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ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot searches for files on the victim's machine.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium has the ability to inject DLLs into specific processes.[32] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Symbexcel: Bringing the Power of Symbolic Execution to the Fight Against Malicious Excel 4 Macros
Excel 4.0 (XL4) macros are a popular attack vector for threat actors, as security vendors struggle to play catchup and detect malicious macros properly. These macros provide attackers with a simple and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0397
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoJax
LoJax has modified the Registry key ‘HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute’ from ‘autocheck autochk ’ to ‘autocheck autoche ’ in order to execute its payload during Windows startup.[144] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has used PowerShell for execution.[228][49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used the Nirsoft SniffPass network sniffer to obtain passwords sent over non-secure protocols.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used ipconfig and arp to determine network configuration information.[149] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has deleted many of its files used during operations as part of cleanup, including removing applications and deleting screenshots.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0686
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuietSieve
QuietSieve has taken screenshots every five minutes and saved them to the user's local Application Data folder under Temp\SymbolSourceSymbols\icons or Temp\ModeAuto\icons.[132] | secon |
title:botconf2017 Python and Machine Learning: How to Clusterize a Malware Dataset
The goal of this workshop is to present how to use python to make machine learning. We take examples of security data like malware and we explain how to transform data to use algorithms of machine learning. We detail the different algori... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used dsquery and other Active Directory utilities to enumerate hosts; they have also used nltest.exe /dclist to retrieve a list of domain controllers.[39][40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has inserted malicious macros into existing documents, providing persistence when they are reopened. Gamaredon Group has loaded the group's previously delivered VBA project by relaunching Microsoft Outlook with the /altvba option, once the Applicatio... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Zombie POODLE, GOLDENDOODLE, and How TLSv1.3 Can Save Us All
HTTPS is the backbone for online privacy and commerce – yet, for two decades, the underlying TLS protocol received little more than a series of band-aid fixes. Rather than deprecating cryptographic techniques with known weakness, the TL... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit can move laterally through industrial networks by means of the SMB service. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0539
ATT&CK Technique Name:Red Alert 2.0
Red Alert 2.0 has communicated with the C2 using HTTP.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the net user command to gather account information.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad has deleted arbitrary Registry values.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1594
ATT&CK Technique Name:Search Victim-Owned Websites
Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees suc... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Holding on for Tonight: Addiction in InfoSec
Substance abuse is present in and affects all communities, even information security. This session will detail the relationship between stress, addiction, and relapse. Additionally, the speaker will discuss her experience with alcohol use disorder while m... | secon |
title:botconf2019 Tracking botnets with Long Term Sandboxing
Sandbox systems have become an efficient way to analyze malware behavior. They can provide information about malware in a quick and automatic manner. However their analysis time is usually limited only to a couple of minutes, thus preventing observation of ma... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can use the GetRegValue function to check Registry keys within HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer\AlwaysInstallElevated and HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer\AlwaysInstallElevated. It also contains additional modules that... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:PyDCrypt
PyDCrypt has dropped DCSrv under the svchost.exe name to disk.[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can copy itself to and launch itself from hidden folders.[34] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 The Firmware Supply-Chain Security Is Broken: Can We Fix It?
