form of economic coercion during diplomatic disputes. On 4 December, a Hatsune Miku themed exhibition, which was scheduled to be held in Shanghai from 18 December 2025 to 1 March 2026, was postponed indefinitely. K-pop groups have also been affected by the cultural restrictions, with concerts and fan events featuring groups with Japanese members being cancelled. On 6 December, South Korean boy band Close Your Eyes held a fan meeting in Hangzhou without Japanese member Kenshin, while a fan meeting event featuring trainees from Incode Entertainment who starred in Mnetโs Boys II Planet was abruptly canceled; the lineup included two Japanese members. The Le Sserafim's meet-and-greet event for its single "Spaghetti" scheduled for 14 December in Shanghai was cancelled; the group has two Japanese members. On 6 December, Hong Kong's Leisure and Cultural Services Department cancelled the screening of three Japanese films โ Kamome Shokudo, Tampopo and Sweet Bean โ at the Food for Thought โ A Cinematic Feast running from 6 December to 18 January. On 7 December, Chinese video game company miHoYo announced a two-week delay for a major update to their game Honkai: Star Rail, in which a new region widely teased to have Japanese influence was supposed to be released. MiHoYo has apologized to players regarding the delay and issued in-game compensation. On 9 December, Studio Ghibli announced that an exhibition in Guangzhou based on the works of Japanese animator Hayao Miyazaki had been cancelled. On 10 December, a Pokรฉmon Trading Card Game tournament scheduled for January 2026 in Shanghai was postponed. In December, it was announced that the two pandas at the Ueno Zoo, Xiao Xiao and Lei Lei, would return to China in January 2026, ahead of schedule; they returned to China on 28 January 2026. In the same month, it was also announced that the Comicup comic convention in Hangzhou that would take place from 27 to 28 December would ban Japanese-themed content and derivative works including Japanese anime and manga. On 14 November, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism advised Chinese citizens to avoid traveling to Japan; China is the largest source of tourists to Japan. Air China (including its subsidiary Air Macau), China Southern Airlines, China Eastern Airlines, Hainan Airlines, Shandong Airlines, Sichuan Airlines, and XiamenAir subsequently announced that tickets for flights to Japan with travel dates before 31 December could be refunded or changed free of charge. On 5 December, they extended this policy for another three months to 28 March. On 26 January 2026, this policy was further extended by seven months, applying to flights to and from Japan as well as transfers scheduled between 29 March and 24 October. News reports in November 2025 stated that Nanjing Lukou International Airport required all passengers going to Japan to use the manual channel and be questioned by customs officers. On 16 November, both Hong Kong and Macau updated their travel safety guidelines, reminding those who planned to go to or were already in Japan to be vigilant. On the same day, the Ministry of Education warned Chinese citizens to be cautious about going to Japan to study; China is the largest source of foreign students in Japan. On 18 November, Financial Times reported that several state-owned enterprises restricted their employees from travelling to Japan. In reaction to the travel warning, tourism agencies in China received a large number of cancellation requests for group tours to Japan, while others announced the suspension of sales of related tourism products. Some hotels and attractions in Japan received notices of cancellation of reservations by Chinese tourists. On 19 November, the Chinese cruise ship Adora Mediterranea cancelled its planned stop at Hirara Port on Miyako Island on 20 November. On 8 December, the Jian Zhen Hao ferry from Shanghai to Osaka and Kobe was cancelled following a request from the Chinese. The Nikkei 225 of the Tokyo Stock Exchange fell on the morning of 17 November, with Fast Retailing, which is related to the Chinese market, and Mitsukoshi Isetan, which is related to overseas tourist spending, experiencing significant declines. Travel statistics cited by The Washington Post, Sankei Shimbun and Bloomberg News estimated that about 543,000 airline tickets from China to Japan โ representing around 40% of total Chinese airline bookings and 20% of China-Japan flight routes โ were cancelled by 20 November and that around 30% of the 1.44 million planned trips from China to Japan through the end of December had been cancelled. The outlets also cited economic analyses which estimated a loss of $500 millionโ$1.2 billion to the Japanese economy as a result of the cancellations; if the travel boycotts persisted, they said those loses could rise from $9 billion to over $11 billion (ยฅ1.79 trillion yen, equivalent to 0.29% of Japan's GDP). On 24 November, Yicai reported that Chinese airlines had cancelled 41 flights across the 12 routes. On 25 November, Bloomberg News reported that Chinese government instructed airlines to reduce the number of flights to Japan through March 2026. By 29 November, Nikkei Asia estimated Chinese airlines had canceled 904 flights for December, 16% of the initial total of 5,548, which was equivalent to around 156,000 seats. On 1 December, the China Central Television reported that more than 1,900 flights from mainland China to Japan for December, representing 40% of the total flights, had been cancelled. In reporting on the travel warning issued by the Chinese government, NHK pointed out that China often used economic pressure as a means of diplomatic friction, such as the boycott of Japanese goods in 2012 and the ban on Korean entertainment in 2017. Decrease in Chinese tourism to Japan has also been marked by a corresponding increase of bookings by Chinese tourists to locations such as South Korea and Russia. In December, the Japan National Tourism Organization revealed that arrivals from China in November had increased just 3% from the same period in 2024, compared to an increase of 40.7% in the first ten months of 2025. The figures also showed that the number of arrivals had dropped from 716,700 in October to 562,600 in November. Bloomberg News calculated that this had led to an economic loss of $367 million (ยฅ57 billion). On 22 December, Flight Manager analyzed that flights across 46 routes covering a total of 38 airports had been cancelled by Chinese airlines for the upcoming two weeks. On 25 December, Nippon Television reported the Chinese government had instructed domestic travel agencies to reduce the number of people visiting Japan to 60% of levels to date. On 20 January 2026, Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism announced that the number of tourists from China in December 2025 had fallen further to 330,000. down 45% from the same month a year earlier. On 26 January, China's foreign ministry warned its citizens from visiting Japan during the Chinese New Year, citing "a surge in crimes targeting Chinese citizens" and earthquakes. In January 2026, 385,300 people from China visited Japan, representing a decline of 60.7% from the same period in 2025. On 17 November, the mayor of Shimonoseki cancelled his planned business trip to Suzhou after receiving a request for postponements from Chinese officials the day before. On 19 November, Kyodo News and other media reported that China informed Japan through diplomatic channels that it would temporarily halt imports of Japanese seafood. Sources told Kyodo News that China stated it was necessary to monitor the testing procedures for the treated water at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. However, China did not state how long it would take for the "improvements to be completed". Spokesperson Mao Ning also confirmed the news, but did not mention that it was for the purpose of boycott. She only said that, to her knowledge, it was because China had not yet received technical data from Japan. She added that under the current circumstances, there was "no market" for Japanese seafood imports. On the same day, Kyodo News reported that intergovernmental consultations to resume Japanese beef exports to China were suspended. Japanese guests and media were prohibited from the biannual Aero Asia show of the Zhuhai International Airshow Center starting on 27 November. On 28 November, Japan Business Federation Chairman Tsutsui Yoshinobu met with Chinese ambassador Wu Jianghao, telling him Japanese businesses hoped to promote smooth exchanges with China and build good relations. On 30 November, The Nikkei reported that Liu Jinsong visited a major Japanese manufacturer in Dalian to assure the company to feel safe while conducting business. On 7 December, Yomiuri Shimbun reported that Japanese companies had faced delays in securing the approval process for importing rare earths from China. On 31 December, the JapanโChina Economic Association announced that a delegation of around 200 business leaders will skip a trip originally scheduled 20 January, first time the trip was skipped since 2012 and 2020, the latter due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On 6 January 2026, the Ministry of Commerce announced that all dual-use items are banned from being exported to Japan for military use effective immediately. In reaction, Japanese vice foreign minister Takehiro Funakoshi summoned Chinese ambassador Wu Jianghao to lodge a strong protest and demand the withdrawal of the sanctions; Wu rejected the demand, calling the restrictions "completely justified, reasonable and lawful". Ministry of Commerce spokesperson He Yadong stated the restrictions were aimed at "Japanese military users, for military purposes, and for any other end-use applications that contribute to enhancing Japan's military capabilities" in order to "preventing remilitarization and attempts to acquire nuclear weapons", and said it would not affect nonmilitary trade. On 7 January, the Ministry of Commerce launched a dumping probe into dichlorosilane imports from Japan. On 8 January, The Wall Street Journal reported China had started restricting exports of rare earth materials to Japan. On the same day, Kyodo News reported that Chinese customs were delaying the clearance of Japanese sake and food items imports to China. On 15 November, the Ministry of State Security announced that it recently "cracked a series of espionage cases involving Japanese intelligence agencies infiltrating and stealing secrets from China" and criticized Takaichi for "persisting in her erroneous remarks without remorse despite repeated solemn representations from China". According to Changanjie Zhishi, a social media account run by the Beijing Daily, the MSS has been actively taking action against the frequent cases of Japanese espionage in recent years. Japanese measures On 17 November, the Japanese Embassy in China reminded Japanese people in China to take safety precautions and avoid crowded places where Japanese people are gathered. On 18 November, Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology issued a notice requiring Japanese schools in China to ensure the safety of children, students and international students. Japan's chief cabinet secretary Kihara said the advisories were made in response to a surge in anti-Japanese sentiment in the Chinese media. Reactions in China and Japan On 10 November, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lin Jian protested Takaichi's remarks, saying China had lodged a complaint with Japan over her remarks and that Japan needed to reflect on its historical crimes and stop interfering in China's internal affairs. He also defended Xue's post by saying it was a personal one and that China would not tolerate any foreign interference when it came to Taiwan. Citing the Mukden incident of 1931, the Chinese embassy in Japan noted that Japan had invaded its neighbours including China under the pretext of "existential crisis". The embassy also stated on 21 November that China could invoke the enemy state clauses in the UN Charter, implying possible military action against Japan. On 14 November, Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Jiang Bin said that if Japan intervened in a war between China and Taiwan, then it would suffer a crushing defeat by the People's Liberation Army. Each of PLA's five theater commands have also released statements condemning Takaichi. On 16 November, foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said Premier Li Qiang had no plans to meet with Takaichi during the upcoming G20 summit in South Africa; Japan had reportedly tried to arrange a Takaichi-Li meeting on the sidelines of the summit to reduce tensions between the two countries. While citing the 1972 JapanโChina Joint Communiquรฉ, Mao further called on Japan to abide by its commitment to China over Taiwan and for Takaichi to retract her comments. On 20 November, China's Ministry of Commerce spokesperson He Yongqian said trade cooperation with Japan had been "severely damaged" and urged Takaichi to retract her comments. On the same day, Mao announced the cancellation of a meeting between culture ministers that was scheduled for November with South Korea and Japan. On 22 November, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Takaichi's comments crossed a red line which demanded a resolute response from China and that all countries had a responsibility to prevent the resurgence of Japanese militarism. He additionally said that China would never allow Japanese right-wing forces to turn back the tide of history, foreign forces to encroach on China's Taiwan area, and a revival of Japanese militarism, which was picked by Chinese state media as the "Three Never Allows". On 24 November, Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu criticized Takaichi's remarks and said they had caused his government to cast doubt on the value of exchanges between China and Japan. Hong Kong also halted exchanges with Japan's consulate and canceled several official events with the country. In addition to statements made in person or on a government website, Chinese officials made posts on X targeting Japan and Takaichi. The X accounts of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense issued warnings in both English and Japanese to Japan. On 24 November, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and President Trump held a phone call, where Xi said "China and the United States once fought side by side against fascism and militarism, and should now work together to safeguard the outcomes of World War II" and that the transfer of Taiwan was an "integral part of the post-World War II international order", while the Chinese readout stated Trump "understands how important the Taiwan question is to China." During a call with French presidential policy advisor Emmanuel Bonne on 27 November and a talk with United Kingdom security advisor Jonathan Powell on 28 November, Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on both countries to abide by the one-China principle and called on them to "safeguard the outcomes" of World War II. Wang also condemned Takaichi's statement during his talk with Bonne and elaborated China's position on Japan-related issues to Powell. On 9 December, Wang told German foreign minister Johann Wadephul that Takaichi was "trying to exploit the Taiwan question โ the very territory Japan colonized for half a century, committing countless crimes against the Chinese people โ to provoke trouble and threaten China militarily", which he said was "completely unacceptable". On 13 December, at the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Day, CCP Organization Department head and Politburo member Shi Taifeng gave a speech saying that under the leadership of the CCP, China had beaten invaders and become a great nation, continuing by saying that "History has proven and will continue to prove that any attempt to revive militarism, challenge the postwar international order, and undermine world peace and stability is doomed to failure". On 14 December, China sent National Health Commission International Cooperation Department director general Feng Yong, a working-level official rather than a minister, to a meeting of health ministers from Japan, China and South Korea in Seoul; the three countries agreed to strengthen trilateral cooperation on universal health coverage and mental health through technology and artificial intelligence. On 15 December, the Chinese foreign minister announced sanctions against former Japanese chief of staff of the joint staff Shigeru Iwasaki for being a consultant to Taiwan's Executive Yuan, saying he had "openly colluded with the โTaiwan independenceโ separatist forces". From 12 to 16 December, foreign minister Wang Yi visited the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Wang later told Chinese media that explained China's position and made clear the country's firm opposition to Takaichi interfering in China's domestic affairs. On 16 December, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said that "On key issues, Japan is still 'squeezing toothpaste' and 'burying nails,' attempting to obfuscate and muddle through", and that China is "firmly opposed to this". On 17 December, Nippon Television reported that the Chinese foreign ministry had summoned ambassadors from ASEAN countries, including the Philippines and Singapore, to criticize Takaichi's statements and urge them to support China, adding that similar requests were also reportedly made to ambassadors from France, Germany and other countries when they met with the Chinese foreign ministry. In response to the delegation of Japanese parliamentary membersโ visit to Taiwan on 22 December, the Chinese foreign ministry lodged "solemn representations with the Japanese side", while foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said that Japanese parliamentarians "paying a visit to China's Taiwan region" were acts that would "seriously violate" the political foundations of the bilateral relationship between China and Japan. On 30 December, Wang Yi told the Symposium on the International Situation and China's Foreign Relations that Takaichi was "openly challenging" China's territorial integrity. On 1 January 2026, Wang Yi held a call with South Korean foreign minister Cho Hyun, telling him that "certain political forces in Japan" were trying to "reverse the course of history and whitewash" Japan's "crimes of aggression and colonialism". on 8 January, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense jointly issued a statement saying that "moves of the Japanese side form a grave challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the postwar international order", referring to Japan possibly seeking to revise the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, discussing the potential introduction of nuclear-powered submarines, and calling for boosting "extended deterrence". In January, Chinese embassy in the US spokesperson Liu Pengyu wrote an article in the Executive Intelligence Review, calling for the US and China to work together to prevent the resurgence of Japanese militarism, writing that "Preventing militarism from harming the world again is in the common interest of both our countries". The Chinese foreign ministry further stated that Takaichi's remarks had "severely hurt the feelings of the Chinese people." On 14 February, at the Munich Security Conference, Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that Takaichi's remarks was "the first time in 80 years that a Japanese Prime Minister has uttered such words. It directly violates Chinaโs territorial sovereignty, and it directly challenges the fact that Taiwan has been returned to China. It completely violates Japan's commitment to China", and that there was "no way" for China to accept that. Chinese state media criticized Takaichi's remarks intensively. Starting on 12 November, the China Media Group's Yuyuan Tantian published two commentaries on its Chinese social media account where it criticized Sanae Takaichi's remarks with insults. On the same day, Hu Xijin, former editor-in-chief of the CCP-owned tabloid Global Times, called Takaichi, on X, an evil witch who had ignited a new round of mutual hatred between the Chinese and Japanese people, though he later said on 25 November that state media used harsh language that does not reflect the actual situation when criticizing Takaichi and Japan and warned against "exaggerated" and "superficial" information. On 14 November, the People's Daily published an editorial under the pseudonym "Zhong Sheng", used to represent the CCP's official view on foreign policy issues, which called Takaichi's statement "utterly isolating political nonsense" and said its aim was "breaking through the restraints of the peaceful constitution" and "seeking a pretext for Japanese military expansion". On 15 November, Beijing Daily compared Takaichi's comments to those which the Japanese Empire gave to justify its invasion of Manchuria. On 16 November, the People's Liberation Army Daily published an article which said that if Japan intervened in a war between China and Taiwan, then its government would be "tying its nation to a chariot of self-destruction." Through an account that it operated on Chinese social media, the daily had on 13 November released posters in both Chinese and Japanese which compared Japan's intervention in Taiwan Strait affairs to Japan's invasion of China in World War II. On 17 November, the People's Daily published another editorial under "Zhong Sheng", warning that "Japan risks universal condemnation if it insists on tying itself to the cart of breaking up China, [and] it will inevitably suffer the results of its own evil actions". On 18 November, Xinhua News Agency published an article saying Takaichi's statements were summoning militarist demons. The Global Times published an editorial on 19 November which questioned Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa. On 22 November, the People's Daily published an editorial which accused Takaichi of propagating the 'China threat theory' and described her words and actions as warmongering that would eventually lead Japan to its demise. On 12 December, PLA Daily published an article by Xu Yizhen, which said Takaichi had "openly turned back the wheel of history" and that "any appeasement or tolerance of these provocative moves by Japanese right-wing politicians will only allow the ghost of militarism to rise again and once more place the peoples of Asia in peril". On 15 December, a People's Daily "Zhong Sheng" editorial said Takaichi was "launching a serious provocation" on Taiwan, saying "Japan has never truly reflected on its historical crimes, and right-wing forces have never ceased attempting to rewrite history. Today, there is even a risk of militarism rising from the ashes". On 18 December, the PLA Daily published two articles criticizing Japan's "militarization of space". On 22 December, it published an article attacking Japan for having "no respect for history", saying that "instead, there is only a malicious attempt to cover up war crimes by using selective stories and wordplay, aiming to completely rewrite the facts of the invasion as generations pass". On 25 December, the People's Daily published an editorial which said that "Post-war Japan has failed to carry out a thorough reckoning with militarism โฆ This โneo-militarismโ, cloaked in the guise of a โpeaceful nationโ, is gradually becoming a real danger to Asia and the world at large". On 2 January 2026, the Study Times published an editorial stating Japanese militarism was infiltrating culture and sports. On 8 January, the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association and the China Institute of Nuclear Industry Strategy jointly released a 29-page report titled Nuclear Ambitions of Japanโs Right-Wing Forces: A Serious Threat to World Peace, which said recent actions by Japanese "right wing forces" were causing a "serious threat" to world peace and alleged Japan was seeking nuclear weapons. The report also claimed that statements from Japanese officials on acquisition of nuclear weapons were "not isolated or personal viewsโ. On 6 January, after China imposed trade restrictions on Japan, Yuyuan Tantian wrote that Japan "deliberately obscured its activities by embedding defence production within its civilian industrial system, with many key defence programmes planned by the defence ministry but outsourced to private contractors" and China was "now moving to cut off this support at its root", while adding that "China's focus has extended beyond any single statement by Japan to the systemic and fundamental issues that have long persisted in the country". On 10 November, Japanese chief cabinet secretary Minoru Kihara, foreign minister Toshimitsu Motegi, and Takayuki Kobayashi, chairman of the Policy Research Council of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), all stated that Xue Jian's remarks were inappropriate. On 11 November, the LDP held a joint meeting of its Foreign Affairs Committee and the Foreign Affairs Research Committee, where the participants agreed to require the government to expel Xue Jian as a persona non grata. On 13 November, former Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said that Takaichi's remarks were not conducive to enhancing Japan's deterrence capabilities and that successive Japanese cabinets avoided directly responding to questions regarding situations involving Taiwan. On 15 November, in response to China's travel advisory against Japan, Kihara asked China to take appropriate actions and said communication between the two countries was essential. On the same day, the three parties in the Osaka City Council, namely the LDP, Komeito, and Osaka Restoration Association, proposed a resolution demanding that Xue Jian apologize, which passed without objection. On 16 November, LDP acting policy research committee chairman Norihisa Tamura stated Takaichi had not provided sufficient background information during her remarks and that she should not make such statements in the future. Tamura also criticized Xue Jian's remarks, believing that they encouraged terrorism. On 18 November, in response to questions about China's travel advisory against Japan, Kimi Onoda, Japan's economic security minister, said the country needed to see the dangers of economic dependence on China given its willingness to use economic coercion in order to settle disputes. On the same day, Hirofumi Yoshimura, leader of the Japan Innovation Party, condemned Xue Jian's remarks, saying that "a red line has been crossed." He also said that preparations should be made to reduce the economic risks