input stringlengths 1 785 | output dict | schema listlengths 0 0 |
|---|---|---|
Bhd. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The update revokes the trust of the following two intermediate CA certificates: Digisign Server ID–(Enrich), issued by Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048) Digisign Server ID (Enrich), issued by GTE CyberTrust Global Root'' From Mozilla's 2011 response:'' While there is no indication they were issued fraudulently... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Furthermore, certificates from this CA contain several technical issues. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
They lack an EKU extension specifying their intended usage and they have been issued without revocation information. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
'' From Entrust's response:'' There is no evidence that the Digicert Malaysia certificate authorities have been compromised. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
'' Here are some notes on the costs and technical requirements of attacking these certificates. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The computing power required to crack and factor an RSA 512 bit key was $5000 and the period of time required was about 2 weeks. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
(see http: //lukenotricks. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
blogspot.co.at/2010/03/rsa512factoringservicetwoweeks.html) In October 2012, Tom Ritter reported that it would cost about $120- $150, per- haps even as little as $75. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Going even further back, there was much discussion about the technical meth- ods of cracking these keys: DJ Bernstein's 2001 paper on building a machine reducing the cost of integer factorization with Number Field Sieve techniques, breaking 1024 bit RSA keys. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
RSA's reaction and 2002 statement on whether or not 1024 bit RSA keys are broken:'' NIST offered a table of proposed key sizes for discussion at its key man- agement workshop in November 2001 [7]. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
For data that needs to be protected no later than the year 2015, the table indicates that the RSA key size should be at least 1024 bits. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
For data that needs to be protected longer, the key size should be at least 2048 bits. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
'' Recent Tapaoux attacks and backdoors include malware signed with strong SHA1/RSA 2048 bit certificates, suggesting certificate theft. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
One of the most interesting components that we discovered as a part of this cam- paign was the use of a digitallysigned advanced keylogger. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "One of the most interesting components that we discovered as a part of this cam- paign",
"start": 0,
"end": 86
},
{
"text": "the use of a digitallysigned advanced keylogger",
"start": 91,
"end": 139
}
... | [] |
It is clean, wellwritten, kernel level malcode. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The languages of its strings are a mix of English and Korean. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is signed with the familiar'' belinda.jablonski @syniverse.com'' digital certificate. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This keylogger is dropped by code running within svchost.exe on WinXP SP3, which maintains an interesting debug string: It probably was developed as a part of a mid-to-late 2009 project: e: \project\2009\x\totalsource\32bit\ndiskpro\src\ioman.c This driver package is built to resemble a legitimate low-level Microsoft s... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This keylogger",
"start": 0,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "code running within svchost.exe on WinXP SP3",
"start": 29,
"end": 73
},
{
"text": "This driver package",
"start": 245,
... | [] |
It is installed as a system kernel driver'' Ndiskpro'' service, described as a'' Microcode Update Device''. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "a system kernel driver'' Ndiskpro'' service",
"start": 19,
"end": 62
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is installed",
"start": 3,
"... | [] |
It is slightly surprising that no rootkit functionality hides this service: When loaded, the NDISKPRO.SYS driver hooks both INT 0x01 and INT 0xff, and retrieves keystroke data directly from port 0x60, the motherboard keyboard con- troller itself. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the NDISKPRO.SYS driver",
"start": 89,
"end": 112
},
{
"text": "both INT 0x01 and INT 0xff",
"start": 119,
"end": 145
},
{
"text": "keystroke data",
"start": 161,
"end": 175... | [] |
It buffers, then communicates logged user data to the running user mode component. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This component then encrypts and writes the retrieved values ondisk to a randomly named .tmp, file like ffffz07131101.tmp. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This component",
"start": 0,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "the retrieved values ondisk",
"start": 40,
"end": 67
},
{
"text": "a randomly named .tmp, file like ffffz07131101.tmp",
"start":... | [] |
This file is located in the same directory as the original dropper, which maintains persistence across reboots with a simple addition to the HKCU run key. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the original dropper",
"start": 46,
"end": 66
},
{
"text": "persistence",
"start": 84,
"end": 95
},
{
"text": "reboots",
"start": 103,
"end": 110
},
{
"t... | [] |
This keylogger module encrypts and stores gathered data in a log file, as men- tioned previously. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This keylogger module",
"start": 0,
"end": 21
},
{
"text": "gathered data",
"start": 42,
"end": 55
},
{
"text": "a log file",
"start": 59,
"end": 69
}
],
"acti... | [] |
