text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0504
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anchor
Anchor can determine the hostname and linux version on a compromised host.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0180
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volgmer
Volgmer deobfuscates its strings and APIs once its executed.[246] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SubmitControl. T... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has distributed targeted emails containing Word documents with embedded malicious macros.[99][100][101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0835
ATT&CK Technique Name:Manipulate I/O Image
Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for te... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0156
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOMPROGO
KOMPROGO is capable of creating a reverse shell.[182] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Consider using Group Policy to configure and block additions/modifications to W32Time DLLs. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer toggles breakers to the open state utilizing unauthorized command messages. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0404
ATT&CK Technique Name:esentutl
esentutl can use Volume Shadow Copy to copy locked files such as ntds.dit.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0442
ATT&CK Technique Name:VBShower
VBShower has the ability to download VBS files to the target computer.[462] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT can create, delete, or modify a specified Registry key or value.[106][107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new Launch Daemons. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:IceApple
IceApple's Credential Dumper module can dump LSA secrets from registry keys, including: HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\PolEKList\default, HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets\*\CurrVal, and HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets\*\OldVal.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group malware can use cmd.exe to download and execute payloads and to execute commands on the system.[143] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Playing Offense and Defense with Deepfakes
This presentation seeks to demonstrate how deepfaking can be leveraged for offensive and defensive purposes. Specifically, deepfake internals are presented including a fine grained, step-by-step breakdown of creation, including the details of all deep lear... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used net localgroup administrators to identify accounts with local administrative rights.[5] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Superman Powered by Kryptonite: Turn the Adversarial Attack into Your Defense Weapon
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is wielding a profound impact on global economic and social progress as well as ordinary citizens' daily life. However, with the advancement of AI technology, the next-generation hackers... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0698
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWizard
HermeticWizard has the ability to create a new process using rundll32.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Net Crawler
Net Crawler uses a list of known credentials gathered through credential dumping to guess passwords to accounts as it spreads throughout a network.[8] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Hand in Your Pocket Without You Noticing: Current State of Mobile Wallet Security
Apple Pay, Google Pay, and Samsung Pay are the de-facto payment services for mobile users. Their growth and popularity during COVID-19 have given mobile users the option to pay with ease, often without the need to to... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 Apple's Predicament: NSPredicate Exploits on iOS and macOS
In 2021 the FORCEDENTRY sandbox escape introduced the usage of NSPredicate in an iOS exploit. This new technique allowed attackers to sidestep codesigning, ASLR, and all other mitigations to execute arbitrary code on Apple devices. As a res... | secon |
title:botconf2017 Botnet Tracking and Data Analysis Using Open-Source Tools
Fully understanding a botnet often requires a researcher to go beyond standard reverse-engineering practice and explore the malware’s network traffic. The latter can provide meaningful information on the evolution of a malware’s activity. Howev... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0514
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMess
WellMess has the ability to use DNS tunneling for C2 communications.[69][70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of behaviors related to process injection/memory tampering based on common sequences of indicators (ex: execution of specific API functions). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1067
ATT&CK Technique Name:FluBot
FluBot can obfuscated class, string, and method names in newer malware versions.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet searches the Registry for indicators of security programs.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0408
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlexiSpy
FlexiSpy is capable of hiding SuperSU's icon if it is installed and visible.[14] FlexiSpy can also hide its own icon to make detection and the uninstallation process more difficult.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0492
ATT&CK Technique Name:CookieMiner
CookieMiner has used base64 encoding to obfuscate scripts on the system.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to intercept shared library import functions.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1136.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Local Account
Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. With a sufficient level of access, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxxZ
ZxxZ has used scheduled tasks for persistence and execution.[29] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Lessons From Two Years of Crypto Audits
Over the last two years, we've completed many successful crypto audits. These audits consisted of mostly paid engagements but also unsolicited ones, as well with a mixture of blockchain projects as well as good old cryptography. We've worked for major blockcha... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin installs a TCP and UDP filter on the eth0 interface.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has hidden its GUI using the ShowWindow() WINAPI call.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
An APT28 loader Trojan will enumerate the victim's processes searching for explorer.exe if its current process does not have necessary permissions.[9] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Site Isolation: Confining Untrustworthy Code in the Web Browser
In the late 2000s, web browsers moved from single-process to multi-process architectures, introducing a sandbox boundary between untrustworthy code from the web and local resources. While effective at the time, the security landscape h... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper can compress 32-bit and 64-bit driver files with the Lempel-Ziv algorithm.[151][152][153] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0502
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drovorub
Drovorub can delete specific files from a compromised host.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly trojanized legitimate ICS equipment providers software packages available for download on their websites.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook can upload files from a victim's machine over the C2 channel.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used compromised domain accounts to gain access to the target environment.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has renamed the WinRAR utility to avoid detection.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats has sent phishing emails with malicious links included.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
The Black Basta dropper has mimicked an application for creating USB bootable drivers.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon attempts to disable UAC remote restrictions by modifying the Registry.[57] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Controlled Chaos: The Inevitable Marriage of DevOps & Security
We've all heard "software is eating the world" – that most organizations are becoming software organizations in some form. In this new era, DevOps rises as the engine of the business, and organizations resisting its ascension empiri... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0313
