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ATT&CK ID:G0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deep Panda
Deep Panda has used -w hidden to conceal PowerShell windows by setting the WindowStyle parameter to hidden. [16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
An APT3 downloader creates persistence by creating the following scheduled task: schtasks /create /tn "mysc" /tr C:\Users\Public\test.exe /sc ONLOGON /ru "System".[10] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Portable Data exFiltration: XSS for PDFs
PDF documents and PDF generators are ubiquitous on the web, and so are injection vulnerabilities. Did you know that controlling a measly HTTP hyperlink can provide a foothold into the inner workings of a PDF? In this session, you will learn how to use a singl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used Powershell to discover email accounts.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot can search for specific files on an infected host.[180] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot establishes persistence in the Startup folder.[262] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can register itself as a system service to gain persistence.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1598.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spearphishing Service
Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater can self delete to cover its tracks.[226] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that root accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0345
ATT&CK Technique Name:Seasalt
Seasalt creates a Registry entry to ensure infection after reboot under HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\currentVersion\Run.[238] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0463
ATT&CK Technique Name:INSOMNIA
INSOMNIA grants itself permissions by injecting its hash into the kernel’s trust cache.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit has used an executable that installs a modified bootloader to prevent normal boot-up.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment networks and systems appropriately to reduce access to critical systems and services to controlled methods. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can create a scheduled task for persistence.[27][28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0583
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pysa
Pysa can perform network reconnaissance using the Advanced Port Scanner tool.[50] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 How can Someone with Autism Specifically Enhance the Cyber Security Workforce?
This session outlines how someone with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) offers a unique skillset that can be very helpful in the cybersecurity field.A higher percentage of hackers show signs or are already diagnosed ASD th... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 From Workstation to Domain Admin: Why Secure Administration isn't Secure and How to Fix it
Organizations have been forced to adapt to the new reality: Anyone can be targeted and many can be compromised.This has been the catalyst for many to tighten up operations and revamp ancient security practice... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0516
ATT&CK Technique Name:SoreFang
SoreFang can gain access by exploiting a Sangfor SSL VPN vulnerability that allows for the placement and delivery of malicious update binaries.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0653
ATT&CK Technique Name:xCaon
xCaon has a command to download files to the victim's machine.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has collected credentials from infected systems, including domain accounts.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 sent spearphishing emails which used a URL-shortener service to masquerade as a legitimate service and to redirect targets to credential harvesting sites.[7][8][9][10] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Breaking Parser Logic: Take Your Path Normalization off and Pop 0days Out!
We propose a new exploit technique that brings a whole-new attack surface to defeat path normalization, which is complicated in implementation due to many implicit properties and edge cases. This complication, being under-es... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chinoxy
Chinoxy can use a digitally signed binary ("Logitech Bluetooth Wizard Host Process") to load its dll into memory.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Restrict Registry permissions to disallow the modification of sensitive Registry keys such as HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 The Unbearable Lightness of BMC's
Welcome to a data center! A place where the air conditioner never stops and the long line of tiny, red and blue LEDs dance chaotically over the sounds of the never-ending fans, playing in unison.One thing is certain, everyone avoids data centers like the plague. An... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit permissions to discover cloud infrastructure in accordance with least privilege. Organizations should limit the number of users within the organization with an IAM role that has administrative privileges, strive to reduce all permanent privileged role ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0475
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackConfig
BackConfig has the ability to set folders or files to be hidden from the Windows Explorer default view.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Process Integrity
Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft. [1] [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1583
ATT&CK Technique Name:Acquire Infrastructure
Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-pa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0333
ATT&CK Technique Name:UBoatRAT
UBoatRAT can upload and download files to the victim’s machine.[455] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1628
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hide Artifacts
Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Mobile operating systems have features and developer APIs to hide various artifacts, such as an application’s launcher icon. These APIs have legitimate usages, such as hidin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0469
ATT&CK Technique Name:ABK
ABK has the ability to inject shellcode into svchost.exe.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception has obtained and used open-source tools such as LaZagne.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0558
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tiktok Pro
Tiktok Pro has registered for device boot, incoming, and outgoing calls broadcast intents.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has used a variety of open-source remote access Trojans for its operations.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM has used net.exe user and net.exe users to enumerate local accounts on a compromised host.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
When PowerShell is necessary, consider restricting PowerShell execution policy to administrators. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration.[48]PowerShell JEA (Just Enough Admin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0311
ATT&CK Technique Name:YiSpecter
YiSpecter has used fake Verisign and Symantec certificates to bypass malware detection systems. YiSpecter has also signed malicious apps with iOS enterprise certificates to work on non-jailbroken iOS devices.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556
ATT&CK Technique Name:Modify Authentication Process
Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0941
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
The encryption of firmware should be considered to prevent adversaries from identifying possible vulnerabilities within the firmware. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Sleight of ARM: Demystifying Intel Houdini
ARM is taking over the computer industry. In recent years, we have seen some of the major players in the industry switch from x86-based processors to ARM processors. Most notable is Apple, which has supported the transition to ARM from x86 with a binary tra... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Consider disabling Windows administrative shares. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can parse the ProxyServer string in the Registry to discover http proxies.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN4
FIN4 has accessed and hijacked online email communications using stolen credentials.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS can delete all files on the C:\, D:\, E:\ and, F:\ drives using PowerShell Remove-Item commands.[182] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus achieved persistence by placing a malicious executable in the startup directory and has added the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key to the Registry.[185] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0527
