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PSYOP 10.pdf | es in neutral countries; and by incorporating disinformation into shared
intelligence with Russia—expecting the disinformation to be collected by Japanese
agents. Furthermore, troops embarking for the tropics through Seattle were issued artic
gear so as to appear that they were heading north. Finally, an entire simulat... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | imulated
forces, though with less and less effort in maintaining the deception. As a result, the
Japanese Imperial Command over time withdrew ships and planes from the Kurile
Islands to meet more imminent threats; however, the troop levels remained steady
throughout the series of deceptions.324
The effect of WEDLOCK ca... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ort, RI: United States Naval War College, 2007),
VII-103 – VII-105, as cited in Leonard Wells, “Military Deception: Equivalent to Intelligence, Maneuver
and Fires” (Paper, Navy War College, 2008), accessed 20 May 2012,
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA494225, 9 – 10.
121
…it failed to convince him that this menace was i... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | nds from Japanese occupation
Deception Events (SEE) Portrayal – increased size of the 9th Fleet
Portrayal – Troops issued artic gear
Simulation – radio traffic
Simulation – 9th Amphibious Force
Disinformation – Press stories
Disinformation – Double agent network
Disinformation – Military attaches
Disinformation – Russi... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | e preparations for Operation CHROMITE, Major General
Edward Almond remained as the Chief of Staff, while the staff for X Corps was formed
as the Special Planning Staff, and the forces assigned to X Corps were carried as GHQ
reserves.327
Since it was impossible to camouflage the amphibious assault preparations, a
decept... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | d/831/filename/832.pdf, 2.
122
the NKPA would not disrupt the actual landing. Kunsan, located one hundred miles to the
south of Inchon, was a likely target for assault—it had been one of the three courses of
action during planning. First, Kunsan was given particular attention during the
preparatory bombing operations, ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | lend
it in with other less essential units.329 In order to add a bit of ambiguity to the situation,
similar efforts—preparatory naval bombardments—were made for Samch’ok, a plausible
amphibious landing objective on the east coast of the peninsula.330 The Inchon landing
could not have succeeded without the operational s... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | drology at Kunsan
Blending – preparatory bombings at Inchon blended into larger
bombing operation
Blending – assault element assigned to the Pusan ‘general reserve’
Blending - Major General Almond remaining Chief of Staff
Termination Trigger
Table 18. Deception Analysis of Operation CHROMITE
328 Whaley, Stratagem (2007... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | 4A directed the creation of an impression because MACVSOG
was prohibited by policy decisions made in Washington from implementing an actual
unconventional warfare campaign in North Vietnam.332 As a result, MACVSOG
implemented a complex deception program to create the perception of a growing and
active underground movem... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | mber of operations. First, North
Vietnamese fishermen captured as part of MACVSOG’s maritime operations were taken to
331 Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Affairs (SACSA), Draft MACSOG
Documentation Study Appendix A Summary of MACSOG Documentation Study (Washington, DC: Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 1970), ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | to C-a-13. MACVSOG attempted on three separate occasions between 1965 and 1968 to gain
approval to execute an actual unconventional warfare plan against North Vietnam.
333 John Plaster, SOG: The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam (New York: Penguin
Group, 1998), 125.
334 Special Assistant for Counterinsurge... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | that portrayed an active SSPL camp.335 While the fishermen
were subjected to SSPL indoctrination, the primary objective was not to actually turn the
fishermen into operatives; rather:
The primary objective of capturing prisoners and leading them to believe
that they were captives of the SSPL was to establish credibilit... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | etnamese government to stop or reduce support for the insurgency in the
South, the program was effective at forcing the North Vietnamese government to increase
internal security measures. A study of North Vietnam’s response to covert operations,
concluded that “Hanoi interprets allied special operations in North Vietna... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | chological Operations, C-a-40.
336 Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Affairs (SACSA), Draft MACSOG
Documentation Study Annex A to Appendix C Psychological Operations, C-a-62.
337 Shultz, Secret War, 142 – 144.
338 Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Affairs (SACSA), Draft MACSOG
Docume... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | perations, C-a-40.
