text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used a compromised account to access an organization's VPN infrastructure.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1559.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Component Object Model
Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1583.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Server
Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Comman... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can use the Windows Command Shell to execute commands, including its own removal.[145] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0647
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turian
Turian can download additional files and tools from its C2.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0556
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pay2Key
Pay2Key has used RSA encrypted communications with C2.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has maintained persistence through a scheduled task. [54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent has the ability to set persistence using the Task Scheduler.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1132
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Encoding
Adversaries may encode data to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may adhere to existing protocol specifications and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:admin@338
admin@338 actors used the following commands after exploiting a machine with LOWBALL malware to obtain information about files and directories: dir c:\ >> %temp%\download dir "c:\Documents and Settings" >> %temp%\download dir "c:\Program Files\" >> %temp%\download dir d:\... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0475
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackConfig
BackConfig can download and execute additional payloads on a compromised host.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Sharpshooter
For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors used the ExpressVPN service to hide their location.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used sticky keys to launch a command prompt.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1521
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypted Channel
Adversaries may explicitly employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerab... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0199
ATT&CK Technique Name:TURNEDUP
TURNEDUP is capable of creating a reverse shell.[341] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0526
ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY
KGH_SPY has the ability to set a Registry key to run a cmd.exe command.[177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus has compressed data before exfiltrating it using a tool called Abbrevia.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has injected malicious DLLs into memory with read, write, and execute permissions.[75][76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing was run through a deployed Ubuntu container.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex has checked the number of CPUs in the system to avoid being run in a sandbox or emulator.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment networks and systems appropriately to reduce access to critical system and services communications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can deobfuscate C2 server responses and unpack its code on targeted hosts.[40][41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:CostaRicto
During CostaRicto, the threat actors collected data and files from compromised networks.[49] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Raiden Glitching Framework
Voltage glitching is a developing technique in hardware hacking that has shown much promise, allowing bypass of security mechanisms and disclosure of firmware and secrets at the physical layer. Current glitching platforms are limited to custom hardware, which makes scali... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1037.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:RC Scripts
Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to m... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Back in Black Hat: The 7th Annual Black Hat USA NOC Report
After a short intermission, the Black Hat NOC team is back with what's sure to be a year like no other. With the world going virtual, and Black Hat being no exception, come find out how we've spent the last two years changing, adapting, and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity can automatically exfiltrate collected documents to the C2 server.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can collect data from a compromised host.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Some vendors of embedded network devices provide cryptographic signing to ensure the integrity of operating system images at boot time. Implement where available, following vendor guidelines. [1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practic... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0459
ATT&CK Technique Name:MechaFlounder
MechaFlounder has the ability to use base16 encoded strings in C2.[53] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 ExplosION: The Hidden Mines in the Android ION Driver
The ION driver is an essential component introduced by Google into the Android kernel to facilitate allocations of device-accessible memory. It has been widely used by vendors for almost 10 years. In addition, almost all untrusted apps can acc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
DustySky captures PNG screenshots of the main screen.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has the curl and wget commands as well as batch scripts to download new tools.[439][440] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0556
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pay2Key
Pay2Key can identify the IP and MAC addresses of the compromised host.[170] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN4
FIN4 has lured victims to click malicious links delivered via spearphishing emails (often sent from compromised accounts).[35][36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0445
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRatReporter
ShimRatReporter listed all running processes on the machine.[226] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Identify and block potentially malicious unmanaged COR_PROFILER profiling DLLs by using application control solutions like AppLocker that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unapproved DLLs.[9][10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
Netwalker can terminate system processes and services, some of which relate to backup software.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can use Winlogon Helper DLL to establish persistence.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0514
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMess
WellMess has used Base64 encoding to uniquely identify communication to and from the C2.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has used appcmd.exe to disable logging on a victim server.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium has named malicious binaries serv.exe, winprint.dll, and chrome_elf.dll and has set its persistence in the Registry with the key value Chrome Update to appear legitimate.[63] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Breaking VSM by Attacking SecureKernel
Virtualization based security technologies (VBS) continue to increase the world's dependency on the security of virtualization stacks. But like all software stacks, virtualization stacks are prone to vulnerabilities too.
