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ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's Get-Keystrokes Exfiltration module can log keystrokes.[139][140] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0341
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbash
Xbash can execute malicious VBScript payloads on the victim’s machine.[168] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys associated with COR_PROFILER. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0600
ATT&CK Technique Name:Doki
Doki has used Ngrok to establish C2 and exfiltrate data.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal's version of Bandook communicates with their server over a TCP port using HTTP payloads Base64 encoded and suffixed with the string "&&&".[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBSRAT
BBSRAT can compress data with ZLIB prior to sending it back to the C2 server.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer uses a custom port scanner to map out a network.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, various implants used batch scripting and cmd.exe for execution.[251] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can run nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts for domain trust discovery.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 used the netstat -anpo tcp command to display TCP connections on the victim's machine.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used a script (atexec.py) to execute a command on a target machine via Task Scheduler.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman has created a scheduled task for persistence.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. [3] [67] These audits should also include if default... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1071.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Web Protocols
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0133
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nomadic Octopus
Nomadic Octopus has used malicious macros to download additional files to the victim's machine.[321] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used the Steam community page as a fallback mechanism for C2.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad has encrypted its payload, a virtual file system, and various files.[291][107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Use of encryption provides an added layer of security to sensitive information sent over email. Encryption using public key cryptography requires the adversary to obtain the private certificate along with an encryption key to decrypt messages. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0374
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpeakUp
SpeakUp attempts to exploit the following vulnerabilities in order to execute its malicious script: CVE-2012-0874, CVE-2010-1871, CVE-2017-10271, CVE-2018-2894, CVE-2016-3088, JBoss AS 3/4/5/6, and the Hadoop YARN ResourceManager. [78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0505
ATT&CK Technique Name:Desert Scorpion
Desert Scorpion can retrieve SMS messages.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin installs a TCP and UDP filter on the eth0 interface.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used services.exe to execute scripts and executables during lateral movement within a victim network.[67][68] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Don't Get Owned by Your Dependencies: How Firefox Uses In-process Sandboxing To Protect Itself From Exploitable Libraries (And You Can Too!)
Memory safety vulnerabilities in third party C libraries are a major source of zero-day attacks in today's applications. Several years ago, our team began expl... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 A New Era of One-Click Attacks: How to Break Install-Less Apps
Apps are becoming larger, cumbersome, and resource-consuming. Vendors want to reduce the whole process for users to reach the target page of content and get the work done with just a few clicks. Install-Less apps are considered a new c... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Finding Our Path: How We're Trying to Improve Active Directory Security
As the dominant directory service solution, Active Directory persists as the crucial backbone of identity, authentication, and security for organizations of all sizes. Over time, nearly every Active Directory environment bec... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Net
Commands such as net group and net localgroup can be used in Net to gather information about and manipulate groups.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shared Modules
Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is pa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 has used search order hijacking to load a malicious payload DLL as a dependency to a benign application packaged in the same ISO.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
During C0018, the threat actors transferred the SoftPerfect Network Scanner and other tools to machines in the network using AnyDesk and PDQ Deploy.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winlogon Helper DLL
Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Regist... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal will delete its dropper and VBS scripts from the victim’s machine.[27][28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:SPACESHIP
SPACESHIP copies staged data to removable drives when they are inserted into the system.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can remotely activate the victim’s webcam to capture content.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
When it first starts, BADNEWS spawns a new thread to log keystrokes.[25][26][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0026
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT18
APT18 actors deleted tools and batch files from victim systems.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya determines if specific antivirus programs are running on an infected host machine.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0586
ATT&CK Technique Name:TAINTEDSCRIBE
TAINTEDSCRIBE can randomly pick one of five hard-coded IP addresses for C2 communication; if one of the IP fails, it will wait 60 seconds and then try another IP address.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:TINYTYPHON
TINYTYPHON installs itself under Registry Run key to establish persistence.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Replication Through Removable Media
Adversaries may move onto devices by exploiting or copying malware to devices connected via USB. In the case of Lateral Movement, adversaries may utilize the physical connection of a device to a compromised or malicious charging station or PC to ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0289
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for iOS
Pegasus for iOS exploits iOS vulnerabilities to escalate privileges.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure least privilege principles are applied to important information resources to reduce exposure to data manipulation risk. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY has used file-sharing services including WeTransfer, TransferNow, and OneDrive to deliver payloads.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0546
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharpStage
SharpStage can execute arbitrary commands with the command line.[106][107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the XServer backdoor to exfiltrate data.[96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can retrieve IP addresses of compromised machines.[104][105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
Emissary has the capability to execute the command net localgroup administrators.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0120
ATT&CK Technique Name:Evilnum
Evilnum has used a component called TerraLoader to check certain hardware and file information to detect sandboxed environments. [19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
When possible, store keys on separate cryptographic hardware instead of on the local system. For example, on Windows systems use a TPM to secure keys and other sensitive credential material.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
In the Ukraine 2015 Incident, Sandworm Team used the credentials of valid accounts to interact with client applications and access employee workstations hosting HMI applications. [6][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0269
ATT&CK Technique Name:QUADAGENT
QUADAGENT uses AES and a preshared key to decrypt the custom Base64 routine used to encode strings and scripts.[184] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can use Windows API functions such as WriteFile, CloseHandle, and GetCurrentHwProfile during its collection and file storage operations. Ramsay can execute its embedded components via CreateProcessA and ShellExecute.[142] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can send stolen information to C2 nodes including passwords, accounts, and emails.[104] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 IPvSeeYou: Exploiting Leaked Identifiers in IPv6 for Street-Level Geolocation
