text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has used scripts to collect the host's network topology.[235] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth's initial payload is a malicious .LNK file. [3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Axiom
Axiom has used spear phishing to initially compromise victims.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can list the running processes and get the process ID and parent process’s ID.[209] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 A Journey Into Fuzzing WebAssembly Virtual Machines
Since the MVP release in 2017, WebAssembly evolve gradually, bringing new adepts and new VM implementations over time. It's now possible to run WebAssembly modules over every modern browser, in some blockchain, or using a standalone VM.In the same ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0667
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chrommme
Chrommme can encrypt sections of its code to evade detection.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can dump passwords and save them into \ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\pwds.txt.[17] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Automatic Protocol Reverse Engineering
Protocol reverse engineering is the process of extracting the specification of a network protocol from a binary code that implements it. Extraction of protocol specification is useful in several security-related contexts, such as finding implementation bugs, d... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used Metasploit’s PsExec NTDSGRAB module to obtain a copy of the victim's Active Directory database.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Restrict permissions and access to the AD FS server to only originate from privileged access workstations.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Regin
The Regin malware platform supports many standard protocols, including SMB.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0138
ATT&CK Technique Name:Andariel
Andariel has used tasklist to enumerate processes and find a specific string.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Partition Integrity
Android includes system partition integrity mechanisms that could detect unauthorized modifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
One variant of BlackEnergy locates existing driver services that have been disabled and drops its driver component into one of those service's paths, replacing the legitimate executable. The malware then sets the hijacked service to start automatically to establish pers... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to decrypt the loader configuration and payload DLL.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1071
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rubeus
Rubeus can use the KerberosRequestorSecurityToken.GetRequest method to request kerberoastable service tickets.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
Elise is capable of launching a remote shell on the host to delete itself.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with LaZagne and other tools, including by dumping passwords saved in victim email.[22][23][24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method
Mobile security products can potentially detect jailbroken or rooted devices. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit access to the root account and prevent users from loading kernel modules and extensions through proper privilege separation and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1548.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Setuid and Setgid
An adversary may abuse configurations where an application has the setuid or setgid bits set in order to get code running in a different (and possibly more privileged) user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 Using Zero to Attack Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) PLONK
We will show how to use zero to attack zero-knowledge proof (ZKP). In particular, we'll discuss a *critical* issue in a cutting-edge ZKP PLONK C++ implementation which allows an attacker to create a *forged* proof that all verifiers will accep... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing has used crontab to download and run shell scripts every minute to ensure persistence.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1583.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:DNS Server
Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: Application Layer Protocol). Instead of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor can use PowerShell commands to disable the network adapters on a victim machines.[148] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0132
ATT&CK Technique Name:H1N1
H1N1 disable recovery options and deletes shadow copies from the victim.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT has used HTTP requests for command and control.[75][76][77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to use port forwarding to establish a proxy between a target host and C2.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor's installer plugin can schedule a new task that loads the dispatcher on boot/logon.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX checks if VMware tools is running in the background by searching for any process named "vmtoolsd".[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0644
ATT&CK Technique Name:ObliqueRAT
ObliqueRAT can copy specific files, webcam captures, and screenshots to local directories.[69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Use least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0336
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanoCore
NanoCore creates a RunOnce key in the Registry to execute its VBS scripts each time the user logs on to the machine.[176] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0122
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pass-The-Hash Toolkit
Pass-The-Hash Toolkit can perform pass the hash.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1592.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Client Configurations
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, archit... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0145
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSOURCE
