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ATT&CK ID:G0094 ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky Kimsuky has downloaded additional scripts, tools, and malware onto victim systems.[35][244]
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ATT&CK ID:S0334 ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkComet DarkComet can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.[96]
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ATT&CK ID:S0410 ATT&CK Technique Name:Fysbis Fysbis has used the command ls /etc | egrep -e"fedora*|debian*|gentoo*|mandriva*|mandrake*|meego*|redhat*|lsb-*|sun-*|SUSE*|release" to determine which Linux OS version is running.[141]
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ATT&CK ID:G0044 ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti Group Winnti Group has used a program named ff.exe to search for specific documents on compromised hosts.[329]
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ATT&CK ID:S0345 ATT&CK Technique Name:Seasalt Seasalt has the capability to identify the drive type on a victim.[210]
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ATT&CK ID:G0102 ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider Wizard Spider has used RDP for lateral movement.[55][56][57]
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ATT&CK ID:S0194 ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit PowerSploit's Get-ProcessTokenGroup Privesc-PowerUp module can enumerate all SIDs associated with its current token.[34][35]
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ATT&CK ID:S1059 ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain metaMain can download files onto compromised systems.[285][275]
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ATT&CK ID:M1052 ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Control Turn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System] to automatically deny elevation requests, add: "ConsentPromptBehaviorUser"=dword:00000000. Consider enabling installer detection...
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ATT&CK ID:G0004 ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang Ke3chang has used implants to collect the system language ID of a compromised machine.[14]
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ATT&CK ID:S0598 ATT&CK Technique Name:P.A.S. Webshell P.A.S. Webshell can display the /etc/passwd file on a compromised host.[30]
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ATT&CK ID:S0081 ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise Elise creates a file in AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer and stores all harvested data in that file.[32]
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ATT&CK ID:T1428 ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploitation of Remote Services Adversaries may exploit remote services of enterprise servers, workstations, or other resources to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Adversaries may exploit remote services by taking advantage of a mobile device’s...
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ATT&CK ID:S0234 ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook Bandook is capable of taking an image of and uploading the current desktop.[22][23]
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ATT&CK ID:G0040 ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork Patchwork attempted to use RDP to move laterally.[43]
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titleblackhat:eu-22 Grand Theft Drone: Reaching Breaking Point in Drone Proprietary RF Link Security The drone industry is under enormous change, and the technology in the remote control for drones has vastly improved. Nevertheless, many remote control vendors reveal a lack of security features, and they use proprietar...
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ATT&CK ID:S0695 ATT&CK Technique Name:Donut Donut can erase file references to payloads in-memory after being reflectively loaded and executed.[5]
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ATT&CK ID:M1026 ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local P...
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titleblackhat:us-22 Breaking the Chrome Sandbox with Mojo If you manage to exploit a Chrome renderer vulnerability, you find yourself in a tight sandbox. Access to OS resources like the file system are greatly restricted and site isolation still enforces the web security guarantees. To allow such strong restrictions, v...
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ATT&CK ID:S0415 ATT&CK Technique Name:BOOSTWRITE BOOSTWRITE has encoded its payloads using a ChaCha stream cipher with a 256-bit key and 64-bit Initialization vector (IV) to evade detection.[59]
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ATT&CK ID:T1011 ATT&CK Technique Name:Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection...
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ATT&CK ID:T1601 ATT&CK Technique Name:Modify System Image Adversaries may make changes to the operating system of embedded network devices to weaken defenses and provide new capabilities for themselves. On such devices, the operating systems are typically monolithic and most of the device functionality and capabilitie...
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ATT&CK ID:G0018 ATT&CK Technique Name:admin@338 admin@338 has attempted to get victims to launch malicious Microsoft Word attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.[2]
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title:blackhat:us-21 HPE iLO5 Firmware Security - Go Home Cryptoprocessor, You're Drunk! At the core of HPE Gen10 servers lies the Integrated Lights Out 5 (iLO 5) out-of-band management technology. Coming with new hardware and software, it introduced a cornerstone feature described as a "silicon root of trust". Whe...
