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ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has communicated to hard-coded IP addresses via HTTP.[202] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict file shares to specific directories with access only to necessary users. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0425
ATT&CK Technique Name:Corona Updates
Corona Updates can collect device network configuration information, such as Wi-Fi SSID and IMSI.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro can check the name of the window displayed on the system.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT used voStro.exe, a compiled pypykatz (Python version of Mimikatz), to steal credentials.[72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has collected browser bookmark information to learn more about compromised hosts, obtain personal information about users, and acquire details about internal network resources.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has leveraged compromised high-privileged on-premises accounts synced to Office 365 to move laterally into a cloud environment, including through the use of Azure AD PowerShell.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has modified UPX headers after packing files to break unpackers.[281] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs creates a new service named WmiApSrvEx to establish persistence.[74] | secon |
title:botconf2016 Detecting the Behavioral Relationships of Malware Connections
A normal computer infected with malware is difficult to detect. There have been several approaches in the last years which analyze the behavior of malware and obtain good results. The malware traffic may be detected, but it is very common t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar can support encrypted communications between the client and server.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can obtain C2 information from Google Docs.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used compromised email accounts to send credential phishing emails.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Unleashing the Power of My 20+ Years Old Car
When I came to Japan about a year and half ago, the first thing I did was buy a car. Coming from a ~70hp family car, I chose to go for something more powerful and bought a 90's sports car. I've been dailying it and tracking it since then (> 50 000km so f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used scheduled tasks establish persistence for TrickBot and other malware.[178][179][180][181] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can run the ShellExecuteW API via the Windows Command Shell.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Upon execution, Metamorfo has unzipped itself after being downloaded to the system and has performed string decryption.[146][147][148] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum was seen using a keylogger tool to capture keystrokes. [131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0404
ATT&CK Technique Name:esentutl
esentutl can be used to read and write alternate data streams.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe has sent spearphishing e-mails with attachments to deliver malicious payloads.[228][229][230][231][232] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has targeted RDP credentials and used it to move through the victim environment.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has stopped SQL services to ensure it can encrypt any database.[26] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Come Join the CAFSA - Continuous Automated Firmware Security Analysis
Modern devices are complex and their firmware often consists of multiple parts that together make up the software stack of a product. Securing firmware is hard work since firmware changes over time and engineering focus shifts to ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Rising Sun can send data gathered from the infected machine via HTTP POST request to the C2.[108] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Policy Implications of Faulty Cyber Risk Models and How to Fix Them
Bad security data leads to bad security policies; better data enables better policies. That, in a nutshell, is the thesis of this talk. To back that up, we'll share a FUD-free and data-driven analysis of the frequency and economic c... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Achieving Linux Kernel Code Execution Through a Malicious USB Device
How robust is the security of a fully updated, widely used and locked-down Linux-based device without any known rooting methods? Where the only non-trusted code being executed is heavily sandboxed JavaScript? Which has almost no us... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth collects the external IP address from the system. [23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal spearphished victims via Facebook and Whatsapp.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0475
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackConfig
BackConfig has used VBS to install its downloader component and malicious documents with VBA macro code.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can use large file sizes to evade detection.[32][33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1584.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domains
Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant. Adversaries may gain access to an email account ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0440
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Smith
Agent Smith shows fraudulent ads to generate revenue.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can perform port scans from an infected host.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can sleep for 195 - 205 seconds after payload execution and before deleting its task.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0504
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anchor
Anchor has used HTTP and HTTPS in C2 communications.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the tasklist command to search for one of its backdoors.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0269
ATT&CK Technique Name:QUADAGENT
QUADAGENT uses multiple protocols (HTTPS, HTTP, DNS) for its C2 server as fallback channels if communication with one is unsuccessful.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 malware has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[59][60][61][62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Duqu uses a custom command and control protocol that communicates over commonly used ports, and is frequently encapsulated by application layer protocols.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0611
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clop
Clop can kill several processes and services related to backups and security solutions.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing has used valid SSH credentials to access remote hosts.[38] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Practical HTTP Header Smuggling: Sneaking Past Reverse Proxies to Attack AWS and Beyond
Web applications commonly rely on proxy servers adding, modifying, or filtering HTTP headers to pass information to back-end servers. Research in recent years has shown how flawed implementations of these action... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit has modules such as Get-NetDomainTrust and Get-NetForestTrust to enumerate domain and forest trusts.[23][24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Apply patch KB2962486 which prevents credentials from being stored in GPPs.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can collect a list of services on a victim machine.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
KeyBoy has a command to launch a file browser or explorer on the system.[162] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Cautious: A New Exploitation Method! No Pipe but as Nasty as Dirty Pipe
Dirty pipe is the name given to the CVE-2022-0847 vulnerability, present in Linux kernel versions 5.8 and later. It is considered a very serious vulnerability found in the Linux kernel recently partially because it gives a bad a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak logs key strokes for configured processes and sends them back to the C2 server.[33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has established fraudulent LinkedIn accounts impersonating HR department employees to target potential victims with fake job offers.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 actors have used gsecdump to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers.[32][33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca required users to click on a malicious file for the loader to activate.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0401