brought about by the decrease in Chinese tourists. On 19 November, The Asahi Shimbun reported that Takaichi privately told people around her that she "went a bit too far" and "gave an answer without fully checking what the fallout would be". The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) stated that as of 20 November, more than 20 Sino-Japanese business-related events had been cancelled. On 21 November, when asked whether she would retract her comments, Takaichi refused, saying Japan's stance remained consistent and that her government would decide whether an event reached a survival-threatening threshold when the time came. On 22 November, Transport Minister Yasushi Kaneko said the decline in tourism numbers from China was not something to worry about given the increase in arrivals from other countries. On 25 November, in response to a question about Trump's public silence on Japan's dispute with China, Motegi said it has never been the case that the White House or the State Department has commented on every issue that could affect it. On 26 November, Takaichi told the parliament regarding her comments that she "did not want to go into specifics", but "simply repeated the governmentโs previous answers over and over, there was a risk that the Budget Committee could be stalled". She also said Japan was "not in a position to recognize Taiwan's legal status". On 1 December, a cross-party delegation from the JapanโChina Friendship Parliamentarians' Union led by secretary-general Yลซko Obuchi of the LDP met with Chinese ambassador Wu Jianghao. The group, which included both LDP and opposition party members, expressed their hope to visit China later this year. On 3 December, Takaichi stated to the Japanese parliament that the "Japanese government's basic position regarding Taiwan remains as stated in the 1972 JapanโChina Joint Communiquรฉ, and there has been no change to this position". The position is that "the government of the Peopleโs Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the Peopleโs Republic of China" and that Japan "fully understands and respects this stand" and "firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration". China refused Takaichi's explanation, with Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stating Takaichi is "still prevaricating by claiming that the Japanese sideโs position remains unchanged" and demanded a full retraction of Takaichi's 7 November statement. In the same day, LDP vice president Tarล Asล said Takaichi's 7 November statement was "not problematic", saying that she "simply stated her consistent stance in more detail". Several news agencies reported that Japan had expressed its concerns to France about China's possible participation in the 2026 G7 summit, where French president Emmanuel Macron was reportedly considering inviting Chinese leader Xi Jinping. On 13 December, after Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi talked with France, Germany and the United Kingdom regarding Japan, National Security Council director-general Keiichi Ichikawa contacted the three countries to state that Japan's position on Taiwan had not changed. On 15 December, after questioning by Japanese Communist Party (JCP) lawmaker Taku Yamazoe, Japanese foreign minister Toshimitsu Motegi told the Japanese parliament that "Regarding Taiwan, Japan's fundamental policy is, as the prime minister has clearly stated, in line with the 1972 JapanโChina Joint Communique", saying that the "document states that the Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the Peopleโs Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation", referencing the PRC's position that Taiwan is a part of China. After further questioning by Yamazoe, Motegi said that "Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration incorporates the provisions of the Cairo Declaration", and said that while Japan was "not a party to the Cairo Declaration itself", the Potsdam Declaration "stipulates that its provisions must be carried out". and stated "the Cairo Declaration set out the policy objectives of the Allied Powers at the time, including the return of Manchuria, Taiwan and other territories from Japan to what was then the Republic of China. [The Potsdam Declaration] states that the terms shall be carried out", and said "Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration". The Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun noted the statement, but also said that "the Japanese side did not reiterate the Japanese governmentโs recognition that the government of the Peopleโs Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, or that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the Peopleโs Republic of China" and "deliberately sidestepped the important information that they are 'territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese'". On 17 December, Takaichi said in a press conference after an extraordinary Diet session that China is an "important neighbor" and that Japan wants to "continue frank dialogue and comprehensively promote a mutually beneficial relationship [with China] based on common strategic interests". On 25 December, Takaichi said that "As neighboring countries, there do tend to be areas of concern and challenges, but that is precisely why communication on all levels, including at the leadership level, is so important", adding that Japan is "open to all sorts of dialogue with China. We have not closed that door". On 18 December, an unnamed official in the Prime Minister's office suggested that Japan should consider acquiring nuclear weapons. This resulted in a strong reaction from China's foreign ministry, who responded that it was a "serious issue that exposes the dangerous attempts by some in Japan to breach international law and possess nuclear weapons" and regarded that as a "signal of the resurgence of Japanese militarism". The Japanese government later clarified that Japan's non-nuclear weapons policy has not changed, but did not comment on the official's subsequent status. Conservatives in Japan has expressed similar support for nuclear weapons, including the Sankei Shimbun in its editorial. On 27 January 2026, in response to a questioning by an opposition party leader, Takaichi told a TV program that "I want to make it absolutely clear that this is not about Japan going out and taking military action if China and the United States come into conflict (over Taiwan)", continuing that "If something serious happens there, we would have to go to rescue the Japanese and American citizens in Taiwan. In that situation, there may be cases where we take joint action. And if the U.S. forces, acting jointly with us, come under attack and Japan does nothing and simply runs away, the JapanโU.S. alliance would collapse. So we would respond strictly within the limits of the law โ within the limits of the laws as they currently exist โ while making a comprehensive judgment based on what is happening on the ground". On 11 November, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), Komeito and the Democratic Party For the People (DPFP) issued protests against Xue Jian's comments. CDP Secretary-General Jun Anzumi criticized them as not beneficial to bilateral relations while DPFP leader Yuichiro Tamaki said they had crossed the bottom line and hinted that Xue might be asked to leave Japan. On the same day, Renhล, a CDP councillor who was born a citizen of Taiwan, posted on X that Xue's comments damaged trust between Japan and China. On 13 November, Komeito leader Tetsuo Saito questioned Takaichi's position on a Taiwan emergency and said he would submit questions to the government to clarify its stance on the matter. On 11 November, Saito had expressed concern to the Chinese Embassy in Japan that Xue's actions were inconsistent with his status as a diplomat. On 15 November, Japanese Communist Party (JCP) policy committee member Taku Yamazoe called on Takaichi to retract her comments. On the same day, former prime minister and CDP leader Yoshihiko Noda said that Takaichi's remarks had a significant impact and needed to be taken seriously. On 16 November, Tomofumi Honjo, the policy research chairman of the CDP, said that Sanae Takaichi did not have a sufficient understanding of the relevant security legislation or of China's stance on the Taiwan issue. He also said that he hoped Japan would proceed with calm dialogue. On 19 November, Motohisa Furukawa, acting representative of the DPFP, said that the Japanese government needed to ask China to explain its response and, if necessary, ask it to withdraw Xue's comments. On the same day, Social Democratic Party leader Mizuho Fukushima, called on Takaichi to retract her remarks, arguing they were causing economic damage to Japanese society. Conservative Party of Japan leader Naoki Hyakuta said that the statement was justified and that it does not have to be retracted. He also congratulated the fall in the number of Chinese tourists. On 23 November JCP Chair Tomoko Tamura said in an interview that Takaichi should retract her remarks on Taiwan, as otherwise relations with China would deteriorate further. On 26 November, CDP leader Yoshihiko Noda argued that Takaichi not mentioning any specific examples regarding Taiwan during the parliament meeting amounted to a "de facto retraction", an explanation which Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun refused by saying "Ceasing to mention the remarks and retracting them are two entirely different matters". JCP Central Committee chairman Kazuo Shii also said he did not believe that Takaichi had retracted her statement. On 10 December, Komeito leader Tetsuo Saito said that held one in-person meeting and multiple phone calls with Chinese ambassador Wu Jianghao since Takaichi's remarks, continuing by saying he hoped to visit China in 2026 and would be willing to take a letter on Takaichi's behalf if requested. On 12 December, CDP lawmaker Kiyomi Tsujimoto said she obtained a script from the Cabinet Secretariat made for Takaichi in advance of her testimony to the Diet in November, which showed the planned response for any questions regarding Taiwan was for Takaichi to decline to comment on hypothetical situations such as a Taiwan crisis. On 10 November, Yomiuri Shimbun's English-language newspaper The Japan News said that Xue's comment was inappropriate and that it was natural for the Japanese government to lodge a protest against it. Follow up editorials which it published on 18 and 20 November criticized China's pressure campaign against Japan and called on Japan to continue its protests against China's actions and to make efforts to explain itself. On 14 November, The Japan Times said Xue's comments were both offensive and in bad taste and a follow up editorial on 21 November called on Japan not to bend to China's campaign of economic coercion. On 11 November, The Mainichi said Takaichi's comments left the door open to dangerous over-interpretation and revealed a lack of awareness of the serious way that the Taiwan contingency scenario had impacted Japan-China relations. An initial follow up editorial on 18 November called for de escalation from both Japan and China while a second follow up on 21 November called for Japan to continue engaging in dialogue with China in spite of the countermeasures it had imposed on Japan which the publication described as anti-Japan in nature. On the same day, Chunichi Shimbun criticized her remarks as reckless and careless and said she should be more careful with her words in the future. An initial follow up editorial on 18 November called for the two countries to continue communicating while a second follow up on 24 November described Takaichi's remarks as a provocation to China and said the opposition parties must not hesitate to criticize her government's policies and actions. On 15 November, The Nikkei said that although China's response to Takaichi's remarks indicated it had lost its composure, the two countries nevertheless needed to talk in order to prevent conflict escalation. A follow up editorial on 25 November said Japan-U.S. solidarity was essential to countering China's propaganda offensive against Japan. On 18 November, The Asahi Shimbun said Takaichi needlessly heightened tensions with her choice of words while also expressing doubts about the logic of China's response. According to a poll published by Kyodo News after Takaichi's remarks, 48.8% of respondents supported activating collective self-defense in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, while 44.2% opposed it. The poll also showed that the latest approval rating of the Takaichi Cabinet was 69.9%, an increase of 5.5 percentage points from October. According to a Nikkei/TV Tokyo survey conducted from 28 to 30 November 55% of respondents believed Takaichi's comments were appropriate and 30% called it inappropriate. The survey also showed the approval rating of the Takaichi Cabinet was 75%. According to a Japan News Network opinion poll in December, 27% of respondents said they believed Takaichi's statement was a problem, while 55% said they did not. Additionally, 51% said they were anxious about the future of relations between China and Japan, while 46% said they were not. According to another poll by All-Nippon News Network in December, 66% of Japanese respondents said they were concerned about the deterioration of relations with China. According to an NHK poll in January 2026, 67% of Japanese respondents were concerned about the impact of export controls announced by China on Japan. Takaichi's stance on China, including her statements that sparked this diplomatic crisis, was cited as a factor of LDP's landslide win in the 2026 Japanese general election resulting in LDP gaining a supermajority in the Lower House. International reactions On 10 November, Presidential Office spokesperson Karen Kuo said Xue's remarks exceeded diplomatic etiquette and that the government took them seriously. On 11 November, Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that "Republic of China (Taiwan) is a sovereign, independent nation" and said it was not subordinate to the PRC. On 14 November, Mainland Affairs Council Deputy Minister Shen Yu-chung said China was ignoring international appeals for peace in the Taiwan Strait and was instead threatening countries that expressed pro-Taiwan sentiments. On 15 November, National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu said China chose to continue using humiliating rhetoric against Japan instead of reflecting on the insulting nature of Xue's remarks. On 16 November, former president Ma Ying-jeou, a member of the Kuomintang, accused Takaichi of "reckless adventurism", saying cross-strait relations were an "internal matter" that Japan should not intervene in. Former Kuomintang chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu also criticized Takaichi's remarks, saying that Taiwan was "no longer Japanโs colony" and that Takaichi was "overreaching" and "reckless". In response, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislator Rosalia Wu criticized the Kuomintang for "failing to distinguish between friend and foe" while Chen Kuan-ting, also a DPP legislator, accused Ma of echoing Beijing's view of the crisis. On 17 November, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te described China's measures against Japan as a hybrid attack that undermined regional peace and stability and called on the country to exercise restraint. Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung said Takaichi's statements were consistent with those made by Shinzo Abe that had linked Taiwan's security directly to Japan's. On the same day, Kuomintang chairwoman Cheng Li-wun accused Lai of inflaming tensions and said leaders should instead show caution and restraint. On 18 November, in response to a question about changes in relations between Japan and China stemming from Xue's comments, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Hsiao Kuang-wei called on China to stop taking provocative actions and that Taiwan would continue to work with like-minded countries to uphold regional stability and security. On 20 November, Lai published pictures of himself eating Japanese-sourced sushi in a show of support to Japan. On the same day, Foreign Minister Lin said more people from Taiwan should travel to Japan and buy its products as a show of support for the country. On 21 November, the Ministry of Health and Welfare announced that Taiwan would lift all import control measures on Japanese food products. Several DPP politicians including Wang Yi-chuan visited Japan as a show of support. On 23 November, an assessment produced by the National Security Bureau said the crisis would accelerate Japan's efforts at implementing security reforms. On 25 November, Taiwanese Premier Cho Jung-tai said that "reunification" with China was "not an option". On 27 November, several members of the New Party protested in front of the JapanโTaiwan Exchange Association. On 5 December, during a meeting with Japan's representative in Taiwan Shuzo Sumi, Cho said that Takaichi's statements "moved us all very, very much. They represent justice and peace" and welcomed Japanese performance groups and pop idols to Taiwan. On 22 December, LDP executive acting secretary-general Kลichi Hagiuda led a group of LDP politicians to visit Taiwan; the delegation met with President Lai. In addition, three LDP lawmakers โ Keisuke Suzuki, Akihisa Nagashima and Junichi Kanda โ as well as a five-person delegation led by Hirofumi Takinami visited Taiwan around the same period. On 12 November, the United States State Department issued a statement to Nikkei Asia which said the country was committed to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and opposed any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side. When asked during a 10 November Fox News interview whether China could not be considered a friend of the United States due to Xue's threatening comments about Takaichi, US president Donald Trump did not offer support for Takaichi, and said that "Well, a lot of our allies arenโt our friends, either. Our allies took advantage of us on trade more than China did". Bloomberg News noted that Trump and high-ranking US government officials did not offer public support for Takaichi, while lower-level officials including US ambassador to Japan George Edward Glass spoke out on her behalf. The Global Taiwan Institute also noted that the US government has largely refrained from any public involvement. Financial Times noted the US had given little public support other than statements made by Glass. On 10 November, Glass said in a post on X that Xue's comment threatened Takaichi and the Japanese people. From 15 to 16 November, Glass posted two messages on X: the first one thanked China for helping Japan and the United States deepen their ties while the second, which contained a photo of Sanae Takaichi and Trump on the same stage at the USS George Washington, said Japan and the United States remained committed to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. On 20 November, after a meeting with Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, Glass called China's ban on Japanese seafood a case of economic coercion and reaffirmed the country's obligation to defend Japan, which he said included the Senkaku islands. On the same day, the State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott said America's treaty commitment to Japan's security was unwavering and that it opposed any unilateral attempts to change the regional status quo; the Financial Times reported that the US officials had promised to give a strong statement of support for Japan but that Japanese officials were "disappointed" to learn that statement was a post by Pigott. On 24 November, President Trump held back to back calls with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi. Both China and the United States said Trump initiated the calls. In a post on Truth Social, Trump said he had a very good telephone call with Xi Jinping and that ChinaโUS relations were "extremely strong", adding they had discussed many topics, including the war in Ukraine, America's fentanyl crisis, and Chinese purchases of U.S. farm products; the post did not mention Japan or Taiwan. On 25 November, Trump said Xi had during their call more or less agreed to his request that China accelerate and increase purchases of American goods. Trump subsequently held a call with Takaichi to brief her on his call with Xi. According to The Wall Street Journal and Reuters, Trump advised Takaichi to not escalate tensions and not to provoke China on the question of Taiwan's sovereignty. In reference to this reporting, Japanese chief cabinet secretary Minoru Kihara said on 27 November that Trump had given no such advice. In the same day, Kyodo News also reported Trump urged Takaichi to avoid escalating tensions with China. On 14 December, Hokkaido Shimbun reported that Trump had told Takaichi that "the US and China are trying to get along, so don't get in the way" citing a government source, and that Takaichi was "quite depressed" after the meeting as Trump "didn't give Takaichi the answer she had in mind". On 7 December, Financial Times reported that according to Japanese officials, there was "deep disappointment" in the Japanese government over the lack of public support from US top officials, adding that Japanese ambassador to the US Shigeo Yamada had urged the Trump administration for public support. On 11 December, White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt said that Trump believes the US "should be in a position to have a good working relationship with China while maintaining our very strong alliance with Japan". On 19 December, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called tensions between China and Japan "preexisting", and said that he believes that "we feel very strongly that we can continue with our strong, firm partnership and alliance with Japan, and do so in a way that continues to allow us to find productive ways to work together with the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government". See also Notes References |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ืื ื_ื ืื] | [TOKENS: 4514] |
ืชืืื ืขื ืืื ืื ืื ื ื ืื ืื ื ื ืื (ื ืืื ื-21 ืืืื ื 1960) ืืื ืคืืืืืืงืื ืืฉืจืืื ืืฉืขืืจ ืืืจ ืืื ืกืช ืืืขื ืืืืืื ืืฉืจ ืืืืฉืืืช ืืฉืจืื ืืืืฉ ืขืกืงืื ืฉืขืื ืืจืืฉ ืงืจื ืืฉืงืขืืช ืืชืืืืื ืจืคืืืืื, ืืฉืขืืจ ืื"ืจ ืืื ืืืจื ืืืืืื ืืืืดืจ ืฉืืชืคืืช ืืืืดืค ืฉืืจืืง. ืืืฆืืืจ 2021 ืืื ืืืื ื ืื ืฉืื ืืืื ืืก. ืืืืืจืคืื ืื ื ื ืื (ืื ืืืื) ื ืืื ืืขืืจ ืื ื ืืจืง ืืืื ืืืฉืืื ืืชืืืื ืืช ื ืชืื ืืืืจ. ืฉืืจืช ืืฆื"ื ืืืืืืขืื ืืื ืืืืืืจ ืืืฉืชืืจืจ ืืืจืืช ืจื-ืกืื. ืืฉื ืช 1985 ืกืืื ืืืืืืื ืืชืืืจ ืจืืฉืื ืืคืงืืืื ืืืฉืคืืื ืฉื ืืืื ืืืจืกืืื ืืขืืจืืช, ืืืฉื ืช 1986 ืืืกืื ืืขืืจื ืืื. ืืืงืืื ืืชืงืืคืช ืืืืืืื ืฉืืืฉ ืืืืฉื ืจืืฉ ืชื ืกืืืื ืืื ืฉืืืชื ืืงืื - ืืืข"ื (ืืืฃ ืกืืืื ืืื ืืืืื ืขืฆืืื ืืืืงืจืื) ืืืงืืจื ืืืืืื. ืืืืืจืืช ืืืงืืืืืช ื-1983 ืฉืืืฉ ืืืืืจ ืืืืืื ืืืจืืฉืืื ืืืืงืืืืจ 1986 ื ืืืจ ืืืืดืจ ืฆืขืืจื "ืชื ืืขืช ืืืจืืช" ืืืจืืฉืืื. ืืฉื ืื 1986โ1992 ืืื ืืืขืฆื ืืืืืจื ืฉื ืืฉืจ ืืฉื ืืจื ืก, ืืืฉืจ ืืืื ืืจื ืก ืืฉืจ ืืื ืชืืง (1986 - 1987) ืืฉืจ ืืืืฅ (1988 - 1990) ืืฉืจ ืืืืืืื (1990 - 1992). ืืื ืืื 1988 ืืื ืืืจ 1989 ืฉืืืฉ ืืืืืจ ืืืืืื. ืืืื ื 1991 ืืื ื ืขื ืืื ืืจืืื"ื ืืืื ืืจืง ืืืืืจ ืฆื"ื, ืื ืืื ืืืชืจ ืขื ืืืื ืื ืืืจื ื ืื ืก ืืชืคืงืื, ืขืงื ืืืืงืืจืช ืืฆืืืืจืืช ืืืจืืคื, ืขื ืืื ืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืคืืืืืืช, ืืกืจ ื ืืกืืื ืฆืืื, ืืชืคืงืื ืจืืืฉ ืืืืชืจ ืืฆื"ื. ืืฉื ืช 1993 ืืื ื ืืกืื ื"ื ืจืืฉ ืืฉืืจืืชื ืืจืืืืช ืืืืืช. ืืงืจืืช ืืืืืจืืช ืืื ืกืช ืืืจืืข ืขืฉืจื ืืืจืืฉืืช ืืืืฉืื ืืืื 1996, ืืฆืืจืฃ ืืฆืืืช ื ืืืื ืืงืืคืืื ืืืื ืืืืืื. ืืืจ ืื ืืื ื ืขื ืืื ืื ืืืื ื ืชื ืืื ืืชืคืงืื ืืืืืจ ืืืืฉืื, ืืขืช ืืืื ืช ืืืฉืืช ืืฉืจืื ืืขืฉืจืื ืืฉืืข, ืืฉืืืฉ ืืชืคืงืื ืื ืืื ืืฉื ืื 1996โ1999. ืืขืช ืืืืชื ืืืืืจ ืืืืฉืื ืืืื ืืื"ืจ ืืคืืจืื ืืืืืง ืืื ืืืฉืืืืช, ืืื"ืจ ืฆืืืช ืืืืืื ืืืฉืจืืื ืขื ืืคืืกืืื ืื ืืืื ืฉืืชืฃ ืืจืืื ืืืกืืื ืืืื ืืืืจืื. ืืฉื ืช 1999 ื ืืืจ ืืื ืกืช ื-15, ืื ืืืจ ืืฉื ืืช ื-2003 ืืื ืกืช ื-16 ืืืืง ืืจืฉืืืช ืืืืืื. ืืื ืกืช ื-15 ืคืขื ืืืืขืืช ืืืืฅ ืืืืืืืื, ืืืืขืืช ืืืืงื ืืืืืขืื ืืืื ืช ืืืืืืช ืืืื. ืืื ืืืชืจ ืืื ืืืขืืืจ ืืงืืงื ืืืขื ืืงื ืื ืืื ื 17 ืืช ืืืืช ืืืืืจื ืืืืืจืืช ืืจืฉืืืืช ืืืงืืืืืช. ืืื ืื ืขืื ืืจืืฉ ืืฉืืืื ืืคืจืืื ืืจืืช ืืืขื ืืืืื ืฆื"ื ืืฉืืืืื ืืื ืขืืจืื. ืืฉื ืช 2001, ืืืจ ืืงืื ืฆืื ืืจืืฉืื ื ืฉืื ืืื ืกืช, ืืื ื ื ืื ืขื ืืื ืืจืืื ืฉืจืื ืืฉืจ ืืื ืชืืง ืืืฉืจื ืจืืฉ ืืืืฉืื, ืืืืฉืืช ืืฉืจืื ืืขืฉืจืื ืืชืฉืข. ื ืื ืฉืืืฉ ืืฉืจ ืืืงืฉืจ ืืื ืืืืฉืื ืืื ืกืช, ืจืืื ืืช ืืืืคืื ืืฉืืจืืจ ืขืืื ืขืืื ืืืืื ืืืฆืจื. ืืืื ืืช "ืชืืง ืขืจืคืืช", ืฉืื ืจืืื ืืืืข ืขื ืืขืืจืืืชื ืฉื ืืืกืจ ืขืจืคืืช ืืคืขืืืืช ืืจืืจ ื ืื ืืฉืจืื. ืืื ืื ืจืืื ืืื ืช ืื"ื ืขื ื ืืงื ืืืจืืจ ืืืืืื ืืืฉืจืืืืช ืืขืื ืืจืืฉ ืืขืืืช ืืฉืจืื ืืืืืช: ืืขืืช ืืฉืจืื ืืขื ืืื ื ืกืืืื ืืืงืกืื ืืืขืืช ืืฉืจืื ืืืืืง ืืืืืืืช. ืืืืจ ืคืจืืฉืช ืืคืืืช ืืขืืืื ืืืงืืืืืฆืื ืื ืืืืืจ 2002 ืืื ื ืืฉืจ ืืชืขืฉืืื ืืืืกืืจ ืืืฉื ืืกืคืจ ืืืืฉืื ืขื ืืืืจ ืืืืืจืืช ืืื ืกืช ืืฉืฉ ืขืฉืจื. ืขื ืืงืืช ืืืืฉืื ื-30 ืืฉื ืช 2003 ืืื ื ืืฉืจ ืืืจืืืืช. ื ืื ืืฆืืื ืืืืฆืื ืืช ืืขืจืืช ืืืจืืืืช ืืืฉืืจ ืืืืื ืงืฉื, ืืืืืื ืืช ืกื ืืืจืืืืช ืืืื ืืข ืืช ืกืืืจืชื ืฉื ืืชื ืืืืื ืจืืื (ืื ื ืฆืืื, ืืืกืคืื, ืืฉืจืื, ืืืงืืจ ืืืืื, ืคืืืื ืืืืจืื ืื). ื ืื ื ืืื ืืืืงืื ืจืืื ืฉืืืืื ืืชืืกืคืืช ืชืงืฆืื ืฉื ืืฉื ื ืืืืืืจื ืฉืงื ืืืขืจืืช ืืืจืืืืช. ืืื ืื ืืฆืืื ืืืืื ืืืืืืื ืฉื ืืื ืืืืชื ื ืืืจืื ืฉื ืงืฉืืฉืื ืืืืื ืกืืขืืืืช (ืงืืืื ืืจืืืืจืืื). ื ืื ืงืืื ืืงืืงื ืืคืขืืืืช ืืกืืจื ืืืืง ืืืืืืง ื ืื ืืขืืฉืื ืื ืืงืื ืืืฆืืื ืื ืืืืื ืืขืืื ืืกืืืืช ืืฉืืขืืจ ืชืจืืืืช ืืืืืจืื ืืืฉืจืื. ืืื ืงืืื ืืช ืืจืคืืจืื ืืฉืืง ืืชืจืืคืืช ืืื ืืจืฉื, ืฉืืืคืฉืจื ืืืืจืช ืชืจืืคืืช ืืื ืืืืฅ ืืืชื ืืืจืงืืช. ื ืื ืืืื ืื ืืื"ืจ ืืขืืช ืืฉืจืื ืืืงืกืื ืืกืืืื ืืื ืฆืื ืืืืฉืื ืืืืขืื ืืืื ืื ืฉืืคืืื. ื ืื ืืชืคืืจ ืืชืคืงืืื ื-14 ืืื ืืืจ 2006 ืืื ืขื ืฉืืจ ืืืจื ืกืืขืช ืืืืืื ืืขืงืืืช ืืคืืฆืื ืฉื ืกืืขืช ืงืืืื ืืืืืืื ืืืงืจืืช ืืืืืจืืช ืืื ืกืช ืืฉืืข ืขืฉืจื. ืืื ืกืช ื-17 ืืืื ื ืื ืืืืจ ืืืืขืืช ืืืงื ืืืง ืืืฉืคื ืืืืืขืืช ืืืงืืจื ืืคืจืืื ืืจืืช ืืขื ืืื ืืืื ืืช ืืกืชืจ. ืืืื ืืชืงืืคื ืงืฆืจื ืืืืจ ืืืืขืืช ืืืืฅ ืืืืืืืื. ื-25 ืืคืืจืืืจ 2007 ืืืืฉ ื ืื ืืช ืืชืคืืจืืชื ืืืื ืกืช ืืืืจ ืฉืืื ื ืฉื ืืช ืืืื ื. ืืืืจ ืคืจืืฉืชื ืืืื ืกืช, ืืงืื ืืช ืงืจื ืืืฉืงืขืืช ืืคืจืืืืช "ืืืช ืืืืงื" (Agate Medical investments) ืืขืื ืืจืืฉื. ืืงืจื ืืฉืงืืขื ืืืืจืืช ืืืฉืืจ ืจืคืืื ืืืืืืืื ืืชืืื ืืฉืืจืืชืื ืืจืคืืืืื. ืืงืจื ืืืืกื 60 ืืืืืื ืืืืจ, ืฉืืืฉืงืืขื ืืขืืงืจืืช ืืงืจื ืืืืชื ืืืจืช ืืื ืืืืงืืช ืขืกืงื ืืืืื ืืงืืืฆืช ืื.ืื.ืื, ืฉืืืืชื ืื ืฉืืฉืืืืช ื ืืื ืื ืงื ืจ. ืืืฉื 7 ืฉื ืื ืืืืจ ืืงืืชื ืืงืจื ืื ืจืฉืื ืืงืืื ืืฉืืขืืชื, ืืืกื ืืืื ืืื ืจืฉืื ืขื ืฉื ืช 2020 ืชืฉืืื ืฉืืืืืช ืฉื ืึพ60%. ืืืฆืืืจ 2012 ืืื ื ืขื ืืื ื ืืื ืื ืงื ืจ ืืืืจืงืืืจ ืฉื ืชืืืื ืืฉืงืขืืช ืืืกืงืื ื. ืืืื 2013 ืืื ื ืืื"ืจ ืืื ืืืจื ืืืืืื. ืืืืจืชื ืืืืชื ืฉื ืืื ืืืืืืงืช ืืฉื ืืืขืืจ ื ืืกืืื ืืชืืื ืืืืืื ืืกืคืื ืืืงืืจืช ืฆืืืืจืืช. ืืฉื ืช 2021, ืคืจืฉ ืืชืคืงืืื ืืืืจ ืฉืืืืื ื ืืกืืื ืฉื ืืฉื ืืืืืคืช ืื ื"ื ืืืืจื. ืฉืืคื ืืืช ืืืฉืคื ืืขืืืื ืืฉืขืืจ ืืืจื ืื ืฆืืืจ ืฉืืื ื ืืืืืง ืืืฆืื ื ืงืืข ืื "ื ืคื ืคืื" ืืืชื ืืืืชื ืืืืื ืื ืืกืืื ืืืืืคืช ืืื ืืดื, ืื ืฆืืืจ ืืชื ืื "ืื ื ืืฆื ืืื ืจืืื ืืชืืืืืื ืืืขื ืืชืื ืฉื ืืื ื"ื ืืืจื ื ืื ืื ืื ืืื"ืจ ืื ื ื ืื". ืื ืืกืฃ ืืื ืืฆืืื ืื ืื ืงืืื ืื ื ืื ืคืขื ืืชืื ืื. ืฉืืืฉ ืืื"ืจ ืืืจืช ืืืจ ืงื ืืืืก. ืืืื 2021 ืืื ืฉืืชืฃ ืืื ืคืงืช ืฉืืชืคืืช ืืืืดืค "ืฉืืจ-ืืง" ืฉืืฉืงืืขื ืืืืจืืช ืืชืืื ืืืื ืืืืืื ืืคืื ื ืกืืช ืืฉืืืฉ ืื ืืืืดืจ ืืืืจืงืืืจืืื ืฉื ืืฉืืชืคืืช. ืืกืืฃ 2023 ื ืงืืข ืืฉืืชืคืืช ืืกืืกืื ืขื ืืืง ืืืขืื ืื ืืืช ืฉืื, ืฉืืืืฉื ืืงืฉื ืืคืจืง ืืช ืืฉืืชืคืืช ืืืืืืืจ ืืื ืืช ืืกืคื. ืืืฆืืืจ 2021 ืืื ื ืขื ืืื ืฉืจ ืืืืฆืจ, ืืืืืืืจ ืืืืจืื, ืื ืฉืื ืืื ืืดื ืืจืืื ืืืื ืืก ืืืืฉ ืฉื ืื. ืืืื ืืืฉืืื ื ืื ื ืฉืื ืืฆืืื ืืื ืืฉืืืฉื, ืืจ ืืกืืืื. ืื ืืืื (ืืืจืื ืฉื ืืื) ืืื ืืืืืฃ ืืืืจ ื ืื. ืืงืจืืื ื ืืกืคืช ืงืืฉืืจืื ืืืฆืื ืืื ืืขืจืืช ืฉืืืืื |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ืืฉื_ืืจืื] | [TOKENS: 4998] |
