text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has constructed legitimate appearing installation folder paths by calling GetWindowsDirectoryW and then inserting a null byte at the fourth character of the path. For Windows Vista or higher, the path would appear as C:\Users\Public.[143] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0423
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ginp
Ginp can use a multi-step phishing overlay to capture banking credentials and then credit card numbers after login.[18] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 One Drive, Double Agent: Clouded OneDrive Turns Sides
Over the last 10 years, ransomware attacks have become the main cybersecurity risk. More than 200 different ransomware families have been used in the wild. Most of them are fairly similar. EDRs can prevent most of them generically with decoy file... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
TACACS+ can keep control over which commands administrators are permitted to use through the configuration of authentication and command authorization. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Update software regularly to include patches that fix DLL side-loading vulnerabilities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream has the ability to discover processes, including Bka.exe and BkavUtil.exe.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0691
ATT&CK Technique Name:Neoichor
Neoichor can clear the browser history on a compromised host by changing the ClearBrowsingHistoryOnExit value to 1 in the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Privacy Registry key.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry utilizes wmic to delete shadow copies.[129][130][131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32's backdoor possesses the capability to list files and directories on a machine. [16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0635
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoomBox
BoomBox has the ability to execute an LDAP query to enumerate the distinguished name, SAM account name, and display name for all domain users.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0473
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avenger
Avenger has the ability to download files from C2 to a compromised host.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Accessibility Features
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 can enumerate local and domain user account information.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has scanned targeted systems for vulnerable Citrix and Microsoft Exchange services.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT can use port 4782 on the compromised host for TCP callbacks.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has created a scheduled task that executes every hour to establish persistence.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0352
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses Word macros for execution.[115] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Hiding Process Memory via Anti-Forensic Techniques
Nowadays, security practitioners typically use memory acquisition or live forensics to detect and analyze sophisticated malware samples. Subsequently, malware authors began to incorporate anti-forensic techniques that subvert the analysis process by... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:XTunnel
A version of XTunnel introduced in July 2015 obfuscated the binary using opaque predicates and other techniques in a likely attempt to obfuscate it and bypass security products.[360] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.[72] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 DNSSEC Downgrade Attacks
In this talk, we show that the cryptographic agility in DNSSEC, although critical for making DNS secure with strong cryptography, also introduces a severe vulnerability. We demonstrate that adversaries, by manipulating the cryptographic material in signed DNS responses, can ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat has the ability to add the following registry key on compromised networks to maintain persistence: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services \LanmanServer\Paramenters[28] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Keynote: Black Hat at 25: Where Do We Go from Here?
For twenty-five years, the InfoSec community and industry have been gathering here in the desert. For twenty-five years, we have chipped away at underlying insecurities in the technologies we use every day with new vulnerability research and adver... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 used a PowerShell script to launch shellcode that retrieved an additional payload.[95][96][97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell can run commands on the compromised asset with CMD functions.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used nbtscan and ping to discover remote systems, as well as dsquery subnet on a domain controller to retrieve all subnets in the Active Directory.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke uses scheduled tasks typically named "Watchmon Service" for persistence.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0494
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zen
Zen can install itself on the system partition to achieve persistence. Zen can also replace framework.jar, which allows it to intercept and modify the behavior of the standard Android API.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
Gazer injects its communication module into an Internet accessible process through which it performs C2.[23][24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0280
ATT&CK Technique Name:MirageFox
MirageFox is likely loaded via DLL hijacking into a legitimate McAfee binary.[27] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 I'm Unique, Just Like You: Human Side-Channels and Their Implications for Security and Privacy
Almost everything about us – our handwriting, DNA, faces, voices, fingerprints, even our eyes – can be used to distinguish us from the seven billion other people on the planet. These physical identifi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs collects a list of available servers with the command net view.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created fake LinkedIn accounts for their targeting efforts.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to inject a downloaded DLL into a newly created rundll32.exe process.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1111
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic can open an interactive command-shell to perform command line functions on victim machines. Koadic performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host (Jscript) and to run arbitrary shellcode.[180][181] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Morning Beverage Break (Briefings)
Open to Briefings Passholders. Please wear your badge. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:S-Type
S-Type has uploaded data and files from a compromised host to its C2 servers.[87] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Exploiting CSP in WebKit to Break Authentication and Authorization
When it comes to modern web applications, browsers are the first line of defense. While built-in security features that come compiled with browsers are responsible for preventing a wide array of attacks, any seemingly trivial mistak... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict the permissions on sensitive files such as /proc/[pid]/maps or /proc/[pid]/mem. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Limit credential overlap across accounts and systems by training users and administrators not to use the same password for multiple accounts. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Bridging Security Infrastructure Between the Data Center and AWS Lambda
While serverless is all the rage, creating secure infrastructure that integrates serverless technology with existing Data Center (DC) services remains a challenge. Square's DC uses a microservice architecture. Services communica... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora has the ability to gain system privileges through Windows services.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain can support an HKCMD sideloading start method.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0375
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remexi
Remexi uses AutoIt and VBS scripts throughout its execution process.[133] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Interconnection Filtering
Filtering requests by checking request origin information may provide some defense against spurious operators.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hikit
Hikit has attempted to disable driver signing verification by tampering with several Registry keys prior to the loading of a rootkit driver component.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
