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title:botconf2019 The Hunt for 3ve
3ve (pronounced “Eve”) was a global, complex family of online ad fraud operations, each designed to evade detection. A cross-industry alliance dismantled 3ve, resulting in the indictment and arrest of its perpetrators. This is the first time that consequences of this magnitude have be... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxxZ
ZxxZ has been encoded to avoid detection from static analysis tools.[366] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda can perform keylogging on the victim’s machine by hooking the functions TranslateMessage and WM_KEYDOWN.[183] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has utilized PowerShell to download files from the C2 server and run various scripts. [21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use read-only containers, read-only file systems, and minimal images when possible to prevent the running of commands.[14] Where possible, also consider using application control and software restriction tools (such as those provided by SELinux) to restrict acc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1461
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lockscreen Bypass
An adversary with physical access to a mobile device may seek to bypass the device’s lockscreen. Several methods exist to accomplish this, including: | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:macOS.OSAMiner
macOS.OSAMiner can gather the device serial number and has checked to ensure there is enough disk space using the Unix utility df.[215] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook has used .PNG images within a zip file to build the executable. [8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan can query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid to retrieve the machine GUID.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Windows Group Policy can be used to manage root certificates and the Flags value of HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\ProtectedRoots can be set to 1 to prevent non-administrator users from making further root installations into ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used SniffPass to collect credentials by sniffing network traffic.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuTo Stealer
AuTo Stealer has the ability to collect information about installed AV products from an infected host.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has used a custom base64 key to encode stolen data before exfiltration.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities CVE-2010-0232 or CVE-2010-4398.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Malware used by Ke3chang can run commands on the command-line interface.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0416
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDFSNIFFER
RDFSNIFFER has used several Win32 API functions to interact with the victim machine.[144] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used local account credentials found during the intrusion for lateral movement and privilege escalation.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor can inject its payload into iexplore.exe process.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Update software regularly by employing patch management for externally exposed applications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity can parse the hard drive on a compromised host to identify specific file extensions.[288] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy chooses a service, drops a DLL file, and writes it to that serviceDLL Registry key.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa can execute supplied shell commands and uses bash scripts to perform additional actions.[26][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
iOS 11.4.1 and higher introduce USB Restricted Mode, which disables data access through the device's charging port under certain conditions (making the port only usable for power), likely preventing this technique from working.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak used legitimate programs such as AmmyyAdmin and Team Viewer for remote interactive C2 to target systems.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1610
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deploy Container
Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
Helminth has used a scheduled task for persistence.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Net
The net user username \password \domain commands in Net can be used to create a domain account.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 The Little Seal Bug: Optical Sound Recovery from Lightweight Reflective Objects
In this talk we will introduce "the little seal bug" attack, an optical side-channel attack used to recover sound from lightweight reflective objects; such objects are commonly seen in home offices, which became a prim... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has encrypted and encoded data in its malware, including by using base64.[232][233][234][235][236] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER can use HTTP for C2 communications.[253][231] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:SSL/TLS Inspection
If it is possible to inspect HTTPS traffic, the captures can be analyzed for connections that appear to be domain fronting. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Practical Approach to Automate the Discovery and Eradication of Open-Source Software Vulnerabilities at Scale
Over the last decade, there has been steady growth in the adoption of open-source components in modern web applications. Although this is generally a good trend for the industry, there are ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowGoop
PowGoop can side-load Goopdate.dll into GoogleUpdate.exe.[43][54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit user accounts that can load or unload device drivers by disabling SeLoadDriverPrivilege. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0283
ATT&CK Technique Name:jRAT
jRAT uses WMIC to identify anti-virus products installed on the victim’s machine and to obtain firewall details.[62] | secon |
title:botconf2017 KNIGHTCRAWLER, « Discovering Watering-holes for Fun, Nothing. »
How to find watering holes (aka. Strategic Web Compromise – SWC) from your bedroom? At the intersection between geopolitics and technology, « KNIGHTCRAWLER » is a personal project developed to find some malicious activities on several tho... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1569.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Launchctl
Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1069.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Groups
Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to det... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar uses /bin/bash to execute commands on the victim’s machine.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monokle
Monokle can list applications installed on the device.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Strider
Strider has registered its persistence module on domain controllers as a Windows LSA (Local System Authority) password filter to acquire credentials any time a domain, local user, or administrator logs in or changes a password.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET loads a system level launchdaemon using the launchctl load -w command from /System/Librarby/LaunchDaemons/ssh.plist.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxxZ
ZxxZ has used API functions such as Process32First, Process32Next, and ShellExecuteA.[189] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has the ability to use DLL side-loading for execution.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0581
ATT&CK Technique Name:IronNetInjector
IronNetInjector has the ability to inject a DLL into running processes, including the IronNetInjector DLL into explorer.exe.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0441
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerShower
PowerShower has the ability to identify the current Windows domain of the infected host.[178] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1637.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Generation Algorithms
Adversaries may use Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to procedurally generate domain names for uses such as command and control communication or malicious application distribution. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Kr00k: Serious Vulnerability Affected Encryption of Billion+ Wi-Fi Devices
We identified Kr00k (CVE-2019-15126) – a previously unknown vulnerability in chips used by a significant proportion of all Wi-Fi capable devices. Specifically, we discovered that Wi-Fi chips by Broadcom and Cypress – and pos... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Glitched on Earth by Humans: A Black-Box Security Evaluation of the SpaceX Starlink User Terminal
The SpaceX operated Starlink low Earth orbit satellite constellation aims to provide satellite internet coverage to the whole world. The widespread availability of Starlink User Terminals (UT) exposes t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
In preparation for its attack against the 2018 Winter Olympics, Sandworm Team conducted online research of partner organizations listed on an official PyeongChang Olympics partnership site.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used a tool to capture the username on a compromised host in order to register it with C2.[207] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin can use Cron to create periodic and pre-scheduled background jobs.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Command-Line Interface
Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environm... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor has the ability to download additional files for execution on the victim's machine.[290] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0459
ATT&CK Technique Name:MechaFlounder
MechaFlounder has the ability to upload and download files to and from a compromised host.[282] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has created a scheduled task to execute additional malicious software, as well as maintain persistence.[113][114][115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink can use various Linux API functions including those for execution and discovery.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0679
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ferocious
Ferocious can use GET.WORKSPACE in Microsoft Excel to determine the OS version of the compromised host.[135] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Malware Buried Deep Down the SPI Flash: Sednit's First UEFI Rootkit Found in the Wild
BIOS rootkits have been researched and discussed heavily in the past few years, but sparse evidence has been presented of real campaigns actively trying to compromise systems at this level. Our talk will revea... | secon |
title:botconf2013 Advanced Techniques in Modern Banking Trojans
Banking Trojans are proven to be a successful cybercrime business model. However, the creation of URL blacklists heavily affected the cybercrime operations. This talk shows new command-and-control methods the cybercriminals have implemented to avoid blackl... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 I Block You Because I Love You: Social Account Identification Attack Against a Website Visitor
In this talk, we present a practical side-channel attack that identifies the social web service account of a visitor to an attacker's website. As user pages and profiles in social web services generally i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0247
ATT&CK Technique Name:NavRAT
NavRAT uses the email platform, Naver, for C2 communications, leveraging SMTP.[16] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Controlled Chaos: The Inevitable Marriage of DevOps & Security
We've all heard "software is eating the world" – that most organizations are becoming software organizations in some form. In this new era, DevOps rises as the engine of the business, and organizations resisting its ascension empiric... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 The Bad Guys Win – Analysis of 10,000 Magecart Vulnerabilities
"Magecart" is the common name for an attack in which hackers compromise 3rd party Javascript code to steal information from web-applications or websites that incorporate the code.Over the last two years, we monitored the web for vulnerab... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can use GetKeyState and GetKeyboardState to capture keystrokes on the victim’s machine.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has collected the hostname and operating system version from the compromised host.[223][224][225] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0259
ATT&CK Technique Name:InnaputRAT
InnaputRAT variants have attempted to appear legitimate by using the file names SafeApp.exe and NeutralApp.exe.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0297
ATT&CK Technique Name:XcodeGhost