Nowadays, it's difficult to find any hardware vendor who develops all the components present in its products. Many of these components, including firmware, are outsourced to ODMs. As a result, this limits the ability of hardware vendors ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT has been delivered via spearphishing emails that contain a malicious Hangul Office or Microsoft Word document.[197] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0230
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZeroT
ZeroT can add a new service to ensure PlugX persists on the system when delivered as another payload onto the system.[93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:ccf32
ccf32 can delete files and folders from compromised machines.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak has named malware "svchost.exe," which is the name of the Windows shared service host program.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 contains modules for searching for passwords in local and remote files.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET adds malicious file paths to the DYLD_FRAMEWORK_PATH and DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variables to execute malicious code.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has collected credentials from infected systems, including domain accounts.[9] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Subverting Sysmon: Application of a Formalized Security Product Evasion Methodology
While security products are a great supplement to the defensive posture of an enterprise, to well-funded nation-state actors, they are an impediment to achieving their objectives. As pentesters argue the efficacy of ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used stolen credentials to compromise Outlook Web Access (OWA).[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles utilizes watering hole websites to target industrial employees. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Rising Sun can enumerate information about files from the infected system, including file size, attributes, creation time, last access time, and write time. Rising Sun can enumerate the compilation timestamp of Windows executable files.[259] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0138
ATT&CK Technique Name:Andariel
Andariel has conducted spearphishing campaigns that included malicious Word or Excel attachments.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:CostaRicto
During CostaRicto, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to download backdoor tools.[45] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Oh No! KPTI Defeated, Unauthorized Data Leakage is Still Possible
Meltdown is a hardware vulnerability affecting most modern processors, including Intel, AMD, IBM POWER, and ARM processors. It allows a rogue process to read the kernel data in CPU L1-d cache, even when it is not authorized to do s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon has modified the Registry to store its encrypted payload.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton contains a file named TS_cnames.py which contains default definitions for program state (TS_progstate). Program state is referenced in TsHi.py.[5]Triton contains a file named TS_cnames.py which contains default definitions for key state (TS_keystate). Key state is ref... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:KEYPLUG
KEYPLUG can use TLS-encrypted WebSocket Protocol (WSS) for C2.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0264
ATT&CK Technique Name:OopsIE
OopsIE creates a scheduled task to run itself every three minutes.[119][124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:The White Company
The White Company has used phishing lure documents that trick users into opening them and infecting their computers.[237] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0124
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pisloader
Pisloader has a command to collect the victim's IP address.[174] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron contains a function to encrypt and store emails that it collects.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell has a command, ps, to obtain a listing of processes on the system.[283] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain has the ability to log keyboard events.[113][114] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0442
ATT&CK Technique Name:VBShower
VBShower has attempted to obtain a VBS script from command and control (C2) nodes over HTTP.[359] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Experimenting with Real-Time Event Feeds
Today, defenders in a typical security operation center rely on their SIEM to do forensics on past logs, and to define real-time detections. This assumes that the SIEM was configured ahead of time to collect the subset of logs that are useful. But how does o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials.[9][10] | secon |
title:botconf2022 Insights and Experiences from Monitoring Multiple P2P Botnets
To this date P2P overlays remain a popular choice for botnet command and control. With the rise of recent IoT botnets, we aimed to monitor multiple IoT P2P botnets at the same time, to compare them against each other and traditional Windows... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar downloads additional plug-ins to load on the victim’s machine, including the ability to upgrade and replace its own binary.[238] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0095
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete has used batch files to initiate additional downloads of malicious files.[200] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
A Patchwork payload deletes Resiliency Registry keys created by Microsoft Office applications in an apparent effort to trick users into thinking there were no issues during application runs.[112] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Good Motive but Bad Design: Pitfalls in MPU Usage in Embedded Systems in the Wild
As more and more microcontroller-based embedded devices are connected to the Internet, as part of the Internet-of-Things (IoT), previously less tested (and insecure) devices are exposed to miscreants. To prevent them ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0558
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tiktok Pro
Tiktok Pro can capture photos and videos from the device’s camera.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0953
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [8], including the management of go... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Afternoon Refreshment Break (Briefings)
Open to Briefings Passholders. Please wear your badge. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady has created the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{E6D34FFC-AD32-4d6a-934C-D387FA873A19} Registry key for persistence.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used Cobalt Strike C2 beacons for data exfiltration.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0513
