text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell can collect the owner and organization information from the target workstation.[208] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific protocols, such as TFTP, can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used different versions of Mimikatz to obtain credentials.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0635
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoomBox
BoomBox can upload data to dedicated per-victim folders in Dropbox.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors downloaded additional malware and malicious scripts onto a compromised host.[330] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Human User Authentication
Devices that allow remote management of firmware should require authentication before allowing any changes. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used Android backdoors capable of enumerating specific files on the infected devices.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Don't Get Owned by Your Dependencies: How Firefox Uses In-process Sandboxing To Protect Itself From Exploitable Libraries (And You Can Too!)
Memory safety vulnerabilities in third party C libraries are a major source of zero-day attacks in today's applications. Several years ago, our team began exp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor contains functionality to query the local/system time.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can bypass UAC by registering as the default handler for .MSC files.[34] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Industrial Remote Controller: Safety, Security, Vulnerabilities
Radio-frequency (RF) remote controllers are widely used in the manufacturing, construction, transportation, and many other industrial applications. Cranes, drillers, and miners, among others, are commonly equipped with RF remotes, whi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can create or add files to Registry Run Keys to establish persistence.[42][43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0068
ATT&CK Technique Name:httpclient
httpclient encrypts C2 content with XOR using a single byte, 0x12.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0095
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete has embedded malicious macros within spearphishing attachments to download additional files.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
If installing itself as a service fails, Elise instead writes itself as a file named svchost.exe saved in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Network.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict write access to XDG autostart entries to only select privileged users. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult can decrypt the payload into memory, create a new suspended process of itself, then inject a decrypted payload to the new process and resume new process execution.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy gathers a list of installed apps from the uninstall program Registry. It also gathers registered mail, browser, and instant messaging clients from the Registry. BlackEnergy has searched for given file types.[55][56] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Trust Dies in Darkness: Shedding Light on Samsung's TrustZone Keymaster Design
ARM-based Android smartphones rely on the TrustZone hardware support for a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to implement security-sensitive functions. The TEE runs a separate, isolated, TrustZone Operating System (TZO... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0522
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exobot
Exobot can obtain the device’s country and carrier name.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper has the ability to corrupt disk partitions, damage the Master Boot Record (MBR), and overwrite the Master File Table (MFT) of all available physical drives.[12][13][14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0021
During C0021, the threat actors used rundll32.exe to execute the Cobalt Strike Beacon loader DLL.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0598
ATT&CK Technique Name:P.A.S. Webshell
P.A.S. Webshell can scan networks for open ports and listening services.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec has a plugin that can perform ARP scanning as well as port scanning.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire.[10] Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0074
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sakula
Some Sakula samples use cmd.exe to delete temporary files.[207] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0445
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRatReporter
ShimRatReporter gathered the operating system name and specific Windows version of an infected machine.[332] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
For Operation Wocao, the threat actors purchased servers with Bitcoin to use during the operation.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:XTunnel
XTunnel relays traffic between a C2 server and a victim.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1072
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Deployment Tools
Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party software suites installed within an enterprise network, such as administration, monitoring, and deployment systems, to move laterally through the network. Third-party applications and software deployment s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit user account and IAM policies to the least privileges required. Consider using temporary credentials for accounts that are only valid for a certain period of time to reduce the effectiveness of compromised accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet attempts to access network resources with a domain account’s credentials.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0021
During C0021, the threat actors used encoded PowerShell commands.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0301
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dendroid
Dendroid can collect the device’s photos, browser history, bookmarks, and accounts stored on the device.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used malware that can collect the victim’s OS version and machine name.[238][239][240][241][242] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0437
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kivars
Kivars has the ability to remotely trigger keyboard input and mouse clicks. [9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used malware that can upload additional files to the victim’s machine.[304][305][306][307] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0418
ATT&CK Technique Name:ViceLeaker
ViceLeaker can collect location information, including GPS coordinates.[35][36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using application control [14] tools, like AppLocker, [15] [16] or Software Restriction Policies [17] where appropriat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 deployed the open source tool Responder to conduct NetBIOS Name Service poisoning, which captured usernames and hashed passwords that allowed access to legitimate credentials.[8][9] APT28 close-access teams have used Wi-Fi pineapples to intercept Wi-Fi signals and user ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used dynamic DNS service providers to host malicious domains.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Consider disabling emond by removing the Launch Daemon plist file. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Backdooring and Hijacking Azure AD Accounts by Abusing External Identities
External identities are a concept in Azure Active Directory which makes it possible to collaborate with users outside of an organization. These external users, often called guest users, can be granted permissions to certain r... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant can perform dynamic DLL importing and API lookups using LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress on obfuscated strings.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
A JHUHUGIT variant takes screenshots by simulating the user pressing the "Take Screenshot" key (VK_SCREENSHOT), accessing the screenshot saved in the clipboard, and converting it to a JPG image.[80][81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0522
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exobot
Exobot can obtain the device’s IMEI, phone number, and IP address.[11] | secon |
title:botconf2016 Attacking Linux/Moose 2.0 Unraveled an EGO MARKET
Want to give your blog a push or your “gun show” more views? Then why not buy 50,000 fake followers for $1,000! Click farms from down South or botnets such as Game over Zeus will be more than happy to supply them for you. For this talk, a criminologist... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0420
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dvmap
Dvmap can turn off VerifyApps, and can grant Device Administrator permissions via commands only, rather than using the UI.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0504
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anchor
Variants of Anchor can use DNS tunneling to communicate with C2.[3][4] | secon |
title:botconf2020 Inline Detection of Copy-Paste Botnet C&C