ืชืืื ืขื ืืื ืื ืืฉื ืืจืื ืืฉื ืึทืจึฐืึตึผื (ื ืืื ื-26 ืืืฆืืืจ 1983, ื' ืืืืช ื'ืชืฉื"ื) ืืื ืืืจ ืืื ืกืช ืืืขื ืืคืืืช ืฉ"ืก, ืขืืจื ืืื ืืืงืฆืืขื. ืืขืืจ ืฉืืืฉ ืืฉืจ ืืืจืืืืช, ืฉืจ ืืคื ืื, ืกืื ืฉืจ ืืคื ืื ืืกืื ืฉืจ ืืืจืืืืช. ืงืืื ืื ืืกืชื ืืืืื ืืคืืืืืืื ืืื ืืืืขืฅ ืืืฉืคืื ืฉื ืืคืืืช ืฉ"ืก, ืจืืฉ ืืื ืฉืจ ืืคื ืื ืืจืื ืืจืขื ืืื ื"ื ืืืื ืืชืจ ืฉืืื ืืืืฆืืช ืืชืื ืืจื ืฉืืื ืืฉืืฉ. ืงืืจืืช ืืืื ื ืืื ืืคืชื ืชืงืืื, ืืจืืืขื ืืฉืืขืช ืืืืืื ืฉื ืืืื ื ืืจืืืื ืืจืื. ืกืืื ืืกืืชืืชืื ืขืื ืืืื. ืืืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืืฉื ืฉื ืื ืจืืืช, ืืื ืขืงื ืืืฉืืจ ืืืืื ืืขื ืฃ ืืฉื ืช 1991 ืฉืื ื ืืืืื ืืคื ื ืืขืฉืืื ืฆืืืืจืืช: ืืื ืืืื ืืงืื ืื"ืจ ืืืืขืฆื ืืืชืืช ืืขืืจ ืืืขื ืืคืืืช ืฉ"ืก, ืืื ืืื ืคืขืื ืืืจืื ืืชืืจื ื ืืืืื ืชืืจื, ืืืคืขืื ืืชื ืกืคืจ, ืกืคืจืืื ืืืืื ืืืขืื ืชืฉืืื. ืืจืื ืืื ืืืืช ืืกืคืจ ืืืืืืชื-ืืชื ื ืฆื ืืฉืจืื ืืื ืื, ืืชืืืื ืชืืจื ืฉืืจืืช ืืฉืจืื, ืืืืืฉื ืืืฉืืืช ื ืืืช ืืื ืืคืชื ืชืงืืื. ืืฉื ืช ื'ืชืฉ"ืก, ืืืืืชื ืืื 16, ืืชื ืืืืืจ ืืืืชื ืืฉื "ืืืฉืืข ืืฉื", ืืืขืืืจ ืืฉื ื, ืืืืจืช ืืืืชืืช "ืืื ืืื" ืขื ืืื ื ืคืืงืื ื ืคืฉ. ืืืืจ ื ืืฉืืืื, ืืื ืืืืื ืืืจืืื 'ืืืจืฉ ืืจืื"ื' ืืืฉื ืืืฉ ืฉื ืื ืืืืกืื ืืจืื ืืช. ืืฉืืจืืช ืกืืืจ ืฉืืจืช ืืคืืงืื ืืขืืจืฃ ืืืืืื ืืืืืื ืืืืื ืืืฉืชืืจืจ ืืืจืืช ืกืื, ืืืืืืืืื ืฉืืจืช ืืชืืืข ืฆืืื ืืคืจืงืืืืืช ืืฆืืืืช ืืืืื ืืืืื ืืฉืืืจืื. ืืฉืืื ืืืืืื ืืืจืืช ืืื ืชืืืจ ืจืืฉืื ืืชืืืจ ืฉื ื ืืืฉืคืืื ืืงืจืื ืืืงืืืืช ืืื ื, ืืช ืืฉื ื ืกืืื ืืืฆืืืื ืืช. ืืชืืื ืืืืช ืืืฉืคื ืืฉืืื ืืจืืื. ืืืืจ ืงืืจืก ืืืจืงืืืจืื ืืงืืคืืก ืืืจืื ืืงืจืื ืืืงืืืืช ืืื ื, ืืื ืืืืืื ืชืขืืื ืืืืช ืืกืคืจ ืืื ืื ืขืกืงืื ืืืขื ืืื ืืืจืกืืืช ืืจืืืืจื. ืืืื ืืื ืชืืืื ืืชืืืจ ืฉืืืฉื ืืืฉืคืืื ืืืื ืืืจืกืืืช ืจืืืืื. ืืืื ื 2022 ืืชื ืื ืืชืจืื ืืืื ืืื ืืขืื ืืืืจืืืืกืืืื ืื ืืคื ื ืืชืจืืื ืืชืืื ืืฆืื ืืืืื ืกืจืื ื ืืืืื ืืืื ืืช. ืืื ื ืืชื ืืืืืืื ืืืกืจ ืืืืงืืื ื ืคืกื ืืืชื ืชืจืืื. ืคืขืืืืช ืฆืืืืจืืช ืืื ืืฉื ืื 2006โ2013, ืืืืจ ืคืืืจืช ืืจื ืฉืืื ืืฉืืฉ, ืืื ืื ื"ื ืืืื ืืชืจ ืฉืืื, ืืื ืื ืืืื ืืืจืืื ืฉืื ืืืืืื ืขื ืคื ืฉืืืช ืืจื ืืฉืืฉ, ืืงืืื ืขืืืจื ืืงืก ืืืืจื ืฉื ืชื ืืืืฆืื ืืืืจ ืืช ืืชืืื. ืืืกืืจืช ืืขืืืชื, ืืื ืืช ืคืจืก ืืจื ืืฉืืฉ ืืืืืจืื ืชืืจื ืืื. ืืฉื ืช 2012 ืืื ืืืืืกืื ืขืืืชืช 'ืืขืช ืฉืืื' ืืคืชื ืชืงืืื, ืืืื ืขืื ืืจืืฉื. ืืขืืืชื ืื ืืืช ืืืื ืืืจืืื ืืืืช ืื ืกืช, ืืืขื ืืงื ืกืืืข ืื ืืงืงืื. ืืืืื ืืื ืกืช ืืชืฉืข ืขืฉืจื ืืื ืืืืขืฅ ืืืฉืคืื ืฉื ืืคืืืช ืฉ"ืก. ืืื ืืฉื ืื 2014โ2016 ืืื ืืืขืฅ ืืงืืงื ืืืืจ ืืื ืกืช ืืืื ืื ืฆืืจ. ืืืืื ืืื ืกืช ืืขืฉืจืื ืืื ืืืื ื ืขื ืืชืืืื ืืื ืืฉืจื ืืคื ืื ืืืืฉืจื ืืคืืชืื ืืคืจืืคืจืื, ืื ืื ืืืืืื, ืขืืืื ืืื ืืืื ื ืืฉืจ ืืจืื ืืจืขื, ืืืื ืืฉืจืื ืืืฉืื ืืืจืื. ืืฉื ืช 2016 ืืื ื ืืจืืฉ ืืืื ืฉื ืืจืขื. ืืฉื ื ืื ืืืคืืข ื"ืจืฉืืืช ืืฆืขืืจืื ืืืืืืืื" ืฉื ืืขืืชืื "ืื-ืืจืงืจ". ืืฉื ืช 2018, ืขืงื ืืืืชื ืฉื ืืฉืจ ืืฉืืจืืชื ืืช ืืื ืืืืืื, ืืื ื ืขื ืืื ืืจืื ืืจืขื ืืืืจืื ืขื ืืืฉืจื ืืฉืืจืืชื ืืช. ืืฉื ืช 2019, ืืงืจืืช ืืืืืจืืช ืืื ืกืช ืืขืฉืจืื ืืืืช, ืืื ื ืืกืื ืืืฉื ืจืืฉ ืืขืืช ืืืืืจืืช ืืืจืืืืช ืืืขื ืฉ"ืก ืืืืฆื ืืืงืื ืืฉืืืขื ืืจืฉืืืชื. ืืงืจืืช ืืจืืืช ืืืืฉืื ืืื ืืืฆื ืืฆืืืช ืืืฉื ืืืชื ืืงืืืืืฆืืื ื. ืืืคืืื ืงืืืื 8 ืื ืืืื, ืืืื 30 ืืืคืจืื 2019 ืืื ืืืื ืืืืจึพืืื ืกืช. ืืงืจืืช ืืืืืจืืช ืืื ืกืช ื-23 ืืจืื ืืืฆื ืืืงืื ืืฉืืืขื ืืืืื ืืกืื ืืืฉื ืจืืฉ ืืื ืกืช, ืืืื ืืืจ ืืืืขืืืช ืืคื ืื ืืงืืืื ืืขืื ืืืืฉื. ืืชืคืงืืื ืืื ืกืช ืขืืกืง ืืจืื ืืื ืืืชืจ ืืืื ื ืขื ืืืืืืช ืืกืืจืื. ืืืืื ืืื ืกืช ืืขืฉืจืื ืืืจืืข ืืื ืืื ืขื ืืืจื ืืื ืกืช ืื ืื ืืืืืื ืืืคืืืชื ืืืื ืืกืงื ืืืจืฆ ืืืง ืฉืืืืื ืืืืืข ืฉืืคืืื ืขื ืืืืืช ืขืฆืืจืื ืืืืืงืื ืืืืื ืืืฉืคื, ืขื ืื ืช ืืื ืืข ืืืืงืช ืขืฆืืจืื ืฉืื ืืฆืืจื. ืืืื ื 2021 ืืื ืืก ืืจืื ืืืืจื ืื ืืื ืืืืื ืืืืชืจ, ืชืื ื ืืฆืื ืืกืื ืืชื ืืคืจืืื ืืจืืช ืืืคืจื ืฉื ืฆื ืืืืฃ ืคืืงืื ืืืจืื. ืืืืืืกื 2022 ืืืจื ืืคึทึผืจืืืืจ ืฉื "ืฉืงืืฃ" ืืฉืืื ืืฉืืืืชืืช ืืื ืกืช ื-24. ืืืืืจืืช ืืื ืกืช ืืขืฉืจืื ืืืืฉ ืืืฆื ืืืงืื ื-6 ืืจืฉืืืช ืฉ"ืก ืืื ืกืช, ืื ืืืจ ืืืกืืจืชื ืืืื ืืื ืกืช ื-25. ืืืืจ ืืืืจืืช ืืื, ื ืืืจ ืืืื ืืกืื ืฉืจ ืืคื ืื ืืกืื ืฉืจ ืืืจืืืืช ืืืืฉืืช ืืฉืจืื ืืฉืืืฉืื ืืฉืืข. ืืืคืจืื 2023 ืืื ื ืืจืื ืืืื ืืฉืจ ืืคื ืื ืืืืจืืืืช ืืืงืืื ืฉื ืืฉืจ ืืงืืื, ืืจืื ืืจืขื, ืฉืคืืืจ ืืชืคืงืืืื ืืืืจ ืคืกืืงืช ืื"ืฅ ืืขื ืืื ื. ืืืืงืืืืจ 2023, ืืจืืฉืืช ืืืืื ืืืืืช ืืจืืืช ืืจืื, ืืืงืฉืช ืืจืื, ืืืืืข ืื"ืจ ืฉ"ืก ืขื ืืื ืืื ืฉื ืืืจืืื ืืืกื ืืชืคืงืื ืฉืจ ืืืจืืืืช, ืืขืื ืืจืื ืืืฉืืจ ืืชืคืงืื ืฉืจ ืืคื ืื. ืืืืืฉืื ืืจืืฉืื ืื ืืืืืืช ืืจืืืช ืืจืื, ืืื ืืฉืจื ืืคื ืื ืืจืืฉืืช ืืจืื ืืกืคืจ ืชืืงืื ืื ืืืืง ืืชืื ืื ืืืื ืืื ืฉืงืืืขืื ืืืืื ืจืืฉืื ืืงืืฆืจืื ืืืงืืช ืืจืื ืืืื ืืืื ื ืงืืื ืืืืืฉืืจ ืืืืจืื ืืื ืืื ืืืคืื ืื. ืืืจืฅ 2024, ืขืืจ ืชืืงืื ืืืืง ืืชืื ืื ืืืื ืืื ืฉืืื ืืฉืจื ืืคื ืื, ืฉืืืกืืฃ ื ืฆืืื ืฆืืืืจ ืื ื ืืืืืืืกืืื ืืขืจืืืช ืืืืจืืืช ืืืืขืฆื ืืจืฆืืช ืืชืื ืื ืืื ืืื. ืืืืืฉืื ืืืโืืื ื 2023 ืจืชื ืืช ืืฉืจื ืืคื ืื ืืืืฆืข 'ืืจืชืื ืืจืืื' ืฉืื ืืืกืื ืืจืืข ืืืฉืืืช ืืืืืืืช ืฉื ืจืฉืืช ืืืืืืืกืื ืืืืืืจื ืืืืคืื ืืืฉืืจ ืืืจืืื ืื ืืืื, ืื ืฉืืืื ืืื ืคืงืช ืืืขืื ื-400,000 ืืจืืื ืื ืืชืงืืคื ืื. ืืืื 2023 ืืืืืข ืืจืื ืขื ืืืจืืช ืืืื ืืืืฆืืช ืืจืืื ืืชืืงืฃ ืฉื ืขืฉืจ ืฉื ืื ื-18 ื-16. ืืจื ืืฉืื ืื, ืชืืงืคื ืฉื ืืจืืื ืฉืืืฆื ืขื ืืื ืืืจื ืืฉืจืืื ืื ืคืืืช ื-18 ืืื ืืืฉ ืฉื ืื ืืืื. ื-30 ืืื ืืืจ 2025, ืืฉืชืชืฃ ืืจืื ืืื ืก ืฉื ืืจืืื ืืฉืืื ืืืขืช ืืืืื. ืื ืืื ืฉื ืฉื ืืืจ ืื ืฆืจืื ืืืืื ืืคืจื ืกืชื ืฉื ืืคืืกืืื ืื ืืืืฉืจ ืืื ืกืช ืคืืขืืื ืขืจืืื ืืืฉืจืื, ืืืช ืื ืืืื ืืืืื ืืืช ืืืืฉืื ืืืืื ืืืืืช ืืจืืืช ืืจืื. ื-26 ืืืื 2025, ืืืฉืจ ืื ืืกื ืืืืืืช ืฉื ืืืคื ืขืืืืื ืืจืื ืืขื ืฃ ืืื ืืื, ืืขืืงืจ ืืืืื ืืช ืืืจื ืืกืื ืืืืืื ืืช ื ืืกืคืืช ืฉืืืฉืจ ืขื ืืื ืจืฉืืช ืืืืืืืกืื ืืืืืืจื. ืืืื 2023 ืืืืืข ืืจืื ืขื ืฉืื ืื ืืืขืื ืฉื ืื ื ืชืงืืื ืืืคืจ ืงืจืข ืืืืขืฆื ืืงืืืืช ืืขืืจ. ื-23 ืืืื ื 2025, ืืืืื ืืืืื ืืช ืจืืฉ ืขืืจืืืช ื ืฆืจืช ืขืื ืกืืื ืืืคืืจ ืืช ืืืขืฆืช ืืขืืจ, ืืืช ืืืืจ ืฉืืขืืจืืื ืฉืงืขื ืืืืืืช ืืืืืื ืืกืืจืื ืืืฉืจ ืืช ืชืืื ืืช ืืืืจืื ืฉื ืืฉืจื ืืคื ืื. ื-20 ืืืืื 2025 ืืชืคืืจ ืืชืคืงืืื ืืฉืจ ืืคื ืื, ืืืืง ืืืืืืช ืืคืืืชื ืืคืจืืฉ ืืืืืฉืื ืขืงื ืืฉืืจ "ืืืง ืืืืืก". ืืจืื ื ืฉืื ืืงืจื ืืื ืืืืืฉื. ืืื ืืชืืืจืจ ืืืคืจ ืื ืื ืืคืชื ืชืงืืื, ืืืฉืืฉ ืืืืื ืืืจื ืงืืืืช ืืืช ืืืืื ืฉืืฉืืื ืช ืื ืืืืฉืืืช ืืขืืจ. ืืืื ืืืืื ืืืื ื ืืื ืืขืืจ ืืช ืชืืืื ืืื"ืช ื' ืืืฉืืื ืืืช ืงืจืืืช ืืืื ืื ืฉื ืืื"ืช ืืฉืืจืืช. ืื ื ืืกืฃ โ ืฉืืขืื โ ืืื ืื ื"ื ืืืืคื ืช ืื ื ืขืงืืื ืืื ื ืืืคืจ ืกืื. ืื ืืืืชื, ืฉืืขืื ืืขืชืืง, ืืืื ืืื ื"ื ืืืฉืจื ืืฉืืจืืชื ืืช. ืงืืฉืืจืื ืืืฆืื ืืื ืืขืจืืช ืฉืืืืื |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Japan] | [TOKENS: 4445] |
Contents Elections in Japan Naruhito Fumihito Sanae Takaichi (LDP) Second Takaichi cabinet(LDP) Eisuke Mori Keiichi Ishii Masakazu Sekiguchi Tetsuro Fukuyama Yukihiko Imasaki Kazuo Ueda The Japanese political process has two types of elections. While the national level features a parliamentary system of government where the head of government is elected indirectly by the legislature, prefectures and municipalities employ a presidential system where chief executives and legislative assemblies are directly elected, independently from each other. Many of the prefectural and municipal elections are held together in unified local elections (็ตฑไธๅฐๆน้ธๆ, Tลitsu chihล senkyo) since 1947, held in years before leap years; but since each election cycle of every chief executive or assembly of any prefecture or municipality is independent and not reset after resignations/deaths/recalls/no-confidence votes/dissolutions/municipal mergers, there are also many non-unified local elections today. Prefectural and municipal assemblies are unicameral, the National Diet is bicameral, with the two houses on independent election cycles. Rules and regulations, supervision Both national & local elections are regulated by the Public Offices Election Law (ๅ
ฌ่ท้ธๆๆณ, kลshoku-senkyo-hล) of 1950. Elections are supervised by Election Administration Commissions at each administrative level under the general direction of the Central Election Management Council, an extraordinary organ attached to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC). The minimum voting age in Japan's non-compulsory electoral system was reduced from 20 to 18 years in June 2016. Voters must satisfy a three-month residency requirement before being allowed to cast a ballot. For those seeking offices, there are two sets of age requirements: twenty-five years of age for admission to the House of Representatives and most local offices, and thirty years of age for admission to the House of Councillors and the prefectural governorship. Each deposit for candidacy for national election is 3 million yen (about 27 thousand dollars) for a single-seat constituency and 6 million yen (about 54 thousand dollars) for proportional representation. National elections National elections include: Japan's post-WWII national legislature, the National Diet (ๅฝไผ, Kokkai), has two directly elected chambers, elected on independent electoral cycles: The House of Representatives (่ก่ญฐ้ข, Shลซgi-in) has 465 members, elected for a rarely completed four-year term, 289 members in single-seat constituencies and 176 members by proportional representation in 11 regional "block" constituencies. General elections of members of the House of Representatives are usually held before the end of a four-year term as the chamber may be dissolved by the emperor on the advice of the Cabinet. Most prime ministers use that option. The only exception in post-war history was the "Lockheed Election" of 1976 in which the Liberal Democratic Party lost its seat majority for the first time. The single-seat constituencies are decided by plurality, and the proportional seats are handed out in each "block" constituency to party lists proportionally (by the D'Hondt method) to their share of the vote. Each voter votes twice, once for a candidate in the local constituency, and once for a party in the regional "block" constituency. In a parallel system, there is no link between votes in one tier and seat numbers in the other; but so-called dual candidacies (้่ค็ซๅ่ฃ, chลfuku rikkลho) of one candidate in both tiers simultaneously are allowed. If such dual candidates lose in the majoritarian tier, they still have a chance to be elected in the proportional block. Parties may also place dual district and block candidates on the same list rank; in that case, the Sekihairitsu (ๆๆ็, ratio of margin of defeat) system determines the order of candidates. The House of Councillors (ๅ่ญฐ้ข, Sangi-in) has 245 members (248 from 2022), elected for a fixed six-year term, 147 (2022โ: 148) members by single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in 45 single- and multi-seat constituencies (most are prefectures, two combined constituencies comprise two neighbouring prefectures each) and 98 (2022โ: 100) by proportional representation (by D'Hondt method) with optionally open lists in a single, nationwide constituency. Regular/Ordinary elections of members of the House of Councillors are held once every three years. In staggered elections, half of the House of Councillors comes up for election every three years in elections. The term is fixed, the House of Councillors cannot be dissolved. This, too, is a parallel electoral system. Dual candidacies are not allowed. As in House of Representatives elections, voters have two votes: In the majoritarian election, the vote has to be for a candidate, but in the proportional election, the vote may be for either a party list or a single candidate; in the latter case, the vote counts as both a vote for the party list (to determine proportional seat distribution), and as a preference vote within that list (to determine the order or proportional candidates within that list). The district magnitudes in the majoritarian tier vary between one and six, dependent on, but not fully proportional to the population of each prefecture. In single-member constituencies, SNTV becomes equivalent to first-past-the-post, whereas seats are usually split between different parties/alliances in multi-member constituencies (and in the proportional constituency by definition). Therefore, the single-member constituencies of the House of Councillors (ๅ่ญฐ้ขไธไบบๅบ, Sangiin ichinin-ku) are more likely to swing the election result and often receive more media and campaign attention. The proportional election to the House of Councillors allows the voters to cast a preference vote for a single candidate on a party list. The preference votes strictly determined the ranking of candidates on party lists before 2019. Since the 2019 election, parties are allowed to prioritize individual candidates on their proportional list over voter preferences in a "special frame" (็นๅฎๆ , tokutei-waku). In the 2019 election, almost all parties continued to use completely open lists; exceptions were the LDP which used the "special frame" to give secure list spots to two LDP prefectural federations affected by the introduction of combined constituencies in 2016, Reiwa Shinsengumi which used it to give secure list spots to two candidates with severe disabilities, and the minor "Labourers' Party for the liberation of labour". The electoral cycles of the two chambers of the Diet are usually not synchronized. When the 1947 constitution came into effect, the first House of Councillors election was held several days apart from the 23rd House of Representatives election. Only in 1980 and 1986, general and regular election coincided on the same day because the House of Representatives was dissolved in time for the election to be scheduled together with the House of Councillors election in early summer. Vacant district seats in both Houses are generally filled in by-elections. Nowadays, these are usually scheduled in April and October as necessary. Vacant proportional seats in both Houses and district seats in the House of Councillors that fall vacant within three months of a regular election are filled by kuriage-tลsen (็นฐใไธใๅฝ้ธ, roughly "being elected as runner-up"): the highest ranking candidate on a proportional list or in the electoral district who was not elected and is not disqualified takes the seat. Disqualifications may, for example, happen if a candidate for the House of Councillors runs for the House of Representatives or vice versa, or after a violation of campaign laws. Between 1885 and 1947 in the Empire of Japan, the prime minister was not elected by the legislature, but responsible to, chosen and appointed by the Emperor. In practice, the Genrล (ๅ
่) usually nominated a candidate for appointment. The Imperial Diet (ๅธๅฝ่ญฐไผ, Teikoku-gikai) and its elected lower house, the House of Representatives, which were set up in 1890 according to the Imperial Constitution, had no constitutionally guaranteed role in the formation of cabinets. Since 1947, the Prime Minister has been chosen in the "designation election of the prime minister" (ๅ
้ฃ็ท็ๅคง่ฃๆๅ้ธๆ, Naikaku sลridaijin shimei senkyo) (ja) in the National Diet. It is held after a cabinet has submitted its resignation โ the outgoing cabinet remains as caretaker cabinet until the Imperial inauguration ceremony of a new prime minister โ; a cabinet must resign en masse under the constitution (Articles 69 and 70) 1. always on convocation of the first Diet after a general election of the House of Representatives, 2. if the post of prime minister has fallen vacant โ that includes cases when the prime minister is permanently incapacitated, e.g. by illness, kidnapping or defection โ, or 3. if a no-confidence vote in the House of Representatives is not answered by the dissolution of the chamber. Though both Houses of the Diet vote in two-round elections to select a prime minister, the House of Representatives has the decisive vote: If the two Houses vote for different candidates (as they did in 1948, 1989, 1998, 2007 and 2008), a procedure in the joint committee of both houses (ไธก้ขๅ่ญฐไผ, Ryลin Kyลgikai) may reach a consensus; but eventually the candidate of the House of Representatives becomes that of the whole Diet and thereby prime minister-designate. The designated prime minister must still be ceremonially appointed by the Emperor in the Imperial Investiture (่ฆชไปปๅผ, Shinnin-shiki) to enter office; but unlike some heads of state, the Emperor has no reserve power to appoint anyone other than the person elected by the Diet. In 2001, LDP president and Prime Minister Junichirล Koizumi instituted an advisory council to investigate the possibility of introducing direct popular election of the prime minister in a constitutional revision. Latest results Held in July 2025, the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito lost its majority in the House of Councillors. The LDPโs national vote share fell to 21.6%, the lowest result in the partyโs history. The coalitionโs decline was driven by growing support for smaller opposition parties. LDP party president and prime minister Shigeru Ishiba would eventually announce his intention to resign in September 2025. List of national elections Apportionment In the 1980s, apportionment of electoral districts still reflected the distribution of the population in the years following World War II, when only one-third of the people lived in urban areas and two thirds lived in rural areas. In the next forty-five years, the population became more than three-quarters urban, as people deserted rural communities to seek economic opportunities in Tokyo and other large cities. The lack of reapportionment led to a serious underrepresentation of urban voters. Urban districts in the House of Representatives were increased by five in 1964, bringing nineteen new representatives to the lower house; in 1975 six more urban districts were established, with a total of twenty new representatives allocated to them and to other urban districts. Yet great inequities remained between urban and rural voters.[citation needed] In the early 1980s, as many as five times the votes were needed to elect a representative from an urban district compared with those needed for a rural district. Similar disparities existed in the prefectural constituencies of the House of Councillors. The Supreme Court had ruled on several occasions that the imbalance violated the constitutional principle of one person-one vote. The Supreme Court mandated the addition of eight representatives to urban districts and the removal of seven from rural districts in 1986. Several lower house districts' boundaries were redrawn. Yet the disparity was still as much as three urban votes to one rural vote.[citation needed] After the 1986 change, the average number of persons per lower house representative was 236,424. However, the figure varied from 427,761 persons per representative in the fourth district of Kanagawa Prefecture, which contains the large city of Yokohama, to 142,932 persons in the third district of largely rural and mountainous Nagano Prefecture.[citation needed] The 1993 reform government under Hosokawa Morihiro introduce a new electoral system whereby 200 members (reduced to 180 beginning with the 2000 election) are elected by proportional representation in multi-member districts or "blocs" while 300 are elected from single-candidate districts. The 2009 general House of Representatives election was the first unconstitutional lower house election since the introducion of the new electoral system in 1994 (parallel voting and "small" FPTP single-member electoral districts/"Kakumander"). In March 2011, the Grand Bench (daihลtei) of the Supreme Court ruled that the maximum discrepancy of 2.30 in voting weight between the Kลchi 3 and Chiba 4 constituencies in the 2009 election was in violation of the constitutionally guaranteed equality of all voters. As in previous such rulings on unconstitutional elections (1972, 1980, 1983 and 1990 Representatives elections, 1992 Councillors election), the election is not invalidated, but the imbalance has to be corrected by the Diet through redistricting and/or reapportionment of seats between prefectures. In 2016, a panel of experts proposed to introduce the [John Quincy] Adams apportionment method (method of smallest divisors) for apportioning House of Representatives seats to prefectures. The reform is planned to be implemented after the 2020 census figures are available and not expected to take effect before 2022. In the meantime, another redistricting and apportionment passed in 2017 is designed to keep the maximum malapportionment ratio in the House of Representatives below 2. In the FPTP tier, it changes 97 districts and cuts six without adding any; in the proportional tier, four "blocks" lose a seat each; the total number of seats in the lower house is cut to 465, 289 majoritarian seats and 176 proportional seats. The malapportionment in the 2010 and 2013 regular House of Councillors elections was ruled unconstitutional (or "in an unconstitutional state") by the Supreme Court, and has been reduced by a 2015 reapportionment below 3 (at least in government statistics from census data which is regular and standardized but lags behind resident registration statistics and the actual number of eligible voters; using the latter, the maximum malapportionment in the 2016 election remained slightly above 3). Prefectural and local elections Local elections include: There are 47 prefectures (-to/-dล/-fu/-ken) of Japan since 1888, they are contiguously subdivided into 1741 municipalities (-shi/-ku/-chล/-son) since 2014 (see Administrative divisions of Japan). Unified local elections (็ตฑไธๅฐๆน้ธๆ, Tลitsu chihล senkyo) are held once every four years. Prefectural assemblies and governors, as well as mayors and assemblies in municipalities, are elected for four-year terms. In April 1947, all local elections in the 46 prefectures (excluding Okinawa Prefecture, then under US military rule) and all their municipalities were held at the same time in "unified local elections". Since then, some gubernatorial and mayoral elections, and most assembly elections, have stayed on this original four-year cycle. Most governors and mayors are now elected on different schedules as the four-year cycle "resets" upon the resignation, death or removal of a sitting governor or mayor. Some assembly election cycles have also shifted due to assembly dissolutions or mergers of municipalities. The most recent were the 2023 Japanese unified local elections. As of 2015, the major contests in the unified local elections are as follows: Although Tokyo's metropolitan governor and assembly elections are currently held on separate schedules, 21 of the 23 special wards of Tokyo follow the unified election schedule for their assembly elections, the only exceptions being Katsushika and Adachi.[citation needed] The majority of Tokyo's special wards follow separate cycles for their mayoral elections. Tokyo elected its governor as part of the unified elections until 2011, but was forced to hold a 2012 election and 2014 election due to the resignations of Shintaro Ishihara and Naoki Inose. Iwate Prefecture, Miyagi Prefecture and Fukushima Prefecture are no longer on the unified election cycle due to the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, which delayed their elections. Ballots, voting machines and early voting Votes in national and most local elections are cast by writing the candidate's or party's name on a blank ballot paper. In elections for the House of Representatives voters fill in two ballots, one with the name of their preferred district candidate and one with their preferred party in the proportional representation block. For the House of Councillors, the district vote is similar (in SNTV multi-member districts, several candidates can be elected, but every voter has only one vote). But in the proportional vote for the House of Councillors votes are cast for a party list (to determine how many proportional seats a party receives) or a candidate (which additionally influences which candidates are elected from a party's list). Ballots that cannot unambiguously be assigned to a candidate are not considered invalid, but are assigned to all potentially intended candidates proportionally to the unambiguous votes each candidate has received. These so-called "proportional fractional votes" (ๆๅ็ฅจ, Anbun-hyล) are rounded to the third decimal. For example, if "Yamada A" and "Yamada B" both stood in an election and there were 1500 unambiguous votes: 1000 for "Yamada A" and 500 for "Yamada B"; five ambiguous votes for "Yamada" would then count for Yamada A as 5ร1000/1500=3.333 votes, and for Yamada B as 5ร500/1500=1.667 votes. The official overall result would then be: Yamada A 1003.333 votes, Yamada B 501.667 votes. In 2002, passage of an electronic voting law allowed for the introduction of electronic voting machines in local elections. The first machine vote took place in Niimi, Okayama in June 2002. In 2003, a system for early voting (ๆๆฅๅๆ็ฅจๅถๅบฆ, Kijitsu-mae tลhyล seido) was introduced. In the 2017 general/House of Representatives election, a record number of more than 21 million Japanese voted early; at the same time overall turnout was low (the second lowest in history), so in 2017, roughly 38% of all actual voters had voted early. For regular/House of Councillors elections, the 2019 election set a new all-time high with more than 17 million early voters, corresponding to roughly a third of actual voters in 2019 as overall turnout hit the second lowest value in history. Walkovers In Japan, walkovers in elections are called Mutลhyล tลsen (็กๆ็ฅจๅฝ้ธ), "[being] elected without vote". And there is literally no vote held in a walkover in Japan, no way to vote "no" or abstain explicitly: If there are only as many candidates in an election as there are seats/offices at the start of the legal election period ("official announcement": kลji (ๅ
