mneb/malware-text-db · Datasets at Hugging Face

input stringlengths 1 785	output dict	schema listlengths 0 0
The use of C++ classes that inherit from a base class to carry out some of the tasking commands, along with the use of concurrency features, indicates that the developers of the RAT put some thought into the architecture and design of their tool, although the decision to implement some commands outside of the class-bas...	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The pngdowner malware is a simple tool constructed using Microsoft Visual Studio and implemented via single C++ source code file.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
This sample contains a PDB path of Y: \Visual Studio 2005\Projects\branch-downer\ downer\Release\downer.pdb, but other similar paths Z: \Visual Studio 2005\Projects\pngdowner\Release\ pngdowner.pdb and Z: \Visual Studio 2005\Projects\downer\Release\downer.pdb have also been observed in other samples.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Appendix 3 lists metadata for known pngdowner samples.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Initially, the malware will perform a connectivity check to a hard-coded URL (http: //www.microsoft.com), using a constant user agent Mozilla/4.0 (Compatible; MSIE 6.0;).	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the malware", "start": 11, "end": 22 }, { "text": "a connectivity check", "start": 36, "end": 56 }, { "text": "a hard-coded URL (http: //www.microsoft.com)", "start": 60, "e...	[]
If this request fails, the malware will attempt to extract proxy details and credentials from Windows Protected Storage, and from the IE Credentials Store using publicly known methods15, using the proxy credentials for subsequent requests if they enable outbound HTTP access.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the malware", "start": 23, "end": 34 }, { "text": "proxy details and credentials", "start": 59, "end": 88 }, { "text": "Windows Protected Storage", "start": 94, "end": 119 ...	[]
An initial request is then made to the hard-coded C2 server and initial URI–forming a URL of the form (in this sample) http: //login.stream-media.net/files/xx11/index.asp? 95027775, where the numerical parameter represents a random integer.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "An initial request", "start": 0, "end": 18 }, { "text": "the hard-coded C2 server and initial URI", "start": 35, "end": 75 } ], "action": [ { "text": "is then made", "start"...	[]
A hard-coded user agent of myAgent is used for thisrequest, and subsequent communication with the C2 server.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Content returned from this request to the C2 server will be saved to a file named index.dat in the user's temporary directory (i.e.,% TEMP%).	{ "entities": {} }	[]
This file is expected to contain a single line, specifying a URL and a filename.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The malware will then attempt to download content from the specified URL to the filename within the user's temporary directory, and then execute this file via the WinExec API.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11 }, { "text": "content", "start": 42, "end": 49 }, { "text": "the specified URL", "start": 55, "end": 72 }, { "text": ...	[]
If this execution attempt succeeds, a final C2 request will be made–in this case to a URL using the same path as the initial request (and a similarly random parameter), but with a filename of success.asp.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a final C2 request", "start": 36, "end": 54 }, { "text": "a URL using the same path as the initial request (and a similarly random parameter)", "start": 84, "end": 167 } ], "action": [ { ...	[]
Content returned from this request will be saved to a file, but then immediately deleted.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Finally, the malware will delete the content saved from the first request, and exit.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the malware", "start": 9, "end": 20 }, { "text": "the content saved from the first request", "start": 33, "end": 73 } ], "action": [ { "text": "delete", "start": 26, ...	[]
The limited functionality, and lack of persistence of this tool, implies that it is used only as a simple download- and-execute utility.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "it", "start": 78, "end": 80 }, { "text": "a simple download- and-execute utility", "start": 97, "end": 135 } ], "action": [ { "text": "is used", "start": 81, "end": ...	[]
Although the version mentioned here uses C++, along with Visual Studios Standard Template Library (STL), older versions of the RAT (such as MD5 hash b54e91c234ec0e739ce429f47a317313), built in 2011, use plain C. This suggests that despite the simple nature of the tool, the developers have made some attempts to modify a...	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Both versions contain debugging/progress messages such as'' down file success''.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Although these are not displayed to the victim, they were likely used by the developers as a simple means to verify functionality of their code.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Like pngdowner, the httpclient malware is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality and uses HTTP for its C2 channel.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the httpclient malware", "start": 16, "end": 38 }, { "text": "HTTP", "start": 112, "end": 116 }, { "text": "its C2 channel", "start": 121, "end": 135 } ], "act...	[]
This malware also initially performs a connectivity check to www.microsoft.com using the hard-coded user agent Mozilla/4.0 (Compatible; MSIE 6.0;), although in this variant no attempt is made to extract proxy credentials.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "This malware", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "a connectivity check", "start": 37, "end": 57 }, { "text": "www.microsoft.com", "start": 61, "end": 78 }, { ...	[]
The malware will then connect to its configured C2 infrastructure (file.anyoffice.info) and perform a HTTP request of the form shown in Figure 14 below: Content returned from the C2 server is deobfuscated by XOR'ing the content with a single byte, 0x12.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11 }, { "text": "its configured C2 infrastructure (file.anyoffice.info)", "start": 33, "end": 87 }, { "text": "a HTTP request of the form shown in Figure 14...	[]
The decoded data is then checked for the string runshell.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
If this string is not present, the C2 request is repeated every 0.5 seconds.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the C2 request", "start": 31, "end": 45 }, { "text": "0.5 seconds", "start": 64, "end": 75 } ], "action": [ { "text": "is repeated", "start": 46, "end": 57 } ...	[]
