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ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries may use new DLLs to execute this technique. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through search order hijacking by using application control solutions capable of blocking DLLs loaded by legitimate software. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has weaponized CHM files in their phishing campaigns.[11][12][13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTRAN
HTRAN can proxy TCP socket connections to obfuscate command and control infrastructure.[22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0953
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [2], including the management of go... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Many vendors provide digitally signed operating system images to validate the integrity of the software used on their platform. Make use of this feature where possible in order to prevent and/or detect attempts by adversaries to compromise the system image. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group used SSH and the PuTTy PSCP utility to gain access to a restricted segment of a compromised network.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Recent OS versions have limited access to certain APIs unless certain conditions are met, making Data Manipulation more difficult | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Consider rotating access keys within a certain number of days to reduce the effectiveness of stolen credentials. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0538
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crutch
Crutch can monitor removable drives and exfiltrate files matching a given extension list.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0800
ATT&CK Technique Name:Authorization Enforcement
Restrict configurations changes and firmware updating abilities to only authorized individuals. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper can use cmd.exe /Q/c move CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE\temp\sys.tmp1 CSIDL_WINDOWS\policydefinitions\postgresql.exe 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\_1636727589.6007507 2>&1 to deploy on an infected system.[152] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0334
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkComet
DarkComet adds several Registry entries to enable automatic execution at every system startup.[70][71] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Certified Pre-Owned: Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services
Microsoft's Active Directory Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) implementation, known as Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), has largely flown under the radar by both the offensive and defensive realms. AD CS is widely deploy... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0248
ATT&CK Technique Name:yty
yty collects files with the following extensions: .ppt, .pptx, .pdf, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .docm, .rtf, .inp, .xlsm, .csv, .odt, .pps, .vcf and sends them back to the C2 server.[199] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat has hijacked the cryptbase.dll within migwiz.exe to escalate privileges. This prevented the User Access Control window from appearing.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0010
For C0010, the threat actors compromised the login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company and likely established a watering hole that collected visitor information.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0380
ATT&CK Technique Name:StoneDrill
StoneDrill has the capability to discover the system OS, Windows version, architecture and environment.[352] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
Gazer can establish persistence by setting the value "Shell" with "explorer.exe, %malware_pathfile%" under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used Windows command-line to run commands.[304][305][306] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0417
ATT&CK Technique Name:GRIFFON
GRIFFON has used a screenshot module that can be used to take a screenshot of the remote system.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0048
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has used Registry run keys to establish persistence for the RTM Trojan and other tools, such as a modified version of TeamViewer remote desktop software.[228][229] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 SMS PVA Services Fueled by Compromised Supply-Chain Mobile Botnets
During our investigation of an SMS PVA service provider, we uncovered a mobile botnet that was used to provide SMS reception services. Whilst examining it, the botnet has active devices in dozens of countries with tens of thousands... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang performs local network connection discovery using netstat.[41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin can report the IP of the compromised host to attacker controlled infrastructure.[171] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denial of Control
Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to preven... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing has used Unix shell scripts to execute commands in the victim environment.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
The HIDE_OVERLAY_WINDOWS permission was introduced in Android 12 allowing apps to hide overlay windows of type TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY drawn by other apps with the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission, preventing other applications from creating overlay windows on ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Proactively search for credentials within the Registry and attempt to remediate the risk. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0246
ATT&CK Technique Name:HARDRAIN
HARDRAIN binds and listens on port 443 with a FakeTLS method.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used the native Windows cabinet creation tool, makecab.exe, likely to compress stolen data to be uploaded.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0099
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT-C-36
APT-C-36 has used a macro function to set scheduled tasks, disguised as those used by Google.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has sent spearphishing emails with various attachment types to corporate and personal email accounts of victim organizations. Attachment types have included .rtf, .doc, .xls, archives containing LNK files, and password protected archives containing .exe an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has sent spearphishing emails with attachment to harvest credentials and deliver malware.[240] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has used the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM account to create files on Exchange servers.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT has encrypted collected data with AES-256 using a hardcoded key.[38] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Knockout Win Against TCC - 20+ NEW Ways to Bypass Your MacOS Privacy Mechanisms
"TotallyNotAVirus 2.app" would like to access the camera and spy on you. To protect your privacy, Apple introduced the Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) framework that restricts access to sensitive personal resou... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0397
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoJax
LoJax has modified the Registry key ‘HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute’ from ‘autocheck autochk ’ to ‘autocheck autoche ’.[84] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Tracking the Criminal of Fake News Based on a Unified Embedding
In recent years, public opinion attack has become more and more common. Attackers purposefully fabricate rumors and fake news, and these negative news widely spread across the Internet, which has a bad impact on individuals, companie... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Malware researchers can reverse engineer malware variants that use D... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda obfuscates the macro commands in its initial payload.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emond
Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a Launch Daemon that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond b... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the SBOM
Despite its simplicity, the "software bill of materials" (SBOM) has been met with apathy and hostility, especially in policy circles. Why has this common industrial concept been so unpopular when translated into the information security context, and ... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Broken Links: Emergence and Future of Software-Supply Chain Compromises
The last two years have been filled with high-profile enterprise security incidents that shared a common origin: breach of a trusted software provider. In truth, supply chain attacks have played a key role in numerous targeted a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has exploited the Microsoft Netlogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472).[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1573.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Asymmetric Cryptography
Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, us... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0316
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for Android
Pegasus for Android accesses calendar entries.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0682
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrailBlazer
