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title:blackhat:us-21 Defeating a Secure Element with Multiple Laser Fault Injections
In 2020, we evaluated the Microchip ATECC508A Secure Memory circuit. We identified a vulnerability allowing an attacker to read a secret data slot using Single Laser Fault Injection. This was presented during Black Hat USA. Subsequentl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational network and systems to restrict access to critical system functions to predetermined management systems. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has attempted to lure victims into opening malicious links embedded in emails.[54][55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
For the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used numerous pieces of malware that were likely developed for or by the group, including SUNBURST, SUNSPOT, Raindrop, and TEARDROP.[30][31][32] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Internal Affairs: Hacking File System Access from the Web
The File System Access API deployed to browsers this year is the current version of a W3C draft to give websites, with user approval, the ability to read, write, and edit files and folders the user selects on their devices, an outgrowth of a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0174
ATT&CK Technique Name:Responder
Responder is used to poison name services to gather hashes and credentials from systems within a local network.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0357
ATT&CK Technique Name:Impacket
SecretsDump and Mimikatz modules within Impacket can perform credential dumping to obtain account and password information.[14] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Windows Heap-backed Pool: The Good, the Bad, and the Encoded
For decades, the Windows kernel pool remained the same, using simple structures that were easy to read, parse and search for, but recently this all changed, with a new and complex design that breaks assumptions and exploits, and of course... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0515
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMail
WellMail has been observed using TCP port 25, without using SMTP, to leverage an open port for secure command and control communications.[44][45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0800
ATT&CK Technique Name:Authorization Enforcement
All field controllers should restrict the modification of programs to only certain users (e.g., engineers, field technician), preferably through implementing a role-based access mechanism. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:TA0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Defense Evasion
The adversary is trying to avoid being detected. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1067
ATT&CK Technique Name:FluBot
FluBot can use locale.getLanguage() to choose the language for notifications and avoid user detection.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Periodically review the hybrid identity solution in use for any discrepancies. For example, review all PTA agents in the Azure Management Portal to identify any unwanted or unapproved ones.[5] If ADFS is in use, review DLLs and executable files in the AD FS and Global Assembl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit search order hijacking vulnerabilities.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 used a Trojan called KEYLIME to capture keystrokes from the victim’s machine.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware communicates with its C2 server via HTTPS.[319] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0196
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY has hashed most its code's functions and encrypted payloads with base64 and XOR.[259] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Use auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses.[40]Use the prog... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0328
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Mango
Stealth Mango is delivered via a a watering hole website that mimics the third-party Android app store APKMonk. In at least one case, the watering hole URL was distributed through Facebook Messenger.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has collected open source information to identify relationships between organizations for targeting purposes.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot module "Trickboot" can write or erase the UEFI/BIOS firmware of a compromised device.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Perform inline allowlisting of automation protocol commands to prevent devices from sending unauthorized command or reporting messages. Allow/denylist techniques need to be designed with sufficient accuracy to prevent the unintended blocking of valid reporti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used tcping.exe, similar to Ping, to probe port status on systems of interest.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1490
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inhibit System Recovery
Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. This may deny access to available backups and recovery options. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Amadey
Amadey can download and execute files to further infect a host machine with additional malware.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
The Industroyer IEC 61850 component sends the domain-specific MMSgetNameList request to determine what logical nodes the device supports. It then searches the logical nodes for the CSW value, which indicates the device performs a circuit breaker or switch control functi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT has used COM hijacking to establish persistence by hijacking a class named MMDeviceEnumerator and also by registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object ({3543619C-D563-43f7-95EA-4DA7E1CC396A}).[4][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0147
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pteranodon
Pteranodon copies itself to the Startup folder to establish persistence.[206] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group malware can deactivate security mechanisms in Microsoft Office by editing several keys and values under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0560
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEARDROP
TEARDROP checked that HKU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF existed before decoding its embedded payload.[89][93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be advised not to use public charging stations or computers to charge their devices. Instead, users should be issued a charger acquired from a trustworthy source. Users should be advised not to click on device prompts to trust attached computers unless ab... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has collected usernames and passwords from Firefox and Chrome.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used the Telegram API sendMessage to relay data on compromised devices.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0249
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gold Dragon
Gold Dragon collects the endpoint victim's username and uses it as a basis for downloading additional components from the C2 server.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0165
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSInfo
OSInfo discovers information about the infected machine.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT performs code injection injecting its own functions to browser processes.[32][33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor has collected the MAC address of a compromised host; it can also use GetAdaptersInfo to identify network adapters.[226][227] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth can launch itself via DLL Search Order Hijacking.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the SAM table.[1... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM samples have been signed with a code-signing certificates.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0445
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRatReporter
ShimRatReporter encrypted gathered information with a combination of shifting and XOR using a static key.[216] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Change Default File Association
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Apply extended ACLs to block unauthorized protocols outside the trusted network.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Amadey
Amadey has collected the computer name and OS version from a compromised machine.[15][16] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Generating YARA Rules by Classifying Malicious Byte Sequences
While ML models for malware detection have become an industry standard for heuristically detecting malware, signature-based detection still proliferates thanks to ease of updates, transparency of detection logic, and operability in compu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can gain execution after a user clicks on a malicious link to decoy landing pages hosted on Google Docs.[15][16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson can add Registry run keys for persistence.[67][68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0432