ฌ็คบ) in national general and regular elections; kokuji (ๅ็คบ) in prefectural and municipal elections as well as national by-elections), they are declared the winners. But the otherwise applicable moratorium period after regular elections on recall attempts does not apply after a walkover. (Recalls are a two-/three-step procedure: first, supporters of a recall must collect a sufficient number of signatures; if they do, a referendum is held on whether or not to recall the incumbent; only if that is accepted by a majority, a fresh election is scheduled.) Article 100 of the Public Offices Election Law deals with walkovers, there are additional walkover provisions for subnational elections in the Local Autonomy Law. Walkovers have become widespread in prefectural and municipal elections in recent years; in the 2019 unified local elections, out of 2277 seats up in 945 electoral districts for 41 prefectural assemblies, a record 612 seats are won by walkovers in a total of 371 districts or 39% of all electoral districts. In one extreme case, a rural single-member electoral district to the Shimane prefectural assembly, there hasn't been a contested election in 31 years (the whole Heisei period). See also Further reading References External links |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza_peace_plan] | [TOKENS: 9569] |
Contents Gaza peace plan Background October 7 attacksMilitary engagements Civilian attacks Israeli invasion of the Gaza StripMilitary engagements Civilian attacks War crimes and effects Impacts and repercussions Other theatersWest Bank conflicts Assassinations and deaths of prominent individuals See also The Gaza peace plan, officially the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict, is a multilateral agreement between Israel and Hamas that aims to address the ongoing Gaza war and broader Middle Eastern crisis. Led by United States president Donald Trump, it was negotiated in consultation with many Arab and Muslim countries. The plan was announced by Trump on September 29, 2025, during a press conference at the White House alongside Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. It was signed on October 9, coming into effect the following day, and was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council on November 17. After the 2005 Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip Hamas won elections in 2006 and formed a government, first alone and then in a grand coalition with Fatah, but later seized Gaza in 2007. Since then, repeated clashes with Israel have escalated into major conflicts, culminating in the October 7 attacks by Hamas in 2023, which triggered a large-scale Israeli military campaign and genocide in Gaza. Interim ceasefires in late 2023 and early 2025 collapsed. The Gaza peace plan calls for an immediate ceasefire, the return of all hostages, prisoner exchanges, the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, the deployment of the International Stabilization Force, transitional governance by Palestinian technocrats under international supervision, large-scale reconstruction, and a conditional pathway toward acceptance of Palestinian self-determination and recognition of Palestinian statehood. The plan was met with support from many countries around the world, including France, Germany, Russia, Italy, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The State of Palestine was not involved in the negotiations, although the governing Palestinian Authority expressed support for the deal. Prior to Trump's announcement of the plan, a senior Hamas official said that Hamas rejected proposed terms of demilitarization. Upon revealing the peace proposal, Trump gave Hamas a deadline of October 5, 2025, to accept. On October 3, in response to the proposal, Hamas agreed to release any remaining hostages in Gaza and to "hand over the administration of the Gaza Strip to a Palestinian body of independent technocrats", though it did not agree to disarm or to forgo influence in Gaza. On October 8, Trump announced that Israel and Hamas had reached an agreement to begin the first phase of the deal. Under this phase, all living hostages were to be released in exchange for 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, including 250 serving life sentences, within 72 hours of the withdrawal of Israeli forces to pre-designated lines within the Gaza Strip. The ceasefire went into effect on October 10, though there have been numerous attacks since, including the killing of 442 Palestinians by Israel. The commencement of the second phase of the plan was announced by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff on 14 January 2026. Background Intermittent discussions are held by various parties and proposals put forward in an attempt to resolve the IsraeliโPalestinian conflict through a peace process. Since the 1970s, there has been a parallel effort made to find terms upon which peace can be agreed to in both this conflict and the wider ArabโIsraeli conflict. Notably, the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel included discussions on plans for Palestinian autonomy, but did not include any Palestinian representatives. The autonomy plan was not implemented, but its stipulations were represented to a large extent in the Oslo Accords. Despite the failure of the peace process to produce a final agreement, the international consensus has for decades supported a two-state solution to the conflict, based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338. This includes the establishment of an independent Palestinian state under the pre-1967 borders including East Jerusalem and a resolution to the refugee question based on the Palestinian right of return (in accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194, though Israel disputes this interpretation). This is in contrast to the current situation under the Oslo Accords in which the Palestinian territories are divided into areas of varying jurisdiction between Israeli military control and the Palestinian National Authority (PA), with the PA only having partial self-rule in Area A of the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. A final settlement as stipulated by the Oslo Accords has yet to be reached. As part of the IsraeliโPalestinian conflict, Gaza has been occupied by Israel since 1967 along with the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The International Court of Justice has ruled the occupation of Palestinian territory is illegal under international law. Following the 2005 Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip, control of the area was transferred to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Hamas, a Palestinian nationalist Islamist political and militant group, won the majority of seats in the Palestinian legislative election in January 2006. Israel frequently instated blockades on imports of goods to Gaza in 2006, including before and during the election;[a] while a blockade on exports cut off Gaza's existing industries (textiles, furniture, greenhouse berry farming) from foreign markets. The blockade was tightened after Hamas captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June 2006. Hamas formed a government, first alone (early 2006) and then in a grand coalition with Fatah (March 2007) while still being the majority party. In a battle in June 2007, Hamas ousted the remaining Fatah officials and took sole control of the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, in the West Bank, PA President Mahmoud Abbas (of Fatah) officially dismissed the government and, by a decree, formed a new one which did not include Hamas; this government was recognized by Israel as representing the PA.[b] Hamas's takeover led Israel and Egypt to impose a blockade on Gaza, also in response to the thousands of rockets and mortar Hamas fired into Israeli territory; the number of munitions fired by Israel on Gaza remained consistently higher in 2006 than the number of munitions fired from Gaza on Israeli territory. Over the years, Israel and Hamas have engaged in several conflicts, including in 2006, 2008-2009, 2012, 2014 and 2021 (of which at least the first three were prompted by Israel either assassinating a Palestinian militant leader in Gaza or sending foot soldiers into Gaza); during these conflicts Hamas intensified its rocket attacks against Israel, and Israel attacked the Gaza Strip with aerial bombing and artillery shelling. In October 2023, Hamas launched the October 7 attacks infiltrating Israel from Gaza via multiple routes. The attack began with thousands of rockets fired into Israel and was followed by massacres in multiple border towns, kibbutzim and at the Nova music festival. The attack killed 1,195 people, mostly civilians. Hamas militants also took around 251 hostages and captives. The assault prompted significant Israeli military retaliation, escalating into the Gaza war, which involved a large-scale invasion and bombardment of the Gaza Strip by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). More than 68,000 Palestinians have been killed in the conflict, mostly civilians. A wide scholarly consensus has concluded that Israel's conduct during the war amounts to genocide in Gaza.[c] On November 24, 2023, after a long fighting period between Israel and Hamas, a ceasefire was achieved due to efforts of Qatar, Egypt, and the United States. At first the ceasefire was meant to last 4 days with the release of 50 Israeli hostages and 150 Palestinian prisoners, while more humanitarian aid was sent into Gaza. The ceasefire was extended twice based on further hostage releases but ultimately ended on December 1 after both sides accused each other of violations. On January 19, 2025, another ceasefire between Israel and Hamas began, after an agreement reached on January 15 following months of negotiation mediated once again by the United States, Qatar, and Egypt. The ceasefire had three stages; the first stage saw the release of 33 Israeli hostages in exchange for about 1,900 Palestinian prisoners. During that time Israeli troops withdrew from populated areas in Gaza, while humanitarian aid was sent in along with displaced Palestinians returning home. During the first stage of the ceasefire, talks were supposed to begin between both parties about the specifics of a more permanent cessation of hostilities in the second and third stages. In the second stage, all living hostages would have been released by Hamas, and Israel would have released more Palestinian prisoners and completely withdraw its forces from Gaza. The third stage would involve, among others, an exchange of the bodies of dead hostages for the bodies of dead Palestinians. The terms of the second and third stage were written into the agreement, but the agreement nevertheless said that talks will continue on the details of the second and third stage. Hamas wanted the agreement to guarantee that the second and third stage will actually happen; and that, until then, the initial ceasefire will remain in force. Israel wanted the agreement to say that mediators (but not necessarily Hamas or Israel) will make every effort that talks about the details of the second and third stage will continue; in case they do not continue, the initial ceasefire, and all other terms of the first stage, would automatically expire after six weeks. According to information about the contents of the January 2025 agreement published by the Israeli media, the final text of the agreement was based on the Israeli proposal, including the mechanism allowing the ceasefire to expire. This led pro-Israeli commenters to argue that Israel did not violate the ceasefire when it resumed the war in March 2025. On January 20, 2025, U.S. President Joe Biden's presidential term ended, and he left completion of the ceasefire agreement in the hands of his successor, Donald Trump. Both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu lead political parties described as right-wing, and though the two leaders had disagreements, Trump was seen at the time as more likely to favor Israel and give it permission to do as it pleased with Palestinian territory. On February 4, 2025, United States president Donald Trump proposed a U.S. takeover of the Gaza Strip and relocation of its inhabitants. The proposal was made during a ceasefire in the Gaza war, fought between Israel and Hamas-led Palestinian militants. Trump expressed his vision to redevelop the territory into the "Riviera of the Middle East". The plan called for the forced displacement of approximately two million Palestinians to neighboring lands. It would also have required the removal of over 50 million tonnes of debris and unexploded ordnance. When asked how the territory would be acquired, Trump claimed the U.S. would "take it". The proposal received negative receptions from several nations and organizations, contrasting with strong support from Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. After completion of the agreement's first phase, Israel proposed extending the first stage. Hamas rejected this saying the ceasefire should proceed to the second phase as originally agreed. On March 18, 2025, Israel launched a surprise attack on the Gaza Strip, ending the ceasefire. The United States and Israel blamed Hamas for the collapse of the ceasefire by refusing to release additional hostages while Hamas accused Israel of causing the collapse of the ceasefire. At the White House press conference on September 29, 2025, U.S. president Donald Trump stated that the United States would play an active role in ensuring Israel's security following a new ceasefire agreement. He emphasized that if Hamas accepted the deal, all hostages, both living and deceased, would be released almost immediately. Trump also expressed his intention to end the war and noted that he was "hearing that Hamas wants to get this done". Trump stated that Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005 in an effort to promote peace, stating, "They said, You take it. This is our contribution to peace. But that didn't work out." Trump further mentioned that during his meeting with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Netanyahu had clearly opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state and criticized other countries that had "foolishly" recognized one. He added that Israel and other nations were "beyond very close" to reaching a deal to end the war, thanking Netanyahu for his efforts. Trump reiterated that the agreement would involve Arab countries and could lead to broader peace in the Middle East. Trump called the 20-point plan an "extremely fair proposal" and urged Hamas to accept it, expressing confidence that a positive response would be forthcoming, though he affirmed Israel's right to act if Hamas rejected the deal. On October 3, 2025, Trump gave Hamas a deadline of October 5, 2025, 18:00 Washington D.C. time (22:00 GMT), to accept the proposed agreement. In an interview to CNN the next day, Trump threatened Hamas, stating that if it refused to give up control of Gaza it would face "complete obliteration". On October 8, in a Fox News interview, Trump said there was a "set of circumstances" that enabled the agreement, including Israeli and American strikes in Iran aimed at destroying its nuclear program. The immediate triggering event that reportedly caused Trump to force Israel to end the war was the Israeli attack on Doha, which violated Qatar's territorial integrity in a failed attempt to kill Hamas negotiators. European and Arab countries also strongly backed the proposal, with Arab countries having close commercial and diplomatic ties to Trump, more European countries promising to recognize Palestine as a state, and increasing global opinion criticising the Gaza genocide. Due to domestic political differences, Trump felt freer to put pressure on Israel, and in the months of his second term, Israel had achieved all of its major military objectives in Iran, Lebanon, and Gaza. Several commenters argued that the timing of the deal was motivated by Trump's desire to win a Nobel Peace Prize. The 2025 prize, announced on October 10, 2025, was not awarded to Trump. It was awarded to Marรญa Corina Machado, a Venezuelan opposition leader, who said she was grateful for what Trump was doing "around the world for peace". Machado also stated she believes Trump "absolutely" deserves a Nobel Peace Prize of his own for "incredible events that are taking place currently in the world"; according to CNN, she was "referring to Trump's efforts to broker peace in the Middle East". Since January 2025, Trump has expressed his wish to be awarded the prize. Political scientist Scott Lucas opined that Trump was "desperate" to obtain the prize because former US president Barack Obama won the 2009 prize. Trump justified his qualification for the prize by claiming to have "ended seven wars". On October 9, Nina Graeger of Peace Research Institute Oslo argued that Trump had "not yet made a substantial enough contribution to peace to win the prize". She stated that it was "too early" to judge if Trump's involvement in the Gaza war would "lead to lasting peace". Graeger stated that Trump's withdrawals from international agreements, his proposed acquisition of Greenland, and his "infringements on basic democratic rights" in the US weakened his case. Outline The plan's 20 points are as follows: Components The plan mandated an immediate cessation of hostilities, with all military operations suspended and frontlines frozen. All Israeli hostages, alive and deceased, were to be returned within 72 hours. Palestinian prisoners were to be released proportionally, including 250 life sentence prisoners and 1,700 individuals arrested since the war began. For every Israeli hostage whose remains are released, Israel will release the remains of 15 deceased Gazans. The proposed strategy includes the destruction of Hamas's offensive weaponry, such as tunnels and military infrastructure, to neutralize their capacity for further violence. The statement says that Gaza will be "a de-radicalized terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbors". It also offers amnesty to Hamas members who commit to peaceful coexistence, with safe passage provided for those opting for exile. Additionally, a temporary international stabilization force, composed of U.S., Arab, and European personnel, would be deployed to oversee security and facilitate the training of a Palestinian police force, ensuring long-term stability and peace. A National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, led by Palestinian technocrats and supported by an international Board of Peace, is planned to be established in to manage day-to-day governance and oversee the rebuilding and repair of infrastructure. Humanitarian aid is to be delivered without interference, with international organizations such as the United Nations and the Red Crescent overseeing its distribution to ensure fairness and efficiency. Additionally, efforts are planned to encourage Palestinians to remain in Gaza, offering support to those choosing to stay and rebuild their communities. On January 21, 2026, during the World Economic Forum in Davos, President Donald Trump stated that Hamas must disarm and release all remaining hostage remains "within weeks" or be "blown away very quickly". This ultimatum was issued a day before the formal signing ceremony for the Board of Peace, a Trump-chaired international organization established to oversee the reconstruction and governance of Gaza , potentially serving as an alternative to United Nations mediation. The strategy includes the acknowledgment of Palestine as a state, contingent upon successful reconstruction efforts and necessary reforms within the Palestinian Authority. To pave the way for long-term peace, a dialogue would be initiated between Israel and the Palestinians to establish a political framework that promotes peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding. Although the plan recognizes the Palestinian state as a possibility that is "the aspiration of the Palestinian people", it does not say that the United States would recognize Palestine as a state. Negotiations On September 30, Donald Trump's proposal was forwarded to Hamas and Trump stated that the group had "three or four days" to respond to the plan. Hamas has announced that they were studying the proposal "in good faith". On October 2, reports emerged that Hamas's political leadership in Qatar were open to accepting the proposed deal and asked for additional clauses for international guarantees concerning Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the safety of its leadership. However, Hamas's leader in the Gaza Strip itself, Izz al-Din al-Haddad, has been reported to have objections to the proposal. An investigation by the New York Times found widespread support for the plan amongst civilians in the Gaza Strip, with many urging Hamas to accept the deal. The Egyptian and Qatari governments continued working to convince Hamas to accept the proposal. Hamas pushed to secure the release of Marwan Barghouti, but Israel refused. On October 3, Trump gave Hamas a deadline of Sunday October 5, 2025, 18:00 Washington D.C. time (22:00 GMT), to accept the proposed deal. Later that day, Hamas announced that they would release all Israeli hostages, living and deceased and expressed willingness to negotiate on Trump's proposed plan, though it did not agree to disarm or forgo influence in Gaza. Trump responded by saying that he believes that Hamas is "ready for lasting peace", and urged Israel to "immediately stop bombing Gaza" to allow for the safe release of hostages. Despite Trump's request for it to stop, Israel continued its bombing up to October 5, killing 70 Palestinians, stating, in one of those strikes, that it targeted a Hamas militant who posed a threat to its forces, expressing regret for harm to uninvolved civilians, and saying it "works to mitigate harm to uninvolved civilians as much as possible". On October 4, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the armed forces to halt their offensive in Gaza City in response to Trump's demands. It was reported that talks between Palestinian factions, including Hamas, regarding the future governance of Gaza would take place in Cairo. US Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner were reported to be heading to Cairo to finalise the technical details of the hostage release and discuss the lasting peace deal. Indirect talks between Israel and Hamas were planned to take place over the next few days in Egypt. Later that evening, Trump posted on social media that Israel "has agreed to the initial withdrawal line" and that when Hamas confirms, a ceasefire will "be IMMEDIATELY effective". On October 5, it was reported that the talks would be held in Sharm el Sheikh. The Israeli delegation would be led by Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and the Hamas delegation led by Khalil Al-Hayya. Trump stated that the talks may take "a couple of days" and called for "everyone to move fast", adding, "I am told that the first phase should be completed this week." On October 6, negotiators from Israel and Hamas began indirect talks in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt to discuss the release of the remaining Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoner exchange mediated by Egyptian, Qatari, Turkish and US officials. The talks lasted for around four hours and ended on a positive note, with a road map agreed for further talks the following day. Two rounds of negotiations were held on October 7, with sources describing "progress" being made. US envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff and Qatari prime minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani were expected[needs update] to join the talks on October 8. A five-point agenda for further talks, covering ending the war, prisoner and hostage exchange, Israeli withdrawal, humanitarian assistance and post-war was agreed. On October 8, Trump was handed a handwritten note from secretary of state Marco Rubio during a live television appearance stating an agreement was "very close" and that he would need to "approve a Truth social post soon so you can announce deal first". Shortly thereafter, reports emerged that an agreement had been reached and would be signed the following day. Trump subsequently confirmed that an agreement on the first phase of the deal had been approved by both sides, posting on social media that, "I am very proud to announce that Israel and Hamas have both signed off on the first Phase of our Peace Plan." The agreement was signed in Egypt at 12 noon local time on October 9. Hostages were to be freed over the weekend or early the following week, with Hamas releasing 20 living hostages in exchange for Israel's release of 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, including 250 serving life sentences and 1,700 prisoners that had been detained since the war began. On October 13, Hamas released the 20 living hostages and Israel began to release the Palestinian prisoners. Vice president of the Palestinian Authority, Hussein al-Sheikh, met with Tony Blair on October 12, 2025, to discuss the ceasefire and reconstruction in the Gaza Strip. An international summit on the next phase of the peace plan was convened on October 13 in Sharm El Shaikh, Egypt. Prior to the summit, Trump stated that negotiations for phase two of the peace plan had begun. On October 14, Egyptian foreign minister Badr Abdelatty stated that fifteen Palestinian technocrats had been chosen to lead a post-war interim administration for the Gaza Strip. He added that the list had been agreed by all Palestinian factions, including Hamas, and had been vetted by Israel. On October 24, Hamas announced it is willing to relinquish control of the Gaza Strip. On November 8, vice-president of the Palestinian Authority, Hussein al-Sheikh, stated that the Palestinian Authority and Hamas had agreed that any future Palestinian technical government