Otherwise, a shell process is started (i.e., cmd.exe), with input/output redirected over the C2 channel.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a shell process", "start": 11, "end": 26 }, { "text": "input/output redirected over the C2 channel", "start": 60, "end": 103 } ], "action": [ { "text": "is started", "start"...	[]
Shell commands from the server are followed by an encoded string $$$, which indicates that the shell session should continue.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
If the session is ended, two other commands are supported: m2b (upload file) and b2m (download file).	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "two other commands", "start": 25, "end": 43 }, { "text": "file", "start": 71, "end": 75 }, { "text": "file", "start": 95, "end": 99 } ], "action": [ { ...	[]
Slight variations on the C2 URLs are used for different phases of the C2 interaction: Given the lack of a persistence mechanism and low level of sophistication, it is likely that httpclient–like pngdowner–is used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Appendix 4 lists metadata for observed httpclient samples.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Other CrowdStrike reporting describes a dropper used by PUTTER PANDA (abc.scr) to install the 4H RAT.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a dropper", "start": 38, "end": 47 }, { "text": "PUTTER PANDA", "start": 56, "end": 68 }, { "text": "the 4H RAT", "start": 90, "end": 100 } ], "action": [ ...	[]
This dropper uses RC4 to decrypt an embedded payload from data in an embedded resource before writing the payload to disk and executing it.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "This dropper", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "the payload", "start": 102, "end": 113 }, { "text": "disk", "start": 117, "end": 121 }, { "text": "it"...	[]
Several instances of this dropper have been observed, most commonly in association with the 4H RAT, but also in relation to other tools that will be described in forthcoming reporting.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Another dropper has been observed, exclusively installing the pngdowner malware (example MD5 hash 4c50457c35e2033b3a03fcbb4adac7b7).	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Another dropper", "start": 0, "end": 15 }, { "text": "the pngdowner malware (example MD5 hash 4c50457c35e2033b3a03fcbb4adac7b7)", "start": 58, "end": 131 } ], "action": [ { "text": ...	[]
This dropper is simplistic in nature, and is compiled from a single C++ source code file.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
It contains a Word document in plaintext (written to BienvenueaSahajaYogaToulouse.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
doc), along with an executable (Update.exe) and DLL (McUpdate.dll).	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The executable and DLL are both contained within the .data	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The executable and DLL", "start": 0, "end": 22 } ] } }	[]
section of the dropper, obfuscated with a 16-byte XOR key (consisting of the bytes 0xA0–0xAF).	{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "obfuscated", "start": 24, "end": 34 } ], "modifier": [ { "text": "with", "start": 35, "end": 39 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "a 16-byte XOR key (consisting of the bytes 0xA0–0...	[]
Both the document and executable are written to disk and the executed via the ShellExecute API (using the verb'' open'').	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Both the document and executable", "start": 0, "end": 32 }, { "text": "disk", "start": 48, "end": 52 }, { "text": "the ShellExecute API (using the verb'' open'')", "start": 74, ...	[]
The executable is also installed into the ASEP registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ CurrentVersion\Run, with a value named McUpdate.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The executable", "start": 0, "end": 14 }, { "text": "the ASEP registry key HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ CurrentVersion\\Run", "start": 38, "end": 111 }, { "text": "a value named McU...	[]
Finally, the dropper deletes itself via a batch file.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the dropper", "start": 9, "end": 20 }, { "text": "itself", "start": 29, "end": 35 }, { "text": "a batch file", "start": 40, "end": 52 } ], "action": [ { ...	[]
The dropped executable (MD5 hash 38a2a6782e1af29ca8cb691cf0d29a0d) primarily aims to inject the specified DLL (McUpdate.dll, MD5 hash 08c7b5501df060ccfc3aa5c8c41b452f) into a process that would normally be accessing the network, likely in order to disguise the malicious activity.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The dropped executable (MD5 hash 38a2a6782e1af29ca8cb691cf0d29a0d)", "start": 0, "end": 66 }, { "text": "the specified DLL (McUpdate.dll, MD5 hash 08c7b5501df060ccfc3aa5c8c41b452f)", "start": 92, "end": 167 ...	[]
Module names corresponding to Outlook Express (msinm.exe), Outlook (outlook.exe), Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe), and Firefox (firefox.exe) are used.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
If Internet Explorer is used, then the malware will attempt to terminate processes corresponding to two components of Sophos Anti-Virus (SAVAdminService.exe and SavService.exe).	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the malware", "start": 35, "end": 46 }, { "text": "processes corresponding to two components of Sophos Anti-Virus (SAVAdminService.exe and SavService.exe)", "start": 73, "end": 176 } ], "action":...	[]
Four examples of these droppers were located, using a mixture of decoy PDF and Microsoft Word documents (shown below in Figures 15-18).	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "these droppers", "start": 17, "end": 31 }, { "text": "a mixture of decoy PDF and Microsoft Word documents", "start": 52, "end": 103 } ], "action": [ { "text": "using", "star...	[]
The common theme throughout these documents is space technology (BienvenueaSahajaYogaToulouse.doc does not follow this trend, but could be targeted at workers at the Toulouse Space Centre, the'' largest space centre in Europe''), indicating that the attackers have a keen interest in this sector, which is also reflected...	{ "entities": {} }	[]
A number of specific and generic detection methods are possible for this RAT, both on a host and on the network.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