125
Deception Objective (DO) North Vietnam reduces support to South Vietnamese insurgency
Deception Target Ho Chi Minh and North Vietnam leadership
Deception Story (THINK) The SSPL is an active resistance movement challenging the
Communist government of North Vietnam
Deception Events (SEE) Portrayal ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | curity program, MACVSOG,
as well as all the major subordinate components, had an official cover story in an attempt
to disguise the true nature of the organization. The official cover story for MACVSOG was:
Studies and Observations Group (SOG): “Studies and Observations Group
is a special staff section of Headquarters,... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | mplementing agency, the operations it studies and observes
are conducted by the RVNAF commands which have responsibility for the
areas of observations.341
In addition to the overarching cover stories, individual missions were
given cover stories. For example, if an aircraft conveying agent teams or equipment
between So... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ity, Cover & Deception, H-12.
126
Deception Objective (DO) Ignore MACVSOG
Deception Target Everyone without need-to-know
Deception Story (THINK) MACVSOG is a staff element used to collect data, not an operational
headquarters
Deception Events (SEE) Disinformation – cover stories
Termination Trigger Since deception was ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | vision staff, the commander of the 25th decided to provide the
enemy with a suitable target. In February 1969, an infantry company established firebase
DIAMOND I in the vicinity of the enemy force. What the NVA saw as a vulnerable target
was in reality ringed with sensors and ground radar systems, and supported by thre... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | a routine occurrence. While using
troops as bait may seem distasteful, the stratagem was effective; moreover, by
establishing DIAMOND I, the 25th Infantry Division was able to influence the NVA into
attacking on the 25th’s terms. The alternative would have meant allowing the NVA force
to attack any one of a number of b... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | were just more of many firebases,
but conveniently located for attack: a variation of cry-wolf with an element of honeypot.
Deception Objective (DO) NVA attacks DIAMOND firebases
Deception Target NVA leadership in 25th Infantry Division area of operations
Deception Story (THINK) DIAMOND firebases are perfectly positio... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ay from the stronghold. After the feints were
completed, the Ranger and ARVN troops were airlifted back to attack the stronghold. A
prisoner captured during the assault on the stronghold indicated that the Ranger and
ARVN battalion’s movements lulled the VC into believing the base area was not the target
of the operati... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | r and ARVN
battalions do not know about it
Deception Events (SEE) Feint – Ranger battalion operation moving away from stronghold
Feint – ARVN battalions operation moving away from stronghold
Simulation – additional camp fires
Termination Trigger Assault on stronghold
Table 22. Deception Analysis of Ranger Assault
344 R... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | forces implemented the “Hail Mary” plan because unfavorable force ratios—
the Iraqi forces in Kuwait had numerical superiority and were in the defensive—
precluded a frontal assault. Therefore, the flanking maneuver was essential for countering
the Iraqi force advantage. 346 Deception became key to distracting Saddam ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | isposition would expose them to the VII and XVIII
Airborne Corps enveloping maneuver and facilitate their destruction.347
This deception plan played to Saddam’s expectations, as early intelligence reports
indicated a concern about amphibious operations and a belief that an attack through the
desert was impossible.348
T... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ssembly areas, “Virtually every
division constructed replicas of Iraqi defensive positions and conducted extensive
346 H. Norman Schwarzkopf, “Central Command Briefing,” Military Review, 71, no. 9 (September
1991): 96 – 97.
347 Breitenbach, “Operation Desert Deception,” 2 – 3.
348 Breitenbach, “Operation Desert Decepti... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | d to maintain the
illusion that the two Corps were still in place, other units still located in the original
staging areas portrayed the XVIII Corps using false radio traffic.351
Portraying a secondary effort, the II Marine Expeditionary Force conducted
several amphibious training exercises, including Operation IMMINEN... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | SEAL Task Force Mimke conducted an
amphibious feint, supported by naval gunfire, to reinforce the threat of landings in order
to prevent the reallocation of the Iraqi divisions on the coast.355
The deception operations may have worked a little too effectively. When the 1st
Cavalry Division launched its feint on 24 Feb... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ,” 5.