ATT&CK Technique Name:LiteDuke
LiteDuke can enumerate the account name on a targeted system.[100] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Building Better CSIRTs Using Behavioral Psychology
Have you ever worked on a security team where the decisions, communication, and overall team culture are dominated by one or two "rock stars"? Are constant disagreements and passive-aggression among team members hurting your ability to respond effe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has used open-source tools such as Weave Scope to target exposed Docker API ports and gain initial access to victim environments.[39][40] TeamTNT has also targeted exposed kubelets for Kubernetes environments.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARDUMP
SUGARDUMP has stored collected data under %<malware_execution_folder>%\\CrashLog.txt.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest hides a copy of itself in the user's ~/Library directory by using a . at the beginning of the file name followed by 9 random characters.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0694
ATT&CK Technique Name:DRATzarus
DRATzarus can enumerate and examine running processes to determine if a debugger is present.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
Gazer can establish persistence by creating a .lnk file in the Start menu.[101][102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot has the ability to capture RDP credentials by capturing the CredEnumerateA API[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1001.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Steganography
Adversaries may use steganographic techniques to hide command and control traffic to make detection efforts more difficult. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital messages that are transferred between systems. This hidden information can be ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM packed some payloads using different types of packers, both known and custom.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum can identify proxy servers configured and used by the victim, and use it to make HTTP requests to C2 its server.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can uninstall its loader through the use of a Sdl command.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the LSASS Memory... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1592.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Firmware
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host firmware that can be used during targeting. Information about host firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer more information about hosts ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
GoldMax has used filenames that matched the system name, and appeared as a scheduled task impersonating systems management software within the corresponding ProgramData subfolder.[65][66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can query Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall for installed applications.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Oldsmar Treatment Plant Intrusion
During the Oldsmar Treatment Plant Intrusion, the threat actors gained access to the system through remote access software, allowing for the use of the standard operator HMI interface.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
Elise encrypts several of its files, including configuration files.[113] | secon |
title:botconf2019 DFIR & Crisis Management – Post-mortems & Lessons Learned in the Pain from the Field
This presentation aims to summarize the best wins & fails of crisis management based on our field experience. We will cover different phases of a crisis with real life examples such as:A CISO and a CIO convinced that ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY has created e-mail accounts to spoof targeted organizations.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0052
ATT&CK Technique Name:CopyKittens
CopyKittens encrypts data with a substitute cipher prior to exfiltration.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles has relied on encrypted SSH-based tunnels to transfer tools and for remote command/program execution.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0829
ATT&CK Technique Name:Loss of View
Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID can inject itself into a suspended msiexec.exe process to send beacons to C2 while appearing as a normal msi application. [12] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 I Am Whoever I Say I Am: Infiltrating Identity Providers Using a 0Click Exploit
Single Sign On (SSO) has become the dominant authentication scheme to login to several related, yet independent, software systems. At the core of this are the identity providers (IdP). Their role is to perform credential... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0396
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilBunny
EvilBunny has an integrated scripting engine to download and execute Lua scripts.[117] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater maintains persistence on victim networks through side-loading dlls to trick legitimate programs into running malware.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Environment Variable Permissions
Prevent users from changing the HISTCONTROL, HISTFILE, and HISTFILESIZE environment variables. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 lured victims to double-click on images in the attachments they sent which would then execute the hidden LNK file.[88][89][90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0551
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenEagle
GoldenEagle has sent messages to an attacker-controlled number.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire.[2] Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth uses JavaScript to perform its core functionalities. [13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0529
ATT&CK Technique Name:CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal can access the device’s SMS and MMS messages.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0489
ATT&CK Technique Name:WolfRAT
WolfRAT uses dumpsys to determine if certain applications are running.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the director... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Container Attack Surface Reduction Beyond Name Space Isolation
Public container images are riddled with vulnerabilities. We've analyzed the top 100 official Docker images present on DockerHub and found thousands of vulnerabilities and misconfigurations. Many of these vulnerabilities lie not within t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0026
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT18
APT18 actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 performed a watering hole attack on forbes.com in 2014 to compromise targets.[5] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.