These are detailed below, and are designed to expand upon the indicators reported in other CrowdStrike reporting.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The following Windows registry artifacts are indicative of a compromised host: redacted) The presence of the following file system artifacts is indicative of a compromised host: A file mapping named & SDKJfhksdf89DIUKJDSF & *sdfsdf78sdfsdf also indicates the victim machine is compromised with PUTTER PANDA malware.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In addition the domains listed in the Appendices and in the Attribution section, the generic signatures below can be used to detect activity from the malware described in this report.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In addition to the indicators described above, PUTTER PANDA have some distinct generic TTPs: PUTTER PANDA are a determined adversary group who have been operating for several years, conducting intelligence-gathering operations with a significant focus on the space sector.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Although some of their tools are simplistic, taken as a whole their toolset provides a wide degree of control over a victim system and can provide the opportunity to deploy additional tools at will.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "their toolset", "start": 62, "end": 75 }, { "text": "a wide degree of control over a victim system", "start": 85, "end": 130 }, { "text": "additional tools", "start": 173, "...	[]
Research presented in this report shows that the PUTTER PANDA operators are likely members of the 12th Bureau, 3rd General Staff Department (GSD) of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), operating from the unit's headquarters in Shanghai with MUCD 61486.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Strategic objectives for this unit are likely to include obtaining intellectual property and industrial secrets relating to defense technology, particularly those to help enable the unit's suspect mission to conduct space surveillance, remote sensing, and interception of satellite communications.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
PUTTER PANDA is likely to continue to aggressively target Western entities that hold valuable information or intellectual property relevant to these interests.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The detection and mitigation guidance given in this report will help to minimize the risk of a successful compromise by these actors, and future CrowdStrike reports will examine other elements of the PUTTER PANDA toolset.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence portal provides enterprises with strategic, customized, and actionable intelligence.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Falcon Intelligence enables organizations to prioritize resources by determining targeted versus commodity attacks, saving time and focusing resources on critical threats.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
With unprecedented insight into adversary tools, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) and multi-source information channels, analysts can identify pending attacks and automatically feed threat intelligence via API to SIEM and thirdparty security tools.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Access to CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence is geared toward all levels of an organization, from the executivewho needs to understand the business threat and strategic business impact, to the front-line securiyt professional struggling to! ght through an adversary's attack against the enterprise.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence is a web-based intelligence subscription that includes full access to a variety of feature sets, including: CrowdStrike Falcon Host is an endpoint threat detection and response product that identifies unknown malware, detects zero-day threats, and prevents damage from targeted attacks in...	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Falcon Host is comprised of two core components, the cloud-based management console and the on-premises host-based sensor that continuously monitors threat activity at the endpoint to prevent damage in real-time.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Falcon Host leverages a lightweight kernel-mode sensor that shadows, captures, and correlates low- level operating system events to instantly identify the adversary tradecraft and activities through Stateful Execution Inspection (SEI) at the endpoint and Machine Learning in the cloud.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
As opposed to focusing on malware signatures, indicators of compromise, exploits, and vulnerabilities, Falcon Host instead identifies mission objectives of the adversary leveraging the Kill Chain model and provides realtime detection by focusing on what the attacker is doing, as opposed to looking nfor a specific, easi...	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Without performing intrusive and performance- impacting scans of the system, Falcon Host's highly efficient real-time monitoring of all system activity is the only security solution that provides maximum visibility into all adversary activities, including Adversary-in-Motion: reconnaissance, exploitation, privilege esc...	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Falcon Host delivers insight into past and current attacks not only on a single host, but also across devices and networks.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Stateful Execution inspection Stateful Execution Inspection (SEI) tracks execution state and links together various stages of the kill chain, from initial code execution to data exfiltration.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
CrowdStrike's Real-time Stateful Execution Engine performs inspection and analysis to understand the full context of a cyber attack.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
SEI is critical to understanding the entire attack life cycle and preventing the damage from advanced malware and targeted attacks.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Existing security technologies that focus solely on malware signatures, incidators of compromise, exploits, and vulnerabilities fail to protect against the majority of attacks as they are blind to the full scope of adversary activity.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
CrowdStrike is a global provider of security technology and services focused on identifying advanced threats and targeted attacks.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Using big-data technologies, CrowdStrike's next-generation threat protection platform leverages real-time Stateful Execution Inspection (SEI) at the endpoint and Machine Learning in the cloud instead of solely focusing on malware signatures, indicators of compromise, exploits, and vulnerabilities.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The CrowdStrike Falcon Platform is a combination of big data technologies and endpoint security driven by advanced threat intelligence.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
