text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has initiated connections to external domains using HTTPS.[292] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0865
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spearphishing Attachment
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0633
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sliver
Sliver has the ability to gather network configuration information.[212] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0147
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pteranodon
Pteranodon can delete files that may interfere with it executing. It also can delete temporary files and itself after the initial script executes.[185] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay can use scheduled tasks to achieve persistence.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:BITTER
BITTER has disguised malware as a Windows Security update service.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0052
ATT&CK Technique Name:CopyKittens
CopyKittens digitally signed an executable with a stolen certificate from legitimate company AI Squared.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1558.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Golden Ticket
Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket. Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Breaking the Isolation: Cross-Account AWS Vulnerabilities
Multiple AWS services were found to be vulnerable to a new cross-account vulnerability class. An attacker could manipulate various services in AWS and cause them to perform actions on other clients' resources due to unsafe identity policies u... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can check the system language using GetUserDefaultUILanguage and GetSystemDefaultUILanguage. If the language is found in the list, the process terminates.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0031
ATT&CK Technique Name:BACKSPACE
Adversaries can direct BACKSPACE to upload files to the C2 Server.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxxZ
ZxxZ has relied on victims to open a malicious attachment delivered via email.[38] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 New Norms and Policies in Cyber-Diplomacy
After the last round of the UN sponsored consultations on international cybersecurity collapsed in 2016, the international situation in cyber diplomacy has been in flux: will there be other UN rounds of discussion? Will private sector-organized initiatives ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0507
ATT&CK Technique Name:eSurv
eSurv’s Android version has used public key encryption and certificate pinning for C2 communication.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has used Registry Run keys to establish automatic execution at system startup.[270][271] | secon |
title:botconf2019 Winnti Arsenal: Brand-new Supplies
This presentation is the result of a long-term research uncovering new unpublished details on the arsenal of the Winnti umbrella. The Winnti umbrella consists in multiple threat actors having in common the use of a custom backdoor for their operations, the Winnti mal... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0075
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rancor
Rancor has used msiexec to download and execute malicious installer files over HTTP.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Enable Windows Group Policy "Do Not Allow Anonymous Enumeration of SAM Accounts and Shares" security setting to limit users who can enumerate network shares.[63] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 The Cost of Learning from the Best: How Prior Knowledge Weakens the Security of Deep Neural Networks
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been found vulnerable to adversarial examples – inputs that an attacker has intentionally designed to cause the model to make mistakes. Fortunately, generating adve... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb's loader has used DLL Search Order Hijacking to load malicious code instead of the legitimate version.dll during the Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe execution process.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda decrypts strings in the code during the execution process.[266] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0479
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEFENSOR ID
DEFENSOR ID can abuse the accessibility service to read any text displayed on the screen.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used a screen capture utility to take screenshots on a compromised host.[14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal has used macros in Word documents that would download a second stage if executed.[95] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Building Cyber Security Strategies for Emerging Industries in Sub Saharan Africa
The increase in cyber attacks in sub-Saharan Africa has become an issue of major concern for the region and its people. With the increase in use of digital technology, cyber security is becoming a critical aspect of th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0274
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calisto
Calisto has the capability to add its own account to the victim's machine.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0200
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dipsind
Dipsind can be configured to only run during normal working hours, which would make its communications harder to distinguish from normal traffic.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor's dispatcher can establish persistence by registering a new service.[18] | secon |
title:botconf2013 Zombies in your browser
Botnets have got a lot of popularity during the recent time. And we have also seen various kinds of botnets ranging from IRC bots to P2P to HTTP bots. In this talk, we will be discussing about the advanced trends in a different kind of botnets, which operate via Browsers, also ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0610
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideTwist
SideTwist can collect the computer name of a targeted system.[260] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxxZ
ZxxZ has been distributed via spearphishing emails, usually containing a malicious RTF or Excel attachment.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0605
ATT&CK Technique Name:EKANS
EKANS masquerades itself as a valid executable with the filename update.exe. Many valid programs use the process name update.exe to perform background software updates. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has used HTTP for C2 communications.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored in SharePoint repositories. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can use system resources to mine cryptocurrency, dropping XMRig to mine Monero.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group malware WhiskeyAlfa-Three modifies sector 0 of the Master Boot Record (MBR) to ensure that the malware will persist even if a victim machine shuts down.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0492
ATT&CK Technique Name:CookieMiner
CookieMiner has checked for the presence of "Little Snitch", macOS network monitoring and application firewall software, stopping and exiting if it is found.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1557
ATT&CK Technique Name:Adversary-in-the-Middle
Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing or Transmitted Data Manipulation. By abusing features of common net... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has used mshta.exe to load an HTA script within a malicious .LNK file.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Use anti-spoofing and email authentication mechanisms to filter messages based on validity checks of the sender domain (using SPF) and integrity of messages (using DKIM). Enabling these mechanisms within an organization (through policies such as DMARC) may en... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Regin
Regin leveraged several compromised universities as proxies to obscure its origin.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
Gazer injects its communication module into an Internet accessible process through which it performs C2.[23][24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake can access device configuration information and status, including Android version, battery level, device model, country, and SIM operator.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson can identify the user on a targeted system.[41][42][43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can scan for open ports on a compromised machine.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
