text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0610
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideTwist
SideTwist can embed C2 responses in the source code of a fake Flickr webpage.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Automated Discovery of Deserialization Gadget Chains
Although vulnerabilities stemming from the deserialization of untrusted data have been understood for many years, unsafe deserialization continues to be a vulnerability class that isn't going away. Attention on Java deserialization vulnerabilitie... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aquatic Panda
Aquatic Panda has attempted to discover services for third party EDR products.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has deployed privileged containers that mount the filesystem of victim machine.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0026
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT18
APT18 actors used the native at Windows task scheduler tool to use scheduled tasks for execution on a victim network.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk can use stolen domain admin accounts to move laterally within a victim domain.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0362
ATT&CK Technique Name:Linux Rabbit
Linux Rabbit brute forces SSH passwords in order to attempt to gain access and install its malware onto the server. [17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1197
ATT&CK Technique Name:BITS Jobs
Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute code and perform various background tasks. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat can clear Windows event logs using wevtutil.exe.[7] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 AI & ML in Cyber Security - Why Algorithms are Dangerous
Every single security company is talking in some way or another about how they are applying machine learning. Companies go out of their way to make sure they mention machine learning and not statistics when they explain how they work. Recentl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0451
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoudMiner
LoudMiner has set the attributes of the VirtualBox directory and VBoxVmService parent directory to "hidden".[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET has used mdfind to enumerate a list of apps known to grant screen sharing permissions.[332] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay can use the Windows Command Shell for execution.[233] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1078.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Local Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba logs keystrokes via polling by using GetKeyState and VkKeyScan functions.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0137
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ferocious Kitten
Ferocious Kitten has obtained open source tools for its operations, including JsonCPP and Psiphon.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can register itself as a system service to gain persistence.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig uses remote services such as VPN, Citrix, or OWA to persist in an environment.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat has decompressed its core DLL using shellcode once an impersonated antivirus component was running on a system.[212] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0616
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEATHRANSOM
DEATHRANSOM can use public and private key pair encryption to encrypt files for ransom payment.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound malware has obtained the victim username and sent it to the C2 server.[108][109][110] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Oops..! I Glitched It Again! How to Multi-Glitch the Glitching-Protections on ARM TrustZone-M
Fault Injection (FI), also referred to as Glitching, has proven to be a severe threat to real-world computing devices. In this kind of attack, physical faults are injected into a device at runtime, to deli... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0544
ATT&CK Technique Name:HenBox
HenBox has obfuscated components using XOR, ZIP with a single-byte key or ZIP/Zlib compression wrapped with RC4 encryption.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546
ATT&CK Technique Name:Event Triggered Execution
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as r... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 How I Created My Clone Using AI - Next-Gen Social Engineering
This talk is inspired by an episode of Black Mirror. I will be demonstrating a live demo creating a bot who talks like me and can be used to impersonate me online and do social engineering. I will be showing a live demo of how to a creat... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Alexa, Hack My Server(less) Please
When adopting serverless technology, we eliminate the need to manage a server for our application. By doing so, we also pass some of the security threats to the cloud provider. We do not need to care about OS patching and configuration any more. It's all in the sa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats used executables to download malicious files from different sources.[297][298] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
The Remsec loader implements itself with the name Security Support Provider, a legitimate Windows function. Various Remsec .exe files mimic legitimate file names used by Microsoft, Symantec, Kaspersky, Hewlett-Packard, and VMWare. Remsec also disguised malicious modules usin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used spearphishing attachments to deliver initial access payloads.[158][159][160] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 leverages the Windows API calls: VirtualAlloc(), WriteProcessMemory(), and CreateRemoteThread() for process injection.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used Prestige ransomware to encrypt data at targeted organizations in transportation and related logistics industries in Ukraine and Poland.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has split archived exfiltration files into chunks smaller than 1MB.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0582
ATT&CK Technique Name:LookBack
LookBack has used VBA macros in Microsoft Word attachments to drop additional files to the host.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta has the ability to use native APIs for numerous functions including discovery and defense evasion.[38][39][40][41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1027.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTML Smuggling
Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be co... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has the ability to list the names of all open windows on the infected host.[11] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Breakfast
Breakfast will be served in Shoreline (South Convention Center, Level 2) at 9:00 AM - 10:00 AM. Please wear your badge. Open to Briefings pass holders. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot can identify the groups the user on a compromised host belongs to.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has used a 30 minute delay after execution to evade sandbox monitoring tools.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire contains a variety of enumeration modules that have an option to use API calls to carry out tasks.[74] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 New Trends in Browser Exploitation: Attacking Client-Side JIT Compilers
As finding reliably exploitable vulnerabilities in web browser engines becomes gradually harder, attackers turn to previously less explored areas of the code. One of these seems especially interesting: just-in-time (JIT) compil... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
If possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational assets and their management devices based on their functional role within the process. Enabling more strict isolation to more critical control and operational information within the control environment. [4] [5] [6] [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony has been delivered via spearphishing attachments.[180] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used valid credentials with various services during lateral movement.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0257