POWERSOURCE achieves persistence by setting a Registry Run key, with the path depending on whether the victim account has user or administrator access.[200] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0892
ATT&CK Technique Name:Change Credential
Adversaries may modify software and device credentials to prevent operator and responder access. Depending on the device, the modification or addition of this password could prevent any device configuration actions from being accomplished and may require a factory... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Fingerprint-Jacking: Practical Fingerprint Authorization Hijacking in Android Apps
Many mobile devices carry a fingerprint scanner nowadays. Mobile apps utilize the fingerprint scanner to facilitate operations such as account login and payment authorization. Despite its security-critical nature, rel... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0635
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoomBox
BoomBox can decrypt AES-encrypted files downloaded from C2.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used malware to set LoadAppInit_DLLs in the Registry key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows in order to establish persistence.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Burning Bridges - Stopping Lateral Movement via the RPC Firewall
In Windows based environments, RPC is the main underlying protocol required for remote administration and for Active Directory services. As such, it is often used by IT admins, but also by ransomware and advanced attackers to spread by... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher extracts and decrypts stage 3 malware, which is stored in encrypted resources.[88][89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0276
ATT&CK Technique Name:Keydnap
Keydnap adds the setuid flag to a binary so it can easily elevate in the future.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake can block, forward, hide, and send SMS messages.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0569
ATT&CK Technique Name:Explosive
Explosive has a function to call the OpenClipboard wrapper.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has used HTTP over ports such as 20, 22, 7080, and 50000, in addition to using ports commonly associated with HTTP/S.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can modify registry keys as part of setting a new pass-through authentication agent.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0545
ATT&CK Technique Name:TERRACOTTA
TERRACOTTA can inject clicks to launch applications, share posts on social media, and interact with WebViews to perform fraudulent actions.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater can execute shell commands using cmd.exe.[318] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Chip.Fail - Glitching the Silicon of the Connected World
All smart devices, from cars to IoT, are based around processors. Often these processors are not considered as part of the threat model when designing a product; instead, there is an implicit trust that they just work and that the security fea... | secon |
title:botconf2022 Identifying malware campaigns on a budget
Malware campaigns plague enterprises, entrepreneurs, and individuals. Platforms and tools have been deployed to gain insight into the ongoing situation. Unfortunately, many of these platforms are rather pricey, which is a problem for me, as a student.This talk... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SubmitControl. T... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has used rundll32.exe to execute Koadic stagers.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1548.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sudo and Sudo Caching
Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. | secon |
title:botconf2014 Bypassing Sandboxes for Fun
Nowadays malware sandboxes are commonly used by malware researchers. Sandboxes have also find they place commercially as a new security device. Not surprisingly, As was firewall in the 90’, IPS in early 2K and Web applications firewall recently, they are presented as a new ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can persist by setting Registry key values HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\QQMusic and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\QQMusic.[146] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can adjust token privileges.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can inject code through calling VirtualAllocExNuma.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0269
ATT&CK Technique Name:QUADAGENT
QUADAGENT used the PowerShell filenames Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 and SystemDiskClean.ps1.[133] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0332
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remcos
Remcos steals and modifies data from the clipboard.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0941
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Consider implementing full disk encryption, especially if engineering workstations are transient assets that are more likely to be lost, stolen, or tampered with. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 copied the SAM and SYSTEM Registry hives for credential harvesting.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEADEYE
DEADEYE can use rundll32.exe for execution of living off the land binaries (lolbin) such as SHELL32.DLL.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1033
ATT&CK Technique Name:DCSrv
DCSrv has created new services for persistence by modifying the Registry.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy stores all collected information in a single file before exfiltration.[99] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0151
ATT&CK Technique Name:HALFBAKED
HALFBAKED can obtain screenshots from the victim.[72] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Is WebAssembly Really Safe? --Wasm VM Escape and RCE Vulnerabilities Have Been Found in New Way
