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ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used valid accounts including shared between Managed Service Providers and clients to move between the two environments.[44][45][46][47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has sent targeted spearphishing e-mails with malicious links.[75][76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:DnsSystem
DnsSystem can write itself to the Startup folder to gain persistence.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used Putty to access compromised systems.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monokle
Monokle can be controlled via email and SMS from a set of "control phones."[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used WMI to load Cobalt Strike onto additional hosts within a compromised network.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0518
ATT&CK Technique Name:PolyglotDuke
PolyglotDuke can use Twitter, Reddit, Imgur and other websites to get a C2 URL.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
In cloud environments, ensure that users are not granted permissions to create or modify traffic mirrors unless this is explicitly required. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1533
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data from Local System
Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to exfiltration. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1114.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Email Forwarding Rule
Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 used NTFS alternate data streams to hide their payloads.[8] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 (Un)protected Broadcasts in Android 9 and 10
We discovered a systemic vulnerability affecting Android version 9, Android version 10, and Android version 11 Developer Preview that allowed third-party apps to spoof certain protected broadcast Intent messages, allowing the sending of unauthorized me... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
An APT3 downloader uses the Windows command "cmd.exe" /C whoami. The group also uses a tool to execute commands on remote computers.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0228
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanHaiShu
NanHaiShu executes additional Jscript code on the victim's machine.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY has a module that can extract cached GPP passwords.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
For Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors obtained publicly-available JSP code that was used to deploy a webshell onto a compromised server.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used WMI and LDAP queries for network discovery and to move laterally.[133][134][135][136] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0282
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacSpy
MacSpy can record the sounds from microphones on a computer.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
When running with root privileges after a Launch Agent is installed, ThiefQuest installs a plist file to the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder with the RunAtLoad key set to true establishing persistence as a Launch Daemon. [18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX has a module to create, delete, or modify Registry keys.[118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu has included encoded shell scripts to potentially aid in the rooting process.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
GoldMax will check if it is being run in a virtualized environment by comparing the collected MAC address to c8:27:cc:c2:37:5a.[23][24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0269
ATT&CK Technique Name:QUADAGENT
QUADAGENT creates a scheduled task to maintain persistence on the victim’s machine.[120] | secon |
title:botconf2015 Make It count: An analysis of a brute-forcing botnet
What does a botnet do when it gets bored? Make every infection second count – even if it means to use the infection time for brute forcing.This presentation aims to show a complete sandbox infection cycle, which started with a seemingly Gamarue infe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher injects itself into various processes depending on whether it is low integrity or high integrity.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot has been delivered via malicious links in phishing e-mails.[105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0318
ATT&CK Technique Name:XLoader for Android
XLoader for Android loads an encrypted DEX code payload.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLC-Blaster
PLC-Blaster stops the execution of the user program on the target to enable the transfer of its own code. The worm then copies itself to the target and subsequently starts the target PLC again. [7] | secon |
title:botconf2018 Cutting the Wrong Wire: how a Clumsy Attacker Revealed a Global Cryptojacking Campaign
We have seen a massive spike in malicious crypto mining campaigns killing themselves for the chance to have their victim’s CPU. The shorter and shorter time window between vulnerability disclosure and cryptojacking ... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Afternoon Break
Afternoon Break will be served in the following areas for Briefings pass holders.Bay View Court North Corridor (North Convention Center)Bay View Court South Corridor (North Convention Center)Breakers Registration Corridor, Lagoon Corridor (Level 2)South Seas Foyer North, Jasmine Foye... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT obtains a list of running processes on the victim.[136][137] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has payed employees, suppliers, and business partners of target organizations for credentials.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession has the ability to execute inside the msiexec.exe process.[22] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Quantum Security and Cryptography: You Are (Probably) Doing it Wrong
