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ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used VBS for code execution.[154][155][156][157] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored in code repositories. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:OutSteel
OutSteel has relied on a user to execute a malicious attachment delivered via spearphishing.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST collected all network interface MAC addresses that are up and not loopback devices, as well as IP address, DHCP configuration, and domain information.[222] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Event-based Fuzzing, Patch-based Research, and Comment Police: Finding Bugs Through a Bug
Learning from known vulnerabilities is a must for every security researcher, and subscribing to the major vendors' monthly public bulletins and security patch updates is the first thing security researchers do ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has exploited CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 to compromise on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server, enabling access to email accounts and installation of additional malware.[33][34][35][36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
The Black Basta dropper can check system flags, CPU registers, CPU instructions, process timing, system libraries, and APIs to determine if a debugger is present.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Action RAT
Action RAT has the ability to collect drive and file information on an infected machine.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER may collect active network connections by running netstat -an on a victim.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0624
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ecipekac
Ecipekac can download additional payloads to a compromised host.[159] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLACKCOFFEE
BLACKCOFFEE uses Microsoft’s TechNet Web portal to obtain an encoded tag containing the IP address of a command and control server and then communicates separately with that IP address for C2. If the C2 server is discovered or shut down, the threat actors can update the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can determine the operating system and whether a targeted machine has a 32 or 64 bit architecture.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:IceApple
IceApple is an IIS post-exploitation framework, consisting of 18 modules that provide several functionalities.[10] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Detecting Deep Fakes with Mice
Neural networks can generate increasingly realistic, human-like speech. These so-called "deep fakes" can be used in social engineering attacks. Bad actors can now impersonate any person's voice merely by gathering a few samples of spoken audio and then synthesizing ne... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 APTs Go Teleworking: The Rise of VPN Exploits
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, workforces rely even more on VPN technologies for remote access into private networks.Pulse Secure by Ivanti is a leading VPN technology. Enterprise VPN devices often are deployed at the intersection between trusted and untr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0398
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperBro
HyperBro has the ability to delete a specified file.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Train users to be aware of the existence of malicious images and how to avoid deploying instances and containers from them. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has he ability to perform anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization checks.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy has the capability to communicate over a backup channel via plus.google.com.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0635
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoomBox
BoomBox can encrypt data using AES prior to exfiltration.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0130
ATT&CK Technique Name:Unknown Logger
Unknown Logger is capable of spreading to USB devices.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sowbug
Sowbug identified and extracted all Word documents on a server by using a command containing * .doc and *.docx. The actors also searched for documents based on a specific date range and attempted to identify all installed software on a victim.[285] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0353
ATT&CK Technique Name:NOKKI
NOKKI has established persistence by writing the payload to the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.[183] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can write its configuration file to the Registry.[36][130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
GoldMax has RSA-encrypted its communication with the C2 server.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used Hermes ransomware to encrypt files with AES256.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound malware is capable of keylogging.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used various tools (such as Mimikatz and WCE) to perform credential dumping.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has included keylogging capabilities as part of Operation ROCK.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
If it is necessary that software must store credentials in the Registry, then ensure the associated accounts have limited permissions so they cannot be abused if obtained by an adversary. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0452
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBferry
USBferry can use net view to gather information about remote systems.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges. [185] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0196
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY has Gzipped information and saved it to a random temp file before exfil.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1636.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calendar Entries
Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather calendar entry data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Calendar Content Provider. On iOS, this can be accomplished using the EventKit framework. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can establish persistence by creating a new service.[111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can use RSA-4096 to encrypt data sent to its C2 server.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0399
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pallas
Pallas can take pictures with both the front and rear-facing cameras.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint has used a PowerShell script to install a shim database.[176] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM has encoded its C2 traffic with Base64.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has encoded data gathered from the victim with a simple substitution cipher and single-byte XOR using the 0xAA key, and Base64 with character permutation.[8][9] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Predictive Vulnerability Scoring System
Effective prioritization of vulnerabilities is essential to staying ahead of your attackers. While your threat intelligence might expose a wealth of information about attackers and attack paths, integrating it into decision-making is no easy task. Too often, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit search order hijacking vulnerabilities.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic uses the rem reg query command to obtain values from Registry keys.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0521
ATT&CK Technique Name:BloodHound
BloodHound has the ability to collect local admin information via GPO.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1114.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Email Collection
Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Advers... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Do Not Trust the ASA, Trojans!