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ATT&CK ID:G0008 ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak Carbanak malware installs itself as a service to provide persistence and SYSTEM privileges.[30]
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ATT&CK ID:S0575 ATT&CK Technique Name:Conti Conti has the ability to discover hosts on a target network.[29]
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ATT&CK ID:S0603 ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet DP_RECV is the name of a standard function block used by network coprocessors. It is used to receive network frames on the Profibus a standard industrial network bus used for distributed I/O. The original block is copied to FC1869, and then replaced by a malicious block. E...
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ATT&CK ID:S0406 ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff Gustuff injects the global action GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK to mimic pressing the back button to close the application if a call to an open antivirus application is detected.[2]
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ATT&CK ID:S0352 ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has disguised its app bundle by adding special characters to the filename and using the icon for legitimate Word documents.[53]
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ATT&CK ID:S0023 ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK Part of APT28's operation involved using CHOPSTICK modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines and using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.[7][6][8]
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ATT&CK ID:M0938 ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention Application control may be able to prevent the running of executables masquerading as other files.
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ATT&CK ID:M1028 ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration Prevent administrator accounts from being enumerated when an application is elevating through UAC since it can lead to the disclosure of account names. The Registry key is located HKLM\ SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\CredUI\Enumera...
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ATT&CK ID:S1029 ATT&CK Technique Name:AuTo Stealer AuTo Stealer can place malicious executables in a victim's AutoRun registry key or StartUp directory, depending on the AV product installed, to maintain persistence.[32]
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ATT&CK ID:S0438 ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor Attor has manipulated the time of last access to files and registry keys after they have been created or modified.[8]
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ATT&CK ID:S0180 ATT&CK Technique Name:Volgmer Volgmer modifies the Registry to store an encoded configuration file in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security.[174][175]
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ATT&CK ID:M1038 ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention Use application control where appropriate. VBA macros obtained from the Internet, based on the file's Mark of the Web (MOTW) attribute, may be blocked from executing in Office applications (ex: Access, Excel, PowerPoint, Visio, and Word) by default starting in ...
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ATT&CK ID:M1029 ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Data Storage Forward logging of historical data to remote data store and centralized logging solution to preserve historical command line log data.
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ATT&CK ID:S0032 ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT gh0st RAT has added a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[104][105]
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ATT&CK ID:G0034 ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team Sandworm Team has used the BlackEnergy KillDisk component to corrupt the infected system's master boot record.[19][20]
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ATT&CK ID:S0098 ATT&CK Technique Name:T9000 If a victim meets certain criteria, T9000 uses the AppInit_DLL functionality to achieve persistence by ensuring that every user mode process that is spawned will load its malicious DLL, ResN32.dll. It does this by creating the following Registry keys: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\...
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ATT&CK ID:S1044 ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream FunnyDream has established persistence by running sc.exe and by setting the WSearch service to run automatically.[55]
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ATT&CK ID:S0263 ATT&CK Technique Name:TYPEFRAME TYPEFRAME can gather the disk volume information.[382]
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ATT&CK ID:G0142 ATT&CK Technique Name:Confucius Confucius has used VBScript to execute malicious code.[37]
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ATT&CK ID:S0640 ATT&CK Technique Name:Avaddon Avaddon modifies several registry keys for persistence and UAC bypass.[16]
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ATT&CK ID:S0650 ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot QakBot can use domain generation algorithms in C2 communication.[24]
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ATT&CK ID:S0153 ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves RedLeaves can obtain information about the logged on user both locally and for Remote Desktop sessions.[155]
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ATT&CK ID:G0078 ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group Gorgon Group malware can create a .lnk file and add a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[107]
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ATT&CK ID:S0477 ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy Goopy has the ability to use a Microsoft Outlook backdoor macro to communicate with its C2.[7]
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ATT&CK ID:G0010 ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover running services and associated processes using the tasklist /svc command.[19]
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ATT&CK ID:S0240 ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT ROKRAT has an audio capture and eavesdropping module.[35]
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titleblackhat:eu-20 BinTyper: Type Confusion Detection for C++ Binaries Type confusion bug (or bad casting) is a popular vulnerability class that attacks C++ software like web browser, document reader. This bug occurs once a program typecasts and uses an object as an incompatible type. An attacker can exploit this vuln...