CrowdStrike Falcon enables enterprises to identify unknown malware, detect zero-day threats, pinpoint advanced adversaries and attribution, and prevent damage from targeted attacks in real time.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
CrowdStrike Services is a wholly owned subsidiary of CrowdStrike responsible for proactively defending against and responding to cyber incidents with pre and post Incident Response services.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
CrowdStrike's seasoned team of Cyber Intelligence professionals, Incident Responders, and Malware Researchers consists of a number of internationally recognized authors, speakers, and experts who have worked on some of the most publicized and challenging intrusions and malware attacks in recent years.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The CrowdStrike Services team leverages our Security Operations Center to monitor the full CrowdStrike Falcon Platform and provide cutting-edge advanced adversary intrusion detection services.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The full spectrum of proactive and response services helps customers respond tactically as well as continually mature and strategically evolve Incident Response program capabilities.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Context Information Security distribute Context Threat Intelligence (CTI) reporting under the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), a method of classifying a document in order to promote the distribution of sensitive information between individuals, organisations or communities in a controlled and trusted way, based on the ori...	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The various levels of the TLP are represented by the following colours: Sources may use TLP: RED when information can not be effectively acted upon by additional parties, and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Recipients may not share TLP: RED information with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
TLP: RED information will be passed verbally or in person.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Sources may use TLP: AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon, but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organisations involved.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Recipients may only share TLP: AMBER information with members of their own organisation who need to know, and only as widely as necessary to act on that information.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Sources may use TLP: GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organisations as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Recipients may share TLP: GREEN information with peers and partner organisations within their sector or community, but not via publicly accessible channels such as publication or posting publicly on the Internet.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Sources may use TLP: WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP: WHITE information may be distributed freely, without restriction.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
On 2nd January 2014 a Systems Administrator at the Monju fast breeder reactor facility in Japan noticed suspicious connections emanating from a machine in the control room, coinciding with what was a seemingly routine software update to a free media player.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Among other items, staff training documents and more than 40,000 emails were stored on the machine and thought to be harvested by the attacker.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Among other items, staff training documents and more than 40,000 emails", "start": 0, "end": 71 }, { "text": "the attacker", "start": 130, "end": 142 } ], "action": [ { "text": "har...	[]
The Japanese Atomic Energy Agency is investigating further.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The attack appears to have been the result of the attackers having compromised the'GOM Player' update server and having it act as a'watering hole', meaning that machines which access the site are delivered malware.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the attackers", "start": 46, "end": 59 }, { "text": "the'GOM Player' update server", "start": 79, "end": 108 }, { "text": "it", "start": 120, "end": 122 }, { ...	[]
Gom Player originates in South Korea and in some parts of Asia it is a popular alternative to Windows Media Player.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
It is unclear whether every machine trying to download an update received this malware or whether only machines which fitted a certain profile were infected.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Technical analysis of the implant on the compromised machine has shown it to be a variant of a Trojan which has been in the wild for some years now and continues to be effective.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "it", "start": 71, "end": 73 }, { "text": "a variant of a Trojan", "start": 80, "end": 101 } ], "action": [ { "text": "be", "start": 77, "end": 79 } ] } }	[]
The'Gh0st RAT' has been used extensively in attacks linked to the Chinese state, though it is important to remember that the code is publicly available and can be modified and used by anyone.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The targeting of a Japanese nuclear facility however, is consistent with Chinese state intelligence requirements.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
If this is the work of a Chinese group then we feel the targeting may go much further than the Civil Nuclear sector and thus be of interest to the wider Energy Sector and industry as a whole.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In order to inform the Energy Sector and beyond about this attack, we have compiled a technical summary of the attack and have provided a number of Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs) which can be used to aid detection.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
It is likely that the attackers would redeploy their implant against other targets, albeit with a delivery mechanism more tailored to the location of the intended victims.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Based on open source reporting, it appears that the intrusion took place via the compromise of the GOM Player update server (app.gomlab.com), where attackers may have gained entry via a PHP-based webshell, hidden within an image, present on the host since October 2011.	{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "compromise", "start": 81, "end": 91 }, { "text": "gained", "start": 167, "end": 173 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "the GOM Player update server (app.gomlab.com)", "start": 95, ...	[]