XcodeGhost can prompt a fake alert dialog to phish user credentials.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monokle
Monokle can retrieve the salt used when storing the user’s password, aiding an adversary in computing the user’s plaintext password/PIN from the stored password hash. Monokle can also capture the user’s dictionary, user-defined shortcuts, and browser history, enabling profi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyZBot
TinyZBot can create a shortcut in the Windows startup folder for persistence.[261] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can capture screenshots that are initially saved as ‘scr.jpg’.[102] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Everything has Changed in iOS 14, but Jailbreak is Eternal
iOS 14.0 was released on Sep 16, 2020, but people got their first real 14.x jailbreak after more than 5 months. In the past, every time Apple released a security update, there would soon be new vulnerabilities, and almost every version woul... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Backdoor.Oldrea injects itself into explorer.exe.[8][9] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 A Deep Dive into macOS MDM (and How it can be Compromised)
On macOS, DEP (Device Enrollment Program) and MDM (Mobile Device Management) are the recommended methods for automating the initial setup & configuration of new devices. MDM can offer sophisticated system configuration options, including pr... | secon |
title:botconf2020 Global threat hunting: how to predict attacks at preparation stage
During my researches at Group-IB on hacking groups activity I noticed that some trojan families use templates in communication processes and infrastructure used in attacks. The idea is to identify such templates and use them to predict... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Threat Hunting in Active Directory Environment
Mandiant conducted multiple investigations and observed techniques that attackers preferred as they conducted privilege escalation to move laterally, persist in the environment, and blend in. Backdoors and misconfigurations on Active directory system... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Pestilential Protocol: How Unsecure HL7 Messages Threaten Patient Lives
Healthcare infosec is in critical condition- too few bodies, underfunded to a fault, and limping along on legacy systems stuffed with vulnerabilities. From exploited insulin/medication pumps to broken pacemakers, no implantable ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs collects a list of running services with the command tasklist /svc.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0472
ATT&CK Technique Name:down_new
down_new has the ability to detect anti-virus products and processes on a compromised host.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0537
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperStack
HyperStack can connect to the IPC$ share on remote machines.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
KeyBoy installs a service pointing to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs collects a list of running services with the command tasklist /v.[151] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0026
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT18
APT18 uses cmd.exe to execute commands on the victim’s machine.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0397
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoJax
LoJax has modified the Registry key ‘HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute’ from ‘autocheck autochk ’ to ‘autocheck autoche ’ in order to execute its payload during Windows startup.[144] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Turing in a Box: Applying Artificial Intelligence as a Service to Targeted Phishing and Defending Against AI Generated Attacks
With recent advances in next-generation language models such as OpenAI's GPT-3, AI generated text has reached a level of sophistication that matches or even exceeds human ge... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used various MS-SQL stored procedures.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windows Credential Editor
Windows Credential Editor can dump credentials.[87] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Real-Time Detection of Attacks Leveraging Domain Administrator Privilege
In Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks, attackers tend to target the Active Directory to expand infections. Attackers try to take over Domain Administrator privilege and create a backdoor called "Golden Ticket" which can d... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman reports window names along with keylogger information to provide application context.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy has a built-in utility command for netstat, can do net session through PowerView, and has an interactive shell which can be used to discover additional information.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0528
ATT&CK Technique Name:Javali
Javali can download payloads from remote C2 servers.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0310
ATT&CK Technique Name:ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A
ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A uses encrypted content within a blog site for part of its command and control. Specifically, the encrypted content contains URLs for other servers to be used for other aspects of command and control.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can use WMI to monitor for and kill specific processes listed in its configuration file.[110][111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Utilize Yama (ex: /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope) to mitigate ptrace based process injection by restricting the use of ptrace to privileged users only. Other mitigation controls involve the deployment of security kernel modules that provide advance... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has created a local user account with administrator privileges.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Backdoor.Oldrea adds Registry Run keys to achieve persistence.[37][38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0026
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT18
APT18 establishes persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can include a rootkit to hide processes, files, and startup.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used administrative accounts, including Domain Admin, to move laterally within a victim network.[25] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.