text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0124
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pisloader
Pisloader has a command to upload a file to the victim machine.[344] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint has used a malicious shim database to maintain persistence.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Use of encryption provides an added layer of security to sensitive information sent over email. Encryption using public key cryptography requires the adversary to obtain the private certificate along with an encryption key to decrypt messages. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork has obfuscated a script with Crypto Obfuscator.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has used the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM account to create files on Exchange servers.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater has been named calc.exe to appear as a legitimate calculator program.[158] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1583.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Malvertising
Adversaries may purchase online advertisements that can be abused to distribute malware to victims. Ads can be purchased to plant as well as favorably position artifacts in specific locations online, such as prominently placed within search engine results. These a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment and control software movement between business and OT environments by way of one directional DMZs. Web access should be restricted from the OT environment. Engineering workstations, including transient cyber assets (TCAs) should have minimal connectivit... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0313
ATT&CK Technique Name:RuMMS
RuMMS uploads incoming SMS messages to a remote command and control server.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0122
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silent Librarian
Silent Librarian has collected e-mail addresses from targeted organizations from open Internet searches.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can establish a LNK file in the startup folder for persistence.[245] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat has the ability to discover network shares on compromised networks.[16][17] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Eliminating Triage Intermediaries for Zero-day Exploits Using a Decentralised Payout Protocol
We present a protocol that collectivises security bounties for deterministically verifiable zero-day exploits. It enables companies to show customers how secure their software is, in terms of dollars stake... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Malware Classification With Machine Learning Enhanced by Windows Kernel Emulation
This session will present a hybrid machine learning architecture that simultaneously utilizes static and dynamic malware analysis methodologies. We employ the Windows kernel emulator published by Mandiant for dynamic ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 used publicly available tools (including Microsoft's built-in SQL querying tool, osql.exe) to map the internal network and conduct reconnaissance against Active Directory, Structured Query Language (SQL) servers, and NetBIOS.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can enumerate local information for Linux hosts and find currently logged on users for Windows hosts.[146] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Regularly audit user accounts for activity and deactivate or remove any that are no longer needed. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has used protocol tunneling to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0518
ATT&CK Technique Name:PolyglotDuke
PolyglotDuke can use a custom algorithm to decrypt strings used by the malware.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0221
ATT&CK Technique Name:Umbreon
Umbreon provides additional access using its backdoor Espeon, providing a reverse shell upon receipt of a special packet.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for permission weaknesses in scheduled tasks that could be used to escalate privileges. [185] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Whip the Whisperer: Simulating Side Channel Leakage
Cryptographic side channels are well-understood from a mathematical perspective, and many countermeasures exist that reduce leakage. Yet, there are many implementations in the field that leak. This is caused by a combination of lack of security ex... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 DataBinding2Shell: Novel Pathways to RCE Web Frameworks
DataBinding is a mechanism that allows request parameters to be bound to a domain object automatically. It makes development more efficient and code cleaner, and is widely implemented by best web frameworks written in trending programming langu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate has used Base64 to encode its C2 traffic.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
A RedLeaves configuration file is encrypted with a simple XOR key, 0x53.[268] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can download additional packages for keylogging, cryptocurrency mining, and other capabilities; it can also retrieve malicious payloads such as Agent Tesla, AsyncRat, NanoCore, RedLine, Cobalt Strike, and Metasploit.[139] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0667
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chrommme
Chrommme can decrypt its encrypted internal code.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows sets its DLL file as a new service in the Registry to establish persistence.[139] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group executed Responder using the command [Responder file path] -i [IP address] -rPv on a compromised host to harvest credentials and move laterally.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1008
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideCopy
SideCopy has used a malicious loader DLL file to execute the credwiz.exe process and side-load the malicious payload Duser.dll.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0272
ATT&CK Technique Name:NDiskMonitor
NDiskMonitor obtains the victim username and encrypts the information to send over its C2 channel.[127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor has checked for the LogMein event log in an attempt to encrypt files in remote machines.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet attempts to access network resources with a domain account’s credentials.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 has configured payloads to load via LD_PRELOAD.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can use the tokens of users to create processes on infected systems.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Consider using the host firewall to restrict file sharing communications such as SMB. [57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0336
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanoCore
NanoCore’s plugins were obfuscated with Eazfuscater.NET 3.3.[227] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony has used several Windows functions for various purposes.[138] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0634
ATT&CK Technique Name:EnvyScout
EnvyScout can deobfuscate and write malicious ISO files to disk.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEADEYE
DEADEYE can discover the DNS domain name of a targeted system.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0529
ATT&CK Technique Name:CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal has looked for specific applications, such as MiCode.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Fooling Windows through Superfetch
Have you ever tried to hide your traces after doing some obscure stuff on a computer? We usually think about cleaning histories, file lefts, event viewer, DNS cache, and registry keys but have you ever thought about Superfetch?This is a Windows service whose purpo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0217
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHUTTERSPEED
SHUTTERSPEED can collect system information.[155] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used msiexec to download and execute malicious Windows Installer files.[24][25][26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0516
ATT&CK Technique Name:SoreFang
SoreFang can collect the hostname, operating system configuration, product ID, and disk space on victim machines by executing Systeminfo.[342] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has used certutil to decode a string into a cabinet file.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
