text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:G0103
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mofang
Mofang's malicious spearphishing attachments required a user to open the file after receiving.[146] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.[114][115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0099
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT-C-36
APT-C-36 has disguised its scheduled tasks as those used by Google.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used web shells for persistence or to ensure redundant access.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the query user and whoami commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance.[137] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used an instrumentor script to gather the names of all services running on a victim's system.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0271
ATT&CK Technique Name:KEYMARBLE
KEYMARBLE can obtain a list of running processes on the system.[144] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0255
ATT&CK Technique Name:DDKONG
DDKONG uses Rundll32 to ensure only a single instance of itself is running at once.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:PyDCrypt
PyDCrypt will remove all created artifacts such as dropped executables.[187] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs establishes persistence by adding a new service with the display name "WMI Performance Adapter Extension" in an attempt to masquerade as a legitimate WMI service.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has used TCP to download additional modules.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit permissions for creating snapshots or backups in accordance with least privilege. Organizations should limit the number of users within the organization with an IAM role that has administrative privileges, strive to reduce all permanent privileged role... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Going Beyond Coverage-Guided Fuzzing with Structured Fuzzing
Coverage-guided fuzzers like AFL and libFuzzer have led to a "fuzzing renaissance". This is because they made it possible for security researchers to write effective fuzzers for formats without knowing about the format's structure. However... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0486
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bonadan
Bonadan can find the external IP address of the infected host.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0441
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerShower
PowerShower has the ability to identify the current user on the infected host.[142] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can encode data using Base64 prior to exfiltration.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0671
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tomiris
Tomiris can upload files matching a hardcoded set of extensions, such as .doc, .docx, .pdf, and .rar, to its C2 server.[133] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0388
ATT&CK Technique Name:YAHOYAH
YAHOYAH checks for antimalware solution processes on the system.[120] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:PingPull
A PingPull variant can communicate with its C2 servers by using HTTPS.[244] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has used a tool known as RemoteExec (similar to PsExec) to remotely execute batch scripts and binaries.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tarrask
Tarrask leverages token theft to obtain lsass.exe security permissions.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0951
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Regularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and public disclosure. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1568.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:DNS Calculation
Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calcula... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:CURIUM
CURIUM has established a network of fictitious social media accounts, including on Facebook and LinkedIn, to establish relationships with victims, often posing as an attractive woman.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.012
ATT&CK Technique Name:COR_PROFILER
Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be lo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has used mofcomp.exe to establish WMI Event Subscription persistence mechanisms configured from a *.mof file.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0671
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tomiris
Tomiris has used SCHTASKS /CREATE /SC DAILY /TN StartDVL /TR "[path to self]" /ST 10:00 to establish persistence.[171] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can receive files from the C2 at runtime.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0162
ATT&CK Technique Name:Komplex
The Komplex trojan creates a persistent launch agent called with $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.updates.plist with launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.updates.plist.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0810
ATT&CK Technique Name:Out-of-Band Communications Channel
Utilize out-of-band communication to validate the integrity of data from the primary channel. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Upgrade to Windows 8 or later and enable secure boot. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mis-Type
Mis-Type has transmitted collected files and data to its C2 server.[87] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Practically-exploitable Cryptographic Vulnerabilities in Matrix
We report several practically-exploitable cryptographic vulnerabilities in the Matrix standard for federated realtime communication and its flagship client and prototype implementation, Element. These, together, invalidate the confident... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Certified Pre-Owned: Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services
Microsoft's Active Directory Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) implementation, known as Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), has largely flown under the radar by both the offensive and defensive realms. AD CS is widely deploy... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta can reboot victim machines in safe mode with networking via bcdedit /set safeboot network.[9][10][11][12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:WinMM
WinMM sets a WH_CBT Windows hook to search for and capture files on the victim.[327] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats has created scheduled tasks to persistently run VBScripts.[111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1542.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Component Firmware
Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer’s main backdoor connected to a remote C2 server using HTTPS.[166] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0276
ATT&CK Technique Name:Keydnap
Keydnap puts a space after a false .jpg extension so that execution actually goes through the Terminal.app program.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
In Industroyer the first COM port from the configuration file is used for the actual communication and the two other COM ports are just opened to prevent other processes accessing them. Thus, the IEC 101 payload component is able to take over and maintain control of the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp can capture display screenshots with the screens_dll.dll plugin.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0274
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calisto
Calisto has the capability to upload and download files to the victim's machine.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has leveraged iplogger.org to send collected data back to C2.[33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete has used pyobfuscate, zlib compression, and base64 encoding for obfuscation. Machete has also used some visual obfuscation techniques by naming variables as combinations of letters to hinder analysis.[51][52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication. Where possible, also enable multi-factor authentication on externally facing services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0214
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAPPYWORK
can collect system information, including computer name, system manufacturer, IsDebuggerPresent state, and execution path.[155] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used forged SAML tokens that allowed the actors to impersonate users and bypass MFA, enabling APT29 to access enterprise cloud applications and services.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can collect the date and time from a compromised host.[41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET downloads browser specific AppleScript modules using a constructed URL with the curl command, https://" & domain & "/agent/scripts/" & moduleName & ".applescript.[485] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM has used a variety of widely-available tools, which in some cases they modified to add functionality and/or subvert antimalware solutions.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT obtains a build identifier as well as victim hard drive information from Windows registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum. Another JHUHUGIT variant gathers the victim storage volume serial number and the storage device name.[177][178] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0839
