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ATT&CK ID:T1565.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transmitted Data Manipulation
Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business pr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor can detect whether it is executed in some virtualized or emulated environment by searching for specific artifacts, such as communication with I/O ports and using VM-specific instructions.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet calls system function blocks which are part of the operating system running on the PLC. Theyre used to execute system tasks, such as reading the system clock (SFC1) and generating data blocks on the fly. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0346
ATT&CK Technique Name:OceanSalt
OceanSalt can extract drive information from the endpoint and search files on the system.[210] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal has obfuscated strings in Bandook by base64 encoding, and then encrypting them.[93] | secon |
title:botconf2017 The (makes me) Wannacry Investigation
On May 12, 2017 a virulent new strain of ransomware known as Wannacry hit hundreds of thousands of computers affecting all types of organisations across the globe. While it is well understand how Wannacry spread using EternalBlue, there was little information on h... | secon |
title:botconf2019 Insights and Trends in the Data-Center Security Landscape
We deployed a large collection of high-interaction deception servers deployed in multiple cloud environments worldwide. Each such deception machine is capable of capturing and recording attacks on various services. This infrastructure provides ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has exfiltrated stolen victim data through C2 communications.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1008
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideCopy
SideCopy uses a loader DLL file to collect AV product names from an infected host.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon copies an executable payload to the target system by using SMB/Windows Admin Shares and then scheduling an unnamed task to execute the malware.[157][158] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0655
ATT&CK Technique Name:BusyGasper
BusyGasper can download a payload or updates from either its C2 server or email attachments in the adversary’s inbox.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to hook libc functions in order to hide the installed dropper and mining software in process lists.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1610
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deploy Container
Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used dumped hashes to authenticate to other machines via pass the hash.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec harvests plain-text credentials as a password filter registered on domain controllers.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1641.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transmitted Data Manipulation
Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or deci... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 The Next Generation of Windows Exploitation: Attacking the Common Log File System
The Common Log File System (CLFS) is a new logging mechanism introduced by Windows Vista, which is responsible for providing a high-performance, universal log file subsystem. In this session, we will share our resear... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1008
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideCopy
SideCopy has used a malicious loader DLL file to execute the credwiz.exe process and side-load the malicious payload Duser.dll.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10+, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla has been distributed via spearphishing emails containing archive attachments, with file types such as .iso, .zip, .img, .dmg, and .tar, as well as through malicious documents.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0003
ATT&CK Technique Name:RIPTIDE
APT12 has used the RIPTIDE RAT, which communicates over HTTP with a payload encrypted with RC4.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1095
ATT&CK Technique Name:Non-Application Layer Protocol
Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive. Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, suc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA has been created with a hidden attribute to insure it's not visible to the victim.[45] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Is This My Domain Controller? A New Class of Active Directory Protocol Injection Attacks
When analyzing the security of cryptographic systems, a critical part is resiliency against eavesdroppers as well as machine-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks. Over the years, researchers were able to break many sec... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0256
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mosquito
Mosquito leverages the CreateProcess() and LoadLibrary() calls to execute files with the .dll and .exe extensions.[125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used malware that can collect the victim’s username.[122][123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0460
ATT&CK Technique Name:Get2
Get2 has the ability to identify the current username of an infected host.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flame
Flame identifies security software such as antivirus through the Security module.[42][43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors gained initial access by exploiting vulnerabilities in JBoss webservers.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit on-premises accounts with access to the hybrid identity solution in place. For example, limit Azure AD Global Administrator accounts to only those required, and ensure that these are dedicated cloud-only accounts rather than hybrid ones.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar has been signed with fake certificates including those appearing to be from VB CORPORATE PTY. LTD.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0259
ATT&CK Technique Name:InnaputRAT
InnaputRAT gathers volume drive information and system information.[173] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0021
For C0021, the threat actors used Cobalt Strike configured with a modified variation of the publicly available Pandora Malleable C2 Profile.[31][32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0493
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenSpy
GoldenSpy has used the Ryeol HTTP Client to facilitate HTTP internet communication.[142] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Time Providers
Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resource... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0280
ATT&CK Technique Name:MirageFox
MirageFox can gather the username from the victim’s machine.[116] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 The Hacker's Guide to Policyland
At the end of 2021, the UK Government launched a new National Cyber Strategy which outlined the UK's approach to being a responsible cyber power, setting a new standard internationally. The broad strategy set out an agenda to build both the UK cyber economy and impr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot can implant malicious code into a compromised device's firmware.[12] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 {JS-ON: Security-OFF}: Abusing JSON-Based SQL Queries
All major SQL-based database engines such as Postgres, SQLite, MS SQL, and MySQL have in the last few years started to adopt native JSON features that enable data interactions with complicated JSON-type objects. While these native JSON features ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0339
ATT&CK Technique Name:Micropsia
Micropsia creates a RAR archive based on collected files on the victim's machine.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman has created a scheduled task for persistence.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
Netwalker can use Windows API functions to inject the ransomware DLL.[127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession has used a file named English.rtf to appear benign on victim hosts.[32][33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth searches for different processes on the system.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1033
ATT&CK Technique Name:DCSrv
DCSrv has created new services for persistence by modifying the Registry.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:GOLD SOUTHFIELD
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has executed base64 encoded PowerShell scripts on compromised hosts.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has cleared Windows event logs and other logs produced by tools they used, including system, security, terminal services, remote services, and audit logs. The actors also deleted specific Registry keys.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used compromised credentials to access other systems on a victim network.[49][50][14] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Keynote: Supply Chain Infections and the Future of Contactless Deliveries