for the Gaza Strip would be led by a minister suggested by the Palestinian Authority with health minister and former mayor of Gaza, Maged Abu Ramadan, being named as a possible candidate. US Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, and Trump adviser Jared Kushner arrived in Israel on October 20 and were joined by US vice-president JD Vance the following day. The European Union together with the Palestinian Authority convened the first summit of the newly formed "Palestine Donor Group" in Brussels on November 20. Palestinian factions including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Popular Front, Democratic Front, Popular Resistance Committees, National Initiative, and the Democratic Reform Movement (Dahlan Movement) started meeting in Cairo on November 24 to discuss a draft "protocol of action of the international force". On November 17, the UN Security Council approved a resolution proposed by the United States regarding a transitional government and the establishment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza. Implementation The first part of the peace plan, titled the "Implementation Steps for President Trump's Proposal for a Comprehensive End of Gaza War", was signed by Israel and Hamas on October 9, 2025, in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt. The agreed to text was as follows: Implementation Steps for President Trump's Proposal for a "Comprehensive End of Gaza War" Implementation steps: The timeline is as follows: The Israeli cabinet approved the agreement in the early hours of October 10, 2025. Subsequently, the Israeli armed forces began withdrawing from parts of the Gaza Strip to agreed-upon deployment lines, also known as the Yellow Line. The withdrawal was completed at 12 noon local time on October 10, at which point the ceasefire formally came into effect. The United States began establishing a joint control centre under the leadership of Brad Cooper, head of US Central Command, to monitor the cessation of hostilities. On October 11, Brad Cooper, Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner travelled into the Gaza Strip to verify Israel's compliance with the first phase of the agreement. On October 12, Hamas announced it was prepared to transfer the 20 living hostages to Israel. In response, Netanyahu stated, "Israel is prepared and ready for the immediate reception of all our hostages." Israeli sources indicated they believed Hamas would release the hostages before midnight on Sunday so that they would be under Israeli care when Trump arrived in Israel on Monday morning. Coordinator for Hostages and Missing Persons Gal Hirsch said the most "realistic" time for the hostages' return is 6 or 7 a.m. on Monday, though there are reports they could return earlier. That evening, Trump declared that "The war is over" and that the Board of Peace and interim administration would be formed quickly. On October 13 at 8 a.m., in Gaza City, Hamas released 7 hostages to the Red Cross and then into the custody of IDF troops. Around 11 a.m., in the southern Gaza Strip, Hamas released the additional 13 living hostages to the Red Cross and then into the custody of IDF troops. Hamas ultimately decided to return the remains of four of the dead hostages later on October 13, despite agreeing to release all 28. According to Israeli officials the released hostages were aged 22โ48, and included a pair of twin brothers and IDF soldiers. Hamas permitted certain hostages to conduct video calls with their families shortly prior to their release. Following their release, the hostages were transported to medical facilities, including Sheba Medical Center in Tel Hashomer, for evaluation and treatment. They faced a range of health issues, including malnutrition, loss of muscle and fat, shrapnel injuries, burns, and other physical trauma. Some also experienced complications from overfeeding shortly before their release after months of starvation. Later on October 13, 2025, during a ceremony in Gaza, the Israeli Defense Forces received the caskets containing the bodies of four deceased hostages and then brought the caskets out of Gaza and into Israel after crossing the Gaza-Israel border. The deceased hostages were reportedly aged between 22 and 53, and included a Nepalese agriculture student and an IDF soldier. On October 15, Israeli officials reported that one of the returned bodies was not that of a hostage. As of October 25, Hamas had returned the remains of only 15 deceased hostages, while the remains of 13 others remained in its possession that it is obligated to return under the agreement. Trump issued a statement acknowledging that Hamas may not know the location of some remains, but noted that there are several to which the group has access and is nevertheless withholding. He warned Hamas that it would be held responsible if the ceasefire collapses and stated that he would closely monitor the group's compliance with the agreement over the next 48 hours. On October 30, Hamas returned to Israel the remains of two deceased hostages, who were abducted from their homes and killed in Hamas captivity. Israeli authorities confirmed their identities the same day. As of that date, the remains of 11 additional deceased hostages were still being held in Gaza, and Israel said Hamas is "required to fulfill its commitments to the mediators and return them as part of the implementation of the agreement". On November 2, Hamas returned the remains of three deceased hostages to Israel. These hostages, including Asaf Hamami and Omer Neutra, were soldiers who were abducted after being killed in combat during the October 7 attacks. As of that date, the remains of eight more deceased hostages were still being held in Gaza. On November 4, Hamas transferred to Israel the remains of the hostage Itay Chen, a 7th Armored Brigade soldier killed in his tank near Nahal Oz on October 7 attacks. Chen was the last slain hostage with US citizenship still held in Gaza. As of that date, the bodies of seven more deceased hostages remained in the Strip. On November 5, Hamas transferred to Israel the remains of the hostage Joshua Loitu Mollel, a 21-year-old Tanzanian agricultural intern abducted from Kibbutz Nahal Oz on October 7 attacks. As of that date, the bodies of six more deceased hostages remained in the Strip. On November 7, Hamas transferred to Israel the remains of the hostage Lior Rudaeff, a 61โyearโold the deputy security coordinator at Kibbutz Nir Yitzhak and a member of its civilโdefence squad, who was killed on the morning of October 7, 2023, during the militant attack, with his body subsequently abducted to Gaza. As of that date, the remains of five additional deceased hostages remained in the Strip. On November 9, the remains of the hostage Hadar Goldin were returned to Israel, after more than 11 years in captivity by Hamas. He had been killed and abducted during the 2014 Gaza War on August 1, 2014, amid a humanitarian ceaseโfire and subsequent tunnel attack. As of that date, the remains of four additional deceased hostages were still held in the Gaza Strip. On November 13, the remains of one more Israeli hostage were handed over by Hamas to Israel. On November 25, the remains of one more Israeli hostage were handed over by PIJ and Hamas to Israel. On December 3, the remains of one more hostage were handed over by Hamas to Israel. On January 26, the IDF announced that it recovered the body of the last hostage in Gaza. Hamas claimed it had provided all the information it had about the hostage's remains and accused Israeli government of obstructing efforts to search for them in Israeli-controlled areas of Gaza. After the return of the living hostages, Israel began releasing Palestinian prisoners, both living and deceased. Some 45 bodies of Palestinians were turned over to the Red Cross without identification on October 15, with more expected. The Nasser Medical Complex in Gaza later reported that Israel had returned the remains of the 45 Palestinians with blindfolds, handcuffs, and legcuffs still on the bodies. As of October 20, Israel had returned 150 bodies to Gaza, of which 135 had been held at Sde Teiman detention camp. According to doctors in Khan Yunis, forensic examinations "indicate that Israel carried out acts of murder, summary executions and systematic torture against many of the Palestinians", and showed "signs of direct gunfire at point-blank range and bodies crushed beneath Israeli tank tracks". Reports of torture were confirmed by Palestinian detainees who were released alive by Israel as part of the Gaza ceasefire deal. The IDF denied engaging in torture, stated that it operates in accordance with international law, and said it had returned the bodies of combatants, but this could not be independently verified. Relatives of some of the deceased denied these allegations. The living Palestinians released by Israel include 1,718 Gaza detainees arrested over the course of the war. About 1,700 of these Gazans had been held without charge. Prior to the release, 11,056 Palestinians, including hundreds of women and children, were held in Israeli prisons according to HaMoked, with about 3,500 of those held in administrative detention without trial. Some of the released prisoners were seen with protruding cheekbones, showing signs of recent beatings, and had to be supported by relatives as they were unable to walk. Among the released were 250 Palestinians who had been serving one or more life terms, most for deadly attacks on Israelis, while others had been convicted of lesser offenses, according to the Justice Ministry. Of these, 154 were expelled to Egypt, from where they are expected to be relocated to third countries, while the remainder returned to their homes in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. According to a list published by Hamas, those freed from Gaza included two women, six minors under 18, and about 30 men over 60. The phase one agreement stipulated that humanitarian aid should enter the Gaza Strip once hostilities had ceased. From October 21, 2025, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs began to publish daily reports about efforts of recovery in Gaza after the ceasefire, monitoring the establishment of food distribution centers, increase in medical help, measures to protect women, people with disabilities and so on. By November 18, it was reported that an average of 800 aid trucks were entering the Gaza Strip every day. A Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC), under the leadership of Admiral Brad Cooper, head of US Central Command, was set up shortly after the ceasefire agreement came into effect on October 10, 2025. The center aims to help facilitate the flow of humanitarian, logistical, and security assistance from international counterparts into Gaza. US diplomat Steven Fagin serves as the civilian lead of the CMCC. On November 3, the United States submitted a draft resolution to the United Nations Security Council that would mandate a Stabilization Force for two years under the direction of a Board of Peace. The draft underwent two further revisions before being adopted as United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 on November 17. The commencement of the second phase of the plan was announced by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff on January 14, 2026 along with the formation of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza to manage the day to day administration of the Gaza Strip during the transitional period. This phase marks a shift from the initial ceasefire to "demilitarization, technocratic governance, and reconstruction". On January 17, the White House announced the formation of a broader "Board of Peace," including a Gaza-focused executive board, which U.S. officials said was intended to support the implementation of postwar arrangements. Israel received a formal U.S. invitation to join the Board of Peace a couple of days later, as part of the administration's initial outreach to selected governments. It was reported that the United States sent invitations to approximately 60 countries in total, underscoring the administration's intention to establish the Board of Peace as a global conflict-resolution mechanism extending beyond Gaza. The announcement prompted objections from the Israeli government, which stated that the proposal had not been coordinated with Israel and ran counter to Israeli policy. According to Israeli officials, the criticism also stemmed from the inclusion of Turkish and Qatari representatives on the proposed board. Israeli officials additionally warned that the board's proposed mandate could limit Israelโs freedom of action in Gaza by transferring key security and governance decisions to an international forum. Several European governments have signaled reluctance or refusal to participate in the broader "Board of Peace" initiative, with diplomats warning that the proposed mechanism could undermine the role of the United Nations and existing multilateral frameworks for peace and reconstruction. Among EU member states, Hungary has been the only country to confirm its acceptance of an invitation, while others have expressed reservations related to the board's proposed charter and financing arrangements. Norway, Sweden, and France were among the countries that publicly declined to participate in the initiative, while Italy stated it would not join due to domestic legal and constitutional considerations. Outside the European Union, Vietnam has also confirmed its acceptance, and a number of additional countries, including India, Australia, Jordan, Greece, Cyprus, and Pakistan, have acknowledged receiving invitations but had not announced decisions on participation at the time of reporting. It was later reported that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, and Pakistan formally agreed to join the board, significantly expanding its geographic scope. On January 21, Israel reversed its earlier position after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to join the U.S.-led Board of Peace, following further discussions with Washington. Netanyahuโs office said Israel accepted the invitation after receiving clarifications regarding the boardโs structure and mandate, narrowing its scope and procedurally separating it from the broader Board of Peace framework, addressing some Israeli concerns. By that date, roughly 35 countries had accepted invitations. On January 22, President Trump officially ratified the Charter of the Board of Peace during a high-profile ceremony at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Trump, serving as the Boardโs Chairman, was joined by leaders from 18 founding nations, including Kazakhstan's President Tokayev, who signed the charter to transition the body into a permanent international organization. During the launch, Jared Kushner presented a "futuristic" blueprint for a unified Gaza, featuring high-rise towers and an airport, while noting that the territory would include a new buffer zone along the Israeli border. On February 2, Rafah border crossing was reopened. Violations and deviations The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, a Gaza-based human rights organization, documented at least 129 violations by Israel between October 13 and October 18. In the first 44 days of the ceasefire, Israeli attacks killed 342 Palestinians across 497 ceasefire violations, according to the Gaza Government Media Office. Those killed by Israel are often subsequently accused of approaching the so-called "yellow line" intended to demarcate the boundaries of Israel's withdrawal within Gaza. As well, while the agreement called for 600 trucks of humanitarian aid to enter Gaza per day, Israel allowed an average of 145 trucks to enter per day between October 10 and November 2. As of mid-January 2026, Israeli attacks had killed at least 442 Palestinians and injured 1,240 others. Opinions According to an analysis published in The Wall Street Journal, Hamas's shift towards agreeing to the peace deal was primarily driven by growing diplomatic pressure both from within and outside the group. This pressure stemmed from Arab and other Muslim countries, especially Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar, who urged Hamas to accept the agreement. Their pressure was influenced by Trump's efforts and by the Israeli attacks in Lebanon, Iran, and Qatar, which heightened fears in the Arab world of Israel's growing power. Additionally, Hamas faced pressure at home, where the people in Gaza were suffering from hunger and destruction and simply wanted the war to end. These factors combined to force Hamas into agreeing to release the hostages and sign the first part of the peace deal, as it saw no other way to end the war. Historian Rashid Khalidi stated on October 13, 2025, that Trump's plan was not a genuine peace process, since it consisted of a ceasefire, a hostage exchange, and a temporary lift of the Israeli blockade of Gaza, but did not contain plans for "completely equal rights for all individuals and both peoples". Belรฉn Fernรกndez wrote in Al Jazeera that Tony Blair's inclusion in the transitional government "smacks rather hard of colonialism" and that Blair's support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq should preclude him from any role on the "Board of Peace". The Guardian wrote that the plan does not provide Palestinians with "meaningful agency" and "risks freezing subjugation under the language of peace". Human rights attorney Noura Erakat said that the goal of the plan is to "force outcomes onto the Palestinian people". Diana Buttu, a former spokesperson for the PLO, said the plan "normalised genocide". Reactions Support in the Israeli government was mixed. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich denounced the plan as "a historic missed opportunity" which will force Israel to "fight in Gaza again". Leader of the Opposition Yair Lapid endorsed the plan and said, "Israel should announce it is joining the discussions led by the president to finalize the details of the deal." Israeli opposition politician Benny Gantz lauded "Trump's extraordinary efforts to secure a hostage deal and safeguard Israeli security" and said the plan "must be implemented, our hostages brought home, Israel's operational freedom maintained, Hamas's terror regime in Gaza replaced, and moderate Arab States instated instead as I proposed a year and a half ago". On October 12, 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that the "military campaign is not over" and that Israel's enemies were "trying to recover in order to attack us again". Defense Minister Israel Katz announced that "Israel's great challenge after the phase of returning the hostages will be the destruction of all of Hamas' terror tunnels in Gaza." Katz said he "instructed the IDF to prepare to carry out the mission". The Palestinian Authority called Trump's efforts "sincere and determined" and said that it is committed to holding new parliamentary and presidential elections within a year of the war's end, changing school curriculum, and forming a new security force, while affirming its desire for a "modern, democratic, and non-militarized Palestinian state, committed to pluralism and the peaceful transfer of power". Taher al-Nounou, a senior Hamas official, said in September they were not consulted about the current proposal and, in any case, they will not accept the demilitarization offer as Israel has demanded. Hamas leader in Gaza, Izz al-Din al-Haddad, reportedly objected to the proposal as he is thought to believe that the plan aims to finish Hamas. Hamas's political leadership in Qatar have been reported to be open to accepting the proposal with certain amendments. On October 3, 2025, Hamas issued an official response, declaring its readiness to release all hostages, to hand over the administration of the Gaza Strip to independent Palestinian technocrats and to negotiate further details. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah called the plan an attempt by Israel to impose through the U.S. "what it could not achieve through war" and condemned "the American-Israeli declaration" as "a recipe for blowing up the region". Following Hamas's agreement to the plan, the PIJ followed suit and said Hamas's response "represents the stance of the Palestinian resistance forces". In the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, senior member Abu Ali Hassan, said that the plan is "a recipe for managing the war and prolonging it, not for its end". He also called the plan "a desperate attempt to separate Gaza from the Palestinian territorial entity". International leaders widely welcomed the ceasefire, affirmed its importance, and hoped it would lead to lasting peace. Argentine president Javier Milei stated that Trump should be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Canadian prime minister Mark Carney praised the efforts of Trump, Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey in negotiating the agreement and called on Israel and Hamas to carry out their commitment to free all hostages. The collective presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina unanimously decided to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize for his "commitment to establishing lasting peace in Gaza" and the Middle East, marking this the first official nomination for the 2026 edition of the award. Immediately following the release of the hostages, U.S. President Trump visited Israel and addressed Israel's Parliament, the Knesset, celebrating the release of hostages and calling for a commitment to end fighting and rebuild Gaza. He described the ceasefire as marking "not only the end of war, but the end of an age of terror and death and the beginning of the age of faith and hope and of God", and stated that Israel had "won all that it can by force of armsโฆ Now it is time to translate these victoriesโฆ into the ultimate prize of peace and prosperity for the entire Middle East." He urged Palestinians to "turn forever from the path of terror and violence" and extended an appeal to Iran for "friendship and cooperation". Trump also highlighted the role of Arab and Muslim countries in pressuring Hamas to release hostages, calling it "an incredible triumph for Israel to have all these nations working together as partners in peace". On October 6, 2025, High Representative Kaja Kallas announced that the European Union seeks a role in the proposed transitional authority for Gaza, stating, "we feel that Europe has a great role and we should be also on board with this." The European Union has two overseas operations in the Palestinian territories, the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Rafah and the European Union Mission for the Support of Palestinian Police and Rule of Law. The United Nations special rapporteur for human rights "expressed hope for a permanent ceasefire", but said that multiple portions of the plan contradicted international law and the ICJ advisory opinion on Israel's occupation of Palestine. On October 23, 2025, the Knesset passed a preliminary reading of bill that would extend Israeli sovereignty to all Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The bill was condemned by Secretary of State Marco Rubio as "counterproductive" to Trump's Gaza peace plan. Trump added that "Israel would lose all of its support from the United States if that happened." In October 2025, Steven Fagin, who previously served as the U.S. ambassador to Yemen, was designated as the civilian leader of the Civil-Military Coordination Center to facilitate the implementation of the peace plan. Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited the center located in Kiryat Gat, which is 56 kilometers (34.7 miles) south of Tel Aviv, and remarked that the center demonstrated a "healthy optimism" regarding advancements in the implementation of the ceasefire. Tens of thousands of individuals have taken to the streets in various cities throughout Europe to commemorate the UN International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People in November 2025, urging for more robust global measures to address the persistent and lethal breaches of the US-mediated ceasefire. On November 27, 2025, Amnesty International released a report stating that despite the ceasefire, Israel continues to commit a genocide in the Gaza Strip by continuing to purposefully inflict conditions of life meant to bring about their bodily annihilation. See also Notes References Bibliography External links |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serbian_anti-corruption_protests] | [TOKENS: 2194] |
