text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron can store email data in files and directories specified in its configuration, such as C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\appdata\Local\Temp\.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0267
ATT&CK Technique Name:FELIXROOT
FELIXROOT collects information about the network including the IP address and DHCP server.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries will likely need to place new binaries in locations to be executed through this weakness. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed path interception by using application control tools, like Windows Defender Application Control, App... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware gathers passwords from multiple sources, including Windows Credential Vault and Outlook.[38] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Come to the Dark Side, We Have Apples: Turning macOS Management Evil
This talk discusses advanced offensive tradecraft considering macOS management platforms such as Jamf and native MDM. We will be introducing new macOS exclusive TTPs covering initial access, command and control, persistence and la... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0437
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kivars
Kivars has the ability to uninstall malware from the infected host.[125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT1
APT1 has used various open-source tools for privilege escalation purposes.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0420
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dvmap
Dvmap can download code and binaries from the C2 server to execute on the device as root.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0463
ATT&CK Technique Name:INSOMNIA
INSOMNIA obfuscates various pieces of information within the application.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0866
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploitation of Remote Services
Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to enable remote service abuse. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0123
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volatile Cedar
Volatile Cedar can inject web shell code into a server.[41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0890
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook has been launched by starting iexplore.exe and replacing it with Bandook's payload.[9][10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Action RAT
Action RAT's commands, strings, and domains can be Base64 encoded within the payload.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot binds and listens on port 1058 for HTTP traffic while also utilizing a FakeTLS method.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0514
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMess
WellMess can send files from the victim machine to C2.[192][193] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0123
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volatile Cedar
Volatile Cedar can deploy additional tools.[98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLC-Blaster
The execution on the PLC can be stopped by violating the cycle time limit. The PLC-Blaster implements an endless loop triggering an error condition within the PLC with the impact of a DoS. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used svchost.exe and Net to execute a system service installed to launch a Cobalt Strike BEACON loader.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0642
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADFLICK
BADFLICK has delayed communication to the actor-controlled IP address by 5 minutes.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin enumerates running processes to search for Wireshark and Windows Sysinternals suite.[88][89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
The QakBot payload has been disguised as a PNG file and hidden within LNK files using a Microsoft File Explorer icon.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0026
ATT&CK Technique Name:GLOOXMAIL
GLOOXMAIL communicates to servers operated by Google using the Jabber/XMPP protocol.[13][28] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Hacking Ten Million Useful Idiots: Online Propaganda as a Socio-Technical Security Project
Online propaganda and election influence have received much attention recently. Defense leaders and the general public are aware of the risks, but have little understanding of the techniques involved, nor rele... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0149
ATT&CK Technique Name:MoonWind
MoonWind saves information from its keylogging routine as a .zip file in the present working directory.[62] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Strengthening Cyber Resiliency in a Time of Geopolitical Crises: Applying Threat Intelligence & Active Defense to Protecting Critical Information Infrastructures
The basis of our presentation is the long-term monitoring of the development of the attackers on the Russian scene, their maturity and... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security
Thunderbolt is a high-bandwidth interconnect promoted by Intel and included in laptops, desktops, and other systems. Being PCIe-based, Thunderbolt devices possess Direct Memory Access (DMA)-enabled I/O. In an "evil maid" DMA attack, whe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0063
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackOasis
BlackOasis's first stage shellcode contains a NOP sled with alternative instructions that was likely designed to bypass antivirus tools.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can steal data and credentials from browsers.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Follow best practices in restricting access to privileged accounts to avoid hostile programs from accessing such sensitive information. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used Plink to tunnel RDP over SSH.[24] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Selling 0-Days to Governments and Offensive Security Companies
Selling 0-days is a fascinating process that not a lot of people are familiar with. This talk will discuss a vulnerability brokerage company called Q-recon and provide a glimpse of how this market works. In the presentation the following... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Protocols used for device management should authenticate all network messages to prevent unauthorized system changes. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0679
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ferocious
Ferocious has the ability to use Visual Basic scripts for execution.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar can search for processes associated with an anti-virus product from list.[57] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Demystify AI Security Products With a Universal Pluggable XAI Translator
In the past years, we witnessed a dramatic rise in the platforms and apps based on machine learning and artificial intelligence. Inevitably, nearly every security product claims to be powered by deep learning technology and ach... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady has relied on users clicking a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.[223] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0133
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nomadic Octopus
Nomadic Octopus has used PowerShell for execution.[168] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0398
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperBro
HyperBro has the ability to download additional files.[221] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Registry keys specific to Microsoft Office feature control security can be set to disable automatic DDE/OLE execution. [3][1][36] Microsoft also created, and enabled by default, Registry keys to completely disable DDE execution in Word and Excel... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil has been executed via malicious MS Word e-mail attachments.[201][202][203] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0508
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ngrok
Ngrok has been used by threat actors to configure servers for data exfiltration.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has added persistence by registering the file name for the next stage malware under HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has used WMI to attempt to delete the shadow volumes on a machine, and to connect a virtual machine to the network domain of the victim organization's network.[73][74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0422
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anubis
Anubis can collect a list of installed applications to compare to a list of targeted applications.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has established GitHub accounts to host its toolsets.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has manually archived stolen files from victim machines before exfiltration.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit permissions to discover cloud accounts in accordance with least privilege. Organizations should limit the number of users within the organization with an IAM role that has administrative privileges, strive to reduce all permanent privileged role assign... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can use WMI to gather system information and to spawn processes for code injection.[20][21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Protocol Tunneling
Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoisonIvy
PoisonIvy creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can upload files.[351] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used stolen credentials to access administrative accounts within the domain.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa’s JavaScript file used a legitimate Microsoft Office 2007 package to side-load the OINFO12.OCX dynamic link library.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1564.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:VBA Stomping
Adversaries may hide malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) payloads embedded within MS Office documents by replacing the VBA source code with benign data. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 actors use the Hunter tool to conduct network service discovery for vulnerable systems.[63][64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA has enumerated processes by ID, name, or privileges.[231] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Messaging Layer Security: Towards a New Era of Secure Group Messaging
The world is moving towards end-to-end encryption (E2EE) for person-to-person messaging, as more services now wish to reduce the amount of sensitive data that they must store. However, the protocols used for encryption are still ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1216
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Script Proxy Execution
Adversaries may use trusted scripts, often signed with certificates, to proxy the execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that have been downloaded from Microsoft or are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used browser extensions including Google Chrome to steal passwords and cookies from browsers. Kimsuky has also used Nirsoft's WebBrowserPassView tool to dump the passwords obtained from victims.[38][39][40][41] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 The Virtual Battlefield in 2022: Russia-Ukraine War & Its Policy Implications
Information is key to human survival. Therefore, information warfare is an inherent part of human conflict. Nation-states run thousands of computer network operations every day. Some are designed to support democracy... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel malware has employed just-in-time decryption of strings to evade sandbox detection.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0228
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanHaiShu
NanHaiShu modifies the %regrun% Registry to point itself to an autostart mechanism.[175] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Is the Mafia Taking Over Cybercrime?
