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ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
Operators deploying Netwalker have used psexec to copy the Netwalker payload across accessible systems.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0518
ATT&CK Technique Name:PolyglotDuke
PolyglotDuke can use steganography to hide C2 information in images.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
RedLeaves is launched through use of DLL search order hijacking to load a malicious dll.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot gathers the OS version, machine name, CPU type, amount of RAM available, and UEFI/BIOS firmware information from the victim’s machine.[371][372][373][374] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Give Me a SQL Injection, I Shall PWN IIS and SQL Server
IIS and SQL Servers play very important roles in the Microsoft Ecosystem. They have been considered unbreakable for many years, and over one decade has passed since the last severe IIS memory corruption vulnerability was disclosed. Are they u... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has injected itself into remote processes to encrypt files using a combination of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread.[54] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 From Thousands of Hours to a Couple of Minutes: Automating Exploit Generation for Arbitrary Types of Kernel Vulnerabilities
Writing a working exploit for a vulnerability is generally challenging, time-consuming, and labor-intensive. To address this issue, automated exploit generation techniques can ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has the ability to replace the pam_unix.so file on an infected machine with its own malicious version that accepts a specific backdoor password for all users.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0365
ATT&CK Technique Name:Olympic Destroyer
Olympic Destroyer uses WMI to help propagate itself across a network.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
Authenticate all access to field controllers before authorizing access to, or modification of, a device's state, logic, or programs. Centralized authentication techniques can help manage the large number of field controller accounts needed across the ICS. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Devices should authenticate all messages between master and outstation assets. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0381
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlawedAmmyy
FlawedAmmyy can collect the victim's operating system and computer name during the initial infection.[139] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0565
ATT&CK Technique Name:Raindrop
Raindrop was installed under names that resembled legitimate Windows file and directory names.[134][135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has created LNK files in the Startup folder to establish persistence.[276] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055
ATT&CK Technique Name:Process Injection
Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0589
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sibot
Sibot has installed a second-stage script in the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\sibot registry key.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet injects an entire DLL into an existing, newly created, or preselected trusted process.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT can execute loadfromfile, loadfromstorage, and loadfrommem to inject a DLL from disk, storage, or memory respectively.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing attempts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has sent stolen payment card data to remote servers via HTTP POSTs.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0399
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pallas
Pallas tracks the latitude and longitude coordinates of the infected device.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
Disable legacy authentication, which does not support MFA, and require the use of modern authentication protocols instead. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0324
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpyDealer
SpyDealer can record phone calls and surrounding audio.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot has used a VNC module to monitor the victim and collect information to pivot to valuable systems on the network [19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0332
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remcos
Remcos searches for Sandboxie and VMware on the system.[45] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 InfoSec Philosophies for the Corrupt Economy
The majority of systematic approaches to information security are created by contributors from stable nation states, where the design assumes that the originator is wholesome and true, the playing field is lush and green and the children frolic care-free... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Net
Lateral movement can be done with Net through net use commands to connect to the on remote systems.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0284
ATT&CK Technique Name:More_eggs
More_eggs can obtain information on installed anti-malware programs.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can be installed via DLL side-loading.[56][17][53] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 All You Ever Wanted to Know about the AMD Platform Security Processor and were Afraid to Emulate - Inside a Deeply Embedded Security Processor
AMDs Zen (and later) CPUs contain the "(Platform) Secure Processor" (PSP) which is an embedded ARM core inside your x86 CPU responsible for initial system b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group sent emails to victims with malicious Microsoft Office documents attached.[110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats decompresses ZIP files once on the victim machine.[150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valid Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT has the ability to set file attributes to "hidden" to hide files from the compromised user's view in Windows File Explorer.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used the storescyncsvc.dll BEACON backdoor to download a secondary backdoor.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST communicated via HTTP GET or HTTP POST requests to third party servers for C2.[324] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0611
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clop
Clop has used the sleep command to avoid sandbox detection.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
Authenticate all access to field controllers before authorizing access to, or modification of, a device's state, logic, or programs. Centralized authentication techniques can help manage the large number of field controller accounts needed across the ICS. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used valid VPN credentials to gain initial access.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Moses Staff
Moses Staff has downloaded and installed web shells to following path C:\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\system_web\IISpool.aspx.[302] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain can collect the username from a compromised host.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
One of Attor's plugins can collect user credentials via capturing keystrokes and can capture keystrokes pressed within the window of the injected process.[23] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Hands Off and Putting SLAB/SLUB Feng Shui in a Blackbox
Successful exploitation against a Linux kernel vulnerability requires the manipulation of memory layout. Over the past years, security researchers have already invented and summarized various memory layout manipulation mechanisms. However, it ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has the ability to communicate with its C2 over HTTP.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec has a plugin detect security products via active drivers.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can download and execute additional files.[467] | secon |
title:botconf2018 The Snake Keeps Reinventing Itself
After having tracked Turla’s activities for several years, we now have a unique understanding of their Tools, Tactics and Procedures (TTPs). In this talk, we would like to share this knowledge to help defenders protect their networks.Turla is an espionage group known... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0514
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMess
WellMess can identify the computer name of a compromised host.[393][394] | secon |
title:botconf2020 Fluxxy Dissection