While IP Geolocation -- tying an IP address to a physical location -- is in common use, available public and commercial techniques and tools provide only coarse city-level locations that are often wrong. With "IPvSeeYou,"... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used BITSAdmin to download and install payloads.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0611
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clop
Clop has used the sleep command to avoid sandbox detection.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 regularly deploys both publicly available (ex: Mimikatz) and custom password retrieval tools on victims.[7][8] They have also dumped the LSASS process memory using the MiniDump function.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dylib Hijacking
Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can send custom Modbus commands to write register values on Schneider PLCs.[4] INCONTROLLER can send write tag values on OPC UA servers.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete has a feature to copy files from every drive onto a removable drive in a hidden folder.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit can enumerate all running processes to compare hashes.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0074
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sakula
Sakula uses DLL side-loading, typically using a digitally signed sample of Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV) 6.0 for Windows Workstations or McAfee's Outlook Scan About Box to load malicious DLL files.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0627
ATT&CK Technique Name:SodaMaster
SodaMaster can check for the presence of the Registry key HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Applications\VMwareHostOpen.exe before proceeding to its main functionality.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1205.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Socket Filters
Adversaries may attach filters to a network socket to monitor then activate backdoors used for persistence or command and control. With elevated permissions, adversaries can use features such as the libpcap library to open sockets and install filters to allow or ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Heyoka Backdoor
Heyoka Backdoor has the ability to delete folders and files from a targeted system.[100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has lured victims into clicking malicious Dropbox download links delivered through spearphishing.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles has used a publicly-available PowerShell-based tool, WMImplant.[226] The group has also used PowerShell to perform Timestomping.[227] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0547
ATT&CK Technique Name:DropBook
DropBook can communicate with its operators by exploiting the Simplenote, DropBox, and the social media platform, Facebook, where it can create fake accounts to control the backdoor and receive instructions.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0328
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Mango
Stealth Mango collects and uploads information about changes in SIM card or phone numbers on the device.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit drops a file named infpub.datinto the Windows directory and is executed through SCManager and rundll.exe. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
Most of the strings in ADVSTORESHELL are encrypted with an XOR-based algorithm; some strings are also encrypted with 3DES and reversed. API function names are also reversed, presumably to avoid detection in memory.[9][10] | secon |
title:botconf2014 Splicing and Dicing 2014: Examining this Year’s Botnet Attack Trends
This presentation will discuss the various types of distributed denial of service attacks launched by botnets in 2014, worldwide. From DNS to Layer7 attacks, attendees will hear expert analysis of botnet breakdowns by-the-numbers inc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attestation
Device attestation could detect devices with unauthorized or unsafe modifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0686
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuietSieve
QuietSieve can search files on the target host by extension, including doc, docx, xls, rtf, odt, txt, jpg, pdf, rar, zip, and 7z.[241] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that can identify traffic patterns indicative of AiTM activity can be used to mitigate activity at the network level.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents on the DCCC and DNC networks.[4] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Breaking Bootloaders on the Cheap
One of the challenges in securing embedded devices is to protect the flash memory storing code, data, and cryptographic secrets against malicious read/write access. Therefore, most microcontroller vendors decided to implement code read protection mechanisms (usuall... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has downloaded additional tools and malware onto compromised networks.[20][21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used C2 infrastructure to receive exfiltrated data.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:pngdowner
If an initial connectivity check fails, pngdowner attempts to extract proxy details and credentials from Windows Protected Storage and from the IE Credentials Store. This allows the adversary to use the proxy credentials for subsequent requests if they enable outbound HTT... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Pre-Stuxnet, Post-Stuxnet: Everything Has Changed, Nothing Has Changed
When Stuxnet was discovered in 2010, it shone a light on vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure that few had noticed before. The security community, largely focused on IT networks, had its eyes opened to a vast sector it had... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro can download additional malware from the C2 server.[181] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic uses the net use, net session, and netstat commands to gather information on network connections.[33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS can use DDE to execute additional payloads on compromised hosts.[27] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Hardening Hyper-V through Offensive Security Research
Virtualization technology is fast becoming the backbone of the security strategy for modern computing platforms. Hyper-V, Microsoft's virtualization stack, is no exception and is therefore held to a high security standard, as is demonstrated by i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0105
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkVishnya
DarkVishnya has obtained and used tools such as Impacket, Winexe, and PsExec.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike includes a capability to modify the Beacon payload to eliminate known signatures or unpacking methods.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth collects data in a plaintext file named r1.log before exfiltration. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla can list the current running processes on the system.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0638
ATT&CK Technique Name:Babuk
Babuk can stop anti-virus services on a compromised host.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has called GetIpNetTable in attempt to identify all mounted drives and hosts that have Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) entries.[202][203] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0147
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pteranodon
Pteranodon exfiltrates screenshot files to its C2 server.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Human User Authentication
All field controllers should require users to authenticate for all remote or local management sessions. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:TA0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privilege Escalation
The adversary is trying to gain higher-level permissions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:China Chopper
China Chopper's server component can list directory contents.[74][75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has used open-source tools such as Weave Scope to target exposed Docker API ports and gain initial access to victim environments.[39][40] TeamTNT has also targeted exposed kubelets for Kubernetes environments.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's New-UserPersistenceOption Persistence argument can be used to establish via a Scheduled Task/Job.[129][130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1033
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Software Installation
Only install browser extensions from trusted sources that can be verified. Browser extensions for some browsers can be controlled through Group Policy. Change settings to prevent the browser from installing extensions without sufficient permissions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0324
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpyDealer
SpyDealer abuses Accessibility features to steal messages from popular apps such as WeChat, Skype, Viber, and QQ.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can establish persistence by writing shortcuts to the Windows Startup folder.[6][7] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.