Quantum Cryptography is not just Alice and Bob exchanging qubits: There is a whole world of exotic applications that use quantum effects for securing information and that are just impossible to achieve with traditional cryptograph... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT schedules tasks to run malicious scripts at different intervals.[150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has gathered hashed user credentials over SMB using spearphishing attachments with external resource links and by modifying .LNK file icon resources to collect credentials from virtualized systems.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Script blocking extensions can help prevent the execution of JavaScript and HTA files that may commonly be used during the exploitation process. For malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first pl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT has the ability to control an infected PC using RDP.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has been observed adding the downloaded payload to the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key to maintain persistence.[81][82][83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Intelligence Program
Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure that proper policies are implemented to dictate the secure enrollment and deactivation of MFA for user accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang backdoor RoyalDNS established persistence through adding a service called Nwsapagent.[69] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Smishmash - Text Based 2fa Spoofing Using OSINT, Phishing Techniques and a Burner Phone
In recent years the data leaks have escalated, and leaked passwords and usernames have become a common attack vector in phishing attacks. Until recently phone numbers were commonly overlooked by attackers as wel... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors renamed a malicious executable to rundll32.exe to allow it to blend in with other Windows system files.[112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0506
ATT&CK Technique Name:ViperRAT
ViperRAT can collect the device’s cell tower information.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole determines a working directory where it stores all the gathered data about the compromised machine.[41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin base64 encodes strings that are sent to the C2 over its DNS tunnel.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0452
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBferry
USBferry can copy its installer to attached USB storage devices.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0814
ATT&CK Technique Name:Static Network Configuration
ICS environments typically have more statically defined devices, therefore minimize the use of both IT discovery protocols (e.g., DHCP, LLDP) and discovery functions in automation protocols. [9] [10] Examples of automation protocols with discovery capab... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0562
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNSPOT
SUNSPOT created a copy of the SolarWinds Orion software source file with a .bk extension to backup the original content, wrote SUNBURST using the same filename but with a .tmp extension, and then moved SUNBURST using MoveFileEx to the original filename with a .cs extension ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex loads injecthelper.dll into a newly created rundll32.exe process.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT can obtain the date and time of a system.[40] | secon |
title:botconf2019 End-to-end Botnet Monitoring with Automated Config Extraction and Emulated Network Participation
With the quantity and sophistication of bots and botnets ever increasing, automation is key in gathering threat intelligence, and disseminating it to defence systems. With botnets’ rapid flux in nodes and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CreepyDrive
CreepyDrive can use legitimate OAuth refresh tokens to authenticate with OneDrive.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Mobile OSes have implemented measures to make it more difficult to trick users into installing untrusted certificates and configurations. iOS 10.3 and higher add an additional step for users to install new trusted CA certificates and configuration profiles. On... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Demystifying PTSD in the Cybersecurity Environment
In February 2018, an article appeared concerning 'cybersecurity PTSD' and its impact on the security workforce, spurring a reaction to the terminology and the conditions referenced. More anecdotally, we as security practitioners have all heard co-w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0402
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX/Shlayer
OSX/Shlayer has relied on users mounting and executing a malicious DMG file.[181][182] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0683
ATT&CK Technique Name:Peirates
Peirates can use stolen service account tokens to perform its operations.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has obtained and leveraged publicly-available tools for early intrusion activities.[14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1072
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer2
Industroyer2 is capable of sending command messages from the compromised device to target remote stations to open data channels, retrieve the location and values of Information Object Addresses (IOAs), and modify the IO state values through Select Before Operate I/O, S... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0341
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbash
Xbash can use scripts to invoke PowerShell to download a malicious PE executable or PE DLL for execution.[249] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0031
ATT&CK Technique Name:BACKSPACE
The "ZJ" variant of BACKSPACE allows "ZJ link" infections with Internet access to relay traffic from "ZJ listen" to a command server.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0247
ATT&CK Technique Name:NavRAT
NavRAT leverages cmd.exe to perform discovery techniques.[232] NavRAT loads malicious shellcode and executes it in memory.[232] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN4