Its encryption algorithm is similar to RC4. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The interesting part is that the module randomly generates the key and stores it in an unexpected place: in the middle of the log file name. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Hence, the numeric part of the filename is used as a seed for the pseudorandom number generator. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The rand function is statically linked to ensure same results on different computers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The Darkhotel toolset consists of multiple components that have been slightly modified over time. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These tools are dropped by hotel installers spoofing legiti- mate software installers, bound within torrent bundles, or dropped by exploits or hypertext linked from spear-phishing emails. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "These tools",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "hotel installers",
"start": 27,
"end": 43
},
{
"text": "legiti- mate software installers",
"start": 53,
"end": 85
},
... | [] |
More advanced tools, like the keylogger decribed above, are later downloaded to the victim system by one of these implants. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "More advanced tools, like the keylogger decribed above",
"start": 0,
"end": 54
},
{
"text": "the victim system",
"start": 80,
"end": 97
},
{
"text": "one of these implants",
"start"... | [] |
In a recent case, word docs embed- ded with 0-day flash swf files either dropped these backdoors or downloaded and executed backdoors from remote web servers. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "word docs",
"start": 18,
"end": 27
},
{
"text": "0-day flash swf files",
"start": 44,
"end": 65
},
{
"text": "these backdoors",
"start": 81,
"end": 96
},
{
... | [] |
These tools pull down the keylog- ger, steal information from the system, or download other tools. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "These tools",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "the keylog- ger",
"start": 22,
"end": 37
},
{
"text": "information",
"start": 45,
"end": 56
},
{
"text"... | [] |
The most interesting behaviors of these components include This module is quite small (27Kb) and comes as a part of WinRar SFX file that drops and starts the module from% APPDATA% \Microsoft\Crypto\DES64v7\msieckc.exe. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "WinRar SFX file",
"start": 116,
"end": 131
},
{
"text": "the module",
"start": 154,
"end": 164
},
{
"text": "% APPDATA% \\Microsoft\\Crypto\\DES64v7\\msieckc.exe",
"start": 169,
... | [] |
This module is designed to update malicious components through recurring checks at the C & C server. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This module",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "malicious components",
"start": 34,
"end": 54
},
{
"text": "recurring checks at the C & C server",
"start": 63,
"end": 99
... | [] |
It is also capable of removing some older components, the names of which are hardcoded in the body of the malware. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "some older components",
"start": 31,
"end": 52
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "removing",
"start": 22,
"end": 30
}
]
... | [] |
The module adds autorun registry settings to enable an automatic start during system boot. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The module",
"start": 0,
"end": 10
},
{
"text": "autorun registry settings",
"start": 16,
"end": 41
},
{
"text": "enable an automatic start during system boot",
"start": 45,
... | [] |
One of the most interesting functions of this executable is its unusual delay and persistence. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "One of the most interesting functions of this executable",
"start": 0,
"end": 56
},
{
"text": "its unusual delay and persistence",
"start": 60,
"end": 93
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": ... | [] |
If a special file exists on the system, the module will not start calling back to C & C server until the special file is 180 days old. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
So, if some other critical malicious component was removed during this period, current module backs up and restores access to the system within 6 months. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "current module",
"start": 79,
"end": 93
},
{
"text": "access to the system within 6 months",
"start": 116,
"end": 152
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "backs up and restores",
"st... | [] |
The component gathers system information and sends it to the Darkhotel com- mand and control servers as detailed in Appendix D. This module is relatively large (455Kb) and comes as a part of a WinRar SFX file that drops and starts the module from% APPDATA% \Microsoft\Display\DmaUp3. exe. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The component",
"start": 0,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "system information",
"start": 22,
"end": 40
},
{
"text": "it",
"start": 51,
"end": 53
},
{
"text": "t... | [] |
The main purpose of the module is to collect various secrets stored on a lo- cal system and upload them to Darkhotel command and control servers: This module is designed to terminate itself on Windows with the system de- fault codepage set to Korean. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the module",
"start": 20,
"end": 30
},
{
"text": "various secrets stored on a lo- cal system",
"start": 45,
"end": 87
},
{
"text": "them",
"start": 99,
"end": 103
},
... | [] |
This malware is 220Kb in size. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It was built as MFC framework application with a lot of extra calls that should have complicated the analysis of the sample. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "a lot of extra calls",
"start": 47,
"end": 67
},
{
"text": "the analysis of the sample",
"start": 97,
"end": 123
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "complicated",
"start": 85,
... | [] |
It mim- ics a GUI desktop application but it does not create any visible windows or dialogs to interact with local users. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "a GUI desktop application",
"start": 12,
"end": 37
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "mim- ics",
"start": 3,
"end": 11
}
]... | [] |