Disable legacy authentication, which does not support MFA, and require the use of modern authentication protocols instead. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0124
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windigo
Windigo has used a script to detect installed software on targeted systems.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0362
ATT&CK Technique Name:Linux Rabbit
Linux Rabbit opens a socket on port 22 and if it receives a response it attempts to obtain the machine's hostname and Top-Level Domain. [99] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1195.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
When possible, include hash values in manifest files to help prevent side-loading of malicious libraries.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Backdoor.Oldrea can use a network scanning module to identify ICS-related ports.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0167
ATT&CK Technique Name:Matryoshka
Matryoshka can establish persistence by adding a Scheduled Task named "Microsoft Boost Kernel Optimization".[103][104] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Exploiting CSP in WebKit to Break Authentication and Authorization
When it comes to modern web applications, browsers are the first line of defense. While built-in security features that come compiled with browsers are responsible for preventing a wide array of attacks, any seemingly trivial mistake... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Check for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific protocols, such as TFTP, can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay can use proxy tools including boost_proxy_client for reverse proxy functionality.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz's SEKURLSA::Pth module can impersonate a user, with only a password hash, to execute arbitrary commands.[12][13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group executed a VBA written malicious macro after victims download malicious DOTM files; Lazarus Group also used Visual Basic macro code to extract a double Base64 encoded DLL implant.[109][110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:AutoIt backdoor
AutoIt backdoor downloads a PowerShell script that decodes to a typical shellcode loader.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used cloud services, including OneDrive, for C2.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0381
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlawedAmmyy
FlawedAmmyy will attempt to detect if a usable smart card is current inserted into a card reader.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used cron to create pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs on a Linux system.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used legitimate executables to perform DLL side-loading of their malware.[8] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Pwning the Core of IoT Botnets: From a Honeypot to Gigabytes of Botnet Source Code
With the leak of Mirai botnet source code back in 2016, countless IoT botnet variants have emerged and evolved as the new fashion trends. In this session, we love to share the interesting stories from single honeypo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet infects OB1 so that its malicious code sequence is executed at the start of a cycle. It also infects OB35. OB35 acts as a watchdog, and on certain conditions, it can stop the execution of OB1. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has obtained IP addresses for publicly-accessible Exchange servers.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to inject DLLs for malicious plugins into running processes.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has used parent PID spoofing to spawn a new cmd process using CreateProcessW and a handle to Taskmgr.exe.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy has used URL/Percent Encoding on data exfiltrated via HTTP POST requests.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has used cmd.exe to execute commands on the victim's machine.[147] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0144
ATT&CK Technique Name:ChChes
ChChes samples were digitally signed with a certificate originally used by Hacking Team that was later leaked and subsequently revoked.[16][17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0375
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remexi
Remexi gathers and exfiltrates keystrokes from the machine.[152] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa has downloaded additional files, including an exploit for used privilege escalation.[273][274] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor has relied upon a victim to click on a malicious email attachment.[236] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used scheduled tasks to automatically log out of created accounts every 8 hours as well as to execute malicious files.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used scheduled tasks to invoke Cobalt Strike including through batch script schtasks /create /ru "SYSTEM" /tn "update" /tr "cmd /c c:\windows\temp\update.bat" /sc once /f /st and to maintain persistence.[38][39] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Pre-built JOP Chains with the JOP ROCKET: Bypassing DEP without ROP
ROP has become virtually synonymous with code-reuse attacks in exploit development, but the reality is there is another way: Jump-oriented Programming (JOP). Until recently, there were no dedicated tools to do JOP, unlike with ROP... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has gathered credentials from the Windows Credential Manager tool.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can spawn a job to inject into LSASS memory and dump password hashes.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain has stored the collected system files in a working directory.[55][59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0284
ATT&CK Technique Name:More_eggs
More_eggs's payload has been encrypted with a key that has the hostname and processor family information appended to the end.[218] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet can brute force a local admin password, then use it to facilitate lateral movement.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa used certutil to decode Base64 binaries at runtime and a 16-byte XOR key to decrypt data.[110][111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba can enumerate files by using a variety of functions.[92] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Bypassing Windows Hello for Business and Pleasure
Windows Hello is the most popular password-less solution that includes authentication by either PIN code or biometric authentication. As a password-less technology, Windows Hello provides people with a more convenient authentication experience compar... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Afternoon Refreshment Break (Briefings)
Open to Briefings Passholders. Please wear your badge. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET attempts to discover accounts from various locations such as a user's Evernote, AppleID, Telegram, Skype, and WeChat data.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has exploited Microsoft Office vulnerability CVE-2017-11882.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors exploited CVE-2017-11882 to execute code on the victim's machine.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SubmitControl. T... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:TINYTYPHON
TINYTYPHON has used XOR with 0x90 to obfuscate its configuration file.[333] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used a compromised account to access an organization's VPN infrastructure.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Consider disabling DCOM through Dcomcnfg.exe.[15] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Light Commands: Hacking Voice Assistants with Lasers
In the near future, our homes will employ potentially dozens of IoT devices. These devices listen to our voice commands using sophisticated microphones. Our laser-based injection attack Light Commands shows how microphones can respond to light as ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT collects the victim username along with other account information (account type, description, full name, SID and status).[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0585
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kerrdown
Kerrdown can download specific payloads to a compromised host based on OS architecture.[240] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0405
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exodus
Exodus Two can obtain a list of installed applications.[10] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.