The first reference to Fluxxy is due to N. Summerlin and B. Porter in 2013 [1]. They describe a network of proxy dedicated to cybercrime operations. While this rogue hosting service has been running for nine years, its intelligence coverage remains low. Fluxxy is a notorious bulletpr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has used net use and netstat to conduct internal discovery of systems. The group has also used quser.exe to identify existing RDP sessions on a victim.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Isolation and Sandboxing
Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. [94] [95]Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can use XDG Autostart Entries to establish persistence.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay has created Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[217] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic has used scheduled tasks to add persistence.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence for their tools.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Trust Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources ba... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0181
ATT&CK Technique Name:FALLCHILL
FALLCHILL collects MAC address and local IP address information from the victim.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Android 11 introduced privacy enhancements to package visibility, filtering results that are returned from the package manager. iOS 12 removed the private API that could previously be used to list installed applications on non-app store applications.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can use vssadmin to delete volume shadow copies and bcdedit to disable recovery features.[47][48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used rundll32 to execute malicious payloads on a compromised host.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used mshta.exe to execute HTML pages downloaded by initial access documents.[23][24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT uses WMI to check the BIOS and manufacturer information for strings like "VMWare", "Virtual", and "XEN" and another WMI request to get the current temperature of the hardware to determine if it's a virtual machine environment. [26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0569
ATT&CK Technique Name:Explosive
Explosive has leveraged its keylogging capabilities to gain access to administrator accounts on target servers.[64][65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can exfiltrate locally stored data via its C2.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil uses the SMB protocol to encrypt files located on remotely connected file shares. [10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0695
ATT&CK Technique Name:Donut
Donut can patch Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI), Windows Lockdown Policy (WLDP), as well as exit-related Native API functions to avoid process termination.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can enumerate all logical drives on a targeted machine.[140] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0371
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERTON
POWERTON has the ability to dump password hashes.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
KeyBoy can determine the public or WAN IP address for the system.[119] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has used base64 encoding to hide command strings delivered from the C2.[94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0381
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlawedAmmyy
FlawedAmmyy has used cmd to execute commands on a compromised host.[130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0561
ATT&CK Technique Name:GuLoader
GuLoader can establish persistence via the Registry under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce.[112] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 APIC's Adventures in Wonderland
Software-defined networking (SDN) along-side with micro-segmentation has been proposed as a new paradigm to deploy applications faster and, simultaneously, protect the individual workloads against lateral movement. Its implementation usually follows an application-ce... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 macOS Vulnerabilities Hiding in Plain Sight
Sometimes when we publish details and writeups about vulnerabilities we are so focused on the actual bug, that we don't notice others, which might be still hidden inside the details. The same can happen when we read these issues, but if we keep our eyes ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0550
ATT&CK Technique Name:DoubleAgent
DoubleAgent has collected files from the infected device.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents on the DCCC and DNC networks.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1036
ATT&CK Technique Name:Account Use Policies
Use conditional access policies to block logins from non-compliant devices or from outside defined organization IP ranges.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Script blocking extensions can help prevent the execution of scripts and HTA files that may commonly be used during the exploitation process. For malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first place... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has reflectively loaded the decoded DLL into memory.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Android 9 introduced a new security policy that prevents applications from reading or writing data to other applications’ internal storage directories, regardless of permissions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0334
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkComet
DarkComet can disable Security Center functions like anti-virus.[26][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee has the ability to set a hardcoded and randomized sleep interval.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, stolen data was copied into a text file using the format From <COMPUTER-NAME> (<Month>-<Day> <Hour>-<Minute>-<Second>).txt prior to compression, encoding, and exfiltration.[73] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Mem2Img: Memory-Resident Malware Detection via Convolution Neural Network
Process injection is a widely used defensive evasion technique commonly used for malware and fileless adversary transactions and requires running custom code in the address space of another process. Process injection improve... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0633
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sliver
Sliver has the ability to manipulate user tokens on targeted Windows systems.[22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0617
ATT&CK Technique Name:HELLOKITTY
HELLOKITTY can use an embedded RSA-2048 public key to encrypt victim data for ransom.[41] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Attacking and Defending Blockchains: From Horror Stories to Secure Wallets
This talk will review some of the most spectacular security failures in blockchain systems, and will help you mitigate your risks. We will notably review some of the most dramatic Ethereum smart contract issues, discuss objec... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
The FunnyDream FilepakMonitor component can inject into the Bka.exe process using the VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread APIs to load the DLL component.[31] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 From Bot to Robot: How Abilities and Law Change with Physicality
Online bots and real-world robots are both capable of manipulating people and communities. Online bots are part of attacks on human belief systems that range in scale from nation-states to smaller communities, aimed at disrupting, cau... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0244
ATT&CK Technique Name:Comnie
Comnie encrypts command and control communications with RC4.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can list all files and their associated attributes, including filename, type, owner, creation time, last access time, last write time, size, and permissions.[330] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
For Operation Spalax, the threat actors used dynamic DNS services, including Duck DNS and DNS Exit, as part of their C2 infrastructure.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0918
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can change service states and configurations. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed has the ability to search for .txt, .ppt, .hwp, .pdf, and .doc files in specified directories.[10] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Security Analysis of CHERI ISA
The CHERI ISA extension provides memory-protection features which allow historically memory-unsafe programming languages such as C and C++ to be adapted to provide robust, compatible, and efficient protections against many currently widely exploited memory safety vuln... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot decodes the configuration data and modules.[233][234][235] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 used Cloudflare services for data exfiltration.[3] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.