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ATT&CK ID:S0493
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenSpy
GoldenSpy's uninstaller can delete registry entries, files and folders, and finally itself once these tasks have been completed.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used an information gathering module that will hide an AV software window from the victim.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware creates a scheduled task entitled "IE Web Cache" to execute a malicious file hourly.[166] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 From Hackathon to Hacked: Web3's Security Journey
If there's one prediction you can make with certainty, it's that security in the Web3/blockchain space will get a whole lot worse before it gets better. We have the perfect cocktail of inexperience mixed with emerging technology playing out in full p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors ran a command script to set up persistence as a scheduled task named "WinUpdate", as well as other encoded commands from the command-line [132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT is able to open a remote shell to execute commands.[26][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
A Helminth VBScript receives a batch script to execute a set of commands in a command prompt.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1058
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prestige
Prestige has the ability to register new registry keys for a new extension handler via HKCR\.enc and HKCR\enc\shell\open\command.[123] | secon |
title:botconf2017 Augmented Intelligence to Scale Humans Fighting Botnets
We propose and implement a novel method of discovering botnet activities by identifying new core domains (domains that are directly below a TLD) that appear in real-time DNS query traffic as suspicious, and discovering botnet C&C groups using a d... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound malware has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[151][152][153] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0614
ATT&CK Technique Name:CostaBricks
CostaBricks has added the entire unobfuscated code of the legitimate open source application Blink to its code.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can drop itself in C:\Windows\System32\spool\prtprocs\x64\winprint.dll as an alternative Print Processor to be loaded automatically when the spoolsv Windows service starts.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0530
ATT&CK Technique Name:Melcoz
Melcoz has the ability to download additional files to a compromised host.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0445
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRatReporter
ShimRatReporter sent collected system and network information compiled into a report to an adversary-controlled C2.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0931
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Sig... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has used malware to identify installed AV and commonly used forensic and malware analysis tools.[114] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has exploited vulnerabilities to gain execution including CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2020-0674.[76][77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can conduct peer-to-peer communication over Windows named pipes encapsulated in the SMB protocol. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:BOOTRASH
BOOTRASH is a Volume Boot Record (VBR) bootkit that uses the VBR to maintain persistence.[1][5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Update software regularly to include patches that fix DLL side-loading vulnerabilities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoisonIvy
PoisonIvy creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can open a command-line interface.[264] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used malicious e-mail attachments to lure victims into executing malware.[91][92][93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe has set up websites with malicious hyperlinks and iframes to infect targeted victims with Crimson, njRAT, and other malicious tools.[8][9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used netstat -ano to determine network connection information.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus has exfiltrated data to file sharing sites.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda have acquired C2 domains prior to operations.[48][49][50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kasidet
Kasidet has the ability to obtain a victim's system name and operating system version.[181] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy's decrypter have been inflated with junk code in between legitimate API functions, and also included infinite loops to avoid analysis.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Ensure that all wired and/or wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use best practices for authentication protocols, such as Kerberos, and ensure web traffic that may contain credentials is protected by SSL/TLS. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
ADVSTORESHELL achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[5][6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Consider periodic review of auditpol settings for Administrator accounts and perform dynamic baselining on SIEM(s) to investigate potential malicious activity. Also ensure that the EventLog service and its threads are properly running. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has communicated with its C2 via HTTP POST requests.[218][219][220][221] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used tools to take screenshots from victims.[10][11][12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0437
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kivars
Kivars has the ability to download and execute files.[246] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk erases the master boot record (MBR) and system logs, leaving the system unusable. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
For Operation Honeybee, the threat actors stole a digital signature from Adobe Systems to use with their MaoCheng dropper.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot has used Nt* Native API functions to inject code into legitimate processes such as wermgr.exe.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0396
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilBunny
EvilBunny has created Registry keys for persistence in [HKLM|HKCU]\…\CurrentVersion\Run.[85] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 FragAttacks: Breaking Wi-Fi through Fragmentation and Aggregation
This presentation introduces three novel security-related design flaws in Wi-Fi and various widespread implementation flaws. An adversary can abuse these to inject packets or exfiltrate selected frames. As an example, it will be demon... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:AvosLocker
AvosLocker has deobfuscated XOR-encoded strings.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mori
Mori can write data to HKLM\Software\NFC\IPA and HKLM\Software\NFC\ and delete Registry values.[95][96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1567.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exfiltration to Code Repository
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a code repository rather than over their primary command and control channel. Code repositories are often accessible via an API (ex: https://api.github.com). Access to these APIs are often over HTTPS, which give... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0187
ATT&CK Technique Name:Daserf
Some Daserf samples were signed with a stolen digital certificate.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0475
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackConfig
BackConfig has hidden malicious payloads in %USERPROFILE%\Adobe\Driver\dwg\ and mimicked the legitimate DHCP service binary.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has compromised user credentials and used valid accounts for operations.[18][19][20] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Process Injection: Breaking All macOS Security Layers With a Single Vulnerability
macOS local security is shifting more and more to the iOS model, where every application is codesigned, sandboxed and needs to ask for permission to access data and features. New security layers have been added to mak... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake can manipulate visual components to trick the user into granting dangerous permissions, and can use phishing overlays and JavaScript injection to capture credentials.[21] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 The Black Hat Europe NOC Report
After a short intermission, the Black Hat NOC team is back with what's sure to be a year like no other. With the world going virtual, and Black Hat being no exception, come find out how we've spent the last two years changing, adapting, and preparing for an event tha... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0520
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN has used HTTPS over port 443 for command and control.[43] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 How to Detect that Your Domains are Being Abused for Phishing by Using DNS