ATT&CK Technique Name:VERMIN
VERMIN collects keystrokes from the victim machine.[178] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption property is set to disabled unless there are application requirements.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAMMERTOSS
The "tDiscoverer" variant of HAMMERTOSS establishes a C2 channel by downloading resources from Web services like Twitter and GitHub. HAMMERTOSS binaries contain an algorithm that generates a different Twitter handle for the malware to check for instructions every day.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0695
ATT&CK Technique Name:Donut
Donut includes subprojects that enumerate and identify information about Process Injection candidates.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0362
ATT&CK Technique Name:Linux Rabbit
Linux Rabbit attempts to gain access to the server via SSH.[28] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Operation Clairvoyance: How APT Groups Spy on the Media Industry
Cyber espionage actors have demonstrated great interest in the media industry. These actors seem to like to see Taiwan's daily activities through the "eyes" of these media companies and journalists. During Taiwan's intense 2022, we ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can add a SID-History to a user if on a domain controller.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can exfiltrate files via the C2 channel.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tonto Team
Tonto Team abuses a legitimate and signed Microsoft executable to launch a malicious DLL.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1205.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Port Knocking
Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can download its second stage from a hardcoded URL within the loader's code.[203][204] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential Adversary-in-the-Middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate. [6] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 A Brief History of Mitigation: The Path to EL1 in iOS 11
In December last year, I released the async_wake exploit for iOS 11.1.2. In this talk, I'll cover how each step of the exploit worked and discuss in depth each mitigation which was defeated along the way.I'll focus on what was supposed to mak... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER can use base64 encoded C2 communications.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0560
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEARDROP
TEARDROP created and read from a file with a fake JPG header, and its payload was encrypted with a simple rotating XOR cipher.[317][328][264] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Clocking On
A nerd's eye view of time and timekeeping...Moves are finally afoot to secure time! Well, to secure what we consider to be the current time. Or, to be more specific, to secure how we distribute what we consider to be the consensus of what is the "current" time. And by "we" I mean The Int... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Insights and Predictions: What's Next in InfoSec
At the beginning of day two of this year's virtual conference, join Black Hat Review Board members Lidia Giuliano, Vitaly Kamluk, Vandana Verma, and Neil Wyler (Grifter) with Moderator, Jeff Wilson for an insightful conversation on the most pre... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict read/write access to system-level process files to only select privileged users who have a legitimate need to manage system services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used repeated MFA requests to gain access to victim accounts.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used legitimate executables to perform DLL side-loading of their malware.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0259
ATT&CK Technique Name:InnaputRAT
Some InnaputRAT variants create a new Windows service to establish persistence.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink has the ability to create a pipe to enable inter-process communication.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has used steganography to hide stolen data inside other files stored on Github.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has developed malware for use in operations, including the creation of infected removable media.[4][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Protocols used for device management should authenticate all network messages to prevent unauthorized system changes. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.014
ATT&CK Technique Name:VDSO Hijacking
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries will likely need to place new binaries in locations to be executed through this weakness. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed path interception by using application control tools, like Windows Defender Application Control, App... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Cloudy With a Chance of Exploits: Compromising Critical Infrastructure Through IIoT Cloud Solutions
The adoption of Industry 4.0 and IoT (IIoT) technologies into industrial business operations has brought great operational and economic benefits, but also introduced new risks and challenges. One of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has downloaded additional scripts and files from adversary-controlled servers.[260][107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel malware has employed just-in-time decryption of strings to evade sandbox detection.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT has a plugin for credential harvesting.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0434
ATT&CK Technique Name:Imminent Monitor
Imminent Monitor has leveraged CreateProcessW() call to execute the debugger.[99] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used HTTP GET requests for C2.[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT can execute getinfo to discover the current time on a compromised host.[68][69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has tricked unwitting recipients into clicking on malicious hyperlinks within emails crafted to resemble trustworthy senders.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can SSH to a remote service.[3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has stored collected credential files in c:\windows\temp prior to exfiltration. Mustang Panda has also stored documents for exfiltration in a hidden folder on USB drives.[64][65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0659
ATT&CK Technique Name:Diavol
Diavol can delete shadow copies using the IVssBackupComponents COM object to call the DeleteSnapshots method.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used PowerShell scripts for execution.[77][78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has used rootkits such as the open-source Diamorphine rootkit and their custom bots to hide cryptocurrency mining activities on the machine.[25] [26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that conducted a variety of system checks to detect sandboxes or VMware services.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats has created scheduled tasks to persistently run VBScripts.[111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kasidet
Kasidet has the ability to search for a given filename on a victim.[158] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda used custom batch scripts to collect files automatically from a targeted system.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a DMZ or on separate hosting infrastructure. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has created the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\AdobelmdyU to maintain persistence.[173] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has attempted to lure users to click on a malicious link within a spearphishing email.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 malware has used HTTP for C2.[338] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has performed DLL search order hijacking to execute their payload.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic has used scheduled tasks to add persistence.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
If a link is being visited by a user, network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora can use DLL side-loading to execute malicious payloads.[29] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.