The Bazar loader is used to download and execute the Bazar backdoor.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0076
ATT&CK Technique Name:FakeM
Some variants of FakeM use SSL to communicate with C2 servers.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0539
ATT&CK Technique Name:Red Alert 2.0
Red Alert 2.0 has used malicious overlays to collect banking credentials.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare
PcShare can delete its persistence mechanisms from the registry.[113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy has used a method similar to RC4 as well as AES for encryption and hexadecimal for encoding data before exfiltration. [52][53][54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT can enumerate files and collect associated metadata.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT has used PowerShell to load itself every time a user logs in to the system. ComRAT can execute PowerShell scripts loaded into memory or from the file system.[62][63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has used Group Policy Objects to deploy batch scripts.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1542.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bootkit
Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Partition Integrity
Android and iOS include system partition integrity mechanisms that could detect unauthorized modifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling has the ability to set its file attributes to hidden.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has use mshta to execute malicious scripts on a compromised host.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon can check for the presence of ESET and Kaspersky security software.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Adversaries can instruct Duqu to spread laterally by copying itself to shares it has enumerated and for which it has obtained legitimate credentials (via keylogging or other means). The remote host is then infected by using the compromised credentials to schedule a task on rem... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 efiXplorer: Hunting for UEFI Firmware Vulnerabilities at Scale with Automated Static Analysis
Existing UEFI analysis instruments lack systemic approach to firmware vulnerability research focused on specifics of x86-based systems. No publicly known tools available for UEFI firmware vulnerabilities re... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1497
ATT&CK Technique Name:Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak has obtained and used open-source tools such as PsExec and Mimikatz.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium has used unverified signatures on malicious DLLs.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0277
ATT&CK Technique Name:FruitFly
FruitFly has the ability to list processes on the system.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit used the EternalRomance SMB exploit to spread through victim networks.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest uses the CGEventTap functions to perform keylogging.[172] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Understanding the IoT Threat Landscape and a Home Appliance Manufacturer's Approach to Counter Threats to IoT
As we live in a world where billions of IoT devices are connected to the Internet, there are streams of news articles that depict damages caused by malware and other threats that target... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Mobile Network Hacking, IP Edition
Mobile networks have gone through a decade of security improvements ranging from better GSM encryption to stronger SIM card and SS7 configurations. These improvements were driven by research at this and other hacking conferences.
Meanwhile, the networks have also ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
CHOPSTICK is capable of performing remote command execution.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
iOS 11 introduced a first-come-first-served principle for URIs, allowing only the prior installed app to be launched via the URI.[1] Android 6 introduced App Links. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Derusbi
Derusbi gathers the name of the local host, version of GNU Compiler Collection (GCC), and the system information about the CPU, machine, and operating system.[112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1005
ATT&CK Technique Name:POLONIUM
POLONIUM has used valid compromised credentials to gain access to victim environments.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0333
ATT&CK Technique Name:UBoatRAT
UBoatRAT can list running processes on the system.[263] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 Apple's Predicament: NSPredicate Exploits on iOS and macOS
In 2021 the FORCEDENTRY sandbox escape introduced the usage of NSPredicate in an iOS exploit. This new technique allowed attackers to sidestep codesigning, ASLR, and all other mitigations to execute arbitrary code on Apple devices. As a resu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0608
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conficker
Conficker adds Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1598.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spearphishing Link
Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actio... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can identify administrator accounts on an infected machine.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta has set the desktop wallpaper on victims' machines to display a ransom note.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can detect if it is running within a sandbox or other virtualized analysis environment.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0397
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoJax
LoJax has loaded an embedded NTFS DXE driver to be able to access and write to NTFS partitions.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony has used scripts to delete itself after execution.[179] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not allow remote access via SSH as root or other privileged accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0600
ATT&CK Technique Name:Doki
Doki has used the dogechain.info API to generate a C2 address.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0610
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideTwist
SideTwist can decode and decrypt messages received from C2.[213] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0698
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWizard
HermeticWizard can connect to remote shares using WNetAddConnection2W.[92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent Office VBA macros from calling Win32 APIs. [190] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0436
ATT&CK Technique Name:TSCookie
TSCookie can use ICMP to receive information on the destination server.[69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0480
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cerberus
Cerberus communicates with the C2 using HTTP requests over port 8888.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis obfuscates its code and encrypts the API names.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can sniff plaintext network credentials and use NBNS Spoofing to poison name services.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1593.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Repositories
Adversaries may search public code repositories for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Victims may store code in repositories on various third-party websites such as GitHub, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0370
ATT&CK Technique Name:SamSam
SamSam uses custom batch scripts to execute some of its components.[294] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin can use Cron to create periodic and pre-scheduled background jobs.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT can use HTTP/S for C2 using the Microsoft Graph API.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has used stolen credentials to connect remotely to victim networks using VPNs protected with only a single factor.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used AdFind to enumerate domain groups.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can list installed security products including the Trusteer and Diebold Warsaw GAS Tecnologia online banking protections.[49][49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors collected a list of open connections on the infected system using netstat and checks whether it has an internet connection.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has used DNS tunneling for C2.[13][14][15] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.