The use of C++ classes that inherit from a base class to carry out some of the tasking commands, along with the use of concurrency features, indicates that the developers of the RAT put some thought into the architecture and design of their tool, although the decision to implement some commands outside of the class-bas...

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The pngdowner malware is a simple tool constructed using Microsoft Visual Studio and implemented via single C++ source code file.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

This sample contains a PDB path of Y: \Visual Studio 2005\Projects\branch-downer\ downer\Release\downer.pdb, but other similar paths Z: \Visual Studio 2005\Projects\pngdowner\Release\ pngdowner.pdb and Z: \Visual Studio 2005\Projects\downer\Release\downer.pdb have also been observed in other samples.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Appendix 3 lists metadata for known pngdowner samples.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Initially, the malware will perform a connectivity check to a hard-coded URL (http: //www.microsoft.com), using a constant user agent Mozilla/4.0 (Compatible; MSIE 6.0;).

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the malware", "start": 11, "end": 22 }, { "text": "a connectivity check", "start": 36, "end": 56 }, { "text": "a hard-coded URL (http: //www.microsoft.com)", "start": 60, "e...

[]

If this request fails, the malware will attempt to extract proxy details and credentials from Windows Protected Storage, and from the IE Credentials Store using publicly known methods15, using the proxy credentials for subsequent requests if they enable outbound HTTP access.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the malware", "start": 23, "end": 34 }, { "text": "proxy details and credentials", "start": 59, "end": 88 }, { "text": "Windows Protected Storage", "start": 94, "end": 119 ...

[]

An initial request is then made to the hard-coded C2 server and initial URI–forming a URL of the form (in this sample) http: //login.stream-media.net/files/xx11/index.asp? 95027775, where the numerical parameter represents a random integer.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "An initial request", "start": 0, "end": 18 }, { "text": "the hard-coded C2 server and initial URI", "start": 35, "end": 75 } ], "action": [ { "text": "is then made", "start"...

[]

A hard-coded user agent of myAgent is used for thisrequest, and subsequent communication with the C2 server.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Content returned from this request to the C2 server will be saved to a file named index.dat in the user's temporary directory (i.e.,% TEMP%).

{ "entities": {} }

[]

This file is expected to contain a single line, specifying a URL and a filename.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The malware will then attempt to download content from the specified URL to the filename within the user's temporary directory, and then execute this file via the WinExec API.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11 }, { "text": "content", "start": 42, "end": 49 }, { "text": "the specified URL", "start": 55, "end": 72 }, { "text": ...

[]

If this execution attempt succeeds, a final C2 request will be made–in this case to a URL using the same path as the initial request (and a similarly random parameter), but with a filename of success.asp.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a final C2 request", "start": 36, "end": 54 }, { "text": "a URL using the same path as the initial request (and a similarly random parameter)", "start": 84, "end": 167 } ], "action": [ { ...

[]

Content returned from this request will be saved to a file, but then immediately deleted.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Finally, the malware will delete the content saved from the first request, and exit.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the malware", "start": 9, "end": 20 }, { "text": "the content saved from the first request", "start": 33, "end": 73 } ], "action": [ { "text": "delete", "start": 26, ...

[]

The limited functionality, and lack of persistence of this tool, implies that it is used only as a simple download- and-execute utility.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "it", "start": 78, "end": 80 }, { "text": "a simple download- and-execute utility", "start": 97, "end": 135 } ], "action": [ { "text": "is used", "start": 81, "end": ...

[]

Although the version mentioned here uses C++, along with Visual Studios Standard Template Library (STL), older versions of the RAT (such as MD5 hash b54e91c234ec0e739ce429f47a317313), built in 2011, use plain C. This suggests that despite the simple nature of the tool, the developers have made some attempts to modify a...

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Both versions contain debugging/progress messages such as'' down file success''.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Although these are not displayed to the victim, they were likely used by the developers as a simple means to verify functionality of their code.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Like pngdowner, the httpclient malware is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality and uses HTTP for its C2 channel.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the httpclient malware", "start": 16, "end": 38 }, { "text": "HTTP", "start": 112, "end": 116 }, { "text": "its C2 channel", "start": 121, "end": 135 } ], "act...

[]

This malware also initially performs a connectivity check to www.microsoft.com using the hard-coded user agent Mozilla/4.0 (Compatible; MSIE 6.0;), although in this variant no attempt is made to extract proxy credentials.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "This malware", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "a connectivity check", "start": 37, "end": 57 }, { "text": "www.microsoft.com", "start": 61, "end": 78 }, { ...

[]

The malware will then connect to its configured C2 infrastructure (file.anyoffice.info) and perform a HTTP request of the form shown in Figure 14 below: Content returned from the C2 server is deobfuscated by XOR'ing the content with a single byte, 0x12.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The malware", "start": 0, "end": 11 }, { "text": "its configured C2 infrastructure (file.anyoffice.info)", "start": 33, "end": 87 }, { "text": "a HTTP request of the form shown in Figure 14...