Claims abound that the Mafia is not only getting involved in cybercrime, but taking a leading role in the enterprise. One can find such arguments regularly in media articles, on blogs, and in discussions with members of the information security industry. In some ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used Win7Elevate to inject malicious code into explorer.exe.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has the ability to copy itself to a hidden file and directory.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:STARWHALE
STARWHALE has relied on victims opening a malicious Excel file for execution.[158] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Perimeter Breached! Hacking an Access Control System
The first critical component to any attack is an entry point. As we lock down our firewalls and sophisticated routers, it can be easy to overlook the network-connected physical access control systems. According to a study done by IBM in 2021, the ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0585
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kerrdown
Kerrdown can encrypt, encode, and compress multiple layers of shellcode.[179] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Biometric Authentication Under Threat: Liveness Detection Hacking
Biometric authentication has been widely used in scenarios such as device unlocking, App login, real-name authentication and even mobile payment. It provides people with a more convenient authentication experience compared with tradi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0166
ATT&CK Technique Name:RemoteCMD
RemoteCMD can execute commands remotely by creating a new schedule task on the remote system[149] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
The payload of CozyCar is encrypted with simple XOR with a rotating key. The CozyCar configuration file has been encrypted with RC4 keys.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink has maintained persistence by patching legitimate device firmware when it is downloaded, including that of WatchGuard devices.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used a legitimately signed executable to execute a malicious payload within a DLL file.[44][45][46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoisonIvy
PoisonIvy hides any strings related to its own indicators of compromise.[253] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0487
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kessel
Kessel has trojanized the ssh_login and user-auth_pubkey functions to steal plaintext credentials.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware attempts to determine the installed version of .NET by querying the Registry.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can inject code into multiple processes on infected endpoints.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM has used a script that configures the knockd service and firewall to only accept C2 connections from systems that use a specified sequence of knock ports.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
For C0015, the threat actors obtained a variety of tools, including AdFind, AnyDesk, and Process Hacker.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0423
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ginp
Ginp can use a multi-step phishing overlay to capture banking credentials and then credit card numbers after login.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0275
ATT&CK Technique Name:UPPERCUT
UPPERCUT has the capability to collect the current logged on user’s username from a machine.[194] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0147
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pteranodon
Pteranodon schedules tasks to invoke its components in order to establish persistence.[134][135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1104
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-Stage Channels
Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0400
ATT&CK Technique Name:RobbinHood
RobbinHood will search for Windows services that are associated with antivirus software on the system and kill the process.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:WIRTE
WIRTE has used HTTPS over ports 2083 and 2087 for C2.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:netsh
netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya initially infected IT networks, but by means of an exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can collect data from the system, and can monitor changes in specified directories.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0402
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX/Shlayer
OSX/Shlayer has collected the IOPlatformUUID, session UID, and the OS version using the command sw_vers -productVersion.[266][267] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0138
ATT&CK Technique Name:OLDBAIT
OLDBAIT installs itself in %ALLUSERPROFILE%\Application Data\Microsoft\MediaPlayer\updatewindws.exe; the directory name is missing a space and the file name is missing the letter "o."[111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0144
ATT&CK Technique Name:ChChes
ChChes collects its process identifier (PID) on the victim.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex can parse the available drives and directories to determine which files to encrypt.[191] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0167
ATT&CK Technique Name:Matryoshka
Matryoshka obfuscates API function names using a substitute cipher combined with Base64 encoding.[204] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group tools have contained an application to check performance of USB flash drives. Gamaredon Group has also used malware to scan for removable drives.[22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors discovered network disks mounted to the system using netstat.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has used web injection attacks to redirect victims to spoofed sites designed to harvest banking and other credentials. IcedID can use a self signed TLS certificate in connection with the spoofed site and simultaneously maintains a live connection with the legitimate ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER may use WMI when collecting information about a victim.[103] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.