The Winnti for Windows installer loads a DLL using rundll32.[100][101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1417.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:GUI Input Capture
Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for sensitive information with a seemingly legitimate prompt. The operating system and installed applications often have legitimate needs to prompt the user for sensitive information ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0374
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpeakUp
SpeakUp encodes its second-stage payload with Base64. [307] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0146
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEXTMATE
TEXTMATE executes cmd.exe to provide a reverse shell to adversaries.[328][329] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0413
ATT&CK Technique Name:MailSniper
MailSniper can be used to obtain account names from Exchange and Office 365 using the Get-GlobalAddressList cmdlet.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa added a spoofed binary to the start-up folder for persistence.[117][118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, PowerView's file share enumeration results were stored in the file c:\ProgramData\found_shares.txt.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Hardware Installation
Block unknown devices and accessories by endpoint security configuration and monitoring agent. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0068
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLATINUM
PLATINUM has used various methods of process injection including hot patching.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Token Manipulation
Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel has sent spearphishing emails with malicious RAR and .LNK attachments.[68][69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0545
ATT&CK Technique Name:TERRACOTTA
TERRACOTTA can obtain a list of installed apps.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1630
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indicator Removal on Host
Adversaries may delete, alter, or hide generated artifacts on a device, including files, jailbreak status, or the malicious application itself. These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion ac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used PowerShell for execution.[152][153][154][155][156][157][158][159][160][161] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon attempts to copy itself to remote machines on the network.[27] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 USMA: Share Kernel Code With Me
The gadget is a mainstream attack method in the Linux kernel. It requires attackers to find available gadgets based on the vulnerability. This is a time-consuming task, and sometimes it is impossible to find a suitable gadget. In addition, the CFI mitigation (such ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0309
ATT&CK Technique Name:Adups
Adups transmitted the full contents of text messages.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0232
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOMEFRY
Some strings in HOMEFRY are obfuscated with XOR x56.[161] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0264
ATT&CK Technique Name:OopsIE
OopsIE has the capability to delete files and scripts from the victim's machine.[165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX adds Run key entries in the Registry to establish persistence.[194][56][195] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can extract clipboard data from a compromised host.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Consider disabling updating the ARP cache on gratuitous ARP replies. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet can delete OLE Automation and SQL stored procedures used to store malicious payloads.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0380
ATT&CK Technique Name:StoneDrill
StoneDrill has used several anti-emulation techniques to prevent automated analysis by emulators or sandboxes.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:TINYTYPHON
TINYTYPHON searches through the drive containing the OS, then all drive letters C through to Z, for documents matching certain extensions.[23] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Windows Defender - Demystifying and Bypassing ASR by Understanding the AV's Signatures
Windows Defender is the Windows' built-in antivirus software, giving it a place in most information systems. But still, its signature format is yet undocumented.This talk tries to rectify this situation. This... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used the quser command to show currently logged on users.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT and its watchdog component are compiled and executed after being delivered to victims as embedded, uncompiled source code.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
An APT19 Port 22 malware variant registers itself as a service.[9] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Demystifying PTSD in the Cybersecurity Environment
In February 2018, an article appeared concerning 'cybersecurity PTSD' and its impact on the security workforce, spurring a reaction to the terminology and the conditions referenced. More anecdotally, we as security practitioners have all heard co-wo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems. In Linux environments, users account-level access to at can be managed using at.allow and at.deny fil... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as LaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.[11][12][13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT has used Zlib to compress C2 communications data before encrypting it.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Consider using application control to prevent execution of hh.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Perform integrity checks of firmware before uploading it on a device. Utilize cryptographic hashes to verify the firmware has not been tampered with by comparing it to a trusted hash of the firmware. This could be from trusted data sources (e.g., vendor site) or through a thi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has used a Python tool named Bewmac to record the webcam on compromised hosts.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has used HTTP for C2 communications.[189][190] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0608
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conficker
Conficker downloads an HTTP server to the infected machine.[119] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0132
ATT&CK Technique Name:H1N1
H1N1 dumps usernames and passwords from Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Outlook.[30] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Advanced VBA Macros Attack & Defence
In 2019, VBA macros are still heavily used to deliver malware, and new obfuscation techniques such as VBA Stomping implemented in EvilClippy allow attackers to deliver malicious payloads to end users without being detected. Luckily, analysis and detection tools a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has established persistence by using S4U tasks as well as the Scheduled Task option in PowerShell Empire.[57][55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT can communicate over DNS with the C2 server.[63][64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak can use the clientgrabber module to steal e-mail credentials from the Registry.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0487
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kessel
Kessel has decrypted the binary's configuration once the main function was launched.[123] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 When Knowledge Graph Meets TTPs: Highly Automated and Adaptive Executable TTP Intelligence for Security Evaluation
Nowadays, more and more security assessments will use BAS (Breach and Attack Simulation) solutions. However, two problems become important and difficult.1. How to grasp the TTPs (Tac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has replaced .dockerd and .dockerenv with their own scripts and cryptocurrency mining software.[164] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used valid accounts for initial access and privilege escalation.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0475
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackConfig
BackConfig has the ability to remove files and folders related to previous infections.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has collected system information, including the machine name and OS version.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has acquired VPS infrastructure for use in malicious campaigns.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Typically, insecure or malicious configuration settings are not installed without the user's consent. Users should be advised not to install unexpected configuration settings (CA certificates, iOS Configuration Profiles, Mobile Device Management server provisioning). | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.