ATT&CK Technique Name:Module Firmware
Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equi... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Zerologon: From Zero to Domain Admin by Exploiting a Crypto Bug
In a Windows Active Directory environment, domain-joined computers need to regularly communicate with domain controllers to facilitate NTLM network authentication and a number of other tasks. This communication takes place via the Netlo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has used compromised credentials and/or session tokens to gain access into a victim's VPN, VDI, RDP, and IAMs.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Updates
Security updates frequently contain patches to vulnerabilities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Routinely check user permissions to ensure only the expected users have the capability to create snapshots and backups. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0193
ATT&CK Technique Name:Forfiles
Forfiles can be used to subvert controls and possibly conceal command execution by not directly invoking cmd.[1][2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0172
ATT&CK Technique Name:Reaver
Reaver creates a shortcut file and saves it in a Startup folder to establish persistence.[219] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar can execute PE files in the address space of the specified process.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0068
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLATINUM
PLATINUM is capable of using Windows hook interfaces for information gathering such as credential access.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell can query the netsvc group value data located in the svchost group Registry key.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0437
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kivars
Kivars has the ability to initiate keylogging on the infected host.[96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke's miner has created UPX-packed files in the Windows Start Menu Folder.[225] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot uses a custom crypter leveraging Microsoft’s CryptoAPI to encrypt C2 traffic.[137]Newer versions of TrickBot have been known to use bcrypt to encrypt and digitally sign responses to their C2 server. [138] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used Metasploit to perform reflective DLL injection in order to escalate privileges.[73][74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI can download files and execute them on the victim’s machine.[249][250] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT1
APT1 has used RAR to compress files before moving them outside of the victim network.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa used ipconfig to gather network configuration information.[101][102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot recursively generates a list of files within a directory and sends them back to the control server.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Harm Reduction: A Framework for Effective & Compassionate Security Guidance
Cybersecurity practitioners in defensive roles are regularly confronted with high risk behaviors from the populations they protect. In theory, the security response should be simple: Inform the user of the risks and get ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper used netview to scan target systems for shared resources.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:CreepySnail
CreepySnail can use Base64 to encode its C2 traffic.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Consider using application control to prevent execution of binaries that are susceptible to abuse and not required for a given system or network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 has modules for brute forcing local administrator and AD user accounts.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay has base64-encoded its portable executable and hidden itself under a JPG header. Ramsay can also embed information within document footers.[266] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can search for tools used in static analysis.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Several Lazarus Group malware families install themselves as new services.[75][76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0079
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkHydrus
DarkHydrus has sent malware that required users to hit the enable button in Microsoft Excel to allow an .iqy file to be downloaded.[70][71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has harvested valid administrative credentials for lateral movement.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used VPNs and Outlook Web Access (OWA) to maintain access to victim networks.[14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Perform regular firmware updates to mitigate risks of exploitation and/or abuse. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Breaking Samsung's ARM TrustZone
The increasing popularity of connected devices in recent years has led manufacturers to put a greater emphasis on security, finding themselves in need of robust designs that would protect their users. From these requirements emerged the ARM TrustZone, a system-wide h... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1071.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:DNS
Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA has downloaded files onto a victim machine.[415] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor can conduct Active Directory reconnaissance using tools such as Sharphound or AdFind.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
A version of KONNI has dropped a Windows shortcut into the Startup folder to establish persistence.[137] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1484.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Trust Modification
Adversaries may add new domain trusts or modify the properties of existing domain trusts to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges. Domain trust details, such as whether or not a domain is federated, allow authentication and authorization properties ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has exploited ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472) against vulnerable domain controllers.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0535
ATT&CK Technique Name:Golden Cup
Golden Cup can collect various pieces of device information, such as serial number and product information.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1590.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Security Appliances
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network security appliances that can be used during targeting. Information about network security appliances may include a variety of details, such as the existence and specifics of deployed firew... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 can use Inveigh to conduct name service poisoning for credential theft and associated relay attacks.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton would reset the controller to the previous state over TriStation and if this failed it would write a dummy program to memory in what was likely an attempt at anti-forensics. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0497
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dacls
Dacls has had its payload named with a dot prefix to make it hidden from view in the Finder application.[16][17] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Hack Different: Pwning iOS 14 with Generation Z Bugz
The traditional Safari exploit is to gain code execution in the renderer first, then escape the sandbox with userland bugs or directly attack the kernel. However, since Safari has been under attention for a long time, it is not easy to find vulne... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT30
APT30 has relied on users to execute malicious file attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.[19] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Bring Your Own Token (BYOT) to Replace the Traditional Smartcards for Strong Authentication and Signing
Smartcards are a good way to enable strong authentication to enterprise network and applications as they provide identification, authentication, and ability to store cryptographic key information... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors installed the AnyDesk remote desktop application onto the compromised network.[4] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.