ATT&CK Technique Name:RuMMS
RuMMS gathers device model and operating system version information and transmits it to a command and control server.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0132
ATT&CK Technique Name:H1N1
H1N1 obfuscates C2 traffic with an altered version of base64.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
An APT28 loader Trojan adds the Registry key HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript to establish persistence.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0408
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlexiSpy
FlexiSpy can record keystrokes and analyze them for keywords.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack can collect network and active connection information.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth logs keystrokes from the victim's machine. [22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has been observed leveraging a module that retrieves passwords stored on a system for the current logged-on user. [14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0206
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wiarp
Wiarp creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can inject files into running processes.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:Confucius
Confucius has exfiltrated stolen files to its C2 server.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear can query the Registry key "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSDTC\MTxOCI" to see if the value OracleOcilib exists.[102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has used spam emails weaponized with archive or document files as its initial infection vector.[129] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has installed web shells on compromised hosts to maintain access.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Install software in write-protected locations. Set directory access controls to prevent file writes to the search paths for applications, both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard library folders. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0174
ATT&CK Technique Name:Responder
Responder captures hashes and credentials that are sent to the system after the name services have been poisoned.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0644
ATT&CK Technique Name:ObliqueRAT
ObliqueRAT can capture a screenshot of the current screen.[115] | secon |
title:botconf2022 Privateloader – The malware behind a havoc-wreaking Pay-Per-Install service
Pay-per-install (PPI) services have been an integral part of the e-crime ecosystem for a considerable amount of time. PPI services monetize wide dissemination of malware by providing the malware operators with mass geo-targete... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used malware that exfiltrates stolen data to its C2 server.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can perform a decremental-xor encryption on the initial C2 request before sending it over the wire.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries will likely need to place new binaries in locations to be executed through this weakness. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed path interception by using application control tools, like Windows Defender Application Control, App... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 has created scheduled tasks to run malicious scripts on a compromised host.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0451
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoudMiner
LoudMiner adds plist files with the naming format com.[random_name].plist in the /Library/LaunchDaemons folder with the RunAtLoad and KeepAlive keys set to true.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTTPBrowser
HTTPBrowser is capable of capturing keystrokes on victims.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has copied tools within a compromised network using RDP.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used compromised Office 365 accounts in tandem with Ruler in an attempt to gain control of endpoints.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can identify installed security tools based on window names.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has used a tool that can obtain info about local and global group users, power users, and administrators.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has gained execution through users opening malicious attachments.[190][191][192][193][194][195][196][197][198] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Recent OS versions have made it more difficult for applications to register as VPN providers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0936
ATT&CK Technique Name:Account Use Policies
Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, and password strength requirements as examples. Consider these features as they relate to assets which may impact safety and availability. [8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0569
ATT&CK Technique Name:Explosive
Explosive has a function to use the OpenClipboard wrapper.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1550
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Alternate Authentication Material
Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has added a leading . to plist filenames, unlisting them from the Finder app and default Terminal directory listings.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0335
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbon
Carbon can collect the IP address of the victims and other computers on the network using the commands: ipconfig -all nbtstat -n, and nbtstat -s.[48][49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0187
ATT&CK Technique Name:Daserf
Daserf uses encrypted Windows APIs and also encrypts data using the alternative base64+RC4 or the Caesar cipher.[98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
An APT32 backdoor can use HTTP over a non-standard TCP port (e.g 14146) which is specified in the backdoor configuration.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has exploited the Office vulnerability CVE-2017-0199 for execution.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group tools have registered Run keys in the registry to give malicious VBS files persistence.[98][99][100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0695
ATT&CK Technique Name:Donut
Donut can generate shellcode outputs that execute via JavaScript or JScript.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used Metasploit to perform reflective DLL injection in order to escalate privileges.[73][74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can use WMI to open a Windows command shell on a remote machine.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has created a scheduled SYSTEM task that runs when a user logs in.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0332
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remcos
Remcos searches for Sandboxie and VMware on the system.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used .iso files to deploy malicious .lnk files.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0328
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Mango
Stealth Mango uploads information about installed packages.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has collected files and data from compromised machines.[108][109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0295
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSAndroid
RCSAndroid has the ability to dynamically download and execute new code at runtime.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can download a clipboard information stealer module.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0647
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turian
Turian can establish persistence by adding Registry Run keys.[267] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has used JavaScript to execute malicious code on a victim's machine.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARDUMP
SUGARDUMP has been named CrashReporter.exe to appear as a legitimate Mozilla executable.[159] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has used the MPRESS packer and similar tools for obfuscation.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sykipot
Sykipot may use net group "domain admins" /domain to display accounts in the "domain admins" permissions group and net localgroup "administrators" to list local system administrator group membership.[47] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.