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ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 has used Microsoft Word icons to hide malicious LNK files.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has used batch scripts in its malware to install persistence mechanisms.[172] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has the ability to delete emails used for C2 once the content has been copied.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0537
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperStack
HyperStack has used RSA encryption for C2 communications.[69] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Booting the iOS Kernel to an Interactive Bash Shell on QEMU
Booting the iOS kernel on QEMU with an interactive bash shell and a live debugger attached to the kernel. A major step forward in the direction of having a full iOS open source system emulator on QEMU. The research details and demo will be ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0130
ATT&CK Technique Name:Unknown Logger
Unknown Logger can obtain information about the victim usernames.[193] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM has created admin accounts on a compromised host.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used the "net view" command to locate mapped network shares.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0839
ATT&CK Technique Name:Module Firmware
Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA can inject into running processes on a compromised host.[60] | secon |
title:botconf2016 Cracking Banking Fraud
This workshop takes us into the world of banking malware, and more specifically into researchers’ chase after configurations – the attack books that dictate which banks are targeted and how. These precious ever-changing fragments of data and the continuous change in the encrypti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0466
ATT&CK Technique Name:WindTail
WindTail has the ability to use the macOS built-in zip utility to archive files.[72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0249
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gold Dragon
Gold Dragon uses HTTP for communication to the control servers.[141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel has sent spearphishing emails in an attempt to lure users into clicking on a malicious attachments.[68][69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has replaced win_fw.dll, an internal component that is executed during IDA Pro installation, with a malicious DLL to download and execute a payload.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has retrieved internal documents from machines inside victim environments, including by using Forfiles to stage documents before exfiltration.[8][9][10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can inject into a target process using process doppelgänging.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has used tools to deploy additional payloads to compromised hosts.[478] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors limited Rclone's bandwidth setting during exfiltration.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Hunting Invisible Salamanders: Cryptographic (in)Security with Attacker-Controlled Keys
<span style="font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-size:
10pt;">Deploying new cryptography often means using existing building blocks in new ways. A prime example is authenticated encryption (AE). Until recentl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tonto Team
Tonto Team has delivered payloads via spearphishing attachments.[227] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 has modules for keystroke logging and capturing credentials from spoofed Outlook authentication messages.[137] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 I calc'd Calc - Exploiting Excel Online
The Microsoft Security Response Center has a unique position in monitoring exploits in the wild. While we have seen several cases in the past years of exploits targeting Office applications, often PowerPoint or Word, exploits targeting online applications are ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can perform COM hijacking by setting the path to itself to the HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command key with a DelegateExecute parameter.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon queries several Registry keys to identify hard disk partitions to overwrite.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0633
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sliver
Sliver can encode binary data into a .PNG file for C2 communication.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity can identify if ESET or BitDefender antivirus are installed before dropping its payload.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro can use Native API to enable obfuscation including GetLastError and GetTickCount.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Sig... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0473
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avenger
Avenger can identify the domain of the compromised host.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Turn off or restrict access to unneeded VB components.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ixeshe
Ixeshe can achieve persistence by adding itself to the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0334
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkComet
DarkComet can open an active screen of the victim’s machine and take control of the mouse and keyboard.[19] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Decisions and Revisions - The Ever Evolving Face of the Black Hat NOC
This session is your chance to get up close and personal with the Black Hat NOC. We'll walk you through the process of deciding what equipment and services we deploy on the Black Hat network, and our reasoning around those decisio... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0403
ATT&CK Technique Name:Riltok
Riltok can retrieve a list of installed applications. Installed application names are then checked against an adversary-defined list of targeted applications.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft PowerPoint via OLE objects (CVE-2014-4114) and Microsoft Word via crafted TIFF images (CVE-2013-3906).[73][74][75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has removed security settings for VBA macro execution by changing registry values HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<version>\<product>\Security\VBAWarnings and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<version>\<product>\Security\AccessVBOM.[60][61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SubmitControl. T... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0206
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wiarp
Wiarp creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can open a command line interface.[351] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has been seen using RDP for lateral movement and persistence, in some cases employing the rdpwinst tool for mangement of multiple sessions.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts, particularly between network and non-network platforms, such a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0951
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Update software on control network assets when possible. If feasible, use modern operating systems and software to reduce exposure to known vulnerabilities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0800
ATT&CK Technique Name:Authorization Enforcement
Only authorized personnel should be able to change settings for alarms. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0086
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZLib
ZLib creates Registry keys to allow itself to run as various services.[141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can retrieve data from specific Windows directories, as well as open random files as part of Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion.[135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0860
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wireless Compromise
Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. Adversaries may also utilize radios and oth... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0516
ATT&CK Technique Name:SoreFang
SoreFang can enumerate processes on a victim machine through use of Tasklist.[238] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer has used Process Doppelgänging to evade security software while deploying tools on compromised systems.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used domain accounts to gain further access to victim systems.[12] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Afternoon Break
Afternoon Break will be served in the following areas for Briefings pass holders.Bay View Court North Corridor (North Convention Center)Bay View Court South Corridor (North Convention Center)Breakers Registration Corridor, Lagoon Corridor (Level 2)South Seas Foyer North, Jasmine Foye... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1559
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inter-Process Communication
Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0581
ATT&CK Technique Name:IronNetInjector
IronNetInjector has used a task XML file named mssch.xml to run an IronPython script when a user logs in or when specific system events are created.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Review privileged cloud account permission levels routinely to look for those that could allow an adversary to gain wide access, such as Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator in Azure AD.[14][15][16] These reviews should also check if ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used mshta.exe to launch collection scripts.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Enforce the principle of least-privilege. Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Control
Although UAC bypass techniques exist, it is still prudent to use the highest enforcement level for UAC when possible and mitigate bypass opportunities that exist with techniques such as DLL Search Order Hijacking. | secon |
title:botconf2019 Demystifying Banking Trojans from Latin America
At the end of 2018, it has been reported that Latin America suffers approximately 3.7 million cyber-attacks per day. Even the most well-known pieces of malware, such as TrickBot or Emotet, have their eyes set on this region. When it comes to malware that... | secon |
title:botconf2018 How many Mirai variants are there?
