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ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has identified domain admins through the use of "net group ‘Domain admins’" commands.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used a tool called CLASSFON to covertly proxy network communications.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has obtained passwords and session tokens with the use of the Redline password stealer.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Heyoka Backdoor
Heyoka Backdoor has the ability to search the compromised host for files.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has gained access to a global administrator account in Azure AD.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Dragonblood: Attacking the Dragonfly Handshake of WPA3
One of its main advantages of WPA3 is that it provides forward secrecy and prevents offline dictionary attacks. However, the WPA3 certification program was created behind closed doors, meaning researchers could not critique it. This is problema... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used nmap from a router VM to scan ports on systems within the restricted segment of an enterprise network.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta can create a new service to establish persistence.[25][26] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 2
To close out Black Hat Europe 2022, join Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss and Review Board members Jiska Classen, Federico Maggi, Leigh-Anne Galloway and Anant Shrivastava for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec comm... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang malware including RoyalCli and BS2005 have communicated over HTTP with the C2 server through Internet Explorer (IE) by using the COM interface IWebBrowser2.[174][175] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has been executed through Word documents with malicious embedded macros.[110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used a modified version of Mimikatz along with a PowerShell-based Mimikatz to dump credentials on the victim machines.[33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0659
ATT&CK Technique Name:Diavol
Diavol has used several API calls like GetLogicalDriveStrings, SleepEx, SystemParametersInfoAPI, CryptEncrypt, and others to execute parts of its attack.[69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0942
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Consider removal of remote services which are not regularly in use, or only enabling them when required (e.g., vendor remote access). Ensure all external remote access point (e.g., jump boxes, VPN concentrator) are configured with least function... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1564.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hidden Window
Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to av... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can place a lnk file in the Startup Folder to achieve persistence.[124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through spearphishing.[31][32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used sticky keys to launch a command prompt.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:netsh
netsh can be used to discover system firewall settings.[71][72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of behaviors related to process injection/memory tampering based on common sequences of indicators (ex: execution of specific API functions). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba has used multiple layers of obfuscation to avoid analysis, including its Base64 encoded payload.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:Scheduled Transfer
Adversaries may schedule data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:Confucius
Confucius has used PowerShell to execute malicious files and payloads.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can inject a variety of payloads into processes dynamically chosen by the adversary.[15][16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should protect their account credentials and enable multi-factor authentication options when available. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Consider enabling DHCP Snooping and Dynamic ARP Inspection on switches to create mappings between IP addresses requested via DHCP and ARP tables and tie the values to a port on the switch that may block bogus traffic.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0257
ATT&CK Technique Name:VERMIN
VERMIN can get a list of the processes and running tasks on the system.[267] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:SeaDuke
SeaDuke uses an event filter in WMI code to execute a previously dropped executable shortly after system startup.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Human User Authentication
All field controllers should require users to authenticate for all remote or local management sessions. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit user access to system utilities such as 'systemctl' or 'systemd-run' to users who have a legitimate need. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 (Long) Dragon Tails – Measuring Dependence on International Vulnerability Research
This talk will present results of a study on the reliance of critical proprietary and open source software on Chinese software vulnerability disclosures. The increasingly difficult environment for Chinese security res... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can maintain persistence by creating an auto-run Registry key.[211][212][213][214] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has used stolen credentials to connect remotely to victim networks using VPNs protected with only a single factor.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound granted compromised email accounts read access to the email boxes of additional targeted accounts. The group then was able to authenticate to the intended victim's OWA (Outlook Web Access) portal and read hundreds of email communications for information on M... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1067
ATT&CK Technique Name:FluBot
FluBot can use Accessibility Services to make removal of the malicious app difficult.[1] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Eliminating Triage Intermediaries for Zero-day Exploits Using a Decentralised Payout Protocol
We present a protocol that collectivises security bounties for deterministically verifiable zero-day exploits. It enables companies to show customers how secure their software is, in terms of dollars staked... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criteria and to prevent Office applications from creating potentially malicious executable content... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0054
ATT&CK Technique Name:CloudDuke
One variant of CloudDuke uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
The INCONTROLLER PLCProxy module can add an IP route to the CODESYS gateway running on Schneider PLCs to allow it to route messages through the PLC to other devices on that network. This allows the malware to bypass firewall rules that prevent it from directly communic... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0640
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avaddon
Avaddon bypasses UAC using the CMSTPLUA COM interface.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has exploited CVE-2017-0005 for local privilege escalation.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
An APT3 downloader first establishes a SOCKS5 connection to 192.157.198[.]103 using TCP port 1913; once the server response is verified, it then requests a connection to 192.184.60[.]229 on TCP port 81.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Preemptively search for files containing passwords or other credentials and take actions to reduce the exposure risk when found. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent Office applications from creating child processes and from writing potentially malicious executable content to disk. [9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT has the ability to inject malicious DLLs into a specific process for privilege escalation.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling has the ability to use TCP and UDP for communication.[16] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Dive into VxWorks Based IoT Device: Debug the Undebugable Device
VxWorks is the industry's leading real-time operating system. It has been widely used in various industry scenarios, which require real-time, deterministic performance and, in many cases, safety and security certifications. There has... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0010
During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely established a watering hole that was hosted on a login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company that was active until at least November 2021.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1056.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Credential API Hooking
Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials. Unlike Keylogging, th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
A OilRig macro has run a PowerShell command to decode file contents. OilRig has also used certutil to decode base64-encoded files on victims.[159][120][160][161] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1553.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. In user mode, Windows Authenticode digital signatures are used to verify a ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy that prevents use of unauthorized external services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has the ability to exfiltrate documents from infected systems.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
The SMOKEDHAM source code is embedded in the dropper as an encrypted string.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0633
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sliver
Sliver can exfiltrate files from the victim using the download command.[115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis will decrypt important strings used for C&C communication.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0574
ATT&CK Technique Name:BendyBear
BendyBear has encrypted payloads using RC4 and XOR.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1550
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Alternate Authentication Material
Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 delivers malware using spearphishing emails with malicious HWP attachments.[32][33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Use of Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) systems will limit actions administrators can perform and provide a history of user actions to detect unauthorized use and abuse. TACACS+ can keep control over which commands administrators are... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Consider blocking container file types at web and/or email gateways. Consider unregistering container file extensions in Windows File Explorer.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:PingPull
PingPull can use AES, in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode padded with PKCS5, to encrypt C2 server communications.[103] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer infected victims using JavaScript code.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0329
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tangelo
Tangelo accesses browser history, pictures, and videos.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0626
ATT&CK Technique Name:P8RAT
P8RAT can check the compromised host for processes associated with VMware or VirtualBox environments.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0333
ATT&CK Technique Name:UBoatRAT
UBoatRAT takes advantage of the /SetNotifyCmdLine option in BITSAdmin to ensure it stays running on a system to maintain persistence.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure proper process and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or modifying firewall settings. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used GitHub as C2, pulling hosted image payloads then committing command execution output to files in specific directories.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can check for the presence of network sniffers, AV, and BitDefender firewall.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0486
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bonadan
Bonadan has discovered the username of the user running the backdoor.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has exfiltrated data via HTTP to already established C2 servers.[23][24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1573
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypted Channel
Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to rever... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1652
ATT&CK Technique Name:Device Driver Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to enumerate local device drivers on a victim host. Information about device drivers may highlight various insights that shape follow-on behaviors, such as the function/purpose of the host, present security tools (i.e. Security Softwa... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Revisiting Stealthy Sensitive Information Collection from Android Apps
In recent years, most countries and territories have put in place strict regulations for user privacy protection. Checking and monitoring the privacy policy compliance of mobile applications thus has become essential for users... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Keynote: Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas
Alejandro Mayorkas was sworn in as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security by President Biden on February 2, 2021. Mayorkas is the first Latino and immigrant confirmed to serve as Secretary of Homeland Security. He has led a distinguished 30-year caree... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Check for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate.[5] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Zero - The Funniest Number in Cryptography
What is the funniest number in cryptography? 0. The reason is that for all x, x*0 = 0, i.e., the equation is always satisfied no matter what x is. This talk will explore crypto bugs in four BLS signatures' libraries (ethereum/py ecc, supranational/blst, he... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team's VBS backdoor can decode Base64-encoded data and save it to the %TEMP% folder. The group also decrypted received information using the Triple DES algorithm and decompresses it using GZip.[204][205] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT can check to see if the infected machine has VM tools running.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowGoop
PowGoop can decrypt PowerShell scripts for execution.[152][176] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet examines fields recorded by the DP_RECV monitor to determine if the target system is in a particular state of operation. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows can run as a service using svchost.exe.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0328
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Mango
Stealth Mango uses commands received from text messages for C2.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group sent victims spearphishing messages via LinkedIn concerning fictitious jobs.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Small Sieve
Small Sieve has the ability to use a custom hex byte swapping encoding scheme combined with an obfuscated Base64 function to protect program strings and Telegram credentials.[303] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1098.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Additional Cloud Roles
An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Offi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle has been distributed through phishing emails containing a malicious URL.[98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1053.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Systemd Timers
Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension .timer that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has encrypted documents with RC4 prior to exfiltration.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has delivered spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to targets.[104][105][106][107][108][109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear can identify the process for a specific security product.[270] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover network configuration details using the arp -a, nbtstat -n, net config, ipconfig /all, and route commands, as well as NBTscan.[83][238][239] Turla RPC backdoors have also retrieved registered RPC interface information from proc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
If possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0284
ATT&CK Technique Name:More_eggs
More_eggs can download and launch additional payloads.[300][301] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 leverages valid accounts after gaining credentials for use within the victim domain.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0402
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX/Shlayer
OSX/Shlayer has used the command appDir="$(dirname $(dirname "$currentDir"))" and $(dirname "$(pwd -P)") to construct installation paths.[220][221] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0927
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment. [10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used malware that has the capability to execute malicious code via COM, DCOM, and Outlook.[12][13][14] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.