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ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex has deleted volume shadow copies using vssadmin.exe.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:STARWHALE
STARWHALE has the ability to execute commands via cmd.exe.[316] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0505
ATT&CK Technique Name:Desert Scorpion
Desert Scorpion can delete copies of itself if additional APKs are downloaded to external storage.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0122
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silent Librarian
Silent Librarian has used collected lists of names and e-mail accounts to use in password spraying attacks against private sector targets.[19] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Hackers, Journalists and the Ethical Swamp
As hacking stories have increasingly made news headlines, those behind the attacks have become ever more adept at co-opting the media into covering their leaks. From Ashley Madison and Sony to the 2016 US Presidential election, news coverage of cyber attack... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0671
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tomiris
Tomiris has used SCHTASKS /CREATE /SC DAILY /TN StartDVL /TR "[path to self]" /ST 10:00 to establish persistence.[171] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0591
ATT&CK Technique Name:ConnectWise
ConnectWise can be used to execute PowerShell commands on target machines.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0424
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triada
Triada was added into the Android system by a third-party vendor identified as Yehuo or Blazefire during the production process.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0421
ATT&CK Technique Name:GolfSpy
GolfSpy registers for the USER_PRESENT broadcast intent and uses it as a trigger to take photos with the front-facing camera.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has used credential dumpers or stealers to obtain legitimate credentials, which they used to gain access to victim accounts.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
To move laterally on a victim network, FIN6 has used credentials stolen from various systems on which it gathered usernames and password hashes.[29][30][31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has utilized multiple commands to identify data of interest in file and directory listings.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats used various implants, including those built with VBScript, on target machines.[87][88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0410
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fysbis
Fysbis has established persistence using a systemd service.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin can save a new file to the system from the C2 server.[387][388] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Identify and correct GPO permissions abuse opportunities (ex: GPO modification privileges) using auditing tools such as BloodHound (version 1.5.1 and later)[5]. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1036.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Right-to-Left Override
Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa has used a custom JSON-based protocol for its C&C communications.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM can continuously capture keystrokes.[166][167] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0226
ATT&CK Technique Name:Smoke Loader
Smoke Loader injects into the Internet Explorer process.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat has the ability to wipe VM snapshots on compromised networks.[4][5] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Fuzzing and Exploiting Virtual Channels in Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol for Fun and Profit
The Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) is a proprietary protocol developed by Microsoft, allowing users to remotely control Windows systems with a graphical user interface (GUI) over the network. This protocol... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0103
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mofang
Mofang delivered spearphishing emails with malicious documents, PDFs, or Excel files attached.[147] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
Gazer versions are signed with various valid certificates; one was likely faked and issued by Comodo for "Solid Loop Ltd," and another was issued for "Ultimate Computer Support Ltd."[35][36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0175
ATT&CK Technique Name:meek
meek uses Domain Fronting to disguise the destination of network traffic as another server that is hosted in the same Content Delivery Network (CDN) as the intended destination. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Duqu uses a custom command and control protocol that communicates over commonly used ports, and is frequently encapsulated by application layer protocols.[5] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 The Enemy Within: Modern Supply Chain Attacks
I'm in your supply chain, and you're probably in mine. Our increasingly interconnected infrastructure leaves us all vulnerable. With hundreds of millions of devices and millions of enterprises betting on the cloud, we see sophisticated attacks every day.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:PingPull
PingPull has the ability to install itself as a service.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. Most embedded network devices support TACACS+ and/or RADIUS. Follow vendor prescribed best practices for hardening access control.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell hooks several API functions to spawn system threads.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0469
ATT&CK Technique Name:ABK
ABK has the ability to use cmd to run a Portable Executable (PE) on the compromised host.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Partition Integrity
Android Verified Boot can detect unauthorized modifications made to the system partition, which could lead to execution flow hijacking.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1218.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mshta
Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel's selective infector modifies executables stored on removable media as a method of spreading across computers.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT has used a Registry Run key to establish persistence by executing JavaScript code within the rundll32.exe process.[127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. [8] [9] These audits should also include if default ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0279
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proton
Proton kills security tools like Wireshark that are running.[70] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Don't Eat Spaghetti with a Spoon - An Analysis of the Practical Value of Threat Intelligence
Threat Intelligence is a sound proposition that has its place in a mature security operation. But like so many good concepts in our industry, its path to commercialization has involved commoditization ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer compares file names and paths to a list of excluded names and directory names during encryption.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:PittyTiger
PittyTiger has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz and gsecdump.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0593
ATT&CK Technique Name:ECCENTRICBANDWAGON
ECCENTRICBANDWAGON can capture and store keystrokes.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can identify the IP of a targeted system.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0600
ATT&CK Technique Name:Doki
Doki was executed through an open Docker daemon API port.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper has the ability to deploy through an infected system's default domain policy.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0107
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cherry Picker
Some variants of Cherry Picker use AppInit_DLLs to achieve persistence by creating the following Registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows "AppInit_DLLs"="pserver32.dll"[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1642
ATT&CK Technique Name:Endpoint Denial of Service
Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Detecting Malicious Cloud Account Behavior: A Look at the New Native Platform Capabilities
Until recently, major public cloud providers have offered relatively basic toolsets for identifying suspicious activity occurring inside customer accounts that may indicate a compromise. Some organizations hav... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Planning a Bug Bounty: The Nuts and Bolts from Concept to Launch
Thinking about launching a vulnerability disclosure or bug bounty program and not sure where to start? Do you use a bug bounty platform or self-host; hire a 3rd party service provider or run things yourself? What should your program ru... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0644
ATT&CK Technique Name:ObliqueRAT
ObliqueRAT has the ability to check for blocklisted computer names on infected endpoints.[254] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 A Compendium of Container Escapes
