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title:blackhat:eu-19 Far Sides of Java Remote Protocols
Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) and Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) are widely deployed mechanisms for cross-process communications. In this talk, we will walk through the technical workflow of the technologies, revealing several critical fla... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackTech
BlackTech has exploited multiple vulnerabilities for execution, including Microsoft Office vulnerabilities CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2014-6352, CVE-2017-0199, and Adobe Flash CVE-2015-5119.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0644
ATT&CK Technique Name:ObliqueRAT
ObliqueRAT can gain persistence by a creating a shortcut in the infected user's Startup directory.[184] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEADEYE
DEADEYE has used schtasks /change to modify scheduled tasks including \Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor, \Microsoft\Windows\Ras\ManagerMobility, \Microsoft\Windows\WDI\SrvSetupResults, and \Microsoft\Windows\WDI\USOShared.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0308
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a
Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a uses Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) for command and control.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
Ensure certificate authorities (CA) are properly secured, including treating CA servers (and other resources hosting CA certificates) as tier 0 assets. Harden abusable CA settings and attributes.For example, consider disabling the usage of AD CS certi... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Straight Outta VMware: Modern Exploitation of the SVGA Device for Guest-to-Host Escapes
This presentation focuses on modern exploitation techniques for VMware Workstation guest's virtual graphics device in order to achieve code execution on the host operating system. There will be in-depth analysis ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0281
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dok
Dok proxies web traffic to potentially monitor and alter victim HTTP(S) traffic.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has created Windows tasks to establish persistence.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0215
ATT&CK Technique Name:KARAE
KARAE was distributed through torrent file-sharing websites to South Korean victims, using a YouTube video downloader application as a lure.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
The Winnti for Windows HTTP/S C2 mode can make use of a local proxy.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0528
ATT&CK Technique Name:Javali
Javali can use DLL side-loading to load malicious DLLs into legitimate executables.[30] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Behind the scenes of iOS and Mac Security
With over 1.4 billion active devices and in-depth security protections spanning every layer from silicon to software, Apple works to advance the state of the art in user security with every new product and software release. We will discuss three iOS and Mac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar uploads files from a specified directory to the C2 server.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel malware can obtain system time from a compromised host.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
Prikormka contains a keylogger module that collects keystrokes and the titles of foreground windows.[141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork has added the path of its second-stage malware to the startup folder to achieve persistence. One of its file stealers has also persisted by adding a Registry Run key.[190][191] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can use a JavaScript file as part of its execution chain.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Disable legacy network protocols that may be used to intercept network traffic if applicable, especially those that are not needed within an environment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0698
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWizard
HermeticWizard has the ability to scan ports on a compromised network.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0546
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharpStage
SharpStage has checked the system settings to see if Arabic is the configured language.[331] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. Most embedded network devices support TACACS+ and/or RADIUS. Follow vendor prescribed best practices for hardening access control.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
A module in Prikormka gathers logins and passwords stored in applications on the victims, including Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and several other browsers.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Use remote desktop gateways. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Amadey
Amadey has obfuscated strings such as antivirus vendor names, domains, files, and others.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0492
ATT&CK Technique Name:CookieMiner
CookieMiner has used the curl --upload-file command to exfiltrate data over HTTP.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has split archived files into multiple parts to bypass a 5MB limit.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0922
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Protect files stored locally with proper permissions to limit opportunities for adversaries to remove indicators of their activity on the system. [3] [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data from Removable Media
Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used a DLL named D8B3.dll that was injected into the Winlogon process.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher is heavily obfuscated in many ways, including through the use of spaghetti code in its functions in an effort to confuse disassembly programs. It also uses a custom XOR algorithm to obfuscate code.[123][124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kasidet
Kasidet has the ability to identify any anti-virus installed on the infected system.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Psylo
Psylo has a command to download a file to the system from its C2 server.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Train users to identify aspects of phishing attempts where they're asked to enter credentials into a site that has the incorrect domain for the application they are logging into. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cachedump
