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ATT&CK ID:M0805
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mechanical Protection Layers
Protection devices should have minimal digital components to prevent exposure to related adversarial techniques. Examples include interlocks, rupture disks, release valves, etc. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX can enumerate and query for information contained within the Windows Registry.[67][68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used a modified version of NBTscan to identify available NetBIOS name servers over the network as well as ping to identify remote systems.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar has been downloaded via Windows BITS functionality.[11] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Greybox Program Synthesis: A New Approach to Attack Dataflow Obfuscation
Obfuscation is getting broadly adopted for a wide range of applications and especially to protect intellectual property (IP) in mobile ecosystem (Android, iOS) and embedded systems at large. It is now ubiquitous, and everyone ... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 WireGuard: Next Generation Secure Network Tunnel
The state of VPN protocols is not pretty, with popular options, such as IPsec and OpenVPN, being overwhelmingly complex, with large attack surfaces, using mostly cryptographic designs from the 90s. WireGuard presents a new abuse-resistant and high-pe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has collected e-mail addresses for activists and bloggers in order to target them with spyware.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used schtasks to register a scheduled task to execute malware during lateral movement.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure that low-privileged user accounts do not have permissions to add permissions to accounts or update IAM policies. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can conduct an image hijack of an .msc file extension as part of its UAC bypass process.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0469
ATT&CK Technique Name:ABK
ABK has the ability to identify the installed anti-virus product on the compromised host.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY tracks TrustedHosts and can move laterally to these targets via WinRM.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke copies and exfiltrates the clipboard contents every 30 seconds.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can monitor processes.[126][127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1548
ATT&CK Technique Name:Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can perform on a machin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Shimming
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward comp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 successfully gained remote access by using pass the ticket.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0589
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sibot
Sibot communicated with its C2 server via HTTP GET requests.[143] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception lured victims into clicking malicious files for machine reconnaissance and to execute malware.[111][112][113][114] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
GoldMax can exfiltrate files over the existing C2 channel.[51][52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0562
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNSPOT
Following the successful injection of SUNBURST, SUNSPOT deleted a temporary file it created named InventoryManager.bk after restoring the original SolarWinds Orion source code to the software library.[231] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman can collect files from a compromised host.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:macOS.OSAMiner
macOS.OSAMiner can parse the output of the native system_profiler tool to determine if the machine is running with 4 cores.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
Several BRONZE BUTLER tools encode data with base64 when posting it to a C2 server.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has used tools to delete files and folders from victims' desktops and profiles.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used legitimate applications to side-load malicious DLLs.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0036
ATT&CK Technique Name:FLASHFLOOD
FLASHFLOOD searches for interesting files (either a default or customized set of file extensions) on the local system and removable media.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has used SSH to move laterally through victim environments.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Stalloris: RPKI Downgrade Attack
The recent hijack of Twitter prefix by RTCOMM demonstrated the central role of RPKI for Internet routing security. The RPKI filtering (ROV) by major networks limited the propagation of the hijacked prefix.We demonstrate the first downgrade attacks against RPKI, which... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0422
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anubis
Anubis has a keylogger that works in every application installed on the device.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors leveraged a custom tool to dump OS credentials and used following commands: reg save HKLM\\SYSTEM system.hiv, reg save HKLM\\SAM sam.hiv, and reg save HKLM\\SECURITY security.hiv, to dump SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY h... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya creates a task to reboot the system one hour after infection.[118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Binaries can also be baselined for what dynamic libraries they require, and if an app requires a new dynamic library that wasn\u2019t included as part of an update, it should be investigated. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group's malware can take screenshots of the compromised computer every minute.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the legitimate Windows services IKEEXT and PrintNotify to side-load malicious DLLs.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0257
ATT&CK Technique Name:VERMIN
VERMIN decrypts code, strings, and commands to use once it's on the victim's machine.[245] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through phishing.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has researched software code to enable supply-chain operations, most notably for the 2017 NotPetya attack. Sandworm Team also collected a list of computers using specific software as part of its targeting efforts.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can spread itself by infecting other portable executable files on removable drives.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0434
ATT&CK Technique Name:Imminent Monitor
Imminent Monitor has a keylogging module.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can use a Registry Run Key and the Startup folder to establish persistence.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Call Log access an uncommonly needed permission, so users should be instructedto use extra scrutiny when granting access to their call logs. | secon |
title:botconf2022 RTM: sink-holing the botnet
This talk is about how we found the flaw in C&C calculation algorithm in RTM botnet. And used that logical weakness to sinkhole the botnet. This gave us as a result a list of compromised machines and an ability to shutdown disrupt the whole botnet.