[]

The decoded data is then checked for the string runshell.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

If this string is not present, the C2 request is repeated every 0.5 seconds.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the C2 request", "start": 31, "end": 45 }, { "text": "0.5 seconds", "start": 64, "end": 75 } ], "action": [ { "text": "is repeated", "start": 46, "end": 57 } ...

[]

Otherwise, a shell process is started (i.e., cmd.exe), with input/output redirected over the C2 channel.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a shell process", "start": 11, "end": 26 }, { "text": "input/output redirected over the C2 channel", "start": 60, "end": 103 } ], "action": [ { "text": "is started", "start"...

[]

Shell commands from the server are followed by an encoded string $$$, which indicates that the shell session should continue.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

If the session is ended, two other commands are supported: m2b (upload file) and b2m (download file).

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "two other commands", "start": 25, "end": 43 }, { "text": "file", "start": 71, "end": 75 }, { "text": "file", "start": 95, "end": 99 } ], "action": [ { ...

[]

Slight variations on the C2 URLs are used for different phases of the C2 interaction: Given the lack of a persistence mechanism and low level of sophistication, it is likely that httpclient–like pngdowner–is used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Appendix 4 lists metadata for observed httpclient samples.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Other CrowdStrike reporting describes a dropper used by PUTTER PANDA (abc.scr) to install the 4H RAT.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "a dropper", "start": 38, "end": 47 }, { "text": "PUTTER PANDA", "start": 56, "end": 68 }, { "text": "the 4H RAT", "start": 90, "end": 100 } ], "action": [ ...

[]

This dropper uses RC4 to decrypt an embedded payload from data in an embedded resource before writing the payload to disk and executing it.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "This dropper", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "the payload", "start": 102, "end": 113 }, { "text": "disk", "start": 117, "end": 121 }, { "text": "it"...

[]

Several instances of this dropper have been observed, most commonly in association with the 4H RAT, but also in relation to other tools that will be described in forthcoming reporting.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Another dropper has been observed, exclusively installing the pngdowner malware (example MD5 hash 4c50457c35e2033b3a03fcbb4adac7b7).

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Another dropper", "start": 0, "end": 15 }, { "text": "the pngdowner malware (example MD5 hash 4c50457c35e2033b3a03fcbb4adac7b7)", "start": 58, "end": 131 } ], "action": [ { "text": ...

[]

This dropper is simplistic in nature, and is compiled from a single C++ source code file.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

It contains a Word document in plaintext (written to BienvenueaSahajaYogaToulouse.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

doc), along with an executable (Update.exe) and DLL (McUpdate.dll).

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The executable and DLL are both contained within the .data

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The executable and DLL", "start": 0, "end": 22 } ] } }

[]

section of the dropper, obfuscated with a 16-byte XOR key (consisting of the bytes 0xA0–0xAF).

{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "obfuscated", "start": 24, "end": 34 } ], "modifier": [ { "text": "with", "start": 35, "end": 39 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "a 16-byte XOR key (consisting of the bytes 0xA0–0...

[]

Both the document and executable are written to disk and the executed via the ShellExecute API (using the verb'' open'').

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Both the document and executable", "start": 0, "end": 32 }, { "text": "disk", "start": 48, "end": 52 }, { "text": "the ShellExecute API (using the verb'' open'')", "start": 74, ...

[]

The executable is also installed into the ASEP registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ CurrentVersion\Run, with a value named McUpdate.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The executable", "start": 0, "end": 14 }, { "text": "the ASEP registry key HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ CurrentVersion\\Run", "start": 38, "end": 111 }, { "text": "a value named McU...

[]

Finally, the dropper deletes itself via a batch file.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the dropper", "start": 9, "end": 20 }, { "text": "itself", "start": 29, "end": 35 }, { "text": "a batch file", "start": 40, "end": 52 } ], "action": [ { ...

[]

The dropped executable (MD5 hash 38a2a6782e1af29ca8cb691cf0d29a0d) primarily aims to inject the specified DLL (McUpdate.dll, MD5 hash 08c7b5501df060ccfc3aa5c8c41b452f) into a process that would normally be accessing the network, likely in order to disguise the malicious activity.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The dropped executable (MD5 hash 38a2a6782e1af29ca8cb691cf0d29a0d)", "start": 0, "end": 66 }, { "text": "the specified DLL (McUpdate.dll, MD5 hash 08c7b5501df060ccfc3aa5c8c41b452f)", "start": 92, "end": 167 ...

[]

Module names corresponding to Outlook Express (msinm.exe), Outlook (outlook.exe), Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe), and Firefox (firefox.exe) are used.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

If Internet Explorer is used, then the malware will attempt to terminate processes corresponding to two components of Sophos Anti-Virus (SAVAdminService.exe and SavService.exe).