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux has a hardcoded location under systemd that it uses to achieve persistence if it is running as root.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
A Lazarus Group malware sample performs reflective DLL injection.[39][40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has obtained and used tools such as Impacket, pwdump, Mimikatz, gsecdump, NBTscan, and Windows Credential Editor.[93][94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used stolen credentials to connect to the victim's network via VPN.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Limit credential overlap across accounts and systems by training users and administrators not to use the same password for multiple accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0646
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpicyOmelette
SpicyOmelette has the ability to execute arbitrary JavaScript code on a compromised host.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sowbug
Sowbug named its tools to masquerade as Windows or Adobe Reader software, such as by using the file name adobecms.exe and the directory CSIDL_APPDATA\microsoft\security.[156] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0655
ATT&CK Technique Name:BusyGasper
BusyGasper can collect the device’s location information based on cellular network or GPS coordinates.[11] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 The Future of Securing Intelligent Electronic Devices Using the IEC 62351-7 Standard for Monitoring
Until recently, passive monitoring has been the standard approach for OT networks because of the critical processes these networks support. However, as industrial organizations embrace Industry 4.0 a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Authenticate connections fromsoftware and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be advised not to use public charging stations or computers to charge their devices. Instead, users should be issued a charger acquired from a trustworthy source. Users should be advised not to click on device prompts to trust attached computers unless ab... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has lured users to click links to malicious HTML applications delivered via spearphishing emails.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete collects stored credentials from several web browsers.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb's loader has reflectively loaded .NET-based assembly/payloads into memory.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Data Storage
Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.[1] Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain acc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0033
ATT&CK Technique Name:Poseidon Group
Poseidon Group searches for administrator accounts on both the local victim machine and the network.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.[3] Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM monitors browsing activity and automatically captures screenshots if a victim browses to a URL matching one of a list of strings.[39][40] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Unpacking the Packed Unpacker: Reverse Engineering an Android Anti-Analysis Native Library
Malware authors implement many different techniques to frustrate analysis and make reverse engineering malware more difficult. Many of these anti-analysis and anti-reverse engineering techniques attempt to sen... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Configure browsers or tasks to regularly delete persistent cookies. | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 ReCertifying Active Directory Certificate Services
Microsoft's Active Directory Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) implementation, known as Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), has unfortunately flown under the radar of the defensive industry. AD CS is widely deployed and provides attackers o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0917
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Use user training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0575
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conti
Conti can use compiler-based obfuscation for its code, encrypt DLLs, and hide Windows API calls.[86][87][48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX has been disguised as legitimate Adobe and PotPlayer files.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has gathered the SYSTEM registry and ntds.dit files from target systems.[4] Chimera specifically has used the NtdsAudit tool to dump the password hashes of domain users via msadcs.exe "NTDS.dit" -s "SYSTEM" -p RecordedTV_pdmp.txt --users-csv RecordedTV_users.csv and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 can use Inveigh to conduct name service poisoning for credential theft and associated relay attacks.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used quser.exe to identify existing RDP connections.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has made registry modifications to alter its behavior upon execution.[119] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0063
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHOTPUT
SHOTPUT has a command to obtain a directory listing.[272] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit on-premises accounts with access to the hybrid identity solution in place. For example, limit Azure AD Global Administrator accounts to only those required, and ensure that these are dedicated cloud-only accounts rather than hybrid ones.[4] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 GDPArrrrr: Using Privacy Laws to Steal Identities
On May 25, 2018 the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into effect, bringing with it the most expansive governmental effort to regulate data security and privacy to date. Among the GDPR's many provisions is the "Right of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can store its configuration in the Registry at HKCU\Software\ under frequently changing names including %USERNAME% and ToolTech-RM.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used DYEPACK.FOX to manipulate PDF data as it is accessed to remove traces of fraudulent SWIFT transactions from the data displayed to the end user.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerDuke
PowerDuke runs cmd.exe /c and sends the output to its C2.[266] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack has used cmd.exe to add a persistent service.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1600.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable Crypto Hardware
Adversaries disable a network device’s dedicated hardware encryption, which may enable them to leverage weaknesses in software encryption in order to reduce the effort involved in collecting, manipulating, and exfiltrating transmitted data. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Practical Web Cache Poisoning: Redefining 'Unexploitable'
Modern web applications are composed from a crude patchwork of caches and content delivery networks. In this session I'll show you how to compromise websites by using esoteric web features to turn their caches into exploit delivery systems, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:AvosLocker
AvosLocker has searched for files and directories on a compromised network.[26][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has installed an "init.d" startup script to maintain persistence.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0635
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoomBox
BoomBox can establish persistence by writing the Registry value MicroNativeCacheSvc to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has added JavaScript to victim websites to download additional frameworks that profile and compromise website visitors.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has searched for private keys in .ssh.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET uses a hidden folder named .xcassets and .git to embed itself in Xcode.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT1
The APT1 group is known to have used RDP during operations.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0653
ATT&CK Technique Name:xCaon
xCaon has encrypted data sent to the C2 server using a XOR key.[149] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus's spearphishing links required user interaction to navigate to the malicious website.[1] | secon |
title:botconf2019 Bot with Rootkit: Update and Mine!
In June of 2019 we got an interesting sample. When analyzing the activity of this sample, we noticed that for some reason it downloaded a legitimate Microsoft update KB3033929 from its own CnC and installed it on infected machine. And things got more interesting when... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.