352 Breitenbach, “Operation Desert Deception,” 4.
353 Schwarzkopf, “Central Command Briefing,” 102. It’s important to note that the press were not
actively deceived or given disinformation to publish. They were afforded the opportunity to observe actual
training and allowed to draw their own conclusions and repor... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | onization.356
Deception Objective (DO) Iraqi forces concentrate away from “Hail Mary” flanking movement
Deception Target Saddam
Deception Story (THINK) Coalition main effort will come through Wadi Al Batin with
supporting amphibious landing
Deception Events (SEE) Demonstration – 1st Cavalry Division entry into Wadi Al ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf |
As a nation we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by
falsehood… we will keep hammering along with the conviction that
‘honesty is the best policy,’ and that truth always wins in the long run.
These pretty little sentences do well for a child’s copy-book, but the man
who acts upon them in war had better ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ikewise,
deception has proven its worth against conventional foes such as the German and Iraqi
Armies, and against irregular foes like the Viet Cong and the Philippine insurgents.
Given the demonstrated worth of deception across the spectrum of operations and against
myriad opponents, it is unacceptable to see the lack... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | systemic disruption styles of war. When the U.S. Army perceives it has a force
advantage—as has been the case since the end of the Cold War—then weight is given
towards cumulative destruction, while systemic disruption and deception wanes.
Conversely, when the U.S. Army perceives a force disadvantage—as was the case du... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | offing. Furthermore, since balance of power ratios are essentially meaningless against
adversaries relying on heavily systemic disruption approaches—e.g., Al Qaeda and other
non-state actors—deception would appear to be of increased utility. However, the most
recent capstone doctrine publications ADP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0 b... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | of several
hundred men, a dozen or so small boats, a few aircraft, a fair amount of
radio and other electronic gear, some wood, canvas, and paint, and bits of
aluminum scrap. None of this was permanently lost to inventory, except
the aluminum.359
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
What follows are some recommendations the U.S. Army s... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | his recommendation is unfeasible in the current
fiscal and force cap environment, thus the recommendations focus on increasing the
capabilities of existing units and personnel.
358 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0: Unified Land
Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the A... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | t single bullet guidance in Army Doctrine Reference Publication
3-0: Unified Combat Operations of “conduct military deception” without further
elaboration must change to something along the lines of the guidance in FM 100-5
(1954), which stated: “It is imperative that commanders constantly realize the importance
of com... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | a secondary task. This office must have the mandate for active military
deception and coordination authority with the proponents for the cover aspects of
deception, e.g., camouflage, OPSEC, and counterintelligence. In addition to coordination
authority, the deception office must be incorporated into the approval proce... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | rational context. The purpose of the
doctrine should be to spark creative thought on how deception might be practiced, not to
dictate how deception is practiced. Additional emphasis should be given to the
360 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, 1.
361 Headquarters, Department of the Arm... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | potential of deception as part every operation. There are two ways to inculcate a
respect for the utility of deception in leaders. First is for senior leaders at the upper
echelons of the U.S. Army to direct deception integration into all training operations as a
forcing function, especially at the combined arms train... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | receive formal education in
deception (Table 24). As the earlier a leader is trained and aware of the utility of
deception the more likely deception will be integrated into the leader’s planning
methodology. Additionally, the educating and implementing at the lowest levels helps to
ensure that as personnel advance, th... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ly than
either approach by itself. This will help to bring the situation described in 1941 Field
Service Regulations of Operations to fruition:
136
A commander who is ingenious and resourceful in the use of tactical
strategems [sic] and ruses often will find methods of deceiving or
misleading the enemy and of concealin... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | xt, but not as examples of “how to conduct” deception. What
must be avoided in the formal education are any deception planning templates or guides
that could result in a dogmatic approach to deception.
Organization Echelon Minimum Optimum
(In addition to minimum)
General Purpose Corps/Division Commander Deputies
Forces... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ations/ Intelligence
Sergeant
Detachment Asst Detachment Detachment Commander
Commander Operations Sergeant
Operations/ Intelligence
Sergeant
Military Information Command/Group/Battalion Commander Deputy Commander
Support Operations S3 S3/S2 Deputies
S2 Command Sergeant Major
S3/S2 NCOICs
Company Commander First Sergea... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | eded, e.g., developing a notional order of battle will
require a witting actor in the personnel section. Additionally, the fact a person occupies a
position indicated in Table 24 does not imply the person is cut out for deception
planning; more important than either the rank or the position are the personal
characteris... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | he use of deception, but he
did not let his personal feelings interfere with the mission.363 That said, a person who is
unable to set aside personal feelings on deception is best left as an unwitting actor.