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the malware", "start": 35, "end": 46 }, { "text": "processes corresponding to two components of Sophos Anti-Virus (SAVAdminService.exe and SavService.exe)", "start": 73, "end": 176 } ], "action":...

[]

Four examples of these droppers were located, using a mixture of decoy PDF and Microsoft Word documents (shown below in Figures 15-18).

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "these droppers", "start": 17, "end": 31 }, { "text": "a mixture of decoy PDF and Microsoft Word documents", "start": 52, "end": 103 } ], "action": [ { "text": "using", "star...

[]

The common theme throughout these documents is space technology (BienvenueaSahajaYogaToulouse.doc does not follow this trend, but could be targeted at workers at the Toulouse Space Centre, the'' largest space centre in Europe''), indicating that the attackers have a keen interest in this sector, which is also reflected...

{ "entities": {} }

[]

A number of specific and generic detection methods are possible for this RAT, both on a host and on the network.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

These are detailed below, and are designed to expand upon the indicators reported in other CrowdStrike reporting.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The following Windows registry artifacts are indicative of a compromised host: redacted) The presence of the following file system artifacts is indicative of a compromised host: A file mapping named & *SDKJfhksdf89*DIUKJDSF & *sdfsdf78sdfsdf also indicates the victim machine is compromised with PUTTER PANDA malware.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

In addition the domains listed in the Appendices and in the Attribution section, the generic signatures below can be used to detect activity from the malware described in this report.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

In addition to the indicators described above, PUTTER PANDA have some distinct generic TTPs: PUTTER PANDA are a determined adversary group who have been operating for several years, conducting intelligence-gathering operations with a significant focus on the space sector.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Although some of their tools are simplistic, taken as a whole their toolset provides a wide degree of control over a victim system and can provide the opportunity to deploy additional tools at will.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "their toolset", "start": 62, "end": 75 }, { "text": "a wide degree of control over a victim system", "start": 85, "end": 130 }, { "text": "additional tools", "start": 173, "...

[]

Research presented in this report shows that the PUTTER PANDA operators are likely members of the 12th Bureau, 3rd General Staff Department (GSD) of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), operating from the unit's headquarters in Shanghai with MUCD 61486.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Strategic objectives for this unit are likely to include obtaining intellectual property and industrial secrets relating to defense technology, particularly those to help enable the unit's suspect mission to conduct space surveillance, remote sensing, and interception of satellite communications.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

PUTTER PANDA is likely to continue to aggressively target Western entities that hold valuable information or intellectual property relevant to these interests.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The detection and mitigation guidance given in this report will help to minimize the risk of a successful compromise by these actors, and future CrowdStrike reports will examine other elements of the PUTTER PANDA toolset.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence portal provides enterprises with strategic, customized, and actionable intelligence.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Falcon Intelligence enables organizations to prioritize resources by determining targeted versus commodity attacks, saving time and focusing resources on critical threats.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

With unprecedented insight into adversary tools, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) and multi-source information channels, analysts can identify pending attacks and automatically feed threat intelligence via API to SIEM and thirdparty security tools.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Access to CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence is geared toward all levels of an organization, from the executivewho needs to understand the business threat and strategic business impact, to the front-line securiyt professional struggling to! ght through an adversary's attack against the enterprise.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence is a web-based intelligence subscription that includes full access to a variety of feature sets, including: CrowdStrike Falcon Host is an endpoint threat detection and response product that identifies unknown malware, detects zero-day threats, and prevents damage from targeted attacks in...

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Falcon Host is comprised of two core components, the cloud-based management console and the on-premises host-based sensor that continuously monitors threat activity at the endpoint to prevent damage in real-time.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Falcon Host leverages a lightweight kernel-mode sensor that shadows, captures, and correlates low- level operating system events to instantly identify the adversary tradecraft and activities through Stateful Execution Inspection (SEI) at the endpoint and Machine Learning in the cloud.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

As opposed to focusing on malware signatures, indicators of compromise, exploits, and vulnerabilities, Falcon Host instead identifies mission objectives of the adversary leveraging the Kill Chain model and provides realtime detection by focusing on what the attacker is doing, as opposed to looking nfor a specific, easi...

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Without performing intrusive and performance- impacting scans of the system, Falcon Host's highly efficient real-time monitoring of all system activity is the only security solution that provides maximum visibility into all adversary activities, including Adversary-in-Motion: reconnaissance, exploitation, privilege esc...

