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title:botconf2015 Inside DarkComet: a wild case-study
This research discusses the application of a framework for the automated analysis of malware samples, specifically botnet binaries, which automates the collection, analysis, and infiltration of botnets. Due to the increased number of samples released daily, such fra... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Can You Hear Me Now? Remote Eavesdropping Vulnerabilities in Mobile Messaging Applications
On January 29, 2019, a serious vulnerability was discovered by multiple parties in Group FaceTime which allowed an attacker to call a target and force the call to connect without user interaction from the tar... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0638
ATT&CK Technique Name:Babuk
Babuk has the ability to enumerate files on a targeted system.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can migrate into another process using reflective DLL injection.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment. [8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1090.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:External Proxy
Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can take a screenshot of the current desktop.[156] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used a tool to run cmd /c wmic computersystem get domain for discovery.[72] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Securing the System: A Deep Dive into Reversing Android Pre-Installed Apps
The Android security community has been predominantly focused on user-space applications for many years. However, there is a distribution mechanism for security issues that affects more unknowing users, generally allows more ... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Unveiling the Underground World of Anti-Cheats
In a world where billion players spend money in games while playing, it was obvious that a parallel market had to come out of it. In this not that new world is related to Cheats, Cheat and Anti-Cheat Developers fight in an endless holy war to see who w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Enterprise Policy
An EMM/MDM can use the Android DevicePolicyManager.setPermittedAccessibilityServices method to set an explicit list of applications that are allowed to use Android's accessibility features. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0638
ATT&CK Technique Name:Babuk
Babuk has the ability to use the command line to control execution on compromised hosts.[30][31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has downloaded a zip file for execution on the system.[4][5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has attempted to get detailed information about a compromised host, including the operating system, version, patches, hotfixes, and service packs.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has deleted files associated with their payload after execution.[162][163] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0585
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kerrdown
Kerrdown can decode, decrypt, and decompress multiple layers of shellcode.[122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assig... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry initially infected IT networks, but by means of an exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet enumerates the currently running processes related to a variety of security products.[98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Specific developer utilities may not be necessary within a given environment and should be removed if not used. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0271
ATT&CK Technique Name:KEYMARBLE
KEYMARBLE has a command to create Registry entries for storing data under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WABE\DataPath.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:StreamEx
StreamEx has the ability to enumerate processes.[240] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can query shared drives on the local system.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1481
ATT&CK Technique Name:Web Service
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media, acting as a mechanism for C2, may give a significant amount of cover. This is due to the likelihood that hosts ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has collected data and files from a compromised machine.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1632.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing Policy Modification
Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of applications signed with unofficial or unknown keys. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on an app from a developer, guaranteeing that the program has not been tampere... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can perform browser pivoting and inject into a user's browser to inherit cookies, authenticated HTTP sessions, and client SSL certificates.[4][9] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 2
At the end of day two of this year's virtual conference, join Black Hat Review Board members Mika Devonshire, Seungjoo Kim, Asuka Nakajima, and Neil Wyler for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. Thi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can store its components in the Registry.[10] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Veni, No Vidi, No Vici: Attacks on ETW Blind EDR Sensors
Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) is a built-in feature, originally designed to perform software diagnostics, and nowadays ETW is essential for Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR) solutions. ETW is deeply integrated into the Windows kernel and i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has been seen changing malicious files to appear legitimate.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0274
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calisto
Calisto runs the ifconfig command to obtain the IP address from the victim’s machine.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETEAGLE
The "SCOUT" variant of NETEAGLE achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use WinRM to execute a payload on a remote host.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Ghost
For Operation Ghost, APT29 registered Twitter accounts to host C2 nodes.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used fsutil fsinfo drives, systeminfo, and vssadmin list shadows for system information including shadow volumes and drive information.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through the Winlogon helper process by using application control [14] tools like AppLocker [15] [16] that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown DLLs. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
ADVSTORESHELL can run Systeminfo to gather information about the victim.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0433
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rifdoor
Rifdoor has encrypted command and control (C2) communications with a stream cipher.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0479
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEFENSOR ID
DEFENSOR ID can abuse the accessibility service to perform actions on behalf of the user, including launching attacker-specified applications to steal data.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has identified high-value email accounts in academia, journalism, NGO's, foreign policy, and national security for targeting.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0543
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spark
Spark has used a splash screen to check whether an user actively clicks on the screen before running malicious code.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0884
ATT&CK Technique Name:Connection Proxy
Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used a modified and obfuscated version of the reGeorg web shell to maintain persistence on a target's Outlook Web Access (OWA) server.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes can download additional files onto an infected machine.[101] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Practical Defenses Against Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial machine learning has hit the spotlight as a topic relevant to practically-minded security teams, but noise and hype have diluted the discourse to gradient-based comparisons of blueberry muffins and chihuahuas. This fails to reflect ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can exploit Oracle Java vulnerabilities for execution, including CVE-2011-3544, CVE-2013-2465, CVE-2012-4681, and CVE-2013-2460.[38][39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used domain accounts to gain further access to victim systems.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1550.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Web Session Cookie
Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0434
ATT&CK Technique Name:Imminent Monitor
Imminent Monitor has encrypted the spearphish attachments to avoid detection from email gateways; the debugger also encrypts information before sending to the C2.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain can support an HKCMD sideloading start method.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can find information about processes running on local and remote systems.[94][95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used WizTree to obtain network files and directory listings.[129] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used web shells, often to maintain access to a victim network.[28][29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can use fileless UAC bypass and create an elevated COM object to escalate privileges.[36][37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0481
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ragnar Locker
Ragnar Locker has used cmd.exe and batch scripts to execute commands.[274] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET adds malicious file paths to the DYLD_FRAMEWORK_PATH and DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variables to execute malicious code.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used valid credentials for privileged accounts with the goal of accessing domain controllers.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
The QakBot dropper can delay dropping the payload to evade detection.[34][35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat can use Windows commands such as fsutil behavior set SymLinkEvaluation R2L:1 to redirect file system access to a different location after gaining access into compromised networks.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mis-Type
Mis-Type has downloaded additional malware and files onto a compromised host.[295] | secon |
title:botconf2013 Back to life, back to correlation
In this presentation, I will talk about all the distinctive characteristics of botnet behavior and more specifically, how we can detect it using effective solutions while avoiding over flood of false positives. How we can collect pieces of information across the IT in... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can use cmd.exe for execution on compromised hosts.[72] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 BitLeaker: Subverting BitLocker with One Vulnerability
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a tamper-resistant security module. It has been widely deployed in commercial devices to protect secret data and ensure the trustworthiness of a system. There are two typical types of TPMs, hardware-based discr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif droppers have used COM properties to execute malware in hidden windows.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has been known to create or enable accounts, such as support_388945a0.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN5
FIN5 has used legitimate VPN, Citrix, or VNC credentials to maintain access to a victim environment.[16][17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0055
ATT&CK Technique Name:RARSTONE
RARSTONE uses SSL to encrypt its communication with its C2 server.[56] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Adventures in the Underland: The CQForensic Toolkit as a Unique Weapon Against Hackers
Best practices come out when true experts’ experience meets the power of science! Let’s face it: hackers’ creativity has no end. What is more, people, the most valuable resource, are not always aware of the level ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET performs AES-CBC encryption on files under ~/Documents, ~/Downloads, and~/Desktop with a fixed key and renames files to give them a .enc extension. Only files with sizes less than 500MB are encrypted.[94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil sends HTTPS POST messages with randomly generated URLs to communicate with a remote server. [4] [5] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Unleashing the Power of My 20+ Years Old Car
When I came to Japan about a year and half ago, the first thing I did was buy a car. Coming from a ~70hp family car, I chose to go for something more powerful and bought a 90's sports car. I've been dailying it and tracking it since then (> 50 000km so fa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has injected a malicious DLL into the Windows Media Player process (wmplayer.exe).[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Remove unnecessary tools and software from containers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0291
ATT&CK Technique Name:PJApps
PJApps has the capability to collect and leak the victim's phone number, mobile device unique identifier (IMEI).[21] | secon |
title:botconf2019 Malspam is different spam
Malspam’ (an umbrella term for spam campaigns that deliver malware or send users to phishing sites) has long been the prominent way for individuals and organisations to get themselves infected. These campaigns are opportunistic (i.e. non targeted), which distinguishes them fr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1590.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:IP Addresses
Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as... | secon |
title:botconf2019 “DESKTOP-Group” – Tracking a Persistent Threat Group (using Email Headers)
At BotConf 2015, I presented a lightning talk “Creating your own CTI in 3 minutes”. This presentation is building on that capability to do semi-automated malware analysis based on a commercial sandbox solution. I will discuss a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used Base64 to encode files with a custom key.[243] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0026
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT18
APT18 actors used the native at Windows task scheduler tool to use scheduled tasks for execution on a victim network.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz's MISC::AddSid module can appended any SID or user/group account to a user's SID-History. Mimikatz also utilizes SID-History Injection to expand the scope of other components such as generated Kerberos Golden Tickets and DCSync beyond a single domain.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. can use overlays capture banking credentials and credit card information, and can open arbitrary WebViews from the C2.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valid Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0480
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cerberus
Cerberus can inject input to grant itself additional permissions without user interaction and to prevent application removal.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has used the WindowStyle parameter to conceal PowerShell windows. [8] [9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has been observed targeting organizations using spearphishing documents with embedded malicious payloads. [8] Highly targeted spear phishing campaigns have been conducted against a U.S. electric grid company. [9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can retrieve system information, such as CPU speed, from Registry keys.[48][49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group digitally signed their own malware to evade detection.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use Python to perform execution.[9][10][11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can Base64 encode strings, store downloaded files in reverse byte order, and use the Eazfuscator tool to obfuscate its third stage.[351][352][353] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity has used encrypted strings in its dropper component.[313][314] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0346
ATT&CK Technique Name:OceanSalt
OceanSalt can collect the computer name from the system.[255] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1553.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Install Root Certificate
Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root ce... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0699
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mythic
Mythic supports SMB-based peer-to-peer C2 profiles.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication on remote service logons where possible. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has exfiltrated data over FTP separately from its primary C2 channel over DNS.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0256
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mosquito
Mosquito establishes persistence under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Run auto_update.[166] | secon |
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Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.