A commander may feel the need to reach outside his staff for the best candidate;
much like General Wavell request... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | t is not
present during routine field training exercises neither is deception. Second, attaching a
deception planning function serves to inhibit the growth of an organic capacity for
deception within the unit by absolving the supported commander and staff of the
planning responsibility. The commander responsible for th... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | upporting resources. At the
same time, the deception planner cannot work in complete isolation from the rest of plans
and operations. In order to ensure the deception plan is fully nested in the supported plan,
the deception planner must also be physically integrated into overall operations planning,
and therefore also... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | on as prisoners.
Magruder used troops portraying deserters to convey disinformation to McClellan; this
tactic would be rightfully unacceptable today for U.S. planners—though interrogators
must still watch for this deception in use by our adversaries.366 Likewise, the use of a
corpse as the central prop in Operation MIN... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | nment, with careful consideration given to the changes since the time the deception
was executed.
365 Hesketh, Fortitude, 351.
366 The Editors of the Army Times. The Tangled Web, 5.
367 Herbig, “American Strategic Deception,” 270 – 271.
139
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
140
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Naval Postgraduate School
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PSYOP 3.pdf | СУЧАСНА ІСТОРІЯ 231
УДК (UDC) 94 : 327.5 : 32.019.51] (479.24+479.25) “19/20”
DOI: DOI: https://doi.org/10.33782/eminak2023.4(44).684
INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIA
Elvin Talishinsky
Azerbaijan University (Baku, Azerbaijan)
e-mail: elvintalishinsky@gmail.c... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | ation’, ‘propaganda’, ‘psychological warfare’, ‘psychological
operations’.
Within the scope of the study, the importance of psychological warfare in today’s
context has been examined using the example of Azerbaijan and Armenia. It has been
emphasized how Armenia effectively employed psychological warfare tactics and
pr... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | er lies in a comprehensive analysis of information and
psychological warfare and operations in the context of the Azerbaijan-Armenian
conflict.
Conclusions. In the 20th century information and psychological warfare and
operations became part of the military policy of states. Now, due to the current
situation on the wor... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | kely to
remain a key component of statecraft and international relations.
Keywords: information warfare, psychological warfare, information aggression,
propaganda, information operations, media
232 ЕМІНАК
ІНФОРМАЦІЙНО-ПСИХОЛОГІЧНА ВІЙНА
У КОНТЕКСТІ АЗЕРБАЙДЖАНСЬКО-ВІРМЕНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ
Ельвін Талішинський
Азербайджанський ... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | а», «психологічна війна», «психологічні операції».
У рамках дослідження на прикладі Азербайджану та Вірменії розглядається
важливість психологічної війни у сучасному контексті. Було підкреслено, як Вірменія
ефективно використовувала тактику психологічної війни та пропаганду, щоб отримати
вигідну позицію наприкінці 20 с... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | сновки. У ХХ ст. інформаційно-психологічні війни та операції стали частиною
військової політики держав. Зараз, у зв’язку зі сформованою ситуацією на світовій
арені, методи та засоби ведення інформаційної війни змінюються і з кожним роком
виходять на все більш високий рівень. Також можна констатувати, що у ХХІ ст.
інфор... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | анда, інформаційні операції, ЗМІ
INTRODUCTION
Currently, information problems are one of the most popular and frequently studied
scientific problems. Information problems are of interest to specialists in almost all
branches of science, and scientists of various specialties are engaged in its research. It
should be not... |
PSYOP 3.pdf |
for humanity is not only a condition, but also an incentive for further action, and
disinformation and information chaos cause a feeling of uncertainty and powerlessness.
Eminak, 2023, 4 (44)
СУЧАСНА ІСТОРІЯ 233
The degree to which the need for information is satisfied also plays a major role in the
well-being of soci... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | lity to conduct
geostrategic information warfare to achieve geopolitical success is steadily increasing.