Cisco ASA and ASA-X are widely deployed firewalls that are relied upon to protect internal networks from the dangers of the outside world. This key piece of network infrastructure is an obvious point of attack, and a known target for exploitation and implantation by A... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. [7] Move system's root of trust to hardware to prevent tampering with the SPI flash memory.[5] Technologies such as Intel Boot Gu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Automated Collection
Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a Command and Scripting Interpreter to search for and copy information fitting set cr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used a keylogger to capture keystrokes by using the SetWindowsHookEx function.[163] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can collect start time information from a compromised host.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has saved files with hidden file attributes.[6][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack can save collected data to disk, different file formats, and network shares.[26][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
Operators deploying Netwalker have used psexec and certutil to retrieve the Netwalker payload.[313] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has used Python-based malware to install and spread their coinminer.[38] | secon |
title:botconf2015 Air-gap limitations and bypass techniques: “command and control” using Smart Electromagnetic Interferences
Air gaps are generally considered to be a very efficient information security protection. However, this technique also showed limitations, involving finding covert channels for bridging the air g... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0465
ATT&CK Technique Name:CARROTBALL
CARROTBALL has used a custom base64 alphabet to decode files.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1003.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LSA Secrets
Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts. LSA secrets are stored in the registry at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHI... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBStealer
Once a removable media device is inserted back into the first victim, USBStealer collects data from it that was exfiltrated from a second victim.[27][28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0540
ATT&CK Technique Name:Asacub
Asacub has encrypted C2 communications using Base64-encoded RC4.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Authenticate connections fromsoftware and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 The Next Arms Race
The Internet is not supposed to have borders, but it does. Countries fight and spy on each other on the Internet every day. So, borders still exist on the Internet, and almost all countries are investing into offensive use of cyber power. The new weapons they are developing are ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum was seen using modified Quarks PwDump to perform credential dumping.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has used Wake-on-Lan to power on turned off systems for lateral movement.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can create a Launch Agent with the RunAtLoad key-value pair set to true, ensuring the com.apple.GrowlHelper.plist file runs every time a user logs in.[18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Block .scr files from being executed from non-standard locations. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
In an Exchange environment, Administrators can use Get-TransportRule / Remove-TransportRule to discover and remove potentially malicious transport rules.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Limit communications with the container service to managed and secured channels, such as local Unix sockets or remote access via SSH. Require secure port access to communicate with the APIs over TLS by disabling unauthenticated access to the Do... | secon |
title:botconf2022 Mastering Advanced Memory Analysis For Fun & Profit
Malware continues to advance in sophistication and prevalence. Well-engineered malware can obfuscate itself from the user, network, and even the operating system running host-based security applications. But one place malware cannot easily hide itsel... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has been modified to be used as a Windows service.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0586
ATT&CK Technique Name:TAINTEDSCRIBE
TAINTEDSCRIBE can enable Windows CLI access and execute files.[324] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity has been signed with self-signed certificates.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST dynamically resolved C2 infrastructure for randomly-generated subdomains within a parent domain.[16] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Black Box is Dead. Long Live Black Box!
The number of logic attacks on ATMs continues to rise. Some of them involve a "black box," a device that is physically connected to the cash dispenser and sends commands to push out cash. Within five years of the first known black box attacks (starting from 2... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has decrypted strings and other important information during the encryption process. Maze also calls certain functions dynamically to hinder analysis.[205] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can detect if it is running within a sandbox or other virtualized analysis environment.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher contains junk code in its functions in an effort to confuse disassembly programs.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0556
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pay2Key
Pay2Key has the ability to gather the hostname of the victim machine.[272] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can decrypt, unpack and load a DLL from its resources, or from blobs encrypted with Data Protection API, two-key triple DES, and variations of the XOR cipher.[117][118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can launch cmd.exe to perform reconnaissance commands.[41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can implement the kernel32.dll Sleep function to delay execution for up to 300 seconds before implementing persistence or processing an addon package.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0828
ATT&CK Technique Name:Loss of Productivity and Revenue
Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-target... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Identifying Multi-Binary Vulnerabilities in Embedded Firmware at Scale
Low-power, single-purpose embedded devices (e.g., routers and IoT devices) have become ubiquitous. While they automate and simplify many aspects of our lives, recent large-scale attacks have shown that their sheer number poses... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has the ability to upload a file from the command and control (C2) server to the victim machine.[217] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher hooks processes by modifying IAT pointers to CreateWindowEx.[9][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0304
ATT&CK Technique Name:Android/Chuli.A
Android/Chuli.A stole contact list data stored both on the the phone and the SIM card.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has disabled host-based firewalls. The group has also globally opened port 3389.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390's malware can add a Registry key to Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[258][259] | secon |
title:botconf2015 Takedowns: case studies and what we all could be doing better
We have all seen the splashy headlines of large threats being subjected to takedowns only to re-emerge days (or hours) later. A few takedowns, however, have achieved long term results. This talk will focus on how recent successful operation... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Putter Panda
A dropper used by Putter Panda installs itself into the ASEP Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with a value named McUpdate.[210] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz's kerberos module can create golden tickets.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0320
ATT&CK Technique Name:DroidJack
DroidJack can capture video using device cameras.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel has used malware that repeatedly checks the mouse cursor position to determine if a real user is on the system.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain can use HTTP for C2 communications.[197][205] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Intel VISA: Through the Rabbit Hole
The complexity of x86-based systems has become so great that not even specialists can know everything. The recently discovered Meltdown/Spectre vulnerabilities, as well as numerous issues in Intel Management Engine, underscore the platform's mindboggling intric... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0586
ATT&CK Technique Name:TAINTEDSCRIBE
The TAINTEDSCRIBE command and execution module can perform target system enumeration.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT can obtain passwords from FTP clients.[31][32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
ADVSTORESHELL connects to port 80 of a C2 server using Wininet API. Data is exchanged via HTTP POSTs.[5] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.