text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles, that may be abused to remotely boot a machine in safe mode.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar's loader can delete scheduled tasks created by a previous instance of the malware.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0180
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volgmer
Volgmer can gather the IP address from the victim's machine.[245] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1582
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMS Control
Adversaries may delete, alter, or send SMS messages without user authorization. This could be used to hide C2 SMS messages, spread malware, or various external effects. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony attachments have been delivered via compressed archive files. Pony also obfuscates the memory flow by adding junk instructions when executing to make analysis more difficult.[254] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0390
ATT&CK Technique Name:SQLRat
SQLRat has used been observed deleting scripts once used.[224] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Dilemma in IoT Access Control: Revealing Novel Attacks and Design Challenges in Mobile-as-a-Gateway IoT
From Bluetooth smart locks to item trackers, Mobile-as-a-Gateway (MaaG) IoT devices are everywhere. MaaG IoT devices use mobile devices as gateways to connect to the internet for management. The... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0473
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avenger
Avenger has the ability to use HTTP in communication with C2.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST collected hostname, OS version, and device uptime.[357][358] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0451
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoudMiner
LoudMiner deleted installation files after completion.[135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
Developers should use Android App Links[4] and iOS Universal Links[5] to provide a secure binding between URIs and applications, preventing malicious applications from intercepting redirections. Additionally, for OAuth use cases, PKCE[6] should be use... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used net time to check the local time on a target system.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used spearphishing to compromise credentials.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0196
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY mimics filenames from %SYSTEM%\System32 to hide DLLs in %WINDIR% and/or %TEMP%.[129][130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0149
ATT&CK Technique Name:MoonWind
MoonWind can obtain the victim hostname, Windows version, RAM amount, number of drives, and screen resolution.[234] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 CnCHunter: An MITM-Approach to Identify Live CnC Servers
How can we identify active CnC servers? Answering this question is critical for containing and combating botnets. Finding CnC servers is not trivial because: CnC servers can change locations expressly to avoid detection, use proprietary commu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0488
ATT&CK Technique Name:CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec can execute PowerShell commands via WMI.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats actors obtained a list of active processes on the victim and sent them to C2 servers.[85] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 A Walk Through Historical Correlations Between Vulnerabilities & Stock Prices
By common sense, we know that security vulnerabilities, data breaches, ransomware, privacy concerns and state-sponsored attacks impact negatively on the stock prices of public companies, but to what extent? How quickly w... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 IPvSeeYou: Exploiting Leaked Identifiers in IPv6 for Street-Level Geolocation
While IP Geolocation -- tying an IP address to a physical location -- is in common use, available public and commercial techniques and tools provide only coarse city-level locations that are often wrong. With "IPvSeeYou,"... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Evasion - The Story of Confirmed Vulnerability
Microsoft Defender for Office 365 safeguards your organization against malicious threats posed by email messages, links (URLs), and collaboration tools. Safe Attachments routes all messages and attachments that do not h... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN5
FIN5 has has used the tool GET2 Penetrator to look for remote login and hard-coded credentials.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
GoldMax can download and execute additional files.[200][201] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar has used XOR, RSA2, and RC4 encrypted files.[46][47][48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has used several Windows API functions throughout the encryption process including IsDebuggerPresent, TerminateProcess, Process32FirstW, among others.[117] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy enumerates information about connected storage devices.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0574
ATT&CK Technique Name:BendyBear
BendyBear has the ability to determine local time on a compromised host.[14] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Emulating Samsung's Baseband for Security Testing
The most crucial interface between modern mobile phones and cellular networks are baseband processors. Basebands are responsible for processing the complicated 2G thru 5G protocols, which gives them a large attack surface. Unfortunately, explorin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1560.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Archive via Utility
Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes can capture screenshots of the infected machine.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can use a variety of commands, including esentutl.exe to steal sensitive data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge, to acquire information that is subsequently exfiltrated.[149][150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has tested if the localhost network is available and other connection capability on an infected system using command scripts.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Enforce registration and execution of only legitimately signed service drivers where possible. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0228
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanHaiShu
NanHaiShu collects the username from the victim.[124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used a Powershell cmdlet to grant the ApplicationImpersonation role to a compromised account.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0598
ATT&CK Technique Name:P.A.S. Webshell
P.A.S. Webshell has the ability to copy files on a compromised host.[135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0698
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWizard
HermeticWizard has been signed by valid certificates assigned to Hermetica Digital.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0651
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoxCaon
BoxCaon has searched for files on the system, such as documents located in the desktop folder.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Controller Authentication
Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, malicious files were decoded prior to execution.[164] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0575
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conti
Conti can retrieve the ARP cache from the local system by using the GetIpNetTable() API call and check to ensure IP addresses it connects to are for local, non-Internet, systems.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0107
ATT&CK Technique Name:Whitefly
Whitefly has used malicious .exe or .dll files disguised as documents or images.[252] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX can be added as a service to establish persistence. PlugX also has a module to change service configurations as well as start, control, and delete services.[89][90][91][92][93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1102.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dead Drop Resolver
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfus... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can establish an SSH connection from a compromised host to a server.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1497.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Activity Based Checks
Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environm... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0258
ATT&CK Technique Name:RGDoor
RGDoor encrypts files with XOR before sending them back to the C2 server.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to gather TCP and UDP table status listings.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Port Monitors
Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. This DLL can be located in C:\Windows\Sys... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0099