Contents Serbian anti-corruption protests Formalized student demands: Government response: Anti-corruption protesters Support: International support: Government parties Other parties Foreign support: Non-centralized students' union leadership In November 2024, mass protests erupted in Novi Sad, Serbia, after the collapse of the city's railway station canopy, which killed 16 people and left another severely injured. By March 2025, the protests had spread to 400 cities and towns across the country. Led by university students, the protests called for accountability for the disaster. The protests began with student-led blockades of educational institutions, initiated on 22 November at the Faculty of Dramatic Arts in Belgrade, after students were attacked during a silent tribute to the victims. Other faculties and high schools soon joined. In the early stages, protesters enacted daily "Serbia, stand still" (Serbian Cyrillic: ะะฐััะฐะฝะธ, ะกัะฑะธัะพ, romanized: Zastani, Srbijo) traffic blockades from 11:52 am to 12:08 pmโthe exact time of the collapseโas a symbolic gesture honoring the deceased, accompanied by a silent protest. By early 2025, these 16-minute pauses had ceased as a standalone action, and the movement transitioned into sustained civil disobedience. Protesters began organizing extended road blockades, walking demonstrations, a protest cycling and relay race from Belgrade to Strasbourg and Brussels, respectively, and blockades of the headquarters of Radio Television of Serbia that severely disrupted its programming. Confrontations escalated as supporters of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the police clashed with demonstrators, leading to street fights and arrests in multiple cities, including smaller ones such as Novi Pazar and Uลพice. After months of student lockouts at most higher learning institutions, including the University of Belgrade and the University of Novi Sad, classes resumed and the 2025/2026 school year commenced in the previously locked-out institutions. Continuing anti-academic rhetoric by the regime presented a false narrative of the lockouts. Background On 1 November 2024, the canopy of the Novi Sad railway station collapsed, killing 14 people on the spot and leaving three with injuries; one of the injured died on 17 November and another died on 21 March 2025. The collapse led to widespread public concern in Serbia, with many questioning the structural integrity and maintenance oversight of public infrastructure. Authorities launched an investigation into the causes of the incident, but public frustration grew due to lack of accountability in the response. The station building was constructed in 1964, and was renovated from 2021 to mid-2024 with support from China's Belt and Road Initiative. The official cause of the collapse remains under investigation, with government corruption and opaque dealings with Chinese contractors blamed. Timeline Protests against government corruption and inaction soon began, grew into the hundreds, and spread across the country. The protests continued in 2025 and into 2026. Symbols and slogans A common protester slogan was "corruption kills". Protest symbols included red handprints with the caption "your hands are bloody", referring to the authorities and ruling politicians, and bleeding doves (the dove is a symbol of Novi Sad). Banners accompanied protests and blockades. Most of them mention Vuฤiฤ and other members of the ruling party, public prosecutor Zagorka Dolovac [sr], and generally support the students. Some of the banners feature quotes or references from Serbian and world pop culture, including Better Call Saul ("Not Even Saul Will Save You"), Grand Theft Auto VI ("The People Rose Up Before [the Release of] GTA VI"), Game of Thrones' Daenerys Targaryen, and Charli XCX's album Brat. National Serbian flags, both contemporary and historical, as well as the flags of many Serbian cities and municipalities, and university and faculty flags, were common sights. Ferrari flags and paraphernalia, once a prominent symbol of opposition to the Miloลกeviฤ regime, made a return. Students called out Vuฤiฤ's excessive behavior, arguing that he is acting ultra vires by involving himself in matters that are out of his legal capacity as the President. Some banners included the word "ฤaci" ("ัะฐัะธ"), a reference to an anti-protest graffiti ฤaci u ลกkolu; this was reported to be an attempt by the ruling SNS to provoke the students, backfiring due to the creator's illiteracy. The pro-government encampment in Pioneers Park was widely dubbed ฤacilend by protesters. Another catchphrase originated from Reddit, is "pump it" ("pumpaj"), meaning to "keep increasing the pressure", which also appeared in memes and banners. Another closely related phrase, "stew it" (dinstaj), was popularized by sociologist Jovo Bakiฤ. Some protests adopted specific names that are wordplays: Reactions Before the 15 March and 28 June protests in Belgrade, public transit operations there halted. Private bus companies cancelled most departures to and from Belgrade. Passenger trains coming in and out of Belgrade were halted due to bomb threats. An attempt of Niลก students to organise transport to Belgrade failed after a private bus company allegedly received threats from people close to the government. Russian President Vladimir Putin voiced support for the Serbian authorities and rejected what he called a "colour revolution". The EU Commission enlargement director-general, Gert Jan Koopman, stated that the EU "will not accept or support a violent change of power in Serbia." US President Donald Trump's envoy for special missions, Richard Grenell, wrote on X that the United States supports peaceful demonstrations but does not support "those who undermine the rule of law or who forcefully take over government buildings." The European Commission and the Council of the European Union remained neutral. On 28 January 2025, a group of Serbian public figures sent a letter to EU officials, including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, urging them to become more actively involved in supporting a "free, democratic and European Serbia".[b] Many supportive Serbs interpreted this lack of attention as backing the government. For example, several days after a "15. za 15" protest in Belgrade, Vuฤiฤ met with European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos in Brussels, a meeting the EU diplomat described as "constructive." Kos made no mention of the use of a sound cannon against non-violent protesters the weekend before, drawing criticism from protesters and their supporters. Support for EU membership fell after the protests began, with many Serbs in support of the protests viewing the EU as an opponent of democratization and bureaucratic reform efforts, resulting in the absence of EU flags and other pro-European symbols from rallies. Protests were publicly supported by over 5,000 university professors, cooperators and researchers. Political organizations that supported the protests include: A number of associations and cultural institutions supported the protests, including: Numerous public figures, artists and celebrities from Serbia, as well as from other former Yugoslav republics supported the protests, including: Composers Rock musicians and bands Hip hop and rap artists Pop and folk singers and musicians During the February 2025 Pesma za Evroviziju song contest, organized by Radio Television of Serbia to select the Serbian entry for the Eurovision Song Contest 2025, several participants, including Ana ฤurฤin, Oxajo, Aleksandar Sedlar and Tam, expressed their support for the protests by wearing badges with messages of support or displaying red hands. Basketball players, coaches and staff Football players and coaches Since mid-December protests have been held by students in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, North Macedonia and by Serbian diaspora in numerous cities around the world. Those include Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Podgorica, Sarajevo, Zagreb, Rijeka, Split, Osijek, Pula, ล ibenik, Hvar, Komiลพa, Skopje, Ljubljana, Maribor, Paris, Marseille, Brussels, Trieste, Milan, Athens, London, Manchester, Cambridge,Dublin, Budapest, Bucharest, Timiศoara, Sofia, Vienna, Graz, Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Dresden, Stuttgart, Aachen, Bonn, Munich, Warsaw, Krakรณw, Poznaล, Wrocลaw, Zurich, Bern, Basel, Geneva, Lausanne, The Hague, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Luxembourg, Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Alicante, Las Palmas, Lisbon, Porto, Gran Canaria, Prague, Brno, Bratislava, Stockholm, Gothenburg, Oslo, Bergen,Trondheim, Helsinki, Reykjavรญk, Valletta, Nicosia, Zanzibar city, Mexico City, Washington DC, Boston, Nantucket, Chicago, Miami, Tampa, Detroit, Houston, Austin Los Angeles, Stanford, California, New York City, San Francisco, San Diego, Pittsburgh, Toronto, Vancouver, Calgary, Montreal, Ottawa, Edmonton, Sydney, Perth, Melbourne, Gold Coast, Auckland, Punta Cana, and Tokyo. On 2 February 2025, during a protest gathering in front of the Embassy of Serbia in Budapest, an unknown man inside the embassy gave the middle finger to the protesters from the open window. Ambassador Aleksandra ฤuroviฤ declined to either apologize or reveal the man's identity. Vasilije ฤarapiฤ, Montenegrin politician and member of the leading Europe Now! party, publicly expressed support for the students. In his statement, ฤarapiฤ emphasized the importance of regional solidarity and the need for accountability in infrastructure projects, urging governments to prioritize public safety to prevent such tragedies. Former president of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili who was leading the 2024โ2025 Georgian protests supported the Serbian protests by calling them "similar" and also called for the stronger support from the EU. European parties Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), European Green Party, Renew Europe and European Left supported the protests. On 31 January, it was announced that the students of Serbia were a candidate for 2025 Nobel Peace Prize. Following March 15 protest in Belgrade, a group of 210 academics from Europe, the United States and South America signed a letter of support to Serbian students and academics. The list included รtienne Balibar, Judith Butler, Annie Ernaux, Nancy Fraser, Thomas Piketty and Slavoj ลฝiลพek. Other public figures and artists which publicly supported the protests include: See also Notes References |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ืืขืงื_ืืฉื_ืืืืืืื ื] | [TOKENS: 5267] |
ืชืืื ืขื ืืื ืื ืืขืงื ืืฉื ืืืืืืื ื ืืจื ืืขืงื ืืฉื ืืึนืึถืืึทืื ืึน (ื"ื ืืืืื ื'ืชืจ"ื, 18 ืืืืืืกื 1880 โ ื"ื ืืชืฉืจื ื'ืชืฉื"ื, 15 ืืืืงืืืืจ 1960) ืืื ืจื, ืคืืกืง ืืืืฉ ืฆืืืืจ ืืฉืจืืื, ืฉืืืื ืืจื ืืขืืจ ืชื ืืืื-ืืคื ืืืฉืจ ืืืชืืช ืืืืฉืืืช ืืฉืจืื ื-8 ืื-9. ืงืืจืืช ืืืื ืืืืืืื ื ื ืืื ืืืื ืืืืจืื, ืืื ืืื ืืืืกืื ืืจืื ืืช ืืืฉืืืชื ืฉื ืืืื, ืืจื ืืืืื ืืืืืืื ื. ืจืื ืืชืืืื ืืื ืืืฉื"ื ืืืืงืื. ืืฉืืื ืืื ืขืกืงื ืฆืืืืจื ืืขืืจื ืืืื ืืฉืืจ ืืืืื ืืืงืืช "ืืืืขื ืืืืืื ื" ืืฉื ืช 1913, ืืื ืื ืฉืืืฉ ืืืจ ืืขื ืืขืืจ ืืจืืฉ ืืคืืืช ืืืืจืื ืฉื. ืงืืืืช ืืืืคืช ืืืชืืื ืืชืงืืคื ืื ืืื ื ืืืื ืชืืืืืจ ืืจืฆื ืื ืืื ืกืืงืืืื. ืืืฉื 4 ืฉื ืื ืขืืจ ืืจื ืืืืืืื ื ืืืืจ ืขื ืืืืขืื ืืืืืื ืืคืงืืขืื ืืฉืจ ืืืืื, ืื ื ืื ื ืขื ืืงืืื ืืืช ืืกืคืจ ืืขืืจื, ืืคืขื ืืชืืงืื ืืืช-ืืื ืกืช ืืขืชืืง, ืืืืจ ืืืืจืื. ืืืืืืช ืืขืืื ืืจืืฉืื ื ืืืืื ื ืชืื ืืชื ืืฆืจืคืชืืช ืฉื ืืฉืคืืชื ืืืืจืืฉื ืืืื ืืืืจืงืื, ืืื ืขื 800 ืืชืืฉืื ืืืืื, ืื ืืื ืงืืจืกืืงื. ืืืืจ ืืืืขื ืืื ืฉืืืฉ ืืืืืืื ื ืืจื ืืงืืืื ืืืืืืืช ืืืื ืฉืืชืฃ ืืืงืืชื ืฉื ืืืกืืืช ืืืืืืื ืืืงืื. ืืชืื ืืืืืื ืืฉื ืช 1920, ืกืืืขื ืืืฉืืช ืฆืจืคืช ืืืืืื ืืฉืื ืืจืฆื ืืืืืืืื ื ืฉื ืืืืจืื. ืขื ืฉืื ืืืืืื ืืจืฆื ืืื ืืื ืจืืืฉื ืฉื ืืงืจืงืขืืช ืกืืื ืงืืจ ืืจืื"ื ืืงืืจ ืจืื ืขืงืืื, ืื ืืืช ืืืื ืกืืื ืงืืจ ืืจืื"ื ืืืืืจ ืืื, ืืืกืื ืืฉืืื ืืช ืืกืืืืืช, ืืื ืืื ืฉืืื ืช ืืืืื ืื ืฉืืืืชื ืืฉืืื ื ืืจืืฉืื ื ืืืืฅ ืืืืืืช. ืืื ืืฉื ืื 1926โ1928 ืฉืืืฉ ืืืจ ืืจืื ืืช ืืจืืฉืืช ืืื ื'ืืจ, ืืืกื ืื ืืืช ืืื ืฉืขืื ืืจืืฉืืชื ืื ืืื ืื ืืช ืืืช ืืืืจืฉ ืืจืื ืื "ืชืืจื ืืืืื". ืืืืจ ืืื - ืขื ืฉื ืช 1941, ืืื ื ืืืืืืื ื ืืื ืืืช ืืืื ืืกืื ืืจื ืืจืืฉื ืืงืืืจ, ืื ืืืช ืืื ืืจื ืจืืฉื ืืืืืกื ืืจืื ืืืืจ ืืืช ืืืื ืืขืจืขืืจืื ืืืฆืจืื, ืชืคืงืืืื ืืื ืฉืืืฉ ืขื ืืืจืชื ืืืจืฅ ืืฉืจืื ืืขืงืืืช ืืืืจืชื ืืืืื ืช ืจื ืืขืืจ ืชื ืืืื ืืฉื ืช 1942. ืืชื ืืืื-ืืคื ืืืื ืืจืื ืืจืืฉื ืืกืคืจืื ืฉื ืืขืืจ ืืื ืืืช ืืื ื. ืื ืืื ืืงืื ืืช ืืฉืืืช "ืงืื ืืขืงื" ืืืื ืขื ืจืื ืืืฉืื ืื ืฉื ืืขืืจ, ืืืกืจ ืืืืื ืืื ืืจืื, ืืืกื ืื ืืช ืืืช ืืืื ืืืืืื ืืขื ืืื ื ืขืืื ืืช. ืืืื ืชื ื ืืฉืื ืืฉื ืช 1942 ืืขื 1958. ืืืืืจืืช ืืื ืกืช ืืฉื ืืื ืืื ืฉืืชืฃ ืืจืฉืืื ืืืื ื ืืฉืจืื ืขื ืืืืื ืื ืืื, ืื ืืืขืืืืชื ืืืืื ืืืื ืืืืชื ืจื ืืืื. ืืื ืขืื ืืช ืชืคืงืืื ืืจื ืฉื ืชื ืืืื ืืื ืืืชืื ืืช ืืฉืจ ืืืชืืช, ืืขืงืืืช ืืฆืืืช ืืืคื"ื ืืืืฉืืช ืืฉืจืื ืืฉืืื ืืช ืืืจืืช ืืชื ืืืืชื.[ืืจืืฉ ืืงืืจ] ืืืื ืืชืคืงืื ืื ืขื ืืคืืืจืชื ืืฉื ืช 1960. ื-1895 ื ืฉื ืืืฉื ืืช ืืกืขืืื ืืช ืืฉื ืืืจื ืฉืืืฉ. ืฆืืฆืืื: ืืื ืจ, ื'ืืืื, ืืืืื, ืขืืืื, ืืฆืืง, ืืืืืืช. ืืชื, ื'ืืืื, ืืืืชื ืืฉืชื ืฉื ืฉืืขืื ืืืื, ืจืืฉ ืืขืืจืืื ืืฉื ื ืฉื ืืืจืื ืืฉื ืื 1938-1950. ืืืืจ ืคืืืจืชื ื ืืฉืื ืืืืืื ืกืืืจื. ืืืืืฉ ืืืื 1960, ื ืฉื ืืจื ืืืืืืื ื ืืืืฉื ืืช ืืจืื ืกืืื ืืืืฉื ืชืืจืืฉ, ืืืช 18. ืืชืงืฉืืจืช ื ืืชืื ืืืงืืจืช ืฆืืืืจืืช ืขื ืืขืฉื ืื ืื ืืื ืืชืืื ื ืืืขื ืื ืืืืื ืชื ืืขื ืืื ืืืืืืื ืฉืื ืืื ืฆืืืช ืืืืื ืืืื ืื ืืงืืืข ืื ืืฉ ืืืืชืื ืฉืืฉื ืืืื ืืคืืืจืช ืืืืฉื ืืจืืฉืื ื ืืื "ืื ื ืืืฉ ืืืืจื ืืืื ื ืืืืื ืืช ืฆืขืื ืืคื ืืืขื ืืืืจืืคื ืืื ืืคื ืืืืื". ืฉืืืฉื ืืืืฉืื ืืืืจ ื ืืฉืืืื ืืฉื ืืื, ื ืคืืจ ืืจื ืืืืืืื ื ืืืืจืชื ืืืืื ืืืืืื ืืืจืืฉืืื ืืชืืฆืื ืืืื ืื. ืืื ื ืงืืจ ืืืจ ืืื ืืืืช ืืืจืืฉืืื. ืขื ืฉืื ืจืืื ืืฉืืื ืช ืืืื ืืชื ืืืื. ืืืืขืฆื ืืืชืืช ืืชื ืืืื ืืืกืื ืืืืจื ืืช "ืคืจืก ืืจื ืืืืืืื ื ืืกืคืจืืช ืชืืจื ืืช". ืขืืืืชื ืืืฉื ืชื ืื ืขืืจืื ืืฉืฃ, ืืกืฃ ืืืงืจ ืืจื ืืืืืืื ื, ืืชืื ืื ืขืชืืงืื, ืืขืืงืจ ืืชืงืืคืช ืืืืื ืื ืืกืคืจื ืืฆืคืื ืืคืจืืงื. ืจืฉืืืื ืขื ืฉืื ืืื ืืืืืืื ืืชืืื ืื ืืืืืื ืืืฉืื ืืืืชืจ ืืื ืืชื ืืื ืฉื ืคืืจืืฉ ืืืฉื ืืืช ืืจืื"ื ืืฉืคื ืืขืจืืืช - ืืคื ืฉื ืืชื ืืืงืืจื. ืืช ืืชื ืืื ืืืื ืขื ืืืื, ืืจืื ืืืืืืื ื, ืืืืฉืง. ืืฉืืืจ ืืจ ืืืฉืจืื ืืื ืืจื ืืืืืืื ื ืฉืืชืฃ ืืืคืืจืืช ืืจืืืืืืืืืช ืฉืืืฆืข ืคืจืืคืกืืจ ื ืืื ืกืืืฉืฅ ืืืื ืืืจืื ืืืืืงืจ ืืชืืง ืืชืืื ืืื ื ืฉืื ืืฉื ืช 1950, ืขื ืืื ืืืื ืืืจืกืืื ืืขืืจืืช ืืืจืืฉืืื - ืืืจืืงื, ืฉื ืืืื ืืชืื ืื ืืฉืืืื ื ืืกืคืื. ืืฉื ืช ืชืฉืค"ื, ืืฆื ืืืืจ ืืกืคืจ 'ืืืื ืืืจืืืื' ืืืื ืืจื ืืฉื ืืื. ืืืืงืจื, ืืขื ืืจื ืืื ืื ืจืืืช ืืชืืืืืชืื ืฉื ืืจื ืืืืืืื ื ืืื ืืืืคืื, ืืื ืืื ืืื ืืืืคื ืฉืืืชื. ืืจื ืืื ืชืื ืืช ืืกืืช ืืืืืคืื ื"ื ืืืื ืคืกืืืืืืืืช ืืืืื ืช ืืืชืืื ืืืฆืืจื ืคืกืืืึพืืคืืืจืคืืช ืกืืจืชืืช" [ืขื' 666] ืืื ื ืกืื ืืจื ืืืืืืื ื. ืื ืืืื ื ืืจืื ืืืงืืคืช ืืงืืื ืืกืคืจืืืช ืืืืฉืื ืืืืฉ ืืืืืื, ืืืืจื ืืจื ืืื, ืืช ืืจื ืืืืืืื ื ืืฆืขืืื ืื ืืืจืื. ืืื ืคืขืื ืืืจืืื "ืื ืืืขืจื". ืืจื ืืืืืืื ื ืืื ืฆืืื ื ื ืืื ืืขืกืง ืจืืืช ืืฉืืืืช ืืืืชืืืช ืื ืืืขืืช ืื ืืฉื ืื. ืืืฉืชื, ืืืืฉืืช ืืืืืืชืืช, ืืืืชื ืคืืจืืืืืช ืืืื ืืืืืืช ืืจืขืืื ืืฆืืื ื - ืืืจ ืื ืืืจ ืื ืืชืฉืืืืชืื ืืืืืชืืืช ืืื ืืจื, ืืื ืืฉืืจ, ืืืกืืืจ ืืืืข ืืฆืืื ืืช ืืื ื ืขืืืืช ืืกืชืืจื ืืฉืืืฉ ืืฉืืืขืืช. ืืืืืื: ืืกืคืจื ืฉื"ืช "ืื ืืืืื" ืืื ืชืืื ื ืืจืฆืืช ืืขืืืื ืขืืจืืช ืืืขืืคื ืฉื ืืืืืื, ืืืื ืืืืืื ืืืืื ืืื, ืืขืช ืจืืืฉืช ืืืฆืจืื ืื ืืื ืืื, ืืคืืื ืืฉืืืืจื ืืงืจ ืืืชืจ. ืืื ืื, ืืชืฉืืื ืืืจืช ืืื ืืืกืจ ืืกืคืง ืืื ื ืฉืง ืืื-ืืืืืื ืืืืืืื ืืืจืฅ ืืฉืจืื[ืืจืืฉื ืืืืจื]. ืืื ืืืงืจ ืืืจืืคืืช, ืืชืฉืืื ืืกืคืจ "ืื ืืืืื" ืฉืืฆื ื-1931, ืืช ืืื ืืื ืืจืื ืืช "ืืืืจืืช ืืงืืืืื ืืืืืจื ื", ืืืืืืื ืืืืจ ืืืืจืขืืช ืชืจืค"ื, ืฉืื ืขืืืื ืืชื ืืืืช ืืงืืืืืช ืืคืืืจืืืื ืืืื ืืืชืื ืฉืืื ื ืืฆืืืช ืืื ืงืืืืืช ืืืฉืจืื: ืืืืื ืฉืจืืืชื ื"ื ืฉืจืืื ืื ืืืืืื ืจืื ืื ื ืืืืจืืช ืืงืืืืื ืืืืืจื ื ืื ืืขื ืืืืขื ืืช ืื ื ืขืื ื ืืืืื ืืคืฉืื ืืืฉืื ืฉืื ืืื ืฉืื ื ืืืืืช ืืื ืืื, ืืกืืจ ืื ื ืืืจืื ืจืืฉ ืื ืื ืืฆืืื ืขืืื ื ืืืคืืฃ ืืช ืขืฆืื ื ืืื ืขืจืืฅ ืืืืฉื ืืืชืช ืืืืื ื ืืืืื ืืืืืื ื ืืืืจืืื, ืืืื ืืืชืจ ืื ืืฉืจืื ืืืืื ืื ื ืืืจ ืืืคื ืื ืืช' ืืชืช ืืืฉืกื ืืขืงื ืืืฉืจืื ืืืืืืื, ืืืฉืื ืืืขืชื ืฉืืืื ืืืจืช ืืืืืช ืืฉืขืืื ืืืืืืช, ืืขืืืืช ืืืฉืคืืืช, ืืฉืืื ืืืื ืงืืืฉ ื' ืฉื ืืืจื ืืื ืืขืืืจ ืืื' ืืืืชืจ ืขื ืืื ืืืืฉ ืืืืืื ืืืืืกืจ ืืขืืื' ืืืฉืืืื ืืจื ืืื ืฆืจื ืืฉืจืื ืืฃ ืืฉืืฉ ืืคืฉืจืืช ืืืชืืฆื ื ืืื ืืืืฉืื ืืื ืืจืขืชื, ืืืื ืืืื ื ืืื ืืกืชืคืื ื ืฉืืืืืืช ืืืืื, ืืจืื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืื ื ืคืฉืืช ืืืื ืงืืืืช ืืืฉืจืื, ืฉืืื ืืคืขืืื ืจืืืช ืืืืืื ืืืฆืื ืืช ืขืฆืื ืืืจืืื ืืืืืื, ืืืื ืืืืืืื ืืจืื ื ืืืืจ ืืืจื ืืื ืฉืืืืืื ืื ืืขืืื ืขื ื ืคืฉื ื ืื ืืงืืื ืขืืืื ืืืืื ืืื ืืืืจืื ืืฉืื ืืืืจืื, ืืื ืื ืื ืขืฉื ืื ืื ืืฆืืืงื ืขืืืื ืืช ืืืื ืืืกืจื ืขืฆืื ืืฆืื ืืืื ืืืื. ืืจื ืืืืืืื ื ืชืื ืืืงืืช "ืืืช ืืฉืคื ืืืืชื ืืืื" ืืืจืืฉืืื ืฉืืืื, ืืืืืืฆืจ ืืชื ืืื ืืืชืืืืื, ืืืฆืข ืืช ืืืืืฉ ืืกืืืื. ืกืคืจืื ืืืืืืื ื ืืื ืืืืจื ืฉื ืกืคืจืื ืชืืจื ืืื, ืืืงืจืื ืืชืฉืืืืช ืืืืื. ืื ืืกืฃ, ืขืกืง ืืืืฆืื ืืืืจ ืฉื ืืงืืจืืช ืืืชืืืช ืืืกืืืจืื (ืืขืืงืจ ืขื ืืืืืช ืืจืืงื, ืืจืื"ื ืืืจืฅ ืืฉืจืื). ืืื ืืคืจืก ืืจื ืงืืง ืืฉื ืื ื'ืชืฉื"ื-ื'ืชืฉื"ื. ืืงืจืืื ื ืืกืคืช ืงืืฉืืจืื ืืืฆืื ืืื ืืขืจืืช ืฉืืืืื |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ืืจื_ืืจืืคืืื] | [TOKENS: 3336] |
ืชืืื ืขื ืืื ืื ืืจื ืืจืืคืืื ืึธืจึทื ืึทืจึฐืึทืคึฐืึดืื (ื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืฉืื ืืืช: ืืึนืจึทื, Zorach; ืฉื ืืฉืคืืชื ืืืชืื ืืืื: ืฐืึทืจืืึทืคึฟืืืง; ื' ืืฉืื ื'ืชืจืก"ื, 2 ืืคืืจืืืจ 1906 โ ื' ืืชืฉืจื ื'ืชืฉืก"ื, 26 ืืกืคืืืืจ 2002) ืืื ืืืจ ืืื ืกืช ืืฉืจ ืืืืฉืืช ืืฉืจืื, ืืจืืฉื ืืคืืขื ืืืืจืื ืืืืคื"ื. ืืืืชืื ืืืืืช ืืขืฆืืืืช. ืงืืจืืช ืืืื ืืจืืคืืื ื ืืื ืืืืืงืืืืกืง, ืื ืืชืืื ืืืืฉื ืืืืืื ืฉื ืืืืืคืจืื ืืจืืกืืช (ืืืื ืืืืืจืืก). ืืืื, ืืจื ืืจืืื ืืจืืคืืื ืืืืจ ืกืคืจื ืืืื (ืืืื ืคืจืก ืืจื ืงืืง ืืกืคืจืืช ืชืืจื ืืช). ืขืื ืื ืขืืจืื ืืื ืืจืืคืืื ืืืฉ ืชื ืืขืช 'ืืืืจืื'. ืจืืฉ ืืฉืืื ืชืืจื ืืช ืืืืืืช. ืืช ืืฉืืืชื ืืืฉืคืืืช ืจืืฉ ืืืื ืืืจืกืืืช ืืจืฉื. ืืืืจืฉื ื ืฉื ืืืฉื ืืช ื ืขืื ืืืืช ืงืืืื. ืืื ืคืขืื ืืชื ืืขืช ืืืืจืื ืืืืจืฉื ืืืฉืชืชืฃ ืืืืื ื ืื ืืืืืช ืืขืืืื ืื ืื ืจืืืคืืช ืื ืืฆืื ืืช ืืืืื ืืจืื ืื ืืืคืขืืืืช ืืืขื ืืงืจื ืืงืืืืช. ืืืื ืืกืื ืื"ืจ ืืืฉืจื ืืืจืฆืืฉืจืืื ืืืืจืฉื ืืื ืืฉื ืื 1936โ1939, ืืืฆืืจ ืืงืื ืืจืกืื ืืฆืืื ืืื ื-17 ืขื ื-21. ืืคืจืืฅ ืืืืืช ืืขืืื ืืฉื ืืื ื ืืื ืขื ืืฉืคืืชื ืืืืื, ืืฉื ืกืืืข ืืืื ืขื ื ืชื ืืืืืืืจื ืืืจืืืช ืืืคื ืคืืืืื ืืืืืื ืืคืืืื ืืืืืื ืืืคื, ืชืื ืฉืืชืืฃ ืคืขืืื ืคืืจื ืขื ืืงืื ืกืื ืืืคื ื ืืืืื, (ืฉืฉื ืื ืืืืจ ืืืืืช ืืขืืื ืืฉื ืืื, ืืืืจ ืืชืืจ ืืกืื ืืืืืช ืืขืืื) ืฆ'ืืืื ื ืกืืืืืืจื, ืืื ืขื ืืกืื ืืืืืช ืืขืืื ืืื ืืืืืจืื ืืืง, ืืงืื ืกืื ืืืืื ืื ืืงืืื ื. ืืืืืื ืฉืื ืข ืืช ืชืืืืื ืืฉืืืืช ืืืจ ืืกืืืืืงื ืืฆืืช ืืืืจืืคื ืืืืืืข ืืจื ืืคื ืืืจืฅ ืืฉืจืื ืืืืจืฆืืช ืืืจืืช. ืืื ืืืืข ืืืืืืืืืกืืืง ืืืฉื ืืืคื. ืืืคื ืืื ืืื ืคืขืื ืืจืืื ืืืืื ืืคืืืืื ืืืืืืื. ืืืื ื 1941 ืืืืข ืืืคื ืืืื ืืื ืขื ืืฉืคืืชื ืืืื ืงืืืจ ืฉืืงื ืื. ืืื ืกืื ื ืฉืื ืืคืืขื ืืืืจืื ืืืืจ ืืืืขื ืืคืืขื ืฉื ืืงืื ืืจืก ืืืืืื ืืขืืืื. ืฉืืืฉ ืื"ืจ ืืืืขื ืืืฆืืช ืืืืื ืคืืืื. ืืืืืืกื 1945 ืืฉืชืชืฃ ืืืื ืืก ืืฆืืื ื ืืขืืืื ืืืื ืืื, ืืืืืจ ืืืืขืืช ืืขืืืื ืืืงืฉ ืืืฉืืื ืืช ืืืกืคืจ "ืืื ืืืฃ" ืืืจืืฉืช ืืขืืืื, ืืื ืืื ืืข ืืช ืืจืืฉื ืฉืฆืืื ืื ืืกืชืคืงื ืืืืฉืืจ ืขืืืื ืฉื ืืื ืืืฃ ืขืืืื. ืืืืจ ืืืื ืืก ืืืงืจ ืืฆืจืคืช ืืฆื ืคืืืื ืืฉืืื ืืฆืจืคืช, ืืจืื ืื ืืืืกืืจืื. ืืคืืจืืืจ 1946 ืืื ืืืงืจ ืืฉืืืืื ืืืคืืืื ืืืขื ืืงืื ืืจืก ืืืืืื ืืขืืืื. ืืืืงืืืืจ 1945 ืฆืืจืฃ ืืืจืื ืืขืืืื ืฉื ืืืืจืื. ืืกืืฃ 1946 ืืฉืชืชืฃ ืืงืื ืืจืก ืืฆืืื ื ืืืื ืืืืืจ ืืื, ืืื ืืืจ 1947 ืืืืข ืืืจืฅ ืืฉืจืื, ืืฉืชืื ืืชืคืงืืื ืืคืชื ืืืคืืืชื ืืืื ื ืฆืื ืืคืืขื ืืืืจืื ืืืืขื ืืืืืื, ืฉื ืืืกื ืืช ืืืืืงื ืืืืง ืืืฉืคื. ืืื ืฉื ืืืจืฆืืช ืืืจืืช ืืืืื ืืช ืืฉืคืืชื, ืืืกืคืืืืจ 1947 ืขืื ืืืจืฅ ืืฉืจืื. ืืื ืืื ืื ืกืื ืืืืงื ืฉื ืืืขืฆืช ืืืืื ื ืืืื ืืช,[ืืจืืฉ ืืงืืจ] ืฉืืึผ ืืื ืืืจ, ืืืื ืืืืชืืื ืขื ืืืืืช ืืขืฆืืืืช. ืืืื ืืืืจ ืืื ืกืช ืื ืืื ืกืช ืืจืืฉืื ื ืืขื ืืื ืกืช ืืชืฉืืขืืช (ืืื ืกืช ืืชืฉืืขืืช ืืื ืืงื ืืืจื ืืื ืกืช). ืืืื ืืืืจ ืืืืฉืืืช ื-10 ืขื ื-15 (1961โ1974) ืืฉืจ ืืืชืืช, ืืฉืจื ืฉืืืชื ืืืืจ ืืืืื ืชื ืื ืืกืื ืฉืจ (1953โ1954, 1956โ1958). ืื ืืกืฃ, ืฉืืืฉ ืืจืืคืืื ืื"ืจ ืืขืืช ืืืืงื, ืืืง ืืืฉืคื (ืืื ืกืช ืืจืืืขืืช ืืืื ืกืช ืืฉืืื ืืช), ืืืืื ืื ืืืืขืืช ืืืืฅ ืืืืืืืื. ืืชืืงืฃ ืชืคืงืืืื ืืกืื ืฉืจ ืืชืืช ืืืืืจ ืืื ืืื ืืชืจื ืืืงืืช ืืืกืืืช ืจืืื, ืืืื ืืฉืืืช ืื ื ืขืงืืื ื ืชืื ืืืืจ. ืืจืืคืืื, ืืขื ืชืืืจ ืืืงืืืจ ืืืฉืคืืื ืืืขื ืืืื ืืืจืกืืื ืืขืืจืืช, ืืื ืืจืฆื ืืืฉืคื ืขืืจื ืืคืงืืืื ืืืฉืคืืื ืฉื ืืืื ืืืจืกืืื ืืื ืืฉื ืื 1948โ1963. ืืงืื ืื ืืื ืืช ืืืืื ืืืงืจ ืืืฉืคื ืืขืืจื ืืืฉืจื ืืืฉืคืืื. ืืืืืกืื ืืื ืืืจืกืืืช ืืจ-ืืืื ืืื"ืจ ืืืืขื ืืื ืื ืฉื ืืืื ืืืจืกืืื. ืืฉื ืช ืชืฉื"ื (1983) ืืื ืืจืืคืืื ืืคืจืก ืืฉืจืื ืขื ืชืจืืื ืืืืืืช ืืืืจื ืืืืืื ื ืืงืืืื ืืืฉืคื ืืขืืจื. ืืฉื ืช ืชืฉื"ื (1986) ืืื ืืคืจืก ืืจื ืงืืง ืืกืคืจืืช ืชืืจื ืืช. ืืืืชื ืืฉื ื ื ืื ื ืขื ืืืืืงื ืืืฉืืืืช ืืคืชืืืช ืืืืืืช ืืื ืืขืฆืืืืช. ืืฉื ืช 1989 ืืืขื ืง ืื ืืชืืืจ "ืืงืืจ ืืจืืฉืืื". ืืฉื ืช 1998 ืืชืคืจืกื ืกืคืจ ืืืืจืื ืืชืื "ืืืืฉืื ืฉื ื ืืฉื ื". ืืื ืืขืืืื ืืฉื ืช 2002, ืืฉืืื ืื 96 . ืืฉื ืช 2010 ื ืงืจื ืจืืื ืขื ืฉืื ืืฉืืื ืช ืืจ ืืืื (ืืืืช ืฉืืืื) ืืืจืืฉืืื. ืืืืื: ืืจื ื"ืจ ืืืชืืจ ืืจืืคืืื, ืืจื ืืขืงื ืืจืืคืืื, ื"ืจ ืขืื ืืื ืืจืืคืืื ืืืฉืืคืืช (ืืืืืืก) ื ืืื ืืืืื. ืืกืคืจืื ืืจื ืืจืืคืืื ืคืจืกื ืกืคืจืื ืจืืื ืื ืืฉืืื ืืฉืคืืืื, ืชืืจื ืืื ืืืืกืืืจืืื. ืืื ืืื: ืืงืจืืื ื ืืกืคืช ืจืื ืื ืงืืฉืืจืื ืืืฆืื ืืื ืืขืจืืช ืฉืืืืื |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Laotian_parliamentary_election] | [TOKENS: 297] |
Contents 2026 Laotian parliamentary election Parliamentary elections are scheduled to be held in Laos on 22 February 2026. Elections are held in a closed autocratic system and are not considered free or fair. Background Laos is a one-party state ruled by the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), the sole legal political party in the country. There is no organized opposition or independent civil society able to challenge the party's authority, and independent monitoring of elections is not permitted. In the previous election held in 2021, the LPRP won 158 of the 164 seats in the National Assembly, with the remaining six seats filled by independent candidates vetted by the party. Ahead of the 2026 election, the size of the legislature was expanded to 175 seats. Electoral system The 149 members of the National Assembly are elected for five-year terms from 18 multi-member constituencies with between five and nineteen seats using the multiple non-transferable vote system. Candidates need to gain the support of a local authority or a mass organisation to run for office. In each constituency, voters vote for a list with as many candidates as there are seats to be filled, and the list with the most votes winning all of its seats. The seat distribution dependent on population; each province has a minimum of five seats, with one additional seat for every 50,000 inhabitants starting at 250,000 inhabitants, up to a maximum of 19 seats. References |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%9326_UEFA_Champions_League] | [TOKENS: 1843] |
Contents 2025โ26 UEFA Champions League The 2025โ26 UEFA Champions League is the 71st season of Europe's premier club football tournament organised by UEFA, and the 34th season since it was rebranded from the European Cup to the UEFA Champions League. Paris Saint-Germain are the defending champions, having secured their maiden title the previous season. The final will be played on 30 May 2026 at Puskรกs Arรฉna in Budapest, Hungary. It will be the first time Puskรกs Arรฉna will host a Champions League final. The stadium previously hosted the 2020 UEFA Super Cup, several matches of UEFA Euro 2020, and the 2023 UEFA Europa League final. The winners of the 2025โ26 UEFA Champions League will automatically qualify for the 2026โ27 UEFA Champions League league phase, the 2026 FIFA Intercontinental Cup final, the 2029 FIFA Club World Cup group stage, and earn the right to play against the winners of the 2025โ26 UEFA Europa League in the 2026 UEFA Super Cup. This is the first Champions League season to feature six clubs from one nation, with England earning an extra spot through UEFA coefficient ranking and Tottenham Hotspur having won the previous season's UEFA Europa League. Association team allocation A total of 82 teams from 53 of the 55 UEFA member associations are set to participate in the 2025โ26 UEFA Champions League (the exceptions being Liechtenstein which does not organise a domestic league and Russia which is currently suspended). The association ranking based on the UEFA association coefficients is used to determine the number of participating teams for each association: For the 2025โ26 UEFA Champions League, the associations are allocated places according to their 2024 UEFA association coefficients, which takes into account their performance in European competitions from 2019โ20 to 2023โ24. The table reflects Russia's ongoing suspension from UEFA. Apart from the allocation based on the association coefficients, associations may have additional teams participating in the Champions League, as noted below: The information here reflects the ongoing suspension of Russia in European football, and so the following changes to the default access list have been made: As the Champions League title holders (Paris Saint-Germain) qualified via their domestic league's standard berth allocation, the following changes to the default access list have been made: The labels in the parentheses show how each team qualified for the place of its starting round: The label of European Performance Spots and title holders already qualified via league position are superscripted. The second qualifying round, third qualifying round and play-off round are divided into Champions Path (CH) and League Path (LP). Schedule The schedule of the competition is as follows. One "exclusive week" was held in which Thursday was also a matchday. All matches in other weeks will be played on Tuesdays and Wednesdays apart from Matchday 8 (Wednesday only) and the final. Qualifying rounds The draw for the first qualifying round was held on 17 June 2025. The first legs were played on 8 and 9 July, and the second legs were played on 15 and 16 July 2025. The winners of the ties advanced to the Champions Path second qualifying round. Twelve of the losing teams were transferred to the Conference League Champions Path second qualifying round, and the other two losing teams (selected via a draw) were transferred to the Conference League Champions Path third qualifying round. The draw for the second qualifying round was held on 18 June 2025. The first legs were played on 22 and 23 July, and the second legs were played on 29 and 30 July 2025. The winners of the ties advanced to the third qualifying round. The losers were transferred to the Europa League third qualifying round. The draw for the third qualifying round was held on 21 July 2025. The first legs were played on 5 and 6 August, and the second legs were played on 12 August 2025. The winners of the ties advanced to the play-off round. The losers of the Champions Path were transferred to the Europa League play-off round. The losers of the League Path were transferred to the Europa League league phase. Play-off round The draw for the play-off round was held on 4 August 2025. The first legs were played on 19 and 20 August, and the second legs were played on 26 and 27 August 2025. The winners of the ties advanced to the league phase. The losers were transferred to the Europa League league phase. League phase The league phase draw for the 2025โ26 UEFA Champions League took place at the Grimaldi Forum in Monaco on 28 August 2025. The 36 teams were divided into four pots of nine teams each based on their UEFA club coefficient, except for the Champions League title holders, who were automatically placed as the top seed in pot 1. The 36 teams were manually drawn and then automated software drew their eight different opponents at random, determining which of their matches were at home and which ones away. Each team faced two opponents from each of the four pots, one at home and one away. Teams could not face opponents from their own association, and could only be drawn against a maximum of two sides from the same association. Bodรธ/Glimt, Kairat, Pafos and Union Saint-Gilloise made their debut appearances in the league phase/group stage. Kairat, based in Almaty, became the easternmost team to ever qualify for the Champions League proper, and, after being drawn to play away against Sporting CP, broke the record for the longest trip in UEFA competitions, travelling 4,294 miles (6,911 km) from Almaty to Lisbon. In addition, Bodรธ/Glimt, based in Bodรธ within the Arctic Circle, became the northernmost European team to ever compete in the Champions League. This marked the first time a Norwegian team participated in the competition proper since the 2007โ08 season, and was also the first season since 2005โ06 in which no Ukrainian sides qualified for the group stage/league phase. A total of 16 national associations were represented in the league phase. The final matchday on 28 January saw significant movement in the table; Real Madrid fell to 9th place following a 4โ2 defeat to Benfica, while Sporting CP secured a direct Round of 16 berth with a late stoppage-time winner against Athletic Bilbao. The top eight ranked teams advanced to the round of 16. The teams ranked from 9th to 24th will compete in the knockout phase play-offs, with the teams ranked from 9th to 16th seeded for the draw. Teams ranked from 25th to 36th were eliminated from all competitions. Knockout phase In the knockout phase, teams will play against each other over two legs on a home-and-away basis, except for the one-match final. The top eight teams from the final standings in the league phase entered at the round of 16. In the knockout phase, there is no country protection, with teams from the same association able to face each other in any round. Teams can also face opponents they played during the league phase. The mechanism of the draws for each round is as follows: In the quarter-finals and semi-finals, the exact match pairings and order of legs were predetermined based on the tournament bracket. The higher-seeded teams, assuming they advance, will play the second leg of each round at home. Should a seeded team be beaten, the team that eliminates them will assume their seeding position. The winner of semi-final 1 will be designated as the "home" team for the final (for administrative purposes as it is played at a neutral venue). The draw for the knockout phase play-offs was held on 30 January 2026, 12:00 CET. The first legs were played on 17 and 18 February, and the second legs will be played on 24 and 25 February 2026. The draw for the round of 16 will be held on 27 February 2026. The first legs will be played on 10 and 11 March, and the second legs will be played on 17 and 18 March 2026. The first legs will be played on 7 and 8 April, and the second legs will be played on 14 and 15 April 2026. The first legs will be played on 28 and 29 April, and the second legs will be played on 5 and 6 May 2026. The final will be played on 30 May 2026 at the Puskรกs Arรฉna in Budapest. The winner of semi-final 1 was designated as the "home" team for administrative purposes. Statistics Statistics exclude qualifying rounds and play-off round. Table correct as of 18 February 2026. See also References External links |
