text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0305
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpyNote RAT
SpyNote RAT uses an Android broadcast receiver to automatically start when the device boots.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application control configured to block execution of wmic.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. For example, in Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016 and above, Windows Defender Application Control ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0634
ATT&CK Technique Name:EnvyScout
EnvyScout can write files to disk with JavaScript using a modified version of the open-source tool FileSaver.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:ccf32
ccf32 has used xcopy \\<target_host>\c$\users\public\path.7z c:\users\public\bin\<target_host>.7z /H /Y to archive collected files.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can use a variety of API calls on a compromised host.[180] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0414
ATT&CK Technique Name:BabyShark
BabyShark has executed the ipconfig /all command.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to block unsigned/untrusted executable files (such as .exe, .dll, or .scr) from running from USB removable drives. [31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Ensure Domain Controller backups are properly secured.[2] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Decisions and Revisions - The Ever Evolving Face of the Black Hat NOC
This session is your chance to get up close and personal with the Black Hat NOC. We'll walk you through the process of deciding what equipment and services we deploy on the Black Hat network, and our reasoning around those decisio... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0527
ATT&CK Technique Name:CSPY Downloader
CSPY Downloader has the ability to remove values it writes to the Registry.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0206
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wiarp
Wiarp creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can download files.[477] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0616
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEATHRANSOM
DEATHRANSOM can delete volume shadow copies on compromised hosts.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0800
ATT&CK Technique Name:Authorization Enforcement
Provide privileges corresponding to the restriction of a GUI session to control system operations (examples include HMI read-only vs. read-write modes). Ensure local users, such as operators and engineers, are giving prioritization over remote sessions and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method
Mobile security products that are part of the Samsung Knox for Mobile Threat Defense program could examine running applications while the device is idle, potentially detecting malicious applications that are running primarily when the devi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0441
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerShower
PowerShower has used a PowerShell document stealer module to pack and exfiltrate .txt, .pdf, .xls or .doc files smaller than 5MB that were modified during the past two days.[101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1505.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transport Agent
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various tasks such as filtering spam, filtering malici... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Off-Path Attacks Against PKI
The security of Internet-based applications fundamentally relies on the trustwortiness of Certificate Authorities (CAs). We practically demonstrate for the first time that even a very weak attacker, namely, an off-path attacker, can effectively subvert the trustworthines... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1036
ATT&CK Technique Name:Account Use Policies
Use conditional access policies to block logins from non-compliant devices or from outside defined organization IP ranges.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rover
Rover searches for files on attached removable drives based on a predefined list of file extensions every five seconds.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has used batch files to deploy open-source and multi-stage RATs.[181] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can decode encrypted strings to enable execution of commands and payloads.[191][192][193][194][195][196] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Amadey
Amadey has changed the Startup folder to the one containing its executable by overwriting the registry keys.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower can change its C2 channel once every 360 loops by retrieving a new domain from the actors’ S3 bucket.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0190
ATT&CK Technique Name:BITSAdmin
BITSAdmin can be used to create BITS Jobs to upload and/or download files.[67] | secon |
title:botconf2019 YARA-Signator: Automated Generation of Code-based YARA Rules
Composing YARA rules based on these feats requires a lot of experience and is typically done manually or at best tool-assisted, which still is a tedious and time-consuming process. In this presentation, we introduce YARA-Signator, an approac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1218.009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Regsvcs/Regasm
Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are binaries that may be digi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used junk code within their DLL files to hinder analysis.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mori
Mori can communicate using HTTP over IPv4 or IPv6 depending on a flag set.[215] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can download additional plug-ins to a compromised host.[112] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Qualcomm WiFi: Infinity War
Qualcomm is the chip manufacturer with the highest market share in smart phones. With hundreds of millions of devices using Qualcomm WiFi chips, any security issue can cause a big impact on users, among which, 0-click remote/adjacent attack surface is always the most con... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman has the ability to enumerate file and folder names.[98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used the tasklist /s command as well as taskmanager to obtain a list of running processes.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1562.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Modify System Firewall
Adversaries may disable or modify system firewalls in order to bypass controls limiting network usage. Changes could be disabling the entire mechanism as well as adding, deleting, or modifying particular rules. This can be done numerous ways de... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 used RDP to move laterally in victim networks.[22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Support Provider
Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cleaver
Cleaver has been known to dump credentials using Mimikatz and Windows Credential Editor.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony can download additional files onto the infected system.[352] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole uses variations of a simple XOR encryption routine for C&C communications.[72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has established persistence by creating a Registry run key.[121] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:HIDEDRV
HIDEDRV injects a DLL for Downdelph into the explorer.exe process.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0196
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY can gather AVs registered in the system.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer’s data wiper module writes zeros into the registry keys in SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services to render a system inoperable.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS creates a scheduled task to establish by executing a malicious payload every subsequent minute.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used UPX to pack a copy of Mimikatz.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Sweet Dreams: Abusing Sleep Mode to Break Wi-Fi Encryption and Disrupt WPA2/3 Networks
This presentation introduces two novel attacks that abuse the power-save (sleep) functionality of Wi-Fi. In our first attack, we target a protected Wi-Fi network and abuse sleep mode to leak frames in plaintext... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used multiple backdoors which communicate with a C2 server via email attachments.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0369
ATT&CK Technique Name:CoinTicker
