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ATT&CK ID:S0181
ATT&CK Technique Name:FALLCHILL
FALLCHILL uses fake Transport Layer Security (TLS) to communicate with its C2 server.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat has hijacked the cryptbase.dll within migwiz.exe to escalate privileges. This prevented the User Access Control window from appearing.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0811
ATT&CK Technique Name:Redundancy of Service
Hot-standbys in diverse locations can ensure continued operations if the primarily system are compromised or unavailable. At the network layer, protocols such as the Parallel Redundancy Protocol can be used to simultaneously use redundant and diverse communica... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 The Cyber Shell Game – War, Information Warfare, and the Darkening Web
This year we celebrate a dubious anniversary – it’s been 20 years since the first major resolution on “information security” was submitted in the United Nations, and it was the first of many. But this is not the “information sec... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0653
ATT&CK Technique Name:xCaon
xCaon has decoded strings from the C2 server before executing commands.[261] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used malicious DLLs that setup persistence in the Registry Key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\Run.[147][148] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
For Operation Spalax, the threat actors used Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) scripts to install malware.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay has been executed through malicious e-mail attachments.[199] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro has been used to execute net view to discover mapped network shares.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:DanBot
DanBot can download additional files to a targeted system.[135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0586
ATT&CK Technique Name:TAINTEDSCRIBE
TAINTEDSCRIBE can execute GetLocalTime for time discovery.[76] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 IAM The One Who Knocks
As organizations start their cloud journey, many are looking at leveraging multi-cloud for their infrastructure. Although this gives teams great flexibility in building their environments, each service provider has a unique paradigm for configuring and managing the configurat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Identify and block potentially malicious unmanaged COR_PROFILER profiling DLLs by using application control solutions like AppLocker that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unapproved DLLs.[9][10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETEAGLE
NETEAGLE can send process listings over the C2 channel.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT injects into a newly spawned process created from a native Windows executable.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Prevent critical business and system processes from being replaced, overwritten, or reconfigured to load potentially malicious code. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has used BITSAdmin to download additional tools.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has moved laterally using the Local Administrator account.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Some data in Remsec is encrypted using RC5 in CBC mode, AES-CBC with a hardcoded key, RC4, or Salsa20. Some data is also base64-encoded.[271][272] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Once a file is uploaded, Machete will delete it from the machine.[136] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Arm'd and Dangerous
Apple's new M1 systems offer a myriad of benefits ...for both macOS users, and unfortunately, to malware authors as well.In this talk we detail the first malicious programs compiled to natively target Apple Silicon (M1/arm64), focusing on methods of analysis. We'll start with a f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire leverages PowerShell for the majority of its client-side agent tasks. Empire also contains the ability to conduct PowerShell remoting with the Invoke-PSRemoting module.[87][88] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Return of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT)
With a 19 year old vulnerability, we were able to sign a message with the private key of Facebook. We'll show how we found one of the oldest TLS vulnerabilities in products of 10 different vendors and how we practically exploited it on famous sites. W... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
For Operation Spalax, the threat actors used packers that read pixel data from images contained in PE files' resource sections and build the next layer of execution from the data.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
Prikormka uses DLL search order hijacking for persistence by saving itself as ntshrui.dll to the Windows directory so it will load before the legitimate ntshrui.dll saved in the System32 subdirectory.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerDuke
PowerDuke has commands to get the current directory name as well as the size of a file. It also has commands to obtain information about logical drives, drive type, and free space.[234] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Fireside Chat: Jeff Moss and Gaurav Keerthi
In this fireside chat, Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss sits down with Gaurav Keerthi, Former Deputy Chief Executive, CSA to discuss the ongoing tension between regulating emerging technologies and the drive for innovation in cybersecurity. They also examine ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team checked for connectivity to resources within the network and used LDAP to query Active Directory, discovering information about computers listed in AD.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used key loggers to steal usernames and passwords.[112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used a script (atexec.py) to execute a command on a target machine via Task Scheduler.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0173
ATT&CK Technique Name:FLIPSIDE