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Contents 2025โ26 UEFA Women's Champions League The 2025โ26 UEFA Women's Champions League is the 25th edition of the European women's club football championship organised by UEFA, and the 17th edition since being rebranded as the UEFA Women's Champions League. It started on 30 July 2025 and will end with the final on 23 May 2026. This is the first season under a new format, which have 18 participating teams, playing six games each against different opponents in a league phase, all in a joint group. The Ullevaal Stadion in Oslo will host the final. The winners will automatically qualify for the 2026โ27 UEFA Women's Champions League league phase, the 2027 FIFA Women's Champions Cup semi-finals and the 2028 FIFA Women's Club World Cup. Video Assistant Referee (VAR) will be used from the League Phase onwards. Association team allocation The association ranking based on the UEFA women's country coefficients is used to determine the number of participating teams for each association: An association must have an eleven-a-side women's domestic league to enter a team. As of 2019โ20, 52 of the 55 UEFA member associations organize a women's domestic league, with the exceptions being Andorra (1 club in Spain), Liechtenstein (3 clubs in Switzerland) and San Marino (1 club in Italy). For the 2025โ26 UEFA Women's Champions League, the associations are allocated places according to their 2024 UEFA women's Association coefficients, which takes into account their performance in European competitions from 2019โ20 to 2023โ24. Apart from the allocation based on the association coefficients, associations may have additional teams participating in the Champions League, as noted below: Due to the suspension of Russia, the following changes to the access list were made: As the Champions League title holders (Arsenal) qualified for the third qualifying round via their domestic league's standard berth allocation, the following changes to the default access list have been made: Since this season marks the inaugural edition of the UEFA Women's Europa Cup, with no title holders from previous season, the following changes to the default access list have been made: The labels in the parentheses show how each team qualified for the place of its starting round: Two qualifying rounds, round 2 and round 3, are divided into Champions Path (CH) and League Path (LP). Notes Schedule The schedule of the competition is as follows. Qualifying rounds Hosted by Racing Union. Hosted by Spartak Myjava. Hosted by Ljuboten. Hosted in a neutral venue. Hosted by Athlone Town. Hosted by Mitrovica. Hosted by Mura. Hosted by Apollon Ladies. Hosted by OH Leuven. Hosted by Vllaznia. Hosted by Gintra. Hosted by Twente. Hosted by HJK. Hosted by Hammarby. Hosted by Sparta Prague. Hosted by Inter Milan. Hosted by Austria Wien. The first legs were played on 11 September, and the second legs were played on 18 September 2025. The winners of the ties advanced to the league phase. League phase The league phase draw for the 2025โ26 UEFA Women's Champions League took place on 19 September 2025. The 18 teams were divided into three pots of six teams. Each team faced two opponents from each of the three pots, one at home and one away. Sweden's Damallsvenskan, despite being one of the strongest leagues in the world, was without any Champions League teams this season for the first time in history, after BK Hรคcken, Hammarby IF and FC Rosengรฅrd were knocked out and sent to the Europa Cup. The top four ranked teams advanced to the quarter-finals. The teams ranked from 5th to 12th will contest the knockout phase play-offs, with the teams ranked from 5th to 8th seeded for the draw. Teams ranked from 13th to 18th were eliminated from all competitions. Knockout phase The draw for the knockout phase play-offs was held on 18 December 2025, 13:00 CET. The first legs were played on 11 and 12 February, and the second legs on 18 and 19 February 2026. The draw for the quarter-finals was held on 18 December 2025 (after the knockout phase play-offs draw). The first legs will be played on 24 and 25 March, and the second legs on 1 and 2 April 2026. Teams seeded one and two will play the second leg at home if they progress to this stage. If a seeded team is beaten, the team that eliminates them takes over their seeding position. The first legs will be played on 25 and 26 April, and the second legs on 2 and 3 May 2026. The final will be play on 23 May 2026 at the Ullevaal Stadion in Oslo. The winner of semi-final 1 will be designated as the "home" team for administrative purposes. Statistics Statistics exclude qualifying rounds and play-off round. See also References External links |
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Contents Elections in Bangladesh Bangladesh elects on national level a legislature with one house or chamber. The unicameral Jatiya Sangsad, meaning national parliament, has 350 members of which 300 members are directly elected through a national election for a five-year term in single-seat constituencies while 50 memberships are reserved for the women who are selected by the ruling party or coalition. The Prime Minister is the head of the government. The president is the head of the state and is elected by the National Parliament. The president of Bangladesh is a ceremonial post and does not exercise any control over the running of the state. Prior to the 2024 Bangladesh constitutional crisis, the country had a two-party system that had evolved over time since the election of 1991. Two political parties or coalitions dominated, one headed by Bangladesh Awami League and the other by Bangladesh Nationalist Party, making it difficult for anybody to achieve electoral success under the banner of any other party. However, the Jatiya Party (Ershad) has enjoyed electoral success over the years, winning several local and mayoral elections and becoming the primary opposition party following the boycott by of the 2014 Bangladeshi general election by BNP. Historical overview The constitution was adopted in 1972 and declared Bangladesh as a parliamentary republic. However, in 1975 executive powers were transferred to the Presidency, reducing the Jatiya Sangsad and the Prime Minister to legislative powers only. This system was maintained until 1991 when the Twelfth Amendment was passed, returning the state to a parliamentary system. Since 1971, 11 parliamentary elections have been held and three Presidential elections have been held by popular vote. Parliamentary elections The Parliament of Bangladesh (Jatiya Sangsad) consists of 350 members elected to five-year terms. Of that number, 300 are elected in single-member territorial constituencies according to the first-past-the-post electoral system. The remaining 50 seats are reserved for women, and are filled on the basis of proportional representation by a vote of the 300 members. The number of reserved seats has been revised over the years, increasing from 30 to 45 under the 8th parliament and 45 to 50 under the 9th parliament. Since independence in 1971, 11 general elections have been held in Bangladesh to elect members of the Jatiya Sangsad: 1970 Pakistani general election The 1970 Pakistani National Assembly election was held on 7 December 1970. The government claimed a high level of public participation and a voter turnout of almost 63%. The total number of registered voters in the country was 56,941,500 of which 31,211,220 were from East Pakistan and 25,730,280 were from West Pakistan. 1970 East Pakistan Provincial Assembly election The 1970 East Pakistan Provincial Assembly election was held on 17 December 1970. The percentage of casting votes was (57.69%), and the number of reserved women seat was 10. The All-Pakistan Awami League won a landslide victory of 288 seats. After claiming all ten seats reserved for women, it held 298 seats. The 1973 general election was held on 7 March 1973. There were 15 seats reserved for women. The 1979 general election was held on 18 February 1979. There were 30 seats reserved for women. The 1986 general election was held on 7 May 1986. There were 30 seats reserved for women. The 1988 general election was held on 3 March 1988. There were 30 seats reserved for women. The 1991 general election was held on 13 January 1991. There were 30 seats reserved for women. Following boycotts by the main opposition party, the Bangladesh Awami League, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party won the uncontested February 1996 general election. However, amidst protests, they were made to cave in to Awami League's original demands, dissolve the parliament, and hold elections under a neutral caretaker government after the enactment of the 13th amendment. Bangladesh Awami League won the June 1996 general election for the first time since 1973 by forming a coalition government, since they fell 5 seats short of a majority. BNP won two-thirds majority in the parliament and won the 2001 general election. Bangladesh Awami League won two-thirds majority in the parliament and won the 2008 general election. In the 2014 general election the Awami League was declared victors in 127 of the 154 uncontested seats by default on 5 January 2014. Of the remaining uncontested seats, the Jatiya Party led by Rowshan Ershad won 20, the JSD won three, the Workers Party won two and the Jatiya Party (Manju) won one. As a result of violence and the opposition boycott voter turnout in Dhaka was 22%. Results of 139 seats out of 147 were released, with the Awami League winning 105, the Jatiya Party winning 13, the Workers Party winning four, the JSD winning two and the Tarikat Federation and BNF winning one each. The remaining 8 constituencies election were suspended due to violence and re-election to be held. The newly elected MPs were sworn in on 9 January. The 2018 general election held on 30 December 2018, voter turnout was 80%. Bangladesh Awami League under the leadership of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina won their 4th term as the ruling party with 302 seats. The Jatiya Party became the main opposition party with only 26 seats. The 2024 general election held on 7 January 2024, voter turnout was 40%. Bangladesh Awami League under the leadership of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina won their 5th term as the ruling party with 223 seats with two other parties (Jatiya Party and Trinomool BNP) securing 6 seats. Other than the political parties, Independents won a total of 63 seats. The BNP won a landslide victory in the election, securing 211 of the 299 published seats outright, while its allied parties secured 3 seats. The Jamaat-e-Islami came second, securing 68 seats, the highest ever number of seats in its history, while its allies secured 9 seats. Although BNP won, it still used a Vote buying tactic to secure the seats in the parliament. The success of the BNP has been attributed to the absence of AL in the election and party's familiarity and perceived experience among the voters, as well as voter's concern for the rise of right-wing politics, while Jamaat mostly won in the constituencies adjacent to western Indian borders, which has been attributed mainly to the anti-India sentiment in the area. Presidential elections In 1974, the president was elected by the National Assembly with only one candidate on the ballot, before a new constitution was adopted in 1975 for the president to be elected by popular vote. There were three such elections, in 1978, 1981 and 1986. After the constitutional reform in 1991, the President was elected by the parliament. Following constitutional reform and a return to a parliamentary democracy in 1991, the office of the President has been largely a ceremonial one. The President is elected by a vote in the Jatiya Sangsad. A Presidential term is for five-years, although they remain in office until their successor is elected. Elections under this system have taken place in 1991, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2009, 2013, 2018 and 2023. The 1978 Bangladeshi presidential elections were held on 3 June 1978. They were the first direct elections for the post President, as the post had previously been elected by the Jatiya Sangsad. The result was a victory for Ziaur Rahman, who won 76.6% of the vote. Turnout was 54.3%. The 1981 Bangladeshi presidential elections were held on 15 November 1981. The result was a victory for the incumbent acting President Abdus Sattar of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), who received 65.5% of the vote, beating his principal challenger Kamal Hossain of the Awami League. Voter turnout was 54.3%. The 1986 Bangladeshi presidential elections were held on 15 October 1986. The result was a victory for incumbent Hussain Muhammad Ershad, who had assumed the office in 1983 following a military coup. Ershad reportedly won 84.1% of the vote with a voter turnout of 54.9%. However the elections were controversial as they were boycotted by all major opposition candidates and there were reports of irregularities. See also Notes References External links |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ืืขืงื_ืืจืื] | [TOKENS: 2181] |
ืชืืื ืขื ืืื ืื ืืขืงื ืืจืื ืืขืงื ืืจืื (ื ืืื ื-18 ืื ืืืืืจ 1960) ืืื ืืืจ ืืื ืกืช ืืกืื ืืืฉื ืจืืฉ ืืื ืกืช ืืืขื ืืคืืืช ืฉ"ืก. ืืขืืจ ืืืื ืืฉืจ ืืจืืืื ืืืืืืืื ืืืืจืชื ืืืืฉืืช ืืฉืจืื ืืฉืืืฉืื ืืฉืืข, ืฉืจ ืืฉืืจืืชื ืืช ืืืืฉืืช ืืฉืจืื ืืฉืืืฉืื ืืฉืชืืื; ืื"ืจ ืืขืืช ืืืื ืื, ืืชืจืืืช ืืืกืคืืจื ืืื ืกืช ื-20, ืื"ืจ ืืขืืช ืืืืืื ืืื ืกืช ืึพ23, ืกืื ืืืฉื ืจืืฉ ืืื ืกืช ืืื"ืจ ืกืืขืช ืฉ"ืก. ืืืืืจืคืื ืืจืื ื ืืื ืืจืืื, ืืจืืงื ืืืืืจ ืืืืืก ืืจืื, ืืืฉ ืื 8 ืืืื ืืืืืืช. ืขืื ืืจืฆื ืืฉื ืช 1962 ืืืกืืจืช ืืืฆืข ืืืื, ืืืื ืืืืจ ืฉืืข. ืืช ืฉืืจืืชื ืืฆืืื ืขืฉื ืืืืื ืืงืฉืจ ืฉื ืคืืงืื ืืืจืื. ืืืืจ ืืฉืืจืืจ ืขืื ืชืงืืคื ืืกืืืืช ืืื ืง ืืืืื. ืืฉื ืช 1993 ืฆืืจืฃ ืืืคืืืช ืฉ"ืก ืขื ืืื ืืจืื ืืจืขื. ืืื ืืฉื ืื 1993โ2003 ืืืื ืืื"ืจ ืืืืขืฆื ืืืชืืช ืืืืจ ืฉืืข, ืืฉื ืช 2001 ืฉืืืฉ ืืื ื"ื ืชื ืืขืช ืฉ"ืก - ืขื ืืฉื ืช 2012 ืืื ืืืืืคื ืืชืคืงืื ืืืื ืืืืื. ื ืืืจ ืืฉื ืช 2003 ืืจืืฉืื ื ืืื ืกืช ื-16 ืืืขื ืกืืขืช ืฉ"ืก, ืืืืฉืื ืืืื ืืืขืื ืืืืจ ืื ืกืช ืื ืืื ืกืช ื-17, ืื ืฉืืืฉ ืื ืืื"ืจ ืืกืืขื. ืืืืื ืืืื ืชื ืืื ืกืช ืืื ืืจืื ืืกืคืจ ืืืงืื ืืืื: ืืืืืจืืช ืืื ืกืช ื-18 ืืืฆื ืืืงืื ืืฉืืฉื ืืจืฉืืืช ืฉ"ืก ืืื ืกืช, ื ืืืจ ืืื ืกืช ืืืื ื ืืชืคืงืื ืืฉืจ ืืฉืืจืืชื ืืช ืืืืฉืื ื-32. ืืฉืจ ืืฉืืจืืชื ืืช ืืชื ืื ืืจืื ืืฉืื ืื ืฉืื ืฉื ืืืง ืฆืขืจ ืืขืื ืืืื (ืืื ื ืขื ืืขืื ืืืื) ื"ืืืง ืืืืืืช ืืขืื ืืืืื". ืืื ืื ืืืืื ืคืขืืืืช ืฉื ืืื ืืืืืืงืช ืฉื ืืื ืื ืืืจื ืืจืืฉื ืืืขืฆืืช ืืชืืืช ืืืืฉืืืื ืฉืื ืื ืืืฉืจืื, ืชืื ื ืืฆืื ืชืงื ื ืืืฉื ืืืกืืืื ืืืชื ืืื ืืช ืื ืฉืื ืืืขืื ืืืงืจืื ืฉื ืืืืืงื ืืขืืช ืขื ืืจืื ืืืืขืฆื. ืืขืงืืืช ืงืืคืืื ืชืงืฉืืจืชื ืฉืืืคื ื ืื ืืื ืืืจืืื ืฆืืจ, ืคืขื ืืจืื ืืืฉืจ ืืชืงื ื ืืืืคืฉืจืช ืืื ืืื ืืืืจืฉื ืื ืืฉืืืื ืืื ืืงืื ืืืจืฅ. ืืืืืจืืช ืืื ืกืช ื-19 ืืืฆื ืฉืื ืืืงืื ืืฉืืืขื ืืจืฉืืืช ืฉ"ืก ืืื ืกืช ืื ืืืจ ืืื ืกืช ืืืขืื. ืืคืืจืืืจ 2016 ืืืงืจ ืืจืื ืืืฆื ืืื ืงืจืื ืืืืจื ืืงืืืื ืืืืืืืช. ืืืงืืจื ืืืฆื ืืชืงืฉืืจืช ืืจืืกืืช ืืืืจื ืืฉืจืืืืช ืืืืืืฉ ืืจืืกื, ืืื ืืจื ืืืฉืืจ ืืืืกื ืืืงืจืืื ืโืืฉืจืื, ืื ืคืชืื ื ืืื ืืงืืจื ืคืืืืืช ืืืืงืจืืื ื. ืขื ืืงืืช ืืืฉืืช ืืฉืจืื ื-35 ืืื ื ืืขืืื ืืจืืฉ ืืขืืช ืืืืืื. ื-25 ืืื ืืืจ 2022 ืืื ื ืืจืื ืืื"ืจ ืกืืขืชื ืืื ืกืช, ืขื ืืชืคืืจืืชื ืฉื ืืื"ืจ ืืืืฆื - ืืจืื ืืจืขื. ืืืืืจืืช ืืื ืกืช ืืขืฉืจืื ืืืืฉ ืืืฆื ืืืงืื ื-2 ืืจืฉืืืช ืฉ"ืก ืืื ืกืช. ืขื ืืฉืืขืช ืืืฉืืช ืืฉืจืื ืืฉืืืฉืื ืืฉืืข ื-29 ืืืฆืืืจ 2022 ืืื ื ืืฉืจ ืืจืืืื ืืืืืืืื ืืืืจืชื ืืืชืคืืจ ืืืกืืจืช ืืืืง ืื ืืจืืืื. ื-17 ืืืืื 2025 ืืชืคืืจ ืืชืคืงืืื ืืฉืจ ืืจืืืื ืืืืืืืื ืืืืจืชื, ืืืืง ืืืืืืช ืืคืืืชื ืืคืจืืฉ ืืืืืฉืื ืขืงื ืืฉืืจ "ืืืง ืืืืืก". ืื-4 ืืืืืืกื 2025 ืืชืื ื ืืกืื ืืืฉื ืจืืฉ ืืื ืกืช ืืืงืื ืืจื ืืืื ืฉืืฆื ืืืื ืกืช ืืืกืืจืช ืืืืง ืื ืืจืืืื ืื ืืืื ืคืจืืฉื ืฉื ืฉืจื ืฉ"ืก ืืืืืฉืื. ืืืื ืืืฉืืื ืืจืื ืืชืืืจืจ ืืืืฉืื ืฉืื ืฆืื. ื ืฉืื ืืฉืืฉื ื ืืื ืืฉื ื ืืืืื. ืงืืฉืืจืื ืืืฆืื ืืื ืืขืจืืช ืฉืืืืื |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ืืืืื_ืกืืืกื] | [TOKENS: 936] |
ืชืืื ืขื ืืื ืื ืืืืื ืกืืืกื ืืืืื ืกืืืกื (ื ืืื ื-1 ืืื ืืืจ 1956) ืืื ืืฉืขืืจ ืืืจ ืืื ืกืช ืืฉืจ ืืืืฉืืืช ืืฉืจืื ืืืขื ืืคืืืช ืฉ"ืก. ืืืืืจืคืื ืกืืืกื ื ืืื ืืืืกืฃ ืืจืื ืืงืืืื ืงื ืฉืืืจืืงื ืืืฉื ืช ืืืืชื ืขืื ืืืฉืจืื. ืืื ืืื ืืืฉืืืช ืื ื ืขืงืืื ืคืจืื ืืืจืื ืืงืจืืืช ืฉืืืื. ืืื ืจื ืฆืืื ืืฉืืจืช ืืฆื"ื ืืืจืืช ืจื-ืกืจื. ืืช ืืจืื ืืคืืืืืืช ืืชืืื ืืืืขืฆื ืฉื ืฉืจ ืืคื ืื ืืจื ืืฆืืง ืืืื ืคืจืฅ. ื-4 ืืื ืืืจ 1987 ืืื ื ืืืชื ืคืจืฅ ืืืืจืื ืืืื ืืจืืฉืืื ืืืฉืจื ืืคื ืื. ืืืื ืืืืจ ืืื ืกืช ืืื ืกืช ื-15 ืืืขื ืืคืืืช ืฉ"ืก, ืืืื ืืฉืจ ืืคื ืื ืืืืฉืื ื-27 (ืืฃ ืขื ืคื ืฉืื ืืื ืืืจ ืื ืกืช ืืืืฉืื ืื), ืืืืืง ืืชืงืืคืช ืืืื ืชื ืื ืืฉืจ ืืืชืืช, ืืืืฉืื ื-28 ืืืื ืืฉืจ ืืชืฉืชืืืช ืืืืืืืืช ืืืืืฉืื ื-29 ืืฉืจ ืืขื ืืื ื ืืจืืฉืืื ืืืืืจ ืืงืืื ื ืืืืื ื-ืืืืืื ื. ืืื ืืจืืฉื ืชืืืื ืืจืื ืืจืขื ืืืื ืืื ืืืืืจื "ืืื ื ืืจืขื", ืืืฉืจ ืืฉื ืืจืขื ืืืืกืจ. ืขืงื ืื ืื ืฉืืืฅ ืืจืฉืืืช ืฉ"ืก ืืื ืกืช ื-16. ืืืื ืืืฉืืื ืืืืชื ืกืืคืื ื ืฉืืื ืืจืืฉืื ืืฆืืื ืืจื ืืื ืืืกืฃ, ืืื ื ืฉื ืืจื ืขืืืืื ืืืกืฃ. ืืชืืืจืจ ืืฉืืื ืช ืืจ ื ืืฃ ืืืจืืฉืืื ืื ืฉืื ืืืืืื ืืืืช ืขื ืื. ืืืื ืืืื ืชืืจื ืืืืื "ืืืื ืืขืช" ืฉืืจืืฉืืช ืืืกื, ืืจื ืืื ืืืกืฃ. ืงืืฉืืจืื ืืืฆืื ืืื ืืขืจืืช ืฉืืืืื |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_PGA_Tour] | [TOKENS: 202] |
Contents 2026 PGA Tour The 2026 PGA Tour is the 111th season of the PGA Tour, the main professional golf tour in the United States. It is also the 58th season since separating from the PGA of America, and the 20th edition of the FedEx Cup. Changes for 2026 The season will see the introduction of a new signature event, the Cadillac Championship. The Mexico Open was moved to the FedExCup Fall. On October 22, 2025, the PGA Tour announced that The Sentry would be canceled as a result of course issues at the Kapalua Resort. Tournament winners in 2025 who did not finish inside the top 50 of the FedEx Cup would be eligible to play in the RBC Heritage instead. Schedule The following table lists official events during the 2026 season. The following events are sanctioned by the PGA Tour, but do not carry FedEx Cup points or official money, nor are wins official. See also Notes References External links |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%9326_Premier_League] | [TOKENS: 1130] |
Contents 2025โ26 Premier League The 2025โ26 Premier League is the 34th season of the Premier League and the 127th season of top-flight English football. The fixtures were released on 18 June 2025 at 09:00 BST. The season will consist of 33 weekend and five midweek rounds of matches. Liverpool are the defending champions, having won their second Premier League title (and 20th English top-flight crown overall) in the previous season. This is the first season to feature the TyneโWear derby in the Premier League since the 2015โ16 season, following Sunderland's promotion via the Championship play-offs. The summer transfer window opened on 16 June 2025 and closed at 19:00 BST on 1 September 2025. The winter window opened on 1 January 2026 and closed on 2 February 2026. Summary The first managerial departure of the season came on the late evening of 8 September 2025, when Nottingham Forest sacked Nuno Espรญrito Santo as his relationship with owner Evangelos Marinakis had deteriorated. He was swiftly replaced the same day, by former Tottenham Hotspur manager Ange Postecoglou, who signed a two-year contract with the club. The second managerial departure came on 27 September 2025, when West Ham United sacked Graham Potter after a string of bad results in the last half of the previous season and the start of the new season, amassing only one win in five in the Premier League, and losing the other four games. On the same day, Potter was replaced by recently sacked manager Nuno Espรญrito Santo. The third managerial departure came on 18 October 2025, when Nottingham Forest sacked Ange Postecoglou 20 minutes after a 0โ3 home loss to Chelsea, and after only 39 days in charge, following a run of extremely poor results, where Postecoglou had failed to win all eight of his matches in charge of Nottingham Forest. Postecoglou was replaced by former Burnley and Everton manager Sean Dyche on 21 October 2025. The fourth managerial departure came on 2 November 2025, when Wolverhampton Wanderers sacked Vรญtor Pereira following an extremely poor run of results in the Premier League, where they lost eight out of 10 games, with two draws, as well as being rock-bottom in the league, being in 20th for almost the entirety of the season. Rob Edwards was named as his successor and Wolves were 20th at the time of the managerial change. The fifth managerial departure came on 1 January 2026 when Enzo Maresca left Chelsea following a run of one win in 7 league games and a reported breakdown in relations between manager and ownership over the structure of the club. The club was fifth at the time of his departure. On 6 January, Liam Rosenior was appointed as Maresca's replacement. The sixth managerial departure came on 5 January 2026 when Manchester United sacked Ruben Amorim following his dispute with the club's recruitment department. The club were sixth at the time of his departure. On 13 January, Michael Carrick was named as Amorim's successor, having had Darren Fletcher as interim head coach in between. The seventh managerial departure came on 11 February 2026 when Tottenham Hotspur sacked Thomas Frank following a run of two wins in 17 league games. The club were in 16th position at the time of his departure. On 14 February 2026, Igor Tudor was announced as Frank's successor until the end of the season. The eighth managerial departure came on 12 February 2026 when Sean Dyche was sacked by Nottingham Forest after less than four months in charge of the club following a goalless home draw to basement side Wolverhampton Wanderers, which left Forest 17th in the table. On 15 February 2026, Vรญtor Pereira was announced as his replacement. This is the first full season with semi-automated offside technology in use, following its introduction during the previous season on 12 April 2025. Puma also replaced Nike as the official match ball supplier, ending a 25-year partnership between the Premier League and Nike, from the 2000โ01 season to the 2024โ25 season. Ref-cam technology also appeared in selected matches during its ยญopening round with a view to making the new technology a permanent feature of live TV games for the rest of the season. Teams Twenty teams are competing in the league: the top seventeen teams from the previous season and three promoted from the Championship. The promoted clubs are Leeds United, Burnley, and Sunderland, returning to the top flight after absences of two, one, and eight years, respectively. They replaced Leicester City, Ipswich Town, and Southampton, who were relegated after a single season in the Premier League. This marked the second consecutive season, and only the third time in English top-flight history, in which all three promoted teams were relegated after just one season. Promoted to the Premier League Relegated to the Championship For the 2025โ26 season, the combined stadium capacity of the 20 Premier League clubs is 846,049, with an average of 42,302. This is the first season Everton will play at their new stadium, the Hill Dickinson Stadium, following their move from Goodison Park. League table Results Season statistics Notes Awards See also References |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%9326_Ligue_1] | [TOKENS: 267] |