FIN4 has used legitimate credentials to hijack email communications.[24][25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
The BlackEnergy 3 variant drops its main DLL component and then creates a .lnk shortcut to that file in the startup folder.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0257
ATT&CK Technique Name:VERMIN
VERMIN can download and upload files to the victim's machine.[463] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Action Bias and the Two Most Dangerous Words in Cybersecurity
Most cybersecurity professionals acknowledge that achieving perfect security is impossible. Yet, they nobly strive for perfection as the ultimate goal and feel loss, failure, and regret when incidents inevitably occur. Human instinct, es... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook has used PowerShell loaders as part of execution.[30] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Catch me, Yes we can! – Pwning Social Engineers using Natural Language Processing Techniques in Real-Time
Social engineering is a big problem but very little progress has been made in stopping it, aside from the detection of email phishing. Social engineering attacks are launched via many vectors i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0440
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Smith
Agent Smith can inject fraudulent ad modules into existing applications on a device.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has queued an APC routine to explorer.exe by calling ZwQueueApcThread.[7] | secon |
title:botconf2016 Tracking Exploit Kits
Despite the ever growing number of malware families, botnets and criminal campaigns; there is only a defined few means by which malware can find its victims. This talk will be a deep dive into tracking exploit kits and the infrastructure behind them. Starting with using our own t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to steal data from the clipboard of an infected host.[44] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Mobile Interconnect Threats: How Next-Gen Products May be Already Outdated
"Walled garden" used to be the security principle backing SS7 networks. This is no longer the case, and some attackers may benefit from access to these networks to leverage mobile network functions: geolocation, access to sub... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET has used a zero-day exploit in the ssh launchdaemon to elevate privileges and bypass SIP.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0454
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cadelspy
Cadelspy has the ability to record audio from the compromised host.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0408
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlexiSpy
FlexiSpy can record both incoming and outgoing phone calls, as well as microphone audio.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. [43] Control flow integrity checking is a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has the ability to extract credentials from the Registry.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork used PowerSploit to download payloads, run a reverse shell, and execute malware on the victim's machine.[174][175] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be instructed to not open links in applications they don’t recognize. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
GoldMax will check if it is being run in a virtualized environment by comparing the collected MAC address to c8:27:cc:c2:37:5a.[23][24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
ADVSTORESHELL is capable of starting a process using CreateProcess.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon can iterate over the running processes to find a suitable injection target.[195] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0238
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proxysvc
Proxysvc uses HTTP over SSL to communicate commands with the control server.[254] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
InstallUtil may not be necessary within a given environment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:CostaRicto
During CostaRicto, the threat actors set up remote tunneling using an SSH tool to maintain access to a compromised environment.[12] | secon |
title:botconf2017 YANT-Yet Another Nymaim Talk
We have already heard of Nymaim’s famous obfuscation techniques, such as WinAPI wrappers, function detours, encrypted memcpy, and others. But have you heard of heaven’s gate, hybrid binaries and thread obfuscation? In this presentation, we will dive into some of the obfusc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0269
ATT&CK Technique Name:QUADAGENT
QUADAGENT uses PowerShell scripts for execution.[195] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has searched for services such as Alibaba Cloud Security's aliyun service and BMC Helix Cloud Security's bmc-agent service in order to disable them.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD has the ability to upload and download files to and from an infected host.[346] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer’s data wiper component enumerates specific files on all the Windows drives.[151] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has encrypted strings with single-byte XOR and base64 encoded RC4.[162] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment. [8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0360
ATT&CK Technique Name:BONDUPDATER
BONDUPDATER uses a DGA to communicate with command and control servers.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has established persistence using Userinit by adding the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
For the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 compromised domains to use for C2.[16] | secon |
title:botconf2014 The Russian DDoS One: Booters to Botnets
The Russian DDoS One or RD1 is an informal grouping of threat actors that focus on providing DDoS booter services on Russian language underground forums.Besides the advertising, contact information, and the occasional drama, most of the business of Russian DDoS... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.