ATT&CK Technique Name:Arp
Arp can be used to display ARP configuration information on the host.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet encrypts exfiltrated data via C2 with static 31-byte long XOR keys.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerDuke
PowerDuke achieves persistence by using various Registry Run keys.[198] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Small Sieve
Small Sieve has the ability to add itself to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\OutlookMicrosift for persistence.[246] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS has used cmd.exe and batch files for execution.[181] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 The Cyber Safety Review Board: Studying Incidents to Drive Systemic Change
Join Rob Silvers (DHS Undersecretary for Policy and Chair of the Cyber Safety Review Board) and Heather Adkins (Deputy Chair and Vice President, Security Engineering, Google) for a discussion about the Cyber Safety Review B... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can add a CLSID key for payload execution through Registry.CurrentUser.CreateSubKey("Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\{" + clsid + "}\\InProcServer32").[13] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Morning Beverage Break (Briefings)
Open to Briefings Passholders. Please wear your badge. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0637
ATT&CK Technique Name:NativeZone
NativeZone has used rundll32 to execute a malicious DLL.[69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1647
ATT&CK Technique Name:Plist File Modification
Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system defenses. macOS applications use plist files, such as the info.plist file, to store properties and configuration ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0403
ATT&CK Technique Name:Riltok
Riltok can query various details about the device, including phone number, country, mobile operator, model, root availability, and operating system version.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet uses a driver registered as a boot start service as the main load-point.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1491.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:External Defacement
An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. External Defacement may ultimately cause users to distrust the systems and to question/discredit the sy... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drinik
Drinik can use keylogging to steal user banking credentials.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT has been delivered via Word documents using DDE for execution.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:StreamEx
StreamEx establishes persistence by installing a new service pointing to its DLL and setting the service to auto-start.[114] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can modify the registry run keys HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook has a command to get the public IP address from a system.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa used JavaScript to execute additional files.[38][39][40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0529
ATT&CK Technique Name:CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal can access the device’s location and track the device over time.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0684
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROADTools
ROADTools automatically gathers data from Azure AD environments using the Azure Graph API.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
Disable legacy authentication, which does not support MFA, and require the use of modern authentication protocols instead. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
The primary delivered mechanism for Agent Tesla is through email phishing messages.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor can use GetLocalTime and GetSystemTime to collect system time.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has been seen exploiting SMB via a vulnerability exploit like EternalBlue (MS17-010) to achieve lateral movement and propagation. [12][13][14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0887
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wireless Sniffing
Adversaries may seek to capture radio frequency (RF) communication used for remote control and reporting in distributed environments. RF communication frequencies vary between 3 kHz to 300 GHz, although are commonly between 300 MHz to 6 GHz. The wavelength and f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement. They manipulated scheduled tasks by updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the sche... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT has used port 1177 for HTTP C2 communications.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla has established persistence via the Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Run registry key and by creating a .lnk shortcut file in the Windows startup folder.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT can capture the victim’s screen remotely.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0667
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chrommme
Chrommme can retrieve the username from a targeted system.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
In one instance, menuPass added PlugX as a service with a display name of "Corel Writing Tools Utility."[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:GOLD SOUTHFIELD
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used publicly-accessible RDP and remote management and monitoring (RMM) servers to gain access to victim machines.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Derusbi
A Linux version of Derusbi checks if the victim user ID is anything other than zero (normally used for root), and the malware will not execute if it does not have root privileges. Derusbi also gathers the username of the victim.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0105
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkVishnya
DarkVishnya created new services for shellcode loaders distribution.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has collected credentials for the target organization from previous breaches for use in brute force attacks.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0536
ATT&CK Technique Name:GPlayed
GPlayed has base64-encoded the exfiltrated data, replacing some of the base64 characters to further obfuscate the data.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0399
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pallas
Pallas stores domain information and URL paths as hardcoded AES-encrypted, base64-encoded strings.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can establish persistence on a compromised host through modifying the profile, login, and run command (rc) files associated with the bash, csh, and tcsh shells. [12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication and limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by preventing Privilege Escalation opportunities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1641
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Manipulation
Adversaries may insert, delete, or alter data in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making. | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Building Better CSIRTs Using Behavioral Psychology
Have you ever worked on a security team where the decisions, communication, and overall team culture are dominated by one or two "rock stars"? Are constant disagreements and passive-aggression among team members hurting your ability to respond effe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows can set the timestamps for its worker and service components to match that of cmd.exe.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used compromised credentials to log on to other systems and escalate privileges.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic gathers a list of all user accounts, privilege classes, and time of last logon.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can use a Visual Basic script to exclude the C:\ drive from Windows Defender.[164][165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0810
ATT&CK Technique Name:Out-of-Band Communications Channel
Ensure devices have an alternative method for communicating in the event that a valid COM port is unavailable. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy has run a plug-in on a victim to spread through the local network by using PsExec and accessing admin shares.[11] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 How I Can Unlock Your Smart Door: Security Pitfalls in Cross-Vendor IoT Access Control
Internet of Things (IoT) devices are increasingly managed through the clouds, which mediate the users' access to devices, e.g., only authorized users can unlock a door. These clouds are operated by device vendo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider used Base64 encoding to obfuscate an Empire service and PowerShell commands.[87][88] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.