Contents 2025โ26 Ligue 1 The 2025โ26 Ligue 1, also known as Ligue 1 McDonald's for sponsorship reasons, is the 88th season of the Ligue 1, France's premier football competition. It began on 15 August 2025 and is set to conclude on 16 May 2026. The match schedule was announced on 27 June 2025. Teams A total of eighteen teams are participating in the 2025โ26 edition of the Ligue 1. Lorient, Paris FC, and Metz were promoted after finishing first, second, and winning the play-off final in the 2024โ25 Ligue 2, respectively. Both Lorient and Metz returned to the top flight after one year's absence, while Paris FC returned to the top flight after forty-six year's absence. They replaced Montpellier (relegated after sixteen years in the top flight), Saint-รtienne (relegated after one year in the top flight), and Reims (relegated after seven years in the top flight). League table Results Season statistics 4 Player scored 4 goals Awards See also References External links This article about a French association football competition is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by adding missing information. |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ืืื ืจ_ืื_ืฉืืงื] | [TOKENS: 4039] |
ืชืืื ืขื ืืื ืื ืืื ืจ ืื ืฉืืงื ืืื ืจ ืื ืฉืืงื (5 ืืคืืจืืืจ 1926 โ 28 ืืืื 2005) ืืื ืืฉืคืื ืืืืฉ ืฆืืืืจ ืืฉืจืืื. ืฉืืืฉ ืคืจืืคืกืืจ ืืืฉืคืืื ืืืื ืืืจืกืืืช ืชื ืืืื, ืืืจ ืืื ืกืช ืืฉืจ ืืืืฉืืืช ืืฉืจืื ืืืขื ืืืคื"ื. ืืืืืจืคืื ื ืืื ืืฆืคืช, ืื ื ืฉื ืื ื (ื ืืื) ืืฉื ืจืืื ื ืขืืืืื ืฉืืงื. ืืืืชื ืืกืชืจ ืฉืืงื-ืืจืื ืืืืชื ืืฉืืจืจืช. ืืื ืืื ืชืืืื ืืฆืืืื ืืืืช ืกืคืจ ืืืืื ืก. ืืืืจ ืฉืืฉืืื ืืช ืชืขืืืช ืืืืจืืช ืืืงืกืืจื ืืช ืืื ืืืจืื ืืืืช ืืืืจืฉ ืืืืจืื ืืืจืื. ืขื ืกืืื ืืืืืืื ืขืื ืืืืจื ืฉืืืจ ืืืืกื ืืขืืจืืื ืื ืฆืขืืจืื ืืขืื ืืืืืจ ืฉืขืื ืขื ืืชื ืืื ืืืืกื ืคื ื ืืืฉืจื ืืกืขื ืืืจืืฉื ืืกืืืจ ืืช ืืืืกื, ืืื ืืื ื ืขืฉื. ืืฆืขืืจืืชื ืื ืืชื ืฉืืจืื ืฉืืืืื ืืื ืืชืคืจืกืื ืืงืืืฆื ืฉืืจื. ืฉืืงื ืืื ืืืืื ืืฉืคืืื ืืืื ืืืจืกืืื ืืขืืจืืช ืืืจืืฉืืื, ืืืืืืช ืืฆืืืื ืืชื ืืื ืืืืื ืืืื ืืื ืืืื ืืืืืืื. ืืืคืจืื 1955 ืงืืื ืชืืืจ ืฉื ื ืืืฉืคืืื ืืื ืืืืืจ 1955 ืืืกืื ืืขืืจื ืืื. ืขื ืกืืื ืืืืืืื ืืืืื ืืฉืืฉ ืขืืืจ ืืืจืื ืืืฉืคื ืขืืจื ืืคืงืืืื ืืืฉืคืืื ืืืื ืืืจืกืืื ืืคืจืกื ืืืงืจ ืขื ืืฉืืจืื ืืืืงืจืืืื. ืืืืฉื ืงืืื ืชืืืจ ืืืงืืืจ ืืืฉืคืืื ืืืืื ืืืจืกืืื ืืขืืจืืช ืืืจืืฉืืื ืืืื ืืคืจืืคืกืืจ ืืืฉืคืืื (ืืฉืคื ืืื-ืืืืื ืคืจืื, ืืื ื ืืฉืคืื ืืืจืืฉื, ืืช ืืืืื ื ืืืฉืคื) ืืืื ืืืจืกืืืช ืชื ืืืื. ืืช ืืงืจืืืจื ืืคืืืืืืช ืฉืื ืืื ืฉืืงื ืขืื ืืฉื ืืกื ืืืชืืืื ืืจืืฉ ืจืฉืืื ืืืชื ืืคืืืชืืช ืืืกืชืืจืืช ืืกืืืื ืืื, ืื ืื ืืฆืืื ืืืืืืจ. ืืืืฉื ืืงืื ืืช "ืืชื ืืขื ืืงืืืื ืขืืืช ืืืืจื". ืืื ืืืจ 1959 ืืื ื ืขื ืืื ืฉืจ ืืืชืืช ืืขืงื ืืฉื ืืืืืืื ื ืืืืขืื ืฉืืืงื ืืขื ืืช ืขื ืงืืคืื ืืกืคืจืืื ืืืจืื ืืืืขืฆื ืืืชืืช ืฉื ืืจืืฉืืื. ืืงืจืืช ืืืืืจืืช ืืื ืกืช ืืจืืืขืืช ื-1959 ืืงืื ืืช "ืืืคืืื ืืกืคืจืืืช ืืืืืืืช" ืฉืืขื ื ืืงืืคืื ืฉื ืืกืคืจืืื, ืื ืื ืืฆืืืื ืืขืืืจ ืืช ืืืื ืืืกืืื. ื-1961 ืืฆืืจืฃ ืืืคืืื ืืืืืจืืืช. ืืืืืจ ืืืชืจ ืืฆืืจืฃ ืฉืืงื ืืืคื"ื. ืืืืืจืืช ืืื ืกืช ืืฉืืืขืืช ืืืฆื ืืืงืื ื-15 ืืจืฉืืืช ืืืคื"ื. ืืื ื ืื ืก ืืื ืกืช ืืฉืืืขืืช ื-1970, ืขืงื ืคืืืจืชื ืฉื ืืืื ืืฉื ืฉืคืืจื. ืืืืฉ ืืืฆื ืืืืืจ ืืืชืจ, ืขื ืืื ืืื ืฉื ืืืืื ืืื ื ืืชืคืงืื ืฉืจ ืืกืขื, ืืืืืคื ืฉืืงื ืืชืคืงืื ืกืื ืฉืจ ืืืื ืื ืืืชืจืืืช ืืืืฉืื ื-15. ืืืืื 1972 ืืืจื ืืฆืืขืชื ืืขื ืชืืงืื ืืืง ืืฉืืืช, ืืขื ืืื ืงืืืขืช ืืืื ืืืืื ืขื-ืคื ืืืืื, ืื ืืืื ืืขืืืช ืืืืฉืื ืืืขืืืช ืืคืืืชื, ืคืืืจ ืืืืื ืชื ืืกืื ืฉืจ ืืืื ืื. ืืืคืจืื 1973 ืคืจืฉ ืืืืื ืืืืคื"ื ืืืคื ืืืืจ ืื ืกืช ืืืื. ืืืืืจืืช ืืื ืกืช ืืฉืืื ืืช ืืงืื ืืช ืจืฉืืืช "ืืชื ืืขื ืืฉืืืืื ืืืจืชื", ืื ืื ืขืืจ ืืช ืืืื ืืืกืืื. ืืฉื ืช 1984 ืืืจ ืฉืื ืืืคื"ื ืื ืืืจ ืืื ืกืช ื-11, ืืืืื ืืจืฆืืคืืช ืขื ืืื ืกืช ื-14. ืืืืจ ืืืืืจืืช ืืื ืกืช ืืฉืชืื ืขืฉืจื ื-1988, ืืื ืืืื ืฉืืงื ืืืืฉื ืจืืฉ ืืชื ืืขื, ืืืื ืฉืืงื ืืฉืจ ืืื ืชืืง ืืืืฉืืชื ืฉื ืืฆืืง ืฉืืืจ. ืืืจื "ืืชืจืืื ืืืกืจืื" ืืืืฆืข 1990 ืืืงืืช ืืืืฉืื ืืืืฉื, ืืื ื ืฉืืงื ืืชืคืงืื ืฉืจ ืืืชืืช, ืชืคืงืื ืื ืืืืืง ืขื 1992. ืืื ืืื ื ืืช ืฉืืื ืืงืืฉ ืืื ื"ื ืืืฉืจื. ืืืืจ ืืชืืืืืืช ืืื ืืจื ืืฆืืง ืืื ืขื ืจืืฉืืช ืืืคื"ื ืืขื ืชืืง ืืืื ืื ืืฉื ืช 1998 - ืืชืืืืืืช ืื ืืคืกืื ืฉืืงื - ืืื ืืืืืข ืฉืื ืืชืืืื ืขืื ืืื ืกืช ืืืื ื ืื ืฉืื ืขืืืช ืฉื ืืืืจืื ืืขืืืื. ืืืืื ืืืื ืชื ืืื ืกืช ืืื ืืช ืืืง ืื ืืืฆืืช ืืื ืขื ืืืจืื ืืืกืฃ ืฉืคืืจื. ืืืืืจืืช ืืื ืกืช ืืฉืฉ ืขืฉืจื ืืืฆื ืืืงืื ืึพ120 ืืืกืืื ืืจืฉืืืช ืืคื"ื ืืื ืกืช. ืฉืืงื ืืื ืื"ืจ ืืฉืืช ืืืคื"ื ืืื"ืจ ืืฉืืืื ืืงืืืื ืืื ื ืืื ืืชืืื ืืืืืื ืื. ืืื ืื ืืืื ืื ืฉืื ืืืื ืฉื ืืืืื ืืืงืจ ืืืฉืคืื ืืืฉืจืื. ืคืจืฉืช ืืขืืืชืืช ืืคืจืฉืช ืืชืจืืืืช ืืืืืชื ืฉืจ ืืืชืืช, ื ืืฉื ืฉืืงื ืืฉืชื ืคืจืฉืืืช (ืืื ืืฉื ืื 1990โ1991), ืฉื ืืงืจื ืขื ืืื ืืืืืื ืืืจืฆืืช ืืืงืืจืืช ืืื ืื ืืืืืืื ืืืจืฆืืช ืืืงืืจืช ืคืฉืขืื. ืืืฉืืืช ื ืืื ืืื ืืฉืชื ืคืจืฉืืืช ืฉืื ืืช. ืืืืช, ืคืจืฉืื ืฉืืื ืชื 'ืคืจืฉืช ืืชืจืืืืช', ืืืืชื ืืฉื ืืืขืืื ืืืกืคืื ืฉื ืืชื ื ืืชืจืืืืช ืืขืืืชืืช ืืืืื ืืื ืงืฉืืจ, ืืื ืืฉืืจ ืืขืืืชื ืืืงืจ ืืืฉืคืื ืืืื ื ืืืฉืคืื ืืืฉืจืื. ืืคืจืฉืื ืื ืืกืคืช, ืฉืืื ืชื 'ืคืจืฉืช ืืขืืืชืืช', ืืืืชื ืืฉื ืฉืฉืืงื ืคืขื ืชืื ื ืืืื ืืื ืืจืกืื ืืชืื ืืจืื ืืืคืจืช ืืืื ืื, ืืขืช ืฉืืื ืืืจ ืืืืขืืช ืฉืจืื, ืืืฉืจ ืืืืืฅ ืขื ืืขืืจืช ืืกืคืื ืืืืืงืช ืขืืืืื ืืช, ืืฉืืืฉ ืขืืืชืืช ืืื ืืื ืงืจืืื ืืฉืคืืชื ืืืจืื ืืืืกืืื. ืืกืืคื ืฉื ืืืจ ืื ืืืืฉ ื ืื ืฉืืงื ืืชื ืืืฉืื. ืืคืจืฉืช ืืชืจืืืืช ืงืืข ืืืืขืฅ ืืืฉืคืื ืืืืฉืื ืื ืืืชื ืืืืชื ืฉื ืฉืืงื ืืื ืืขื ืืคืื, ืืืื ืื ืกืืจ ืื ืืฉ ืื ืจืืืืช ืืืขืืืื ืืืื ืคืืืื. ืืคืจืฉืช ืืขืืืชืืช ืกืืจ ืืืืขืฅ ืืืฉืคืื ืืืืฉืื ืื ืืฉ ืื ืจืืืืช ืืืขืืื ืืช ืฉืืงื ืืืื ืืืื ืืจืื ืืืคืจืช ืืืื ืื, ืืืื ืกืืจ ืื ืืื ืืงืื ืืขืฉืืช ืืืช, ืืฉื ืืืกืจ ืขื ืืื ืืฆืืืืจ. ืขื ืืืืื ืื ืฉื ืืืืขืฅ ืืืฉืคืื ืืืืฉืื ืืืืฉื ืขืชืืจื ืืื"ืฅ, ืืืจืืฉื ืืืื ืืช ืืืืืชื ืืืืขืืื ืืช ืฉืืงื ืืืื. ืืขืชืืจื ืืชืงืืื ืืืืื ืื ืฉืื"ืฅ ืืืจื ืืืืขืฅ ืืืฉืคืื ืืืืฉืื ืืงืืื ืฉืืืืข ืืฉืืงื ืืจื ืืขืืื ืืืื ืืืฃ ืืืขืืืื ืืืื ืื ืืฉืชืื ืข ืื ืขืืืื ืืฉ ืืกืืก ืจืืืืชื ืืื ืฉืืืฆืข ืืช ืืขืืืจืืช ืืื ื ืืฉื. ืืืื ืืืฉืืื ืืื ื ืฉืื ืืืืืืืช (ืขื ืืคืืืจืชื ืืฉื ืช 1968), ืื ืืืื ืืื ืืจืืขื ืืืืื. ื-1970 ืืชืืชื ืขื ื ืืื ืฉืืงื, ืื ืืืื ืืื ืฉืืืฉื ืืืืื. ืืื ืืขืืืื ืืืืจ ืืืื ืงืฉื ื-28 ืืืื 2005. ืืชื ืกืืืจ ืืจืืก ืืืืชื ืืืฉื ืชืฉืขื ืืืืฉืื ืจืืฉืช ืืืืขืฆื ืืืชืืช ืืืคืจ ืกืื, ืืืืืชื ืืืืฉื ืืจืืฉืื ื ืฉืขืืื ืืจืืฉ ืืืขืฆื ืืชืืช. ื-2021 ืืื ืฆื ืืงืจืืืช ืจืืื ืขื ืฉืื ืืฉืืื ืช ืืืื ืืืจืืฉืืื. ืงืืฉืืจืื ืืืฆืื ืืื ืืขืจืืช ืฉืืืืื |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_in_basketball] | [TOKENS: 346] |
Contents 2026 in sports Sports in 2026 describes the year's events in world sport. The main sporting events scheduled to be held in 2026 are the 2026 Winter Olympics, the 2026 Winter Paralympics, both staged in Milano Cortina, the 2026 FIFA World Cup in the United States, Canada and Mexico, the 2026 Commonwealth Games in Glasgow and the 2026 World Baseball Classic in the United States, Puerto Rico and Japan. In rugby league, the Menโs, Womenโs and the Wheelchair Rugby League World Cups will all be held in Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. In rugby union, there will be a new international rugby union tournament, which will be known as the World Rugby Nations Championship. There are also two T20 Cricket World Cups in 2026, the menโs version will be staged in India and Sri Lanka while the womenโs version will be staged in England and Wales. Calendar by month Multi-sport events Air sports American football Aquatics Archery Association football Athletics Australian football Badminton Baseball Basketball Biathlon Bobsleigh & skeleton Boules Bowling Canadian football Canoeing Cheerleading Combat sports Cricket Cue sports Curling Cycling Darts Dance sport Disc golf Dodgeball Equestrianism Esports Figure skating Fistball Gaelic football Golf Grass skiing Gymnastics Handball Hockey Hurling Korfball Lacrosse Luge Mind sports Minigolf Modern pentathlon Motorsports Netball Parasports Ottawa 2026 IWBF Wheelchair Basketball World Championships Roller Skating Rowing Rugby Sailing Sepak takraw Shooting sports Skiing Snowboarding Speed Skating Surfing Swimming Table Tennis Tennis Triathlon Volleyball Water Polo Weightlifting References |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%9326_Bundesliga] | [TOKENS: 161] |
Contents 2025โ26 Bundesliga The 2025โ26 Bundesliga is the 63rd season of the Bundesliga, Germany's premier men's football competition. Bayern Munich are the defending champions. The season began on 22 August 2025 and will conclude on 16 May 2026. The fixtures were released on 27 June 2025. Teams Hamburger SV and 1. FC Kรถln returned to the Bundesliga after seven and one year absences, respectively. They replaced Holstein Kiel and VfL Bochum after spending time in the top flight for one and four years respectively. League table Results Relegation play-offs The relegation play-offs will take place on 21 or 22 and 25 or 26 May 2026. Statistics Awards References External links |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_cricket_in_2026] | [TOKENS: 158] |
Contents International cricket in 2026 The 2026 International cricket season will take place from April 2026 to September 2026. This calendar will include men's Test, One Day International (ODI) and Twenty20 International (T20I) matches (between full member teams), women's Test, women's One Day International (WODI) and women's Twenty20 International (WT20I) matches, as well as some other significant series. The 2026 Women's T20 World Cup is scheduled to be hosted in England in June and July 2026. In addition to the matches shown here, a number of other T20I series involving associate nations will be played during this period. Season overview April May June July August Teams: September See also References |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_European_Tour] | [TOKENS: 221] |
Contents 2026 European Tour The 2026 European Tour, titled as the 2026 DP World Tour for sponsorship reasons, is the 55th season of the European Tour, the main professional golf tour in Europe since its inaugural season in 1972. It is the fifth season of the tour under a title sponsorship agreement with DP World that was announced in November 2021. Changes for 2026 The full schedule was announced in September 2025. As part of the announcement, it was revealed that a new event, the Estrella Damm Catalunya Championship, would be added to the schedule, alongside the confirmation that Trump International, Doonbeg would host the 2026 Amgen Irish Open. Several tournaments held in 2025 were not included in the schedule announcement: the Ras Al Khaimah Championship, the Porsche Singapore Classic, the Barracuda Championship (which was also not announced as part of the 2026 PGA Tour schedule) and the Nexo Championship. Schedule The following table lists official events during the 2026 season. See also Notes References External links |
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Contents 2025โ2027 World Test Championship The 2025โ2027 ICC World Test Championship is the fourth edition of the ICC World Test Championship. It is being played in Test format. It started on 17 June 2025 with the contest between Sri Lanka and Bangladesh at Galle International Cricket Stadium, and it is scheduled to finish in June 2027 with the final match planned to be played at Lord's. Format The tournament consists of 27 series and 71 matches in the league stage. The top two teams in the points table compete at the final. Each team plays six series, three at home and three away, with each series containing two to five Test matches. The points system is unchanged from the previous edition. A win is worth all 12 points, a tie is worth 6 points each, a draw is worth 4 points each, and a loss is worth 0 points. A team that is behind the required over rate at the end of a match would have one point deducted for each over it was behind (over rate deduction doesn't applied when the team all out the opponent within 80 overs) . As in the previous edition, teams are ranked in the league table based on the percentage of total points won out of total points contested. In the event that this percentage is tied between teams, a series of tiebreaker criteria are used to determine the standings of teams, starting with the number of series wins, followed by each team's percentage in away matches, and finally the ICC Test Rankings at the end of the league stage. Participants The nine full members of the ICC who will participate are: The three full members of the ICC who will not participate are Afghanistan, Ireland, and Zimbabwe. Schedule The International Cricket Council (ICC) announced the 2023โ2027 Future Tours Programme on 17 August 2022 and identified which series was a part of the World Test Championship. Rather than being a full round-robin tournament in which everyone played everyone else equally, each team played only six of the other eight as in the previous cycles. The exact dates and the venues of these series will be decided by the boards of the competing teams. League table League stage Source: Final match Statistics Notes References External links |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Men%27s_T20_World_Cup] | [TOKENS: 2884] |
Contents 2026 Men's T20 World Cup The 2026 ICC Men's T20 World Cup is the tenth edition of the ICC Men's T20 World Cup, co-hosted by Board of Control for Cricket in India and Sri Lanka Cricket from 7 February to 8 March 2026. Sri Lanka had previously hosted the competition in 2012 and India in 2016. A total of twenty teams are competing in 55 matches across five venues in India and three in Sri Lanka. Twenty teams compete in the tournament, which includes the teams from the two hosts, six of the top seven teams from the previous edition, the four highest-ranked teams in the ICC Men's T20I Team Rankings not already qualified, and eight other teams determined through regional qualifiers. Italy qualified for the Men's T20 World Cup for the first time. India are the defending champions. Background The ICC Men's T20 World Cup is a biennial world cup for cricket in Twenty20 International (T20I) format, organised by the International Cricket Council (ICC). It was first played in 2007 in South Africa, and the 2026 tournament marked its tenth edition. The ninth edition, held in 2024 in the West Indies and the United States, was contested by 20 teams, and was won by India, who defeated South Africa in the final. In November 2021, as part of the 2024โ2031 ICC men's hosts cycle, the ICC announced that the 2026 Men's T20 World Cup would be played in India and Sri Lanka. Initially Sri Lanka Cricket proposed to host the entire tournament, however, due to expansion of the tournament to 20 teams from the previous edition and lack of cricket stadiums in Sri Lanka, it was decided to be co-hosted with the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI). Sri Lanka had previously hosted the competition in 2012 and India in 2016. The tournament's format will remain the same as the previous edition. The 20 qualifying teams were divided into four groups of five each. In the group stage, each team plays each of the other teams in the group once in a round-robin format, and the top two teams in each group will advance to the Super 8 stage, where the teams would be placed into two groups of four teams each. Prior to the tournament, the ICC announced the eight seeded teams based on the ICC T20I rankings, who will be placed in predetermined positions in the Super 8 stage, irrespective of their position in the group stage. If an unseeded team qualifies at the expense of a seeded team, it will take the position of the corresponding seeded team that fails to qualify from their group. In the Super 8 stage, each team will play against each of the other teams in the group once. The top two teams from each group will advance to the knockout stage, which consists of two semi-finals, the winners of which face off in the final. No points would be carried over between stages. In the 2023โ2027 ICC Men's Future Tours Programme, the tournament was scheduled to be held in FebruaryโMarch 2026. The ICC announced the final schedule on 25 November 2025, with the tournament scheduled to take place from 7 February to 8 March 2026. The teams will play 55 matches across five venues in India and three venues in Sri Lanka. On 26 January 2026, the ICC announced that warm-up matches would be held from 2 to 6 February. While the ICC has not officially announced the prizes, media reports indicated an allocation of $13.5 million for the tournament. In November 2025, former Indian captain Rohit Sharma was named as an ambassador for the tournament. The official theme song for the tournament, "Feel the Thrill", produced and performed by Anirudh Ravichander with lyrics by Heisenberg and Raqueeb Alam, was released on 30 January 2026. A remix version featuring Sri Lankan artist Dinesh Gamage sub-titled "Tamil Sinhalese version", which replaced Hindi verses with Tamil and Sinhala verses, was released on 7 February. A promotional event, the "Captains' Carnival", featuring all the team captains and social media influencers was held on 5 February in Mumbai and Colombo. On 6 February, the ICC announced that an opening ceremony would be held at the Wankhede Stadium ahead of the third match of the opening day between India and the United States. Badshah, Nora Fatehi, Rishab Sharma, and Sivamani performed at the opening ceremony. Qualification The hosts, India and Sri Lanka, along with the top seven teams from the 2024 tournament: Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, England, South Africa, the United States and the West Indies; directly qualified for the 2026 tournament. The remaining three direct qualification places were allocated to the next best-ranked teams in the ICC Men's T20I Team Rankings as on 30 June 2024, that had not finished in the top seven: Ireland, New Zealand and Pakistan. The eight remaining places were filled through the ICC's regional qualifiers, consisting of two teams each from Africa and Europe regions, three teams combined from Asia and East Asia-Pacific and one team from the Americas. In June 2025, Canada qualified from the World Cup from the Americas region, followed by Italy and Netherlands from the Europe region in July. In October 2025, Namibia and Zimbabwe qualified from the Africa region, followed by Nepal, Oman and United Arab Emirates from the combined Asia-EAP qualifier. Italy qualified for the men's T20 World Cup for the first time. Ahead of the 2026 tournament, Bangladesh withdrew from the tournament and were replaced by the next best ranked team in the T20I Rankings: Scotland. Venues On 6 November 2025, the ICC announced the finalised venues for the World Cup, five in India: Narendra Modi Stadium in Ahmedabad, M. A. Chidambaram Stadium in Chennai, Arun Jaitley Stadium in Delhi, Eden Gardens in Kolkata and Wankhede Stadium in Mumbai; and three in Sri Lanka: R. Premadasa Stadium and Sinhalese Sports Club Cricket Ground in Colombo and Pallekele Cricket Stadium in Kandy. Squads Each team was allowed a maximum squad size of 15 players and was required to submit the provisional squad to the ICC by 8 January 2026. The teams were allowed to make changes to the squads until 31 January 2026. Any changes after this required permission from the ICC's technical committee. Match officials On 30 January 2026, the ICC released the list of match referees and umpires for the tournament. Warm-up matches A total of 16 warm-up matches were played from 2 to 6 February, involving 18 teams participating in the World Cup in addition to the India A and Sri Lanka A teams. The warm-up matches were held at four venues in India: BCCI Centre of Excellence Grounds 1 & 2 in Bengaluru, M. A. Chidambaram Stadium in Chennai, and DY Patil Stadium in Navi Mumbai; and three in Sri Lanka: Colombo Cricket Club Ground, R. Premadasa Stadium and SSC Cricket Ground in Colombo. Sri Lanka and England played a three-match T20I series from 30 January to 3 February at the Pallekele Cricket Stadium in Kandy as preparation for the World Cup. Group stage The ICC announced the groups and fixtures on 25 November 2025, with group stage being played from 7 to 20 February. The 20 teams were divided into four groups of five with each team facing the other teams in the group. The group stage will feature a total of 40 matches. The opening match was played between Netherlands and Pakistan at the SSC Cricket Ground on 7 February. The following table lists teams in order of their initial group stage seedings. Super 8 stage The top two teams from the four groups advance to the Super 8 stage, where they are divided into two groups of four teams each. In the Super 8 stage, each team will play the others in the respective group in a round-robin format, with the top two teams from each group advancing to the semifinals. Prior to the tournament, eight teams were pre-seeded for the Super 8 stage based on the T20I rankings at the time: Australia, India, South Africa, and the West Indies in Group 1; England, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka in Group 2. Australia did not qualify for the Super 8 stage, and their place was taken by Zimbabwe. Knockout stage The knockout stage consists of two semi-finals to be played on 4 and 5 March, and the final on 8 March. The first semi-final and the final are scheduled to be held at Eden Gardens in Kolkata and Narendra Modi Stadium in Ahmedabad respectively, but either will be moved to the R. Premadasa Stadium in Colombo if the match features Pakistan. The second semi-final will be held at the Wankhede Stadium in Mumbai. Statistics Controversies After the Bangladeshi cricketer Mustafizur Rahman was released by the Kolkata Knight Riders under BCCI's request from the 2026 Indian Premier League squad, on 3 January 2026, the Bangladesh Cricket Board (BCB) requested for Bangladesh's matches at the World Cup to be moved from India, citing security reasons. Officials from the ICC met with members of the BCB to try and find a solution to the issue. On 6 January, ESPNcricinfo reported that the ICC rejected the BCB's request and Bangladesh would forfeit points if they refused to play. A day later, the BCB denied this, stating, "the ICC has conveyed its willingness to work closely with the BCB to address [our] concerns". On 12 January, media reported that the Tamil Nadu Cricket Association and the Kerala Cricket Association offered to host the matches at M. A. Chidambaram Stadium at Chennai and Greenfield International Stadium at Thiruvananthapuram respectively instead of Eden Gardens and Wankhede Stadium in India. The same day, the ICC refused Bangladesh's security assessment, stating that "there was no overall threat to the [team]" and that there was "low to moderate risks [to the team] in some venues and low to nil in others". A day later, the BCB reiterated its request to move Bangladesh's matches outside of India citing security concerns. On 17 January, the BCB requested to swap groups with Ireland, who were scheduled to play their matches in Sri Lanka, which was rejected by the ICC. On 18 January, the ICC announced that the final decision on the matter would be taken after the board meeting scheduled on 21 January. Following the meeting on 21 January, the ICC refused to shift Bangladesh's matches, and offered a revised deadline of one day for the BCB to decide on the participation. The next day, the BCB reiterated their refusal to play in India. On 24 January, the ICC officially announced that Bangladesh would be replaced by Scotland, the next highest ranked team in the ICC T20I rankings, who had not qualified for the tournament. In a press release issued on 9 February 2026, the ICC stated that no financial, sporting, or administrative penalty would be imposed on the BCB with regards to its withdrawal from the tournament. It also said that the BCB have the right to appeal against the same as per existing ICC regulations, and Bangladesh would be given the hosting rights to an ICC event in the 2028โ2031 events cycle. On 1 February, the Pakistani government allowed its cricket team to participate in the World Cup but directed the team not to play its match against India on February 15. While the PCB did not officially communicate the decision to the ICC, it was reportedly taken in protest against the ICC's refusal to relocate Bangladesh's matches out of India. The ICC warned the PCB of possible sanctions for a potential boycott of the match against India. Following discussions between the ICC, PCB and BCB, on 9 February, the Pakistan government announced that it was directing the team to take part in the match against India. During the IndiaโPakistan match on the 15 February 2026, there was no handshake between the Indian captain Suryakumar Yadav and the Pakistani captain Salman Ali Agha, which typically happens during coin tosses, and among players after the match is concluded. This policy has continued since the 2025 Asia Cup, due to the Pahalgam terror attack and the 2025 IndiaโPakistan conflict. However, this is the first time this has occurred in an ICC tournament. Due to the prior seeding, all of the group winners ended up in Group 1, and all the runners-up in Group 2. ICC faced a backlash for its pre-seeding system with critics commenting how ICC's tournaments have always been unfair and this isn't a new situation. People also complained that Sri Lanka could not play at home in the semi-finals, while India, the other host, had a chance of playing the knock-outs at home. The ICC countered that pre-seedings were made to enable fans to safely arrange travel for their team's games. Broadcasting JioStar handled the global broadcasting rights as part of its deal with the ICC, and the global broadcasters for the tournament were confirmed by the ICC on 5 February 2026. The matches were broadcast across more than 80 territories. The matches were also broadcast through ICC.tv and the ICC's official YouTube channel. JioHotstar provided a vertical live feed along with 360 degree view and multi-camera features. The ICC partnered with American sports podcaster Jomboy to provide an alternate commentary feed for American viewers. The ICC released the following list of commentators for the tournament on 6 February 2026. References External links |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_in_association_football] | [TOKENS: 72] |
Contents 2026 in association football The following are the scheduled events of association football for the calendar year 2026 throughout the world. This includes the following: Events Club continental champions Men's national leagues Men's domestic cups Women's national leagues Women's domestic cups Men's national Tier II - V leagues Men's national Tier II - V cups Deaths References External links |
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