text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
Variants of Emissary have added Run Registry keys to establish persistence.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0193
ATT&CK Technique Name:Forfiles
Forfiles can be used to act on (ex: copy, move, etc.) files/directories in a system during (ex: copy files into a staging area before).[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has relied on users opening malicious email attachments, decompressing the attached archive, and double-clicking the executable within.[206] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 PMFault: Voltage Fault Injection on Server Platforms Through the PMBus
Hardware-based attacks like voltage glitching have been a threat to embedded processors like smartcards for decades. More recently, attacks like Clkscrew, Plundervolt, VoltJockey, and V0ltPwn, have shown that desktop and serve... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Back in Black Hat: The 7th Annual Black Hat USA NOC Report
After a short intermission, the Black Hat NOC team is back with what's sure to be a year like no other. With the world going virtual, and Black Hat being no exception, come find out how we've spent the last two years changing, adapting, and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0263
ATT&CK Technique Name:TYPEFRAME
TYPEFRAME has used ports 443, 8080, and 8443 with a FakeTLS method.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 has signed its malware with an invalid digital certificates listed as "Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Company Limited."[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has executed wget and curl commands to Pastebin over the HTTPS protocol.[288] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application control configured to block execution of msbuild.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. For example, in Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016 and above, Windows Defender Application Contr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method
Mobile security products can often detect rooted devices. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0264
ATT&CK Technique Name:OopsIE
OopsIE can upload files from the victim's machine to its C2 server.[93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1578.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Create Snapshot
An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permiss... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy has a module to clear event logs with PowerShell.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa can delete itself from the compromised computer.[137] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
Helminth samples have been signed with legitimate, compromised code signing certificates owned by software company AI Squared.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum can establish persistence by adding a new service NtmsSvc with the display name Removable Storage to masquerade as a legitimate Removable Storage Manager.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used malware to turn off the RequireSigned feature which ensures only signed DLLs can be run on Windows.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0411
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rotexy
Rotexy collects information about the compromised device, including phone number, network operator, OS version, device model, and the device registration country.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARDUMP
SUGARDUMP has created scheduled tasks called MicrosoftInternetExplorerCrashRepoeterTaskMachineUA and MicrosoftEdgeCrashRepoeterTaskMachineUA, which were configured to execute CrashReporter.exe during user logon.[168] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1092
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Through Removable Media
Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0335
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbon
Carbon creates a base directory that contains the files and folders that are collected.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SubmitControl. T... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has used compromised credentials and/or session tokens to gain access into a victim's VPN, VDI, RDP, and IAMs.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest exfiltrates targeted file extensions in the /Users/ folder to the command and control server via unencrypted HTTP. Network packets contain a string with two pieces of information: a file path and the contents of the file in a base64 encoded string.[131][132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
The Maze encryption process has used batch scripts with various commands.[206][207] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1008
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideCopy
SideCopy has identified the OS version of a compromised host.[8] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Re-route Your Intent for Privilege Escalation: A Universal Way to Exploit Android PendingIntents in High-profile and System Apps
PendingIntent, the advanced version of normal Android Intent, provides powerful inter-component communication on Android. A PendingIntent holds a base Intent that can be ... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Catch Me If You Can: Deterministic Discovery of Race Conditions with Fuzzing
Finding concurrency bugs has presented a challenge for security and development teams. Race condition-based vulnerabilities are a growing category of bugs reported to vendors and have been observed in in-the-wild exploits. ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has created a scheduled SYSTEM task that runs when a user logs in.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can place a lnk file in the Startup Folder to achieve persistence.[124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Web proxies can be used to enforce an external network communication policy that prevents use of unauthorized external services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Enterprise Policy
If devices are enrolled using Apple User Enrollment or using a profile owner enrollment mode for Android, device controls prevent the enterprise from accessing the device’s physical location. This is typically used for a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) deployment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has lured victims into executing malware via malicious e-mail attachments.[246] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0545
ATT&CK Technique Name:TERRACOTTA
TERRACOTTA has used timer events in React Native to initiate the foreground service.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has exfiltrated data over the C2 channel.[100] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 How Did the Adversaries Abusing the Bitcoin Blockchain Evade Our Takeover?