Mirai was soon open-sourced after overwhelming several high-profile targets including Krebsonsecurity, OVH, and DYN in Autumn 2016, which leads to a proliferation of Mirai variants in the past 2 years. For better fight against Mirai botnets, effective variant classif... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk has attempted to get the access token of a process by calling OpenProcessToken. If KillDisk gets the access token, then it attempt to modify the token privileges with AdjustTokenPrivileges.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:China Chopper
China Chopper's server component executes code sent via HTTP POST commands.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has used Windows Scheduled Tasks to establish persistence on local and remote hosts.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0575
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conti
Conti can utilize command line options to allow an attacker control over how it scans and encrypts files.[89][59] | secon |
title:botconf2014 Finding Holes in Banking 2FA: Operation Emmental
Like Swiss Emmental cheese, your online banking protections might be full of holes. Banks have been trying to prevent crooks from accessingyour online accounts for ages. They have invented all sorts of methods to protect the user’s ability to do online ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0261
ATT&CK Technique Name:Catchamas
Catchamas collects keystrokes from the victim’s machine.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0499
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hancitor
Hancitor has added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0241
ATT&CK Technique Name:RATANKBA
RATANKBA gathers information about the OS architecture, OS name, and OS version/Service pack.[296][297] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can use XDG Autostart Entries to establish persistence.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy decodes its secondary payload and writes it to the victim’s machine. Zebrocy also uses AES and XOR to decrypt strings and payloads.[263][264] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can enumerate directories on a compromise host.[318] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can use HTTP and HTTPS for command and control communication.[289][290][291] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Consider using multi-factor authentication to restrict access to resources and cloud storage APIs.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has delivered initial payloads hidden using archives and encoding measures.[220][221][222][223][224][225] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0176
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wingbird
Wingbird side loads a malicious file, sspisrv.dll, in part of a spoofed lssas.exe service.[66][67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0683
ATT&CK Technique Name:Peirates
Peirates can enumerate Kubernetes pods in a given namespace.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication. Where possible, also enable multi-factor authentication on externally facing services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monokle
Monokle can be controlled via phone call from a set of "control phones."[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee has relied upon a user opening an ISO file to enable execution of malicious shortcut files and DLLs.[49][50][51][52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors’ XServer tool communicated using HTTP and HTTPS.[238] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS has used VBScript to call wscript to execute a PowerShell command.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Filter for protocols and payloads associated with program upload activity to prevent unauthorized access to device configurations. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0043
ATT&CK Technique Name:Group5
Malware used by Group5 is capable of capturing keystrokes.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron can be configured to exfiltrate data during nighttime or working hours.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has used Base64 to encode its C2 communications.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 downloaded additional malware, such as TEARDROP and Cobalt Strike, onto a compromised host following initial access.[419] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Ghost in the Wireless, iwlwifi Edition
Wi-Fi replaced Ethernet and became the main network protocol on laptops for the last few years. Software implementations of the Wi-Fi protocol naturally became the targets of attackers, and vulnerabilities found in Wi-Fi drivers were exploited to gain control ... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Real-Time Detection of Attacks Leveraging Domain Administrator Privilege
In Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks, attackers tend to target the Active Directory to expand infections. Attackers try to take over Domain Administrator privilege and create a backdoor called "Golden Ticket" which can ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has used cmd.exe to run a PowerShell script. [114] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 How I Used a JSON Deserialization 0day to Steal Your Money on the Blockchain
Fastjson is a widely used open source JSON parser with 23'100 stars on GitHub. As a basic module of countless java web services, it serves hundreds of millions of users. We managed to find a way to bypass many security chec... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
System settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded through the Apple Store which may help mitigate some of these issues. Not allowing unsigned applications from being run may also mitigate some risk. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0608
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conficker
Conficker resets system restore points and deletes backup files.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used pass-the-hash tools to obtain authenticated access to sensitive internal desktops and servers.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit search order hijacking vulnerabilities.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can gather information about a tenant’s domains using public Microsoft APIs.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec contains a module to move data from airgapped networks to Internet-connected systems by using a removable USB device.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Consider blocking the execution of known vulnerable drivers that adversaries may exploit to execute code in kernel mode. Validate driver block rules in audit mode to ensure stability prior to production deployment.[42] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Stress-Testing Democracy: Election Integrity During a Global Pandemic
Technologists have long warned that much of the technology and infrastructure we depend on for voting suffers from exploitable vulnerabilities that could be used to cast doubt on the integrity of elections. Those problems are extr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has used DLL side-loading, including by using legitimate Kaspersky antivirus variants as well as rc.exe, a legitimate Microsoft Resource Compiler.[27][61][62][28][63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has maintained persistence by placing itself inside the current user's startup folder.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT can inject malicious code into process created by the "Command_Create&Inject" function.[25] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.