Cachedump can extract cached password hashes from cache entry information.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0932
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication wherever possible. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum can establish persistence by creating a .lnk shortcut to itself in the Startup folder.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has conducted widespread scanning of target environments to identify vulnerabilities for exploit.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes can modify Registry values to stored information and establish persistence.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 created a custom video recording capability that could be used to monitor operations in the victim's environment.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0922
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Protect files with proper permissions to limit opportunities for adversaries to interact and collect information from databases. [4] [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0372
ATT&CK Technique Name:LockerGoga
LockerGoga has encrypted files, including core Windows OS files, using RSA-OAEP MGF1 and then demanded Bitcoin be paid for the decryption key.[51][52][53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has the ability to create scheduled tasks for persistence.[136][137][138][139][140][141][142][143] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has accessed email accounts using Outlook Web Access.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0500
ATT&CK Technique Name:MCMD
MCMD has the ability to remove set Registry Keys, including those used for persistence.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0951
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
A patch management process should be implemented to check unused dependencies, unmaintained and/or previously vulnerable dependencies, unnecessary features, components, files, and documentation. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 changed domain federation trust settings using Azure AD administrative permissions to configure the domain to accept authorization tokens signed by their own SAML signing certificate.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0525
ATT&CK Technique Name:Android/AdDisplay.Ashas
Android/AdDisplay.Ashas can generate revenue by automatically displaying ads.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0396
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilBunny
EvilBunny has executed C2 commands directly via HTTP.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity can install a service to execute itself as a service.[57][58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can use cmd.exe for execution on remote hosts.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0124
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pisloader
Pisloader has a command to collect victim system information, including the system name and OS version.[277] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0165
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSInfo
OSInfo specifically looks for Domain Admins and power users within the domain.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segregate SNMP traffic on a separate management network.[3] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Dirty Vanity: A New Approach to Code Injection & EDR Bypass
This talk showcases yet another new code injection technique (I know, bear with me), nicknamed "Dirty Vanity". This technique challenges current injection detection and prevention means while opening a wider spectrum of attacks that cha... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum establishes persistence by creating a .lnk shortcut to itself in the Startup folder.[186] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0226
ATT&CK Technique Name:Smoke Loader
Smoke Loader searches through Outlook files and directories (e.g., inbox, sent, templates, drafts, archives, etc.).[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0561
ATT&CK Technique Name:GuLoader
GuLoader has the ability to download malware from Google Drive.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0249
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gold Dragon
Gold Dragon deletes one of its files, 2.hwp, from the endpoint after establishing persistence.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca employed a PowerShell script called RDPConnectionParser to read and filter the Windows event log "Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RDPClient/Operational"(Event ID 1024) to obtain network information from RDP connections. Earth Lusca has also used netstat f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare
PcShare can execute cmd commands on a compromised host.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:IndigoZebra
IndigoZebra has acquired open source tools such as NBTscan and Meterpreter for their operations.[59][60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy identifies network drives when they are added to victim systems.[62] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 The Ripple Effect: Building a Diverse Security Research Team
Achieving a diverse, inclusive team which is a dream to work in was not a short journey. It took time and was well worth the effort. While the industry numbers paint a gloomy picture for gender equality and representation, we successfully... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST collected a list of service names that were hashed using a FNV-1a + XOR algorithm to check against similarly-hashed hardcoded blocklists.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Perform inline allowlisting of automation protocol commands to prevent devices from sending unauthorized command or reporting messages. Allow/denylist techniques need to be designed with sufficient accuracy to prevent the unintended blocking of valid message... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can exploit vulnerabilities such as MS16-032 and MS16-135.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0381
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlawedAmmyy
FlawedAmmyy has sent data collected from a compromised host to its C2 servers.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1078.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Default Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on W... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:macOS.OSAMiner