As a high-profile public-sector organization, the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration deals with criminals claiming to be representatives of the organization and contacting the public with phishing e-mails every day. By usi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Follow Office macro security best practices suitable for your environment. Disable Office VBA macros from executing.Disable Office add-ins. If they are required, follow best practices for securing them by requiring them to be signed and disablin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle has used HTTP POST requests for C2 communications.[317] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Behind the scenes of iOS and Mac Security
With over 1.4 billion active devices and in-depth security protections spanning every layer from silicon to software, Apple works to advance the state of the art in user security with every new product and software release. We will discuss three iOS and Mac ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has used search order hijacking to load a malicious DLL.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 actors look for and use VPN profiles during an operation to access the network using external VPN services.[42] Threat Group-3390 has also obtained OWA account credentials during intrusions that it subsequently used to attempt to regain access wh... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0120
ATT&CK Technique Name:Evilnum
Evilnum has sent spearphishing emails containing a link to a zip file hosted on Google Drive.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has searched for unsecured AWS credentials and Docker API credentials.[35][36][37] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Drill Apple Core: Up and Down - Fuzz Apple Core Component in Kernel and User Mode for Fun and Profit
Apple operation system has gained much popularity both in the personal computer (MacOS) and in the mobile devices (iOS) in the current world (including hackers). The system core module is becoming a ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Based on comparison of Gazer versions, Turla made an effort to obfuscate strings in the malware that could be used as IoCs, including the mutex name and named pipe.[20] | secon |
title:botconf2016 Preventing File-Based Botnet Persistence and Growth
In the current threat landscape, we see most botnets propagating via exploits and file based malware. Anything that touches the disk has the ability to be blocked via access controls on the host. New techniques utilize more than just binaries to exec... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries install new AppCertDLL binaries to execute this technique. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through AppCertDLLs functionality by using application control [3] tools, like Windows Defender Application Control[4], AppLocker, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1542
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-OS Boot
Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT can collect the hostname, Microsoft Windows version, and processor architecture from a victim machine.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rover
Rover has functionality to remove Registry Run key persistence as a cleanup procedure.[139] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0316
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for Android
Pegasus for Android attempts to modify the device's system partition.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used a compromised account to create a scheduled task on a system.[21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has checked for network connectivity from a compromised host using ping, including attempts to contact google[.]com.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer has used a Trojanized version of the Windows Notepad application for an additional backdoor persistence mechanism.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0859
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valid Accounts
Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls plac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound malware can list running processes.[167] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Close all browser sessions regularly and when they are no longer needed. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0808
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Network Traffic
Utilize strong cryptographic techniques and protocols to prevent eavesdropping on network communications. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Properly configure firewalls, application firewalls, and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to sites and services used by remote access tools. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1218.014
ATT&CK Technique Name:MMC
Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary that may be signed by Microsoft and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt. MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom co... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
An adversary must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0934
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Hardware Installation
Enforce system policies or physical restrictions to limit hardware such as USB devices on critical assets. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0495
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDAT
RDAT can communicate with the C2 via base32-encoded subdomains.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0574
ATT&CK Technique Name:BendyBear
BendyBear can query the host's Registry key at HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Console\QuickEdit to retrieve data.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created fake email accounts to correspond with fake LinkedIn personas; Lazarus Group also established email accounts to match those of the victim as part of their BEC attempt.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0427
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickMo
TrickMo can inject input to set itself as the default SMS handler, and to automatically click through pop-ups without giving the user any time to react.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can mimic the HTTP protocol for C2 communication, while hiding the actual data in either an HTTP header, URI parameter, the transaction body, or appending it to the URI.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Suckfly
Suckfly used legitimate account credentials that they dumped to navigate the internal victim network as though they were the legitimate account owner.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0511
ATT&CK Technique Name:RegDuke
RegDuke can decrypt strings with a key either stored in the Registry or hardcoded in the code.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Configure intrusion prevention devices to detect SNMP queries and commands from unauthorized sources.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used a legitimate application, ScreenConnect, to manage systems remotely and move laterally.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARDUMP
SUGARDUMP has sent stolen credentials and other data to its C2 server.[127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM leveraged valid accounts to maintain access to a victim network.[35] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Come Join the CAFSA - Continuous Automated Firmware Security Analysis
Modern devices are complex and their firmware often consists of multiple parts that together make up the software stack of a product. Securing firmware is hard work since firmware changes over time and engineering focus shifts to... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shark
Shark has stored information in folders named U1 and U2 prior to exfiltration.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Portable Executable Injection
Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can use net config workstation, arp -a, nslookup, and ipconfig /all to gather network configuration information.[186][187][188][189] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used malware to gather credentials from FTP clients and Outlook.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore uses the curl -s -L -o command to exfiltrate archived data to a URL.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerShell Profile
Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile (profile.ps1) is a script that runs when PowerShell starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user envir... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 deployed JScript web shells through the creation of malicious ViewState objects.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0511
ATT&CK Technique Name:RegDuke
RegDuke can persist using a WMI consumer that is launched every time a process named WINWORD.EXE is started.[14] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Design Pitfalls in Commercial Mini-Programs on Android and iOS
A new, commercial mobile-computing paradigm, dubbed app-in-app, is gaining high popularity in the past years. Under the paradigm, a mobile app, called host app or host, operates a set of sub-apps (a.k.a. mini-programs) as its in-app com... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLACKCOFFEE
BLACKCOFFEE has the capability to delete files.[30] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.