Cyber security has been a game of cat-and-mouse. In the past, we have seen the malware ecosystem adopt concepts such as code obfuscation, polymorphism, domain-generation algorithms (DGAs), as well as virtual machine and sa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has gained access to a global administrator account in Azure AD.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has placed trojanized installers for control system software on legitimate vendor app stores.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0231
ATT&CK Technique Name:Invoke-PSImage
Invoke-PSImage can be used to embed a PowerShell script within the pixels of a PNG file.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that can identify traffic patterns indicative of AiTM activity can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Provide the ability to verify the integrity of control logic or programs loaded on a controller. While techniques like CRCs and checksums are commonly used, they are not cryptographically strong and can be vulnerable to collisions. Preferably cryptographic hash functions (e.g... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackTech
BlackTech has used stolen code-signing certificates for its malicious payloads.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro can check whether the target system is using Japanese, Taiwanese, or English through detection of specific Windows Security and Internet Explorer dialog.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
Remove vulnerable Group Policy Preferences.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0188
ATT&CK Technique Name:Starloader
Starloader decrypts and executes shellcode from a file called Stars.jps.[222] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can use com objects identified with CLSID_ShellLink(IShellLink and IPersistFile) and WScript.Shell(RegWrite method) to enable persistence mechanisms.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1595.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Vulnerability Scanning
Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent.btz
Agent.btz collects the network adapter’s IP and MAC address as well as IP addresses of the network adapter’s default gateway, primary/secondary WINS, DHCP, and DNS servers, and saves them into a log file.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor's dispatcher can inject itself into running processes to gain higher privileges and to evade detection.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Limit or restrict program execution using anti-virus software. On MacOS, allowlist programs that are allowed to have the plist tag. All other programs should be considered suspicious. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used WMI for the remote execution of files for lateral movement.[118][119] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0443
ATT&CK Technique Name:MESSAGETAP
MESSAGETAP checks two files, keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt, for instructions on how to target and save data parsed and extracted from SMS message data from the network traffic. If an SMS message contained either a phone number, IMSI number, or keyword that matched the pr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0644
ATT&CK Technique Name:ObliqueRAT
ObliqueRAT has the ability to extract data from removable devices connected to the endpoint.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Consider using IP allowlisting along with user account management to ensure that data access is restricted not only to valid users but only from expected IP ranges to mitigate the use of stolen credentials to access data. | secon |
title:botconf2017 Advanced Threat Hunting
Many threat intelligence teams are small and must make limited resources work in the most efficient way possible. The data these teams rely on may be quite high volume and potentially low signal to noise ratio. The tools used to collect and exploit this data have finite resourc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mis-Type
Mis-Type network traffic can communicate over a raw socket.[38] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 The Case for a National Cybersecurity Safety Board
In the wake of a series of destabilizing and damaging cyber attacks, there has been a growing call for the U.S. government to establish an analogue of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to investigate cyber attacks. As we recently argue... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Oops..! I Glitched It Again! How to Multi-Glitch the Glitching-Protections on ARM TrustZone-M
Fault Injection (FI), also referred to as Glitching, has proven to be a severe threat to real-world computing devices. In this kind of attack, physical faults are injected into a device at runtime, to delib... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker can modify registry values within the Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap registry key.[178] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has been distributed through malicious links contained within spearphishing emails.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has encrypted virtual disk volumes on ESXi servers using a version of Darkside ransomware.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the sp_addlinkedsrvlogin command in MS-SQL to create a link between a created account and other servers in the network.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has used powershell.exe to download and execute scripts.[50][51][52][53][54][55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0480
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cerberus
Cerberus can update the malicious payload module on command.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA has hashed a string containing system information prior to exfiltration via POST requests.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has renamed system utilities such as wscript.exe and mshta.exe.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
For C0015, security researchers assessed the threat actors likely used a phishing campaign to distribute a weaponized attachment to victims.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
On Android 11 and up, users are not prompted with the option to select "Allow all the time" and must navigate to the settings page to manually select this option. On iOS 14 and up, users can select whether to provide Precise Location for each installed applica... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has used legitimate local admin account credentials.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has removed various hooks before installing the trojan or bootkit to evade sandbox analysis or other analysis software.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1055
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharkBot
SharkBot can use the Android "Direct Reply" feature to spread the malware to other devices. It can also download the full version of the malware after initial device compromise.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:cmd
cmd can be used to copy files to/from a remotely connected internal system.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover operating system configuration details using the systeminfo and set commands.[379][380] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Small Sieve
Small Sieve can use SSL/TLS for its HTTPS Telegram Bot API-based C2 channel.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can establish a remote HTTP connection to change the operating mode of Omron PLCs.[5][6] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Elevating Kerberos to the Next Level
Kerberos is the primary authentication protocol for on-premise Windows enterprise networks. As it's so crucial for enterprise security a lot of research has focused on exploiting it for remote access and lateral movement such as the well known Golden/Silver tick... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can be used to conduct packet captures on target hosts.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Configure default account policy to enable logging. Manage policies to ensure only necessary users have permissions to make changes to logging policies. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0382
ATT&CK Technique Name:ServHelper
ServHelper has commands for adding a remote desktop user and sending RDP traffic to the attacker through a reverse SSH tunnel.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has used revoked certificates to sign malware.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for various malware it uses, including downloaders known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD and FrameworkPOS.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can inject into the svchost.exe process for execution.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0582
ATT&CK Technique Name:LookBack
LookBack removes itself after execution and can delete files on the system.[134] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0527
ATT&CK Technique Name:CSPY Downloader
CSPY Downloader can use the schtasks utility to bypass UAC.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba can use the function GetIpNetTable to recover the last connections to the victim's machine.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1007
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Service Discovery
Adversaries may try to gather information about registered local system services. Adversaries may obtain information about services using tools as well as OS utility commands such as sc query, tasklist /svc, systemctl --type=service, and net start. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has created scheduled tasks using name variants such as "Windows Update Security", "Windows Update Security Patches", and "Google Chrome Security Update", to launch Maze at a specific time.[105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0323
ATT&CK Technique Name:Charger
Charger steals contacts from the victim user's device.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used malicious e-mail attachments to lure victims into executing malware.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0324
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpyDealer
SpyDealer maintains persistence by installing an Android application package (APK) on the system partition.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can track key presses with a keylogger module.[40][41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole gathers the local system time from the victim’s machine.[46][47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER has the ability to exploit a vulnerable Asrock driver (AsrDrv103.sys) using CVE-2020-15368 to load its own unsigned driver on the system.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has used Web shells to maintain access to victim websites.[5] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.