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ATT&CK ID:S0070 ATT&CK Technique Name:HTTPBrowser HTTPBrowser is capable of spawning a reverse shell on a victim.[162]
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ATT&CK ID:S1065 ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT Woody RAT can collect information from a compromised host.[197]
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ATT&CK ID:S0009 ATT&CK Technique Name:Hikit Hikit has used DLL Search Order Hijacking to load oci.dll as a persistence mechanism.[23]
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ATT&CK ID:M1037 ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented.
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ATT&CK ID:G0016 ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29 APT29 has used residential proxies, including Azure Virtual Machines, to obfuscate their access to victim environments.[3]
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ATT&CK ID:S0689 ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate WhisperGate can pause for 20 seconds to bypass antivirus solutions.[44][45]
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ATT&CK ID:S0496 ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil REvil can download a copy of itself from an attacker controlled IP address to the victim machine.[382][383][384]
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titleblackhat:eu-19 OEM Finder: Hunting Vulnerable OEM IoT Devices at Scale Nowadays, many consumer IoT vendors employ an OEM production model. They purchase IoT devices from OEM suppliers, then customize and sell those devices under their own brands. While this production model can reduce the device manufacturing cost...
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ATT&CK ID:S0605 ATT&CK Technique Name:EKANS EKANS can use Windows Mangement Instrumentation (WMI) calls to execute operations.[38]
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title:blackhat:us-21 Crashing Your Way to Medium-IL: Exploiting the PDB Parser for Privilege Escalation If you have ever done Windows debugging or crash dump analysis, you must be familiar with PDB files. These files store debugging information (or 'symbols') about a program, and are parsed by debuggers such as WinDBG ...
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ATT&CK ID:G0060 ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER BRONZE BUTLER has masked executables with document file icons including Word and Adobe PDF.[7]
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ATT&CK ID:S1016 ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa MacMa installs a com.apple.softwareupdate.plist file in the /LaunchAgents folder with the RunAtLoad value set to true. Upon user login, MacMa is executed from /var/root/.local/softwareupdate with root privileges. Some variations also include the LimitLoadToSessionType key wit...
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ATT&CK ID:S0375 ATT&CK Technique Name:Remexi Remexi achieves persistence using Userinit by adding the Registry key HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit.[9]
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ATT&CK ID:S0473 ATT&CK Technique Name:Avenger Avenger has the ability to browse files in directories such as Program Files and the Desktop.[25]
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ATT&CK ID:S0526 ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY KGH_SPY can send data to C2 with HTTP POST requests.[85]
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titleblackhat:us-21 Generating YARA Rules by Classifying Malicious Byte Sequences While ML models for malware detection have become an industry standard for heuristically detecting malware, signature-based detection still proliferates thanks to ease of updates, transparency of detection logic, and operability in comput...
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ATT&CK ID:M1013 ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance Ensure applications are using Apple's developer guidance which enables hardened runtime.[5]
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ATT&CK ID:C0012 ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute batch scripts for lateral movement with the following command: SCHTASKS /Create /S <IP Address> /U <Username> /p <Password> /SC ONCE /TN test /TR <Path to a Batch File> /ST <Time> /R...
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ATT&CK ID:S0168 ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer Gazer stores configuration items in alternate data streams (ADSs) if the Registry is not accessible.[14]
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ATT&CK ID:C0014 ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao During Operation Wocao, threat actors used VBScript to conduct reconnaissance on targeted systems.[114]
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ATT&CK ID:M1051 ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software A patch management process should be implemented to check unused dependencies, unmaintained and/or previously vulnerable dependencies, unnecessary features, components, files, and documentation.
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ATT&CK ID:G0008 ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak Carbanak may use netsh to add local firewall rule exceptions.[5]
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ATT&CK ID:S1037 ATT&CK Technique Name:STARWHALE STARWHALE has the ability to collect the IP address of an infected host.[218]
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ATT&CK ID:T1550.002 ATT&CK Technique Name:Pass the Hash Adversaries may "pass the hash" using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This ...
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ATT&CK ID:T1498.001 ATT&CK Technique Name:Direct Network Flood Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. Direct Network Floods are ...