FLIPSIDE uses RDP to tunnel traffic from a victim environment.[15] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 The Case for a National Cybersecurity Safety Board
In the wake of a series of destabilizing and damaging cyber attacks, there has been a growing call for the U.S. government to establish an analogue of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to investigate cyber attacks. As we recently argu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has maintained persistence by loading malicious code into a startup folder or by adding a Registry Run key.[138][139][140][141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEADEYE
The DEADEYE.EMBED variant of DEADEYE can embed its payload in an alternate data stream of a local file.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0391
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAWKBALL
HAWKBALL has used HTTP to communicate with a single hard-coded C2 server.[153] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy has a command to create a scheduled task for persistence.[183] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0592
ATT&CK Technique Name:RemoteUtilities
RemoteUtilities can use Msiexec to install a service.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1127.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:MSBuild
Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building va... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0029
ATT&CK Technique Name:PsExec
PsExec can leverage Windows services to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM with the -s argument.[98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete used the startup folder for persistence.[149][150] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Cloudy with a Chance of APT: Novel Microsoft 365 Attacks in the Wild
This past year has proved the point that advanced nation-state backed threat actors are increasingly investing their time and money to develop novel ways to access the cloud. These actors are especially interested in Microsoft 365... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0816
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mitigation Limited or Not Effective
This technique may not be effectively mitigated against, consider controls for assets and processes that lead to the use of this technique. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS collects C2 information via a dead drop resolver.[3][4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can remove artifacts from the compromised host, including created Registry keys.[20] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 3d Red Pill: A Guest-to-Host Escape on QEMU/KVM Virtio Device
As a critical para-virtualized driver platform for the hypervisor, virtio has been widely adopted in qemu/kvm virtual machine for better I/O performance. Vulnerabilities that have been explored so far fail to carry out guest-to-host es... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle has contained a hardcoded list of IP addresses to block that belong to sandboxes and analysis platforms.[21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1617
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hooking
Adversaries may utilize hooking to hide the presence of artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Hooking can be used to modify return values or data structures of system APIs and function calls. This process typically involves using 3rd party root frame... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent DDE attacks and spawning of child processes from Office programs.[35][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0627
ATT&CK Technique Name:SodaMaster
SodaMaster has the ability to download additional payloads from C2 to the targeted system.[159] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Enterprise Policy
On Android devices with a work profile, the DevicePolicyManager.setPermittedCrossProfileNotificationListeners method can be used to manage the list of applications running within the personal profile that can access notifications generated within the work profile.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher tracks the latitude and longitude coordinates of the infected device.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can obtain a list of local groups and members.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used a UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) rootkit known as LoJax.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire includes various modules to attempt to bypass UAC for escalation of privileges.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:TianySpy
TianySpy can utilize WebViews to display fake authentication pages that capture user credentials.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0667
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chrommme
Chrommme can store captured system information locally prior to exfiltration.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0318
ATT&CK Technique Name:XLoader for Android
XLoader for Android has fetched its C2 address from encoded Twitter names, as well as Instagram and Tumblr.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
An APT3 downloader establishes SOCKS5 connections for its initial C2.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain account permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups acros... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sykipot
Sykipot may use ipconfig /all to gather system network configuration details.[223] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0347
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuditCred
AuditCred is installed as a new service on the system.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Limit privileges of user accounts so only authorized users can edit the rc.common file. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 Seeing Through the Invisible: Radiation Spikes Detected in Chernobyl During the Russian Invasion Were Fabricated
Chernobyl, an iconic symbol in our social imaginary that represents everything that may go wrong with radioactivity, was taken by the Russian occupation forces, as part of a full-scale in... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can use Keychain Services API functions to find and collect passwords, such as SecKeychainFindInternetPassword and SecKeychainItemCopyAttributesAndData.[8][9] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Uncommon Sense: Detecting Exploits with Novel Hardware Performance Counters and ML Magic