CoinTicker downloads the EggShell mach-o binary using curl, which does not set the quarantine flag.[7] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 X-in-the-Middle: Attacking Fast Charging Piles and Electric Vehicles
Electric vehicles represented by Tesla are changing the way people travel. How to safely and quickly charge electric vehicles is a problem that manufacturers of electric vehicles and charging piles need to solve. We conducted an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can conduct an image hijack of an .msc file extension as part of its UAC bypass process.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0130
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ajax Security Team
Ajax Security Team has lured victims into executing malicious files.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can search registry keys to identify antivirus programs on an compromised host.[104] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1033
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Software Installation
Restrict software installation to trusted repositories only and be cautious of orphaned software packages. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0343
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Windows
Exaramel for Windows stores the backdoor's configuration in the Registry in XML format.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec contains a network loader to receive executable modules from remote attackers and run them on the local victim. It can also upload and download files over HTTP and HTTPS.[379][380] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.[67][68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can delete .LNK files created in the Startup folder.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0107
ATT&CK Technique Name:Whitefly
Whitefly has used search order hijacking to run the loader Vcrodat.[39] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 The Problems and Promise of WebAssembly
WebAssembly is a new standard that allows assembly-like code to run in browsers at near-native speed. But how does WebAssembly work, and how does it execute code while maintaining the security guarantees of a browser? This presentation gives an overview of th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
The Bumblebee loader can support the Dij command which gives it the ability to inject DLLs into the memory of other processes.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has sent spearphishing emails with a malicious executable disguised as a document or spreadsheet.[25][26][27][28][29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1053.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Systemd Timers
Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0201
ATT&CK Technique Name:JPIN
JPIN can obtain system information such as OS version and disk space.[179] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0568
ATT&CK Technique Name:EVILNUM
EVILNUM can upload files over the C2 channel from the infected host.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0414
ATT&CK Technique Name:BabyShark
BabyShark has a PowerShell-based remote administration ability that can implement a PowerShell or C# based keylogger.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot has been known to use PowerShell to download new payloads, open documents, and upload data to command and control servers. [231] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint has collected credit card data using native API functions.[138] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has gathered information about running services.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0021
During C0021, the threat actors sent phishing emails with unique malicious links, likely for tracking victim clicks.[31][32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0284
ATT&CK Technique Name:More_eggs
More_eggs has the capability to gather the username from the victim's machine.[119][120] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork payloads download additional files from the C2 server.[341][54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher takes a screenshot of the screen and displays it on top of all other windows for few seconds in an apparent attempt to hide some messages showed by the system during the setup process.[61][62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used its plainpwd tool, a modified version of Mimikatz, and comsvcs.dll to dump Windows credentials from system memory.[78][79][80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local P... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can check for the Kaspersky Anti-Virus suite.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has been observed adding the downloaded payload to the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key to maintain persistence.[81][82][83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0337
ATT&CK Technique Name:BadPatch
BadPatch can download and execute or update malware.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has downloaded files, malware, and tools from its C2 onto a compromised host.[252][253][254][129][134][255][256][257][258][259] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational network and systems to restrict access to critical system functions to predetermined management systems. [9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
Various implementations of CHOPSTICK communicate with C2 over HTTP.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1560.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Archive via Library
An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party libraries. Many libraries exist that can archive data, including Python rarfile , libzip , and zlib . Most libraries include functionality to encrypt and/or com... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream has compressed collected files with zLib and encrypted them using an XOR operation with the string key from the command line or qwerasdf if the command line argument doesn’t contain the key. File names are obfuscated using XOR with the same key as the compress... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex has used rundll32.exe to load a DLL for file encryption.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0515
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMail
WellMail can archive files on the compromised host.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Review privileged cloud account permission levels routinely to look for those that could allow an adversary to gain wide access, such as Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator in Azure AD.[14][15][16] These reviews should also check if ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0279
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proton
Proton modifies the tty_tickets line in the sudoers file.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used the malicious NTWDBLIB.DLL and cliconfig.exe to bypass UAC protections.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD has used HTTP for communications with command and control (C2) servers.[245][246] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
The different components of Machete are executed by Windows Task Scheduler.[98][99] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT can execute enum to enumerate files in storage on a compromised system.[282] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike has the ability to load DLLs via reflective injection.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0605
ATT&CK Technique Name:EKANS
EKANS infection resulted in a temporary production loss within a Honda manufacturing plant. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used batch scripts to perform reconnaissance.[248] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0608
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conficker
Conficker variants used the Windows AUTORUN feature to spread through USB propagation.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can use System namespace methods to execute lateral movement using DCOM.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1067
ATT&CK Technique Name:FluBot
FluBot can retrieve the contacts list from an infected device.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that can identify traffic patterns indicative of AiTM activity can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin uses various WMI queries to check if the sample is running in a sandbox.[112][113] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Security Advocacy Shouldn't Be for Security Professionals: An Analysis of How the Industry Misses the Mark and How We Can Improve
Call it what you will, security advocacy/evangelism/devrel content such as documentation, talks, demos, videos, etc. is usually targeted at other security professionals... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.