In this talk, we will explain how we fo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has embedded binaries within RC4 encrypted .png files.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has deleted dropper files on an infected system using command scripts.[243] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has side-loaded its malicious DLL file.[40][41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 can enumerate files on the local file system and includes a module for enumerating recently accessed files.[233] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Network Connections Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire contains modules for executing commands over SSH as well as in-memory VNC agent injection.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackdoorDiplomacy
BackdoorDiplomacy has obfuscated tools and malware it uses with VMProtect.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing has used valid SSH credentials to access remote hosts.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0942
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Consider the disabling of features such as AutoRun. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1057
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Loss Prevention
Data loss prevention can be detect and block sensitive data being uploaded to web services via web browsers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has delivered macro-enabled documents that required targets to click the "enable content" button to execute the payload on the system.[171][172][173][174] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has used the Windows command line to create a Registry entry under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence.[230] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Configure browsers/applications to regularly delete persistent web cookies. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1626
ATT&CK Technique Name:Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevated privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can gain on a machine.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0293
ATT&CK Technique Name:BrainTest
BrainTest uses root privileges (if available) to copy an additional Android app package (APK) to /system/priv-app to maintain persistence even after a factory reset.[1] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 It's a PHP Unserialization Vulnerability Jim, but Not as We Know It
Recent years have seen the emergence of PHP unserialization vulnerabilities as a viable route to remote code execution or other malicious outcomes. The presentation will start with a brief refresher on the issue as it has previousl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1552
ATT&CK Technique Name:Unsecured Credentials
Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. Bash History), operating system or application-specific... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has gained access through VPNs including with compromised accounts and stolen VPN certificates.[22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0382
ATT&CK Technique Name:ServHelper
ServHelper contains modules that will use schtasks to carry out malicious operations.[156] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can obtain a list of SIDs and provide the option for selecting process tokens to impersonate.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can execute Lazagne as well as Mimikatz using PowerShell.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used FTP to exfiltrate files (separately from the C2 channel).[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0528
ATT&CK Technique Name:Javali
Javali has used the MSI installer to download and execute malicious payloads.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
Elise can download additional files from the C2 server for execution.[163] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 The Windows Notification Facility: Peeling the Onion of the Most Undocumented Kernel Attack Surface Yet
All Windows researchers know about RPC and ALPC, and the attack surface provided through the kernel's system call layer. As they know about shared memory, the object manager, the registry, and cou... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
After collecting documents from removable media, Prikormka compresses the collected files, and encrypts it with Blowfish.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0334
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkComet
DarkComet can load any files onto the infected machine to execute.[136][137] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Audit images deployed within the environment to ensure they do not contain any malicious components. | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 The Price of Compatibility: Defeating macOS Kernel Using Extended File Attributes
Filesystem is one of the infrastructures of OS, and any flaws in it may cause serious impacts.When I studied filesystem's implementation on macOS, I found that the old msdos FAT filesystem supports advanced features... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Regin
Regin appears to have functionality to sniff for credentials passed over HTTP, SMTP, and SMB.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0452
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBferry
USBferry can collect information from an air-gapped host machine.[189] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0626
ATT&CK Technique Name:P8RAT
P8RAT has the ability to "sleep" for a specified time to evade detection.[32] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Sensor and Process Fingerprinting in Industrial Control Systems
Critical infrastructure, such as electricity and water distribution, is heavily dependent on automated control. The security of these cyber-physical systems is vital for the normal functioning of modern societies; attacks to those infra... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used the Windows API to execute code within a victim's system.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0263
ATT&CK Technique Name:TYPEFRAME
APIs and strings in some TYPEFRAME variants are RC4 encrypted. Another variant is encoded with XOR.[339] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Backdooring and Hijacking Azure AD Accounts by Abusing External Identities
External identities are a concept in Azure Active Directory which makes it possible to collaborate with users outside of an organization. These external users, often called guest users, can be granted permissions to certain ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can automatically gather the username, domain name, machine name, and other information from a compromised system.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not allow privileged accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0668
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyTurla
TinyTurla has been deployed as w64time.dll to appear legitimate.[170] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Net
Commands such as net group /domain can be used in Net to gather information about and manipulate groups.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0659
ATT&CK Technique Name:Diavol
Diavol can use the ARP table to find remote hosts to scan.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has obfuscated malware to help avoid detection.[114] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot can enumerate computers and network devices.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig uses remote services such as VPN, Citrix, or OWA to persist in an environment.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet uses an RPC server that contains a routine for file deletion and also removes itself from the system through a DLL export by deleting specific files.[229] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0545
ATT&CK Technique Name:TERRACOTTA
TERRACOTTA has displayed a form to collect user data after installation.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer contained a module which leveraged a vulnerability in the Siemens SIPROTEC relays (CVE-2015-5374) to create a Denial of Service against automated protective relays. [1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0083
ATT&CK Technique Name:Misdat
The initial beacon packet for Misdat contains the operating system version of the victim.[232] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
For C0015, the threat actors used Cobalt Strike and Conti ransomware.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0176
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wingbird
Wingbird uses services.exe to register a new autostart service named "Audit Service" using a copy of the local lsass.exe file.[137][138] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Backdoor.Oldrea collects information about available drives, default browser, desktop file list, My Documents, Internet history, program files, and root of available drives. It also searches for ICS-related software files.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used net group "Domain Admins" /domain to identify domain administrators.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Application denylists can be used to block automation protocol functions used to initiate device shutdowns or restarts, such as DNP3's 0x0D function code, or vulnerabilities that can be used to trigger device shutdowns (e.g., CVE-2014-9195, CVE-2015-5374). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Enforce the principle of least-privilege. Consider implementing access control mechanisms that include both authentication and authorization. | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.