In recent years, exploits like speculative execution, Rowhammer, and Return Oriented Programming (ROP) were detected using hardware performance counters (HPCs). But to date, only relatively simple and well-under... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Network segmentation can be used to isolate infrastructure components that do not require broad network access. This may mitigate, or at least alleviate, the scope of AiTM activity. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Needing the DoH: The Ongoing Encryption and Centralization of DNS
Most connections on the Internet start with a DNS request. As the connections themselves increasingly have moved to encrypted methods (primarily HTTP to HTTPS), surveillance and data aggregation by service providers and nation states... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0445
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRatReporter
ShimRatReporter gathered a list of installed software on the infected host.[27] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Let's Attack Let's Encrypt
Following the recent off-path attacks against PKI, Let’sEncrypt deployed in 2020 domain validation from multiple vantage points to ensure security even against the stronger on-path MitM adversaries. The idea behind such distributed domain validation is that even if the adv... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER may enumerate user directories on a victim.[235] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet's infection sequence consists of code blocks and data blocks that will be downloaded to the PLC to alter its behavior. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT has encoded data into a binary blob using XOR.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0317
ATT&CK Technique Name:Marcher
Marcher requests Android Device Administrator access.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak downloads an executable and injects it directly into a new process.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD can use ShellExecute to execute applications.[135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0150
ATT&CK Technique Name:POSHSPY
POSHSPY uses PowerShell to execute various commands, one to execute its payload.[178] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used malware such as Azorult and Cobalt Strike in their operations.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
In the Ukraine 2015 Incident, Sandworm Team developed and used malicious firmware to render communication devices inoperable. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0207
ATT&CK Technique Name:Vasport
Vasport copies itself to disk and creates an associated run key Registry entry to establish.[273] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Understanding the IoT Threat Landscape and a Home Appliance Manufacturer's Approach to Counter Threats to IoT
As we live in a world where billions of IoT devices are connected to the Internet, there are streams of news articles that depict damages caused by malware and other threats that target ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0229
ATT&CK Technique Name:Orz
Orz can overwrite Registry settings to reduce its visibility on the victim.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
When possible, include hash values in manifest files to help prevent side-loading of malicious libraries.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0478
ATT&CK Technique Name:EventBot
EventBot can abuse Android’s accessibility service to record the screen PIN.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti Group
Winnti Group used a rootkit to modify typical server functionality.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has recruited target organization employees or contractors who provide credentials and approve an associated MFA prompt, or install remote management software onto a corporate workstation, allowing LAPSUS$ to take control of an authenticated system.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has acquired web services for use in C2 and exfiltration.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0286
ATT&CK Technique Name:OBAD
OBAD contains encrypted code along with an obfuscated decryption routine to make it difficult to analyze.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0500
ATT&CK Technique Name:MCMD
MCMD can upload additional files to a compromised host.[281] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Consider filtering DHCP traffic on ports 67 and 68 to/from unknown or untrusted DHCP servers. Additionally, port security may also be enabled on layer switches. Furthermore, consider enabling DHCP snooping on layer 2 switches as it will prevent DHCP spoofing ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
RedLeaves is launched through use of DLL search order hijacking to load a malicious dll.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has presented the user with a UAC prompt to elevate privileges while installing.[9] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 The Enemy Within: Modern Supply Chain Attacks
I'm in your supply chain, and you're probably in mine. Our increasingly interconnected infrastructure leaves us all vulnerable. With hundreds of millions of devices and millions of enterprises betting on the cloud, we see sophisticated attacks every day... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CreepyDrive
CreepyDrive can use cloud services including OneDrive for data exfiltration.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0589
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sibot
Sibot has executed downloaded DLLs with rundll32.exe.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0594
ATT&CK Technique Name:Out1
Out1 can use HTTP and HTTPS in communications with remote hosts.[217] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST created an Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry value for the process dllhost.exe to trigger the installation of Cobalt Strike.[10] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.