The Trojan collects data about the system and anti malware software installed on it, and uploads that data to Darkhotel command and control servers. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The Trojan",
"start": 0,
"end": 10
},
{
"text": "data",
"start": 20,
"end": 24
},
{
"text": "the system",
"start": 31,
"end": 41
},
{
"text": "anti malw... | [] |
More technical details are provided in Appendix D. This malware is 63kb in size. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is bound to a variety of other software packages that vary in name, but the host package is consistently detected as'' Virus.Win32. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "a variety of other software packages that vary in name",
"start": 15,
"end": 69
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is bound",
"start": 3,
... | [] |
Pioneer.dx''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It drops the igfxext.exe'' selective infector'' component to disk and runs it. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "the igfxext.exe'' selective infector'' component",
"start": 9,
"end": 57
},
{
"text": "disk",
"start": 61,
"end": 65
},
{... | [] |
This component is a virus, and is used to selectively infiltrate into other comput- ers via USB or network shares. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This component",
"start": 0,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "other comput- ers",
"start": 70,
"end": 87
},
{
"text": "USB",
"start": 92,
"end": 95
},
{
"text": "... | [] |
First, the virus retrieves all available disks and starting from disk number 4 (D:\) to disk number 20 (Z:\), finds executable files and infects them. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the virus",
"start": 7,
"end": 16
},
{
"text": "all available disks",
"start": 27,
"end": 46
},
{
"text": "executable files",
"start": 116,
"end": 132
},
{
... | [] |
The code simply brute forces the list of mapped removable drives. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The code",
"start": 0,
"end": 8
},
{
"text": "the list of mapped removable drives",
"start": 29,
"end": 64
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "brute forces",
"start": 16,
"e... | [] |
During its infection routine, the infector changes the entrypoint of executable files, creates an .rdat section, and inserts a small loader in the section, then puts its main payload in the overlay. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the infector",
"start": 30,
"end": 42
},
{
"text": "the entrypoint of executable files",
"start": 51,
"end": 85
},
{
"text": "an .rdat section",
"start": 95,
"end": 111
... | [] |
Every infected file has functionality described in TrojanDropper & Injector section, so it can collect information about the comput- er, send it to the C2 and download other Darkhotel components as commanded. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Every infected file",
"start": 0,
"end": 19
},
{
"text": "functionality described in TrojanDropper & Injector section",
"start": 24,
"end": 84
},
{
"text": "it",
"start": 89,
... | [] |
Observed downloaded components are signed with a familiar expired certificate from www.esupplychain.com.tw, issued by Cybertrust SureServer CA. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Again, further technical details are provided in Appendix D. Almost every backdoor in this set maintains an internal campaign code or id, used in initial c2 communications as described above. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Almost every backdoor in this set",
"start": 61,
"end": 94
},
{
"text": "an internal campaign code or id, used in initial c2 communications as described above",
"start": 105,
"end": 190
}
],
"act... | [] |
Some IDs appear to be related to geographic interests, others do not seem obvious. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We gathered a list of Darkhotel campaign IDs shown below. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Internal IDs and c2 resources overlap across these com- ponents, there is no pattern of distribution according to connectback resources. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The most common id is'' DEXT87'': This infrastructure team appears to employ a lesser skillset than top notch campaigns, maintaining weak server configurations with limited monitoring and defensive reactions, and making some simple mistakes. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
However, they are ef- fective at maintaining a fully available infrastructure to support new and existing infections. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Overall, victims in our sinkhole logs and KSN data were found across the globe, with the majority in Japan, Taiwan, China, Russia, Korea and Hong Kong. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The following C & C domains have been sinkholed and redirected to the Kaspersky Sinkhole Server Our Kaspersky Security Network detected Darkhotel infections across thousands of machines, mostly related to the Darkhotel p2p campaigns. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These geolocation estimates probably provide the most accurate picture of where Darkhotel activity is occurring. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Here is a pie chart to better visualize the proportions of attack activity throughout the world. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As you can see, over 90% of it occurs in the top five countries: Japan, followed by Taiwan, China, Russia and Korea. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Because the operators very actively build up new command and control serv- ers, it is difficult to sinkhole enough domains to get an accurate overall picture of victim system location based on this data. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the operators",
"start": 8,
"end": 21
},
{
"text": "new command and control serv- ers",
"start": 45,
"end": 78
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "build up",
"start": 36,
"e... | [] |
Also, many researcher systems are connected to the sinkholed domains. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
