text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used prodump to dump credentials from LSASS.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora can load additional drivers and files onto a victim machine.[339] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Various Lazarus Group malware modifies the Windows firewall to allow incoming connections or disable it entirely using netsh. [19][20][21] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Deepfake Social Engineering: Creating a Framework for Synthetic Media Social Engineering
How do you know that you are actually talking to the person you think you are talking to? Deepfake and related synthetic media technologies represent the greatest revolution in social engineering capabilities o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1616
ATT&CK Technique Name:Call Control
Adversaries may make, forward, or block phone calls without user authorization. This could be used for adversary goals such as audio surveillance, blocking or forwarding calls from the device owner, or C2 communication. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0918
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit the accounts that may use remote services. Limit the permissions for accounts that are at higher risk of compromise; for example, configure SSH so users can only run specific programs. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEADEYE
DEADEYE can execute the GetComputerNameA and GetComputerNameExA WinAPI functions.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0152
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilGrab
EvilGrab has the capability to capture audio from a victim machine.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBStealer
USBStealer searches victim drives for files matching certain extensions (".skr",".pkr" or ".key") or names.[313][314] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:Antivirus/Antimalware
Anti-virus can be used to automatically quarantine suspicious files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Providing user guidance around commonly abused features, such as the modal that requests for administrator permissions, should aid in preventing impairing defenses. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper can enumerate common folders such as My Documents, Desktop, and AppData.[140][141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork has used BITS jobs to download malicious payloads.[20] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 HTTP Desync Attacks: Smashing into the Cell Next Door
HTTP requests are traditionally viewed as isolated, standalone entities. In this session, I'll introduce techniques for remote, unauthenticated attackers to smash through this isolation and splice their requests into others, through which I was a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can be used to create SAML tokens using the AD Federated Services token signing certificate.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can measure the download speed on a targeted host.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0634
ATT&CK Technique Name:EnvyScout
EnvyScout can use cmd.exe to execute malicious files on compromised hosts.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors established email addresses to register domains for their operations.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's Install-SSP Persistence module can be used to establish by installing a SSP DLL.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1055
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharkBot
SharkBot can use input injection via Accessibility Services to simulate user touch inputs, prevent applications from opening, change device settings, and bypass MFA protections.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used the Windows command shell to execute commands.[133] | secon |
title:botconf2013 Efficient Program Exploration by Input Fuzzing
One of the issues of a malware detection service is to update its database. For that, an analysis of new samples must be performed. Usually, one tries to replay the behavior of malware in a safe environment. But, a bot sample may activate a malicious func... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT contains watchdog functionality that ensures its process is always running, else spawns a new instance.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hikit
Hikit has used DLL Search Order Hijacking to load oci.dll as a persistence mechanism.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT schedules tasks to run malicious scripts at different intervals.[150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar has manually loaded ntdll from disk in order to identity and remove API hooks set by security products.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater can download updates and auxiliary modules.[429] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0691
ATT&CK Technique Name:Neoichor
Neoichor can upload files from a victim's machine.[93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:PyDCrypt
PyDCrypt has probed victim machines with whoami and has collected the username from the machine.[147] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can enumerate running processes on a machine.[166] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0358
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ruler
Ruler can be used to automate the abuse of Outlook Forms to establish persistence.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Isolation and Sandboxing
Ensure Protected View is enabled.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya contains a modified version of Mimikatz to help gather credentials that are later used for lateral movement.[63][64][59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear can find the presence of a specific security software.[112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used tools to identify the user of a compromised host.[167] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:MiniDuke
MiniDuke uses HTTP and HTTPS for command and control.[66][120] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 A Survivor-Centric, Trauma-Informed Approach to Stalkerware
Stalkerware is a type of spyware that is often used to surveil intimate partners or ex-partners. While it has been around for many years, its use has seen an uptick in recent years, with some studies suggesting a particular increase during ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has obtained and used open source scripts from GitHub.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot's second stage DLL has set a timer using "timeSetEvent" to schedule its next execution.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0396
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilBunny
EvilBunny has used time measurements from 3 different APIs before and after performing sleep operations to check and abort if the malware is running in a sandbox.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke has used several C2 servers per targeted organization.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0926
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit impact of exploitation. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1078.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Local Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 used the following Windows scheduled tasks for DEADEYE dropper persistence on US state government networks: \Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor, \Microsoft\Windows\Ras\ManagerMobility, \Microsoft\Windows\WDI\SrvSetupResults, and \Micr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0462
ATT&CK Technique Name:CARROTBAT
CARROTBAT has the ability to execute obfuscated commands on the infected host.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has abused the KernelCallbackTable to hijack process control flow and execute shellcode.[1][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use a custom command and control protocol that can be encapsulated in DNS. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.[16][17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest uses various API to perform behaviors such as executing payloads and performing local enumeration.[171] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore will enumerate the macOS version to determine which follow-on behaviors to execute using /usr/bin/sw_vers -productVersion.[72][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has exfiltrated its collected data from the infected machine to the C2, sometimes using the MIME protocol.[4] | secon |
title:botconf2013 Exploit Krawler: New Weapon againt Exploits Kits
Exploit Krawler is a device that will allow us to grab the tools from miscellaneous exploit kits (applet java,pdf..) in order to make their analysis easier. These exploit kits are more and more numerous on Internet and are more and more used to drop mal... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Control