ATT&CK Technique Name:CSPY Downloader
CSPY Downloader has attempted to appear as a legitimate Windows service with a fake description claiming it is used to support packed applications.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot has used an email with an Excel sheet containing a malicious macro to deploy the malware[233] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can use AdjustTokenPrivileges() to elevate privileges.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN4
FIN4 has used legitimate credentials to hijack email communications.[24][25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0522
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exobot
Exobot can request device administrator permissions.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can use the GetForegroundWindow and GetWindowText APIs to discover where the user is typing.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate has the ability to inject its fourth stage into a suspended process created by the legitimate Windows utility InstallUtil.exe.[44][45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0382
ATT&CK Technique Name:ServHelper
ServHelper can execute shell commands against cmd.[298][299] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can call the GetNetworkParams API as part of its C2 establishment process.[167] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practic... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. can use keylogging to capture user input.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:CALENDAR
The CALENDAR malware communicates through the use of events in Google Calendar.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 can use LDAP queries and nltest /domain_trusts for domain trust discovery.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can sniff plaintext network credentials and use NBNS Spoofing to poison name services.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used net user to enumerate local accounts on the system.[48][49] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Side Channel Attacks in 4G and 5G Cellular Networks
The adoption of Fourth Generation Long Term Evolution (4G LTE)—the de facto standard for cellular telecommunication—has seen a stable growth in recent years, replacing prior generations due to its promise of improved assurances (e.g., higher bandwi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption property is set to disabled unless there are application requirements.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-1314
Threat Group-1314 actors spawned shells on remote systems on a victim network to execute commands.[330] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT can communicate over multiple C2 host and port combinations.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARDUMP
SUGARDUMP variants have harvested credentials from browsers such as Firefox, Chrome, Opera, and Edge.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke collects user credentials, including passwords, for various programs including Web browsers.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has been delivered via spearphishing campaigns through a malicious Word document.[130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0516
ATT&CK Technique Name:SoreFang
SoreFang can decode and decrypt exfiltrated data sent to C2.[217] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used fake job advertisements sent via LinkedIn to spearphish targets.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has obtained tools such as AD Explorer inspection software for their operations.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell can obtain a list of the services from a system.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT encodes many of its artifacts and is encrypted (AES-128) when downloaded.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot gathers system information, network addresses, disk type, disk free space, and the operation system version.[49][50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used a scheduled task to establish persistence for a keylogger.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict access to the authorized_keys file. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1651
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cloud Administration Command
Adversaries may abuse cloud management services to execute commands within virtual machines or hybrid-joined devices. Resources such as AWS Systems Manager, Azure RunCommand, and Runbooks allow users to remotely run scripts in virtual machines by levera... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:admin@338
admin@338 has exploited client software vulnerabilities for execution, such as Microsoft Word CVE-2012-0158.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz, CrackMapExec, and PsExec.[43] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 No Free Charge Theorem 2.0: How to Steal Private Information from a Mobile Device Using a Powerbank
Thanks to their omnipresence and multi-purposeness, users rely on smartphones to execute in few touches a wide range of privacy-related operation, such as accessing bank accounts, checking emails, or... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 A Hole in the Tube: Uncovering Vulnerabilities in Critical Infrastructure of Healthcare Facilities
A hidden infrastructure that transports critical care items within all modern hospitals, lies in plain sight - the pneumatic tube system (PTS). This critical infrastructure is responsible for deliverin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Ensure containers are not running as root by default. In Kubernetes environments, consider defining Pod Security Standards that prevent pods from running privileged containers.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT1
The file name AcroRD32.exe, a legitimate process name for Adobe's Acrobat Reader, was used by APT1 as a name for malware.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0653
ATT&CK Technique Name:xCaon
xCaon has checked for the existence of Kaspersky antivirus software on the system.[118] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 Taking Kernel Hardening to the Next Level
Memory safety issues are the foremost security problems in today's operating systems (OS). In 2021 alone, there were 175 CVEs assigned to potentially exploitable bugs in Linux. Since OS is an attractive target to adversaries who wish to elevate privileges... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0473
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avenger
Avenger has the ability to use Tasklist to identify running processes.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate some obfuscation activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0814
ATT&CK Technique Name:Static Network Configuration
ICS environments typically have more statically defined devices, therefore minimize the use of both IT discovery protocols (e.g., DHCP, LLDP) and discovery functions in automation protocols. [9] [10] Examples of automation protocols with discovery capab... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy has run a keylogger plug-in on a victim.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32's backdoor has modified the Windows Registry to store the backdoor's configuration. [11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro can use cmd.exe to execute commands received from C2.[129] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used a scheduled task to establish persistence for a keylogger.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0311
ATT&CK Technique Name:YiSpecter
YiSpecter has used private APIs to download and install other pieces of itself, as well as other malicious apps. [31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local P... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
A physical second factor key that uses the target login domain as part of the negotiation protocol will prevent session cookie theft through proxy methods.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0582
ATT&CK Technique Name:LookBack
LookBack has a C2 proxy tool that masquerades as GUP.exe, which is software used by Notepad++.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can collect the OS, and build version on a compromised host.[153] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1633.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Checks
Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behavior after checking for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual environment or sandbox. If the adversary detects a vi... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.