macOS.OSAMiner can parse the output of the native system_profiler tool to determine if the machine is running with 4 cores.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to block unsigned/untrusted executable files (such as .exe, .dll, or .scr) from running from USB removable drives. [31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:CostaRicto
During CostaRicto, the threat actors set up remote SSH tunneling into the victim's environment from a malicious domain.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower can send additional modules over C2 encrypted with a simple substitution cipher.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0043
ATT&CK Technique Name:BUBBLEWRAP
BUBBLEWRAP can communicate using HTTP or HTTPS.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint has modified the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM to store a malicious payload.[115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0623
ATT&CK Technique Name:Siloscape
Siloscape is executed after the attacker gains initial access to a Windows container using a known vulnerability.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0641
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kobalos
Kobalos replaced the SSH client with a trojanized SSH client to steal credentials on compromised systems.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0691
ATT&CK Technique Name:Neoichor
Neoichor can gather the IP address from an infected host.[118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0066
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elderwood
Elderwood has delivered zero-day exploits and malware to victims via targeted emails containing a link to malicious content hosted on an uncommon Web server.[37][38] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Chip.Fail - Glitching the Silicon of the Connected World
All smart devices, from cars to IoT, are based around processors. Often these processors are not considered as part of the threat model when designing a product; instead, there is an implicit trust that they just work and that the security fe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 collected the victim's username and executed the whoami command on the victim's machine. APT32 executed shellcode to collect the username on the victim's machine. [11][12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0058
ATT&CK Technique Name:SslMM
To establish persistence, SslMM identifies the Start Menu Startup directory and drops a link to its own executable disguised as an "Office Start," "Yahoo Talk," "MSN Gaming Z0ne," or "MSN Talk" shortcut.[33] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 The Unbelievable Insecurity of the Big Data Stack: An Offensive Approach to Analyzing Huge and Complex Big Data Infrastructures
Honoring the term, the variety of technologies in the Big Data stack is hugely BIG. Many complex components in charge of transport, storing, and processing millions of reco... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has used the NtQueryDirectoryFile and ZwQueryDirectoryFile functions to hide files and directories.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0626
ATT&CK Technique Name:P8RAT
P8RAT can check the compromised host for processes associated with VMware or VirtualBox environments.[39] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Android Universal Root: Exploiting Mobile GPU / Command Queue Drivers
Rooting modern Android devices using kernel bugs from an unprivileged process without any hardcoded offsets/addresses and with almost a 100% success rate is exceptionally rare. After reporting the in-the-wild CVE-2020-0069 in Medi... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Demystifying Key Stretching and PAKEs
Key stretching can make the difference between recovering a secret nearly instant to nearly impossible, but it has had a fun history with bugs, footguns, and "features". This talk will answer many common questions and myths on key stretching and PAKEs. What to a... | secon |
title:botconf2016 FastIR Collector
The goal of the wokshop is to present and use the open source live forensic collector FastIR on differents cases investigations on Windows: RAT with tricks anti forensics, rootkits, Trojan with dll injections… And we’ll present new features we have developped this year with agent and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shark
Shark has the ability to use HTTP in C2 communications.[210][211] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor can download additional plugins, updates and other files. [42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0538
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crutch
Crutch has used a hardcoded GitHub repository as a fallback channel.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0683
ATT&CK Technique Name:Peirates
Peirates can dump the contents of AWS S3 buckets. It can also retrieve service account tokens from kOps buckets in Google Cloud Storage or S3.[13] | secon |
title:botconf2015 Automatically classifying unknown bots by the register messages
The ever-increasing number of malware/botnet samples demands efficient and scalable classification solution for better detection and prevention. C&C protocol based classification has proved to be effective and accurate. However, it’s not ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
CozyCar uses Twitter as a backup C2 channel to Twitter accounts specified in its configuration file.[22] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Windows Defender - Demystifying and Bypassing ASR by Understanding the AV's Signatures
Windows Defender is the Windows' built-in antivirus software, giving it a place in most information systems. But still, its signature format is yet undocumented.This talk tries to rectify this situation. This... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Arm'd and Dangerous
Apple's new M1 systems offer a myriad of benefits ...for both macOS users, and unfortunately, to malware authors as well.In this talk we detail the first malicious programs compiled to natively target Apple Silicon (M1/arm64), focusing on methods of analysis. We'll start with a f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries will likely need to place new binaries in locations to be executed through this weakness. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed path interception by using application control tools, like Windows Defender Application Control, App... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla established persistence by adding a Shell value under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0683
ATT&CK Technique Name:Peirates
Peirates can initiate a port scan against a given IP address.[47] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.