TrailBlazer can masquerade its C2 traffic as legitimate Google Notifications HTTP requests.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer has a data wiper component that enumerates keys in the Registry HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0238
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proxysvc
Proxysvc can overwrite files indicated by the attacker before deleting them.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0263
ATT&CK Technique Name:TYPEFRAME
TYPEFRAME can install and store encrypted configuration data under the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\laxhost.dll and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has created local privileged users on victim machines.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has conducted internal spearphishing within the victim's environment for lateral movement.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla may attempt to connect to systems within a victim's network using net use commands and a predefined list or collection of passwords.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has executed scripts to disable the event log service.[12] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Anti-Forensics: Reverse Engineering a Leading Phone Forensic Tool
How can vulnerabilities in forensic software affect cases brought to the courts? That question was the impetus of what kicked off my research on the Cellebrite UFED - a widely-used phone forensic tool. This talk will cover what my ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0147
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pteranodon
Pteranodon can capture screenshots at a configurable interval.[129][130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has been observed making videos of victims to observe bank employees day to day activities.[43][44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metador
Metador has used Microsoft's Console Debugger in some of their operations.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 collected emails from specific individuals, such as executives and IT staff, using New-MailboxExportRequest followed by Get-MailboxExportRequest.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer has attempted to install itself as a service to maintain persistence.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has used port-protocol mismatches on ports such as 53, 80, 443, and 8080 during C2.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0678
ATT&CK Technique Name:Torisma
Torisma can use GetlogicalDrives to get a bitmask of all drives available on a compromised system. It can also use GetDriveType to determine if a new drive is a CD-ROM drive.[370] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0210
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nerex
Nerex creates a Registry subkey that registers a new service.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can collect the IP address of a compromised host.[156][157] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has a tool that can obtain information about the local system.[23][24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat can broadcasts NetBIOS Name Service (NBNC) messages to search for servers connected to compromised networks.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can capture keystrokes on a compromised host.[177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing has used valid SSH credentials to access remote hosts.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1074
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Staged
Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionalit... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has run tools including Browser64 to steal passwords saved in victim web browsers.[54][55] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Let's Dance in the Cache - Destabilizing Hash Table on Microsoft IIS
Hash Table, as the most fundamental Data Structure in Computer Science, is extensively applied in Software Architecture to store data in an associative manner. However, its architecture makes it prone to Collision Attacks. To ... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Monocerus: Dynamic Analysis for Smart Contract
By introducing the concept of storing and executing program on blockchain, smart contract becomes vital for the Fintech revolution. Unfortunately, like legacy code, smart contract can be ridden with vulnerabilities, which may cause immediate negative... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink can use non-standard ports for C2 not typically associated with HTTP or HTTPS traffic.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used "systeminfo" and similar commands to acquire detailed configuration information of a victim machine.[399] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mis-Type
Mis-Type has temporarily stored collected information to the files "%AppData%\{Unique Identifier}\HOSTRURKLSR" and "%AppData%\{Unique Identifier}\NEWERSSEMP".[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weakne... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Transparency in the Software Supply Chain: Making SBOM a Reality
We can't buy a piece of candy without knowing its ingredients, or design and sell a piece of machinery without accounting for each nut and bolt. Yet, even as supply chain uncertainty has emerged as a top information security risk, the... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Making an Impact from India to the Rest of the World by Building and Nurturing Women Infosec Community
India is one of the most diverse and fastest growing countries in the world and due to the fast growth, women often are left behind. The world average female literacy rate is 79.7%, while in India ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Ensure that all accounts use the least privileges they require. In Azure AD environments, consider using Privileged Identity Management (PIM) to define roles that require two or more approvals before assignment to users.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire has a dylib hijacker module that generates a malicious dylib given the path to a legitimate dylib of a vulnerable application.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
The Black Basta dropper can check system flags, CPU registers, CPU instructions, process timing, system libraries, and APIs to determine if a debugger is present.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0516
ATT&CK Technique Name:SoreFang
SoreFang can download additional payloads from C2.[421][422] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used the commercially available tool RemoteExec for agentless remote code execution.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0628
ATT&CK Technique Name:FYAnti
FYAnti can search the C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\ directory for files of a specified size.[131] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 IRonMAN: InterpRetable Incident Inspector Based ON Large-Scale Language Model and Association miNing
Contextual incident investigation and incident similarity assessment are crucial components of modern IR and proactive threat hunting strategies. However, current automated systems often rely on patt... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has created scheduled tasks using name variants such as "Windows Update Security", "Windows Update Security Patches", and "Google Chrome Security Update", to launch Maze at a specific time.[105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Hiding Process Memory via Anti-Forensic Techniques
Nowadays, security practitioners typically use memory acquisition or live forensics to detect and analyze sophisticated malware samples. Subsequently, malware authors began to incorporate anti-forensic techniques that subvert the analysis process b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
DustySky extracts basic information about the operating system.[119] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT contains a .NET wrapper DLL for creating and managing scheduled tasks for maintaining persistence upon reboot.[144][145] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0654
ATT&CK Technique Name:ProLock
ProLock can use .jpg and .bmp files to store its payload.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent has the ability to set persistence using the Task Scheduler.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0405
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exodus
Exodus One queries the device for its IMEI code and the phone number in order to validate the target of a new infection.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0333
ATT&CK Technique Name:UBoatRAT
UBoatRAT has used GitHub and a public blog service in Hong Kong for C2 communications.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0418
ATT&CK Technique Name:ViceLeaker
ViceLeaker can delete arbitrary files from the device.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0434
ATT&CK Technique Name:Imminent Monitor
Imminent Monitor has a "Process Watcher" feature to monitor processes in case the client ever crashes or gets closed.[128] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has collected files and other sensitive information from a compromised network.[70] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 The Subtle Art of Chaining Headers - IKEv2 Attack Surface Case Study
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is a significant component of IP Security (IPsec), a suite of protocols used extensively for creating Virtual Private Networks. IKE is used for performing mutual authentication, establishing and mainta... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.