However, this graph of current sinkhole callbacks presents a low confidence distribution of victim geolocation, with India, Japan, Ireland, Korea, China and Taiwan in the top slots. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Removing India and Ireland, the set more closely matches our KSN data. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Many of these c2s maintain a common directory path that serves a ddrlog. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Many of these c2s",
"start": 0,
"end": 17
},
{
"text": "a common directory path that serves a ddrlog",
"start": 27,
"end": 71
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "maintain",
"start":... | [] |
The ddrlogs appear to maintain callback data that the attackers want to set aside in error logs. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Many of the callback URLs have errors, many are from unwanted IP ranges, and others are clearly unwanted researcher sandbox system callbacks. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A description of the detailed connectback URL values and their xor/base64 encoding scheme is included in the'' Interesting Malware Trojan.Win32.Karba.e'' technical notes in Appendix D. The Darkhotel c2 maintain these directory structures to store and serve ddrlog content: The following structures appear to be common ac... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The Darkhotel c2",
"start": 185,
"end": 201
},
{
"text": "these directory structures",
"start": 211,
"end": 237
},
{
"text": "store and serve ddrlog content",
"start": 241,
... | [] |
Those records are formatted in the following manner: Only 120 IP addresses perform the'' B'' checkin, and 90% of these are from the range 150.70.97.x. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This entire range is owned by Trend Micro in Tokyo, JP. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A handful of the remaining addresses, like 222.150.70.228, appear to come from other ranges owned by Trend Micro in JP. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
One outlier comes from an El Sal- vadoran ISP, and another is connected to a Japanese ISP. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Approximately 20,000 IP addresses perform the'' L'' checkin. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Other ddrlogs may include'' A'' tags as well. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The'' A'' tag labels unwanted checkins from untargeted locations, like Hungary and Italy. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The'' B'' tag labels unwanted checkins from Trend Micro IP ranges. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The'' L'' tag labels unwanted checkins from a variety of ranges, but includes odd IP like the loopback address, 127.0.0.1, clearly an error. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Entries in these logs include callback URLs that have spaces and unusual charac- ters that do not conform to the required base64 character dictionary. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Typical main page: For begatrendstone.com, we have the following directory structure: The group encrypts victim data on their servers with single user/passkey combi- nations across multiple victims. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The group",
"start": 86,
"end": 95
},
{
"text": "victim data",
"start": 105,
"end": 116
},
{
"text": "their servers",
"start": 120,
"end": 133
},
{
"text... | [] |
When an unauthorized user attempts to access a Darkhotel web interface for victim management without the correct passkey, the html page and table layout renders properly, but all the data values on the page are returned as garbled ciphertext. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
New victim systems appear to be systematically vetted. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "New victim systems",
"start": 0,
"end": 18
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "be systematically vetted",
"start": 29,
"end": 53
}
]
}
} | [] |
The attackers maintain a web interface to vet these new victim systems. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The attackers",
"start": 0,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "a web interface",
"start": 23,
"end": 38
},
{
"text": "vet these new victim systems",
"start": 42,
"end": 70
}
... | [] |
The attackers first and foremost list and sort victim systems according to their latest c2 checkin. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The attackers",
"start": 0,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "victim systems",
"start": 47,
"end": 61
},
{
"text": "their latest c2 checkin",
"start": 75,
"end": 99
}
],
... | [] |
Collected data probably is presented in order of importance: Here is an example of one of these web pages: Clearly, some automated analysis activity involving researchers' sandbox tools are filling up these logs. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
From June 2013 to April 2014 (approximately an 11 month period), in only 15 ddrlog files, we observe almost 7,000 connections from research sandbox systems. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The network connections provide a1= through a3= values identifying a QEMU based sandbox, all sourced from only 485 WAN IP ad- dresses. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Under 30 lan IPs are recorded, all in the same 172.16.2.14126 range. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This system (s) uses a'' Dave'' user account and'' HOMEOFFD5F0AC'' Windows system name. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These characteristics correspond with network activity generated by GFI Soft- ware's'' CWsandbox'' tools, now owned by'' ThreatTrack Security''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
For the past seven years, a strong threat actor named Darkhotel, also known as Tapaoux, has carried out a number of successful attacks against a wide range of victims from around the world. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It employs methods and techniques which go well beyond typical cybercriminal behavior. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The Darkhotel crew's skillset allows it to launch interesting cryptographical at- tacks, for instance factoring 512 bit RSA keys. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
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