Enable pass the hash mitigations to apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logon. The associated Registry key is located HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy.Through GPO: Computer Configuratio... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang performs process discovery using tasklist commands.[142][143] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron gathers the victim computer name using the Win32 API call GetComputerName.[207] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has performed file deletion to evade detection.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla has established persistence via the Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon registry key.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0071
ATT&CK Technique Name:hcdLoader
hcdLoader installs itself as a service for persistence.[61][62] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Pre-Stuxnet, Post-Stuxnet: Everything Has Changed, Nothing Has Changed
When Stuxnet was discovered in 2010, it shone a light on vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure that few had noticed before. The security community, largely focused on IT networks, had its eyes opened to a vast sector it had ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT has the ability to use the Gmail web UI to receive commands and exfiltrate information.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0048
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has used an RSS feed on Livejournal to update a list of encrypted C2 server names.[18] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Clocking On
A nerd's eye view of time and timekeeping...Moves are finally afoot to secure time! Well, to secure what we consider to be the current time. Or, to be more specific, to secure how we distribute what we consider to be the consensus of what is the "current" time. And by "we" I mean The In... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has encrypted configuration files.[337][338] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0372
ATT&CK Technique Name:LockerGoga
LockerGoga has been observed shutting down infected systems.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 used large size files to avoid detection by security solutions with hardcoded size limits.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group malware KiloAlfa contains keylogging functionality.[98][99] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kevin
Kevin can generate a sequence of dummy HTTP C2 requests to obscure traffic.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0497
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dacls
The Dacls Mach-O binary has been disguised as a .nib file.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Refer to NIST guidelines when creating password policies.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1631.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ptrace System Calls
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address ... | secon |
title:botconf2019 Finding Neutrino Botnet: from Web Scans to Botnet Architecture
In August 2018, we began to record mass scans of phpMyAdmin systems. Scans were accompanied by bruteforcing of 159 various web shells with the command die(md5(Ch3ck1ng)). This information became the starting point of our investigation. Ste... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTTPBrowser
HTTPBrowser deletes its original installer file once installation is complete.[104] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Lowering the Bar: Deep Learning for Side Channel Analysis
Deep learning can help automate the signal analysis process in power side channel analysis. So far, power side channel analysis relies on the combination of cryptanalytic science, and the art of signal processing. Deep learning is essentiall... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0411
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rotexy
Rotexy can access and upload the contacts list to the command and control server.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like Gpppassword to gather credentials.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon uses commands such as netsh interface show to discover network interface settings.[151] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0226
ATT&CK Technique Name:Smoke Loader
Smoke Loader scans processes to perform anti-VM checks. [53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Derusbi
Derusbi obfuscates C2 traffic with variable 4-byte XOR keys.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can communicate with C2 via HTTP POST requests.[344] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Finding Bugs Compiler Knows but Doesn't Tell You: Dissecting Undefined Behavior Optimizations in LLVM
"Undefined Behavior", like signed integer overflow or accessing null pointer, is an erroneous action that makes programs unpredictable. There are no rules on how to generate code for "Undefined ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS can sleep for a given number of seconds.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly utilized watering hole attacks on energy sector websites by injecting a redirect iframe to deliver Backdoor.Oldrea or Trojan.Karagany. [4] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Look, No Hands! -- The Remote, Interaction-less Attack Surface of the iPhone
There have been rumors of remote vulnerabilities requiring no user interaction being used to attack the iPhone, but limited information is available about the technical aspects of these attacks on modern devices. This pres... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT samples have been seen which hijack COM objects for persistence by replacing the path to shell32.dll in registry location HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}\InprocServer32.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0180
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volgmer
Volgmer can delete files and itself after infection to avoid analysis.[249] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use known credentials to run commands and spawn processes as a domain user account.[5][6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda adds persistence by creating Registry Run keys.[284][285] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can create a service to establish persistence.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0180
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volgmer
Volgmer installs a copy of itself in a randomly selected service, then overwrites the ServiceDLL entry in the service's Registry entry. Some Volgmer variants also install .dll files as services with names generated by a list of hard-coded strings.[130][131][132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST remained dormant after initial access for a period of up to two weeks.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 can use DNS over HTTPS for C2.[3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has obtained stolen valid certificates, including from VMProtect and the Chinese instant messaging application Youdu, for their operations.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has gathered all of the running system processes.[169] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Image File Execution Options Injection
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0316
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for Android
Pegasus for Android has the ability to take pictures using the device camera.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
One variant of BlackEnergy locates existing driver services that have been disabled and drops its driver component into one of those service's paths, replacing the legitimate executable. The malware then sets the hijacked service to start automatically to establish pers... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya creates a task to reboot the system one hour after infection.[118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Use access control lists on storage systems and objects. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Efail: Breaking S/MIME and OpenPGP Email Encryption using Exfiltration Channels
OpenPGP and S/MIME are the two prime standards for providing end-to-end security for emails. From today's viewpoint this is surprising as both standards rely on outdated cryptographic primitives that were responsible fo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0800
ATT&CK Technique Name:Authorization Enforcement
All field controllers should restrict the modification of programs to only certain users (e.g., engineers, field technician), preferably through implementing a role-based access mechanism. | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.