WebAssembly (Wasm) supports binary format which provides languages such as C/C++, C# and Rust with a compilation target on the web. It is a web standard with active participation from all major browser v... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 uses a tool that captures information from air-gapped computers via an infected USB and transfers it to network-connected computer when the USB is inserted.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has downloaded additional malware with scheduled tasks.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet uses the SetSecurityDescriptorDacl API to reduce object integrity levels.[162] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke searches attached and mounted drives for file extensions and keywords that match a predefined list.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper can overwrite the C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs file on a targeted system.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has communicated with hosts over raw TCP on port 9999.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flame
Flame has a module named BeetleJuice that contains Bluetooth functionality that may be used in different ways, including transmitting encoded information from the infected system over the Bluetooth protocol, acting as a Bluetooth beacon, and identifying other Bluetooth device... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Page Cache Attacks: Microarchitectural Attacks on Flawless Hardware
In recent years, we have seen that optimizations in processors often enable new microarchitectural side channels. The severity of side-channel attacks varies widely, from small annoyances for which developers have to introduce wor... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Alarm.DISARM - Remotely Exploiting and Disarming Popular Physical Security System from Public Internet
You probably know this movie scene where the hacker of the group remotely disables the alarm before the other guys break in to execute a perfectly planned heist? Great, so this presentation is ab... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 ClusterFuzz: Fuzzing at Google Scale
Fuzzing is an effective way of finding security vulnerabilities, but it does not scale well for a defender trying to protect a complex software with several third-party dependencies. There are numerous daunting challenges that come into play which include writin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Small Sieve
Small Sieve has the ability to add itself to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\OutlookMicrosift for persistence.[246] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda can perform keylogging on the victim’s machine by hooking the functions TranslateMessage and WM_KEYDOWN.[183] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 The Hunt for Major League IoT-ICS Threats: A Deep Dive into IoT Threat Terrain
Because the Internet of Things is a major part of modern life, security threats are everywhere. Security incidents as well as the results of our many threat hunts have shown us that hundreds of millions of devices have b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has the ability to clean up installed files, delete files, and delete itself from the victim’s machine.[103] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0691
ATT&CK Technique Name:Neoichor
Neoichor can collect the OS version and computer name from a compromised host.[185] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has used ListPlanting to inject code into a trusted process.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1518
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0535
ATT&CK Technique Name:Golden Cup
Golden Cup can collect images, videos, and attacker-specified files.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Amadey
Amadey does not run any tasks or install additional malware if the victim machine is based in Russia.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0086
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZLib
ZLib has the ability to obtain screenshots of the compromised system.[187] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0568
ATT&CK Technique Name:EVILNUM
EVILNUM can obtain the computer name from the victim's system.[128] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Exploiting Kernel Races through Taming Thread Interleaving
A kernel race condition vulnerability is difficult to exploit, because thread interleaving is non-deterministic and cannot be controlled. Thus, conventional exploitation techniques against kernel races simply attempt to brute force, i.e., k... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0610
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideTwist
SideTwist can use GetUserNameW, GetComputerNameW, and GetComputerNameExW to gather information.[155] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:TianySpy
TianySpy can utilize WebViews to display fake authentication pages that capture user credentials.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk loads and executes functions from a DLL.[13] | secon |
title:botconf2013 BladeRunner: Adventures in Tracking Botnets
The problem of tracking botnets is not a new one, but still proves to be an important and fruitful research topic. We have been tracking many botnets for years using an internally built tracking system, which has undergone a number of significant improvement... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0221
ATT&CK Technique Name:Umbreon
Umbreon provides additional access using its backdoor Espeon, providing a reverse shell upon receipt of a special packet.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0655
ATT&CK Technique Name:BusyGasper
BusyGasper can open a hidden menu when a specific phone number is called from the infected device.[3] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Open Sesame: Picking Locks with Cortana
Many new devices are trying to fit into our life seamlessly. As a result, there’s a quest for a “universal access methods” for all devices. Voice activation seems to be a natural candidate for the task and many implementations for it surfaced in recent years. ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1072
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer2
Industroyer2 can iterate across a device’s IOAs to modify the ON/OFF value of a given IO state.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0048
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has attempted to lure victims into opening e-mail attachments to execute malicious code.[207] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has downloaded malware and tools--including Nishang and PowerCat--onto a compromised host.[208][110] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.