Containers are a hot topic because of the simplicity they bring to the process of software development, shipping, and deployment. They are insanely useful for eliminating environmental constraints such as library version conflicts, and for the overall organization a... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Hacking Your Non-Compete
Nearly everyone in the cybersecurity community found themselves contemplating leaving an employer, been offered an opportunity to really stretch their wings as part of a start-up or just become fed-up with their current work environment. While many of us are masters of techn... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0011
During C0011, Transparent Tribe relied on a student target to open a malicious document delivered via email.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Afternoon Break
Afternoon Break will be served in the following areas for Briefings pass holders.Bay View Court North Corridor (North Convention Center)Bay View Court South Corridor (North Convention Center)Breakers Registration Corridor, Lagoon Corridor (Level 2)South Seas Foyer North, Jasmine Foy... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1033
ATT&CK Technique Name:DCSrv
DCSrv has encrypted drives using the core encryption mechanism from DiskCryptor.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1575
ATT&CK Technique Name:Native API
Adversaries may use Android’s Native Development Kit (NDK) to write native functions that can achieve execution of binaries or functions. Like system calls on a traditional desktop operating system, native code achieves execution on a lower level than normal Android SDK ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0511
ATT&CK Technique Name:RegDuke
RegDuke can use control-flow flattening or the commercially available .NET Reactor for obfuscation.[120] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 I, for One, Welcome Our New Power Analysis Overlords
Despite high-profile failures, there can be no doubt that embedded security is improving. Yet, several dark clouds loom on the horizon – including side channel attacks and fault attacks. For many, they remain vague and undefined, with complicated ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with logging. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware encrypts C2 traffic using RC4 with a hard-coded key.[127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Update software regularly to include patches that fix DLL side-loading vulnerabilities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Duqu is capable of loading executable code via process hollowing.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
During FunnyDream, the threat actors used netstat to discover network connections on remote systems.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Review authentication logs to ensure that mechanisms such as enforcement of MFA are functioning as intended.Periodically review the hybrid identity solution in use for any discrepancies. For example, review all Pass Through Authentication (PTA) agents in the Azure Management ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Utilize Yama (ex: /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope) to mitigate ptrace based process injection by restricting the use of ptrace to privileged users only. Other mitigation controls involve the deployment of security kernel modules that provide advance... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
System scans can be performed to identify unauthorized archival utilities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0655
ATT&CK Technique Name:BusyGasper
BusyGasper can collect the device’s location information based on cellular network or GPS coordinates.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0497
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dacls
Dacls can establish persistence via a Launch Daemon.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet infected WinCC machines via a hardcoded database server password.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
KeyBoy uses -w Hidden to conceal a PowerShell window that downloads a payload. [24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon can establish persistence by registering a malicious DLL as an alternative Print Processor which is loaded when the print spooler service starts.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya initially infected IT networks, but by means of an exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0196
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY can download additional files and payloads to compromised hosts.[360][361] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth has obfuscated and randomized parts of the JScript code it is initiating.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1592
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gather Victim Host Information
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics re... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Routinely check user permissions to ensure only the expected users have the capability to delete new instances. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used IMAP, POP3, and SMTP for a communication channel in various implants, including using self-registered Google Mail accounts and later compromised email servers of its victims.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan can delete files via C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ping 1.1.1.1 -n 1 -w 3000 > Nul & rmdir /s /q.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1584.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Web Services
Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, SendGrid, etc. Adversaries may tr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Administrators should audit all cloud and container accounts to ensure that they are necessary and that the permissions granted to them are appropriate. Where possible, the ability to request temporary account tokens on behalf of another accounts should be disabled. Additiona... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Do not allow a user to be a local administrator for multiple systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1136.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Account
Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accoun... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0529
ATT&CK Technique Name:CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal has used incorrect file extensions and encryption to hide most of its assets, including secondary APKs, configuration files, and JAR or DEX files.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1204
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Execution
An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be obser... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Securing Open Source Software - End-to-End, at Massive Scale, Together
Open source software is a significant part of the core infrastructure in most enterprises in most sectors around the world and is foundational to the internet as we know it. Consequently, it represents a massive and profoundly v... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon has stored its encrypted payload in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Print\Components\.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can collect the contents of the %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\LocalState file.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT sets HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load to point to its executable.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to identify the location, public IP address, and domain name on a compromised host.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created VBScripts to run on an SSH server.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1558.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:AS-REP Roasting
Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled Kerberos preauthentication by Password Cracking Kerberos messages. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Security architecture improvements in each new version of Android and iOS make it more difficult to escalate privileges. Additionally, newer versions of Android have strengthened the sandboxing applied to applications, restricting their ability to enumerate fi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0042
ATT&CK Technique Name:LOWBALL
LOWBALL uses the Dropbox cloud storage service for command and control.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
In cloud environments, ensure that users are not granted permissions to create or modify traffic mirrors unless this is explicitly required. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM ensured each payload had a unique hash, including by using different types of packers.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used password spraying attacks to obtain valid credentials.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0357
ATT&CK Technique Name:Impacket
Impacket can be used to sniff network traffic via an interface or raw socket.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT has encrypted its C2 communications with AES.[126] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used Visual Basic scripts.[111] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.