Thus, the main axiom of the 21st century has become the long-known truth: “who owns
the information, owns the world”.
All this determines the relevance of studying the problem of information warfare
within the frame... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | tation is a
continuation of state policy. Thus, the purpose of the paper is to highlight the
development of information-psychological warfare, its history, concepts, technologies
and methods, which are one of the most important areas of work in the field of
international relations.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The fundamental and... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | nd
1939-1945. The second edition in 1954 was expanded to include an analysis of
propaganda campaigns during the Korean War, 1950-19532.
It is noteworthy that in the work ‘Psychological Warfare: International Propaganda
and Communications’ P. Linebarger analyzes methods of processing the enemy’s mass
consciousness using... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | various government agencies and departments of the United
States and Great Britain, to which he had access during the years of his military
service3.
1 Талышинский Э.Б. Современные информационные войны и Азербайджан. Баку: Мутарджим,
2016. C. 11.
2 Linebarger Paul M.A. Psychological Warfare: International Propaganda a... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | in New Zealand and a
janitor at American headquarters in Chongqing. I learned from all these people and
tried to make this book a reflection of the collective experience… I also owe a lot to the
officers of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense, who introduced me to the details
of psychological warfare. The cir... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | ed
psycholinguistics, psychology of propaganda and mass communications.
Some works by scientists highlight general and specific concepts of propaganda and
psychological wars: among them we can note, for example, the historians Philip Taylor
and Scot MacDonald. P. Taylor, in his work ‘Munitions of the Mind: War propagan... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | such as the
Thirty Years’ War and the English Civil War.
S. MacDonald’s book ‘Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First
Century’6 analyzes the history of the manipulation of visual means that were used in
psychological warfare. The author provides an informative history of both
psychological operations and... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | the analysis of various
operations of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition against Nazi Germany during the
World War II. Among them are the British scientist Ellick Paul Howe7; a former combat
liaison officer in the Psychological Warfare Branch Edward Boehm8; English historian
and civil servant Michael Balfour9,... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | outledge,
2007. 204 p.
7 Howe E. The Black Game: British Subversive Operations Against the Germans During the Second World
War. London: Michael Joseph, 1982. 276 p.
8 Boehm E. Behind Enemy Lines: WWII Allied/Axis Propaganda. New York: Wellfleet Press, 1989. 203 p.
9 Balfour M. Propaganda in War 1939-1945: Organizations... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | between
political actors for dominance over representatives of the political identity of Karabakh.
He comes to the conclusion that the largest political actors trying to influence the
conflict are not only regional interests, but also Russia and the United States”11. It
should be noted that S. Fedorchenko in his work ... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | f the parties to the Karabakh conflict’12, he defines the methods of
information warfare between the parties to the conflict for dominance over its intra-
country, regional and global assessments.
The information actions of Armenia emanating from Azerbaijan were studied by the
Azerbaijani scientist Chingiz Mamedov and ... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | tion-psychological war of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The author
especially notes that the Armenian-Azerbaijani war became a new step in the
development of media technologies of confrontation. It should be noted that, unlike
most military operations of the last 10 years, in this case there was not a rebel struggle
against ... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | абах в ракурсе информационных войн // Постсоветские
исследования. 2018. T. 1. № 2. С. 209.
12 Гордиевич А.А. Информационная война как составная часть стратегии сторон Карабахского
конфликта // 78-я научная конференция студентов и аспирантов Белорусского государственного
университета: материалы конф. Ч. 2, Минск, 10-21 ... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | XXI. 2023. Вип.: Special Issue. C. 93-104. DOI:
10.26693/ahpsxxi2023.si.093; Калінічева Г. Використання інформаційно-психологічної зброї в
умовах російсько-української війни // Acta De Historia & Politica: Saeculum XXI. 2023. Вип. 6. С. 53-
65. DOI: 10.26693/ahpsxxi2023.06.053; Звездова О. Психологічна війна як гібрид... |
PSYOP 3.pdf | s of hybrid wars and the use
of information and psychological warfare.
CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO THE CONTENT OF INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE
In almost all wars that have occurred from the past to the present, psychological
warfare techniques have been used. Before examining these wars and the techniques
used in... |
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