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ATT&CK ID:G0069 ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater MuddyWater has stored a decoy PDF file within a victim's %temp% folder.[63]
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ATT&CK ID:S0021 ATT&CK Technique Name:Derusbi Derusbi variants have been seen that use Registry persistence to proxy execution through regsvr32.exe.[17]
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ATT&CK ID:S1039 ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee Bumblebee can achieve persistence by copying its DLL to a subdirectory of %APPDATA% and creating a Visual Basic Script that will load the DLL via a scheduled task.[33][34]
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ATT&CK ID:S0206 ATT&CK Technique Name:Wiarp Wiarp creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can inject files into running processes.[68]
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ATT&CK ID:M1026 ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit impact of exploitation.
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ATT&CK ID:S0245 ATT&CK Technique Name:BADCALL BADCALL disables the Windows firewall before binding to a port.[4]
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titleblackhat:asia-20 The Inside Story: There are Apps in Apps and Here is How to Break Them With the rapid development of mobile internet, apps have become more and more complex. However, their most used functions are limited to a few pages.Enter instant app. Instant apps have many advantages over normal apps, such as...
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ATT&CK ID:G0006 ATT&CK Technique Name:APT1 APT1 uses two utilities, GETMAIL and MAPIGET, to steal email. MAPIGET steals email still on Exchange servers that has not yet been archived.[1]
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ATT&CK ID:S0697 ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper HermeticWiper has the ability to use scheduled tasks for execution.[78]
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ATT&CK ID:S1059 ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain metaMain can create a named pipe to listen for and send data to a named pipe-based C2 server.[16]
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titleblackhat:us-18 A Dive in to Hyper-V Architecture & Vulnerabilities Virtualization technology is an increasingly common foundation on which platform security is built and clouds are secured. However, virtualization stacks are ultimately software, all software has vulnerabilities, and few things are more beautiful (...
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titleblackhat:us-18 Threat Modeling in 2018: Attacks, Impacts and Other Updates Attacks always get better, and that means your threat modeling needs to evolve. This talk looks at what's new and important in threat modeling, organizes it into a simple conceptual framework, and makes it actionable. This includes new pr...
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ATT&CK ID:S0338 ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobian RAT Cobian RAT obfuscates communications with the C2 server using Base64 encoding.[25]
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ATT&CK ID:S0023 ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK Part of APT28's operation involved using CHOPSTICK modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines, using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.[2][3][1]
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ATT&CK ID:S1050 ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare PcShare has created the HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}\\InprocServer32 Registry key for persistence.[12]
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ATT&CK ID:S0250 ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic Koadic can gather hashed passwords by gathering domain controller hashes from NTDS.[17]
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ATT&CK ID:S0455 ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo Metamorfo has been delivered to victims via emails with malicious HTML attachments.[145][146]
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ATT&CK ID:S0353 ATT&CK Technique Name:NOKKI NOKKI can collect the username from the victim’s machine.[130]
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title:botconf2019 Using a Cryptographic Weakness for Malware Traffic Clustering and IDS Rule Generation Encrypted C&C data can make the life of malware analysts and incident handlers a lot harder, as it can make C&C traffic a lot harder to recognise, when done right. Fortunately, not every malware author is able to imp...
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title:botconf2019 Unrevealing the Architecture Behind the Counter-Strike 1.6 Botnet: Zero-Days and Trojans The Belonard Botnet was designed to promote servers in Counter-Strike 1.6. In order to achieve that, the botmaster employed the Belonard Trojan, which was spread via malicious game server; an infected pirated buil...
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ATT&CK ID:T1499.004 ATT&CK Technique Name:Application or System Exploitation Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likel...
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ATT&CK ID:M0808 ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Network Traffic The encryption of firmware should be considered to prevent adversaries from identifying possible vulnerabilities within the firmware.
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ATT&CK ID:M0947 ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit Limit access to network infrastructure and resources that can be used to reshape traffic or otherwise produce AiTM conditions.
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ATT&CK ID:G0093 ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM GALLIUM used Web shells to persist in victim environments and assist in execution and exfiltration.[15][16]
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