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bread
Bread can access SMS messages in order to complete carrier billing fraud.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Net
The net accounts and net accounts /domain commands with Net can be used to obtain password policy information.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerDuke
PowerDuke has a command to write random data across a file and delete it.[180] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CreepyDrive
CreepyDrive can use Powershell for execution, including the cmdlets Invoke-WebRequest and Invoke-Expression.[68] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 AcuTherm: A Hybrid Attack on Password Entry Based on Both Acoustic and Thermal Side-Channels
Despite predictions of their demise and calls for their deprecation, passwords remain the most popular form of user authentication. Traditional password vulnerabilities stem from their storage and/or low e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Use user training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's Get-MicrophoneAudio Exfiltration module can record system microphone audio.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can inject its code into a trusted process via the APC queue.[10] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Real 'Cyber War': Espionage, DDoS, Leaks, and Wipers in the Russian Invasion of Ukraine
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has included a wealth of cyber operations that have tested our collective assumptions about the role that cyber plays in modern warfare. The concept of 'Cyber War' has been subject... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used dir c:\\ to search for files.[215] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 They Hacked Thousands of Cloud Accounts Then Sent Us Weird GIFs
As organizations migrate their computing resources to cloud and container environments, attackers are taking notice -- and following. In August 2020, we discovered the first crypto-mining worm stealing AWS credentials. The attackers are... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0253
ATT&CK Technique Name:RunningRAT
RunningRAT gathers the OS version, logical drives information, processor information, and volume information.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa used HTTP and HTTPS to send data back to its C2 server.[156][157] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta can make a random number of calls to the kernel32.beep function to hinder log analysis.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa sent the victim computer identifier in a User-Agent string back to the C2 server every 10 minutes.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has embedded an ISO file within an HTML attachment that contained JavaScript code to initiate malware execution.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Protocols used for device management should authenticate all network messages to prevent unauthorized system changes. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Controlling the Source: Abusing Source Code Management Systems
Source Code Management (SCM) systems play a vital role within organizations and have been an afterthought in terms of defenses compared to other critical enterprise systems such as Active Directory. SCM systems are used in the majority o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum has used DriveLetterView to enumerate drive information.[214] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to delete files and directories on compromised hosts.[16] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Win the 0-Day Racing Game Against Botnet in Public Cloud
Botnet appears to be one of the significant threats to public cloud. They exploit new vulnerabilities(0-days) to take down a large part of the internet. As a cloud service provider, we built an automated 0-day monitoring solution to block t... | secon |
title:botconf2020 An overview of the Botnet Simulation Framework
Conducting botnet research is oftentimes limited to the anal-ysis of active botnets. This prevents researchers from testing detectionand tracking mechanisms on potential future threats. Specifically in thedomain of P2P botnets, the configuration parameter... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete can download additional files for execution on the victim’s machine.[272] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0230
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZeroT
ZeroT gathers the victim's computer name, Windows version, and system language, and then sends it to its C2 server.[409] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0519
ATT&CK Technique Name:SYNful Knock
SYNful Knock has the capability to add its own custom backdoor password when it modifies the operating system of the affected network device.[1] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Cyber Insurance 101 for CISO’s
This session provides a basic understanding of a cyber policy including market dynamics, coverage terms and conditions, and services included with the product. We also discuss the value a CISO can bring to the cyber insurance procurement process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0245
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADCALL
BADCALL functions as a proxy server between the victim and C2 server.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Use strong passphrases for private keys to make cracking difficult. Do not store credentials within the Registry. Establish an organizational policy that prohibits password storage in files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can delete all Registry entries created during its execution.[140] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has been delivered via malicious links in e-mail.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro has dropped an executable file to the startup directory.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can overwrite the Master Book Record (MBR) on victim systems with a malicious 16-bit bootloader.[22][23][24][25][26][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has displayed fake forms on top of banking sites to intercept credentials from victims.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a bootkit. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can scan for systems that are vulnerable to the EternalBlue exploit.[51][52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal variants reported on in 2014 and 2015 used a simple XOR cipher for C2. Some Bisonal samples encrypt C2 communications with RC4.[15][16][17] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Beyond Root: Custom Firmware for Embedded Mobile Chipsets
Rooting a smartphone is often considered the ultimate method to allow a user to take complete control of their device. Despite this, many smartphones contain hardware which is closed off to any modification. This talk aims to show how this h... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Review authentication logs to ensure that mechanisms such as enforcement of MFA are functioning as intended.Periodically review the hybrid identity solution in use for any discrepancies. For example, review all Pass Through Authentication (PTA) agents in the Azure Management ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has captured the user-agent strings from visitors to their phishing sites.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0680
ATT&CK Technique Name:LitePower
LitePower can take system screenshots and save them to %AppData%.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor can perform a long sleep (greater than or equal to 3 minutes) to evade detection.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury has installed a self-signed RPM package mimicking the original system package on RPM based systems.[27] | secon |
title:botconf2022 Smoke and Fire – Smokeloader Historical Changes and Trends
Smokeloader (aka Sharik or SmokeBot) turned 10 in 2021! Few malware families make to this mark without collapsing or getting caught by law enforcement. For over a decade, Smokeloader has been deployed as part of distribution schemes of many hi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:OutSteel
OutSteel can upload files from a compromised host over its C2 channel.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0671
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tomiris
Tomiris has the ability to sleep for at least nine minutes to evade sandbox-based analysis systems.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0336
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanoCore
NanoCore can capture audio feeds from the system.[27][28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda will delete their tools and files, and kill processes after their objectives are reached.[155] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream has the ability to discover application windows via execution of EnumWindows.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0516
ATT&CK Technique Name:SoreFang
SoreFang can collect usernames from the local system via net.exe user.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can conduct brute force attacks to capture credentials.[21][22][23] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.