Defending against supply chain compromises in the Before Times was tough enough. But last year was … special, and safely managing the integrity of the software supply chain has become harder than ever.Some of these problems a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:KEYPLUG
KEYPLUG can decode its configuration file to determine C2 protocols.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Use of Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) systems will limit actions administrators can perform and provide a history of user actions to detect unauthorized use and abuse. TACACS+ can keep control over which commands administrators are... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 Taking Kernel Hardening to the Next Level
Memory safety issues are the foremost security problems in today's operating systems (OS). In 2021 alone, there were 175 CVEs assigned to potentially exploitable bugs in Linux. Since OS is an attractive target to adversaries who wish to elevate privileges,... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Fixing a Memory Forensics Blind Spot: Linux Kernel Tracing
The ubiquity of Linux servers across the internet and within cloud instances necessitates that defensive research maintains pace with the introduction of new features to the platform. Unfortunately, these research efforts have not adequatel... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used a Mimikatz-based tool and a PowerShell script to steal passwords from Google Chrome.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA has taken a screenshot of a victim's desktop, named it "Filter3.jpg", and stored it in the local directory.[158] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1036.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Invalid Code Signature
Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tamp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors downloaded files and tools onto a victim machine.[185] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
Authenticate all access to field controllers before authorizing access to, or modification of, a device's state, logic, or programs. Centralized authentication techniques can help manage the large number of field controller accounts needed across the ICS. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has delivered components for its ransomware attacks using MSI files, some of which have been executed from the command-line using msiexec.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Accessibility Features
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0812
ATT&CK Technique Name:Safety Instrumented Systems
Ensure that all SIS are segmented from operational networks to prevent them from being targeted by additional adversarial behavior. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used spearphishing via a link to get users to download and run their malware.[102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practic... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 The Data Distribution Service (DDS) Protocol is Critical: Let's Use it Securely!
We discovered and disclosed vulnerabilities in most of the OMG Data Distribution Service (DDS) implementations. DDS enables crucial technologies like autonomous driving, healthcare machinery, military tactical systems, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to overwrite readdir() and readdir64().[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint can iterate through running processes every six seconds collecting a list of processes to capture from later.[194] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0244
ATT&CK Technique Name:Comnie
Comnie uses blogs and third-party sites (GitHub, tumbler, and BlogSpot) to avoid DNS-based blocking of their communication to the command and control server.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has tested connectivity between a compromised machine and a C2 server using Ping with commands such as CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c ping -n 1.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can delete files.[105][106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0066
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elderwood
Elderwood has encrypted documents and malicious executables.[112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0208
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pasam
Pasam creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can upload files.[340] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Print Processors
Adversaries may abuse print processors to run malicious DLLs during system boot for persistence and/or privilege escalation. Print processors are DLLs that are loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, during boot. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has crafted phishing emails containing malicious hyperlinks.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0527
ATT&CK Technique Name:CSPY Downloader
CSPY Downloader can bypass UAC using the SilentCleanup task to execute the binary with elevated privileges.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
Authenticate all access to field controllers before authorizing access to, or modification of, a device's state, logic, or programs. Centralized authentication techniques can help manage the large number of field controller accounts needed across the ICS. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
One of Stuxnet's rootkits is contained entirely in the fake s7otbxdx.dll. In order to continue existing undetected on the PLC it needs to account for at least the following situations: read requests for its own malicious code blocks, read requests for infected blocks (OB1, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoisonIvy
PoisonIvy creates run key Registry entries pointing to a malicious executable dropped to disk.[197] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used compromised Office 365 service accounts with Global Administrator privileges to collect email from user inboxes.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0297
ATT&CK Technique Name:XcodeGhost
XcodeGhost can read and write data in the user’s clipboard.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0332
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remcos
Remcos has a command to hide itself through injecting into another process.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
Gazer performs thread execution hijacking to inject its orchestrator into a running thread from a remote process.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0472
ATT&CK Technique Name:down_new
down_new has the ability to use HTTP in C2 communications.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute batch scripts for lateral movement with the following command: SCHTASKS /Create /S <IP Address> /U <Username> /p <Password> /SC ONCE /TN test /TR <Path to a Batch File> /ST <Time> /R... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors named a malicious scheduled task "WinUpdate" for persistence.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
Gazer uses custom encryption for C2 that uses RSA.[21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0413
ATT&CK Technique Name:MailSniper
MailSniper can be used for password spraying against Exchange and Office 365.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0611
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clop
Clop can enumerate all processes on the victim's machine.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0254
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLAINTEE
PLAINTEE uses cmd.exe to execute commands on the victim’s machine.[260] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
A module in Prikormka collects information from the victim about the current user name.[145] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used legitimate websites for C2 through dead drop resolvers (DDR), including GitHub, Pastebin, and Microsoft TechNet.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell has a command to transfer files from a remote host.[492] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0399
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pallas
Pallas captures and exfiltrates all SMS messages, including future messages as they are received.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Axiom
Axiom has used steganography to hide its C2 communications.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 sent spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Office and RAR attachments.[12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0341
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbash
Xbash can create a Startup item for persistence if it determines it is on a Windows system.[280] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire includes keylogging capabilities for Windows, Linux, and macOS systems.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can deliver additional payloads to victim machines.[116][117] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackdoorDiplomacy
BackdoorDiplomacy has executed DLL search order hijacking.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 registered devices in order to enable mailbox syncing via the Set-CASMailbox command.[10] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.