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Falcon Host delivers insight into past and current attacks not only on a single host, but also across devices and networks.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Stateful Execution inspection Stateful Execution Inspection (SEI) tracks execution state and links together various stages of the kill chain, from initial code execution to data exfiltration.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

CrowdStrike's Real-time Stateful Execution Engine performs inspection and analysis to understand the full context of a cyber attack.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

SEI is critical to understanding the entire attack life cycle and preventing the damage from advanced malware and targeted attacks.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Existing security technologies that focus solely on malware signatures, incidators of compromise, exploits, and vulnerabilities fail to protect against the majority of attacks as they are blind to the full scope of adversary activity.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

CrowdStrike is a global provider of security technology and services focused on identifying advanced threats and targeted attacks.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Using big-data technologies, CrowdStrike's next-generation threat protection platform leverages real-time Stateful Execution Inspection (SEI) at the endpoint and Machine Learning in the cloud instead of solely focusing on malware signatures, indicators of compromise, exploits, and vulnerabilities.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The CrowdStrike Falcon Platform is a combination of big data technologies and endpoint security driven by advanced threat intelligence.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

CrowdStrike Falcon enables enterprises to identify unknown malware, detect zero-day threats, pinpoint advanced adversaries and attribution, and prevent damage from targeted attacks in real time.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

CrowdStrike Services is a wholly owned subsidiary of CrowdStrike responsible for proactively defending against and responding to cyber incidents with pre and post Incident Response services.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

CrowdStrike's seasoned team of Cyber Intelligence professionals, Incident Responders, and Malware Researchers consists of a number of internationally recognized authors, speakers, and experts who have worked on some of the most publicized and challenging intrusions and malware attacks in recent years.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The CrowdStrike Services team leverages our Security Operations Center to monitor the full CrowdStrike Falcon Platform and provide cutting-edge advanced adversary intrusion detection services.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The full spectrum of proactive and response services helps customers respond tactically as well as continually mature and strategically evolve Incident Response program capabilities.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Context Information Security distribute Context Threat Intelligence (CTI) reporting under the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), a method of classifying a document in order to promote the distribution of sensitive information between individuals, organisations or communities in a controlled and trusted way, based on the ori...

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The various levels of the TLP are represented by the following colours: Sources may use TLP: RED when information can not be effectively acted upon by additional parties, and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Recipients may not share TLP: RED information with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

TLP: RED information will be passed verbally or in person.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Sources may use TLP: AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon, but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organisations involved.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Recipients may only share TLP: AMBER information with members of their own organisation who need to know, and only as widely as necessary to act on that information.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Sources may use TLP: GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organisations as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Recipients may share TLP: GREEN information with peers and partner organisations within their sector or community, but not via publicly accessible channels such as publication or posting publicly on the Internet.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Sources may use TLP: WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP: WHITE information may be distributed freely, without restriction.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

On 2nd January 2014 a Systems Administrator at the Monju fast breeder reactor facility in Japan noticed suspicious connections emanating from a machine in the control room, coinciding with what was a seemingly routine software update to a free media player.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Among other items, staff training documents and more than 40,000 emails were stored on the machine and thought to be harvested by the attacker.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Among other items, staff training documents and more than 40,000 emails", "start": 0, "end": 71 }, { "text": "the attacker", "start": 130, "end": 142 } ], "action": [ { "text": "har...

[]

The Japanese Atomic Energy Agency is investigating further.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The attack appears to have been the result of the attackers having compromised the'GOM Player' update server and having it act as a'watering hole', meaning that machines which access the site are delivered malware.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the attackers", "start": 46, "end": 59 }, { "text": "the'GOM Player' update server", "start": 79, "end": 108 }, { "text": "it", "start": 120, "end": 122 }, { ...

[]

Gom Player originates in South Korea and in some parts of Asia it is a popular alternative to Windows Media Player.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

It is unclear whether every machine trying to download an update received this malware or whether only machines which fitted a certain profile were infected.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Technical analysis of the implant on the compromised machine has shown it to be a variant of a Trojan which has been in the wild for some years now and continues to be effective.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "it", "start": 71, "end": 73 }, { "text": "a variant of a Trojan", "start": 80, "end": 101 } ], "action": [ { "text": "be", "start": 77, "end": 79 } ] } }

[]

The'Gh0st RAT' has been used extensively in attacks linked to the Chinese state, though it is important to remember that the code is publicly available and can be modified and used by anyone.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The targeting of a Japanese nuclear facility however, is consistent with Chinese state intelligence requirements.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

If this is the work of a Chinese group then we feel the targeting may go much further than the Civil Nuclear sector and thus be of interest to the wider Energy Sector and industry as a whole.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

In order to inform the Energy Sector and beyond about this attack, we have compiled a technical summary of the attack and have provided a number of Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs) which can be used to aid detection.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

It is likely that the attackers would redeploy their implant against other targets, albeit with a delivery mechanism more tailored to the location of the intended victims.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Based on open source reporting, it appears that the intrusion took place via the compromise of the GOM Player update server (app.gomlab.com), where attackers may have gained entry via a PHP-based webshell, hidden within an image, present on the host since October 2011.

{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "compromise", "start": 81, "end": 91 }, { "text": "gained", "start": 167, "end": 173 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "the GOM Player update server (app.gomlab.com)", "start": 95, ...

[]