The source code of botnets is often leaked online and re-used by new botnets. The re-use of source code assists bot-owners in quickly setting up their botnets, but it also inherits similarities to known botnets that can assist in detection. Most specifically, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuTo Stealer
AuTo Stealer can use cmd.exe to execute a created batch file.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1495
ATT&CK Technique Name:Firmware Corruption
Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot, thus denying the availability to use the devices and/or the system. Firmware is ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has performed frequent and scheduled data collection from victim networks.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1087.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Account
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0244
ATT&CK Technique Name:Comnie
Comnie uses the tasklist to view running processes on the victim’s machine.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet uses a hardcoded password in the WinCC software's database server as one of the mechanisms used to propagate to nearby systems. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network.[1] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Give Me a SQL Injection, I Shall PWN IIS and SQL Server
IIS and SQL Servers play very important roles in the Microsoft Ecosystem. They have been considered unbreakable for many years, and over one decade has passed since the last severe IIS memory corruption vulnerability was disclosed. Are they ... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 Title Redacted - Under Embargo until July 25
Abstract redacted, under embargo until July 25. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can send C2 communications with XOR encryption.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS has been disguised as legitimate software programs associated with the travel and airline industries.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0345
ATT&CK Technique Name:Seasalt
Seasalt has masqueraded as a service called "SaSaut" with a display name of "System Authorization Service" in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate service.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX has the ability to use DLL search order hijacking for installation on targeted systems.[28] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Finding New Bluetooth Low Energy Exploits via Reverse Engineering Multiple Vendors' Firmwares
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) has seen widespread product adoption and a renewed interest from a security community whose interest in Classic Bluetooth (BT) had waned. Protocols that run "above" the Host Contr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maroochy Water Breach
In the Maroochy Water Breach, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBStealer
USBStealer registers itself under a Registry Run key with the name "USB Disk Security."[272] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has used obfuscated or encrypted scripts.[43][44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
If a link is being visited by a user, block unknown or unused files in transit by default that should not be downloaded or by policy from suspicious sites as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some download scann... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has the ability to use cmd.exe to execute commands passed from an Outlook C2 channel.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used HTTP GET and POST requests for C2.[178] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer obfuscated scripts that were used on victim machines.[49] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Building a Vulnerability Disclosure Program that Works for Election Vendors and Hackers
Election vendors are an integral part of American democracy. Because voting machines and the companies that manufacture them are so vital to our nation, their security practices and protections are under intense... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has been known to side load DLLs with a valid version of Chrome with one of their tools.[3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0303
ATT&CK Technique Name:MazarBOT
MazarBOT can send messages to premium-rate numbers.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork copied all targeted files to a directory called index that was eventually uploaded to the C&C server.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon has used DLL side-loading to load malicious DLL's into legitimate executables.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has obfuscated binary strings including the use of XOR encryption and Base64 encoding.[185][186] Kimsuky has also modified the first byte of DLL implants targeting victims to prevent recognition of the executable file format.[187] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can exploit multiple vulnerabilities including EternalBlue (CVE-2017-0144) and EternalRomance (CVE-2017-0144).[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0384
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dridex
Dridex contains a backconnect module for tunneling network traffic through a victim's computer. Infected computers become part of a P2P botnet that can relay C2 traffic to other infected peers.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used stolen cookies to access cloud resources and a forged duo-sid cookie to bypass MFA set on an email account.[3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0271
ATT&CK Technique Name:KEYMARBLE
KEYMARBLE has a command to search for files on the victim’s machine.[163] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has tricked unwitting recipients into clicking on malicious hyperlinks within emails crafted to resemble trustworthy senders.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0133
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nomadic Octopus
Nomadic Octopus attempted to make Octopus appear as a Telegram Messenger with a Russian interface.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0382
ATT&CK Technique Name:ServHelper
ServHelper may attempt to establish persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ run key.[239] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used administrative accounts, including Domain Admin, to move laterally within a victim network.[25] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Remote Timing Attacks on TPMs, AKA TPM-Fail
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) serves as a hardware-based root of trust that protects cryptographic keys from privileged systems and physical adversaries. These devices are generally based on a cryptographic coprocessor such as Arm SecurCore and can be foun... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has edited the Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost.exe.config file to load a malicious DLL into the AD FS process, thereby enabling persistent access to any service federated with AD FS for a user with a specified User Principal Name.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY has gathered targeted individuals' e-mail addresses through open source research and website contact forms.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon has used the RoyalRoad exploit builder to drop a second stage loader, intel.wll, into the Word Startup folder on the compromised host.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can identify the processes for Bkav antivirus.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:Antivirus/Antimalware
Anti-virus can be used to automatically quarantine suspicious files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be advised not to grant consent for screen captures to occur unless expected. Users should avoid enabling USB debugging (Android Debug Bridge) unless explicitly required. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 created tokens using compromised SAML signing certificates.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0574
ATT&CK Technique Name:BendyBear
BendyBear can check for analysis environments and signs of debugging using the Windows API kernel32!GetTickCountKernel32 call.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used HTTP over TCP ports 808 and 880 for command and control.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1057
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Loss Prevention
Data loss prevention can detect and block sensitive data being uploaded via web browsers. | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 2021: A Titan M Odyssey
In the past years, most of the Android devices were relying on ARM Trustzone for critical security features.In 2018, with the release of the Pixel 3, Google introduced the Titan M chip, a hardware security module used to enhance the device security by reducing its attack surf... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0149
ATT&CK Technique Name:MoonWind
MoonWind installs itself as a new service with automatic startup to establish persistence. The service checks every 60 seconds to determine if the malware is running; if not, it will spawn a new instance.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has used scheduled tasks named MSST and \Microsoft\Windows\Autochk\Scheduled to establish persistence.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0470
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBK
BBK has the ability to use HTTP in communications with C2.[3] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.