pdf下载:https://www.botconf... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Kernel Mode Threats and Practical Defenses
Recent advancements in OS security from Microsoft such as PatchGuard, Driver Signature Enforcement, and SecureBoot have helped curtail once-widespread commodity kernel mode malware such as TDL4 and ZeroAccess. However, advanced attackers have found ways of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0543
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spark
Spark can collect the hostname, keyboard layout, and language from the system.[344] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0641
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kobalos
Kobalos can remove all command history on compromised hosts.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Sharpshooter
For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors used Dropbox to host lure documents and their first-stage downloader.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerDuke
PowerDuke achieves persistence by using various Registry Run keys.[198] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can send large amounts of device data over its C2 channel, including the device’s manufacturer, model, version and serial number, telephone number, and IP address.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can create a scheduled task for persistence.[27][28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0589
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sibot
Sibot has used a legitimate compromised website to download DLLs to the victim's machine.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0582
ATT&CK Technique Name:LookBack
LookBack can retrieve file listings from the victim machine.[181] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored in repositories. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has deployed different types of containers into victim environments to facilitate execution.[8][9] TeamTNT has also transferred cryptocurrency mining software to Kubernetes clusters discovered within local IP address ranges.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear has used DLL side loading to import and load a malicious DLL loader.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can create a backdoor by converting a domain to a federated domain which will be able to authenticate any user across the tenant. AADInternals can also modify DesktopSSO information.[3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT1
APT1 gathered a list of running processes on the system using tasklist /v.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can collect files and information from a compromised host.[112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0520
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN can search, read, write, move, and execute files.[58][59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flame
Rundll32.exe is used as a way of executing Flame at the command-line.[46] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Android Universal Root: Exploiting Mobile GPU / Command Queue Drivers
Rooting modern Android devices using kernel bugs from an unprivileged process without any hardcoded offsets/addresses and with almost a 100% success rate is exceptionally rare. After reporting the in-the-wild CVE-2020-0069 in Med... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used scheduled tasks establish persistence for TrickBot and other malware.[178][179][180][181] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has used stolen certificates from Electrum Technologies GmbH to sign payloads.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0336
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanoCore
NanoCore can perform keylogging on the victim’s machine.[119] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has compressed network communications and encrypted them with a custom stream cipher.[66][67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0513
ATT&CK Technique Name:LiteDuke
LiteDuke has the ability to check for the presence of Kaspersky security software.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can establish persistence by creating a new service.[111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa used a function to gather the current time.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Enforce that all binaries be signed by the correct Apple Developer IDs. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0698
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWizard
HermeticWizard can use a list of hardcoded credentials to to authenticate via NTLMSSP to the SMB shares on remote systems.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 actors have mailed USB drives to potential victims containing malware that downloads and installs various backdoors, including in some cases for ransomware operations.[14] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Unlimited Results: Breaking Firmware Encryption of ESP32-V3
ESP32 is one of the most widely used microcontrollers, and is present in hundreds of million devices such as IoT applications, mobile devices, hardware wallets, etc. In 2019, Limited Results published a fault injection attack at Black Hat E... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet collects the IP address of a compromised system.[221] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used vssadmin to create a volume shadow copy and retrieve the NTDS.dit file. Mustang Panda has also used reg save on the SYSTEM file Registry location to help extract the NTDS.dit file.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0423
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ginp
Ginp can inject input to make itself the default SMS handler.[7] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Insider Threats Packing Their Bags With Corporate Data
What if your organization could discover which of your employees are exfiltrating data prior to leaving? The 2020 Securonix Insider Threat Report found that 60% of Insider Threats involve "Flight Risk" employees planning to leave. While we kno... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Use network appliances and host-based security software to block network traffic that is not necessary within the environment, such as legacy protocols that may be leveraged for AiTM conditions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
A patch management process should be implemented to check unused applications, unmaintained and/or previously vulnerable software, unnecessary features, components, files, and documentation. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used valid credentials for privileged accounts with the goal of accessing domain controllers.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady can communicate with its C2 servers via HTTP.[327] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can delete files from a compromised host after they are exfiltrated.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0679
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ferocious
Ferocious can run GET.WORKSPACE in Microsoft Excel to check if a mouse is present.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0229
ATT&CK Technique Name:Orz
Some Orz versions have an embedded DLL known as MockDll that uses Process Hollowing and regsvr32 to execute another payload.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1548.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elevated Execution with Prompt
Adversaries may leverage the AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials. The purpose of this API is to give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges, suc... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Unlimited Results: Breaking Firmware Encryption of ESP32-V3
ESP32 is one of the most widely used microcontrollers, and is present in hundreds of million devices such as IoT applications, mobile devices, hardware wallets, etc. In 2019, Limited Results published a fault injection attack at Black Hat ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0883
ATT&CK Technique Name:Internet Accessible Device
Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments through systems exposed directly to the internet for remote access rather than through External Remote Services. Internet Accessible Devices are exposed to the internet unintentionally or intentiona... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher tracks the latitude and longitude coordinates of the infected device.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used the BITS protocol to exfiltrate stolen data from a compromised host.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has been modified to be used as a Windows service.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro has been used to run the whoami command on the system.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0068
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLATINUM
PLATINUM has used various methods of process injection including hot patching.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Regularly audit user accounts for activity and deactivate or remove any that are no longer needed. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
Application developers could be encouraged to avoid placing sensitive data in notification text. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0528
ATT&CK Technique Name:Javali
Javali can monitor processes for open browsers and custom banking applications.[135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon has used administrator credentials for lateral movement in compromised networks.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1587.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing Certificates
Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's New-UserPersistenceOption Persistence argument can be used to establish via the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[201][202] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has used the C$ network share for lateral movement.[46] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.